G.R. No.

L-2474

May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem,

and MARIA DUEAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.
Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of
the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal
was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in
favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from
1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal
situation then prevailing, entered the land in question.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano
Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in
question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the
plea that only question of law are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to
her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in
his favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueas. If the son born to the
couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If
otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin
entitled to succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined
hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal
is concerned. The determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship
that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period of
conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the death of the
alleged father Emiliano Andal.
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of
tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in
his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness
became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he

could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas,
his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until
the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and
treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without
the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943,
Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under
these facts, can the child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of
the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth
of the child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1,
1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he
having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the
marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that
it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that
Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and
get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during
the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing
and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book
"Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21,
1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough
evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were
still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same
house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that
does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that
Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so

serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and
his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal
intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the
carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual
intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards
eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed
than the consequences of the disease." (An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by
Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was
suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence
that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor
of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule
123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre
underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred
eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of
three hundred days following its dissolution.
We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had
access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born
within three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts
no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also
seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically
or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is
no such proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not also
overcome this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p.
92).
In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not
err in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal
and Maria Dueas.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

G.R. No. 138493

June 15, 2000

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,

vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious.
Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years
old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar
nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected,
the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the
cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court
of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:

IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly,

the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto.4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the
Court, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto
as null and void "ab initio";
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel
from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE
recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the
City Prosecutor, counsel for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to
counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition
for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter
referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on
September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of
said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that
she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as
the mother by forging her signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years old,
saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to
Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth certificate .
. . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The

child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the
informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her
correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother
was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father,
the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth
certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is
clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child
in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years
old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year
petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and
simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary
rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void
and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing,
judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent
Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the
respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live
birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of
hearing thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the
office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states
no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent
as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa
Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant
petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the
Family Code." The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an
answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who]
was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent."
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as
Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C.
Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V.
Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her
Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . .
Certificate of Baptism, . . . Student's Report Card . . . all incorporated in her
answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and
affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition
states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the
respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant

petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the
instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
the Family Code.5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

the Present Action

Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 8 of
the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father
or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not
subject to a collateral attack.

The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that
petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no
evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It
further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth
took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its
concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not
signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to
be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.

This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the
present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in
interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 9 The interest of respondent in the civil
status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against
the former. 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her
parents.

The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which
stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same
was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a
situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not
his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate
for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the
father or the mother.

Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A
close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that
the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does
not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

Hence, this appeal.6

In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,

11

the Court ruled thus:

Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal
capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031
subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper
and is barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to
hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the
self-serving oral testimony of respondent.7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of

Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171
of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles
provide:
xxx

xxx

xxx

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as
his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who
can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err

when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at
bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision
refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this
case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at
all. Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late
Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code
which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought
within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside
in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of
birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to
the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily,
the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly
void ab initio. 1
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate

Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's

testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption
of regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys
the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well
as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate
itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. 14 More important, the Court of
Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena
is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's
pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time.1awphil Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given
birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home,
when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in
a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena
Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was
not hers nor her husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:
q Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with
your husband Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?
a She is not our child.
xxx

xxx

xxx

q Do you recall where she was born?

a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in
your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.

q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your
daughter with your husband?
a No, sir.

15

Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has
presented no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really
Hermogena's child; Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother
would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and
the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990,
private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's
sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of
San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They
alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so,
that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who predeceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extrajudicial, were without issue and/or without descendants
whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised
and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the
sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.
The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.

The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the
estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child
of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal
Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership
with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
(4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared an
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private
respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses
failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36)
years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetriciangynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister
of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, 2 categorically declared that petitioner was
not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente
followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed
the private respondents petition for letters and administration and declared
petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by
the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Decision of
the appellate court states:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and

another one entered declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez is not
the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of
the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for
the appointment of an administrator of the intestate of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED; said
petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated;
and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of
Special proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the
Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles
166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and
misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions,
more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code
in this case and in adopting and upholding private respondent's
theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or
impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still
the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of
witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and demeanor
have not convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity
thereof, than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the
now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way
not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the supreme
Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the

parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife
with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise
legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that
both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the
child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been that of the husband except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the
place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was
recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has

been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,

the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of
the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
which ever is earlier.

We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the
biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties
as follows:

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the
child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article only in
the following case:

. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's

evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood
kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is
strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being
childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late
Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby,
and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared
for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own true child,
giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had believed
that she was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from
them as such.

1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period

fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth
of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the
husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these
articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable
to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at
all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian
never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian,
admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years
and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten
or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to
the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent
obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who
treated his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the
testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez,
Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he
being the only boy and the youngest of the children of their
widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente and his
wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to
adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked
for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys
but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up
unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a
baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the
baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already
77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo
City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge of
the lower court had to be held at her residence in Paraaque, MM.
Considering, her advanced age and weak physical condition at the
time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is
highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by
her Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in material
things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under
her oath as a witness. There were also several disinterested

neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian

in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin
C. Asendido) who testified in this case and declared that they used
to see Isabel almost everyday especially as she had drugstore in
the ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to have
been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any
time at all, and that it is also true with the rest of their townmates.
Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who
used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence,
likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become
pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and
that when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went
to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and
asked the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me that
the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about
it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with
child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be
hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby
at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a
baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36
(the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of
that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente
O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and
suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years
old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother
of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should
the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced,
skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr.
Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by
Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and
even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth
certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a
midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a
practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense
and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as
their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez,
though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if
not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court
proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents

of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to

legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not
come around doing so either because he was too busy or for some
other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his
or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts
of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr.
Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the
extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs
of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without
descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness
stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty.
Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he
signed the same only because the latter told him to do so (p. 24,
tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such a
statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is
not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant and,
therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr. Chipongian,
he lamely explained that he signed said document without
understanding completely the meaning of the words "descendant
and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe,
Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone
to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee,
the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as
against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is
really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death,
would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my
husband and my child or only daughter will
inherit what is legally my own property, in case I
die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband
that any inheritance due him from my property
when he die to make our own daughter his

sole heir. This do [sic] not mean what he legally

owns or his inherited property. I leave him to
decide for himself regarding those.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.

(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")

We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian,
it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for
the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be
their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian
had to implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee
although without any legal papers her properties when she dies,
and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the properties that he
would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is
not truly their daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her
(Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria
Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because
that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It
is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the
mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it
is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by
Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth
date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record.
The weight of these findings was not negated by documentary evidence presented
by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3")
purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28,
1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article
410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary
evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the
content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence, the most
telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that
"(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died
without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared
that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after
he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem,

ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51078R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action for recognition and
support against private respondent, and from the respondent Court"s resolution,
dated 11 October 1978, denying petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said
decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her
mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and
support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent
Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held 21
January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of
Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon
plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial
on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to
his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to
appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing
whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao
argued that the result of the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable
evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial court"s
decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:

From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that JAO
was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by
Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long
thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and subsequently, they
lived together as husband and wife. ...
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied ARLENE
to the Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her confinement
was with JAO"s consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the salaries
of the maids, and other household expenses. ...
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16, 1968,
after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must
have conceived JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967.
"Thus, one issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether on or about that
time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse and were already living with
one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the
third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside
Club; that after several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her
house at 30 Long beach, Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of
November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with her at her dwelling
after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro
Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle
and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December
14, 1967 because the day following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin
Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to Mindoro by boat. He dated
ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He remembered he had carnal
knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968, because that was a
week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started
cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the
paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the
NBI and which resulted in the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE,
JAO could not be the father of JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a
position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage
by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court ... where the
blood grouping tests of the NBI were admitted; especially where, in the
latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted the test and it appears
that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the findings and
report. ... In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court
had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus,

it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood

grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950"s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it
can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of
the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the
father of a particular child, but at least can show only a possibility
that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have
recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the
decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of nonpaternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed
manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one
of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may
scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results
avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to
turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the
fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged
father or any one of many others with the same blood type may
have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes
that the tests may have some probative value to establish
paternity where the blood type and the combination in the child is
shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let
it in (I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion
is now in accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative
relation between the trait of the progenitor and the trait of the
progeny. In other words, the blood composition of a child may be
some evidence as to the child"s paternity. But thus far this trait (in
the present state of scientific discovery as generally accepted) can
be used only negatively i.e. to evidence that a particular man F is
not the father of a particular child C. (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd
Ed., pp. 610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood
test, JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in
cases where they tended to establish paternity; and that there has been no
case where the blood test was invoked to establish non-paternity, thereby
implying that blood tests have probative value only when the result is a
possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention is
fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would
be recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood
grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the test is regarded

worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an admitted test, it is admissible in

subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in the negative or in
the affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner"s
contention that JAO"s actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to
recognition. Said the respondent appellate court:
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his
own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the
latter"s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation,
rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE,
the attention given to her during her pregnancy and the financial
assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood
grouping test. These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the
unborn JANICE as his own as the possession of such status cannot be
founded on conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have
earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of
Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which provides:
"When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said
article which states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived
from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that
her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the
latter avers it was one week after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy
paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must have been conceived when
ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE herself
testified that their cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967, then
it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during this
cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot
be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her
alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of
conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying"

Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and considering
that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside
Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the
trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of plaintiff"s cause by
ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and candid
manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have
been overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by her acts,
whether she was lying or not.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new
one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm
paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of
filiation, support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood
tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a
possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that the
child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of
the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility,
coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to
definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel." 3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to
disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For
the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal
scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively
prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not
the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father
are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.4
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove
non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the
positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown
that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized
as final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity
consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that
the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation. The
Court said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the
plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific
fact. Courts, it was stated, should apply the results of science when competently

obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result was to deny
progress.7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph,8 a filiation proceeding
where an uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was
held conclusive.9 Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in
force in several states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of nonpaternity, thus
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which
can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same
type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten by
the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the
impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed
father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot
be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a
blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of nonpaternity. 12

result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific

fact.
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted,
which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the
issue of recognition raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Moreover,
The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a
ground for compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have
produced the conception of the child. This would be the case, for instance,
if the cohabitation took place outside of the period of conception of the
child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the
supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself
cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the
instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the
tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear
to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a
serologist, and has had extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood
tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood
grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System, 14 under witness and
supervision.15
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper
subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood
test, she, represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to
prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test
again.161avvphi1
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the
result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and
conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No
evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed
or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by
her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill
the earth. Others did not heed the sequence of this command because they multiply
first and then go. Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate
offspring to sue his father for recognition and support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:

Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to
Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less
that a year's time, she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco
distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they
renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of
goods. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became
intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in
April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president and general
manager. He came home to her three or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid
rentals, lights and water bills. 1 Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was
provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to give
her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner
and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a
still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by
petitioner. 2 Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54, Makati, private
respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila
Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of
Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. 3 Leoncia submitted
receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from
December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. 4
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of
cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) 5 or
thru Merceditas herself; 6 and sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532, 7 the signature appearing thereon having been
identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks which
he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. 8 Both petitioner and his daughter
admitted that the check and the signature are those of the former. 9
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he
showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the
St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth
grading periods 10 as her parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia
and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their presence and of
Elynia. 11 Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one
whom she recognized as her Daddy. 12 He treated her as a father would to his child.
He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her
for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. 13

When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave

Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong." 14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and
petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the
morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon.
When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it
was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was
already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following
morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to
Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.
Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes
with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila,
upon his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes
of explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt. 15 They stayed
at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to
Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped
coming home.
Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia
and Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite
column 16 of the death certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in
column 13 thereof opposite father's name the typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano,
appears. He also denied the following: all the notes alleged to have been received
from him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merceditas'
Report Card; and being the source of a photo of himself with a handwritten
dedication. He admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 including
the signature is his. He was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on
January 7, 1964. 16 He does not understand why this case was filed against him. 17
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia,
leased it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and
Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. They later transferred to San Juan
St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped visiting her in March or April,
1963 because he planned to get married with another which he eventually did in
September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by
Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she
been brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her
father was at their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was
advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7,
1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December 30,

1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium
because he was at their home at that time; and that her father lived with a certain
woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living with them in
Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to the office everyday and when he goes
to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother goes with him.
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies
about petitioner's sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7,
1964. It could not be true that her husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived
three (3) times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her husband
never slept out of their house and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of
the Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a
year because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial
court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis
of the following:
1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas'
conception;
2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was
living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her;
3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;

Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of

P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the costs.
SO ORDERED. 19
The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26,
1992. 20
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent
court:
1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a judgment
declaring petitioner father of Merceditas with finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition; and

4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and
5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by petitioner to
Merceditas.
Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint.

of the filing of the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to August 15,

1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month from August
16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
(P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1978 to August 15,
1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a month
from August 16, 1981 up to the time she reached the age of
majority on December 30, 1984.

18

Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the
same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidenced
adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that
petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The dispositive portion of its
decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S.
ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child
of defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the right appurtenant to
such status.
Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the
rate of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date

3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established decisions of this

Court.
Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the
trial court, therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to
Merceditas. It would have been only from the date of the judgment of the trial court
that support should have commenced, if so granted. Under the law in force when the
complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain an action for compulsory
recognition. In order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition,
it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing under the caption
"parent" in the report card, is not sufficient. Merceditas has never been to the family
home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor brought around
town by him, treated as his child, introduced to other people as his child, led people
to believe that she was part of his family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those
who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two
groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified

by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new
Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each
other on account of certain legal impediments. 21 Since petitioner had a subsisting
marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, 22 she is a spurious child.
In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other
than natural in accordance with Article 269 23 and other than natural children by
legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in
the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the
transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to
surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. 24
However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of
paternity 25 either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle
that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his
parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood
relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights
of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents
but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a
child. 26 The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of
the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of
the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to
recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case,
petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his spurious child. This provision
should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other
illegitimate) children . . . under the circumstances specified in
articles 283 and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise
our finding, that private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and the

paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the

highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak
denials of petitioner:
Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and
defendant carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not
satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is
not convinced that her mother and defendant were in cohabitation
during the period of her conception, and took into account the
testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment
where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified
that he took care of all the bills and that he shared the same bed
with plaintiffs mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at
Guagua was rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes,
who was a mere employee and godson of the defendant with a
monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the latter, and
only frequented the place upon instruction of the defendant to
take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an
apartment at the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by
and of which Artemio was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46,
8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the absence of
Artemio whose residence and main office was in Cavite. There, for
the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The
apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As
Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50,
8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon
Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74).
Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services
needed in the apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to
Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for liquidation of
cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or
Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32,
8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of
four times a week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio
was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38,
7/18/73).
Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute
between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio
transferred Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20,
7/18/73) where they were known as husband and wife (id. p. 41).
In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was fetched by

Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant's

Brief)
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several
places heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted
man Friday of Artemio who would deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1"
and "F-3") and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference,
among the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from
defendant were the following:
Exh. "F-1"
"Dear Ne,

The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia

whose nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio shortens to "Ne".
Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing" mentioned in
Exh. "F-1" refers to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia
who was with Artemio when Leoncia was removed from the
hospital during the birth of Merceditas. (pp. 17-19, Appellant's
Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when pieced together
ineluctably gives lie to defendants' diversionary defense that it
was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with
during her period of conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of
Leoncia being in the apartment and sharing the same bedroom
and the same bed hardly inspires belief.

Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng

diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay masakit pa.
Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis
diyan ay si Miling na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati kung may
kailangan ka dian.Sgn."
"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio
ng Makati. Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.
Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta
ako.
Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan. SgExh. "F-2"
"Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawaExh.
"F-3"

xxx xxx xxx

Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the
relationship between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a man
Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to the hilt and
unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an accounting of his
expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia,
Artemio or Guagua Telephone System which would not have been
the case, if it were true that there was an intimate relationship
between him and plaintiff's mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather,
Melencio foisted on the court a quo the impression that he was the
lover and paramour of Leoncia but since there was really no such
relationship, he could not state the place in San Juan or Highway
54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long they stayed there belying
his pretense (sic) of an intimate relationship with plaintiffs mother.
27

"Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako

diyan (11:30 am). Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na,
sigurado yon.
Sgn."Exh. "F-4"
"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng
mataas ang dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa
oficena.
Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong
makarating dian sa Jueves. Sgn."

Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then
applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as
sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession of
status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his paternity,
and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was
really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated denial of paternity
after the action has been filed against the putative father is not
the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had
already been recognized by defendant by various positive acts
clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once
validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere

change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil

status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest.
Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the
revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1
Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983 Ed.).
To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not,
however, mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character
while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously
and without concealment though without publicity (since the
relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of
Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia vs.
Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701) There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1,
1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302,
September 24, 1991.)
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the
delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio
(TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their
residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself
(id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without
any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since
Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and
called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact
that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and
sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all
what a father should do for his child bringing home goodies,
candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys
which Artemio gives Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are
positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and
recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh.
"E-7" where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a "frog test"
to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2"

and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74)
and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature
appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of
Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio
would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check
(TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the
check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband
and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas
(sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas
(sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1"
and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of
Artemio were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and
"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas
(sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite,
Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To
Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20,
Appellant's Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to
offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of
Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee's daughter.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in
order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan
to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total
stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in
the process falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting. 28
Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient
proof of continuos possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied
next paragraph (4) of Article 283:

. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too

replete with details that are coherent, logical and natural which
cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive and
malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to
possess.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the
genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their
living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of
appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support
from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no
room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed
by his belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as
lacking in credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that
defendant is the father since the Certificate of Live Birth was not
signed by appellee and since the monthly report card is not
sufficient to establish recognition, considering the denial of the
defendant of his signature appearing thereon.
While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of
Live Birth, the evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave
birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the
Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25,
5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id. p. 26) who made
inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries were
directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the
answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper
(id. p. 28). The inquiries were about the name of the father,
mother and child. After the interview the nurse told them that the
information has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be
signed by Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is no office, as it
was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in the morning for
Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to
give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving
very early the following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00
a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33). Artemio stayed in the
hospital in the evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As
pointed out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958] and Berciles v.
Government Service Insurance System (128
SCRA 53 [1984] that if the father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by
the mother, doctor, register, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity does not
apply to this case because it was Eustaquio

himself who went to the municipal building and

gave all the data about his daughter's birth. . . .
. . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is
the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status
by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed affiliation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, . . . Such
evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence,
the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 29
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers
all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that
the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory
recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it
may still be enough under the last paragraph. 30 This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation. 31
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious
child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent
court took into account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time
the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the
Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff,
having been born on December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years

old at the time and was already of school age spending about
P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while
defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She attained
the age of majority on December 30, 1984 (Article 234, Supra).
She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of twelve
(12) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is
hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years; and
considering the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as
she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for
the next three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding
three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years,
four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she attained the age
of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees
is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover,
the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts and
circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. 32
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was arrived
at arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years
after the decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any consideration
because it appears that it is being raised for the first time in this petition. 33
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26,
1992 are AFFIRMED.

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon.
Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and
Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review,
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938
of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said
special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and
legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint
denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix
of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said
complaint are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad
Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real
and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28,
1983;

3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan,

for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other
that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was
christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire
and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who
was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired,
showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his
putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from
indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder
reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself
for me alone and for me all the time. As I have
now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio
for our sake and for the child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.

7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving
heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been
ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag,
Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in
whose behalf this instant complaint is filed;
9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son,
Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said
child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative
father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for
defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said
demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refused
and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance
against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3
xxx xxx xxx

. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm

proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my
name and let me entitle him to all what I am and
what I've got.

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering

defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties
left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child
Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.

. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my

heir.

Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of
affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the
action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent
Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court
was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder
of causes of action. 4

. . . How is CHAD and you . . .

. . . Why should we not start now to own him,
jointly against the whole world. After all we love
each other and CHAD is the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is
nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving
heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death
was the owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio
City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with
approximate value of several millions of pesos;

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative
defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of
further proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of
the parties so as to hear their respective sides

WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes

of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence
is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is
hereby denied and the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was
granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined
respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the
complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and
thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative
defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the
said motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action
exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary
right to redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which
apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to
enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that there is
no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not
premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then
recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by
the defendant by filing one action after another is definitely
violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the
Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural
guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious
child may file an action for recognition within four years from his
attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether
the letters of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that
should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.

No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as

was done in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a
misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of
special jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to
entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control
the body of the complaint.
From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is
sufficient' in form and substance and, therefore, the motion to
dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which
it should be shown that the allegations of the complaint are
unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on
January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with
respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated
October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on
certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed
Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER
DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT providing clear exceptions to the general rule that
interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the special
civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by
Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent
Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not
theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the
interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code
requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate

minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of

Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code,
providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to
establish illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code,
providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action for
recognition of a natural child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional
Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private
respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the
complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor
child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first
be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in
the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of
such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then
there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the
complaint should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the
petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as
defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late
Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of
the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had
been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver
her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants
therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the
dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that,
even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the
time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already
reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a
minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the
putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because
such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There
being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of
the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the
prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends
that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor

Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition
and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain
ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion
of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always
that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes
of action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there
is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly,
there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported
by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and
the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been
in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings
for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the
same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither
of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff
to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious
reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the
other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court;
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has
prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel
recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that
since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family
Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that

the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has
prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner
theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and,
instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive
effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law
being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be
made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except
in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record
of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's
filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is
based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an
illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the
complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing
which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private
respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and,
since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation
may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine
whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right
or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14
We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question
is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may
affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes
them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or
invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be
governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises
especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the
Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably
affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child
she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in
court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of
the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned
order of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by
petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and
may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case
No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon
City. The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano,
1
who found that "(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that
seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners) as
his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence
to prove the petitioners filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench, another
action for recognition and support against the private respondent before another
branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and guardian
ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL
FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A
Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends
regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they
started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The
tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of
petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two
children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March,
1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was
spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence:
their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the
baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is
respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner
Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta
Esguerra.

Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, 3 Dr. Milagros

Villanueva, 4 Ruby Chua Cu, 5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. 6 The first three witnesses
told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times, 7 introduced the
private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand,
testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner
Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two
petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of
petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante
Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of
petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent also presented as
witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's
allegation that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during
their affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito
together at the said restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only learned he
was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was
sued for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the
plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the relief's
prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein private
respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito
Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 41/2
as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has a
supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support
in the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be delivered to
Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and natural guardian, with
arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on February 19,
1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint dismissed by the
respondent Court of Appeals 8 in its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It
found that the "proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the
(private respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further held that the
doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on
December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not giving
full faith and credit to the testimony in of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and
value to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value

to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during the

baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving
probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much credence
to the self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6)
holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be
reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is
when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the
case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and
settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent
is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which
the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold
that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and
Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father
of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as
one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante
Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent
showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity
(Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio,
192 SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness between
Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him
paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels
and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each
other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much
less would prove violation of complaint's person and honor.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming private
respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that
private respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles
vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that
although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a
child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the baptismal
record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. .
. . The reason for this rule that canonical records do not constitute

the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove

the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is
simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by
reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his
presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day
stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect
to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts
which require separate and concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are
not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying
private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of
their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the
respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the
father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth
certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but,
also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which
he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child
upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth
of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the
latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.
(Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate no
signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of
paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners
and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly calibrated their
weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who
solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness
stand:
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion
when you called for the father and the mother of
the child, that both father and mother were
present?

A Yes.

Q What month in 1986.

Q Would you able to recognized the father and

the mother who were present at that time?

A It is difficult. . .

A Yes.
Q Please point to the court?
A There (witness pointing to the defendant,
Carlito Fernandez).

Q When was the first time you know you are

going to testify here?
A Let us see, you came there two times and first
one was you want to get a baptismal certificate
and then the second time was I asked you for
what is this? And you said it is for the court.

Q For instance, just give us more specifically

what question do you remember having asked
him?

Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra

went to your place, you were already informed
that you will testify here before this Honorable
Court?

A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan

and his works?

A Yes.

Q What was the answer of Fernandez?

A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please
look at the defendant again. I want to be sure if
he is the person who appeared before you on
that occasion?

Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta

Esguerra that this man wearing the blue T-shirt
is the father?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .
A Yes.

A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown
a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private
respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were
first shown this picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.

Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra
and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of
the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this
proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates
numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of
the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of
Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is
insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate
court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing
petitioners action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering our
findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 15, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708
which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch
60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to
acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give
support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by
Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent
who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child.
She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to
Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as
petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2,
1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan
Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after
their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San
Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent
her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he
rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts
house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent
Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar
planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a
servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to
her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This
displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend
New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for
San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that
she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the
night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something

jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the
child of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to
petitioners house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners
wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her
stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told
petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she
was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias
counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already
pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking
in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2,
1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia
despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality,
her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court
declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this
case, based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never
be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with
plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the
evidence of the plaintiff in support of the claim to "be meritorious;
defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse with the plaintiffs mother,
Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was
presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on
the personal appearance of the child, then there can never be a doubt that
the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors
mother, Florencia Regodos."2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:
The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a
widow should not prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the
Supreme Court, even where a witness has been found to have deliberately
falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the whole of
her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts
and disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA

574, 575). There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first
intercourse with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months
later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to appellee (TSN, Hearing of
June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A").
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced
before the trial court and there being no evidence that the latter had
overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent reason to disturb the trial
courts findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.3
Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF
THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF
SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT.4
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts.
As a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual
findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals,
become final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a different
conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The
Court is convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions. 5
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private
respondent was based on the testimony of the childs mother and "the personal
appearance of the child."
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation.6 An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties

so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and

convincing evidence.7
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates,

the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of
petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.8
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect
to the childs paternity.9 Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and
they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. 10

Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her
in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of
voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and
the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition
for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which
did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias
husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to
the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.11 The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in
the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.12
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and
set aside. Private respondents petition for recognition and support is dismissed.

NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas
who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time,
enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a
widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered
all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation
and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and
her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further
alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to
support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the
amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
He described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child
also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the
country, respondent spent time riding on petitioners jeepney which was then being
utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had
seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against
said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges
against respondents brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It
was at that time respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for
charity as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the
child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism
when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of
respondents chicanery and deceit designed to scandalize him in exchange for
financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondents evidence.

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his kumadre
Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no more
companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision
(petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at
the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former
boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of
her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought
that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly
and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant with

petitioners child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower. She
wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have
another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she
stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to
their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan
City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and massaged
her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the
childs birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It
was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was
excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his look-alike, and
this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the
apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the babys birth,
petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter
and eventually his wife was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate
child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent money so
she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and
sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of relatives and
friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought
to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the
Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it
was only petitioners wife who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory
words against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by petitioner of
apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his
presence during and after delivery of respondents baby, respondents attempted
suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the
bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioners wife at
the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision 8 in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1.

Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND

(P2,000.00) PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through the mother;

2.

Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way
of litigation expenses; and

3.

To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.9

petitioners motion for postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for
the initial presentation of defendants evidence, and the motion for reconsideration
of the said order denying the motion for postponement and submitting the case for
decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that respondent
satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and
consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondents
prayer for support. The appellate court thus held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the
civil registry which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however, that during her pregnancy,
Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00
which he paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her with a
household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). He
also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was
with Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in labor, walking her around and
massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented
apartment after Annabelles discharge from the hospital. People living in the same
apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos delight to father a son at his age which
was his look alike. It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give
him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace Murillo,
the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record.
Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiffs
evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the
Supreme Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of
Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision provides that the father is obliged
to recognize the child as his natural child x x 3) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or proof
that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory
recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three paragraphs,
it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of
defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA,
supra).

Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case
without affording him the right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the
trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and
ordering him to give monthly support.

It shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the
same needs it for maintenance x x. (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10

By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal. The appellate
court found no reason to disturb the trial courts exercise of discretion in denying

Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER
WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN
UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT
CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION OF
CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION
TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND
THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER. 11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the
convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the
principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the
matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option of
choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself
or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides
or may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place
where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced. 14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the
Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under
the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue
must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed
waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioners objection on venue is therefore
deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the resetting
of the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was
not the first time petitioners motion for postponement was denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondents last
witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the
continuation of hearing for the reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner)
on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated December 17,
1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at those hearing dates
earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioners former counsel,
Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997
hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which request was
granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17,
1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection
from respondents counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the
hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997. With the non-appearance of both petitioner and
Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco
declared their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and accordingly
deemed the case submitted for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E.

