Professional Documents
Culture Documents
special) exclude from the agent the power to execute all other
acts of administration? fhe answer seems to be in the affirmative
under the principle that if the principal decides to detail the powers
he grants to the agent, then he means to exclude all other powers
of administration other than those that are incidental to those
specifically granted.
-oOo-
Guepren 3
132
1.
that the "contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.',
with his obligations, the remedy of the principal is to sue him for
damages, since an action for specific performance is not available
for personal obligations to do. The liability of an agent for damages
when he fails to carry out his obligations is consistent with the terms
of Article 11 70 of the New civil code which provides that "Those who
in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence,
or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages." This same principle is expressed in Article
responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence, which shall be
adjudged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether
the agency was or was not for a compensation.,'
failed to collect the sums owed to the principal and thereby allowed
the allotted funds to be exhausted by other creditors, such agent
was adjudged to have failed to act with the care of a good father
of a family required under Article 1BB7 of the New Civil Code and
became personally liable for the damages which the principal
suffered through his non-performance.
ln BA Finance v. Court of Appeals,a the finance company was
constituted under the deed of chattel mortgage as an attorney-infact for the mortgagors with full power and authority to file, follow-up,
prosecute, compromise or settle insurance claims; to sign, execute,
and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts and documents to
the insurance company as may be necessary to prove the claim,
and to collect from the latter the proceeds of insurance to the extent
of its interests, in the event that the mortgaged car suffers any loss
or damage, the grant of power constituted the finance company as
the agent of the mortgagors.
When the mortgaged motor vehicle figured in an accident that
would have allowed recovery for total loss on the insurance claim,
and the mortgagors had instructed the finance company to make
such claim, but instead it opted to have the motor vehicle repaired,
the Court decreed that the failure and refusal of the finance
company to seek total loss claims against the insurance company,
constituted negligence and not outright refusal to comply with the
110 Phit.157 (1908).
2Article 1718 of the old Civil Code.
314 scRA 776 (1965).
4201 scRA 157 (1991)
134
OBL|GATtoNS,
135
OauoffioN
Gexrnll Rulr
r36
IONS,
137
1.
'
!
{a)
(b)
Durv or OseoreNce
representation.
r.t{r
..
ii
ii
agency from other legal concepts is @onfrol;_pne person the agent - agrees to act under the bontioi or direction of
5333
One of the clearest examples that the agent has given the
consent of the principal to a contract or a transaction, is when he
acts in accordance with the instructions of the principal. There is
no doubt that when an agent complies with the instructions of his
principal, he is acting within the scope of his authority.
Nonetheless, the underlying obligation of the agent to follow
the instructions of the principal, is still a personal obligation "to do,"
and the expression of the principal's will depends much on how the
agent obeys his instructions. ln the event that the agent refuses to
follow the instructions of the principal, then the obligatory nature of
the agency relationship is preserved by three legal consequences
mandated by law:
l !. {, ur.,. t , ; ; .(,li,,i ill''ilitr'r i,:( '.tFrrst, the agent becomes personally liable for damages arising
from a breach of his duty of obedience to the principal.
Second, since the agent had not given the principal's consent
to the contract or transaction entered into with a third party, the
principal is not personally bound by the terms of such contract or
transactions.
138
Thus, Article 1B9B of the New Civil Code provides "lf the agent
contracts in the name of the principal, exceeding the scope of his
authority, and the principal does not ratify the contract, it shall be void
if the party with whom the agent contracted is aware of the limits of
the powers granted by the principal. ln this case, however, the agent
is liable if he undertook to secure the principal's ratification."
ln Tan Tiong Teck v. SEC,? it was held that the agent is not
deemed to have exceeded his authority should he perform the
agency in a manner more advantageous to the principal than that
indicated by the principal. Thus, when the agent sold the car of the
principal for more than the amount indicated by the principal, then
he had not exceeded his authority because a higher price was more
advantageous to the principal.
