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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 130026. May 31, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MAGAT y


LONDONIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM: batas
Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120, finding
accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann Fideli L.
Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death for
each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 as compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.
The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rape reads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO.Q-96-68119


"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen
year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO
MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal code, as amended by RA
7659, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th birthday of
Ann Fideli L. Magat in Kasunduan, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with
lewd designs, and by means of threat and violence, did then and there,
unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat."1

CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68120

"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen


year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO
MAGAT y LON DONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September1996, in Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs and by means of
threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat."2
Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained
for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and
the public prosecutor, Rio Espiritu agreed with the plea bargain. Consequently, the trial
court issued, on that same day, an Order, the fallo of which reads: katarungan
"On arraignment, accused with the assistance of his counsel Atty.
Diosdado Savellano and upon the request of the accused, the information
was read and explained to him in tagalog, a dialect known to him and after
which accused entered a plea of "GUILTY" to the crime charged against
him, and further pleads for a lower penalty to which the Hon. Public
Prosecutor interpose no objection.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accused ANTONIO LON
DONIO MAGAT, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Article 335, RPC in relation to RA 7659 and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment for each
case."3
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the
ground that the penalty imposed was "too light."4As a consequence, accused-appellant
was re-arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a plea of not
guilty.5
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida Daniel,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation and complainant's mother.

On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty.6 The court read to him
the Informations in English and Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he understood
his change of plea and propounded questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea.7
Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court required
the taking of complainant's testimony. The accused-appellant did not present any
evidence.
On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
HTML

"CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment finding the accused


ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, GUILTY of the crime of Rape in
violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, beyond
reasonable doubt and accordingly, sentences him as follows:
1.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accused Antonio Magat y
Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection; and
2.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accused Antonio Magat y
Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection.
On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is hereby
ordered to pay Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages
and another sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary and corrective damages.
SO ORDERED."8
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and proceeding
into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial court dated
January 10,1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argues that when the court
rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for
reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction
having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution
later realizes that the penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit

that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against
double jeopardy.
The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his
own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the
plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only
instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads
guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.- The accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. CODES
"A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser
penalty.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but
pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as
aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on
the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense
charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and
unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him.9 Hence, an
accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt
provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him.10
Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial
court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional
plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him,
is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before
judgment may be rendered.11

In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for
the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.12 Thus, since
the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy
will not lie.
Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant
was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did
not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he
is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same13 and waived the errors in
procedure.14 yacats
Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for setting
aside the Order of January 10,1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he made an
improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not complying with the procedure
laid down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court.15 He claims that the
record of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it conducted a searching
inquiry to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with
full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that there is no evidence
that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with the rules.
Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are
now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.16
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the
procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment, particularly the rules governing a plea
of guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the
mind of either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of
the charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser

degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.17 Apart from the
circumstances that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully
understood the consequences of his plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is
essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from
death sentences.18
We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial
judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the
voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence
of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not
make the procedure flawed. The minutes of the proceedings19 indubitably show that the
judge read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog,
asked him questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his
educational attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the
consequence of his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the
two (2) letters sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his
"sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform.20 olanski
Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming
that there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain the
conviction of the accused-appellant.
The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the Solicitor General, reveal:
"Complainant's x x x parents separated when she was only seven (7)
years old and she and her younger brother David were left with her father,
accused-appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister, Abigail,
stayed with their mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp. 3841; 49-51).
"On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten when
she resisted, thus, she found it futile to resist every time her father
touched her after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
"August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening, while
sleeping together with accused-appellant and her brother in their rented
house at Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by the kisses of
her father. He then removed her clothes and after removing his own

clothes, went on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina as he
had done to her many times before this incident. After he had finished, he
told her to wash her vagina which she did (TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).
"On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old, was
at home with accused-appellant and her brother after 'selling' when her
father ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell asleep
but complainant could not sleep and was restless that night. Again,
accused-appellant raped her on the same bed where her brother was also
sleeping. She did not resist him anymore because nothing would happen
anyway and he would just beat her if she did (TSN, supra, 21-25). haideem
"x x x complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually abused
but also physically abused by accused-appellant who even beat her with a
whip while being tied and struck her with a bag containing tin cans causing
head injuries necessitating her hospitalization. She also confirmed that her
father started raping her on her 9th birthday which was repeated several
times after that. She likewise revealed that she felt some fluid ('katas')
coming out of her fathers penis every time he raped her but she did not
become pregnant because her father made her drink the water from boiled
guava leaves and a medicine she identified as 'Gextex' (should be
Gestex) if her menstruation was delayed. In fact, when her menstrual
period was delayed for three (3) months, her father even boxed her
stomach after making her drink the water boiled from guava leaves and
Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She was not able to report
or reveal what her father did to her because she was warned by him that
he would kill her, her brother, her mother and her relatives if ever she
would escape and reveal the rape. Besides, she had nowhere else to go
and was further made to believe by her father that there was nothing
wrong with what he was doing to her because it was not forbidden by the
Bible."
The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. Ida P. Daniel of the
NBI testified that complainant had "lax fourchette" and "distensible hymen" which may
be caused by sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object such as a penis.
She also concluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to the
conclusion that there was more than one or even more than ten (10) times of sexual
intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object that passed through her vaginal canal.
Moreover, her hymen orifice can allow complete penetration of an average-sized
Filipino adult penis in its erect stage which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms. in diameter.21 hustisya
Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's
evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the in culpatory testimony of the complainant,
giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.

