2) Personal examination

okabe vs judge gutierrez

FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita
Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11,
1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who
was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was
alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied
receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses
and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant
City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for
estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial
court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a
personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17,
2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She
left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the
private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order.
Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only
documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were
respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counteraffidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19,
2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated
July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor
children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of
the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the
respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the
petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and
w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside
the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining
existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent
Maruyama and the latters documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of
the petitioner.
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or
complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties
and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the
case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence
of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required
under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In Okabe v. Gutierrez, we stressed that the judge should consider not only the
report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon
the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting
evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory
that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted.
3) Paricularity of description
bache and co vs ruiz

Facts: Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge

Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code. Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon and
Arturo Logronio went to CFI with proper documents. Judge Vivencio Ruiz asked his secretary to
take the deposition and when done stenographer read it to the judge. Logronio took the oath
ans was warned by judge that he may be charged with perjury if found lying. Search warrant
was issued and served. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal
complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents. BIR based on the
documents seized. Petitioner contend that judged failed to personally examine the
complainant and witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not search warrant is null and void on the ground of no personal
examination of the jusge?
Decision: This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an examination at all
of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court.
But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It
was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to
make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses
that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining them came
up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above.
The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge
did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and
to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training,
was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on
the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
people vs veloso
A search warrant was obtained for a building owned by a congressman. The police received
reliable information that this building was being used for illegal gambling operations under the
guise of an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. The congressman was also the
manager of the club.
On the day of the raid, the congressman was apprehended for resistance to agents of the
authority. The police also found gambling paraphernalia on his person. In court, he was found
guilty of maintaining a gambling house. He argued that the search warrant was invalid since it
was a John Doe warrant where his name did not appear in the search warrant as the person to
be seized.
The Court found the search warrant to be sufficient in form. First, it clarified the rule on John
Doe warrants
[a] warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of
John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name in unknown, is void, without other
and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the
officer in acting under it. [To become valid,] such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best
descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and
this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom
the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give
his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can
be identified
[t]he search warrant itself described the building to be searched as the building No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands. This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation
of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons
presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission
of the crime.

[furthermore, although] the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be
seized. The search warrant did state that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the
building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely in the building numbered 124
Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation
of the Gambling Law. The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper
person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had
gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club,
the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Lastly, it reminded that John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. It
is important that the police particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in
the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of
conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference
People v. Veloso parliamentary club - JOHN DOE WARRANTS Valid IF the best
description possible is given in the arrest warrant it must be sufficient to indicate
clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his occupation, personal appearance or
peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances which he may be identified
pangandaman vs casar
Facts:
The offended party was ambushed in Lanao but he survived. based on his description, there
were around 50 persons who staged the ambush from both sides of the hill. However, he could
not recognize anyone of the 50. but he filed a case against all 50 ambushers all "JOHN DOES".
So the Court issued a warrant of arrest against the 50.
issue: WON the warrant of arrest is valid? can a court issue a warrant of arrest
against an unknown accused?
HELD:
NO. it is not valid. Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not
one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a
general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of the
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or
persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

microsoft corp vs maxicorp

In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares
(Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of
Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For
their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain
Joel Diaz. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought
with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as evidence as well
as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician,
who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from
Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of
copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the
corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the
fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name hence the proceeding in the
trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what
they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright
infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and
Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold
within Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed
there.

The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz name does not
render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a
specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause
is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for
the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing
NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
Facts: Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July 1985, in Dumaguete City, by
Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) elements. His arrest was the result of a "buy-bust" operation in which Pat. Leon
Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the
pre-arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-appellant, who was with a group of
friends in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for
buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced two sticks of
marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously marked P5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the
signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the accusedappellant. He recovered the
marked money and found 17 more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team
members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep,
where they boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station. The 19 sticks of marijuana
were marked and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with
positive results. Kalubiran contended however that one Quindo approached and frisk him on
the same night, and found nothing on him. However, he was called back by one Villamor, who
told him at gun point to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the police
station. He was released the following day with the help of a lawyer. After trial, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Dumaguete City found Kalubiran guilty as charged and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed.
Issue; Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the 19 sticks of marijuana found in his
possession
during his arrest.
Held: Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came
under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually
committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also
lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116. In
addition to the Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and
seizures under the conditions established in the case. However, Kalubiran was accused only of
selling the two sticks of
marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also have been
charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time of his arrest. It
is unfortunate that he cannot

be held to answer for the second offense because he has not been impleaded in a separate
information for violation of Section 8 of the said law.

people vs malmstedt
Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd time in
December 1988 as a
tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989,
Malmstedt left
for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to
Sagada and
stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at
Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in
the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding
Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs.
At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the
bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the bulge
on
Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's passport and other
identification papers.
When Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on
his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as ordered, the
officer noticed 4
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative
of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage
carrier, each
containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus for questioning. It was observed
that there were
also bulges inside the teddy bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then

brought to the
headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At the investigation
room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were
taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were
brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the objects examined as hashish.
Malmstedt
claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2
travelling bags
were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he
met in Sagada.
He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but
because there were
no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to
take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. An information was
filed against
Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt
entered a plea of
"not guilty." After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment
and to pay a
fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an issued warrant.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace
officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace
officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a

penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a)
and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Herein,
Malmstedt was
caught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made
upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which
allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Espano vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers,
namely, Pat.
Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD),
Narcotics
Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in
the area. They
saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they
approached
Espano, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic
cellophane tea
bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in
his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana.
Espano was
brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs.
On 24 July
1991, Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991. On 14
August 1992,
the trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of the crime charged. Espano appealed
the decision to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the decision
of the trial
court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search of Espanos home after his arrest does not violate against his right

against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Held: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was
caught in
flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila.
The police
officer saw Espano handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and
discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two
cellophane bags of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10
cellophane bags of
marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The
articles seized from
Espano during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful
arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of
marijuana became
unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover,
it was beyond
the reach and control of Espano. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes
shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized." An
exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond
the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the
ten cellophane
bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets
do not fall under
the said exceptions.

seizure of evidence in plain view

People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]

Facts: On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Zamboanga City

conducted
surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information
received from
civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. The
Narcom agent
(Sgt. Ani) was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00, which was
turned over to the
Narcom office. The next day, a buy-bust was planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer.
NARCOM teams
proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money.
Musa returned to
his house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. The signal to
apprehend Musa was
given. The NARCOM team rushed to the location of Ani, and a NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga)
frisked
Musa but did not find the marked money. The money was given to Musas wife who was able to
slip away.
Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the
kitchen. Musa was
placed under arrest and was brought to the NARCOM office. One newspaper-wrapper marijuana
and the
plastic bag containing more marijuana was sent to the PC Crime Laboratory, the test of which
gave positive
results for the presence of marijuana. On the other hand, Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM
agents,
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside his house without any search warrant, neither his
permission to enter the
house. The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly found a red plastic bag whose
contents, Mari
Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother,
Faisal, who was
living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari
Musa was
handcuffed and was taken to the NARCOM office where he was joined by his wife. Musa
claimed that he was
subjected to torture when he refused to sign the document containing details of the
investigation. The next

day, he was taken to the fiscals office to which he was allegedly made to answer to a single
question: that if
he owned the marijuana. He allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal that he had been
maltreated by the
NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari Musa
was brought
to the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa was filed on 15 December 1989. Upon his
arraignment on
11 January 1990, Musa pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC
Zamboanga City
(Branch XII) found him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425.
Musa appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be admitted as
evidence as
evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest.
Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a
search upon
the person of the person arrested. An officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested and money or
property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit
of the crime
or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or
which may be
used as evidence in the trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap
a drug-pusher,
the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher
immediately after
the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a
suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When
the discovery of
the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what was placed
before him in full
view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine
and upheld the
admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view" doctrine, however, may not be used to launch
unbridled

searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence
of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. What the
'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a
search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence
before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object
to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The "plain view" doctrine neither
justify the seizure
of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view"
of the object.
Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag containing marijuana does not, however, diminish, in any
way, the
damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the
appellant sold
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue of
the
testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to
Sgt. Ani,
among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been proved
beyond reasonable
doubt.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]

Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on
a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled
goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes
y Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale

and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National
Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at
P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that
they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.
Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was
incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an
information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and
hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a
resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision
on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.
Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter
"will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes
part on
warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section
2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution
and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be
complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers
was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does
not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without
warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves
and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be
considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of
the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify
the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to
have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen
cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine
jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped

information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
Unfortunately,none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the
two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search
leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached
Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For
all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will
search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court
upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly
asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent
of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside
the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain
Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right
of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure
People vs. Salanguit
Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90,Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan
St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified
that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale
took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a
cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by
Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open
and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also
containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt
of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police
operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with
the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those
contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one
weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. Charges against
Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and
marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28
December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision,convicting Salanguit in
Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA
6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of
arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his
conviction on the grounds that
(1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against
him on the
ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana
allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of
unnecessary force by

the police in the execution of the warrant.

Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as
evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.
Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application
for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant
is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police.
The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the
search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is
valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from
Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing
witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With
respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when
the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of
the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition,
was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357
only.
SEARCH OF VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT
Roldan vs. Arca [GR L-25434, 25 July 1975]

Facts: On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila a civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for
the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by the
Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. On 10 April 1964, the company prayed for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April
1964, the CFI set aside its order of 10 April 1964 and granted the company's motion for
reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the company took
possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from the Philippine Fisheries Commission adn the
Philippine Navy by virtue of the said writ. On 10 December 1964, the CFI dismissed Civil Case
56701 for failure of the company to prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and the
Navy to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie
however, remained in the possession of the company. On 20 July 1965, the Fisheries
Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III,
also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions
of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. On August 5 or 6,
1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught
with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels. On 18 August
1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal
charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels. On 30 September 1965, there were
filed in the CFI of Palawan a couple of informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex
III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI both for violations of Act 4003, as
amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of
dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as
instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to
detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine
Navy to take the boats in custody. On 2 October 1965, the company filed a complaint with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila
against the Commission and the Navy. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the

seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off
the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated 13 September 1965 by
the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of
the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. On 18 October
1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by the company of a bond
of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels. On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the
Navy filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on 18 October
1965 on the ground, among others, that on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy received from
the Palawan CFI two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold
the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels should not be released until
further orders from the Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover
the Government's losses in case the two vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed
beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the
crime. On 23 November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The
Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
Issue: Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or
effect the seizure of the vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of
dynamite and without the requisite licenses?
Held: Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20 March 1963 empowers the Fisheries
Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his
duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as
dynamites and the like; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things
that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and effectively implement the
enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing." Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same
Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all
the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine
Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with
dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less
than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year
and six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of
all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in
violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in
case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall
be forfeited to the Government." The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the
possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat
shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and explosives are
being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that the possession or discover
in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under
expert testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat,
or the fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives." Under Section 78 of
the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea
fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the
Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be
punished for each offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more
than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That in case of an association
or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of his
employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the
responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the
absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of such vessel
shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided, further, That in case of a second
offense, the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to
the Government." Under Section 13 of Executive Order 389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to
assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining

to Fishing. Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD 34 of 27 October
1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the
Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or
envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach or violation of the
customs and tariff laws. Herein, when the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries
Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex
VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were found to
be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with
explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not
practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally
effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery
laws: They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing
ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

People vs. Aminnudin [GR L-74860, 6 July 1988]

Facts: Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after disembarking from
the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves
took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were
verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on
the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against Aminnudin, who was
eventually convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Issue: Whether there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest against
Aminnudin, for alleged possession and transport of illegal drugs?
Held: It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he
was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and
regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with
marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two
days before the arrest (this was the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano
Querol, Jr.), another two weeks and a third "weeks before June 25." There was no
warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, Aminnudin was
not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to
justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant. The present case
presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The
Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not necessary. "

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS. ALVANO SAYCON Y BUQUIRAN
G.R. No. 110995
Facts:
The trial court rendered, on June 15, 1993, a judgment of conviction. The court found Alvano
Saycon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having transported four (4) grams of
Metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00

On July 8, 1992, 6:00 A.M. the Coastguard personnel received information from Narcotics
Command agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected shabu courier by the name of Alvaro
Saycon was on board the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete
City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to
intercept the suspect. NarCom agents, Philippine Coastguard personnel and Senior Police
Officers posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1.

The MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City.
Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint
manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer. He was invited
to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area and willingly went with them. The coastguard
asked him to open his bag and willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong
wallet. Inside the maong wallet was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected shabu. The
police officer, Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the
suspected shabu was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the
suspected shabu were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When he was arrested,
the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest.
Alvaro Saycon appeal before this court seeking reversal of the decision of the trial court and
contends that the search of his bag was illegal because it had been made without a search
warrant and that therefore, the shabu discovered during the illegal search was inadmissible
in evidence against him.
Issue:
Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Rulings:
Yes. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles- automobiles, trucks, etc.
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching
a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant may be sought. Also, a peace officer may without a warrant, arrest a person when
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATIONS, however, appellant shall suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate
period ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision
correctional as maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No
pronouncement as to cost.
SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE
Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples Rights
(ULAP), petitioners,

vs.
Gen. Renato De Villa and National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC),
respondents.

Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing
to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on
several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car
subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. Instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed. Petitioners contended that the
checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. Finally, on 17 July 1988, military
and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of
the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the
National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.
Issue:
The question was raised as to whether or not checkpoints violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures.
Held:
The Supreme Court held to dismiss the petition. True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfareand and individuals right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Rudy Caballes, petitioner
Vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents
Facts:
While on a routine patrol in Brgy. Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt. Victorino Nocejo and
Pat. Alex de Castro spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with kakawati leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the
vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes was asked by the officers as to what was loaded

in the jeep, to which he did not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officers checked
the cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National
Power Corporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the
Pagsanjan Police Station, where he was imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes
guilty of the crime of Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible
against Caballes.
Ruling:
No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the case at bar does not
fall under any of the accepted exceptions.

1.

Search of a moving vehicle

The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized for the
purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving vehicle is particularly difficult for
want of a specific description of the place, things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still, however, there must be probable cause
to conduct such warrantless search. One form of search of moving vehicles is the stop-andsearch without warrant at checkpoints, which has been declared as not illegal per se, for as
long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive
to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an
extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right
against unreasonable search. The circumstances in this case, however, do not constitute a
routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to
an extensive search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case,
the officers flagged down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the
back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because
it is not common for such to be covered in kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause
to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip or confidential information
that could have backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become sufficient to constitute probable cause.
2.

Plain view doctrine

It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were
placed in sacks andcovered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was underneath the
leaves. Object was not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure without further
search.
3.