Dury or Dulceruce
Often, an agency relation is entered into mainly for business
or commercial ventures, and it is not expected that the principal can
cover all contingencies with specific instructions, or that every act
of the agenl must be based on detailed instructions of the principal.
The agent is expected to use his business discretion as the principal
would or could, if personally present. Therefore, we should consider
the principal's instructions as the limit of an agent's power; and that
in the absence of limiting instructions, it is expected that the agent
uses his best judgment to stay within the scope of the principal's
authority granted to him. This is part of the "duty of diligence" of
every agent who accepts an agency designation. Thus, Article 1887
of the New Civil Code provides that in default of the principal's
instructions, the agent "shall do all that a good father of a family
would do, as required by the nature of the business."
This is not to say that when the principal has given detailed
instructions to the agent, that the agent is no longer bound to
exercise due cliligence, for indeed every agent is a party to a contract
of agency, not a mere robot, who is expected to exercise prudence
in following the instructions of the principal.
This principle is also expressed underArticle 1BB1 of the New
Civil Code, which provides that the agent "may do such acts as may
be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose of the agency."
Likewise, Article 1BB2 provides that "The limits of the agent's authority
shall not be considered exceeded should it have been performed in
a manner more advantageous to the principal than that specified
by him." ln other words, an agent not only naqf.ipieEi powiirs-;l Out
, also implied powers emanating from the eipress fowers granied to
the
scRA646 (2011).
140
141
the truism that in the pursuit of the agency, it is expected that the
agent would have to act based on his own assessment of what is
necessary under the situation when it is not covered by an express
instruction from the principal. The agent is supposed lo exercise the
business judgment expected from the principal when entering into
juridical relations with third parties or pursuing the business under
his management.
1.
2.
Article 1909 of the New Civil Code provides that "The agent is
responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence, which shall
be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether
the agency was or was not for a compensation."
Domingo v. Domingo,l0 in noting that "Article 1909 of the New
Civil Code is essentially a reinstatement of Article 1726 of the old
Spanish Civil Code"11 held that the provisions of Article '1909
honesty,
candor and fairness on the part of the agent, the real estate
broker in this case, to his principal, the vendor. The law
142
r43
contract.'
ln Cadwallader v. Smith
ln Tan Tiong Teck y. SEC,15 the client ordered the broker to sell
the shares giving a floor or minimum price, and the broker did sell
at the minimum price indicated even though the prevailing ranging
prices were much higher. The broker was liable for the difference
suffered by the principal because the broker failed to exercise the
prudence and tact of a good father of a family which the law required
of him.
137
Phit.365 (1951
17'194
18285
1e/brcr,
).
1A4
l45r
say that PAL is relieved from any liability due to any of its negligent
acts."2o The Court then affirmed that the procedural remedy that BA
Durv or Loynlry
1.
a.
Article 1891 of the New Civil Code provides that the agent "is
bound to render an account of his transactions and to deliver to the
2albitl,
atp.464.
2344Ph1t.343 (1923).
2445Pht. BB3 (1924).
25U.5. v. Reyes, 36 Phn.792 (1917), Domingo v. Domingo,42 SCRA 131 (1971).
26U.5. v.
I4G
b.