While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in
capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the
trial court in obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine
precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which
the plea of guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the
conviction is predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by
the accused of the offense charged.22 In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendant
was sentenced to death without having been previously informed of the nature of the
charges against him and of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances recited in the
information, as he is fully apprised not only of the allegations in the information but of
the entire evidence of the prosecution.23
Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated his first plea of guilt. It
removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt.24
Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in
Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contending that the complainant was already nineteen
(19) years old when the alleged rape occurred.
Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.......when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim." (Underscoring supplied)
Complainant was born on August 14, 1977.25 On September 1, 1996, when the rape was
committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120), complainant was already nineteen (19)
years of age. Therefore, the same does not fall under the last paragraph of Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper penalty should be
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Jksm

However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-9668119, complainant being only 17 years of age when accused-appellant, his father,
raped her.
Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages claiming
that the same is excessive.
With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People vs.
Victor,26 which was later reaffirmed in People vs. Prades,27 that "if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00."28 Accordingly, in Criminal Case NO.
Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages should be increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while appellant
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage should be the same
(P75,000.00). As rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and
shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regarded any lesser.
The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations overtime, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."29 More
so, if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and blood.
With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs. Prades30 held: Chiefx
" x x x The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that
under consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the
victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just,
without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of
allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should
be dispensed within criminal prosecution for rape with the civil aspect
included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such
allegations can be made.

"Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by
the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such
agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary
implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through the
superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade."
Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages excessive. An award
of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to our mind more reasonable. However, we are
deleting the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in the absence of any legal
basis therefor.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the
ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty
should be imposed accordingly.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.......In Criminal Case No. Q - 96 - 68119, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court convicting accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio of
rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of compensatory
damages be increased to Seventy - Five Thousand Pesos (75,000.00),
moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and
exemplary damages deleted. Esm
2.......In Criminal Case No. Q- 96-68120, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting accused - appellant of rape and sentencing him to the
Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby reduced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. The award of compensatory damages is increased to
Seventy - Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) , moral damages is reduced
to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages is deleted.
In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive clemency
or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official business.

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., on leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 131799-801. February 23, 2004]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELICIANO ULIT y


TAMPOY, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision31 dated December 17, 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97388 finding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape. 32 In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two
counts of acts of lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death, while for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the
appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. The appellant was, likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano,
the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000 for each count of acts of
lasciviousness.

The Indictments
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were filed
against her uncle, the appellant. The docket number and the accusatory portion of each
Information reads:
Criminal Case No. 97-385
That sometime in the month of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the uncle of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence, her
relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree, while armed with a knife, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an

eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.33
Criminal Case No. 97-386
That sometime in the month of February 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the uncle of complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence her
relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree, while armed with a knife, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an
eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
Criminal Case No. 97-387
That sometime in the month of December 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon
complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and
there kissing her and touching her sexual organ, without her consent and against her
will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.35
Criminal Case No. 97-388
That on or about the 2nd day of March 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon
complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and
there dragging her inside a bathroom and repeatedly kissing her on her checks [sic],
without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.36

The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint
trial of all the cases ensued.
In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the Philippine

General Hospital. On May 5, 1997, the prosecution presented her as its first witness.
On direct examination, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986. 37 In
November 1996, her uncle, the appellant, did something to her. When the prosecution
asked her what happened, Lucelle did not answer. When asked if she wanted to
continue with her testimony, again, she did not respond. The trial was reset to June 2
and 9, 1997. When trial resumed on June 9, 1997, Lucelle was questioned by the
prosecution on direct examination, but still, she gave no answer. She cried profusely in
open court. When asked by the court if she wanted to proceed with the trial, she
remained silent. The trial was reset anew to July 9 and 14, 1997.
In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and
psychological examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr.
Rochelflume Samson examined Lucelle and submitted her Report dated August 29,
1997 with the following remarks and recommendation:
Based on clinical history, mental status examination and psychological evaluation,
this patient is suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This illness is
characterized by intense fear and feeling of helplessness whenever she recalls her
traumatic experience of being raped. It causes her intense psychological distress
whenever asked to talk about the rape scene or incident. Thus, she avoids
recollections of the trauma.
At present, she is still manifesting symptoms described above. She would be
having difficulties testifying in court because of this. She requires psychiatric treatment
at the Out-Patient Section.38

