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Mind Association

On the Phase `Theory of Meaning'


Author(s): Jane Heal
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 87, No. 347 (Jul., 1978), pp. 359-375
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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On the Phrase'Theoryof Meaning'


JANE HEAL

In this paper I shall tryto distinguishtwo ways in which the


phrase 'theoryof meaning' can be used and thus to throwsome
lighton recentdebates in philosophyof language. In particularI
shall discuss an argumentadvanced by Dummett in his remarks
on Davidson's views on meaning.Section I will set out the claim
that someone who says that he is seekinga 'theoryof so and so'
may be engagedin eitherof two independententerprises.One of
these I label 'constructinga calculus' and the other 'seeking a
conceptanalysis'. Section II applies the conclusionsof Section I
to the notion of linguisticmeaning and suggeststhat much of
Davidson's work can be read as concernedwith calculus constructionfor meaningratherthan with analysis. Finally Section
III considers and rejects an argumentof Dummett which, if
successful,would show that the distinctionsof Section II were
ill founded.The two uses of 'theoryof meaning' here discussed
are not the only importantones. There are several others,one
of which will be mentionedbriefly.'
I
Considerthe collectionof objects consistingof the legs, backs,
seats, rails etc. of the chairsin my study,togetherwiththe chairs
intowhichtheyare assembled.The followingthingsare true:
(i) some of the objects in the collectionare simple (these are
the seats, legs, etc.) and some are complex (the chairs);
each complexobject is constitutedby some structuredset
of simple objects.
(ii) withrespectto the importantpropertyof weightit seems
very probable that the weight possessed by a complex
object is determinedby the weightsof its constituents.
I

For some furtheruseful distinctionsbetween possible meanings of 'theory


of meaning' see G. Harman, 'Three Levels of Meaning', 7ournal of Philosophy,I968, pp. 590-602.
359

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360

JANE HEAL:

sortsof question about these objects


We can ask two different
and theirweights.
First we can ask: 'What, if any, is the systematicfunctional
relationshipbetweenthe weightsof the parts and the weightsof
the wholes?What are the weightsof the parts?And, if we knew
them, according to what algorithmshould we compute the
weight of the whole?' To ask these questions is to demand a
'theoryof weight' in one use of that phrase-one in which it
could be paraphrasedas 'calculus of weight'.
The second sort of questionwe can ask about the objects and
theirweightsis this: 'What is it to have weight?What kind of
behaviour or interactiondoes an object have to enter into if it
has weight?What featuresof its behaviourconstituteits having
some particularweight?'To ask these questionsis to demand a
kind fromthat men'theoryof weight'but of a quite different
tioned above. What we want now is an analysis of the concept
expressedby the word 'weight';we want to knowhow the notion
fitstogetherwith other notions and how it helps us in underthe world.
standingor systematising
Traditionallyto ask for the analysisof a concept has been to
conditions
ask fora statementof logicallynecessaryand sufficient
for applying that concept, to be given in terms simpler and
epistemologicallypriorto the concept to be elucidated. But the
notion of analysis invoked in this paper is broader. All that is
required of an analysisis that,if given in termswhich a person
alreadyunderstands,it servesto make clearerto him the meaning
of some word and that it thus articulateswhat is, in some sense,
implicitlyknownby someonewho alreadyunderstandsthe word.
What is requiredin a calculus is moreclear cut. A fullcalculus
forsome set of objects withrespectto some propertyor rangeof
propertieswill provideus with two things-first,a statementof
what the relevant propertiesof the simples are and, second,
instructionson how to workout the propertiesof the complexes
fromthose of the simples.The firstset of statementsprovidesus
with axioms fromwhich,by use of the rules relatingsimples to
about
complexes,we deriveas theoremsthe desired information
the complexes. The calculi we shall consider have a recursive
structureallowingforderivationof infinitely
manytheorems.
formsare
Withinthese constraintsa wide varietyof different
possible. Consider again the case of weight. As things actually
are we can determinethe weightof a whole simplyby adding the

