Dela Pena, Jefferson A.

LLB -1

EH 308

1. Requirements needed for an applicant to take the bar

According to the Rules 138 Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
2. Requirements to practice law in the Philippines
According to the Rule 138 Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
3. Case Digest
Borja vs Sulyap
G.R. No. 150718. March 26, 2003
Parties of the case:
Petitioner Borja, as lessor, and respondent Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease
involving a one storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila, Quezon City.
Respondent paid advance rentals, association dues and deposits pursuant to lease. Upon the
expiration of the contract of lease, respondent demanded for the return of the same, but Borja
refused to do so. Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise.
Sulyapfiled a writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement.
Arguments:
Petitioner argued stating that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to
Sulyaps fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not be imposed. He contended that there was
fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of
compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose

and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2%
monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in case of default in payment. He alleged that his
former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement,
removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and
fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order to
make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.
Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave hisconsent to the
inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the
compromise agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in
fact signed by the petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval.
Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the
amount due, plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees, in case of default in payment, was actually
chosen by the petitioner.
Decision:
YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground ofvitiated consent
or forgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud
in the instant case. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his
former counsel fraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he
affixed his signature to the compromise agreement submitted to the court.
The court found no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be
annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an
employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to
the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private
practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
Significance of the case:
In the future when we decide to practice our legal profession, we should be mindful of our
position that we cannot be accused of having a conflict of interest. We should know the different
rules and regulations.