FILEQ FILE NO. August 9, 2016 Orrice oF STATE OF MINNESOTA APPELLATECOURTS: IN SUPREME COURT In Re Petition for Disciplinary Action against PETITION FOR MICHELLE LOWNEY MacDONALD, DISCIPLINARY ACTION a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0182370. ‘TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA: At the direction of a Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Panel, the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, hereinafter Director, files this petition, ‘The above-named attorney, hereinafter respondent, was admitted to practice law in Minnesota on September 11, 1987. Respondent currently practices law in West St. Paul, Minnesota. Respondent has committed the following unprofessional conduct warranting public discipline: DISCIPLINARY HISTORY On August 10, 2012, respondent was issued an admonition for failing to deposit settlement proceeds into a trust account, failing to maintain proper trust account books and records, failing to promptly deliver funds to a client, failing in her duty to be responsible for the conduct of a non-lawyer and failing to cooperate with the Director's investigation in violation of Rules 1.15(a), (¢)(3) and (4), 1.16(d), 5.3(c)(2) and 8.1(b), Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), and Rule 25, Rules on Lawyers, Professional Responsibility (RLPR).FIRST COUNT Gri ic] ‘i Mat Sanctions 1. In April 2011, Sandra Grazzini-Rucki commenced a marriage dissolution action in Dakota County District Court (Court File No. 19AV-FA-11-1 1273). Since January 8, 2013, and at all times relevant to the matter herein, respondent has represented Grazzini-Rucki.! 2. Between August 30 and September 3, 2013, respondent served subpoenas on three of Grazzini-Rucki’s former attorneys, Linda Olup, Elizabeth Henry and Jennifer Evans. The subpoenas required the attorneys, not their record keepers, to appear at trial and provide copies of their billing records. 3. Respondent's subpoenas failed to comply with Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.03. Rule 45.03 requires that the attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena “take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to that subpoena.” 4. Prior to the trial date, attorneys Olup and Evans provided respondent with the documents identified in their subpoenas, and also contacted respondent’s office to address the subpoenas and the need for them to appear personally at trial. Despite having already received the documents identified in the subpoena, respondent, ‘or someone acting on her behalf, instructed Olup and Evans to appear personally at the trial, 5. Prior to the trial date, attorney Henry (through counsel) contacted respondent's office on more than one occasion seeking, to address the subpoena and the need for her personal appearance at trial. Respondent failed to respond. 6. Prior to the trial date, attorneys Olnp, Evans and Henry each filed a motion to quash respondent's subpoenas. Respondent filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel dated September 10, 2015; however, respondent subsequently filed a certificate of representation dated October 22, 2015, and remains counsel of record. 27. Ahearing on the motions was held on September 6, 2013. Despite having received notice of the time and date of the hearing, respondent arrived at least 20 minutes after it was scheduled to begin and offered no explanation for her tardiness. 8. During the September 6, 2013, hearing, respondent was admonished multiple times not to interrupt the court, Respondent's interruptions were intended to disrupt the tribunal and did disrupt the tribunal such that the court asked a bailiff to step forward. See Exhibit A attached hereto (Sept. 6, 2013, Transcript ("Tr.”) pp. 25-26, 29-82), 9. By orders filed on September 9 and 25, 2013, the court quashed the subpoenas respondent served on Olup, Evans and Henry, found that respondent failed to comply with Rule 45,03(a) and assessed sanctions against respondent personally and against her law firm in the amount of $6,202.50. 10. _ In its September 9, 2013, order, the court stated that respondent had breached her obligations under Rule 45.03(a) by failing “to consider the relevant provisions of the Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(6); the availability of testimony from [Grazzini-Rucki] in laying the foundation for the attorney fee records; and the common practice of submitting requests for attorney fees post-trial and pursuant to Rules of Practice District Courts, Rule 119.” 11. _Inits September 9, 2013, order for sanctions, the court stated that respondent failed to meet her burden pursuant to Rule 45.03(a) of demonstrating that it would be reasonable to subject the subpoenaed persons “to the undue burden of both producing their billing records and providing testimony at trial.” 