During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The trial
was reset to July 21, 1997.
During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented Lucelle anew to
continue with her testimony on direct examination. She declared that the appellant
raped her in November 1996 and many other times thereafter in her residence at No.
7104 San Maximo Street, Makati City. Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and
circumstances before and during the commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked
Lucelle to identify her signature in her sworn statement39 and to affirm the truth of its
contents. She did so. The public prosecutor then marked the sworn statement in
evidence as Exhibit H, and then manifested to the court that he had no more questions
for the witness on direct examination.
On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that she was born on
February 19, 1986. The appellant mounted her, removed her pants, poked a knife at her

and threatened her.40


On cross-examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was her mothers older
brother. In November 1996, she was not enrolled in any school. Her father was working
at a construction firm, the appellant was employed at the Department of Environment
and Sanitation in Makati City, while her grandmother, who lived with her, worked as a
maid in Bel Air Subdivison. Her mother worked for one of her fathers cousins. On redirect examination, the prosecution elicited from Lucelle that the appellant raped her in
November 1996 at 11:00 p.m. inside the room of her aunt Marina in her grandmothers
house at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City, and that her aunt, Marina,
and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When asked where her aunt and Ate Sharon
were when she was being raped in her aunts room, Lucelle did not respond. When
asked why she did not respond to the questions propounded to her during the previous
hearings and why she had been crying in open court, Lucelle replied that she was afraid
of her uncle, the appellant.
In her sworn statement,41 Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she was
sleeping in a room in the house. It was about 6 oclock in the evening. She was
awakened when she felt someone kissing her on the cheek. When she opened her eyes,
she saw her uncle, the appellant, armed with a bladed weapon (balisong). He poked the
weapon on the left side of her neck. He warned her that if she told her parents, he
would kill her. He removed her panties, undressed himself and mounted her. He then
inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her private part and cried. The
appellant, thereafter, left the room. Also during the month of November 1996, the
appellant continued kissing her whenever her parents were out of the house.
In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed
her and mashed her private parts. Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again
abused her (sinalbahe) while she was in the same room. It was about 11 oclock in the
evening. He again warned her not to divulge to her parents what he did to her. At 9:00
p.m. on March 2, 1997, Lucelle urinated in the bathroom and when she was about to go
out, the appellant entered, pushed her inside and kissed her on her cheeks several
times.
Celso Serrano, Lucelles father, testified that sometime in November 1996, at dawn,
he was in bed and noticed that the appellant was in the bedroom of his cousin-in-law.
Sometime later, he went to the bathroom. He then heard his wife ask the appellant
where he had come from and the latter replied that he just came from the roof of the
house. On another occasion, one early Sunday morning, he noticed blood stains on
Lucelles short pants. When she declared that she had her monthly period, he gave her
P5.00 with which to buy sanitary napkins. Lucelle refused to accept the money. He
suggested that she wash herself but she just nodded her head. When he asked her why
she refused to accept the money, Lucelle replied that she was afraid to tell him because
she might be killed.

Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelles mother. Lucelle was born on
February 19, 1986.42 She and her husband Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle
resided with her mother, Guadalupe Ulit, at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia,
Makati City. Her sister Marina and the appellant, her brother, also resided in the same
house. The family slept together in the evenings in the sala of the house while Marina
slept in her bedroom. At times, Marina allowed her niece Lucelle to sleep in her
bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, 1997, Lourdes noticed that Lucelle was not at
her side. The appellant, who usually also slept in the sala, was not there either. Lourdes
went to Marinas bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a blanket.
Beside her was the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt.
When the appellant saw Lourdes, he slid down from the bed, went under the papag,
and furtively left the room. When Lourdes removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle lying
sideways with her knees up to her chin (nakabaluktot). Lucelle was trembling with fear.
When Lourdes asked Lucelle what happened, she did not respond. Lourdes left the
room and went back to the sala. She wanted to talk to the appellant but decided against
it when she saw him seated in the sala, playing with his balisong.
Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, she and her husband
were having dinner when she noticed that Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked
for her daughter in the house, but failed to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if
she had seen Lucelle. Nita replied in the negative. When Lourdes asked Nita if Lucelle
was inside the bathroom, Nita responded that the appellant was using it. Momentarily,
Lourdes saw the appellant emerge from the bathroom. He was in his short pants and
his shirt was on his shoulder. He was perspiring profusely. Lourdes was flabbergasted
when she saw Lucelle come out of the bathroom after the appellant. Lucelle was crying
and looked pale. When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she was crying, she told her mother
that she had just urinated. The appellant later told her sister Lourdes that he did not do
anything to Lucelle.
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes
brought Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way,
Lucelle adamantly refused to tell her parents what the appellant did to her. However,
when they reached the barangay headquarters, Lucelle told the barangay chairman that
the appellant sexually abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the
barangay chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting Lucelle.
Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay
chairman ordered him and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the
appellant to the barangay hall. The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he raped
Lucelle and the latter replied that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the
Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle
in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her resistance, and that he threatened
to kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents to her parents. 43 The appellant

signed his statement in the presence of the barangay chairman and the barangay
tanods.
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City
Police Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for
rape and acts of laciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit took the
sworn statements of Lourdes and Lucelle.44 She conducted a custodial investigation of
the appellant who was without counsel during which the latter admitted having raped the
victim. SPO4 Hogar also prepared a report on her investigation of the victims
complaint.45
On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that
on March 12, 1997, she conducted genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and
submitted Living Case Report No. MG-97-355 which contained the following findings:
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Height: 141 cm.

Weight: 78 lbs.

Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative,


ambulatory subject.
Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light-brown, 2.6 cms. in diameter.
Nipples, light-brown, protruding, 0.8 cm. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENERAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated.
Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact, distensible.
Hymenal orifice, admits a tube 2.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities,
shallow.
CONCLUSIONS
1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the
subject at the time of examination.
2.) Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to
allow complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury.46

When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay


before the barangay chairman47 as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando
David, the appellant objected to its admission on the ground that the appellant was not
assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same.
Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the statement as part of Davids testimony. The

appellants counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of Lucelles sworn statement


on the ground that she was incompetent to give the same because of her mental illness.
The trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in evidence as part of her
testimony.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to
November 5, 1997 for the appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called
for trial on that date, his counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing
his plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 from not guilty to guilty. He also
manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense in Criminal
Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein. The trial court suspended the
proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer with his counsel. When
trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the court
that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his
decision to plead guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer
present any evidence in his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was rearraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 with the assistance of the same
counsel and entered his plea of guilty to the charges.
On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant
of all the crimes charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
In Criminal Case Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, for rape, the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y
TAMPOY, as principal in the two counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is hereby declare[d]
CONVICTED in each of the cases. Accordingly he is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty [of] DEATH in each of the two cases; and indemnify the victim LUCELLE
SERRANO, in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages for each of the cases;
2.
In Criminal Case Nos. 97-387 and 97-388, for acts of lasciviousness, the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO
ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in two counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.
He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of the two cases; and, accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term from eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum; and, indemnify the victim, LUCELLE
SERRANO, in the amount of P20,000 as moral damages for each of the cases.
SO ORDERED.48

The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellants plea of guilty, the
prosecutor adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for
qualified rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386. The trial court ruled that

although Lucelle did not testify on the contents of her sworn statement49 the same were
admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.
The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-387 and
97-388. In view of the trial courts imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, the said cases were brought to this Court on
automatic appeal.
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the lone assignment of error,
to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FELICIANO ULIT
WITH A DEATH PENALTY DESPITE HIS ADMISSION OF GUILT.50

The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97385 and 97-386, and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court.
He pleads, however, that he be spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so
remorseful for the crimes he committed and that he pleaded guilty in Criminal Cases
Nos. 97-385 and 97-387; he no longer presented any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97388 so that the proceedings before the court would be shortened and simplified.
Nevertheless, the appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not
limited to the assigned errors.51 An appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the
appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse
the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as
errors.52

Appellants Plea of Guilty in


Criminal Case No. 97-385
was Imprudently Made.
In Criminal Case No. 97-385, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the
rape of his niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the
appellant was charged with a capital offense. When the appellant informed the trial
court of his decision to change his plea of not guilty to guilty, it behooved the trial court
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay,53 this Court enumerated the following duties
of the trial court under the rule:
1.
The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2.
The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused and precise degree of his culpability; and
3.
The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.54

The raison detre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care
where the imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence
is irrevocable. Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded
guilty. Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be
averted since by admitting his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and the dire
consequences of his plea.55
There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching
inquiry. It has been held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full or complete comprehension by the accused of his
plea of guilty so that it can truly be said that it is based on a free and informed judgment.
In People vs. Aranzado,56 we formulated the following guidelines as to how the trial court
may conduct its searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was
detained and interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in
order to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under
a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
or avenging quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of
a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty

under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently
indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty
should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that
the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause
him to supply missing details or significance.57

In People vs. Ostia,58 we held that the trial court is also required to probe thoroughly
into the reasons or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a change of
plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of
the crime for which he is charged as well as the nature and effect of any modifying
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense, inclusive of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special qualifying
circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the
crime for which he would plead guilty to.59
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellants
voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilty. This is evident by the
transcript of stenographic notes taken on November 5, 1998:
ATTY. MANALO
Your Honor, at todays reception of defense evidence, accused informed this
representation that he will no longer present evidence and instead willing to change his
plea from not guilty to that of guilty. This accuseds representation is therefore praying
that he be allowed to change his plea from that of not guilty to guilty.
COURT
You better confer with your client and explain to him the consequences of his
intended change of plea from not guilty to that of guilty.
ATTY. MANALO
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT (to the accused)
Is your counsels manifestation true, that you would like to change your plea from
not guilty to that of guilty and that you are no longer presenting evidence in Criminal
Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.

COURT
(to the accused)
You talk with your lawyer and think twice before asking the court to change your
plea of not guilty to that of guilty. The Court will call your case again.
COURT
(to the accused)
Mr. Ulit, earlier your counsel informed the court that you would like to change your
plea from not guilty to that of guilty, in Criminal Case No. 97-385, for rape and Criminal
Case No. 97-387, for Acts of Lasciviousness, do you affirm the manifestation of your
counsel?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that you are accused here for the crime of rape, a capital offense
which carries with it a capital punishment?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
(to accused)
Despite your knowledge that you are charged with a capital offense which carries
with it a capital penalty you still insists that you are pleading guilty?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT (to accused)
Was there anyone who forced you to change your plea of not guilty to that of
guilty?
ACCUSED
None, Your Honor.
COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that by pleading guilty you will be sentenced in accordance with
[what] the law provides?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
(to accused)

Do you know that the penalty provided for by law is death penalty because the
Information states that the victim is eleven years old and your niece and that you used
a deadly weapon in the commission of the rape?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor. I am willing to plead guilty.
COURT
Alright, arraign the accused.60