the American colonization era, held that the director and general
manager of the stock corporation, who arso was the majority
stockholder, and was designated to be the main negotiator for the
company with the Government for the sale of its largL tract of land,
having special knowledge of commercial information that would
increase the value of the shares in relation to the sale of the parcels
of land to the Government, courd.regaily be treated as being an
agent of the stockholders of the company, with a fiduciary obligation
to reveal to the other stockholders such special information before
proceeding to purchase from the other stockholders their
shares of
stock. consequenfly, since such director purchased the shares of a
stockholder without having disclosed important facts or to render
the
appropriate report on the expected increase in value of the company,
tlrere was fraud committed for which the director was held liable for
the earnings earned against the stockholder on the sale of shares"
ln Miguel v. Court of Appeals,2s the Court held that
principal,
"owes
interest on the
under Article 1896 of the New Civil Code he
sums he has applied to his own use from the day on which he did
so, and on those which he still owes after the extinguishment of the
agency." The provisions of this article presumes that the property or
business acquired by the agent for his own in violation of his fiduciary
duty is one that the principal is not demanding to be delivered to
him. This is clear from Article 1918 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "The principal is not liable for the expenses incurred by
the agent . . . [i]f the agent acted in contravention of the principal's
instructions, unless the latter should wish to avail himself of the
benefits derived from the contract." ln other words, if the contract
or business acquired by the agent in breach of his duty of loyalty is
demanded by the principal to be turned over to him, then the use
of the principal's sum to acquire such business would be deemed
to have been ratified, and the agent is not personally liable for the
interests due on said amount.
2829
2741
pht.947 (1909)
2slbid,
85 N.J"
148
c.
(1)
xxx
(2) Agents, the property whose administration
or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the
consent of the principal has been given;
xxx
149
(2)
(1459a)
TJOWER &
938 (1924).
786 (19s2).
(i)
ln the case where the agent was the lender to the principal and
charged interest higher than the current rate, the difference would
have to be returned to the principal. lf the agent borrows for himself
without the principal's the money which the principal has authorized
him to lend out, he would not only be liable for the current interest
that the principal would have earned had it been lent out to a third
32lbid, at p. Bo4.
33515
scRA460 (2007).
party, he would also be liable for damages that the principal may
150
have
suffered.
ln Hodges rz Sa/as and Sa/as,3i the Court held that when the
power granted to the agent was only to borrow money and mortgage
principal's property to secure the loan, it cannot be interpreted to
include the authority to mortgage the properties to support the
agent's personal loans and use the proceeds thereof for his own
benefit. The lender who lends money to the agent knowing that is
was for personal purpose and not for the principal,s account, is a
mortgagee in bad faith and cannot foreclose on the mortgage thus
constituted for the account of the agent. In addition, the court ruled
that "ln cases like the present one, it should be understood that the
agent was obligated to turn over the money to the principals, or, at
least place it at their disposll."es
d.
at
of a
without revealing the same to his principal, the vendor, is
guilty of a breach of his loyalty to the principal and forfeits
his right to collect the commission from his principal, even
if the principal does not suffer any injury by reason of such
breach of fidelity, or that he obtained better results or that
the agency is a gratuitous one, or that usage or customs
allows it; because the rule is to prevent the possibility of any
wrong, not to remedy or repair an actual damage. By taking
such profit or bonus or gift or propina from the vendee, the
agent thereby assumes a position wholly inconsistent with
that of being an agent for his principal, who has a right to
treat him, insofar as his commission is concerned, as if no
agency had existed. The fact that the principal may have
been benefited by the valuable services of the said agent
369
(i936).
578.
151
152
does not excurpate the agent who has onry himserf to brame
for such a result by reason of his treachery or perfidy.3s
The court then went on to cite cases under the ord spanish
civil code where a rigorous application of Article 1720 was made:
.
.
commission whire ignorant of the fact that the ratter has been
3slbid,
at pp. '137-138
407 Phit.
736 (1907).
419 Phit.
1Bs (i907).
4236
Phit. 792 (i917)
4349 phit.
962 (1927).
4454 phit.
513 (1930).
xxx
. . .lf the agent does not conduct himself with entire
fidelity towards his principal, but is guilty of taking a secret
profit or commission in regard the matter in which he is
employed, he loses his right to compensation on the ground
that he has taken a position wholly inconsistent with that of
agent for his employer, and which gives his employer, upon
discovering it, the right to treat him so far as compensation,
at least, is concerned as if no agency had existed. This
may operate to give to the principal the benefit of valuable
services rendered by the agent, but the agent has only
himself to blame for that result.
xx
The intent with which the agent took a secret profit has
been held immaterial where the agent has in fact entered
into a relationship inconsistent with his agency, since the
law condemns the corrupting tendency of the inconsistent
relationship. .
