negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports,
DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as

actions" consisted in staying away from their classes,

converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable

assemblies,

etc.

Through

their

representatives, the teachers participating in the mass

Superintendent of City Schools of

actions were served with an order of the Secretary of

Manila, petitioners,

Education to return to work in 24 hours or face

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO
BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN

dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS

officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their

LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO,

replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the

ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

mass actions continued into the week, with more

teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass
actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein,

NARVASA, J.:p
The

issue

teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,

raised

in

the

special

civil

action

of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the

Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where
the relief sought from the Commission on Human
Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and
reversal or modification of a decision or order issued
by a court of justice or government agency or official
exercising

quasi-judicial

functions,

may

the

Commission take cognizance of the case and grant

that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular
subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction
of a court or other government agency or official for
purposes

of

trial

and

adjudgment,

may

the

Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the

same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing

Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political

demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the
CHR

complainants

(private

respondents)

were

administratively charged on the basis of the principal's

report and given five (5) days to answer the charges.
They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90)
days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and
temporarily

replaced

(unmarked

CHR

Exhibits,

Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was

consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance
with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No.

and adjudication?

DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the

Apolinario

respondents and are hence taken as substantially

respondents, 6 the

correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions

investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending

posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together

with

writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by

others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise

Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied

Budoy,

undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

Jr.,

Julieta
Esber

Babaran,

were,
latter

filed

Luz

among
separate

del

Castillo,

others,

answers,

opted

named
for

formal

resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive

their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the
entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day,

dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the

some

from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of

800

members

public
of

Association

the

school
Manila

(MPSTA)

and

teachers,
Public

among

School

Alliance

of

them

Teachers

answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal

Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.

Concerned

Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as

"mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged
at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to

4.

In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition

for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila

against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed
(unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA
went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt
to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged
violation of the striking teachers" right to due process
and

peaceable

assembly

docketed

as

G.R.

No.

95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General,

before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No.

Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a

95590." 9 Both

petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher

motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was

associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous

submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds

similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded."

therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action

and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers

case." 14

submitted sworn statements dated September 27,

1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the

that while they were participating in peaceful mass

motion to dismiss,

actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements

as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently

judgments affecting the

"striking teachers" were promulgated in

for reasons completely unknown to them. 10

two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education

"ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering

forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers
CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the
Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11,

Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing

dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and
del Castillo; 15 and

1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6,

requiring his attendance therein. 11

1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it
was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the
subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the)
Commission,

with

the

Chairman

presiding,

and

Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C.

Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the
complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had
been "denied due process and suspended without

petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still

timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the
Civil Service Commission on the matters complained
of," 16 and inter

alia "ruling

that

it

was prima

facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-towork

orders,

file

administrative

charges

against

recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue

decision on those charges." 17

formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the
mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent

were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers,

Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss

(and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)

and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to

sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an

submit

Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following

days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to

disposition:

hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without

their

counter-affidavits

within

ten

(10)

respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers"

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case

"were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a

and be accordingly guided in its investigation and

and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while

resolution of the matter, considering that these forty

two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their
wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro
Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of
Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High
School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and
enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19,
1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all
documents relevant to the allegations aforestated
herein to assist the Commission in this matter.
Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint
on the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx

chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil
expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are
different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being
unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December

28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of
petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its
position that it does not feel bound by this Court's
joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra.
It has also made plain its intention "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to

try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional

jurisdiction over the following general issues:

provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on

Human Rights.

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied

due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution

administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their

as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it

superiors; and

succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee

on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause

of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are

of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which

the following 25

causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify

their mass action or strike.

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate,

party, all forms of human rights violations involving

civil and political rights;

that is to say, determine with character of finality and

definiteness, the same issues which have been passed
upon and decided by the Secretary of Education,
Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission,

this

Court

having

in

fact,

as

aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected

may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on
said matters, if still timely.
The

threshold

question

procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof

in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3)

Provide

appropriate

legal

measures

for

the

protection of human rights of all persons within the

Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and

is

whether

or

not

the

Commission on Human Rights has the power under

the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court
of justice, 19

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of

or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or

adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political

provide for preventive measures and legal aid services

to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;

rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights

to have no such power; and that it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.

way

of

adjudicative

may investigate, i.e.,

receive

power
evidence

education, and information to enhance respect for the

primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in

the

(5) Establish a continuing program of research,

is

that

and

it

make

findings of fact as regards claimed human rights

violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the

human

rights

and

to

provide

for

compensation to victims of violations of human rights,

or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance
with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

end that the controversy may be decided or determined

authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance

appeals or modes of review as may be provided by

with law; and

law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does

not have. 22

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may

be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the
enumerated

powers

and

functions

bears

any

resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The

Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt
and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to
any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents

or

other

evidence

is

necessary

or

convenient to determine the truth. It may also request

the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical
sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
understood,

means

to

examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,

study.