Villarosa filed his appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date
he filed entry of appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial court,
without offering any explanation for Atty. Balas failure to appear for the initial
presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its March 14,
1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On
August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the presentation of
their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial
court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October 10,
1997 for the reason that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another
case which was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As
prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to October 10, 1997. On said date,
however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On February 16,
1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear
whether Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court
received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa.
The reason given by the latter was the scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998 Order issued by the
RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 1946. But as clearly stated in
the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the
hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a
previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998 hearing was scheduled as
early as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial court
denied for the second time petitioners motion for postponement. Even at the
hearing of their motion for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September
21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and instead filed another motion for
postponement. The trial court thus ordered that the case be submitted for decision
stressing that the case had long been pending and that petitioner and his counsel
have been given opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a second
motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the
hearing thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement
have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they
must be prepared on the day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an order declaring a party to
have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds
the trial courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed on the part of one party. 20
Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view of
his own negligence in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules.
As we held in Tiomico v. Court of Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence
of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The
inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates and in
belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court
appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in mind that a
client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the
case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts denial of
the motion for postponement filed by petitioners counsel, petitioners contention
that he was deprived of his day in court must likewise fail. The essence of due

process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. Where a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain
of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in
ruling that respondents evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is
the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1) of Christian Paulo
Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed
by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the
said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she
wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. 25 Thus, if the father
did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. 26 Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument 27 and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating
petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration
of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity. 30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their
rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits E and F32 showing petitioner
and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value.
The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit C) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital

where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to

prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioners admission
in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondents child
as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner and respondent
showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are
not sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not
signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he
is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not
qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. 35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In the
said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is
the father of private respondents daughter and were signed by him. The Court
therein considered the totality of evidence which established beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondents daughter. On the
other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained the appellate courts
finding that private respondents evidence to establish her filiation with and
paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latters public
acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private respondents mother, and
private respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial
evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court
thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous possession of
status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered
the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondents evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of
Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while respondent lived in Murillos
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with
details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence, documentary and
testimonial presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate courts
ruling anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate court which was
quoted at length in the ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself
(id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth without any objection on the
part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had
always known and called Artemio as her Daddy (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the

fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take
her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id.
p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child bringing home goodies,
candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio
gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that
Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special
attention is called to Exh. E-7 where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a
frog test to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio,
thru Elynia (Exhs. E-2 and E-3, and D-6), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN,
p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. G) and the signature appearing therein which
was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks
and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p.
49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were
those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio
has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in
Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of
Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. H-1 and
H-2) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio [were] both
identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. H-1 and
H-2 at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia
(TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong. (Exh. I). (pp. 19-20, Appellants Brief)

lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. 43 The rule on substitution of

parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus
applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAGR. CV No. 64379 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.

The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of
the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The
entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated
therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellees daughter. This
particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are
not competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondents evidence failed to
establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties
so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioners counsel
informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still
alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held
that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her
husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON,
respondents.

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to
inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that
right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,
1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife
died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession
of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed
estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for
the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the
defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the
adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was
their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case
No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In
its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the

appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CAG.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia
and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the
estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of
the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the
petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the
private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally
adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the
decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her
parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code,
naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who
manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural
mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to
annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel
already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish
this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge
the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way
back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should
have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of
Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They
did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption
was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of
such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10)
days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners
could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL
and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could
have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the

adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided

by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is
of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the
present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial
judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter
alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the
validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition,
but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional
facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a
collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases
where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments,
Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; it cannot be considered void
merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as
the abandonment of his next of kin to the
adoption, may be essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this
does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily
in accordance with the truth; a mere error
cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of
adopted children would always be uncertain,
since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with
different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have

been valid, while another court would hold it to

have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts
as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking
in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel
is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the
lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the
present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have
this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental
purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense
or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted
children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents

in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in
acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love
for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.

grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the
adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one who the person
represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in
their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased
father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article
981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these
rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted
children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel
Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of
their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in
holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND
LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 1 which reversed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring
William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir
of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to
pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an
action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late
William Liyao" against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. 2 The complaint was later amended to
include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized
and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."3
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two
(2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in
Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting
marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice
president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She
failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of
land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far
East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao
visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical
and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William
Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to
secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a

bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company 4 and gave
weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the
office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. 6
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. 7 Corazon also
presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao
while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. 8 During the
occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence
of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I
can still make a good looking son." 9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child
of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy
and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William
Liyaos death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his
tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings,
collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White
Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G.
Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some
housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions
like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples
residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see
William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was
pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a
week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see William
Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and
knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of
grocery supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two
(2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on
November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy
and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage,
"Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."10 He then talked about his plan for
the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it "engrande" and "make
the bells of San Sebastian Church ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since
William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos
funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved
shirt of blue and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph13 as well as another
shirt of lime green14 as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with
the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From William."15 Maurita remembered
having invited the couple during her mothers birthday where the couple had their
pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew
that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled

nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire
cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo
or any other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew
that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter
being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout
Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to
see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to
White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr.
Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that
she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon
how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had
mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon
with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave
Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from
Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in
the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from
the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about
six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the
latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of
Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying
Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by
his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao
carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the
possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.16 Linda grew up and lived with her parents at
San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents
were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her
parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at
their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town
business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would
change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father
reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described him as
very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success
would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough,
strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two
strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He
suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr.
Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his
therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his
name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She
handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their

lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was not
active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder
stroke during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two
(2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was
easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to
spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon
was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil
Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment 17 of their marriage.
Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the
company garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to
Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged investments with the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company.
Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to
take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from
the office. There was one instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is
leaving and taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs.
Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go.
Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after
having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear,
sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never
been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village,
Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. 19 Her father
suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the
first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were
affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict
medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr.
Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control.20 Tita Rose
testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far
East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any
formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son
of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the company,
Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late father representing
payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose
added that the laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the
personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for
work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the
morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin
Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr.
Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in
September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added

that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among
which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975,
Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer
leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to
carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao
and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of
the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr.
Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo
who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon.
He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic
Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to
the latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda
said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty.
Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the
lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not
remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like
shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad
litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son
of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan,
Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the
minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao,
entitled to all succesional rights as such; and

latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential
secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as
his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his
legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the
law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the
presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that
marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period
cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court
gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon
Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal
separation, were seen in each others company during the supposed time that
Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further
noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr.
which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity
in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates and considering that his signature does not appear
thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute
competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as
evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to
prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon
Garcia since William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a
number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately,
both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May
petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his
supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate.22 The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only
flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption
is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. 23

(d) Costs of suit.21

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance
of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter
was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The
trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and

consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of
the New Civil Code24 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way
that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten
(10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the
late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations
with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation," 25 executed and
signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any
property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. 26
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under
the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. 27 Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the
one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
economic interest involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed
to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.29
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as
guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 30 We cannot allow

petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law
that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other
hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the
paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. 31
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon
Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of
the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the
records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth
of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the
case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia,
and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.1wphi1
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with
the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors,

represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as
proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to
enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July
1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves
de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some
real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that
petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon
City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and
subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15
February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of
Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled
that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial
considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have
effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1wphi1.nt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several
other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to
compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent
Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once
petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It was
contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to
likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be
taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately,
dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper.1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special
proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or
right.

Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.2
In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by
petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn
legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the
complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has
ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in direct action frontally
addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is
time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved
by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.4 The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court
action is required.5 In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or
an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of
limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement. 7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being
their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate.8 this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. 9 Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, 10 and in proper cases Article

171,11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable, 12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children
of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy
of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in
Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to
be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private document. Signed by
the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of
legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners
totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly
opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de
Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners
are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy
as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, 15 one that can only be repudiated
or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. 16 Indeed, a child so
born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard
and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. 1 In case
of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and
vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of
upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma.
Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married on December 29, 1989.2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas
parents in Fairview, Quezon City.3 Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma.
Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On
December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy.5 He alleged that nine years before he married Ma.
Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage
was never annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was
residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She,
however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario
at all.8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The
custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights.9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage
annulled. She held him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved
for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the
decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called visitation rights between the

hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday." 10 She argued that there was
nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child."11 She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be
changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an
illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma.
Theresas motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the
other, something they should never do if they want to assure the normal
development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a
father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize
something that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the
emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were
allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this
matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby
DENIED.12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling
of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the
continued use of Gerardos surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo
had already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname
(Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court.13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a
putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court
affirmed the "best interest of the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled
that "[a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the convenience of the parents
which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once
a week."14

The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers
surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate
proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry.15
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of
the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so
that she could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the
appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling
and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the
appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never
entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called
"marriage" with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had
established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to
Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal
and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be
deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate
and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family
Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither
custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot
impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing
the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to
destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any
possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal
upon an illegitimate relationship.16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth
certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that
appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural
child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the
Family Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring
ours)

Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of
his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much
less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are
the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy
cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can
change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not
what a parent says it is.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision
but the same was denied.18 Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.19 Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate.20
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article
167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of

physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. 31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to
make marital intimacy impossible.32 This may take place, for instance, when they
reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the
period of conception.33 Or, the husband was in prison during the period of
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of
prison regulations.34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon
City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no
evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them.
Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her
lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for
them to engage in the marital act.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of

legitimacy.22 We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania
v. Court of Appeals23:

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the

assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.

Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer 35 to the petition for
annulment of marriage36 that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an
admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an
admission that was binding on her.

Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband
Mario or, in a proper case,25 his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child
Jose Gerardo born to his wife.26 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.27 Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
her child.

Gerardos argument is without merit.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception.28 To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child.29 Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 30

First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate
son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal
by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that
there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she
never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between
them.

Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time
material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility
of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such
possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. 37 A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. 38
Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say
that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. 39
The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It
also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. 40
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the
trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the
Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the
mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to
the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the
very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.41 Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to
exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth.43 Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary
evidence of the filiation of a child,44 as the status of a child is determined by the law
itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
termination of marriage is sought to be established.45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it
could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this
case was improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.46 As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be
rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect
to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. 47
Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it
bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in
consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose
Gerardos illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at
heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more
favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred
and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and
mother, full support and full inheritance.48 On the other hand, an illegitimate child is
bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother.
He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of
that of his legitimate counterpart.49 Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the
discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as
bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy
presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble
between the very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him.
The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This
madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is
that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim
of incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy
which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames.50 A persons surname or family name identifies the family to
which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child.51 Hence, Gerardo cannot
impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to
him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the
entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed
out in a separate proceeding.

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the

Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to
each others company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them,
Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.

CORONA, J.:

Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:

At issue in this petition for certiorari 1 is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA)
gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
in issuing a decision2 and resolution3 upholding the resolution and order of the trial
court,4 which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private respondents complaint
for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) paternity testing.

Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.5

Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which
they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her
34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe
decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. 52 Through its laws, the State safeguards
them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual
development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in
this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and
lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January
10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE,
respondents.
DECISION

On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills
Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door
hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On
March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. 6
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and
intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He
claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their
relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only
because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she
proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was
a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two
consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe)
became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of
marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate
(him) from his wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and
children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as
by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop" 7 where she worked.
Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000,
Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their
return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last
intimacy was sometime in 1998."8 Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and
family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country

Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to
Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had
no "alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body." 9
Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC)
attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified.
The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually
married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. 10
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired
Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case. 11
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court.12
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination.13 He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under
the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the
putative father.14 In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges
for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a
petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was
forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be
ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right
to privacy and right against self-incrimination.15
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because
the private respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of
action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs
primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or
wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have
been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint
but by the facts alleged.16

In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the
petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his
answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he
fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the childs
conception and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there
existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is
whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents
have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner
and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and
petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness
and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the
father. He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for
recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin,
as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his
filiation in a separate suit under Article 28317 in relation to Article 26518 of the Civil
Code and Section 1, Rule 10519 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action
against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support,
such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20
we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim
ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the
putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because
such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There
being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of
the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the
prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends
that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to

compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil.
763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the
same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the
opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in
the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring
that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted
and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that
same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there
is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a
rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x
xx
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this
court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we
have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well
settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x;
and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate
of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it
been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court;
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag,
the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not
respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how
intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the
declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing
violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means
for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief

historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called
for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee21 where the appellant was convicted of
murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that
"while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative
as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA
test result (emphasis supplied)."
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous
decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,22 promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against
the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved
by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and
written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of
parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it
was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained
in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in
Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo24
where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of
the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA
testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile."
A year later, in People v. Janson,25 we acquitted the accused charged with rape for
lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real
malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our
doubts!"

In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC26 where the Court en banc was faced with the
issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In
Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,27 we affirmed the conviction of
the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA
test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the
reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in
all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA,
with the notable exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on
Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with
semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the
semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open
court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the
wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the
case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since
it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the
admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from
semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory
extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated
his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article
III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken
from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30 We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests
for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine from ones mouth32 and the
tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. 33 In Jimenez v.
Caizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an
action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent,
her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure,
rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA
testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres,36 where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification
system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, 37
and the infringement of privacy of communication38 where the constitutional right to
privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no
water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for
the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case,
an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing,
we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such
dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded
its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly
found widespread general acceptance.39 Several cases decided by various State
Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of
procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb40 shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that,
in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The
Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already
acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The
Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York
Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the
challenge, to order DNA tests:41
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity
executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services
law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health
law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child
pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and
filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the
public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth
occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial
or administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged
acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one
hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one
hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either
signators filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment
within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment
or the date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a
proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either
signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which the
respondent is required to answer the petition. After the expiration of sixty
days of the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator may
challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of
fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the
party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a

partys challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall order

genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the
childs paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if
appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither signators legal
obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the
acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the
acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. If a party
petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court determines that
the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the
acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the
order to the registrar of the district in which the childs birth certificate is
filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of
social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the
social services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject
of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to
title six-A of article three of the social services law, the court shall
immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement
unit of the social services district that provides the mother with such
services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through
an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit,
if and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in
section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act: 42
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test
results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic
marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or the motion of
any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit
to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally
acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the
secretary of the federal department of health and human services and
performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by
the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the
determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the
child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written
finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child
on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. The

record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test
ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred elevenk of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court
pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil
practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made
thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be
deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or
report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or
tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of
paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a child
pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to
this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section
may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of
the civil practice law and rules if offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section
shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party
is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any qualified
public health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the
court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social
services district. In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct
that the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties
according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the
party who does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is
financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,43 a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used
to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between
A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time
of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,44
the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed
G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said
judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a genetic
marker test that he was not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested the
tests after the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,45 the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the
constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements
pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the
advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary:

As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has
increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support
agreement(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to
99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the
disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA
paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in
1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a
decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males
from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively
pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement
between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far
more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were
often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father
was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the mother could
prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man--the
putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in
lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet
her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have included the
use of DNA testing:46
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother,
child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification
profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling;
compensation of expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary
report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own
motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father
submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may
include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell antigens,
red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or
DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged
father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court
orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to be
conducted and a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA
identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available,
the court may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the
appropriate party.

(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the

refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the
fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be
conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a
nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to,
the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified
person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue
typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and the DNA
identification profile and summary report are admissible as
provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of
the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons
indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the
contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity
testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated, unless
the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have identical
DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in
subsection (5), either party may move for summary disposition under the
court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child
support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7.
(emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,47 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results
showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a
child born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test
eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not
Justin's father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA
testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,48 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for
genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had
concluded without such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first
filed the case for paternity and support with the District Court, neither party
requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that
the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld.

