Soledad carpio v leonora valmonte

Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; To find the existence of an abuse of right, the
following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.In
the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission,
whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to
obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law
are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience
and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as abuse of rights under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith. To find the existence of an abuse of right,
the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which
is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
accountable.
Same; Same; Same; A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith;
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.One is not allowed to exercise his
right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he
would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
Same; Same; Same; To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork.Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to
factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial court, we
sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that respondents
claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence
during the trial and must therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages
must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. [Carpio vs.
Valmonte, 438 SCRA 38(2004)]

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES,
a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.
Actions; Human Relations; Torts and Damages; Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria;
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury) refers to a self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.Petitioners Lim
and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a
gate-crasher. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a
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* SECOND DIVISION.
533

VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 28, 2005

533
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to
the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Where the trial court and the appellate court reached
divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of
the case, the Supreme Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to
review such findings of facts.The general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as

our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law. One of the
exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim
did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him
politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to
finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests.
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that
brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges
proves.Another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes,
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses
Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silvaproved only that it was Dr.
Filart who invited him to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Party Gatecrashers; A person who did not abuse her right in
asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be made to pay
for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.Ms. Lim, not having
abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
534

534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes
Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its
liability springs from that of its employee.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of Abuse of Rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code, known
to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances, the object of the article being to
set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones
rights but also in the performance of ones duties.Article 19, known to contain
what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for
all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states: Art. 19. Every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Elsewhere, we
explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is

thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this
article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to
injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When
Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the
Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and
that is, the act complained of must be intentional.Article 20 pertains to damages
arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly
within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states: Art.
21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals,
good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. A
common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.
535

VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 28, 2005

535
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes
Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and
conjectures.As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not
shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not
know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes
had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except
the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias
and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work
at the hotel with foreign businessmen. The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and
conjectures.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith.The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to
leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard,
we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act
of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed
she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of
human dignity but respect of such dignity. Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct
especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that
Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment
which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals. [Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532(2005)]

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA

ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
1.ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES; MAINTAINER LIABLE FOR INJURIES
CAUSED TO CHILD.One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to
489

VOL. 91, JUNE 13, 1952

489
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., vs. Balandan, et al.
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting
thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises.
2.ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO SWIMMING POOL OR WATER TANK.The
attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial
as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its location.

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the
sum of P2,000 for the death of their son Mario.
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an iceplant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two
tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the
factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not
provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a
foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which
was continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said
commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased.
There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiffs'
son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3, years old, while playing with and in company
of other boys of his age, entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a
bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank
490

490
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., vs. Balandan, et al.
to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having died
of 'asphyxia secondary to drowning.'"
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that
the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt
the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons entering its premises. It
applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this
jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric, 16 Phil., 8.

The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in
play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured
thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. (See 65 C. J. S.,
p. 455.)
The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children
of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this'
attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children (65 C. J. S., p. 458).
Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to
attract little children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive
nuisance? The great majority of American decisions say no.
"The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location."
"There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has been held
not to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams,
ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools, * * *." (65 C. J. S., p. 476 et seg.
citing decisions of California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, lowa,
491

VOL. 91, JUNE 13, 1952

491
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., vs. Balandan, et al
Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Nebraska, Wisconsin.)
ln fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above volume of
Corpus Juris Secundum was published in 1950, whereas its decision was
promulgated on September 30, 1949.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an
attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
"Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their
waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early
instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the

owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely
duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, * * * (he) is not
liable because of having created an 'attractive nuisance.' Anderson vs. Reith-Riley
Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the
question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes
immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitionerthat the parents of the boy
were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for
Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible
individualneeds no further discussion.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from
liability. No costs. [Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., vs. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil. 488(1952)]

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N.
SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Easement; A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest and becomes a continuing property
right; Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory.A legal easement is
one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and
becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable
from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil
Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with
the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.
________________

* SECOND DIVISION.
100

100

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villanueva vs. Velasco
Remedial Law; Judgment; A decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the
parties to said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said
case has been commenced or filed in court.A decision in a case is conclusive and
binding upon the parties to said case and those who are their successor in interest
by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In this case, private
respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703
on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina
Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on
March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it
from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner.
For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action in court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. [Villanueva
vs. Velasco, 346 SCRA 99(2000)]

ANGELA C. GARCIA, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JOAQUIN DEL ROSARIO, defendant
and appellant.

BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE; DAMAGES.Held: Under the facts stated in the

opinion, that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in damages resulting from a
breach of his contract of marriage.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro. Cui, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Emiliano T. Tirona, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Mindoro,
on the 10th day of March, 1911. Its purpose was to recover damages from the def
endant, as the result of a breach of promise of marriage.
190

190
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Del Rosario,
The complaint sets up three causes of action. For the first cause of action the
plaintiff alleges that upon the 30th day of June, 1910, the plaintiff and defendant
entered into a mutual agreement to join in holy matrimony; that since that date the
defendant has refused, although often so requested, to carry out said mutual
contract, without any legal reason whatever, as a result of which the plaintiff has
suffered damages in the sum of P5,000.
As a second cause of action the plaintiff alleged that by reason of said promise to
marry and after said contract had been mutually entered into, the defendant had
had illicit relations with her, to which illicit relations she consented-, by reason of his
promise to marry; that as a result of said illicit relations, she had become pregnant;
and prayed that the court should award her damages in the sum of P25, to be paid
monthly, for the maintenance and education of the child, together with the sum of
P50, as medical fees.
For a third cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that at the time of said mutual
promise to marry, the plaintiff was employed as a teacher in the public school of the
municipality of Calapan, and was receiving as such teacher, the sum of P30 per
month; that by reason of the acts of the def endant and by reason of his failure to

comply with his promise to marry and by reason of her pregnancy, caused by the
defendant as above described, she was obliged to give up her position as such
teacher, and prayed f or damages in the sum of P30, to be paid monthly, or the sum
total of P2,000.
To the foregoing complaint the defendant presented a demurrer, which was
overruled by the court, whereupon the defendant presented an answer, in which he
interposed a general and special defense. The general defense was a general
denial. In his special defense he alleged that on said 30th day of June, 1910, the day
on which said contract to marry was mutually entered into, the plaintiff was 25
years 8 months and 28 days of age, and prayed that he be absolved from all liability
under the complaint. At the beginning of the trial, the plaintiff waived her right to
recover
191

VOL. 33, JANUARY 14, 1916.

191
Garcia vs. Del Rosario.
any damage from the defendant based upon the first and second causes of action.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Mariano Cui, judge, reached the
conclusion that the defendant had damaged the plaintiff in the sum of P540, and
rendered a judgment for that amount, together with costs. From that judgment the
defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:
"1. That the lower court committed an error in overruling the demurrer presented.
"2. That the lower court committed an error in finding that, by reason of the fact
that the defendant had not complied with his promise to marry the plaintiff, she had
been prejudiced in her employment."
Inasmuch as the plaintiff withdrew her first and second causes of action, the
demurrer can now relate only to the third. From a reading of the complaint, in the
third cause of action, we are of the opinion that the facts contained therein are
sufficient, if true, to constitute a cause of action for damages.
With reference to the second assignment of error, we find upon an examination of
the facts, that the judge of the lower court, the Honorable Mariano Cui, has so
carefully and exactly stated the facts, resulting from a preponderance of the
evidence, that we here insert the same:

"It is an indisputable fact in this case that the defendant, while still a bachelor, for
he married after the filing of the complaint, made love to the plaintiff, with whom he
succeeded in having amorous relations. His attentions commenced in March, 1910,
which was when defendant began to f requent the house of plaintiff, who was then
over twentyfive years of age, and they were finally accepted by her about the
beginning of June of said year, f rom which month amorous relations were
maintained between them. According to plaintiff's statement, she accepted
defendant's attentions because he finally promised to marry her. This point is
confirmed by plaintiff's father, Leonardo Cruz Gar192