"Adjudicate," commonly

The

dictionary

or

popularly

understood,

means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,

resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties
to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to
pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to
award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the

exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . .
Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,
having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights
had

"Investigate," commonly
on,

certain matter or matters." 29

should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and

research

an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a

definition

of

"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into

systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject
to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official
inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere
included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.

been

transgressed.

More

particularly,

the

Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits"

the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted
actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether
or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those
actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the
order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or
are justified by the grievances complained of by them;
and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may

The legal meaning of "investigate" is

properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the

by step by patient inquiry or observation.

original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education,

To trace or track; to search into; to

examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy;

to

find

out

by

careful

inquisition; examination; the taking of

evidence; a legal inquiry;"

28 "to inquire; to make an

investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the

exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . .

being within the scope of the disciplinary powers

granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also,
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above
narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and
resolved them, 33 and it

appears that appeals have been seasonably taken

by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has
had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the

conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not
having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth
committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon

and

determined

through

motion

for

reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education

himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed

by

the

Civil

Service

Commission

and

eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no
place in this scheme of things. It has no business
intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission.
It has no business going over the same ground
traversed by the latter and making its own judgment
on the questions involved. This would accord success
to what may well have been the complaining teachers'
strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of
the Education Secretary in the administrative cases
against them which they anticipated would be adverse
to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be
done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on
Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to
those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no
power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing
the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary
Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the
appropriate

Government

assistance;

that

would

agency
be

Commission. 35 It

cannot

arrogate

or

the

tribunal
Civil

unto

for

Service
itself

the

appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of

December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE,
and the respondent Commission on Human Rights
and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited
"to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

ground by a member of Damondamon's group who

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor

Remulla!"

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE

AUTHORITY, petitioner,

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA
VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO

the private respondents to cover the happenings in the

area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched
from them by members of the Philippine National

ORDONEZ,respondents.

Police and some government officials and their civilian

followers.
On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and
designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and
General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing
Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area
was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV

injunction

commanding

Company

and

EPZA,

Governor

the

125th

PNP

and

their

Remulla

subordinates to desist from committing further acts of

demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further
orders from the Commission and to appeal before the
Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a
dialogue (Annex A).

was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly

Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group

sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority

accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again

(EPZA).

bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private

respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several

the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

individuals had entered the premises and planted

agricultural products therein without permission from

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion

EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the

Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating

intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a

her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include

P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted

the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the

the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were

contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads

Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent

as follows:

Loreto Aledia.
Considering the sworn statements of the farmers
Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita

whose farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton

Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez filed in the

destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent

respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a

cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of

joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for

ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants,

"justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan

and their possession and cultivation thereof spanning

at

decades,

iba

pang

tulong").

The

CHR

conducted

an

investigation of the complaint.

including

the

failure

of

the

officials

concerned to comply with the Constitutional provision

on the eviction of rural "squatters", the Commission

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who

are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991
a verified complaint for violation of their human rights.
They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock
in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA
Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates
and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a
bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the
private respondents who tried to stop them by showing

reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further

orders the Secretary of Public Works and Highways,
their Contractors and representatives to refrain and
desist

from

bulldozing

complainants-farmers who

the
have

farmlands
come

of
to

the
the

Commission for relief, during the pendency of this

investigation and to refrain from further destruction of
the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of
the Commission.

a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the

Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing.

This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m.

However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the

and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works

and Highways or his representative is requested to

d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance

appear. (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied)

with international treaty obligations on human rights.

(Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)

On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift

the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue

On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a

injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.

Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused

from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that

On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the

motion.

the Comment filed by the latter "fully traversed and

squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the
main

On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the

Petition

for

Certiorari and

Prohibition"

(p.

83, Rollo).

Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a

special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of

prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or

injunction or restraining order against supposed

preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in

violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and

excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of

desist from continuing the acts complained of?

discretion

in

issuing

the

restraining

order

and

injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no

In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human

clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction;

Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we

that the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the

held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a

private respondent's complaint because the issue

quasi-judicial body.

raised therein had been decided by this Court, hence,

it is barred by prior judgment.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in

the

On

September

19,

1991,

this

Court

issued

way

of

adjudicative

mayinvestigate, i.e.,

receive

power

is

evidence

that

and

it

make

temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease

findings of fact as regards claimed human rights

and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the

violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-

questioned injunction orders.

finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to

the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the

quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of

immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order, and

receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts

for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing

of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly

further acts of destruction and harassment. The CHR

speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of

contends that its principal function under Section 18,

receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a

Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to

controversy must be accompanied by the authority

mere investigation" because it is mandated, among

of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the

others, to:

end that the controversy may be decided or determined

authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such

a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,

all forms of human rights violations involving civil and

appeals or modes of review as may be provided by

law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not

political rights;

have.

b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of

xxx xxx xxx

procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,

in accordance with the Rules of Court;

having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and

c.

Provide

appropriate

legal

measures

for

the

protection of human rights of all persons within the

Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the under privileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection;

should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)

the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights
had

been

transgressed.

More

particularly, the

Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the

question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted

which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is

actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike

hereby made PERMANENT.

and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)

whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in
those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions and return to their classes
despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and
regulations
sanctions,

warranting
or

are

administrative

justified

by

disciplinary

the

grievances

complained of by them; and (c) what were the

particular acts done by each individual teacher and
what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for
said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said

so.

"Jurisdiction

is

conferred

only

by

the

Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of

Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991;
Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October
1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication
(Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158;
Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al.. G.R. Nos.
97108-09, March 4, 1992).
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial

and

judicial

remedies

(including

preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may

seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice,
the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for
a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by
the judge of any court in which the action is pending
[within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be
granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an
inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58,
Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of
the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no
other purpose
WHEREFORE,

the

petition

for certiorari and

prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction

dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent
Commission on Human Right are here by ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO,
CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO,
AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the
Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed
into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer
for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No.
90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice,"
dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of
the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer
of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent
to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days
(up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their
receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that
their stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by
their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed
to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to
stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along
North
EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No.
90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing
the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before
the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted
by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as
CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on
28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition
of
private
respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August
1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance
of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private
respondents to purchase light housing materials and
food under the Commission's supervision and again
directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said
order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest." 6

A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990,

questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also
averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged
violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila
Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of
the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed)
that the moratorium referred to therein refers to
moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor
dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not
poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs
even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of
1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed,
vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying
government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA
corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the
sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or
not a certain business establishment (should) be
allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon
City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued,
upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the
petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to
be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that
they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to
dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as
being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights,
(but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was
heard and submitted for resolution, along with the
contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by
petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss
was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR
cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition
of
the
stalls,sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it
imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order,
denying
petitioners'
motion
to
dismiss
and
supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under
its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who
complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be
and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of
the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper
tiger limited only to investigating civil and political
rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial
body with the power to provide appropriate legal

measures for the protection of human rights of all

persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to
one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All
these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled
upon by respondents with little regard at the same
time for the basic rights of women and children, and
their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have
psychologically scarred and traumatized the children,
who were witness and exposed to such a violent
demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our
resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently
reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June
1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining
order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from
further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the
"business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon
City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the
petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as
financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the
Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment
for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its
own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of
its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to
dispense with the comment of private respondent
Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the
resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such
comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by
the
1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then
President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission
are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or

detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights,
or their families;
(7)
Monitor
the
Philippine
Government's
compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as
may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional
Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been
shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on
Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has
observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance
can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory
power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above
rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of
CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human

rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define
it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be
described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a
symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977,
one of the questions that has been propounded is
"(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The
participants, representing different sectors of the
society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in
man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in
all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or
England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States
or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the
right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of
the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the
rights of the accused to due process of law; political
rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be
elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics; and social rights,
such as the right to an education, employment, and
social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in
the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human
rights are not granted by the State but can only be
recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man
simply because he is human. They are part of his
natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as
well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can
be understood to include those that relate to an
individual's social, economic, cultural, political and
civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes
of an individual, along with what is generally
considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally
contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific
provisions on human rights and in creating an
independent commission to safeguard these rights? It
may of value to look back at the country's experience
under the martial law regime which may have, in fact,
impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard.
Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an
advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled
"Present
State
of
Human
Rights
in
the
Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of
1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the