Consented search

At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
People vs. Libnao

Facts: On August 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers
in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On 19
October 1996, at about 10 p.m., Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a
briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a
tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a
checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon
Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 a.m. of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing
tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as Agpanga
Libnao and Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the
twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them
to Kabayan Center 2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the
opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to
the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the
black bag was opened in the presence of Libnao, Nunga, and personnel of the center. Found
inside it were 8 bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves
were suspected to be marijuana. To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3
Antonio interrogated the two. Nunga stated that it was owned by Libnao. The latter, in turn,
disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the
assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the
course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles
were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on 23 October
1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She
concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. Libnao and Nunga were
charged for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. On 19 November 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Tarlac City, found Libnao and Nunga guilty. For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos. Libnao appealed.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure made upon Libnao and Nunga
was reasonable.
Held: The constitutional guarantee (in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution) is not a
blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.
Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and
seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of
arrest. Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the
carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to
the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of
moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under
said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine
checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only
if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The warrantless
search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been
conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the
information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of
19 October 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night
riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and
carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they
were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these

circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of Libnaos bag was not illegal. It is also
clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was
making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No.
6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a
warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante
delicto.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, et al. 420 SCRA 280 (2004)
FACTS:
On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at
Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC
gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario),
Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were
ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which
the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a
bomb and when appellant opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The
three were then brought to the police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were
investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were
made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court
rendered them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article
IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700
grams of marijuana violated their constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure
HELD: No.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing
through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped
and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of
the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal
effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. In light then of
Vinecario et al.s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been
flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on
the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario,
when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a
member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on
the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of
the backpack were instruments of some offense.
STOP and FRISK
Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968]
Warren (J)
Facts: Martin McFadden, a Cleveland police detective, on a downtown beat which he had been
patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (Terry and Richard Chilton) on a street
corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, strolling down
Huron Road, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24

times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a
corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the
two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third
man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified
himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon
McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat
pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He
removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their
hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from
Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz
(since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under
Terry's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police
station. Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved
to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns
had been seized during a search incident to a
lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence
on the ground
that the officer had cause to believe that Terry and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation
was warranted, and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their outer
clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop"
and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search
for evidence of
crime. Terry and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the
State Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was
involved.
Issue: Whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to
a limited search
for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.
Held: The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies as much to
the citizen on
the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety
of the police
conduct but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and
seizure. The
exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and
restrained police
investigative techniques; and this Court's approval of such techniques should not discourage
remedies other
than the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction.
The Fourth

Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed here. Whenever a
police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person
within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in
an attempt to
find weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. Where a reasonably prudent officer is
warranted in the
circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he
may make a
reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous
regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that
the individual is armed. Though the police must whenever practicable secure a warrant to
make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon
on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required. The reasonableness of any
particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances against
the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the action
taken was appropriate. The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating
suspicious conduct when he decided to approach Terry and his companions. An officer justified
in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to determine
whether that person is carrying a weapon. A search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. An officer may
make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of danger before
being possessed of information justifying arrest. The officer's protective seizure of Terry and his
companions and the limited search which he made were reasonable, both at their inception
and as conducted. The actions of Terry and his companions were consistent with the officer's
hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. The officer's
search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the men were
armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself and
others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Herein, Officer
McFadden patted down the outer clothing of Terry and his two companions. He did not place
his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt
weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He did not conduct a general
exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find. Thus, the revolver
seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time McFadden seized
Terry and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that
Terry was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for thE protection of himself and others
to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it
materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the
discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to
be decided on its own facts. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
POSADAS vs CA
Facts:

Pat. Ursicio Ungad and Pat. Umbra Umpar were conducting surveillance along
Magallanes Street Davao City. While they were within the preemies they spotted petitioner
carrying a buri bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner
and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt
to get away was thwarted by the two. They checked the bag and found one caliber and two
ammunitions.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest is a valid warrantless arrest

Ruling:
Section 12 Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure is not applicable because
at the time the police officers identified themselves and apprehended petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed or actually committing the offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he is hiding
something.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to
flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession
of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and mush too late.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Nilo Solayao, accused-appelant
Facts:
On July 9, 1992 about 9 oclock in the evening SPO3 Jose Nino with CAFGU members
conducted intelligence patrol in the Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to verify reports
on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. From
Caulangohan they proceeded to another barangay and met the group of the accused Nilo
Solayao. The group of Spo3 Jose Nino had become suspicious when they observed that that the
latter were drunk and the accused himself was wearing a camouflage uniform. Upon seeing the
government agents the group fled and Nilo was left behind. The Police officer Nino had seized
the dried coconut leaves which Nilo was carrying and found wrapped a 49-inch long
homemade firearm locally known as latong. SPO3 confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policeman of Cabiran and was charged before the RTC of Naval,
Biliran with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
Issue:
1.

Whether or not there is an unlawful search warrant.

2.
Whether or not the prosecutor was able to prove that there is an absence of a
license or permit to possess the subject firearm.
Ruling:
The argument of the accused-appelant in which there is an unlawful search warrant
is hardly tenable. He and his companions drunken actuations aroused the suspicious of SPO3
Ninos group as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or single
suit and upon seeing the government agents, his companions fled. It should be noted that the

peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons
were roaming around the barangay of Caibiran. There was a justifiable cause to stop and
frisk the accused when his companion fled upon seeing the group of SPO3 Nino. Thus, there
was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The prosecutor was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that the accusedappelant admitted before the Police Officer at the time he was accosted that he did not have
any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one, the
prosecutor had relied in the accused appellants admission and didnt do its duty to establish
the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a
certification from the government agency concerned. Thus, Nilo Solayao was acquitted for
insuffiency of evidence.

Malacat v Court of Appeals

Facts:
On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to bomb threats
reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force
of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila,
near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslimlooking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the seizure of
the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion
Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18
February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the
Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR
CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop
and frisk.
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop
and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable cause was not required as it was not
certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation,
hence to require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC emphasized that Yu
and his companions were confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to
obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the officers had to act in haste,
as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in different
directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus it is reasonable for an officer to
conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a
crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The trial
court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for
the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on
ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED
and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for
any other lawful cause.
People of the Phils., plaintiff-appelle
v. Binad Sy Chua, accused-apellant
FACTS:
On Sept. 21, 1996 in the city of Angeles, Binad Sy Chua was accused of a criminal case,
illegal possession of plastic bags containing methamphetamine Hydrocloride known as SHABU
weighing 1,955.815 grams w/c is a regulated drug w/o any authority. Another criminal act was
charged on him on the same date and place of willfully & unlawfully in his possession and
under his controla 20 pcs.of live .22 cal. Ammunitions w/o the license or permit to carry them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Binad Sy Chua is guilty of criminal cases nos.96-507 & 96-513.
COURT RULING:
The decision of the RTC of Angeles City in criminal cases nos. 96-507 & 96-513
convicting the accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was reversed and set aside in violation of
sec. 16 Art.III, R.A. No. 6425, sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua &
to pay a fine of Php 1000000. He was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lack of
merit of his arrest then was reviewed. Consequently, he is ordered to be released from the
custody unless hes lawfully held for another crime.
EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
People vs. de Gracia
Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by
ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the
Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government
establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist
group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th Marine
Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took
over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort
Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1 December
1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command,
was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located
at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team composed of
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt.
Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at around
10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command
post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters
away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted
from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar
office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5
men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance
team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group
and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by
the group, then only 6 meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at
the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in
the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they

were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at
around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as
team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th
Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able
to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites,
M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a
certain Col.Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the
first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only
person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also
found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an
inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that
time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being
mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the
Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was
able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de
Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for
illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment, de Gracia
pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not authorized to posses
any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise stipulated that there was a
rebellion during the period from November 30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991,
the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the
height of the December 1989 coup detat?
Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not
armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a
group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place,
the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun
store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for
explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The
presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at
that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding
areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was
being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity
to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested
that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is
no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest

served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls
and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded
like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo
marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings
and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the
operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment.
Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and
tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended
to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said
drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months
ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness
and record such event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of
human rights
Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure
used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by
the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of
arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There
is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be
achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected.
However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints
and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is
no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear
facts no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court
temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is
remanded to the RTC of Manila.
SEARCHES OF PASSENGERS AT AIRPORT
People vs. Gatward
Facts: At about 3:30 p.m. of 30 August 1994, U Aung Win, a Passenger of TG Flight 620 of the
Thai Airways which had just arrived from Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage, a
travelling bag for examination to Customs Examiner Busran Tawano, who was assigned at the
Arrival Area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City. U Aung Win also
handed to Tawano his Customs Declaration 128417 stating that he had no articles to declare.
When Tawano was about to inspect his luggage, U Aung Win suddenly left, proceeding towards
the direction of Carousel 1, the conveyor for the pieces of luggage of the passengers of Flight
620, as if to retrieve another baggage from it. After having inspected the luggages of the other
incoming passengers, Tawano became alarmed by the failure of U Aung Win to return and
suspected that the
bag of U Aung Win contained illegal articles. The Customs Examiner reported the matter to his
superiors.
Upon their instructions, the bag was turned over to the office of the Customs Police in the NAIA
for x-ray
examination where it was detected that it contained some powdery substance. When opened,
the bag revealed
two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between its partitions. Representative
samples of the
substance were examined by Elizabeth Ayonon, a chemist of the Crime Laboratory Service of

the Philippine
National Police (PNP) assigned at the Arrival Area of the NAIA, and by Tita Advincula, another
chemist of
the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, and found to be positive for heroin. The two
chemists
concluded that the entire substance, with a total weight of 5,579.80 grams, contained in the
two packages
found in the bag of U Aung Win, is heroin. A manhunt was conducted to locate U Aung Win. At
about 7:45
p.m. of the same date, Rey Espinosa, an employee of the Lufthansa Airlines, notified the
commander of the
NAIA Customs Police District Command that a certain Burmese national by the name of U Aung
Win
appeared at the check-in counter of the airline as a departing passenger. Immediately, a team
of law enforcers
proceeded to the Departure Area and apprehended the accused after he had been identified
through his
signatures in his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Arrival
Card.
Customs Examiner Tawano also positively identified U Aung Win as the person who left his bag
with him at
the Arrival Area of the NAIA. During the investigation of U Aung Win, the agents of the Customs
Police and
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) gathered the information that U Aung Win had a contact in
Bangkok
and that there were other drug couriers in the Philippines. Following the lead, a team of
lawmen, together
with U Aung Win, was dispatched to the City Garden Hotel in Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, to
enable U Aung
Win to communicate with his contact in Bangkok for further instructions. While the police
officers were
standing by, they noticed two persons, a Caucasian and an oriental, alight from a car and enter
the hotel. U
Aung Win whispered to Customs Police Special Agent Edgar Quiones that he recognized the
two as drug
couriers whom he saw talking with his contact in Bangkok named Mau Mau. The members of
the team were
able to establish the identity of the two persons as Nigel Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win
Naing, a
Thailander, from the driver of the hotel service car used by the two when they arrived in the
hotel. It was

gathered by the law enforcers that Gatward and Zaw Win Naing were scheduled to leave for
Bangkok on
board a KLM flight. On 31 August 1994, operatives of the NAIA Customs Police mounted a
surveillance operation at the Departure Area for Gatward and Zaw Win Naing who might be
leaving the country. At about
7:45 p.m., Special Agent Gino Minguillan of the Customs Police made a verification on the
passenger
manifest of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Flight 806, bound for Amsterdam via Bangkok, which was
scheduled
to depart at about 7:55 p.m. He found the name "GATWARD/NRMR" listed therein as a
passenger for
Amsterdam and accordingly informed his teammates who responded immediately Customs
Police Captain
Juanito Algenio requested Victorio Erece, manager of the KLM airline at the NAIA, to let
passenger Gatward
disembark from the aircraft and to have his checked-in luggage, if any, unloaded. The manager
acceded to the
request to off-load Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in bag as the plane was
about to depart and
to do so would unduly delay the flight. However, Erece made an assurance that the bag would
be returned
immediately to the Philippines on the first available flight from Bangkok. Upon his
disembarkment. Gatward
was invited by the police officers for investigation. At about 3:00 p.m. of 1 September 1994,
Gatward's
luggage, was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai airways, pursuant to
the request of
Erece. Upon its retrieval, the law enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the
presence of
Gatward and some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery substance.
Inside the bag
were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each containing the powdery substance,
together with
many clothes. The envelopes were hidden inside the bag, one at the side in between a doublewall, the other
inside a partition in the middle. Upon its examination by Chemists Ayonon and Advincula
pursuant to the
request of Police Senior Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the powdery substance
contained in the
two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of 5,237.70 grams, was found to be heroin. Nigel
Richard
Gatward was charged with violating Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act

of 1972
(transporting); while U Aung Win was charged for transgressing Section 3 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of
1972 (importing). Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge when arraigned, while U Aung Win
pleaded guilty
of the crime charged upon his arraignment. On 3 March 1995, the trial court found both guilty
of the crime
charged.
Issue: Whether Gatwards and U Aung Wins suitcases may be searched without
warrant.
Held: While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked in
his bag as his
personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof
in accordance
with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived
any objection to
a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified
since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto. The
conviction of U
Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but
also upon
the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which was required by the lower court
despite said plea.
The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this country the
heroin found in
his luggage which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the international
airport. There
was, of course, no showing that he was authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor
did he claim or
present any authority to do so.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
FACTS:
On February 12, 1998, at about 1:30 p. m., Susan Canton was at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When the metal
detector alarmed while Susan was passing through, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of
the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at
that time, made a pat down search on the former. Upon Frisking, Susan, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area and when the latter inserted her hand under the skirt of Susan,

She noticed that the packages contained what felt like rice granules. Mylene then reported the
matter tom SPO4 Victorio de los Santos, her supervisor on duty. The supervisor then instructed
Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring Susan to a comfort room for a thorough
physical investigation. Upon further frisking, Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages
individually wrapped and sealed in grey colored packing tape which Susan voluntarily handed
to them. Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Santos and after laboratory
examination, it yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified
that no investigation was ever conducted on Susan. However, Susan signed a receipt of the
following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one
Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles. He said that he informed Susan of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did
not have a counsel when she signed the receipt. Yet he told her that she had the option to sign
or not to sign the receipt.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the search conducted on Susan was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
2.
Whether or not the scope of a search pursuant to airport security is confined
only to search weapons under Terry Search doctrine.
3.

Whether or not Susan was lawfully arrested without a warrant.

4.
Whether or not the constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under
custodial investigation was violated.
5.

Whether or not Susans conviction and penalty on her are correct.