192
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Del Rosario.
cia, in his statement that at the beginning of June as stated above, when he noticed
that defendant was frequenting his house, where plaintiff lived and still lives, he
asked him the reason therefor and defendant replied that he wished to marry
plaintiff. Although defendant in his testimony denies that he made such promises of
marriage, still his own letters, addressed to plaintiff, which are Exhibits A, B, C, and
D, contradict him and at the same time corroborate plaintiff's testimony, especially
the first of said exhibits, which bears the date of October 6, 1910, wherein
defendant made protest of the sincerity of his promise of marriage, so that plaintiff
would not doubt him.
"It is also another indisputable fact that the plaintiff, when she contracted amorous
relations with the defendant, was a temporary Insular teacher in the public school of
the town of Calapan, Mindoro, and as such teacher received a monthly salary of
P30, and that she ceased to be such by resigning on November 26, 1910. With
reference to this resignation, plaintiff testified that from September, 1910,
defendant had been urging her to resign her position as teacher, telling her that he
was unwilling for her to continue as such; and, moreover, that plaintiff insisted that
he marry her, because she was then ashamed to walk through the streets on
account of her pregnant condition, which was already apparent, and she had trouble
in tightening up her belt to hide that condition; and that finally plaintiff, confiding in
the sincerity of defendant's promise of marriage, acceded to his suggestions and
resigned f rom her employment as teacher. Defendant tried to deny this, alleging
that plaintiff resigned from her employment as teacher because her pregnant
condition at that time prevented her from continuing in said employment, such
being the real reason for her resignation; but in view of the intimate amorous
relations that existed between them, as evidenced by the letters above mentioned,

one of which, Exhibit B, is dated January 8, 1911, plaintiff's testimony is more

deserving of credence. According to plaintiff, she might
193

VOL. 33, JANUARY 14, 1916.

198
Garcia vs. Del Rosario.
have been able to continue in her employment as a teacher until her superior
officers should dismiss her, despite her pregnant condition, and from that time on
she has been unable to secure other employment, being at the present time
supported by her father and the little she earns.
"The conclusion, therefore, is that the defendant, in not carrying out the promise of
marriage he made to the plaintiff, caused her damages in her employment as
teacher, whereby she received a salary of P30 a month, by making her resign theref
rom, as she did. On account of this action of the defendant, indemnity for damages
can be recovered from him, for through his fault in failing to carry out his promise of
marriage plaintiff lost her position as teacher. (Article 1902, Civil Code.) In order
equitably to adjust said indemnity, in the opinion of the court, it is necessary to take
into account, not only the monthly salaries defendant receives, and which are P50
as an employee of the provincial treasury of Mindoro and P15 as clerk to the parish
priest of Calapan, but also a reasonable time within which plaintiff may get another
position as teacher, and for which a year and a half from the date when she
resigned from her employment as teacher are sufficient; and on this basis plaintiff is
sufficiently indemnified by the sum of P540, equivalent to her salary for a year and
a half in her former employment as teacher.
"In view of the foregoing, the court believes it proper to render judgment in
plaintiff's favor and against the defendant to the effect that she recover from him
the sum of P540 in the nature of an indemnity for the damages caused by the loss
of her position as teacher, and also the costs of the suit."
In our opinion, the lower court committed neither of the errors complained of by the
appellant. His judg [GARCIA vs. DEL ROSARIO, 33 Phil. 189(1916)]

G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005.*

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN, respondents.