The case of Kohl v. Amundson,49 decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota,
demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the
adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case,
Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of Amundsons child through DNA
testing, was able to have the default judgment against him vacated. He then
obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld
from his wages for child support. The Court said "(w)hile Amundson may have a
remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d)
Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default
judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from
obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages."
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,50 another case decided by the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established
through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could
still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named
individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this
doctrine in Williams v. Williams.51
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing.
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only
available "when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." 52 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of
Appeals53 where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we
discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by "grave
abuse of discretion":
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction
of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand,
if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis
supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion,
prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its
jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would
have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision
of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was
correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as
much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We
therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a
valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented
by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change
of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they
executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate
that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. 1

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.2 The trial court
found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is,
that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore
because of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The
trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child.
Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed
to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,

legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner
Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner
Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.3

Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also
not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by
Singaporean law.13

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained that the Singaporean
practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle
name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the
middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the
laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of
name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose
would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself
not reasonable.5

The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a
change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. 14

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6 arguing
that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined
by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is
contrary to Article 1747 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith
globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on
the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment,
for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best
interest of the child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner
points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment
and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges
that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until
he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to
previous cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of
name.10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition. The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court correctly denied
the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the
Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father
and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the
same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the
middle name "Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere
convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or
cancellation of entry.12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any
compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle
name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the middle
name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real.
The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the
childs middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true
parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine
Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang.

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and
reasonable cause for which the change is sought. 15 To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name
is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented
need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What
is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with
the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. 17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not
simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but
instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction
involving petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of
surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the
given name18 and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have
to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We
quote, thus:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he
is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with
him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons;
they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential
thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of
a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to
the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena

Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name
from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition
based on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine
citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a
Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last
World War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a
fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to

protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean
that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to
identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, 21 while illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. 22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies
him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or
private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his
middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as
this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean
society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which,
however, are not apropos both.

In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an

illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her
behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of
her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court held that a
petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for
the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity
provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she
would carry if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court
pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any
opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause
prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family
Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the
mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name,
even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate
daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil
Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her
school records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but
this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states
that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father,
there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to
which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification
to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his

justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action
on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the
cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed
their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have
exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to
change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of
reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the
tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a
result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of
Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner
had been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name and
she had not used her registered name in her school records and voters registration
records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a
mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress
his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for
change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the
petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of
the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which
his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. 26
As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the
change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in
his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED.

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,

vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the
exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court
will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness
to exercise such authority and care.
The Case
The Petition for Review1 before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August
28, 2002 Decision2 and the December 11, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR SP No. 69400.4 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P.
Miguel shall have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he
reaches ten (10) years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years
of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent he prefers to live with
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones, shall help support the child, shall
have visitorial rights at least once a week, and may take the child out upon
the written consent of the mother.
"Acting on the petitioners Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order, and
finding it to be without merit, the same is DENIED." 5
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:

"He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social
Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts
were futile.

"On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda
Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.

"Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711.
However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte.

"On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include
Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.

"The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be
given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his
capability to support and educate him.

"A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002
ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.

"On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with
the May 2, 2002 Resolution of this Court.

"The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan.
"The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the
minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of
him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner
enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in
Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.
"According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving
monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.
"On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel
came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that
they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to
bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They
promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the
petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as
promised by them.
"The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza,
Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latters
mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, respondent
Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter
at Tuguegarao City.

"In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of
the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines
and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their
agreement.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioners allegation that
respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who
took the child from the petitioner or the latters parents. She averred that
she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when
she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and
consented.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the
petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato
Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of
the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner
arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The custody
of the child, according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to
petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that
even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioners parents,
she has already been living separately from the petitioner in Japan because
the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman
until his deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese
national is for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying
temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to send
money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she
has no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning
to the Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she could.

"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be
given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and
Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody
of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While
acknowledging that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the
trouble and expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it
nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother.
Petitioner, however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the "ultimate" issue as follows: "x x x
[w]hether or not [he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental
care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away." 7
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be modified in
regard to its erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor
child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she
leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants
joint custody over the minor, such that the mother would have custody when she is
in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have
custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she
cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most
of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28,
2001,8 granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor.

At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is
studying,9 thus rendering petitioners argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas
Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent
Motion for a Hold Departure Order,"10 alleging therein that respondents were
preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and her
Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit. 11
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child
of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines12 explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.13
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were
generally classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction;
and (2) spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit.14 A natural child is one
born outside a lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.15 On the other hand, a
spurious child is one born of parents who, at the time of conception, were
disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. 16
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of
majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. 17 If both
acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was
awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children
applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the
father and the mother.18
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code.19 Now, there are only two classes of children -legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. 20
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before
the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has
become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or
born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed
under one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. 21 The
concept of "natural child" is important only for purposes of legitimation. 22 Without
the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there
is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their

son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him
resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of
him.
David v. Court of Appeals23 held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the
father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody
of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an
illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody
and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child;24 in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of
the adoptive parent.25

portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is
deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10)
years of age, to choose which parent to live with is DELETED for lack of legal basis.
Costs against petitioner.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having
sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. 26 She has
the right to keep him in her company.27 She cannot be deprived of that right,28 and
she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law." 29
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the
court finds cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award
of custody to someone else.30 In the past, the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority:
neglect or abandonment,31 unemployment, immorality,32 habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling
factor,33 we hold that the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the
child to Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge
of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court
of Appeals,34 the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his
children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of
parents over their children.35 Even when the parents are estranged and their
affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring
remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent
any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This
provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to
each other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or
because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been
established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the
July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that
time already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were
born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4
The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record
of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in
May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5

On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of
the children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and
physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the
following:

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part
of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the
grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the
appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonios]

prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x
Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the other
reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of

the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:

a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the
entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors
in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the
correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with
[Grande] over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and
Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties
minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall
stay with [Antonios] residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday
evening and to [Grandes] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of
minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the
days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed
minors outside of the country, without the written consent of the other and
permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000
per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7
(Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro
forma and for lack of merit.

a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of
Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only
take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the fathers
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental
custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors,
she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in
conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause,
compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering
that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a
consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the
CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right
especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over
their children.13

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion
for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed
the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied,
petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article
176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is
in permissive languagemay not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there
a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of
respondent?

We find the present petition impressed with merit.

The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core
issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now
reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate
child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255
is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of
the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the
surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a
judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free
from any interpretation.16 Respondents position that the court can order the minors
to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to
confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the
fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18
for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the
surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best
interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her
mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court,
upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a
surname different from the surnames of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule
regarding the use of a childs surname is second only to the rule requiring that the
child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of
an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his
interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name
to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a

legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as
to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence
in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court
found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name
will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in
the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the
fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register
of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the
Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new
surname) pursuant to RA 9255."

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document
is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall
use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the
following documents:
xxxx

The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper
annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby
changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis
supplied.)

7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of
Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use
the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument
duly notarized.

Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a

legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in
the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law
cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance an administrative agency
certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity

in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has
the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the
rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary
to statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution
provides:

a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and

Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may
only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA
9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their
fathers surname upon the latters recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of
an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are
given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.

c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by
the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged
thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to
have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not
offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary
weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into,
and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court
is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion
of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte
dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special
Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovannis guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor
GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old
and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be
served with summons and other court processes;

2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N.

Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated
[August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a petition for
change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother
[who is residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan,
Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the
filing of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since his
birth [in 1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine
(9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982
[,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother
used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage
between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth
[as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan,
Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and
up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters
of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovannis pleas]
for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he
desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname;
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the
United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child;
and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI
NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change
of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents petition sufficient
in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. 5 Publication of
the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte
once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered. 6 The trial court also
directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order. 7

Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court
to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG,
acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court
granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an
appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition
in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. 9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador11 and
claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely
affected by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to
make the proceeding adversarial.12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to
distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name." 13 Understandably,
therefore, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. 14
This is a reasonable requirement for those seeking such change because a persons
name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be
involved in the process and decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name.
Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,15 a separate and distinct
proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil
registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon). 16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the
court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is
whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the
reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient
to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of
name, meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights.17 Such issues are
ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is observed.18

When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the
Family Code of the Philippines),19 the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as
regards his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child
shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname from
birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis
putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code
which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang 20 is
enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname,
reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.1awphi1.net21
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name
to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a
legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as
to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence
in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court
found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil

Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name
will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in
the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner 22 in support of its
position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a
proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name.
Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by
petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondents case. While the OSG is
correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial,
the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure
to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical
errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition
for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary
proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is
not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical
errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil
registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a
corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In
this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an
adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation
notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG
a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did
not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to
exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not
merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither
opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were not adversarial enough.23 (emphasis supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. 24 Respondent
gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. 25 With this,
all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound
by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by
serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.

There being no explicit provision of law in point, the Court is called upon to cast
illumination in a gray area even as it fills up unintentional interstices in the fabric of
Civil Law with overlays of philosophical, historical and sociological strands. For an
understanding of how the issue arose, we now proceed to unravel the pertinent
factual background.
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time,
their relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in
love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought
a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a
Nevada court in 1949.
Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction
which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in
1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de
facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30,
1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio
and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under
Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an
estimated value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late
husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived
by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and
petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to
intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter
alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by
private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her
children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her
administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing
the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99
[1983]), declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon
instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the
heirs of Antonio de Santos.

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS,
respondents.
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's
order dated January 9, 1992.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that
since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as
legitimated her half brothers and sisters.

This argument is tenable.

obligations of the latter. Does this cluster of rights include the right to be
legitimated?

Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each
other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the
latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private
respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in
Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this
fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time.
Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that
he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate,
though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private
respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of
"Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a
provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void
and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their
offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are
"conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning," but because
there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged
natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as
such kind of children. In the case at bench, the marriage under question is
considered "void from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior
valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union
cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception,
their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a
prior subsisting marriage.
What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper
(those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other")? A legal
fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived by law to simulate a fact or
condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what it purports to be. In
this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving rise
to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural
children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with
acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and

Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the basis of
rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing the
substantive provisions of the law in force.
Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the new
provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on the
classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the corresponding rights they
are entitled to under the law. Thus, the title on "Paternity and Filiation" devotes two
whole chapters to legitimate children alone, and one chapter on those deemed by
law to be possessed of the rights of the former, such as legitimated children,
because of their compliance with certain requisites laid down by law; two other
chapters deal with illegitimate children composed of recognized natural children,
and those other than natural, or spurious, whether recognized or not. The wellordered delineation of such distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear
intent on the part of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and separate
one from the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights
accruing to the different categories of children.
It must be noted that before said Code was enacted, other classes of illegitimate
children were recognized, such as, "manceres" or the offspring of prostitutes and the
"sacrilegious" or children of those who had received Holy Orders. Subsequently, the
Civil Code, in an effort to keep in step with modern times, limited illegitimate filiation
to those which are incestuous, adulterous and illicit.
At the core of the institution of legitimacy held sacrosanct by Spanish tradition and
culture, lies the "inviolable social institution" known as marriage. This union, absent
any formal or substantial defect or of any vice of consent, is virtually adamantine.
On the whole, the status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its
resultant issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one
born outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the
time of the child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and
subsequently do so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the
"legitimated" child eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with
legitimacy. Without such marriage, the natural child's rights depend on whether he is
acknowledged or recognized by his parents, but he does not rise to the level of a
legitimate child in the manner that the legitimated child does.
A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is
declared a nullity is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is the
law which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child.
Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or derisively
denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There is no marriage
valid or otherwise which would give any semblance of legality to the child's
existence. Nothing links child to parent aside from the information appearing in the

birth certificate. When such child is recognized by one or both parents, he acquires
certain rights nowhere approaching those of his legitimate counterparts.

by legal fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of
the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children.

The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by
children, depending on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and support.

It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural

children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal fiction. This
conclusion is arrived at through a syllogism as simple as it is deceptive, which runs
as follows:

Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. 2 Thus, they
"shall principally use the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to support
from their legitimate ascendants and descendants, 4 as well as to a legitime
consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents, 5 and to other
successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of
legitimacy cannot be renounced." 6
Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction
shall principally use the surname of the father. 7 If a natural child is recognized by
only one parent, the child shall follow the surname of such recognizing parent. 8 Both
types of children are entitled to receive support from the parent recognizing them. 9
They also cannot be deprived of their legitime equivalent to one-half of that
pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the recognizing
parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latter's estate. 10
Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their
minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally, take the
latter's surname. 11 The only support which they are entitled to is from the
recognizing parent, 12 and their legitime, also to be taken from the free portion,
consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two-fifths
that of each legitimate child. 13
It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly secured
by law, 14 the legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the free
portion of the hereditary estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse,
may be reduced if it should exceed said portion. 15
Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above
mentioned. 16
These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a
legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate
children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an
acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditary rights are
concerned.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's
half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons:
First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that
they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children

The respondent's children are natural children by legal fiction.

Therefore, they have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children.
Acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated.
Ergo, respondent's children have the right to be
legitimated (as in fact they were "deemed
legitimated" by the subsequent valid marriage of
their parents in the Philippines in 1967).
The above line of reasoning follows the Euclidian geometric proposition that things
equal to the same thing are equal to each other. This may hold true in the realm of
instructional, as opposed to descriptive science, where the former calls for the
application of absolute, mathematical rules with precision but not to the latter,
particularly those which deal with the social sciences where human relationships are
central to a study whose main concern is not to leave out anything of significance.
The former deals with inanimate things, those which a scientist has described as the
"dead aspect of nature," excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining
absolute results and nothing more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole
truth as with those aspects or parts only through which the inexorable result can be
obtained. To apply the strict rules of syllogism, where the basic premise is defective,
to the arena of paternity and filiation, especially in the determination of the status
and rights of the different kinds of illegitimate children vis-a-vis the legitimate ones,
is bound to spawn mischief and results never intended by the framers of the
provisions of the law under review.
Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it may eventually be postulated that
"adulterous children shall enjoy the status, rights and obligations of legitimate
children," a doctrine which no moral philosophy under our social and cultural milieu
can countenance.
This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are "natural"
can be legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged natural children
(and, consequently, natural children by legal fiction) a "right" to be legitimized when
no such right exists. Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It
is a privilege, available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269.
Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged

natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore,

they likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially,
as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father and
his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their
parents.
The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the second
union affected by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of a valid
marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wife?
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our archaic law
on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns upon illegal
relations such that the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not
extend, nor were they intended to extend, to natural children by legal fiction. Article
269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined
thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children
conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized,
and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural
children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by
legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is
involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children,
like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her
testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half
siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to
only half of her share.

The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple and
unmistakable language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all point to the
correctness of petitioner's claim. If it should be asserted that we now trench on a
gray area of law that calls for interpretation, or a lacuna that cries for filling up, then
we have to pierce the shroud unintentionally created by the letter of the law and
expose its spirit as evincing intent, in this case one which decidedly favors
legitimacy over illegitimacy. The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by
law and the corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by
elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children
to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate
had their parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under
the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two
classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are
nothing if not pure fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE
CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled to all the rights
accorded to her by law.