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PHRASE

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weightsof the parts. But thingsmightbe different


in that the
colour,shape, size, arrangement
etc. of the partsmightaffectthe
weightof the whole. Such complicationsin no way inhibitthe
construction
of a calculus.All thatis requiredfora calculus to be
possible is thattherebe some systematicfunctionalrelationships
betweenweight-relevant
propertiesof partsand the weightof the
whole.
Calculi can be of various shapes and degrees of complexity.
The simplesttypeis thatwhich deals withjust one propertyand
its contrary.For example, consider the properties of being
poisonousto human beings and being harmlessto human beings.
A simplecalculus of 'poison-value'would be one whichprovided
rules for workingout which of the two predicatesapplied to a
chemical compound given informationon the toxic or harmless
natureof the substancesfromwhich it was compounded.So the
rule mightbe simplythata compoundis poisonous if and onlyif
at least one of the substances fromwhich it is compounded is
poisonous. In practiceof course no calculus of this shape will be
forthcomingsince chemical bonds are not 'poison functional'.
But genuine examples of the above sketchedshape of calculus
are easilyfound; forexamplein the truthtables forthe sentential
connectives.
Anothershape of calculus deals with ranges of properties,for
example,weights.Here we have rulesforcalculatingwhichout of
a, perhapsindefinitely
large,class of propertiesis possessed by a
certainobject, given information
about relevantpropertiesof its
parts.A veryimportantsubclass of this sort of calculus contains
calculi which deal with the conditionsunder which a complex
has a certainproperty.'Being F iffso and so' is one of a rangeof
properties,'being F iffp', 'being F iffq' etc; which of these
propertiesis possessed by a complexwhole may be determinedin
a systematicmannerby propertiesof its parts. Consider poisons
again. Suppose thatsubstanceS3 iS compoundedfromS, and S2
by chemical process C. The rule relatingthe propertiesof the
input and outputof C mightbe this: if S, is poisonous iffobject
01 is F and S2 is poisonous iff02 is G thenS3 iS poisonousiff01
is G.
It may be advantageousto cast our information
about poisons
in the form of a poison conditions calculus instead of in the
simpleformeven whenthe rulesgoverningchemicalcombination
make the lattertheoreticallypossible. This will be the case, for

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362

JANE HEAL:

example,if we do not knowwhetheror not the simplesubstances


S1 and S2 are poisonous but do know of each necessaryand
conditionsfor its being poisonous. In generala simple
sufficient
calculus concerningthe propertyof being F can alwaysbe recast
as a calculus of conditionsfor being F (even if we have to start
with the truisticaxioms that an item is F iffit is F) while the
reverseis not the case.
It is importantto grasp clearlythe distinctionbetweencalculus
thingsand because,
and analysisbecause the two do such different
for many concepts,calculus and analysisare independent.They
are independent,in that the informationwe give in an analysis
neitherimpliesnor is impliedby thatwhichwe give in a calculus.
Suppose that someone has an intuitivegrasp on the notionof
'being poisonous' but would like more insightinto the concept;
he wondershow to formulatein an explicitand watertightway
conditions about causation of harm or illness which express
exactlywhat he understandsby 'poisonous'. The task is not as
simple as it mightseem; substanceswhich are prescribedto help
people give up alcohol, by makingthem react to it with nausea,
are not poisonsin the ordinarysense,but a substancewhichmade
a personunable to drinkwaterwithoutnausea mightbe thought
a poison; both substanceswould cause illness if ingestedin the
right circumstances; therefore contributingto cause illness
cannot sum up all that is involved in being poisonous. Notions
like 'the normalstate of the person' or 'what is necessaryforthe
survivalof the person' must,it seems, be broughtin as well. To
attempt to resolve these perplexities by offeringsomeone a
calculus of poisons,so thathe could withcompletereliabilityand
accuracy read offfrom chemical compositionwhetheror not a
substancewas poisonous,is entirelyto missthe point.Conversely,
someone who wants a calculus of poisons, for example to help
him in evaluatingnew food additives,will finda detailedconceptual analysisof 'poisonous' quite useless.
Confusionis easy at this point. We are used to sayingthings
like 'To knowwhatit is fora thingto have a certainpropertyF is
to knowthe conditionsunder which one can correctlysay that it
is F' or 'A person grasps the concept expressedby a word if he
has a methodof telling,of any given object, whetheror not the
word applies to it'. Against the backgroundof such seeming
philosophicaltruismsit sounds odd to say thata man mighthave
a calculus of the conditionsunder which a word applied to an