Actions; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; The thrust of Rule 45 is the resolution only
of questions of law and any peripheral factual question addressed to the Supreme
Court is beyond the bounds of this mode of review.It is worthy of note that the
thrust of Rule 45 is the resolution only of questions of law and any peripheral factual
question addressed to this Court is beyond the bounds of this mode of review.
Petitioners point out that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove the fact of
prior existence of the dollars and the jewelry which had been lost while deposited in
the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana, the basis of the trial court and the appellate
court being the sole testimony of McLoughlin as to the contents thereof. Likewise,
petitioners dispute the finding of gross negligence on their part as not supported by
the evidence on record. We are not persuaded. We adhere to the findings of the trial
court as affirmed by the appellate court that the fact of loss was established by the
credible testimony in open court by McLoughlin. Such findings are factual and
therefore beyond the ambit of the present petition.
Hotels and Inns; Deposits; Safety Deposit Boxes; Mere close companionship and
intimacy are not enough to warrant the conclusion that a hotel guest and his
companion are husband and wifeit is no excuse for the hotel to have allowed the
latter to open the safety deposit box of the former.The management contends,
however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees believe that Tan was his
spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The evidence on record,
however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the
management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of McLoughlin will not
exculpate the petitioners from liability in the absence of any showing that he made
the management believe that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have
access to the safety deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not
enough to warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
639

VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005

639
YHT Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
in the instant case is the very safety of McLoughlins deposit. If only petitioners
exercised due diligence in taking care of McLoughlins safety deposit box, they
should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that the

latter had been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of
times at the early hours of the morning. Tans acts should have prompted the
management to investigate her relationship with McLoughlin. Then, petitioners
would have exercised due diligence required of them. Failure to do so warrants the
conclusion that the management had been remiss in complying with the obligations
imposed upon hotel-keepers under the law.
Same; Same; Same; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Where the loss of a hotel guests money
was consummated through the negligence of the hotel employee in allowing the
companion of said guest to open the safety deposit box without the guests consent,
both the assisting employees and the hotel owner and operator are solidarily liable.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their
obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear
the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code
provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Also, this Court has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that
the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the
victim to prove the negligence of such employer. Thus, given the fact that the loss
of McLoughlins money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas
employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guests
consent, both the assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner
and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Catering to the public, hotel-keepers are bound
to provide not only lodging for hotel guests but also security to their persons and
belongingsa twin duty which the law does not allow to be negated or diluted by
any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in
prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.The issue
of whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box exe640

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
YHT Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
cuted by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for
resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appellate court found
the same to be null and void. We find no reason to reverse their common
conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus: Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free

himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for
the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the
guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001
is suppressed or diminished shall be void. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New
Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as
that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to
provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn
does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; With greater reason should the liability of the
hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken without the guests
knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself.In
an early case, the Court of Appeals through its then Presiding Justice (later
Associate Justice of the Court) Jose P. Bengzon, ruled that to hold hotelkeepers or
innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be
actually delivered to the innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such
effects are within the hotel or inn. With greater reason should the liability of the
hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken without the guests
knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in
this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 2002 of the Civil Code which exempts the
hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or
visitors presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or
has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the lossa depositary is not
responsible for the loss of goods by theft, unless his actionable negligence
contributes to the loss.Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on
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641
YHT Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Article 2002 which exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the
acts of his guest, his family, or visitors. Even a cursory reading of the provision
would lead us to reject petitioners contention. The justification they raise would
render nugatory the public interest sought to be protected by the provision. What if

the negligence of the employer or its employees facilitated the consummation of a

crime committed by the registered guests relatives or visitor? Should the law
exculpate the hotel from liability since the loss was due to the act of the visitor of
the registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this provision presupposes that the hotelkeeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to
the occurrence of the loss. A depositary is not responsible for the loss of goods by
theft, unless his actionable negligence contributes to the loss.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The hotel was guilty of concurrent negligence in
allowing the hotel guests companion, who was not the registered guest, to open
the safety deposit box of the guest, even assuming that the latter was also guilty of
negligence in allowing another person to use his keyto rule otherwise would result
in undermining the safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the management
will be given imprimatur to allow any person, under the pretense of being a family
member or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the safety deposit box without
fear of any liability that will attach thereafter in case such person turns out to be a
complete stranger.In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety
deposit box was shared not only by the guest himself but also by the management
since two keys are necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without the assistance
of hotel employees, the loss would not have occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of
concurrent negligence in allowing Tan, who was not the registered guest, to open
the safety deposit box of McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter was also guilty
of negligence in allowing another person to use his key. To rule otherwise would
result in undermining the safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the
management will be given imprimatur to allow any person, under the pretense of
being a family member or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the safety deposit
box without fear of any liability that will attach thereafter in case such person turns
out to be a complete stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade responsibility for
any liability incurred by its employees in conspiracy with the guests relatives and
visitors.
642