RULING:
The Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the
search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. Susans arrest did not precede the
search. . It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the
white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN
was arrested.
Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, the provision is clear that the search,
unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. The Terry search or the stop and frisk
situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously,
for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him,
he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. In this case, after the metal detector
alarmed Susan, R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. Thus,
the strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstance.
Warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that Susan
was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound
to arrest her, under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
As testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial
investigation was conducted after Susans arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of
the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign
or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the

prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her
detention and used in evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of her right to
counsel has no leg to stand on.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law.
For possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10
million. In view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession
of Susan, the trial courts imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range
prescribed by law.
Susan Canton was found guilty beyong reasonable doubt of the violation of Section
16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 ( Republic Act No. 6425) as amended and
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00). The appellants passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be
returned to her.
WAIVER
People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]
Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC
Command put up a
checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They
stopped and
checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a
cream-colored Ford
Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle
was driven by
Conway Omaweng and had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to
inspect the
vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they
saw a travelling
bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the
right side of the
vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng consented
to. When they
opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of different sizes containing
pulverized
substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing the stuff
concluded that it was
marijuana. The Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc
poblacion to report
the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence
custodian. The PC
Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations
of the
substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive
for hashish or

marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on
12
September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an
extension of time to
do so, the court declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and,
finding probable
cause against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court. On 14
November 1988, the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with
the
violation of Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case
713). After his
motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not
guilty during
his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented 4
witnesses.
Omaweng did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn
Statement, dated
23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March
1991, the
trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting
prohibited drugs
(Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional
right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of
his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior
consent to the search
and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of
the PC
Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he
chose not to testify
on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
when he voluntarily
submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is precluded
from later
complaining thereof right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be

waived and such

waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41
packages of
drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for
such seizure.
People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]
Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by the
Police Operatives
from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) on
account of
confidential and intelligence reports received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around
Bambang Street,
Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulay's
illegal drug trade.
On 17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain
quantity of drugs
that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the operatives, together with the
informer
proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3 vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the
side of North
Cemetery and waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulays vehicle at 3:00 am.
The operatives
tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, where they
accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo
Vegetable
Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8
bundles of
suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The
team seized the
suspected contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3 suspects were brought to
the police
headquarters at DEU-WPDC for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were
submitted to the
NBI for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that
the confiscated
stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The defense, however,
contends that the 3
accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulays house
to get the
things of his child allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged

charge of
trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they
were
detained. On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC Manila (Branch 35) indicting
Antonio
Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos
@ "Boy
Kuba" for having violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3
accused
pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty
as charged and
were sentenced to death and a fine of P10 million.
Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and
seizure, due to waiver on their part?
Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo
Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure
when they voluntarily
submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never
protested when the
police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the
bundles, nor when
they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for
investigation
and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it
made on his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be secure from
unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly." Further,
they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by their
voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment
and by
participating in the trial.
People v. Barros
Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of
the P.C.
Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for
Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both
M/Sgt. Yag-as

and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board
the bus and
seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus
continued and upon
reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station,
called C2C
[Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the
carton, he found
out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton was
but nobody
answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao
invited
Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the carton
containing
marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of Barros.
When Barros
denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who
pinpointed to
Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of
RA 6425, as
amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros
of violation of
Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.
Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the
moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver?
Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2,
Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure
will be
inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial
warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are
certain
exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace
officers may
lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a
warrant, it not

being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle
can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out
warrantless
searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the
vehicles are
neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the
vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected
to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a lawoffender
or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or
the
proceeds of some criminal offense. The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct
without a
judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had
emanated from a
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of
the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume
of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3)
Narcom agents were
informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs
would be brought
into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his
waistline, he failed
to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5)
Narcom agents had
received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that
of the accused
would be transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the record that any circumstance
which
constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to
search the carton box
allegedly owned by Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had

apprehended the accused

(M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his
possession, (C2C
Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable
cause. Further, The
accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion
of his
warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must appear
first that the
right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such
a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that
the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein. As the
constitutional quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto,
but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every
reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was
equally nonpermissible
and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana
should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against Barros.
People vs. Damaso
Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with
the 152nd
PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence
of CPP/NPA
members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended
Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When
interrogated, the
persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in
Urdaneta,

Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded
to the house in
Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other
items. After
the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They
interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie
Mendoza/Basilio Damaso.
She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso(@Mendoza). When they reached the
house, the group
found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the
new address of
Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested
him to point out
the new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to go with
them. When
they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already
knew that she
was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she
requested the
group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio
sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found
persons who
were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa,
Eric
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow
them to look
around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive
orientation, one
M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines,
Zambales,
Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their
headquarters for
final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation.
Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the
items confiscated
therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the
Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident

to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka
Mel, Teresita
Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y
Evangelista @ Ka
Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such
information was
later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge. Upon
arraignment,
Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
rested its case
and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the
admissibility of
the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal
for lack of a
search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the
accused. On 17
January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable
doubt,
sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
Damaso appealed.
Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless
search of his house.
Held: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to,
or in
connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to
establish the fact
that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle
and other
subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that
Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being
that the law
enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings.
The constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by
anyone except
the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her .
The records
show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his

alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz
Morados was
indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her
authority to open
his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an
authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any
color of legality.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a
consequence, the
search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation
here demanded
urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the
record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not
grant them the license to go inside his house.
ALLOWABLE WARRANTLESS ARREST
In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also Roque vs. de Villa [GR
84581-82],
In RE: Anonuevo. Anonuevo vs. Ramos [GR 84583-84], In RE: Ocaya. Ocaya vs.
Aguirre [GR
83162], In RE: Espiritu. Espiritu vs. Lim [GR 85727], and In RE: Nazareno. Nazareno
vs.
Station Commander of Muntinlupa Police Station [GR 86332]

Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit
(liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon,
is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of
2 CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. In view

of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security
reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as
the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2
CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a
consequence
of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an
inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando
Dural alias
Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority."
(Criminal Case C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was
amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court
on behalf of
Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9
February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and
Brig. Gen.
Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were
heard on 15
February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed
against them, and
they were accordingly released.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the
crime of rebellion.
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2
CAPCOM soldiers
nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day
after the said
shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was
arrested for being
a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a

continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that
he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of
persons involved in
the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than
for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need
not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination
by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other
milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of
the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities.
People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991]
Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt.
Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of
Edison Sucro,
because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at
about 5:00 P.M.
on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at
C. Quimpo
Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat.
Fulgencio saw
Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a
cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a
buyer, Aldie

Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana
which he gave to a
group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported
the activity
going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about
6:30 P.M.,
Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was
transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while
the police
officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept
Macabante and
Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and
Maagma Sts. in
front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the
ground which
turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he
bought the
same from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro
at the corner of
C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from
the cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PCINP Crime
Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found
positive of
marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Upon
arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged.
Trial ensued and
a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and
sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro
appealed.
Issue: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and
consequently, whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where
arrest without
warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or

is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" An offense is
committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby
and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
stems from the
fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the
requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that
searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions
granted by law is
a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers
have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance
activities of the
accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause
for the arresting
officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. Thus, as
there is
nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest;
ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
People vs. Rodrigueza [GR 95902, 4 February 1992]
Facts: [Prosecution] At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at
the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with
S/Sgt. Elpidio
Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M.
Zeidem, when a
confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of
prohibited drugs in
Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buybust operation, which

team was given

P200.00 in different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet
powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money
to Taduran who acted as
the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs.
Taduran went to
Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where he
could find Don
and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he returned, he was
accompanied by a
man who was later on introduced to him as Don Rodrigueza. After agreeing on the price of
P200.00 for 100
grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it
and left Taduran
and Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic"
which was later
identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and
made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. Based on that information, Major
Zeidem ordered a
team to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC
Galutan and
S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested Rodrigueza, Antonio
Lonceras and
Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended
the three accused. The arrests were brought to the headquarters for investigation. Thereafter,
agents of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's
father.
Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a
plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any search
warrant. The next day,
Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but Don Rodrigueza was detained. [Defense]
Don
Rodrigueza, on the other hand, claimed that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in
San Roque,
Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his
brother arrived
and told him that their father was taken by some military men the preceding night. Rodrigueza
went to Camp

Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he arrived, he was
asked if he
knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the negative.
Like Segovia, he
was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From
that time on,
he was not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in
order to make him
admit his complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana.
On 10 July 1987, Don Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, for possession of 100
grams of
marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana
leaves for a
consideration of P200.00. During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge against
them. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act 6425,
as amended)
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
and costs. The
court, however, acquitted Segovia and Lonceres. Rodrigueza appealed.
Issue: Whether the time of Don Rodriguezas arrest is material in determining his culpability in
the crime
charged.
Held: As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be
authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, the Court has
allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus,
when the owner
of the premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a
lawful arrest; when
it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles
for the
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited
articles in
plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and
building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search warrant. Herein,
however, the raid

conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by
any search
warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned
cases. Hence,
Rodrigueza's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM
agents could
not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for
quite some time.
Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could,
have first secured a search warrant during that time. Further, the inconsistencies made by
prosecution witnesses give more
credibility to the testimony of Don Rodrigueza. While it is true that Rodrigueza's defense
amounts to an alibi,
and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some
evidentiary aspects
pointing to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his
testimony that he
was not among those who were arrested on the night of 1 July 1987. His co-accused Segovia
also testified that
Rodrigueza was not with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents. Hence,
Rodrigueza is
acquitted of the crime charged, due to the failure of the prosecution to establish its cause.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]
Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police
(PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the
presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana
pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed
by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the
pusher. As
to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior
to 8 August
1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher
will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00
a.m. he called

for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the
team of SPO4
Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the
alleged pusher
to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1
Paguidopon, a
"trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to
Mula and
Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."
SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were accosted. The
police officers
then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed
the same to
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina
to open the
bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening
the bag,
which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by
the police
officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as
evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused,
but this was
likewise denied. The accused waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum. On 25
April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and
sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal
Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court on
automatic review.
Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify
their arrest, and the seizure

of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.

Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in
a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon
the existence of a probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the
exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and
solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The foregoing
constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes
a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which
must precede the search. Still, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they
could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It
matters not that Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1
Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the
arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a crime,is an equivocal statement
which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and addresses
of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested,
and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence
against them.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
PRIVACY OF COOMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE
In the matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta,
and of contempt proceedings against Eva Maravilla-Illustre in G.R. No. 68635,
entitled Eva Maravilla-Illustre
vs.
Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.
Facts:
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of her case (a
land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust
resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st division, that it was railroaded
with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her
letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot.
She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustres letter basically attacks the
participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was
previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The
letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was
issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about
to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty. Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It
was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre
wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to expose
the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. True to her threats,
Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with
knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also
charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty.

LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without
any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices
were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC
is charging them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and
that they did not intend to dishonor the court.
Issue:WON privacy of communication was violated.
Held:The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the
premises is
unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an
irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.
People vs. Albofera,
FACTS:
Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a
forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the
killing.
The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and
accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.
Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated
therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had
ordered the arrest of the victim, Carancio, and that the group sentenced him (the victim) to
die by stabbing.
Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a
letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter,
accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his
favor instead.
Later the accused were convicted of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the Alboferas letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of
alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accuseds privacy?
HELD:
No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search
and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Alboferas privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who
produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is
nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Alboferas) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas
tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.
Waterous Drug Corporation vs.NLRC
Facts:
On August 15, 1988, Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corporation. Catolico purchased 10 bottles of Voren tablets from Yung Shin

Pharmaceuticals a price of 364php per bottle with its original price of 320php per bottle,
overpriced amounting 64php per bottle. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals sent a check to WDRC for
refund of jack-up price amounting 640php addressed to Catolico. Ms. Saldana, the WDRC clerk
opened the envelope and found out that there was a check amounting 640php issued by YSP.
On March 5, 1990, Waterous Drug Corporation issued a memorandum for Catolicos
termination by reason of dishonesty.
Issue:
Whether or not the check admissible in the court as evidence against
Catolico
Held:
Yes. The rationale is the doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Marti which
states that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. Since the envelope was opened by Saldana, a private
individual, the check is admissible to court as evidence.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY, AND PETITION
SCOPE
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15,
2008
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria
Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales
warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found
to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape. Meanwhile,
respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media
establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary
Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere
press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the
clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive
that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in
the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on

behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The
concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in
the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP OR PRIOR RESTRAINT
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of StafF
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been
used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized items and articles, and thus those
seized articles will not be used by the respondents against the petitioners in the court.
The petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject
to the warrant were real properties.
Issue: Whether or not, the two warrants are valid to justify the seizure of the items.
Held: The warrants are null and void. The Court found out that the affidavit for the
application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause because the
statements of the witnesses are mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence prohibits the
issuance of general warrants. In this case, the warrant issued doesnt describe and enumerate
the items to be searched and seized and did not indicate and specify the subversive nature of
the said items.
United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), petitioner,
vs.Commission on Elections (COMELEC), respondent.
Facts:
At a time when the country was already under martial law, amendments to the 1973
Constitution were proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. The amendments to the constitution
were to be placed in a plebiscite for the peoples approval. The Commission on elections,
pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and pertinent
enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, issued three (3) Resolutions 1467-1469 providing for
equal opportunity on public discussions and debates, equal time on the use of broadcast
media, and equal space on the use of print media.
On March 12, 1981, President Marcos advanced his campaign for the YES votes on the
constitutional amendments in his nationwide Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo radio-television
program carried live from 9:30 to 11:30 PM via radio and television. Pursuant to the resolutions
promulgated by the COMELEC, petitioner UNIDO demand exactly the same opportunity, the
same prime tune, the same number of TV and radio stations all over the country at the earliest
possible date to campaign for NO votes in the forthcoming plebiscite.
After due and careful deliberation, the Commission held and ruled that the demand of the
UNIDO cannot be granted and thereby denied. UNIDO filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
Commission appealing that such denial is a basic ground for contradiction to the Constitution
and the Law, and moreover, violate the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play.
Issue: The question was raised whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection
by virtue of the COMELECs denial of their request.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded
equal protection.

It is considered view of the Commission that when President Marcos conducted his pulongpulong or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as
President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. The
President/Prime Minister is responsible for the program of government and the guidelines of
policy. It cannot be denied that seeking constitutional changes constitutes a program of
government imbued with the nature of highest importance to enlighten the people on its sense
and significance.
The UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional prerogatives vested in
the President/Prime Minister as above discussed. As such, it has no right to 'demand' equal
coverage by media accorded President Marcos. The UNIDO, however, is free to enter into
appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned.
Adiong vs. Comelec, G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992; 207 SCRA 713
(Constitutional Law Right to Free Press)
FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said
resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars
and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.
HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobileplaces whether public
or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the
prohibition.
MOVIE CENSORSHIP
Gonzales v Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
Facts:
Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated
for adults only by a subcommittee of the movie review board together with the required cuts
and scene deletions. He justified that these requirements were without basis and were
restrains on artistic expression. He adduced that the film is an integral whole and all its
portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the
integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations
advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.
He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decion of the sub
committee.
When Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the board claimed that the deletions were
removed and the requirement to submit the master negative was taken out but the film was
still rated for adults only. The petition was amended to contest the rating only.
Issue: Was the rating made with grave avuse of discretion (Note I put in those
regarding obscenity for future purposes)
Held: No. Petition dismissed. There was no grave abuse of discretion DUE TO LACK
OF VOTES
Ratio:
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse

Burstyn-importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform
(No clear dividing line between what affords knowledge and that of pleasure or else there will
be a diminution to a right to self-expression)
Bagatsing- Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such
freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.
Censorship doesnt full cover free speech or there might bean emasculation of basic rights.
However, there must be in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful
exercise of such right without denying the freedom from liability.
Freedom from censorship is a settled principle in our jurisdiction. Mutuc- board of review is
limited to classification of films to safeguard other constitutional objections, hence the GP, PG,
or R-18 ratings.
That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption
is against its validity
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear
and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent.
Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is
feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident.
Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot
be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable.
Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to
public public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
Roth- "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance unorthodox Ideas,
controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.
Given obscenity as the nemesis of censorship, there is difficulty in determining what is
obsecene.
Roth- The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the
effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons
The test was whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. Some
material can legitimately deal with sex and its effects on susceptible persons. Such a
censorship can be considered violative of the constitution. On the other hand, the substituted
standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and
scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the
vital problems of human interest and public concern.
In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed

strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State.
Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any government
office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no
orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him
is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with
imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is
entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be
considered obscene.
On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is
to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was
stated in a recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of
construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible
of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always
adopt the former.
There can be no valid objection to the controlling standard.
There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of what
obscenity is is very restrictive.
But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young
people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the
petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused.
The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for
observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their
way, television reaches every home where there is a set.
It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It
cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude
of caring for the welfare of the young.
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the
test being whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal
us to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found abuse
of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for
entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules that the
abuse was grave.
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,
vs. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of a
movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but
unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros"
subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book,
Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of

his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his
girlfriend.
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in behalf of her
mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and
deletions in the movie.
On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the petitioner and private
respondent executed a Licensing Agreement where the petitioner agreed to pay the private
respondent the sum of P20,000.00 payable without need of further demand, as follows:
P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00
on or before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants authority and
permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla
for purposes of producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to said
production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission for the use of
LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed therein, the authority and
permission hereby granted, to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first committed any of the
acts herein authorized.
After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different
theaters all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement,
on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for
judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal
interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the
picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees
equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla
depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private
respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was
without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion
and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the
Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life of
Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure.
2.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and of the press.
RULING:
1.
Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from
the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother
and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, a privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the
benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in
the character and memory of the deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he
or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the

film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
2.
No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the
right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values
that press for recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such
vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests
test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and
the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering
the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of
such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression
are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR
1988
(Constitutional Law Right to Free Speech, Public Figure)
FACTS: Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production and
filming of the projected motion picture The Four Day Revolution, which relates to the nonbloody change of government that took place at EDSA, for its unlawful intrusion upon the
formers right to privacy.
Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech
and expression; and the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and
concern and not on the individual private life of respondent senator.
ISSUE: WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free
speech.
HELD: Yes. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of
public interest. Private respondent is a public figure due to his participation in the culmination
of the change of government. The right of privacy of the a public figure is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN and Loren Legarda (2005)Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.ABSCBN aired
Prosti-tuition
, an episode of
The InsideStory
produced and hosted by Loren Legarda. It depicted of female students moonlighting as
prostitutes to enable them topay for their tuition fees and interviewed student
prostitutes,pimps, customers and some faculty members. PhilippineWomens University (PWU)
was named as the school of someof the students involved and the faade of PWU served as
thebackground of the episode. It caused uproar in the PWUcommunity. Dr. Leticia de Guzman
(Chancellor and Trustee of PWU) and PWU Parents and Teachers Association file letter
complaints with petitioner MTRCB, alleging that the episodebesmirched the name of the PWU
and resulted in theharassment of some of its female students.MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a
formal complaint with theMTRCB Investigating Committee alleging that respondents:

did not submit

The Inside Story
to MTRCB for review-exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7of PD 1986 and
Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IVof MTRCB Rules and RegulationsRespondents:
The Inside Story
is a public affairs program,news documentary and socio-political editorial, the airing of which is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. MTRCB
has no power, authorityand jurisdiction to impose any form of
prior restraint
uponrespondents.MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered respondents to payP20,000 for nonsubmission of the program and declared thatall subsequent programs of the
The Inside Story
and all other programs of the ABSCBN Ch 2 of the same category shall besubmitted to the
Board of Review and Approval beforeshowing. On appeal, the Chairman of MTRCB issued
aDecision affirming the ruling of the Investigating Committee.Respondents filed a special civil
action for certiorari with theRTC and sought to:-declare unconstitutional certain provisions of
PD 1986and MTRCB Rules and Regulations
(alternative) exclude the
The Inside Story
from thecoverage of such provisions-annul and set aside MTRCB Decision and Resolution
because they constitute
prior restraint
on respondentsexercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and thoseprovisions do not
apply to the
The Inside Story
because it fallsunder the category of public affairs program, newsdocumentary or sociopolitical editorials governed bystandards similar to those governing newspapers.RTC decided
in favor of ABSCBN:-annulled Decision and Resolution of the MTRCB
declared that assailed provisions do not cover
TheInside Story
and other similar programs for beingpublic affairs programs which can be equated
tonewspapersHence, this petition for review on certiorari by MTRCB.Issue: WON the MTRCB has
the power/authority to review theThe Inside Story prior to its exhibition or broadcast
bytelevision.

YESMTRCB/SG: (1) all tv programs including public affairsprograms, news documentaries or

socio-political editorials aresubject to MTRCBs power of review, (2) tv programs are

moreaccessible to the public than newspapers, thus liberalregulation cannot apply, (3) power
to review tv programs doesnot amount to
prior restraint
, (4) Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986 does notviolate respondents constitutional freedom of expression
andof the press.SC: Rule in statutory construction:
Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos
(where the law does not make anyexception, courts may not except something therefrom,
unlessthere is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it).When the law says all
television programs, the word allcovers all tv programs, whether religious, public affairs,
newsdocumentary, etc. Since
The Inside Story
is a tv program, it iswithin the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of
review.There also has been no declaration by the framers of theConstitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has apreferred status. If the SC did not exempt religious
programsfrom the jurisdiction and review power of MTRCB, with morereason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom
The InsideStory
. The only exceptions are tv programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government
and/or its departmentsand agencies, and newsreels.WON
The Inside Story
falls under the category of Newsreels.Respondents: Yes.SC: NO. It is not defined in PD 1986 but
Websters dictionarydefines it as short motion picture films portraying or dealingwith current
events; mostly reenactments of events that hadalready happened. The MTRCB Rules and
Regulations defineit as straight news reporting, as distinguished from newsanalyses,
commentaries and opinions.
The Inside Story
ismore of a public affairs program, a variety of news treatment; across between pure tv news
and news-related commentaries,etc. within MTRCBs review power.MTRCB did not disapprove
or ban the showing of theprogram nor did it cancel respondents permit. The latter wasmerely
penalized for their failure to submit the program toMTRCB for its review and approval.
Therefore, there is noneed to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986 andMTRCB Rules
and Regulations contravene the Constitution.No question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the courtunless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicialinquiry:-proper party-actual case or controversyquestion raised at the earliest possible opportunitythe decision on the constitutional or legal questionmust be necessary to the determination of
the caseitself
Petition of MTRCB Granted. RTC Decision Reversed. MTRCBDecision Affirmed
FREEDOM FROM SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
CONTENT-BASED AND CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATIONS
Soriano vs. La Guardia
Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB,
separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse
effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in
Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that
petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior
restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the
power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be
avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication.
There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
TEST OF VALID GOVT INTERFERENCE
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free
press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner
Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his copetitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only
political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or
mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political
matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state,
would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880
could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of
assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present
danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local
officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as
well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P.
Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the
act was based on the police power of the state.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an
acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and
present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing
according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the

words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks
to prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited
more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation
under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a
grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities
in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews
for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for
or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR. [137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL
1985]
Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on
grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition.
Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to
establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates
freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue
raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the
petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because
there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still
finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters as this case.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.
(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of
Freedom of Expression.
Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The
absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in
administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation
(69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be
closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence
presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

(3) The decision must have something to support itself.