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363

object (i.e. an accurate method for reading offwhetheror not


the word should be applied) but not have a grasp of the concept
expressedby the word.
There are two thingswhichhelp to fool us here.
First, having understandingof a word does in some sense
involvegraspinga rule forapplyingthatword. But concentration
on this should not blind us to other necessaryingredientsof
understanding.Besides grasp of a rule, understandingrequires
knowledgethat the rule in question is the one relevantin the
languageto the meaningof the word.
A second confusingfactoris the phrase 'the conditionsfor
correctapplication of a word'. The definitearticle here has a
misleadingforce.Any true biconditionalof the form'An object
is F iffp' can be regardedas giving(the) conditionsunderwhich
an object is F. But there are immensenumbers of true biconditionalsof this form,and only some of themthrowlighton the
meaningof 'F'.
We should not ignorethe possibilitythatthe meaningrelevant
rule for some terms does take the formof a calculus. For such
termsknowledgeof the rule embodied in the calculus would be
a part of understandingthe term and calculus would not be
independentof analysis. But even for these terms,full understandingrequires also that the person knows that the calculus
rule is the rule relevantin the languageto the term.
Convincing examples of terms where the meaning relevant
rule is a calculus are hard to come by. But thereare termswhere
the meaningrelevantrule is recursiveand thus formallysimilar
to a calculus rule. Contrastingone of thesewitha different
sortof
termmay help to clarifythe issue.
Take the terms 'Hohenstaufen' and 'haemophiliac'. It is
possible to give for each a rule of verysimilarshape 'whichwill
(stretchingthe facts a little) lead to correctapplication. So for
'Hohenstaufen'we can say the following:
This man (pointingto some particularhistoricalfigure)is a
Hohenstaufenand any offspring
of a male Hohenstaufenis
a Hohenstaufen.
For 'haemophiliac'we offer:
This woman (pointingto some particularhistoricalfigure)is
a haemophiliabearer; any femaleoffspring
of a haemophilia

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364

JANE HEAL:

bearer is a haemophiliabearer and any male offspring


of a
haemophiliabeareris a haemophiliac.
Someone who knows these two rules and nothingmore does
notunderstandeitherterm.But ifwe tellhimthat'Hohenstaufen'
is a familyname-i.e. the sort of term to which preciselythis
given form of definitionis appropriate-he then has materials
fora fullgraspof the term.But ifwe told himthat'haemophiliac'
was a familyname we would simplybe tellinga lie. The rule he
has so fargraspedforthistermis irrelevantforunderstanding
the
term. He needs another rule, not of recursive shape, which
mentionsblood clotting,reactionto bruisingand the like.
To say all thisis notto commitoneselfto a fullblooded analytic/
syntheticdistinction.It may indeed be the case that no biconditionals (rules) are unassailable,that the class of those which are
favoured as meaning explainers cannot be sharply demarcated
forall time and thatthe difference
betweenbiconditionalswhich
are and those which are not meaning explainers amounts to
somethingless deep and less interestingthan certain classical
philosophicalpicturessuggest.But at a pre-theoretical
level it is
clearthatsome distinctioncan be drawn.And, ifwe wantto make
sense of the idea of discoveringnew factswhich can nevertheless
be adequatelydescribedin our existinglanguage,the distinction
mustbe preserved.
II
Let us now turn to the topic of linguisticmeaning and ask
whetherthe distinctionbetweencalculus and analysishas a place
here. I suggest that prima facie calculus and analysis can be
recognisedand seem to be independent.Argumentshave been
advanced for supposing that calculus and analysisfor linguistic
meaningare peculiarlycloselylinked. I shall discuss these later.
But firstlet us establish how the distinctionat least seems to
apply.
An analysisof the conceptof meaningwould tell us the difference betweennoise types(or marksor gestures)whichare meaningfuland those which are not. It would tell us what it is about
the noises 'snow is white' which gives them meaningwhile the
noises 'Tegup sned lok' have none. It will also tell us what it is
about a noise which makes it have the particularmeaningit does
have.

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The differencebetween meaningfuland meaninglessnoises