First. The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea, from
not guilty to that of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do so.
Second. It appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the
appellant opted not to avail himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and
refused to execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The records
also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and
March 2, 1997. However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was
assisted by counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for
inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances and
the appellants reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellants Sinumpaang
Salaysay in evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February
1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was not
assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same.
Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was
assisted by counsel when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted by counsel, whether he had waived his
right thereto, before and when he signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Fourth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a
rape committed in November 1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay,61 he confessed
to having raped the victim only in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. The appellant did
not admit having raped her in November 1996 as alleged in the Information in Criminal
Case No. 97-385. The trial court did not even inquire from the appellant who prepared
and typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the contents of his statement were explained
to him before he signed the same.
Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and simple
terms so as to be understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified rape; (b)
the circumstances of relationship and the minority of the victim; and (c) that his plea of
guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the penalty for the crime in light of Article 63 of

the Revised Penal Code.


Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he
would be civilly liable to the victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages and
P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellants counsel whether the
meaning and the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a
language or dialect known to and understood by him.
Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age,
educational attainment and socio-economic status.
Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident of qualified rape as charged in Criminal Case
No. 97-385.
Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal
Case No. 97-385 in spite of his plea of guilty.
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of
the condemnatory judgment.62 However, where the trial court receives, independently of
his plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether the accused committed the crimes
charged and the precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be
convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which
to predicate conviction.63
In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided
to change his plea. In fact, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion that the
evidence it had presented be considered proof of the degree of culpability of the
appellant. It is, thus, incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the evidence
adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 97-385 is sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the appellants guilt for qualified rape.
In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the
following considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 64 It, likewise,
bears stressing that in all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the
defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the

prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.65

The Prosecution Adduced Proof


of the Appellants Guilt Beyond
Reasonable Doubt of the Crime
of Rape in Criminal Case
No. 97-385
We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the
prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim
in November 1996. The victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination
and her testimony on clarificatory questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the
appellant raped her in November 1996. Quoted hereunder is the testimony of Lucelle on
direct and on re-direct examination:
Fiscal
Q

So, matapos mong ituro ang tiyuhin mo, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?

Ginahasa niya ako.

Ilang ulit kang ginahasa?

Marami po.

Kailan ka ginahasa ng tiyuhin mo?

November po.

19?

1996, po.

Saan ka ginahasa?

7104 San Maximo St., Makati City, po.66

Fiscal
Q

Humigit-kumulang, anong oras ng gabi nang gahasain ka ng Tito Ely mo noong


Nobyembre 1996?

Alas onse po ng gabi.

Samakatuwid, hindi na siya nagtratrabaho, wala na siya sa trabaho?

Wala na po.

Saang lugar ka ginahasa?

Sa 7104 San Maximo St.

Sa loob ba ng bahay?

Opo.

Saang parte ng bahay ka ginahasa ng Tito mo?

Sa kuwarto po.67
...

COURT
Q

Noong Nobyembre 1996, ayon sa iyo ay ginahasa ka ng iyong Tito. Saan ka


ginahasa ng Tito mo?

Sa 7104 San Maximo St., po.

Doon din sa bahay na iyong tinitirhan?

Opo.68

In her Sworn Statement,69 Lucelle narrated in detail how the appellant ravished her:
06. T:
Kailan ka unang senalbahe ng iyong TITO ELY?
S:
Noon pong Nobyembre 1996 hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa, mga
bandang 6:00 ng gabi po nang ako ay natutulog sa loob po ng kuwarto ay nagising
na lang po ako nang maramdaman ko na may humahalik sa aking pisngi, at nang
ako po ay magising ay nakita ko po si TITO ELY na may hawak na balisong na
humigit kumulang po sa 10 pulgada ang haba na nakatutok sa aking kaliwang leeg
habang humahalik po sa aking pisngi at ang sabi ay kung ako daw po ay
magsusumbong sa aking magulang ay papatayin po niya (TITO ELY) ako.
Pagkatapos po ay hinubaran po ako ng panty at naghubad na rin po si TITO ELY
ng kanyang short pants at pumatong na po sa akin. Ipinasok po ni TITO ELY and
kanyang (TITO ELY) ari sa aking PEPE at ako po ay nasaktan at umiyak na lang
po ako at nang makaraos po si TITO ELY ay umalis na lang .70

We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn
statement of Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely
identified her signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence
which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be attributed to the witness
herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from
whom the witness has received the information.71 It signifies all evidence which is not

founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which,
consequently, is not subject to cross-examination.72 The basis for the exclusion appears
to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test which can ordinarily be
applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present
and available for cross-examination. In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay
evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall
enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him. 73
Generally, the affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on the truth of the
contents thereof are hearsay evidence. 74 Such affidavit must be formally offered in
evidence and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be considered by the court
for the simple reason that the court shall consider such evidence formally offered and
accepted.75
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn
statement which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she
narrated how and when the appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She
was cross-examined by the appellants counsel and answered the trial courts
clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn statement as part of her
testimony and the court admitted the same for the said purpose without objection on the
part of the appellant.

