1

[G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented
by his Attorney-in-Fact, CHRISTIAN DE JESUS, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Philippine National Bank disputes the decision handed down by the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 23 March 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001, entitled
Generoso De Jesus, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Christian De Jesus, versus
Philippine National Bank. The assailed decision has affirmed the judgment rendered by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, declaring
respondent Generoso de Jesus as being the true and lawful owner of the 124-squaremeter portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17197 and
ordering petitioner bank to vacate the premises, to deliver possession thereof to
respondent, and to remove the improvement thereon.
It would appear that on 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, over the questioned property. In his
complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired a parcel of land situated in
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square meters covered by TCT
No. T-17197, and that on 26 March 1993, he had caused a verification survey of the
property and discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon
by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of
demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building
sometime in 1981 from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was
in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in
question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square
meter which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. The sale, however, did not
materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later
mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the
rightful owner of the disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and ordering petitioner
to surrender possession of the property to respondent and to cause, at its expense, the
removal of any improvement thereon.

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, sustained the trial court but it ordered to be
deleted the award to respondent of attorneys fees, as well as moral and exemplary
damages, and litigation expenses.
Petitioner went to this Court, via a petition for review, after the appellate court had
denied the banks motion for reconsideration, here now contending that 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN ADJUDGING PNB A
BUILDER IN BAD FAITH OVER THE ENCROACHED PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN NOT APPLYING IN
FAVOR OF PNB THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE
RULING IN TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORP. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 7.[1]
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have both rejected the idea that
petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith. In the context that such term is
used in particular reference to Article 448, et seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good
faith is one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to
be its owner and unaware of any defect in his title or mode of acquisition.
The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in
bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the
price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

2
A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the landowner
to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the
land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows
the principal and not the other way around. [2] Even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He much choose one. He cannot, for
instance, compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. [3] In order,
however, that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding
right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to prove
good faith on his part.
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good faith is a concept of his own
mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It
implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought
to put the holder upon inquiry.[4] The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the
validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another.[5] Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.[6]
Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should be
evident enough that petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good
faith. Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of
the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold to it stood on the land
not covered by the land conveyed to it.
Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio,
has in actuality been part of the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil
Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one
of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where
the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true
owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or
bad faith is entirely irrelevant. [7]
In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article 448 of
the Civil Code. The Court commiserates with petitioner in its present predicament; upon
the other hand, respondent, too, is entitled to his rights under the law, particularly after
having long been deprived of the enjoyment of his property. Nevertheless, the Court
expresses hope that the parties will still be able to come up with an arrangement that
can be mutually suitable and acceptable to them.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001 is

AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendantappellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo to the then
Court of Appeals, which the latter certified to this instance as involving pure questions of
law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the
municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters.
Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683,
with an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof
had encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, After
the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on
November 2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking
DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on
February 6,1973 against DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as
Civil Case No 1, Said complaint was later amended to include DEPRA as a party plain.
plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and
applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on September 29, 1973, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the
plaintiffs, as lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the
disputed portion with an area of thirty four (34) square meters, the
rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month, payable by the lessee to
the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the rent is due;

3
and the lease shall commence on the day that this decision shall have
become final.
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appeal so that, ff it were a valid judgment, it
would have ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment
of rentals so that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court.
On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before
the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial Court), involving the very same
34 square meters, which was the bone of contention in the Municipal Court. DUMLAO,
in his Answer, admitted the encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit
is barred by res judicata by virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had
become final and executory.
After the case had been set for pre-trial, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for
Judgment based on the Stipulation of Facts attached thereto. Premised thereon, the
Trial Court on October 31, 1974, issued the assailed Order, decreeing:

difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was the
deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was
based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land. " 4
Conceded in the Stipulation of Facts between the parties is that DUMLAO was a builder
in good faith. Thus,
8. That the subject matter in the unlawful detainer case, Civil Case
No. 1, before the Municipal Court of Dumangas, Iloilo involves the
same subject matter in the present case, the Thirty-four (34) square
meters portion of land and built thereon in good faith is a portion of
defendant's kitchen and has been in the possession of the defendant
since 1952 continuously up to the present; ... (Emphasis ours)

Without pronouncement as to costs.