must be somethingto do withthe differing
roles the two have in
human life and behaviour,the circumstancesin which human
beings produce noises of the two kinds and how they react to
them.To say this is to say the bare minimum.It is merelyto rule
out of court theorieswhich treat having meaning as a natural
propertyof noises,a propertywhichtheywould have independent
of all humanthoughtand behaviour.That thisnoise has meaning,
and thatit has such and such a particularmeaning,is a matterof
its being part of these people's (or this person's) language. And
havinga languageis a matterof behavingin a certainway vis a' vis
the noiseswhichconstitutethe language.
But in sayingthisone says nothingabout whatkindsof notions
can properlybe used in the analysis.Should we go forsomething
reductive,helping ourselvesto a rich psychologicalvocabulary,
and assumingthatattributionof thoughtsto creaturesis, in some
sense, prior to attributionof language? Or should we stick to
something more neutral and behavioural, leaving open the
possibility that attributionof thought and interpretationof
language go hand in hand in constructingtheories to explain
behaviour? Can we assume that the utteranceof meaningful
noises will typicallybe a voluntaryaction and not a symptomatic
or spontaneoushappening?Can we use notionslike 'convention'
or 'rule' and if so how should theybe understood?These are the
sorts of questions which are raised in many discussionsof language, all of whichare to be seen, on the schemehereproposed,as
offering
analysesofthe notionof linguisticmeaning.'
But what of truth and truth conditions?Some philosophers
have proposedthese as centralnotionsin the analysisof meaning.
So my remarksabove seem either to condemn these theories
out of hand (surelysomewhatrash!) or to be confrontedwith a
counter example to the claim that any sensible or plausible
analysisof meaningmusttalkabout human behaviour.
This difficulty
however is illusory.First it is not clear that
philosopherswho talkoftruthand truthconditionsare attempting
There is a massive literatureon the topic. I mentionjust a few prominent
examples:
H. P. Grice, 'Meaning', PhilosophicalReview,1957, pp. 377-388.
J. R. Searle, SpeechActs,Cambridge UniversityPress, I969.
D. K. Lewis, Convention,Harvard UniversityPress, I969.
W. Sellars, 'Empiricismand the Philosophyof Mind' in Science,Perception
and Reality,Routledge and Kegan Paul, I963.
J. F. Bennett,LinguisticBehaviour,CambridgeUniversityPress, 1976.

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JANE HEAL:

analysesof meaning(as opposed to, e.g. makingclaims about the


formthata calculus of meaningshould take). But second,waiving
thispoint,even ifwhatis proposedby themis a (correct)analysis
of meaningit cannot be a rival to an analysiswhich appeals to
human behaviour.Truth itself,as a predicateof noises, must be
explainedvia appeal to behaviour.'Being true' and 'havingsuch
and such truthconditions'are not, any morethatis 'being meaningful',predicateswhich noises have naturallyor independently
of human beings.
It may be objectedthatTarski has shown how to explainwhat
it is to be truein his accountof how one may constructa so called
truthdefinitionor truththeoryforcertainsortsof language. But
at this point the distinctionbetween calculus and analysis can
with advantage be brought into play. What a Tarskian 'truth
definition'fora languageprovidesis a calculus of truthconditions
fora limitednumberof noises,namelythoseused in the particular
languagetreated.To suppose thatthisthrowslighton the concept
of truthor could serveto explainto someone the predicate'true'
(as applied to noises) is like supposing that someone who has a
calculus of P-conditions for carbon compounds but does not
know anythingfurtherabout what is involved in applyingthe
label 'P' (e.g. does not know that eatingsomethingto which 'P'
can be applied will resultin illness) must ipso facto have a grasp
on theconceptofa poison.'
What would a calculus of meaningdo? It will providea set of
statementswhich enables us to calculate the meaning of any
about
complexlinguisticitem (e.g. a sentence)frominformation
the meanings(or meaningrelevantproperties)of its component
words.
Anyone attemptingto constructa calculus of meaning for
naturallanguage faces formidabledifficulties.
He must hit on a
perspicuousand adequate canonicalformfor ascribingmeanings
to sentences, discriminatethe right sub-sententialunits and
their meaning-relevant
devise a suitable way of characterisingproperties.
The last two paragraphsstate in a bald way somethingsimilarto the theses
much more subtly argued in P. F. Strawson, 'Meaning and Truth': An
InauguralLecture,OxfordUniversityPress, I970.
H. Field, 'Tarski's Theory of Truth', JournalofPhilosophy,I972, pp. 347375.
M. A. E. Dummett, 'Truth', Proceedingsof theAristotelianSociety,I958-9,
pp. I4I-I62,
and Frege, The Philosophyof Language, Duckworth I973,
Ch. io.