12. _ Respondent appealed the district court’s imposition of monetary sanctions against her and her law firm. In an opinion filed on January 12, 2015, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. The court found that “[tJhe district court neither erred in applying the law nor abused its discretion in sanctioning [respondent and her law firm] for breach of an attorney’s duty under Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.03(a) to take reasonable stepsto avoid imposing undue burden or expense on subpoenaed former attorneys of [respondent and her law firm’s] client.” The court also stated, “The district court was explicitly permitted, by rule, to award sanctions against [respondent and her law firm” and that the court “did not abuse its discretion in permitting judgment to be entered to enforce the awards.” 13. _ In April 2015, respondent paid the sanctions assessed against her. Pre-trial Conduct 14. On May 17, 2013, the court issued an order appointing the successor guardian ad litem (“GAL”) as “a party to this proceeding by separate court order.” On May 20, 2013, the court issued its order appointing the GAL which specifically stated that the GAL “shall hereby be a party to these proceedings.” 15. On May 31, 2013, respondent filed a motion to stay the proceedings; however, respondent failed to serve her motion upon opposing counsel and counsel for the GAL. 16. During the June 12, 2013, hearing on respondent’s motion and several other motions, respondent was reminded by the court that the GAL was a party to the proceedings. The court stated to respondent, “Okay. Mr. Jerabek has entered an appearance in this case on behalf of the Guardian ad Litem. He's been served all the rest of the documents by all the rest of the parties. I don’t know why you can't comply with that.” 17. During the June 12, 2013, hearing, respondent interrupted the court multiple times Respondent was admonished by the court multiple times not to. interrupt. Respondent's interruptions were intended to disrupt the tribunal. See Exhibit B attached hereto (June 12, 2013, Tr. pp. 3, 9-11, 17, 37-39, 48-49).Trial 18. _ Respondent appeared on Grazzini-Rucki’s behalf at the September 11-12, 2013, trial on custody, parenting time and child support issues (Court File No. 19AV-FA-11-1273). 19. Before the proceedings began on September 12, 2013, respondent demanded that the court reporter provide her with the transcript from the previous day and demanded that the discussion be on the record. The court declined to go on the record until the deputy returned to the courtroom. 20. Thereafter, a recess was taken. During the recess, sheriff's deputies ‘observed respondent taking photographs in/of the courtroom in violation of Minn. R. Ct. 4.01. Respondent refused to comply with the deputy’s orders to provide her name, date of birth and address. In order to avoid delaying the court proceedings, sheriff's deputies took no further action at the time. 21, After the parties returned to the courtroom, the court relayed for the record what happened during the recess with regard to respondent taking photographs in the courtroom. 22, Respondent then notified the court that she had commenced a federal lawsuit against the presiding judge, The Honorable David L. Knutson, and asked that he recuse himself. 23, Judge Knutson stated that respondent was “doing this for the sole reason to delay these proceedings and to further complicate the issues in this case and to further prejudice these five children, and I'm not going to allow that to happen.” 24, During another recess, sheriff's deputies attempted to give respondent a misdemeanor citation for contempt of court relating to her violation of Rule 4,01. Respondent was informed that she was under arrest, but that she was not going to be handcuffed. The deputies escorted respondent to the holding cell area where she was instructed to provide her full name, date of birth and address for the citation.Respondent was informed that she would be cited and released/returned to the courtroom following completion of the paperwork. Respondent refused to provide the requested information. Eventually, due to respondent's refusal to cooperate with the deputies, she was placed into a holding cell. Prior to being placed in a holding cell, respondent was required to remove her shoes, jewelry and other personal effects. 25. After the recess was over, deputies informed respondent that she was needed back in the courtroom. Respondent refused to speak to the deputies, refused to stand up and refused to put her shoes and glasses on. 26. Asa result of respondent's refusal to stand, she was lifted from her seat by the deputies, placed in a wheelchair and transported to the courtroom under the jurisdiction of the sheriff's department. Deputies advised the court that respondent would be released as soon as she provided her full name, date of birth and address. Respondent continued in her refusal to provide the requested information. 