Consistent with the principle that our Court system, like any other, must be a dispute
resolving mechanism, we accord legal effect to the agreement of the parties, within the
context of their mutual concession and stipulation. They have, thereby, chosen a legal
formula to resolve their dispute to appeal ply to DUMLAO the rights of a "builder in good
faith" and to DEPRA those of a "landowner in good faith" as prescribed in Article 448.
Hence, we shall refrain from further examining whether the factual situations of
DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridical positions respectively defined by law, for
a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in good faith" under Article 526
and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448.

SO ORDERED.

In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the thirty four (34)
square meters subject of this litigation is part and parcel of Lot 685 of
the Cadastral Survey of Dumangas of which the plaintiff is owner as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3087 and such plaintiff is
entitled to possess the same.

Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the
Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is
limited to the sole issue of possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an
encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance.

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in
good faith,

Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the Municipal Court, we
hold the same to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in
respect of possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1 The Municipal Court
over-stepped its bounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease",
which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an
interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129). 3 Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null
and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title.
Besides, even if the Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to

to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after

payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or

shall have the right

to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and
the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The

4
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof (Paragraphing
supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the
encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of
his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building,
and to sell the encroached part of his land, 5 as he had manifested before the Municipal
Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it was made in a void proceeding.
However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of
First Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled
to possession," without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled
to have the kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having
chosen to sell his encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. 6 In this case,
DUMLAO had expressed his willingness to pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by
another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid
the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The
owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article
361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land
to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here
did refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel
the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it erected.
He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land. the other party fails to pay for the same (italics ours).
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling
defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from the land
belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose
neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void,
for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is.
furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now
Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605,
608[1946]).

ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity
stated in Articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent.
As will be seen, the Article favors the owner of the land, by giving him one of the two
options mentioned in the Article. Some commentators have questioned the preference
in favor of the owner of the land, but Manresa's opinion is that the Article is just and fair.
. . . es justa la facultad que el codigo da al dueno del suelo en el
articulo 361, en el caso de edificacion o plantacion? Algunos
comentaristas la conceptuan injusta, y como un extraordinario
privilegio en favor de la propiedad territorial. Entienden que impone el
Codigo una pena al poseedor de buena fe y como advierte uno de los
comentaristas aludidos 'no se ve claro el por que de tal pena . . . al
obligar al que obro de buena fe a quedarse con el edificio o
plantacion, previo el pago del terreno que ocupa, porque si bien es
verdad que cuando edifico o planto demostro con este hecho, que
queria para si el edificio o plantio tambien lo es que el que edifico o
planto de buena fe lo hizo en la erronea inteligencia de creerse dueno
del terreno Posible es que, de saber lo contrario, y de tener noticia de
que habia que comprar y pagar el terreno, no se hubiera decidido a
plantar ni a edificar. La ley obligandole a hacerlo fuerza su voluntad, y
la fuerza por un hecho inocente de que no debe ser responsable'. Asi
podra suceder pero la realidad es que con ese hecho voluntario,
aunque sea inocente, se ha enriquecido torticeramente con perjuicio
de otro a quien es justo indemnizarle,
En nuestra opinion, el Codigo ha resuelto el conflicto de la manera
mas justa y equitativa y respetando en lo possible el principio que
para la accesion se establece en el art. 358. 7
Our own Code Commission must have taken account of the objections to Article 361 of
the Spanish Civil Code. Hence, the Commission provided a modification thereof, and
Article 448 of our Code has been made to provide:

A word anent the philosophy behind Article 448 of the Civil rode.
The original provision was found in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code; which
provided:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy

5
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his options.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict
of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving
the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to
pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the
owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because
his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213;
Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico,
G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs.
Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off.
Gaz. 2050). 8
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this case is
hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings
consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of
the kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34
square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than
that of the kitchen built thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional,
Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days
within which to exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil
Code), whether to appropriate the kitchen as his own by paying to
DUMLAO either the amount of tile expenses spent by DUMLAO f or
the building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus value")
which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by
reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area.
The amounts to be respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in
accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the
other party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen
(15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to
the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the
option to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter
rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial Court, the value
of the land is considerably more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO
shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and to the Court
within fifteen (15) days from notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land.
In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days
from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of
the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such agreement
and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial
Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the
said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease,
provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be
less than Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable within the first five
(5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall
not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the
judgment, considering the long period of time since 1952 that
DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall
be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced
lease. DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or
improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the two-year period,
or upon default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two (2)
consecutive months, DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced
lease, to recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed by
DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall
be tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for payment to DEPRA, and
such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance
was made within the period fixed by the Court.

6
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at
Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the
occupancy of DEPRA's land for the period counted from 1952, the
year DUMLAO occupied the subject area, up to the commencement
date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impose or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act
upon city and municipal courts; "

d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Precision shall be

inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial
Court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such
payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement
of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such other
acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.

3 "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil ease ...

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

No costs,
4 Supra.
SO ORDERED.
5 Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 (1946).
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.
6 Ibid.
Gutierrez, Jr., * J., took no part.
7 3 Manresa, 7th Ed., pp. 300-301.
8 II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 ed., p. 97.
* Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. took no part, having been one of
the two members of a Court of Appeals' Division of Five Justices who
dissented from the majority opinion certifying this case to this Court.

Footnotes
1 "Rule 70
Forcible Entry and Detainer
"Sec. 7. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership. The judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to
the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession."
2 "Sec. 44. Original jurisdiction. ...

7
Pablito Meneses over lots found by the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the
bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995
I
PABLITO
MENESES
and
LORENZO
MENESES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO
QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all
surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla, Josefina,
Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS
OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia,
all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny,
Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed
Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. Galileo Brion, respondents.
G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995
CESAR
vs.
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.

ALMENDRAL, petitioner,

G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995

EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO
QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF
FERNANDO QUISUMBING, (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and
Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR.
(Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar,
all
surnamed
Quisumbing), petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO MENESES and
BRAULIO C. DARUM,respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07049 affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 474-83-C
which declared as null and void the original certificates of title and free patents issued to

On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baos,
Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1268 covering Lot 1585 with an area of 417 square meters, and
Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808 and Original Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with
an area of 515 square meters. Both lots are located in Los Baos, Laguna.
Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver
and Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and
affection" for and "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses (Rollo, p.
45). After the execution of said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land,
introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and
paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter
land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land since
1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as
September 6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square
meters located in Los Baos, Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern
boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on August 14, 1973 under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo,
Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed
Quisumbing.
In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then Court of First
Instance of Bian, Laguna to recover possession over a portion of the property from
Dominga Villamor and Lorenzo Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. B-350. On January
3, 1966, the case was decided in favor of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals sustained the Quisumbings' right over the property.
In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of
title over an additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their
property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its Decision of
September 28, 1978, the Court of First Instance of Bian confirmed the Quisumbings'
title thereto which, after it was duly surveyed, was identified as Psu-208327. The
additional area was divided into two lots in the survey plan approved by the Director of
Lands on November 16, 1964. In ordering the confirmation and registration of title on
favor of the Quisumbings, the land registration court said:

8
. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the property was
bolstered by the unappealed decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil
Case No. B-350 of this Court when the properties applied for were
classified as accretions made by the waters of the Laguna Lake. . . .
(G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).
On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio
C. Darum and Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to
Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baos,
using his brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their "private
accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and, confederating with District Land Officer Darum
and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original certificates of
title to the land.
On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands
registered by the Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have
a valid right as owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the
disputed lots. In so holding, the trial court relied heavily on the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350, and quoted the following portions of the appellate
court's decision:
Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic) 859 square meters of
land under TCT No. 25978 of the Laguna Land Registry, the
northwest boundary of which is the Laguna de Bay.
It is ascertained that the northwest portion of Quisumbing's lot is
bounded by the Laguna de Bay. The nature of the Laguna de Bay has
long been settled in the case of Government of the Philippines v.
Colegio de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when it held that:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in
depression of the earth; it contains fresh water
coming from rivers and brooks and springs, and is
connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River.
According to the definition first quoted, Laguna de
Bay is a lake.
Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the authorities cited by
the appellants referring to seashore would not apply. The provision of
the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin
of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August
3, 1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon land

contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers andlakes by
accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of the property is
bounded by Laguna de Bay, which is a lake, even if the area where
Lanuza's house and Villamor's house for that matter is located is not
included within the title, it must necessarily be an accretion upon
appellees' land by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof
which should belong to the owner of the adjacent land. The
authorities cited by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions
by water of the sea under Title I. Lakewaters being terrestrial waters,
their ownership is governed by Title II of the Law of Waters. As held in
the Colegio de San Jose case, the provisions of the Law of Waters
regulating the ownership and use of sea water are not applicable to
the ownership and use of lakes which are governed by different
provisions. As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation
is necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as
the law does not require the same (Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962 citing
Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567
and 3 Manresa, C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp. 80-84).
The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been
procured through fraud, deceit and bad faith, citing the following facts as bases for its
conclusion: (1) The Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly executed by
Silverio Bautista in favor of Pablito Meneses was a simulated contract for lack of
consideration; (2) The said instrument was sworn to before Mayor Lorenzo Meneses
who had no authority to notarize deeds of conveyances; (3) Although the lots subject of
the deed of conveyance were placed in his brother's name, Mayor Meneses actually
exercised rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendral admitted
having anomalously prepared the documents to support the free patent applications of
Pablito Meneses and, having personally filled up the blank forms, signed them in the
absence of the persons concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession
from 1979 to 1980 despite orders from the Director of Lands to produce and surrender
the same; (6) District Land Officer Braulio Darum approved the free patent applications
and issued the questioned titles without the required cadastral survey duly approved by
the Director of Lands and despite the pendency of LRC Case No. B-327 involving the
contested lots; (7) Darum represented the Bureau of Lands in LRC Case No. B-327
without authority from the Director of Lands and after he had withdrawn his appearance
in said case, persisted in filing a motion to set aside the order for the issuance of a
decree in favor of the Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refused to
produce the missing original records of the free patent applications and their supporting

9
documents; and (9) When Darum was not yet an oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he
admitted in his letter to the Land Registration Commission that the contested lots are
portions of the land being claimed by the Quisumbings contrary to his later
representation in the joint answer to the petition that the subject lots are not portions of
Lots 1 and 2, Psu-208327 owned by the Quisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito Meneses' Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"),
covering Lot No. 1585, consisting of 417 square meters and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808 (Exh. "H"),
covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515 square meters, both located
at Los Baos, Laguna, as accretion lands forming parts of a bigger
accretion land owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment
(Exh. "A"), rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna,
in LRC Case No. B-327, which bigger accretion land is directly
adjacent to or at the back of plaintiffs' riparian land, and consequently,
declaring as null and void and cancelled Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original Certificate of Title No.
P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808;
2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his Deputy at
Calamba, Laguna, to make the corresponding entries of cancellation
in his Registry of the above mentioned Original Certificate of
Titles/Free Patents;
3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito Meneses and
all persons acting in their behalves to vacate the subject lands and
surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and
4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs
the sums of:
a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month from
January, 1977, until the subject property is
completely vacated, as actual and compensatory
damages;
b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;