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Here we shall not discuss these questions further.I turn


insteadto the question 'What would be the advantagesof having
a calculus of meaning?Why should a philosopherbe interested
in constructing
such calculi or in investigating
the generalshape
theymighttake?'
One of the most notable featuresof naturallanguages is that
each of themmakes possible (in some sense) an indefinitely
large
numberof sentencesconstructedfroma finitestock of words by
repeated application of a finiterepertoireof sentence building
procedures. A competentuser of a language can understand
sentenceshe has neverheardbeforeand it seems thatthismustbe
on the basis of his understandingof their parts and structure.
Hence we have some grounds for supposing that it must be
possible to provide a meaningcalculus for any naturallanguage
and also forsupposingthatin providingone we give a formalised
of certainof the psychologicalabilities
and explicitrepresentation
and processes involvedin controllinga language.
Anotherand even more importantreason for being interested
in meaningcalculi is thatseeing what is involvedin constructing
such a calculus can throwlighton traditionalquestionsin metaphysics and philosophyof language.
When noises have meaningthey do not only have distinctive
relationswith human beings who use them or respond to them
but also distinctiveconnectionswith some items (facts,states of
affairs,
conditions,thingsor whatnot) in the world.A noise which
has meaning points beyond itself; it representsaffairsas being
thus or so. In emphasising,as I have done, that analysisof the
concept of meaningmust involvereferenceto human behaviour
the claim was that the meaning connectionbetweenwords and
the worldcan onlybe understoodifpeople are broughtin to make
the link. People interactwiththings,statesof affairs,objects etc;
they move among them, handle them, causally affectand are
causally affectedby them. People also interactwith noises; they
utterthem,respondto themand so forth.It is only because both
thesekindsofthingsgo on, in a way whichformsa certainoverall
pattern,thatthe noises come into the rightrelationto the states
of affairs,
objects,etc. forthe one to mean the other.
But to say this is not to deny that thereare certainquestions
about the connectionbetween word and world which can be
raisedand discussedwithoutexplicitmentionofhumanbehaviour.
For example,it is verytemptingto construethe statement'Noise

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JANE HEAL:

N means that p' as relational,i.e. as saying that N has some


relationto a non-linguistic
entitysuch as a factof stateof affairs.
But whenwe say thiswe runstraightintothe traditionalproblem
of falsehood. The noise has meaning even when the supposed
relatumdoes not exist. So perhapshavingmeaningis a matterof
being relatedto an abstractentity,a sense or proposition,which
is, in its turn connectedto the world? Or perhaps each bit of a
sentencestandsin a relation(call it 'denoting')to a non-linguistic
entityand falsehoodariseswhenthe bitsare wronglyput together?
But are therethingswhich connectwithpredicatesin the way in
which names connectwiththeirbearers?And so on, into an area
ofproblemsfamiliarto anystudentofmetaphysicsor philosophical
logic.
The questionsjust mentionedare all ones to which the label
'semantic' is historicallyappropriate.And in asking them we
desirea 'theoryof meaning'of yeta thirdkind.We wantto know
about the nature,in particularthe structureor 'logical forms',of
word-worldconnections.In consideringthe questionswe abstract
fromor disregardhumanbehaviourbut onlyin the sense thatwe
are indifferent
to the fact that the patternswe study are necessarilyembodied in human behaviourand we do not pursue the
analysisof the conceptsinvoked(truth,denotation,sense,or what
not) to the point at which mentionof human behaviourbecomes
necessary.
Semantics is traditionallycontrastedwith pragmaticsand it
might be thoughtthat my distinctionbetween semantics and
analysis of the concept of meaning was just this familiarone
re-expressed.However thereare certainstrandsof the traditional
view which should be rejected. The relationbetweensemantics
and pragmatics is sometimes conceived on the analogy with
Geology and Architecture.We may say, with some truth,that
Geologytells us what stones are while Architecture
tells us what
we can (if we choose) do with those stones. So, similarly,one
might say that semantics tells us what meaningfulnoises are
whilepragmaticstellsus whatwe can (if we choose) do withsuch
noises. But to talk like this is to fall into a dangerousmuddle.
Stones,withall theirphysicalpropertiesand history,would exist
and be stoneswhetheror not humanbeingsconstructedbuildings
withthem. But meaningfulnoises would not exist as meaningful
noisesifhumanbeingsdid notspeakthemand respondto them.
Thinkinghow to constructa calculus is relevantto semantic