27. By the time Judge Knutson returned to the courtroom, respondent's client and staff had vacated the courtroom with respondent's trial materials. The court gave respondent several opportunities to contact her client and asked respondent multiple times how she wished to proceed. The court also asked respondent several times whether she wished to remain in the courtroom or go with the deputies. Respondent refused to respond to the court's inquiries, did not attempt to contact her client and did not ask the court for any accommodations. 28. _ Respondent's participation in the trial on Grazzini-Rucki’s behalf after being returned to the courtroom was minimal. She was informed by the court that the trial would proceed and was asked whether she wished to continue her cross-examination of Julie Friedrich who served on the case as GAL from July 14, 2011, through May 17, 2013. Respondent refused to respond to the court's inquiry and did not continue her cross-examination of the witness.29. The court again offered respondent the opportunity to comply with the deputy’s requests for information and the opportunity to call whomever she believed had removed her trial materials from the courtroom. Respondent refused to respond to the court's inquiry and did not comply with the deputy’s requests. 30. The court further informed respondent that she could remedy the situation in which she had placed herself by complying with the deputy’s requests for information, putting her shoes and glasses on and calling her office to retrieve her trial materials. Respondent did not comply with the deputy’s requests and continued to ignore the court's inquiries asking what she would like to do. At no time did respondent ask the court for any accommodations. 31. Respondent briefly examined the opposing party, but otherwise failed to respond when the court inquired as to whether she would like to continue her examination before the lunch break. 32. After the lunch break, Laura Miles (GAL) testified, Thereafter, the trial concluded and the court took the matter under advisement. Appeal 33. On November 25, 2013, the court issued its order on the custody, parenting time and child support issues tried before it on September 11 and 12, 2013. 34. On or about January 24, 2014, respondent filed an appeal on Grazzii Rucki’s behalf relating to the court's orders dated September 9, September 25 and November 25, 2013, among others. 35. Despite two district court orders expressly providing that the GAL is to be a party to the proceedings from which the appeal was ultimately taken, respondent failed to timely serve the notice of appeal on the GAL. 36. On January 27, 2014, the Court of Appeals issued a notice of case filing and assigned case number A14-0139 to the matter. The notice of case filing noted several deficiencies with respondent's appeal. Namely, respondent failed to file anaffidavit of service for the appeal, failed to file proof of service on the originating court and failed to file certified copies of the February 20, September 9 and September 25, 2013, orders and the December 19, 2013, judgment. The notice of case filing gave respondent ten days to correct the deficiencies. 37. _ By letter dated February 3, 2014, respondent filed copies of the February 20, September 9 and September 25, 2013, orders and the December 19, 2013, judgment, Respondent, however, failed to file an affidavit of service for the appeal and proof of service on the originating court. 38. On February 4, 2014, the Court of Appeals issued an order questioning whether it had jurisdiction over the September 9 and 25, 2013, orders regarding the motions to quash and the sanctions imposed against respondent, respectively. The Court of Appeals again noted that respondent had not filed an affidavit of service and that it was “unclear whether [respondent] served the appeal papers on the nonparty witnesses [Olup, Henry and Evans] to whom attorney fees were awarded, as well as to the attorney representing respondent David Rucki.” 39. On February 25, 2014, the Court of Appeals issued an order concluding that the nonparty witnesses were respondents to the appeal and that respondent had not filed proof that they were timely served with the notice of appeal. The court dismissed that part of the appeal. 40. The court's February 25, 2014, order further noted that respondent “failed to either pay the $550 filing fee or to file a copy of a district court order granting [Grazzini-Rucki] in forma pauperis status on appeal.” Respondent paid the $550 filing fee on or about March 10, 2014. 