The Prosecution Proved Beyond


Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant
Raped the Victim in February 1997
The trial court convicted the appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. 97-386 on the
basis of Lucelles sworn statement,76 the testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the
appellants statement77 executed in the Barangay Chairmans Office, and the testimony of
Dr. Armie Soreta-Umil. We agree with the trial courts findings and conclusion.
First. In Lucelles sworn statement,78 she declared that the appellant subjected her to
sexual abuse.

Second. Lourdes saw Lucelle in bed (papag) in Marinas room, covered with a
blanket beside the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. He
slid down from the papag, went under the bed and slipped outside. When Lourdes
removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle trembling with fear, lying sidewise, her knees
near her chin (nakabaluktot).
Third. The appellant admitted to the barangay chairman on March 5, 1997, that he
raped Lucelle in February 1997:
Na, noong isang araw ng PEBRERO 1997, sa loob ng kuwarto ng aking kapatid
na babae, pumasok ako na nadatnang nakahiga si LUCILLE ULIT sa isang papag na
anyong natutulog. Lumapit ako sa kanya at pinaghihipuan sa maseselang parte ng
kanyang katawan at nang siyay magising tinakot ko siyang huwag sisigaw, habang
siya ay aking hinuhubaran ng Short na kasama pati ang kanyang panty.
Nagpupumiglas siya habang ako ay nakadagan sa kanya na noon din ay hinuhubad ko
ang aking brief. Pinaghahalikan ko po siya habang siya ay nagpupumiglas at umiiyak
at noon din ay aking pinasok ang aking ari sa kanyang ari. Umiiyak siya habang ang
aking ari ay labas masok sa kanyang ari. Nang ako ay makaraos ay tinakot ko siyang
huwag magsusumbog sa kanyang mga magulang.79

Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his
statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible
in evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial
investigation when he gave his statement.80
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust
into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted
by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government. 81 The barangay chairman 82 is not deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants statement before
the barangay chairman is inadmissible.

The Sufficiency of Evidence on


Lucelles Relationship with the
Appellant, her Minority, and the
Propriety of the Imposition of

the Death Penalty


The appellants conviction for two counts of rape having been duly established by
the prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659, which was the law in effect at the time of the commission of the subject rapes,
provides in part:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.

By using force or intimidation;

2.

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.

When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.


Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1.

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
...

The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More


importantly, they must be both alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime of rape
and warrant the imposition of the death penalty. 83 In addition to the requirement that the
qualifying and aggravating circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information,
it must be established with certainty that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of
age or that she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be
stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature
once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to
the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.84
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately
established. The allegations in both Informations that the appellant is the victims uncle,
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree is specific enough to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship.

In People v. Ferolino,85 we said


In this case the allegation that FERLYN is ANTONIO's niece is not specific enough
to satisfy the special qualifying circumstances of relationship. If the offender is merely a
relation - not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common law spouse of
the mother of the victim - it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree. That
relationship by consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these
cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to further allege that such relationship was
within the third civil degree.86

The prosecutions evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victims uncle,
being the older brother of the victims mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim. In People
v. Pruna,87 the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in
rape cases, set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as qualifying circumstance:
1.

The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2.

In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such


as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.

3.

If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been


lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

4.

a.

If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is


sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b.

If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is


sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c.

If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is


sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the


testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the
complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.

5.

It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.88

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove Lucelles age. While the victim testified that
she was born on February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant twice
raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not expressly and clearly admit
the same as required by Pruna. The corroboration of Lucelles mother as to her age is
not sufficient either, as there is no evidence that the said certificate of birth was lost or
destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the prosecution. The fact that there
was no objection from the defense regarding the victims age cannot be taken against
the appellant since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the same.
Moreover, the trial court did not make a categorical finding of the victims minority,
another requirement mandated by Pruna.
Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that, [w]henever rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
The evidence on record shows that the appellant raped Lucelle with the use of a
deadly weapon in both rape incidents as alleged in both informations, and under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable
penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death.
In the determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed on the
appellant, the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime
is crucial. In the cases at bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece between the
appellant and the victim has been duly proven, the alternative circumstance of
relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance against the appellant. While it is true that the alternative
circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity, regardless
of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it
is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code when the
offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The
relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned.89
Hence, for the prosecutions failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set
forth in Pruna, and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by
any of the relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,

the appellant can only be convicted of rape in its aggravated form, the imposable
penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crimes,
the appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of rape,
conformably to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
The victim is entitled to moral damages without need of proof other than the fact of
the rape itself because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such an award.90 We find the trial courts award of P50,000 as moral damages to
the victim in each rape to be in order.
However, the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity to the victim in each
case, the same being mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. 91 Thus, this Court
awards the victim the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape.
In addition to this, appellant is ordered to pay the victim P25,000 as exemplary
damages, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon having
attended the commission of the crime.92
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, and in each case, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim,
Lucelle Serrano, P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000
as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and
Tinga, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN,


Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 163972-77


Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

- versus -

THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN


(Fourth Division),
Respondent.

Promulgated:
March 28, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170,
24195-24196,93 questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.

