Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 13-1795
KHARYN RAMSAY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SAWYER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT OF MARYLAND LLC; JEFFREY TAPPER,
Attorney-At-Law,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:12-cv-02741-RDB)
Argued:
Decided:
December 9, 2014
rental
agent
for
her
former
apartment
and
the
agents
Procedure
claim.
12(b)(6)
that
Ramsay
had
failed
to
state
Upon our review, we hold that the rental agent was not a
the
language
added
to
the
court
orders
by
the
agents
judgment.
I.
Ramsay was a tenant of certain residential property owned
by SRH Woodmoor LLC (Woodmoor).
Ramsay
defaulted
on
her
rent
obligations,
Sawyer
later
Following
Sawyer
Ramsays
hired
failure
defendant
to
Jeffrey
pay
the
Tapper,
judgment
an
amount,
attorney
and
debt
from
Ramsay.
Pursuant
to
Maryland
state
court
not appear for the show cause hearing as ordered, the court
found her in contempt of court.
the
portion
of
both
orders
completed
by
Tapper
state law claims under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act
and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.
The district court dismissed Ramsays FDCPA claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
dismissed
those
claims
without
prejudice.
This
appeal
followed.
II.
Ramsay argues that the district court erred in dismissing
her claims against Sawyer based on the courts conclusion that
Sawyer was not a debt collector under the FDCPA.
According to
with
Ramsays
argument,
which
is
precluded
by
We
the
enacting
abusive
debt
U.S.C.
1692.
collectors
the
FDCPA,
collection
from
practices
Section
using
Congress
any
1692e
by
sought
debt
generally
false,
to
eliminate
collectors.
prohibits
deceptive,
or
15
debt
misleading
debts,
or
(2)
any
person
who
regularly
collects
or
the
FDCPA
excludes
from
the
15 U.S.C. 1692a(6).
definition
of
debt
15 U.S.C.
1692a(6)(F)(iii).
A rental agent generally obtains a debt when a lease is
executed, which necessarily predates a default under the lease,
unless the agents relationship with its principal begins at
some later date. 1
Cir. 2011).
property
owner,
Woodmoor.
In
this
capacity,
Sawyer
was
lease,
Ramsay
was
obligated
to
remit
offers
no
her
monthly
rental
payments to Sawyer.
In
that
her
complaint,
undermine
the
Ramsay
facts
plain
on
contrary
the
face
allegations
of
the
lease
the
collector
debt
bound
was
by
the
default,
Sawyer
requirements
U.S.C. 1692a(6)(F)(iii).
of
was
the
not
FDCPA.
debt
See
15
III.
Ramsay next argues that Tapper violated the FDCPA by adding
the stamped language to the DC/CV 32 and 33 court orders.
As
implied that the DC/CV 32 and DC/CV 33 documents were not court
2
Tapper indisputably
meaning of the FDCPA.
was
debt
collector
within
the
orders
requiring
response.
We
disagree
with
Ramsays
arguments.
To
effectuate
collection
its
practices,
goal
the
of
FDCPA
eliminating
imposes
abusive
certain
debt
affirmative
388-89
prohibition
(4th
that
Cir.
[a]
2014).
debt
In
collector
addition
may
not
to
use
the
any
general
false,
least
sophisticated
consumer
would
be
misled
or
misleading
to
such
consumer
does
not
turn
on
the
Instead,
communication
in
court
question
deceptive or misleading.
must
reasonably
consider
can
be
whether
viewed
as
the
being
determination
requires
an
objective
inquiry,
which
1055,
1061-62
(9th
Cir.
2011);
see
Absolute
Collection
of
the
least
9
sophisticated
consumer
test
collector.
(citation
Natl
omitted).
Fin.
Servs.,
Although
the
Inc.,
FDCPA
98
F.3d
protects
at
136
uninformed
Id.
evaluate
Ramsays
claim
that
least
sophisticated
in
Aid
of
Enforcement
of
Judgment,
and
listed
any
assets,
property
or
credits,
on
specified
date.
The bottom portion of the document further warned:
NOTICE TO PERSON SERVED:
If you refuse or without
sufficient excuse neglect to obey this Order, you may
be punished for contempt.
This portion of the document also stated, in boldface, uppercase letters, YOU ARE ORDERED TO APPEAR IN PERSON, and bore
the signature of a judge.
The DC/CV 33 document similarly listed the courts name and
address, the case number, and the parties names at the top of
the
document.
The
middle
portion
of
the
form
was
titled
we
conclude
reasonably
render
either
that
the
document
stamped
language
deceptive
or
did
not
misleading,
they were orders of the court, and set forth both the name of
the court and the signature of a judge.
deceived regarding the fact that the documents were court orders
requiring the consumer to appear in court.
The presence of the stamped language did not alter these
clear representations that the documents were issued by a court
and
required
compliance
with
the
courts
directives.
The
court, the case number, and the parties, and did not conceal or
obscure any text of either document or suggest that Ramsay could
ignore the remainder of the documents and their contents.
Nor
collection
uninformed
level
of
proceeding.
consumer,
courts
understanding
and
While
the
nevertheless
willingness
FDCPA
protects
presum[e]
to
read
with
the
basic
care.
creditor,
as
plaintiff
in
collection
proceeding,
the
portion
of
the
documents
that
he
was
required
to
representation
that
the
orders
were
communications
We
IV.
For these reasons, we affirm the district courts judgment
dismissing Ramsays complaint. 6
AFFIRMED
agree
with
the
majority
that
Sawyer
cannot
be
liable
under the FDCPA because the debt it obtained was not yet in
default.
But
believe
that
Ramsays
complaint
plausibly
the
FDCPA,
Ramsay
need
not
prove
an
intentional
or
Cir.
consumer
1996)
standard
(observing
protects
that
the
15
the
least-sophisticated-
gullible
as
well
as
the
1993)).
versed
in
The
legal
conspicuous
least
sophisticated
language,
statement
forms,
appears
on
consumer
and
the
is
not
formalities.
top
of
well-
When
document
and
As
severe,
including
arrest,
detention,
and
the
collateral
stamped
language
is
also
plainly
false.
The
the
and
communications
taking
steps
to
by
supplying
ensure
that
the
the
necessary
orders
were
16
Tapper
is
true
that
this
Court
has
left
open
the
question
An interrogatory, however, is
An interrogatory
R.
Civ.
P.
33.
An
order,
by
contrast,
is
See
command
Russell,
Had
the
763
F.3d
district
at
court
389
(citing
denied
the
15
U.S.C.
motion
to
18