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No. 10-1141
______________
UNITED STATES
v.
ELDRIDGE CLARK,
Appellant
OPINION
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge
Eldridge Clark appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a reduction of sentence,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In denying Clarks 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction
motion, the District Court determined that it lacked authority to reduce Clarks sentence
under United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009). We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We write solely for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential facts.
On December 30, 1999, Clark pled guilty to Count I of the indictment, which charged
him with distributing crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1).
Prior to Clarks sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence
Investigation Report that calculated Clarks total offense levels under both the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) provisions for career
offenders (Career Offender Guidelines), pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, and under the
crack cocaine Guidelines (the Crack Cocaine Guidelines), pursuant to the drug quantity
table in U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c). Under the Career Offender Guidelines, Clarks total
offense level was 31. Under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines, his total offense level was 33.
The parties disagreed as to certain sentence enhancements that were potentially
applicable to the Crack Cocaine Guidelines calculation. At sentencing, the District Court
noted that the parties factual disagreements as to the enhancements were moot. Based
on a review of Clarks sentencing transcript, it appears that the District Court applied the
Career Offender Guidelines because, had the District Court ruled in Clarks favor on the
disputed enhancements pertinent to the Crack Cocaine Guidelines, the Career Offender
Guidelines would have resulted in the greater total offense level.1 Clark raised no
objection to his career offender status. In fact, in his presentencing submission to the
District Court, he indicated his belief that the District Court should apply the Career
Offender Guidelines. During sentencing, Clarks counsel urged that the total offense
level should be 31 because Clark was a career offender.
The District Court calculated Clarks total offense level to be 31 and his criminal
history category to be VI, which produced a Guidelines sentencing range of 188 to 235
months. On May 15, 2000, the District Court sentenced Clark to a term of imprisonment
in the middle of the then-mandatory Guidelines range200 months.
On March 7, 2008, Clark filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence under
3582(c)(2). The District Court appointed counsel, who submitted a supplemental brief
on Clarks behalf. The District Court denied Clarks 3582(c)(2) motion. On the Order
Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction, the District Court filled in the original and
the amended Guidelines range with the identical range applied in the May 15, 2000
sentencing188 to 235 months. The District Court, citing to our decision in United
States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009), noted that it lacked authority to
U.S.S.G 4B1.1 instructs that a district court apply the career offender offense
level, instead of the drug offense calculation, if the career offender offense level results in
a greater offense level. Neither party contends that the District Court was without
authority to apply the career offender offense level although it resulted in a lower offense
level.
3
This Court has identified two requirements for a 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction:
(1) the defendants initial sentence must have been based on a sentencing range that
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission, and (2) the sentence
reduction must be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission. United States v. Fleming, --- F.3d ---, 2010 WL 2902725, at *3 (3d Cir.
July 27, 2010) (quoting 3582(c)(2)). We need not discuss the second statutory
requirement because Clark is unable to satisfy the first statutory requirement. See United
States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 312-14 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that statutory directives
pertaining to sentencing are not optional even though [t]he Guidelines are no longer
mandatory).
6
and quotation marks omitted). The Court emphasized that the provision applies only to a
limited class of prisonersnamely, those whose sentence was based on a sentencing
range subsequently lowered by the Commission. Id.
The Dillon precedents address the degree of reduction available to defendants who
are statutorily eligible for a sentence reduction. Because Clark cannot establish that he is
statutorily eligible for any sentence reduction under 3582(c)(2), Clarks discussion of a
further reduction is to no avail, and Dillon I and Dillon II are inapposite. Thus, the
District Court properly determined that Booker did not provide the District Court
authority to reduce Clarks sentence at all.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Courts judgment.