41. On May 14, 2014, Grazzini-Rucki’s appeal was dismissed in its entirety based upon respondent's failure to timely serve the notice of appeal on the GAL or her counsel.42. Onor about May 20, 2014, respondent filed a letter requesting reconsideration of the May 14, 2014, dismissal and alleging that the GAL was e-served with a notice of appeal and statement of the case. 43. On May 29, 2014, the court denied respondent's request for reconsideration of the May 14, 2014, dismissal, noting that respondent had provided no proof that the GAL expressly consented to electronic service of the notice of appeal pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 125.08 and that the district court’s orders expressly provided that the GAL be a party to the proceedings. The court further noted that the request for reconsideration was unauthorized pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 140.01. Frivolous Lawsuit against Judge Knutson 44. Asstated above (22), respondent filed a lawsuit in federal court on behalf of Grazzini-Rucki and her five children against Judge Knutson, among others, on September 11, 2013, the first day of the dissolution trial. The Minnesota Attorney General's Office (“AGO”) represented Judge Knutson in the matter. 45. On October 28, 2013, the AGO filed a motion to dismiss the case. 46. On November 12, 2013, respondent filed an amended complaint. 47. On November 26, 2013, the AGO filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. 48. On January 10, 2014, the court heard the AGO’s motion to dismiss. 49. On February 18, 2014, respondent filed a request to file a “motion to supplement the record with important new evidence.” 50. On March 14, 2014, the AGO filed a response to respondent's request. The AGO noted that respondent's request was untimely. 51. On April 3, 2014, respondent filed a request to supplement the record even further. 52, On May 29, 2014, the federal court issued a memorandum opinion and order dismissing the claims. The opinion and order specifically stated, “AlthoughPlaintiff accuses Defendants of compromising the Minnesota Court Information System, usurping court files, obstructing evidence, and acting with malice, oppression, or fraud, nothing in the record supports these allegations.” (Emphasis added.) 53. The May 29, 2014, memorandum. opinion and order also noted that respondent's request to supplement the record “made more than two months after the instant motion was filed on November 26, 2013, is untimely, and no ‘good cause’ has. been shown.” The AGO was, nonetheless, required to respond to respondent's untimely request to supplement the record and the court was required to waste resources in reviewing the various submissions pertaining to the issue. Baseless Derogatory Statements about Judge Knutson 54, Ina statement of the case filed with the Court of Appeals (case number 13-2196) and dated November 21, 2013, respondent stated, “[Judge Knutson] has acted...in a continued effort to retaliate against the Petitioner, and her attorney.” See Exhibit C (p. 3) attached hereto. Respondent's statement that Judge Knutson retaliated against respondent and her client lacked a basis in law or fact and was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. 55. _ In three separate letters dated December 26, 2013, to Elizabeth Henry and her attorney, Gary Luloff, Linda Olup and Jennifer Evans (see | 2 above) respondent stated multiple times that Judge Knutson was retaliating against her and her client. See Exhibit D attached hereto. Respondent's statements that Judge Knutson was retaliating against respondent and her client lacked a basis in law or fact and were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. 56. In two letters to the Board on Judicial Standards (“BJS”) dated December 26, 2013, and February 7, 2014, respondent stated multiple times that Judge Knutson was retaliating against her and her client. See Exhibit B attached hereto. Respondent's statements that Judge Knutson was retaliating against respondent and 10her client lacked a basis in law or fact and were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. 57. Ina statement of the case filed with the Court of Appeals (case number A14-0139) and dated January 24, 2014, respondent stated, “[Judge Knutson] has persisted in retaliation...” Respondent further stated, “Purfunctory [sic] ‘Trial’ on September 11 and September 12, 2013, over objection, where after [Grazzini-Rucki] and [respondent] were offered a break by the Judge, the same Judge [[udge Knutson] surruptiously [sic] arranged to have [respondent] placed under ‘arrest’, and then arranged that she be returned to the courtroom.” See Exhibit F (pp. 3 and 5) attached hereto, Respondent's statements that Judge Knutson has persisted in retaliation and that he surreptitiously arranged to have her arrested lacked a basis in law or fact and were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. 