The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as
follows:

Said accused,94 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for
three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00,
respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given
period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of
Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in
addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute the
same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable,
said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of
the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual.
The prosecution explained:
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears
that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of

falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under Article


172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against the
principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be
the master mind of these criminal acts.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer
of said accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts
because:
x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total
amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial
government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage
caused to the government has already been restituted x x x.95

The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,96 dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval.97

The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
May 31, 2004.

This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea
bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely

affixed his signature on the payrolls on a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and that the amount
involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.98

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.99

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference,100 viz:

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is

provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the
following:

(a)

plea bargaining;

(b)

stipulation of facts;

(c)

marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d)

waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e)
lawful defense; and

modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a

(f)
aspects of the case.

such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil

SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be
approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining
was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented
several witnesses.101

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining
may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,102 and that
the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules
however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial
court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.103 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that

a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.104

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,105 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,106 viz:

x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor
with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring
opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice
Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court
could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to
the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record.
The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a
lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much
less bargaining.107 (Emphasis supplied)

However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise
of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an

evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.108

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. The
Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the
charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they
are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic
benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing
them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government.109

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer
should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -

Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete


justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to
adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do.
Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance
rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.110

and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts,111 in order to afford equal
justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,112 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14,
2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused,
Charlie Atong Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the

case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement,
the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement
complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that
the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of not guilty; and that the prosecution consented to the
plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to
Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is Plunder.113

The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not
be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August
16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:

In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has
already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to
the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant
cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our
mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of
the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual
defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our
cases against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears
to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper
of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.114

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and
Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must concur:
(a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person.115

On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender committed any
of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the falsification
was committed in a public or official or commercial document.116

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he
has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence
permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or property.117 Article 217 also provides that the
failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use. In this regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed;
in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.118

Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements
must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable officer for public
funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a
provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two months after such
accounts should be rendered.119

Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other,
to wit:

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily


includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.120

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold
petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner
may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear
that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds,
while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner,
nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account was in violation
of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds,121 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this

case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,122 and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in comparison.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the
imbalance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31,
2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea
Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ


Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ


Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ, Petitioners, v. REYNALDO P.
VENTUS AND JOJO B. JOSON, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated August 11, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094. The CA
dismissed for lack of merit the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioners
Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez, praying for the following reliefs: (1) the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to
enjoin the public respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia from implementing the Orders
dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005; (2) the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to
annul the said Orders, and (3) the dismissal of the estafa case against them for having
been prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.
The procedural antecedents are as follows:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a
Complaint-Affidavit3 for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office
of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to be business partners in financing
casino players, private respondents alleged that sometime in March and April 2002,
petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty Thousand
(P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which the latter
had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one
Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit,4 denying the accusation against
him, and claiming that his only participation in the transaction between private
respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to having initially introduced them to each other.
On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their Reply-Affidavit,5 asserting that
Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of the registration paper of the motor
vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well as the one who personally took them out
from the rent-a-car company.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit,6 stating that neither original
nor photocopies of the registration was required by private respondents to be submitted
to them because from the very start, they were informed by Aguinaldo that she merely
leased the vehicles from LEDC Rent-a-Car.
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga issued a
Resolution7 recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). He also noted that

Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any controverting evidence despite the
subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information8 (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners with the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-216182, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez, the case was
raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of Bail
to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted in an Order of even date.9
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to Recall or
Quash Warrants of Arrest,10 alleging that the Resolution dated February 25, 2003 has
not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file a motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed
With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila.11 Citing the Counter-Affidavit
and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez, Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or
false pretenses was committed because private respondents were fully aware that she
does not own the pledged motor vehicles.
On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order12 granting the motion for
withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest warrant only insofar as
Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration with the
OCP.
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment,
pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon
the prosecution's motion,13 the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be
deferred until the resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration.14
On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived pending
resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of Manila.15
On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel, filed a Motion
to Set Case for Trial,16 considering that petitioners' motions for reconsideration and for
withdrawal of the information have already been denied for lack of merit.
On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition
for review17 in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled Benjamin Perez and Felilibeth
Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson.
Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion to set the case for
trial, the public respondent issued an Order18 dated March 15, 2004 directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for
arraignment.

On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and
Suspend Further Proceedings,19 until their petition for review before the DOJ is resolved
with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration20 of the Order dated March 15, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel
arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration.21
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapea and Associates,
filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest.22 De Castro alleged that
she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered archived.
Petitioners filed an Opposition with Motion to Expunge,23 alleging that De Castro is not a
party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for
review before the DOJ.
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation24 informing the public respondent
that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated September 6, 2004 denying
petitioners' petition for review in I.S. No. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820 for estafa, entitled
Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo.25
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest
against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with conformity of the public
prosecutor. x x x
It appears from the records that:
(1) the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was recalled pending
resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ; x x x
(2) the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed x x x
(3) accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond.
In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest
is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let warrant of arrest be issued against
accused Aguinaldo.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.26
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash
Warrant of Arrest.27
On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest, and setting petitioners'
arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows only
a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul,28 he also ruled
that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial court.