human rights expressed in the International Covenant,

these
rights
became
unavailable
upon
the
proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972.
Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by
the thousands became subject to arrest upon
suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite
periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this
representative. The right to petition for the redress of
grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass
media were subjected to censorship and short term
licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost
independence and security of tenure, except members
of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit
letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the
acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were
practiced as declared by international bodies like
Amnesty
International
and
the
International
Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the
Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task
must be made clear in view of the importance of
human rights and also because civil and political
rights have been determined by many international
covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the
Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if
we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse
its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its
effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its
tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty
because civil and political rights are very broad. The
Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political
rights. Every single right of an individual involves his
civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw
the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political
rights have been made clear in the language of human
rights advocates, as well as in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a
number of articles on the right to life, the right against
torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on.
These are very specific rights that are considered
enshrined in many international documents and legal
instruments as constituting civil and political rights,
and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say
civil and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the
other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will
encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be
addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the

commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in
doing that the commission will be authorized to take
under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at
this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned
earlier that we would like to define the specific
parameters which cover civil and political rights as
covered by the international standards governing the
behavior of governments regarding the particular
political and civil rights of citizens, especially of
political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect
we have experienced during martial law which we
would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question
that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say
is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all
those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are
the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined
in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are
integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman
saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights
covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil
and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on
the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in
the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of
human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the
defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the
rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing
and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of
human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and
respond also to repeated points raised by the previous
speaker.
There are actually six areas where this
Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1)
protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and
public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings
and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against
the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with
Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make
the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future
expansion. The
coverage
of
the
concept
and
jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was
actually disturbed this morning when the reference
was made without qualification to the rights embodied

in the universal Declaration of Human Rights,

although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil
and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President,
Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human
rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring
to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the
commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is
the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that,
although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are
rights specified in that other convention which may
not be specified here. I was wondering whether it
would be wise to link our concept of human rights to
general terms like "convention," rather than specify the
rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period
of amendments, could specify to us which of these
articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept
of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of
including these in the proposed constitutional article,
but to give the sense of the Commission as to what
human rights would be included, without prejudice to
expansion later on, if the need arises. For example,
there was no definite reply to the question of
Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to
marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is
not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat
the various specific civil and political rights that we felt
must be envisioned initially by this provision freedom
from political detention and arrest prevention of torture,
right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes
precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a
specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not
opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the
record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept
or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights
with the so-called civil or political rights as contained
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring
to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will
refer to each and every specific article therein, but only
to those that pertain to the civil and politically related,
as we understand it in this Commission on Human
Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even
clear as to the distinction between civil and social
rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international

covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second
covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of
labor to organize, the right to education, housing,
shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the
moment the sense of the committee to those that the
Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint
of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on
how much we need a Commission on Human
Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless.
They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept
clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more
abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases
involved are very delicate torture, salvaging, picking
up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and the
persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power
like politicians, men in the military and big shots.
Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be
independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much
we need this commission, especially for the little
Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of
help and cannot get it. And I think we should
concentrate only on civil and political violations because
if we open this to land, housing and health, we will
have no place to go again and we will not receive any
response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18,
Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as
referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of
the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to
a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general
sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed
in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees
against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures,
and
imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to
refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of government,
the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the
right of petition and, in general, the rights

appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of

government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that
the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human
Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate
Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment
of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and
public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed
against
the
religious."
While
the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other
cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into
account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil
that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on
a land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the
North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take
judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a
right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in
fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards
hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the
private respondents can fall within the compartment of
"human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" intended by the Constitution.
On
its
contempt
powers,
the
CHR
is
constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its
authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt,
and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite
for contempt could be exercised against persons who
refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is

not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an

adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human
Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by
implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from
proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the
judge of any court in which the action is pending
[within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of
a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes
omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to
indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition is not an
appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is
there lack of locus standion the part of the petitioners
to question the disbursement but, more importantly,
the matter lies with the appropriate administrative
agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition
for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become
moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case
No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that
the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true
that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the
doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide
a
remedy
for
an
act
already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR
Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been
intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR
from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition
is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR
Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00
fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