58. Ina third letter to BJS dated March 11, 2014, respondent again stated multiple times that Judge Knutson was retaliating against her and her client. Respondent further stated, “Judge Knutson continues to ignore motions to remove, and fails to recuse himself, even though the assistant chief judge ruled no jurisdiction, he continues to make rulings, and accept filings, more recently proposed order when the case is presumably concluded.” See Exhibit G attached hereto. Respondent's statements that Judge Knutson was retaliating against respondent and her client lacked a basis in law or fact and were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless. disregard as to their truth or falsity. Respondent's assertion that Judge Knutson failed to recuse himself even though the assistant chief judge ruled he had no jurisdiction similarly lacked a basis in law or fact and was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity? 2 The assistant chief judge never ruled that Judge Knutson did not have jurisdiction. Rather, the assistant chief judge ruled that she (the assistant chief judge) was “without jurisdiction to hear {Grazzini-Rucki’s] u59. Ina statement of the case filed with the Court of Appeals (case number ‘A14-0524) and dated March 27, 2014, respondent stated multiple times that Judge Knutson was retaliating against her and her client, Respondent also stated, “The “Trial’ on September 11 and 12, 2013, was over standing objection, where after [respondent]...was offered a break by [Judge Knutson], he surruptiously [sic] arranged to have her placed under ‘arrest’ by deputies, and then ordered the deputies to return her to the courtroom.” See Exhibit H (pp. 4-5) attached hereto. Respondent's statements that Judge Knutson was retaliating against her and her client and that he surreptitiously arranged to have respondent arrested lacked a basis in law or fact and ‘were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. 60. Respondent's conduct in the Grazzini-Rucki matter violated Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.4(0), 3.5(h), 4.4(a), 8.2(a) and 8.4(d), MRPC. SECOND COUNT Di fatter 61. Onorabout February 24, 2014, respondent filed a certificate of representation on behalf of Joseph Francis D’Costa in his marriage dissolution action. Respondent was the third lawyer to assume representation of D’Costa. D’Costa’s wife (hereinafter referred to as “mother”) was represented by Shannon Fitzpatrick at all times relevant to the matter herein. 62, D’Costa’s divorce trial took place over nine days. Trial was scheduled for two days to begin on June 16, 2014. Pursuant to the court's February 24, 2014, order for trial, the parties’ deadline to exchange exhibit lists and exhibits was no later than two weeks before trial, ie,, June 2, 2014. 63. The order for trial required that a party intending to introduce an audio or video recording “prior to the trial, timely prepare, serve and file a verbatim transcript of motion to remove [Judge Knutson] in light of her appeal of the removal issue as stated in her Statement of the Case.” 12the recorded statement.” Respondent failed to, prior to trial, prepare, serve or file transcripts of audio recordings made by her client and submitted as exhibits. 64. On May 6, 2014, the court issued an order noting that respondent failed to “serve or file the Parenting/Financial Disclosure Statement as required by Gen. R. Prac. 305." Pursuant to Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 305, the parenting/financial disclosure statement was required to be served and filed at least seven days before the pretrial conference, which was scheduled for and occurred on May 6, 2014. 65. The court’s May 6, 2014, order specifically stated that “[tJhe trial order filed February 24, 2014 remains in full force and effect, including the requirement that findings of ions of la for judy d band de ited no later than June 6, 2014.” 66. _ Respondent timely provided an exhibit list identifying Exhibits 101-148? to opposing, counsel on June 2, 2014, but failed to provide any exhibits. On June 3, 2014, respondent faxed exhibits 124-128, 145-146 and 148 to opposing counsel. Opposing counsel notified respondent more than once that she had not received all of D’Costa’s exhibits. As of June 6, 2014, respondent had failed to provide a complete set of exhibits to opposing counsel. 67. _ Respondent also failed to submit the required proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment and judgment and decree which was due no later than June 6, 2014. 68. The deadline to object to the opposing party’s exhibits was seven days before trial. Respondent failed to timely object to mother’s exhibits. 69. On February 20, 2015, the court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, judgment and decree which specifically noted that when respondent finally produced her exhibits on June 13, 2014, more than 11 days late, “they were contained in two thick three-ringed binders with no exhibit tabs separating the Respondent did not inciude an entry or an exhibit for number 141, 13individual exhibits. Also, the exhibits did not correspond to the exhibit list, and many single exhibits consisted of multiple different documents.” The court further stated, “It is not an exaggeration to say that [D’Costa’s] exhibits, when proffered, were a mess.” 70. During the trial, respondent interrupted the court multiple times. Respondent's interruptions were intended to disrupt the tribunal and did disrupt the tribunal such that, on more than one occasion, the court had to instruct respondent to stop talking or to wait for the court to finish. See Exhibit I (Sept. 9, 2014, Tr. pp. 593-96, 616-19) and Exhibit J (Sept. 25, 2014, Tr. pp. 894, 1011, 1089-90) attached hereto. 