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
YHT Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A tort liability can exist even if there are already
contractual relationsthe act that breaks the contract may also be tort.Petitioners
contend that McLoughlins case was mounted on the theory of contract, but the trial
court and the appellate court upheld the grant of the claims of the latter on the
basis of tort. There is nothing anomalous in how the lower courts decided the

controversy for this Court has pronounced a jurisprudential rule that tort liability can
exist even if there are already contractual relations. The act that breaks the contract
may also be tort.
Damages; It is within the province of lower courts to settle factual issues such as
the proper amount of damages awarded.As to damages awarded to McLoughlin,
we see no reason to modify the amounts awarded by the appellate court for the
same were based on facts and law. It is within the province of lower courts to settle
factual issues such as the proper amount of damages awarded and such finding is
binding upon this Court especially if sufficiently proven by evidence and not
unconscionable or excessive.
Same; Although trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral
damages, the appellate court may modify or change the amount awarded when it is
palpably and scandalously excessive.The amount of P50,000.00 for moral
damages is reasonable. Although trial courts are given discretion to determine the
amount of moral damages, the appellate court may modify or change the amount
awarded when it is palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendants
culpable action.
[YHT Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 451 SCRA 638(2005)]

YOLANDA FLORALDE, NIDA VELASCO and NORMELITA ALAMBRA, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PAULINO W. RESMA,
respondents.
Sexual Harassment; Words and Phrases; Sexual harassment in the workplace is not
about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desireit is about
power being exercised by a superior officer over his women subordinates.The
sexual harassment charges against Resma were filed by three (3) rank and file
employees of the Agricultural Training Institute, where respondent Paulino Resma is
OIC. Being rank and file employees, they were all reporting to their superior, Paulino
Resma. Their time records were signed by the latter. Sexual harassment in the
workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual
desire; it is about power being exercised by a superior officer over his women
subordinates. The power emanates from the fact that the superior can remove the
subordinate from his workplace if the latter would refuse his amorous advances.

Same; The Court is not convinced that three women would prevaricate a charge for
sexual harassment at the mere urging of another since a charge for sexual
harassment is not a trivial matterit entails having to go public with an incident
that one is trying to forget as well as opening oneself to public ridicule and scrutiny.
We are not convinced that all three women would prevaricate at the mere urging
of Atty. Ola. Filing a charge for sexual harassment is not a trivial matter. It entails
having to go public with an incident that one is trying to forget. It means opening
oneself to public ridicule and scrutiny. We, therefore, cannot believe the version of
the defense that the charges were all fabricated.
Same; Administrative Law, Evidence; Words and Phrases; The concept of
preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it, and at bottom, it means
probability of truth.As to the issue of whether the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission is supported by substantial evidence, we find that, in fact,
preponderant evidence supported its findings. In determining where the
preponderance or the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the
court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their
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* EN BANC.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Floralde vs. Court of Appeals
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are
testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far
as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The Court may also consider the
number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greatest number. By preponderance of evidence, is meant that the evidence as a
whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. The concept of
preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability
of truth.

Same; Same; Same; Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that the findings of
fact of an administrative agency must be respected, as long as such findings are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or preponderant.The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission. Well-settled is the rule in our
jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected,
as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or preponderant. It is not the task of an
appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence. [Floralde vs. Court of
Appeals, 337 SCRA 371(2000)]