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369

OF MEANING'

problemsbecause it involvesthinkingabout the formsof words


one should use to ascribe meaning to sentences and words.
Calculus constructionimposes tight constraintson semantic
description.We mustfindways of talkingabout words,constructions and sentencessuch that statementsabout words and constructionsformulatedin these ways entailthe requiredcanonical
statementsabout sentences.Ways of talkingwhich satisfythese
constraintscan be takento expresswhat a language user (implicitly)knowsabout the noises of his language. And because of this
theyhave a privilegedstatus,namelysome claim to be regarded
as the correctways of talkingabout meaning.Hence we may hope
that brooding on calculus constructionwill provide pointersto
thesolutionofsemanticproblems.
Are there philosophers concerned to construct calculi of
meaning?Davidson writes
It is conceded by mostphilosophersof languageand recently
theoryof meaning
even by some linguiststhat a satisfactory
must give an account of how the meanings of sentences
depend on the meaningof words. .. I do not dispute [this
claim] . .. insteadI wantto ask whatit is fora theoryto give
an account of the kind adumbrated.1
This seems to be an explicit avowal of interestin exactlythe
calculus constructionproject. And the questions (about the
canonical form of meaning ascription, about characterising
subsententialunits) which Davidson discusses in this paper are
exactlythe ones we would expectto findof interestto a calculus
constructor.Many other philosophers and logicians are also
concernedwith calculus constructionand, simultaneously,with
semanticproblems.They aim to characterisethe roles of various
subsententialunit, to say what connectioneach has with what
sort of non-linguisticitem and to reveal how they contributeto
determiningthe meaningsof sentences.
What, finally,is the upshot of this discussion as far as the
relation between meaning calculus and meaning analysis is
concerned?I suggestthat we have as yet no reason to suppose
that the two are peculiarlycloselylinked.
One could argue that any language worththe name must be
syntacticallycomplex and hence that analysis of the concept of
meaningmust involvegrasp of how a calculus of meaningmight
I

D. Davidson, 'Truth and Meaning', Synthese,I967, p.

304.

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work. But the premisshere is controversial.Some hold that the


essentialsof conventionalmeaningmightbe exhibitedin a system
containingonlya small numberof unstructured
signals.And even
ifa sketchoftheshape ofa meaningcalculusmustbe a component
of an analysis, much besides will be needed. In settingup a
calculus one must, in order to state the axioms and rules, use
unanalysedsemanticterms-'means', 'denotes' etc.-but for an
analysiswe want to know what these semantictermsthemselves
mean,how theyconnectwith,explainand systematise
behavioural,
psychologicaland sociologicalfacts.It seems primafacie unlikely
thatknowledgeof the formof a meaningcalculus could itselfbear
directlyon these controversialmatters. How could it tell us
whetherand how possession of a language is connected with
intellectualabilities,help us adjudicate betweenrival speech act
theories,and so on? But some recentremarksof Dummett seem
to suggest that, for meaning,there is a route fromcalculus to
analysis.And it is to examinationof his argumentthatI now turn.

III
In a recentpaper Dummettwritesas follows:
Accordingto a well knownview the best methodof formulatingthe philosophicalproblemssurroundingthe conceptof
meaningand relatednotionsis by askingwhatformshould be
taken by what is called a 'theoryof meaning'for any one
entirelanguage; thatis, a detailedspecificationof the meanings of all the words and sentence-forming
operatorsof the
language, yieldinga specificationof the meaning of every
expressionand sentenceof the language... I sharethe belief
that this is themostfruitful
approachto the problemsin this
area of philosophy.'
Solvingthe philosophicalproblemssurroundingthe conceptof
meaning would provide, says Dummett, 'a complete theoryof
how language functionsas a language'. I take it that such a
completetheorywould include what I have called an analysisof
the concept of meaning. So Dummett seems to be saying that
knowingwhat forma calculus of meaningshould have will take
us a major part of the way, perhapsall of the way, to an analysis
of meaning.
I

M. A. E. Dummett, 'What is a Theory of Meaning?' in Mind and Language,


S. Guttenplan(ed.), OxfordUniversityPress, I975, p. 97.

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OF MEANING'

37I

He supportsthe contentionfirstwith an explicit argument.'