d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and

e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial
court granted in its Order of September 7, 1984 subject to the posting by the
Quisumbings of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. The defendants unsuccessfully
moved for the reconsideration of said order.
The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Pablito
Meneses, Silverio Bautista, Pablo Silva, Virgilio Cruz and Cesar Almendral for violation
of paragraphs (e) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring in the
approval and grant of the free patents over portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned
by the heirs of Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing. In due course, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as charged. The case
was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987, the judgment of conviction was
affirmed (Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 [1987]).
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision in Civil Case No.
07049 to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1987, the Court of Appeals found the
appeal to be without merit and affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of the appellate
court's decision but it was denied in the Resolution of February 23, 1988 which in
pertinent part stated:
However, for humanitarian considerations, and considering the appeal
of the defendants-appellants for a reduction of the moral and
exemplary damages, We favor the reduction of the moral damages
from P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the exemplary damages from
P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other respects, We find no justification
for modifying the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court
(G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).
Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 82220. Cesar Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for
a 45-day extension within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. After this Court
had granted them a 30-day extension, Almendral still failed to file any petition. The
Quisumbings also filed a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 83059,
solely on the issue of the propriety of the reduction of the amount of damages in the
Court of Appeals' Resolution of February 23, 1988. Upon motion of petitioners in G.R.
No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the Resolution of August 1, 1988.

10
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised before the Court of
Appeals, contending in the main: (1) that the lands in question were not accretion lands
but lands of the public domain; (2) that no conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad
faith attended the issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3) that
the Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights was founded on a valid consideration.
As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion lands, petitioners
relied on the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga,
CA-G.R. No. 55390-R, October 23, 1980, holding that the property involved therein was
part of the natural bed of the Laguna de Bay and therefore what had to be determined
was whether said property was covered by water when the lake was at its highest
depth.
Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual issues which have
been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court (Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229
SCRA 533 [1994]) and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms
the factual findings of the trial court (Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The
jurisdiction of this Court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion (BA
Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 566 [1941]). We find no such
showing in this case.
Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the Court of Appeals in
Civil Case No. B-350 has a bearing in the resolution of this case for while the lots
occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming
here, the two cases refer to the same accretion lands northwest of the original land
owned by the Quisumbings.
In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327
ordering the confirmation and registration of title in favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387
square meters of accretion land is binding on petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in
rem, binds the whole world, more so because it became final and executory upon the
Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an appeal.
Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore land known as Lots 190
and 1585 are part of Laguna de Bay" and therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal
right to claim the same as accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of
the decision in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although the
case deals with the registration of a reclaimed land along the Laguna de Bay, is
nonetheless enlightening:

Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject
to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in
seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence
in the case of lakes. Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides,
which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in
the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months
a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring
about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the
rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs
during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of
the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be
considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay.
Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or
basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore
land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate
definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
. . . . that part of (the land) which is between high
and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of
the tides.
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a
portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or
flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources." Since the
inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of
tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of
the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought
to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay,
nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a
public land and therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title (at
pp. 538-539).
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires
the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river
(or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers (or the sea coast). While the trial court mainly relied on the findings in Civil Case
No. B-350 that the lands in controversy are accretion lands and it has not determined on
its own the presence of said requisites, it is too late now for petitioners in G.R. No.

11
82220 to claim otherwise. Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands could only
benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands in controversy
(Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of indefeasibility of title
should favor them as the one-year period provided for by law to impugn their title had
elapsed. They also urged that, having been granted by the state, their title is superior to
that of the Quisumbings. We hold, however, that in the light of the fraud attending the
issuance of the free patents and titles of Pablito Meneses, said assertions crumble.
Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 (1987)
which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.
Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059 (questioning the
reduction of the damages awarded to the Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the
Resolution of February 23, 1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the amount of
damages is primarily with the trial court (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
[1966]). While it is the appellate court's duty to review the same, a reduction of the
award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The Court of Appeals can
only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are palpably or
scandalously and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
226 SCRA 423 [1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440
[1987]).
There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of Appeals of the damages
awarded by the trial court. Its action was premise merely on "humanitarian
considerations" and the plea of the defendants-appellants. We may agree with the Court
of Appeals in reducing the award after scrutinizing its factual findings only if such
findings are diametrically opposed to that of the trial court (Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is, the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point
the factual findings if the lower court upon which the award of damages had been
based.
We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court.
Respondent Braulio C. Darum in G.R. No. 83059 must also be solidarily liable for said
damages in his capacity as a public officer. A public official is by law not immune from
damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the
scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42, 227 SCRA 271 [1993]).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No.
83059 is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED while its Resolution of February 23, 1988 insofar as it reduces the amount

of damages awarded to the Quisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners
in G.R. No. 82220 and respondent Braulio Darum in G.R. No. 83059. SO ORDERED