The International Bill of Human Rights was the

name given to UN General Assembly resolution 217 A
(III) and two international treaties established by
the United Nations. It consists of theUniversal
Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948),
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966) with its two Optional Protocols and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966). The two covenants entered into
force in 1976, after a sufficient number of countries
had ratified them.
In the beginning, different views were expressed
about the form the bill of rights should take. In 1948,
General Assembly planned the bill to include UDHR,
one Covenant and measures of implementation. The
Drafting
Committee
decided
to
prepare
two
documents: one in the form of a declaration, which
would set forth general principles or standards of
human rights; the other in the form of a convention,
which would define specific rights and their
limitations. Accordingly, the Committee transmitted to
the Commission on Human Rights draft articles of an
international declaration and an international
convention on human rights. At its second session, in
December 1947, the Commission decided to apply the
term "International Bill of Human Rights" to the series
of documents in preparation and established three
working groups: one on the declaration, one on the
convention (which it renamed "covenant") and one on
implementation. The Commission revised the draft
declaration at its third session, in May/June 1948,
taking into consideration comments received from
Governments. It did not have time, however, to
consider
the
covenant
or
the
question
of
implementation. The declaration was therefore
submitted through the United Nations Economic and
Social Council to the General Assembly, meeting
in Paris.
Later the draft covenant was divided in two
(decided by the General Assembly in 1952[1]), differing
with both catalogue of rights and degree of obligations
- for example, the ICESCR refers to the "progressive
realisation" of the rights it contains. In 1998 it was
hailed as "A Magna Carta for all humanity"
The Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights (UDHR) is a declaration adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948 at
thePalais de Chaillot, Paris. The Declaration arose
directly from the experience of the Second World
War and represents the first global expression of what
many people believe to be the rights to which
all human beings are inherently entitled. The full text
is published by the United Nations on its website.[1]
The Declaration consists of thirty articles which
have been elaborated in subsequent international
treaties,
economic
transfers,
regional human
rightsinstruments, national constitutions, and other
laws. The International Bill of Human Rights consists
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional
Protocols. In 1966, the General Assembly adopted the

two detailed Covenants, which complete the

International Bill of Human Rights. In 1976, after the
Covenants had been ratified by a sufficient number of
individual nations, the Bill took on the force
of international law.[2]
HISTORY:
During World War II, the Allies adopted the Four
Freedomsfreedom
of
speech, freedom
of
religion, freedom from fear, and freedom from want
as their basic war aims. The United Nations
Charter "reaffirmed faith in fundamental human
rights, and dignity and worth of the human person"
and committed all member states to promote
"universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion".[3]
When
the
atrocities
committed
by Nazi
Germany became apparent after the war, the
consensus within the world community was that the
United Nations Charter did not sufficiently define the
rights to which it referred.[4][5] A universal declaration
that specified the rights of individuals was necessary
to give effect to the Charter's provisions on human
rights.[6]
Creation and drafting
Main article: Drafting of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights
In June 1946, the UN Economic and Social
Council established
the Commission
on
Human
Rights, which consisted of 18 members from various
nationalities
and
political
backgrounds.
The
Commission on Human Rights, a standing body of the
United Nations, was constituted to undertake the work
of preparing what was initially conceived as an
International Bill of Rights.[7]
The commission established a special Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Drafting Committee,
chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, to write the articles of
the Declaration. The committee met in two sessions
over the course of two years.
Canadian John Peters Humphrey, Director of the
Division of Human Rights within the United Nations
Secretariat, was called upon by the United Nations
Secretary-General to work on the project and became
the Declaration's principal drafter. [8] At the time,
Humphrey was newly appointed as Director of the
Division of Human Rights within the United Nations
Secretariat.[9]
Other well-known members of the drafting
committee included Ren Cassin of France, Charles
Malik of Lebanon, P. C. Chang of the Republic of
China (Taiwan),.[10] Humphrey provided the initial draft
which became the working text of the Commission.
According to Allan Carlson in Globalizing Family
Values, the Declaration's pro-family phrases were the
result
of
the Christian
Democratic movement's
influence on Cassin and Malik.[11]
Once the committee finished its work in May
1948, the draft was further discussed by
the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and