It amountsin effectto the bald claimthatradicalconfusionabout
the analysis of some concept can be removed by acquiring a
calculusforthe concept.But thethrustofthe argumentof Section
I was preciselythat,formost concepts,this is not so. Dummett's
explicit argument offersnothing to suggest that meaning is
exceptional.
There is however,a line of reasoningleading to preciselythis
desired conclusion implicit in other passages of his writings.
Dummettsays:
Anytheoryofmeaningwhichwas not,or did notimmediately
yield, a theory of understanding,would not satisfy the
purpose for which, philosophically,we require a theoryof
meaning ... To know a language is to be able to employa
language; hence, once we have an explicitaccount of that in
which knowledgeof a language consistswe therebyhave an
account of the workingsof that language... Conversely. . .
once we can say what it is forsomeone to know a language,
in the sense of knowingthe meaningsof all expressionsof
the language,then we have essentiallysolved everyproblem
that can arise concerning meaning... Our problem is,
therefore:what it is that a speakerknows when he knows a
language, and what, in particular,does he therebyknow
about any given sentenceof the language?2
The startingpoint here is the assumptionthat an analysis of
meaningfor linguisticnoises must illuminatethe nature of the
practicalabilityto speak a language.The stateof personsvis a vis
noises which constitutesthose noises (part of) theirlanguage is
understandingthose noises. This understandingcan in turn be
equated withknowingwhatthosenoises mean. Having a language
is having some set of practicalabilities (knowinghow to speak
and how to respondto speech) but it is not misleadingto represent
this practical ability as possession of theoreticalknowledge of
what noises mean. Thus we shall see what the practicalabilityto
speak a language involveswhen we see it as springingfromthis
theoreticalknowledge.But when we say that having a language
consistsin havingcertainknowledgewe use the word 'knowledge'
I
2

M. A. E. Dummett, op. cit. p. 98.


M. A. E. Dummett,op. cit. pp. Ioo-IoI and 'What is a Theory of Meaning?
(II)' in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Oxford
UniversityPress, 1976, p. 69.

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372

JANE HEAL:

in its usual and adequately understoodsense. So to grasp what


having a language consists of we need only to articulatethe
contentof the languageuser's knowledge;we must spell out what
sortofthinghe knowswhenhe knowsthe meaningsofnoises.
Dummett continues:
Thus what we seek is a theoreticalrepresentationof the
masteryof an entirelanguage-what is called by Davidson,
and willbe called here,'a theoryofmeaning'forthelanguage.'
This is the crucial move in the argument.We, as speakers of
English, understandnew sentencesin virtueof our grasp on the
meaningsof constituentwords and constructions.Our abilityto
speak and respond to sentencesof English is thus explained by
our (implicit)grasp of a calculus of meaning.So what is set out
in a calculus of meaning is the contentof what is known by a
languageuser,theknowledgeofwhichconstituteshima competent
user of his language. Thereforeto spell out what forma calculus
of meaning takes is the correctroute to gettinga theoretical
representationof the practicalabilityto speak a language. It is
thus the correctroute to understandingwhat it is to have a
languageand so to gettingan analysisofthe conceptofmeaning.
it soon appears thatwhen we followthis recomUnfortunately
mendedroutewe arriveat somethingnotablythinand unsatisfying.
For examplewe get this kind of remark:
Competentspeakersof English know that 'London' denotes
London, that 'runs' applies to things which run and that
'The Earthmoves' meansthatthe Earthmoves.
I have suggestedearlierthatby contemplatingsuch statements
we may get lighton semanticquestions. But we do not seem to
get lighton language as a formof human behaviour.Primafacie
we get no aid in adjudicatingbetweenrival 'speech act' theories
of meaning,in tellingwhetherlanguageis essentiallya vehiclefor
thoughtor a tool for communication,in understandingwhether
and how intellectualabilitiesconnectwithpossessionofa language
and so forth.But theseseem to be importantconceptualquestions
about language and hence about meaning.
What has gone wrong?
Dummett himselfoffersa diagnosis in termsof a distinction
between'modest'and 'fullblooded' theoriesofmeaning.A modest
I

M. A. E. Dummett, op. cit. pp. 69-70.

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ON THE

PHRASE

'THEORY

OF MEANING'