.
153
154
lrirn and the principal, and he may not set up his right of possession
as against that of the principal until the agency is terminated.
Therefore, when the agent enters into a contract that should pertain
to ilre princlpal, but in his own name, it would be a violation of his
duty of loyalty to the principal, and as between the principal and the
agent, the latter must account to the principal for all profits earned
from the transaction.
140.
4792pht.66 (1952).
4899
t55
(i)
1-
r5(;
NON.COI]POIIAI E MEDIA
O[
DOING UIJSINF]SS
l,()wl ll
&
AtilHolll
ANIJ
2.
THT-
15/
Under Articre 18g6 of the New civir code, the agent wourd
owe
interest to the principal on the following items:
(a)
(21
substitute:
4e9
Article 1892 0f the New civil code sets the default rule that the
;rgent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him
trom doing so. This has reversed the rule under the old civil code
that without express power to do so, an agent is without authority to
appoint a substitute.
NON-COTIPOHAIE MI-DIA
{r8
OI
TJOIN(i TJUSINL.SIJ
[the
daughterl merely acted within the limits of the authority given by her
father, but she will have to be 'responsible for the actJof the subagent,'among which is precisely the sale of the subject properties in
favor of respondents."sz
Lyric
liable for the loss of the thing from fire, which was shown to be truly
a force majeure.
1.
t,()wt n
b.
(a)
(b)
5t
r59
160
l'( )\/Vl ll & AtJ Il lotll lY DU I lESj & OBL ltlAl l(-,[ll;,
ANll I l-lli I-tl(;U IS Cr[ l-HF AGi:hl l
c.
scRA 3s (2002)
l6r
nrcipal.
Thus, under Article 1911 of the New Civil Code, "Even u,rhr;nr
llxr agent has exceeded his authorityr, the pnincipalrer-nains solidariiu
h;rhlc witl-r the agent if the [principall allowed the [agentl tn act an
llrouqh he had full powers."
Under Article 1900 of the New Civil Code, insofar as third
lx)rsons are concerned, "an act is deemed to have been pertorrned
wilhirr the scope of the agent's authority, if such act is within the
terms of the power of attorney, as written, even if the agent has in facl
exr:eeded the limits of his authority according to an understanding
between the principal and agent." ln other words, as to third parties
;rr;ting in good faith, the written instructions of the principal are the
trinding powers of the agent, and cannot be overcome by non-rruritten
irrstructions of the principal not made known to them.
"l"hus,
NON'COfll'OllAl
162
t:r
Mt Dln
Ol
DOINC LIUSlNl-SS
limited to thr:se which are specifiecJ and defined in his written power
of attorney, which limitation is a notice to, and is binding upon, the
person dealing with such agent.
ln Eugenio v. Court of
Appeals,62
scRA2oT (1994).
63Slrong v. Gutierrez Repide,6 Phil. 680 (1960); Deen v. Pacific Commercial Co.,42
Phil. 738 (1922):, Veloso v. La urbana,58 Phil. 681 (1933); Toyota Shaw, lnc. v. Courl of
Pr)wFli
t63
:;uch person must not act negligently but must use reasonable
rliligence and prudence to ascertain whether the agent acts within
ll're scope of his authorit!. The settled rule is that, persons dealing
with an assumed agent are bound at their peril, and if they would
lrold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency
lrut also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is
r;ontroverted, the burden of proof is upon them to prove it.68
ln Yu Eng Cho v. Pan American World Airways, lnc.,6s the Court
lreld that the fact that one is dealing with an agent, whether the
irgency be general or special, should be a danger signal. The mere
rt,'presentation or declaration of one that he is authorized to act on
lx-.half of another cannot of itself serve as proof of his authority to act
; rs agent or of the extent of his authority as agent.
Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the purported agent acts
without authority or in excess of authority, under Article 1901 of the
New Civil Code, a third person cannot set-up the fact that the agent
lras exceeded his powers, if the principal has ratified, or has signified
Iris willingness to ratify the agent's acts.
';lt::ttrrship Agencies, lnc. v- Sprint Transport Servlces, |nc.,592 SCRA 622 (2009)
(t5245
SCRA460 (1995).
66
Reiterated in Escueta v. Lim, 512 SCRA 41 1, 420 (2007).
';/427 S?RA TB (2004).
{inReiterated in Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp.,49O SCRA 204 (2006).
""328 scRA 717 (2ooo).
164
person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the
validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions
found therein.
1.
a.
The basis of the rule set out in Article 1897 finds its roots in the
principle of relativity in Contract Law which provides that a contract
is binding only as between the parties and their successors-in
interest. Consequently, a person acting as a mere representative
of another acquires no rights whatsoever, nor does he incur any
liabilities arising from the said contract between his principal and
another party."
ln Ang v. Fulton Fire lnsurance Co.,73 the Court held that when
the agent has acted within the scope of his authority, the action on
the contract must be brought against the principal and not against
the agent, since in such an instance the agent is not a party to the
contract sued upon, and the party suing has no cause of action
against the agent.
ln Nepomuceno v. Heredia,Ta where, pursuant to the instructions
using the sums given to him by the principals, and that after the
fact of purchase the principals had ratified the transaction and even
received profits arising from the investment in the land, but that
eventually a defect in the title to the land arose, the Court ruled that
the principals could not recover their losses from the agent: "There is
nothing in the record which would indicate that the defendant failed
to exercise reasonable care and diligence in the performance of his
duty as such agent, or that he undertook to guarantee the vendor's
title to the land purchased by direction of the plaintiffs."T5
ln the same manner, in Esperanza and Bullo v. Catindig,T6 an
action brought in the name of the agent and not in the name of the
principal who is the real party in interest, was dismissed not upon the
merits, but upon the ground that it has not been properly instituted.
T2Angeles v. Philippine National Raitways (PNR), 500 SCRA 444 (2006); Chua
747
71521
scRA 63 (2007).
scRAsB4(2007).
v.
Total Office Products and Services (Topros), lnc., 471 SCRA 500 (2005); Tan v. Engineering Services,49B SCRA 93 (2006); Chong v. Couri of Appeals, 527 SCRA 144 (2007).
?32
70526
165
scRA945 (1961).
Phit.563 (1907).
75/bd, at p. 566.
7622 Pht.397 (1914).
166
ln Bay View Hotel v. Ker & Co.,7't where admissions were made
in a case filed by an agent prior to the amendment of the petition
which formally included the principal as a party to the case, the
Court denied the argument that since the implied admission was
made before the amendment of its complaint, it cannot work to the
benefit of the principal, thus Moreover, since an agent may do such acts as may
be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose of the
agency, admissions secured by the agent within the scope
of the agency ought to favor the principal. This has to be
the rule, for the act or declarations of an agent of the party
within the scope of the agency and during its existence are
considered and treated in turn as declarations, acts and
representations of his principal and may be given in evidence
against such party.T8
771't6
scRA 69 (1999).
81lbid, al p. 77 citing Marimperio Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, 156
,
scRA 368 (1987).
167
b.
t,owHt
168
v-
Warner Barnes,87 the Court held that since the scope and extent of
the functions of an ad.iustment and settlement agent are merely to
settle and adjust claims in behalf of his principal, the same cannot
be taken to mean that it includes the assumption of personal liability.
Thus, if claims are disapproved by the principal, the agent does not
assume any personal liability, and the recourse of the insured is to
press his claim against the principal.
c.
for
8643
BTBB
88267
scRA53o (1997).
(i 960)"
r69
of
his
Article 1909 of the New Civil Code provides that "The agent is
responsil:le not only for fraud, but also for negligence, which shall
tre judged with rnore or less rigor by the courts, according to whether
lhe agency was or was not for a compensation."