71. Inits February 20, 2015, findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, judgment and decree, the court specifically found that “[tJhe duration of the trial was far longer than necessary as a result of the conduct of [D’Costa] and his counsel {respondent].” The court noted that respondent took testimony over 26 hours, while opposing counsel used 17 hours and that some of opposing counsel's “trial time was a product of [D’Costa] and his counsel's [respondent's] failure to be organized for trial.” Finally, the court stated, “But for the conduct of [D’Costa] and his counsel [respondent] (including disorganization, noncompliance with trial scheduling orders, nonresponsive and argumentative and narrative testimony, and poor trial preparation and presentation of [D'Costa’s] case), each side's trial time would not have exceeded 10 hours and the trial would have taken no more than 4 days.” 72. The court granted mother’s request for attorney's fees and awarded mother “§20,000 as and for a conduct-based attorney fee award,” In lieu of the award, the court ordered an unequal property division. 73. On April 22, 2015, respondent filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals. 74. On appeal, respondent argued that D’Costa’s fundamental right to parent was being violated and she challenged the constitutionality of Minn, Stat. § 518, Respondent also attempted to challenge the admissibility of certain evidence. 4Respondent attempted to argue, for the first time on appeal, that the district court denied D’Costa’s procedural due process rights before finding that he owed past child support. Respondent further argued “that the district court abused its discretion in ordering [D’Costa] to pay mother’s attorney fees by foregoing an $18,000 property equalizer.” 75. On February 1, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, The opinion noted that respondent's appeal was “saddled with numerous procedural deficiencies.” First, D’Costa had “no standing to argue that his fundamental right to parent is being violated.” Second, respondent did not comply with the notice requirements of Minn. R. Civ. P. 5A when she filed notice of D’Costa’s challenge with the Attorney General's Office because she “did not include a timely pleading, written motion, or other paper challenging the constitutionality of chapter 518.” Third, respondent's constitutional challenge was “vague and unclear.” 76. The Court of Appeals concluded that “[bJecause [D’Costa] did not move for anew trial based on the district court’s hearsay rulings, his evidentiary challenges are not properly before this court.” The Court of Appeals found that a due-process argument was never raised to the district court; therefore, it was not properly before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals further found that the record amply supported the district court's finding that respondent's and D’Costa’s conduct caused the trial to be considerably longer than necessary. 77. The Court of Appeals determined that conduct-based fees were appropriate to award on appeal and permitted mother to file a motion for fees pursuant to Minn, R. Civ. P, 139,06. 78. On February 19, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued an order granting mother’s motion for attorney fees. D’Costa was required to pay mother $16,000 for attorney fees and $642.23 for briefing expenses and costs. The Court of Appeals reiterated its conclusion from the February 1, 2016, opinion that “additional 15conduct-based fees are warranted on appeal because [mother] ‘was forced to defend’ numerous arguments that were procedurally barred.” 79. OnMay 16, 2016, judgment was entered against D’Costa in the amount of $16,642.23. 80. Respondent's conduct in the D’Costa matter violated Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.4(c), 3.5(h) and 8.4(d), MRPC. WHEREFORE, the Director respectfully prays for an order of this Court imposing appropriate discipline, awarding costs and disbursements pursuant to the Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, and for such other, further or different relief as may be just and proper. Dated: —Sulys 18 _. 2016. mM. SUSAN M. HUMISTON, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF LAWYERS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Attorney No. 0254289 1500 Landmark Towers 345 St. Peter Street St, Paul, MN 55102-1218 (651) 296-3952 and SIAMA C. BRAND SENIOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Attorney No. 0350291 16