(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not
simply accept subordinates views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various
issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it
gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation
of life, liberty and property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for
the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If in the
circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in
such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be
used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment
on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues
to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the
pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore,
broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due
process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
UNPROTECTED SPEECH
SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 139987. March 31,
2005
Issue: Whether the questioned news item is libelous.

Factual Predicate: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City,
against the petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent,
respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It
states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region
comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and
Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who
are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly
newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without
justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the
honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential
Commission on Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of
Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish
and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol
Region, with banner headline and front page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol
Region VILLAFUERTES DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE. The trial court found the petitioner
guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of the trial court.

Ruling: No. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken

the memory of one who is dead. The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are
those which are classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits
regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged matters are the
qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first classification, may
be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes the presence of malice
in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code fall into this
category. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a
scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of
officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies
of Government public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
Fernando v CA G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006
Facts:
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine
National Police CIDG conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair).
On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued
Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy.
The warrant ordered the search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler, IOU magazine,
and VHS tapes.
On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos,
who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The
police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different
magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right to present
evidence. The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted
herein petitioners Fernando and Estorninos.
The CA affirmed the decision. The petitioners sought for review in the SC on certiorari and
assailed the CA decision.
They assigned the following errors:
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not present at the
time of the raid
II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing anything illegal at
the time of the raid.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they
were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that since he was not charged as the
owner of an establishment selling obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he was
present during the raid and that he was selling the said materials. Estorninos, on the other
hand, insists that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.
The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications are
expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner Fernandos ownership was sufficiently
proven. As the owner, according to the Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the
prohibited materials and liable under the Information.
Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners conviction.

Held: No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and
indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution
must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the
offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the
confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
People v. Kottinger-.obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy.
The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may
fall.
Also, that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. The
disclaimer was whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances
of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the
aggregate sense of the community reached by it.
Go Pin- If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for
the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no
offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts
sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said
pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor
importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive
consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see
those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and
persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and
improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and
taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the youth who because of their
immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting
effects of these pictures
Padan- An actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no
redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and
unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it
does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth
of the land.
Katigbak- the Court measures obscenity in terms of the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole rather than in isolated passages.
Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the Court recognized
that Kottinger failed to afford a conclusive definition of obscenity, and that both Go Pin and
Padan y Alova raised more questions than answers such as, whether the absence or presence
of artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to
satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, determine what art is; or that if they find inspiration in
the exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be obscene. Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave
too much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad lib of ideas and two-cents
worths among judges as to what is obscene or what is art.
The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed out how hazy
jurisprudence is on obscenity and how jurisprudence actually failed to settle questions on the
matter. Significantly, the dynamism of human civilization does not help at all. It is evident
that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the
rapid advance of civilization. It seems futile at this point to formulate a perfect definition of
obscenity that shall apply in all cases.

There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the latest word is that of Miller v. California
which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the
unbridled discretion in determining what is patently offensive. No one will be subject to
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or
describe patently offensive hard core sexual conduct. Ie offensive descriptions of sex acts.
What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound discretion.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals
affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court
are accorded great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported
by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.
Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials? We
emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give
them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to
prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms
under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The mayors permit shows that
Fernando was the owner of the store.
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and
exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan, who led the
PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom
the search warrant was served.
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983
Facts : Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon
Bagatsing, the city mayor of manila that on behalf of anti-bases coalition sought a permit from
the city of manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on october 26, 1983 from 2.00 to 5.00 in
the afternoon, starting from the luneta, a public park, to the gates of united states embassy,
hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of the public property, a short
program would be held.
On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction because due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had
not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a
rally. On october 25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant
solicitor general eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october 19, suc permit was
denied.
Issues :
1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US embassy would be applicable or
a violation of Ordinance no.7295 of the city of manila.
2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceably assembly was justified by clear and present danger.
Ruling : The petition was granted. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction
allowing the proposed march and rally. The court found that there was no clear and present
danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the
exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly.

Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second
paragraph of its Article 22 that the receiving state is under a special duty to take appropriate
steps tp protect the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent
any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
That being the case, if there were clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a
justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy.
Luzviminda dela Cruz v CA, et. al. 305 SCRA 303 (March 25, 1999)
Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by
the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with
the administrative complaints filed before its office by their respective principals for
participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by
DECS constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty,
gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence
without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the
Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely participating in a
peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of
their constitutional right and insist their assembly does not constitutes as a strike as there is
no actual disruption of classes.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercise of their right to freedom to assembly
and petition were valid.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
Philippine government in action and the Philippine constitution
The Philippine constitution explained
Held: The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that public teachers in the
exercise of their right to ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for redress
should be done within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct
of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes is highly prejudicial to the best
interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are penalized not because they
exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right
was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in
various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible.
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of
which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one
can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions

in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February
14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the
rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No.
880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people
of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,
nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of
such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power
to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause
does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words
opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and
benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for
the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to
the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that
has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response
(CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL
and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE
the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects,
and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M.
to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they

held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court
(VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at
the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and
continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and
using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being
held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because
of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held
liable for holding an illegal assembly.
Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum that they were under
preventive suspension for one academic year for their failure to explain the holding of an
illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with
damages against private respondents.
Issue: WON the suspension of the students for 1 academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom pf peaceable assembly and free speech?
Decision: Yes. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation of the
right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free
speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of
expression which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of
public interest without censorship or punishment and which is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. 7
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 21 for this
Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a
right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that
may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to
be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid
of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there
may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. Petition Granted.
One week suspension had been served.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
PUBLIC AID TO RELIGION
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, et al (2003)
FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and
manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO
46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on
Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the
exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation

of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of
religion
RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and
economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a
religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State,
the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate
the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III,
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without
doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has
in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal
food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference
with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of
personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product
as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected
by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and
ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in
the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws
do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given
detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the
perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided.
The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the
official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is
GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
Aglipay vs Ruiz
Facts of the Case:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar
to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued
already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress
Held:

No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative
postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no
religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the
issuance of new postage stamps would be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the
phrase advantageous to the Government does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a
particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing
of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a
great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the
country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines
instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and
it also bore the inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,
1937. In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore
the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to
costs.
FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS [96 PHIL 417; G.R. L-5917; 28 JAN 1955]
Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop
Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration
of all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the
supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.
Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor
was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was
turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their
faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America.
CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme
Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration
CA affirmed the decision of the CFI
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate
supreme bishop of IFI.
Held: Supreme Court affirmed CAs decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo
De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes
as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws
To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the
rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other
superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules
for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the
congregation adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence
to duly constituted authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man
not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not
personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the

court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a
widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the
conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good
standing in the congregation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative
charge of "gross and immoral conduct."
HELD:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests
but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled
to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the
compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the
RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such
exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondents stance that the respondents
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free
exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by
the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest
test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to
discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override
respondents religious belief and practice.
Pamil vs. Teleron
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
Facts:
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Albuquerque, Bohol.
He was also proclaimed as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case
against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in the
Revised Administrative Code; in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal
office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality. In this case,
the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is
repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of the revised
administrative code.
Issue:
Whether or not the Revised Administrative Code is no longer operative.
Held:
Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the
majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in
this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed

and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. It is also pointed
out that how can one who swore to serve the Churchs interest above all be in duty to enforce
state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the
separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there
is no implied repeal.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional
limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and
state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious
ceremony. The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population
which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of
religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.