Atlerchandising Corp.,s1
780 (1923).
170
of the agent are by law those of the principal, it means that both
the principal and the agent are deemed joint tortfeasors, and are
deemed liable solidarily insofar as third parties are concerned. The
remedy of the principal is to sue the agent for damages sustained
due to agent's fraudulent or negligent acts.
Thus, in Lopez v. Alvendia,s2 the petitioners had issued a check
in payment of the judgment debt and made arrangements with the
bank for the latter to allow the encashment thereof; but the check
was dishonored by the bank which increased the amount of the
judgment debt. When the petitioners sought not to be made liable
for the increased amount of the judgment debt on the ground that
the alleged "oversight" was on the part of the bank, the Court denied
such defense on the ground that "The principal is responsible for
the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and
should bear the damages caused upon third parties."s3 The Court
also noted that if indeed "the fault (oversight) lies on the agent bank,
the petitioners are free to sue said bank for damages occasioned
thereby."ea
d.
ln lJy v. CourT of Appeals,e8 the Court held that the agents of the
lrarties to a contract do not have the right to bring an action based
2.
171
scRA634 (1964).
s3lbid, at p.
641
s4lbid, at p.641
e5285
et
.
lbid, at p. 354.
1'8314
.
scRA45o (1998)
SCRA69 (1999).
v.
172
a.
The general rule is set underArticle 1317 of the New Civil Code
that "No one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent
him. A contract entered into in the name of another by one who
has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly
or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other party."
The rules underArticle 1317 are supported underArticle 1403,
which includes among those classified an "unenforceable contracts,"
"(1)Those entered into in the name of another person by one who
(c)
173
Thus,
Court of Appeals,1o1 the Court held that the liability of an agent who
exceeds the scope of his authority depends upon whether the third
person was aware of the limits of the agent's power. The agent is not
bound nor liable for damages in case he gave notice of his power to
the person with whom he has contracted, nor in case such person
is aware of the limits of the agent's powers. The resulting contract
would be void even as between the agent and the third person, and
consequently not legally binding as between them. However, if the
agent promised or undertook to secure the principal's ratification
and failed, he is personally liable. lf the ratification is obtained, then
the principal becomes.liable.
ln Eurotech lndustrialTechnologies, /nc. v. Cuizon,lo2 the Court
noted a claim interposed underArticle 1898 would not allow the third
party to recover against both the principal and the agent, thus: "We
likewise take note of the fact that in this case, petitioner is seeking to
recover both from respondents ERWIN, the principal, and EDWIN,
the agent. lt is well to state here that Article 189[B] of the New Civil
Code upon which petitioner anchors its claim against respondent
EDWIN does not hold that in case of excess of authority, both the
agent and the principal are liable to the other contracting party."103
Although Article 1B9B describes the contract entered into by the
agent in the name of the principal without or in excess of authority
as being "void," if the party with whom the agent contract is unaware
of the limits of the powers granted by the principal, the contract is
unenforceable under Article 1403(1 ) of the New Civil Code.
101231
scRA3To (1994)
scRA 584 (2007)
102521
103/b/d, at p. 595.
104304 SCRA 25 (1999).
174
POWFR & n
ln Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, lnc.,1oo the Court held that even when
the agent, in this case the attorney-at-law who represented the client
in forging a compromise agreement, had exceeded his authority in
inserting a penalty clause, the status of the said clause was not
void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified. lndeed,
the client's failure to question the inclusion of the penalty in the
judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so and with
the representation of new counsel, was tantamount to ratification;
hence, the client was estopped from assailing the validity thereof.
ln Pineda v. Court of Appeals,1o7 where it was admitted by the
buyer of a parcel of land that at the time he 'purchased' respondents'
property from [the agent] Pineda, the latter had no Special Power of
Attorney to sell the property, ruled the contract of sale to be void for
lack of consent, rather than unenforceable for having been entered
into the names of the registered owner by one who was not duly
authorized, thus:
Further, Article 1318 of the New Civil Code lists the
a valid and perfected contract, namely: "(1)
consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is
the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation
requisites of
lbid, al p. 31
LJ
I't
totlt tY.