He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the petition for
review, although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing the Orders dated May 16,
2005 and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a
Resolution29 dated December 4, 2006. Hence, this instant petition for review on
certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE MOTION TO
REINSTATE THE CASE AND ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA
DE CASTRO WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182.
II.
A PROCEDURAL TECHINICALITY THAT THE SUSPENSION ALLOWED FOR ARRAIGNMENT
IS ALREADY BEYOND THE 60-DAY PERIOD MAY BE RELAXED IN THE INTEREST OF AN
ORDERLY AND SPEEDY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
III.
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE I.S. NO. 02L-51569 (CRIMINAL CASE NO.
03-21[6]182) BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MANILA HAS NOT YET
BEEN COMPLETED.30
On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in issuing the
Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an arrest warrant against
Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to Reinstate the Case and to Issue a Warrant
of Arrest against Aguinaldo was filed by De Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case
No. 03-216182, entitled People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin
Perez, instead of private complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. They also
assert that said motion was erroneously granted based on the purported denial of their
petition for review by the DOJ, despite a Certification showing that their actual petition
in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo,
has not yet been resolved and is still pending with the DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely
directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their procedural right to due process, as
their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ.
On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could receive a
copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and thus move for its
reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-216182 had already been filed

with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend that such precipitate filing of the
Information and issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of
incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been completed because they
were not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
In support of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to
preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that an
Information filed without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a
complete preliminary investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his right
to due process and infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to Reinstate
the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest31 was filed by one Levita De Castro who is not a
party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not even a
private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly
used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their
P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners' motion to
expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect,
as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted based on the
purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ. In reinstating the case and
issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the public respondent erroneously relied
on the DOJ Resolution dated September 6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a
different case, i.e., I.S. No. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820, entitled Levita De Castro v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo, for two (2) counts of estafa. As correctly noted by petitioners,
however, their petition for review with the DOJ is still pending resolution. In particular,
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido, Jr. certified that based on available
records of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, their petition for review filed in I.S.
Number 02L-51569, entitled Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo for estafa,
is still pending resolution as of May 27, 2005.32 It bears stressing that their petition
stemmed from Criminal Case No. 03-216812, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez wherein the public respondent issued the
interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now before the Court.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision
of Section 11 (c),33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against
them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway,34 the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition
for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits
the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.35
In Dio v. Olivarez,36 the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of

the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice
Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored on the rule
provided under Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which
mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be
seventy- five (75) days.37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court ruled that in a long line of decisions,
it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge
of judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere
expedience of invoking substantial justice. Relaxation or suspension of procedural
rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling
reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.39
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such reasons shown to
warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the CA correctly ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the Secretary of
Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon the petitioners' motion,
the arraignment of the petitioners herein was ordered deferred by the public
respondent. We believe that the period of one year and one month from April 16, 2004
to May 16, 2005 when the public respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of petitioner Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give the petitioners the
opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. The
petitioners though submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30, 2005 stating
that their petition for review is pending resolution by the Department as of May 27,
2005. However, such delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days
prescribed under the afore-quoted Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Besides, the petitioners may be faulted for the delay in the
resolution of their petition. According to their counsel, she received the letter dated
April 15, 2004 from the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent pleadings relative to
petitioners' petition for review; admittedly, however, the same was complied with only
on October 15, 2004. We therefore find that the trial court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.40
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument that the
precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put
petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been
completed because they were not afforded their right to file a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan41 wherein it was held that since filing
of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation
proper, an Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for

reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary


investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales42 as misplaced. A closer look into said
case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to move for a
reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary
investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman before the filing of an
Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for
reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed
their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information
Prematurely Filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,43 pursuant to
Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal)44 and Section
56 of the Manual for Prosecutors45.
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003,
the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting
their arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ.
The Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from
the time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 200546 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than
ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In
fact, the public respondent had been very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years
having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be
arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the
criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for
review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the affirmative.
Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit to the OCP of Manila
before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez cannot be heard to decry that his right
to preliminary investigation was not completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not
personally informed of any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the
Information, she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such
investigation. In petitioners' motion for reconsideration47 of the February 25, 2003
Resolution of ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter-Affidavit and
Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of the prosecutor to indict her
for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for reconsideration was held to be consistent
with the principle of due process and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for
Prosecutors,48 she cannot complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, [d]ue process simply
demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.49

In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16, 2005 Order
granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was filed by
one who is not a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition
for review in a different case. Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the
public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August
23, 2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one,
the public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which allows suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For
another, records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the
preliminary investigation of their estafa case.
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without petitioners
having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial court for
trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998,
or the Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure
a Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.' In
this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to
speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time
within which trial must commence the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for
review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because
the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no
probable cause exists. Moreover, judges should take note of the following:
1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for reinvestigation of
the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the proceedings
upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of
the accused and direct the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of
the motion on or before the period fixed by the court, which in no instance could
be more than the period fixed by the court counted from the granting of the
motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will proceed with the
arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend
the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the
arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing
of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance,
could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review
before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as
scheduled and without further delay.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated December 4, 2006 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, are AFFIRMED. Considering that the proceedings in this
criminal case had been held in abeyance long enough, let the records of this case be
remanded to the trial court which is hereby directed to try the case on the merits with
dispatch in accordance with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

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