Social Council, the Third Committee of the General

Assembly before being put to vote in December 1948.
During these discussions many amendments and
propositions were made by UN Member States.[12]
British representatives were extremely frustrated
that the proposal had moral but no legal obligation.
[13]
(It was not until 1976 that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights came into force,
giving a legal status to most of the Declaration.)
Adoption
On 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration
was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 48
in
favor,
none
against,
and
eight abstentions (the Soviet
Union, Ukrainian
SSR,Byelorussian SSR, People's Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, People's Republic of Poland, Union of
South Africa, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of
Saudi
Arabia).[14][15] Honduras and Yemenboth
members of UN at the timefailed to vote or abstain.
[16]
South Africa's position can be seen as an attempt to
protect its system of apartheid, which clearly violated
any number of articles in the Declaration. [14] The Saudi
Arabian delegation's abstention was prompted
primarily by two of the Declaration's articles: Article
18, which states that everyone has the right "to change
his religion or belief"; and Article 16, on equal
marriage rights.[14] The six communist nations
abstentions centered around the view that the
Declaration did not go far enough in condemning
fascism and Nazism.[17] Eleanor Roosevelt attributed
the abstention of the Soviet bloc nations to Article 13,
which provided the right of citizens to leave their
countries.
STRUCTURE:
The underlying structure of the Universal
Declaration was introduced in its second draft, which
was prepared by Ren Cassin. Cassin worked from a
first draft, which was prepared by John Peters
Humphrey. The structure was influenced by the Code
Napolon, including a preamble and introductory
general principles.[21]
Cassin compared the Declaration to the portico of
a Greek temple, with a foundation, steps, four
columns, and a pediment. Articles 1 and 2 are the
foundation blocks, with their principles of dignity,
liberty, equality, and brotherhood. The seven
paragraphs of the preamblesetting out the reasons
for the Declarationrepresent the steps. The main
body of the Declaration forms the four columns. The
first column (articles 311) constitutes rights of the
individual such as the right to life and the prohibition
of slavery. Articles 6 through 11 refer to the
fundamental legality of human rights with specific
remedies cited for their defense when violated. The
second column (articles 1217) constitutes the rights
of the individual in civil and political society (including
such things asfreedom of movement). The third
column (articles 1821) is concerned with spiritual,
public, and political freedoms such as freedom of
association, thought, conscience, and religion. The
fourth column (articles 2227) sets out social,
economic, and cultural rights. In Cassin's model, the

last three articles of the Declaration provide the

pediment which binds the structure together. These
articles are concerned with the duty of the individual
to society and the prohibition of use of rights in
contravention of the purposes of the United Nations
Organisation.[22]
Significance
The Guinness Book of Records describes the
Declaration as the world's "Most Translated Document"
(464 different translations).[24] In its preamble,
governments commit themselves and their people to
progressive measures which secure the universal and
effective recognition and observance of the human
rights
set
out
in
the
Declaration. Eleanor
Roosevelt supported the adoption of the Declaration as
a declaration rather than as a treaty because she
believed that it would have the same kind of influence
on global society as the United States Declaration of
Independence had within the United States. In this,
she proved to be correct. Even though it is not legally
binding, the Declaration has been adopted in or has
influenced most national constitutions since 1948. It
has also served as the foundation for a growing
number of national laws, international laws, and
treaties, as well as for a growing number of regional,
sub national, and national institutions protecting and
promoting human rights.
Legal effect
While not a treaty itself, the Declaration was
explicitly adopted for the purpose of defining the
meaning of the words "fundamental freedoms" and
"human rights" appearing in the United Nations
Charter, which is binding on all member states. For
this reason, the Universal Declaration is a
fundamental constitutive document of the United
Nations.
In
addition,
many
international
lawyers[25]believe that the Declaration forms part
of customary international law[26] and is a powerful tool
in applying diplomatic and moral pressure to
governments that violate any of its articles. The 1968
United Nations International Conference on Human
Rights advised that the Declaration "constitutes an
obligation for the members of the international
community" to all persons. The Declaration has served
as the foundation for two binding UN human rights
covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The principles
of the Declaration are elaborated in international
treaties such as the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the International Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United
Nations Convention Against Torture, and many more.
The Declaration continues to be widely cited by
governments, academics, advocates, and constitutional
courts, and by individuals who appeal to its principles
for the protection of their recognised human rights.
Non-binding agreements

Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in

Islam (1990)

Vienna Declaration and Programme of

Action (1993)

United Nations Millennium

Declaration (2000)
International human rights law

Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)

European Convention on Human

Rights (1952)

Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees (1954)

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination (1969)

International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (1976)
International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1976)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (1981)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990)
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (2000)
Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2007)