175
l\Gl--N"1"
It may be true that the resurlting sale was void under the terms
of Article 1874 o'f the New Civil Code that declares void the sale
of a piece of land effected through an agent, when the authority of
the agent is not in writing, but it was wrong to reason out as aforequoted, that the sale was void when made in the name of the real
owner whenever the purported agent had in fact no authority, since
it is clear underArticle 1403 of the New Civil Code, that such legal
infirmity does not render the sale void, but merely unenforceable.
b.
106399
scRA60l
107376
loBlbid, at p. zzg.
(2003).
110117
176
ll
'
,.t'
. I r 1/ ,
:'.1 (a)
,..
,r
terms of the
,(Ol
1r
power of attorney as written, even if in fact the agent
had exceeded the limits of his authority according
to an understanding between the principal and the
agent (Arts. 1900 and 1903);
r1531
scRA617 (1970).
3.
v" Poizat,116
178
a.
Also, in Sy-Juco v. Sy-Juco,12a the Court held that the fact that
money used by the agent belonged to the principal is covered by
the exception.
117
12225
12358
120156
121s11
118212
179
lBO
shipping company, NFA could not claim it is not liable to the shipping
b.
Article 1BB3 of the New Civil Code makes it clear that the
foregoing rules are without prejudice to actions between principal
oompany under Article 1BB3 of the New Civil Code "since it had
no knowledge of the fact of agency between respondent Superior
Shipping and Medalla at the time when the contract was entered
into between them (NFA and Medalla)."132 The Court further held Petitioner submits that "(A)n undisclosed principal
cannot maintain an action upon a contract made by his
agent unless such principal was disclosed in such contract.
One who deals with an agent acquires no right against the
and agent.
undisclosed principal."
bar. xxx
failed to disclose his principal and was held personally liable for the
drafts he accepted, even when he did so expressly as an agent.
Section 20 of the Negotiable lnstruments Law provides expressly
that when an agent signs in a representative capacity, but does not
indicate or disclose his principalwould incur personal liability on the
bill of exchange.
tbid, at p. 31 .
12849 Phit.
816 (1926).
12e102 scRA
(19s1
530
13041
the contract.l33
4.
.
).
lt is an
ln Beaumontv. Prieto,l3o the Court held that when the agent acts
in his own name he is not personally liable to the person with whom
he enters into a contract when things belonging to the principal are
the subject thereof; yet such third person has a right of action not
only against the principal but also against the agent, when the rights
and obligations which are the subject matter of the litigation cannot
be legally and juridically determined without hearing both of them.
181
132lbid,
alp. 168.
182
(a)
.,
.(b)
;lossession.l35
(c)
1.
183
5.
2.
a.
b.
c.
LeoN,
136133
atp.544.
184
it.was a mere agent to seil and the urtimate buyers of the products
should be the one made riabre for the purchase price, (whereas
the purported principar insisted that it was a sare arrangement).
The court ruled that whether the contract between the plrties
be
one of sare or agency to seil, there is no doubt that the purported
agent would be personally liable for the price of the meichandise
sold. Being a commission agent under its authority, then pursuant
toArticle 1905, it should not have sold the merchandise on credit.
under Article 1905, the commission agent cannot, without
the
d.
Sale on Credit
Under
e.
f.
g.
scRAs2T (1971).
loNS,
1Bs
from his liability to return the goods received from the consignorprincipal when it is shown by preponderance of evidence in the
civil case brought that the goods were taken from the custody of
the consignee by robbery, and no separate conviction of robbery is
necessary to avail of the exempting provisions underArticle 1174 o',l
the New Civil Code for force maieure.
-oOo-