373

theoryof meaningfora languageis one which gives the interpretation of the languageto someone who alreadyhas the concepts
expressiblein thelanguage-it sets out whichwordsare associated
withwhichconcepts.A fullblooded theoryof meaningdoes more
than this; it tells us what it is to have the conceptsexpressedin
the language. A theory of meaning which is modest cannot
illuminatewhat kind of practical abilitya person has when he
speaksa language,but a fullblooded theorywould do so. To say
John knows that 'The Earth moves' means that the Earth
moves
gives littlegrasp on John'sbehaviourand abilitiesvis a' vis these
noises because we have not been told whathavingthe concept'the
Earth' or 'moves' involves.If we knewthese things,then to learn
that Johnknows 'the Earth moves' means that the Earth moves
would be to learn interestingthingsabout John'semploymentof
and responseto thissentence.
But is this correct?
Dummett writes:
We need not stop to enquire whether or in what cases
someone who does not possess the linguistic means to
express a concept or who lacks a language altogethermay
to acknowyet be said to grasp that concept. It is sufficient
ledge thatthe prototypicalcase of graspinga conceptis that
in which this grasp consistsin the understandingof certain
wordor expressionor rangeof expressionsin some language.'
however,we do need to stop to enquirejust this.
Unfortunately,
If having a concept can, roughly speaking, be equated with
havingcontrolof a linguisticexpressionforthat conceptthen,of
course,a fullblooded theoryof meaningwill give us insightinto
what sort of human behaviouris involvedin having a language.
But if non-languageusers can have conceptsin a full blown and
non-parasiticsense thenspellingout what is involvedin havinga
conceptwill not help in explainingwhat language is. It will not
show what extraabilitiesand patternsof behaviourare exhibited
by language users, over and above those exhibited by nonlinguisticconcept possessors. Talk of the 'prototypicalcase of
graspinga concept' unjustifiablyblurs and implicitlyprejudges
connection.
the issue of the thought-language
I

M. A. E. Dummett, 'What is a Theory of Meaning?', Mind and Language,


S. Guttenplan (ed.), Oxford UniversityPress, I975, p. IOI.

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374

JANE HEAL:

I suggest an alternativediagnosis of the fault in Dummett's


originalargument.It is the falseassumptionthata languageuser's
knowledge about the noises he utters is adequately and fully
presented,forthe purpose of gettingat the analysisof meaning,
as grasp of a calculus of meaningforthose noises. Knowledge of
the connectionbetweenmeanings-which is all that is provided
bythecalculus-will notdo thejob we want.We need a breakdown
of the contentof what is knownwhen someone knowsthat 'The
Earth moves' means thatthe Earth moves. But we need more not
in the sense Dummettproposesof being told more about what is
involved in having the concepts 'moves' 'the Earth' etc, but
ratherin the sense of knowingwhat is involved in having the
concept 'means'.
Consider the case of poisons. When someone (e.g. Cesare
Borgia) knows how to handle poisons it is plausible to thinkthat
we can get some insightinto this practicalabilityby spellingout
the theoreticalknowledgehe has about the substances he deals
with. But if we are then told that he possesses such and such a
calculus of poisons we are not much helped. Suppose he knows
that S, is a poison and S2 is a poison and that any compound
of poisons is a poison, how does this show what competentand
sensible handlingof poisons amountsto? We can see that he is
committedto treatinga compound of S, and S2 in the same way
that he treats S, and S2 themselves.But we still do not know
what that distinctiveway of treatingthings, treatingthem as
poisons,consistsin.
What we need is an account of a poison as somethingwhich
when ingestedproducesillnessor death. It is a person's grasp on
these concepts (eating, illness, death etc.) which shows us what
his abilityto handle poisons amountsto. We know how notions
like illness and death connect with his motivations(that he
probably does not want them for himself,that he might want
them forothers)and we know that he knows what eatingis and
how to get people to do it. So we can see how thisknowledgethat
some substanceis a poison connectswithhis mode of handlingit,
his administeringit or not administeringit to himselfor others,
etc.
Similarlythen,to see what kinds of abilitya person has when
he knowshow to handlemeaningfulnoises correctly
we musthave
an account of termslike 'denote', 'means', 'is true' or whatever
are our fundamentalsemantic terms. We must see how these

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ON THE

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'THEORY

OF MEANING'

375

connect with 'communication','belief', 'intention','expression


of thought', 'utterance' or whatever. And this knowledge is
exactlywhata calculus of meaningdoes not provide.
So thisparticularattemptto linkmeaninganalysiswithmeaning
calculus has failed.Otherattemptsmightbe moresuccessful.But
the generalthrustof the argumentsdeployedin this paper is to
suggestthat answeringmanyof the fundamentalquestionsabout
meaning-getting what I have called an analysis of linguistic
meaning-requires attentionto the foundationsof philosophical
psychologyrather than to considerationsdrawn from formal
semanticsor philosophicallogic.
Squabbling over what kind of enterpriseis most importantor
best deserves the title 'theoryof meaning' is an entirelyfutile
exercise.I hope only to have given some plausibilityto the idea
thatthereare severaldifferent
enterprisesin this area and to have
induced some caution in the handling of the phrase 'theoryof
meaning'whichseemsto be one ofthemostslipperyand potentially
mostconfusingin currentphilosophicaljargon.
UNIVERSITY

OF NEWCASTLE

UPON

TYNE

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