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO
TAPIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO
RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO,
ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official
and/or private capacities, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:p
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for
annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the
Bureau of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted
administrative remedies before having recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod,
Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the
dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the
subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped
paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment
with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was
rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.

12
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the
same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of
judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which
dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of
judgment but private respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower
court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of
the subject lots they occupied..
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the
survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over
the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be
released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the
Bureau of Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera,
respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered
a report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06000571-D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be
cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land
applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto
Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of
Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private
respondents who, if qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective
portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,
Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad
then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove
whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private
respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the
RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent
Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent
Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and
order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative
decision of the Bureau of Lands.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the
approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual
findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held
to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the
Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural resources. 1
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by
Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the
same had been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as
Officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to
appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does
not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It
also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the
orders were issued and executed..
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL
CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION
ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS
MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not
the subject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land
being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which
provides:

13
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites :
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are
called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the
above-mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion
was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, 4 this Court held
that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and
flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first
and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a
riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped
from denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales
Application MSA (G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of said Application constituted an
admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of
Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which
was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales
Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio
Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation report to
respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular inspection that said land actually
covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The
investigation report also states that, except for the swampy portion which is fully planted
to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of
petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of
private respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of
1978. 6
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which
was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in

accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court
has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality.8 Again, when said factual findings are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court. 9
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or
artificial. In Republic v. CA,10 this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes
from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it
differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of
Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water
current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and
deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part
of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by
the
Sun
Valley
Lumber
Co.
consequent
to
its
sawmill
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission
that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in
the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and
Cagayan River bounding his land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.
Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands,
as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the
court a quo dismissed petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an
Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the
decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands". 14 It would be
incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands
acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands.
In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge"
of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on
said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the

14
case ofHamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 15 this Court held that
the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set
aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving
public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have
acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 16
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being
an artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction,
authority and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public
Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which states, thus:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
the exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this
Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate
control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct
executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other
form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or
capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the
Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the
conclusive finding that the subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he issued the
assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate
the subject land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is
incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the
subject land to private respondents Salasalans and Rabayas as they had not yet been
issued patents or titles over the subject land. The execution order merely directed the
segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which was actually being
occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the finding
that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the
subject land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in
the exercise of his administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject
land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the
occupants thereof.

While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by
them, they nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous
Sales Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they
were in fact directed to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely
implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners' own
application still has to be given due course. 17
As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over
any form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public
domain. 18 He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the
circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact.
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that where, in the disposition of
public lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented,
he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error
is one of judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.
Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds
no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

15
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3788 December 21, 1907
PEDRO P. ROXAS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JULIA TUASON, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI, AND ALEJANDRO
AND CONSOLACION AGUIRRE, respondents-appellants.
1.

REALTY; ALLUVIUM; TITLE BY ACCRETION. When the boundary between

two estates if a river or a stream, the bed of which belongs to neither of them,
the gradual increase of one side is for the benefit thereof and does not
prejudice the property on the opposite side because, in accordance with the
provisions of article 366 of the Civil Code, the owner of an estate increased by
alluvium acquires the title thereto by accretion.

TORRES, J.:
On February 19, 1906, attorneys Rosado, Sanz & Opisso, on behalf of Pedro P. Roxas,
applied for the registration of the estate owned by the said Roxas, known as
the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act; said hacienda was acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the
will of his late father, Jose Bonifacio Roxas, y Ubaldo. The property consists of four
different parcels of land, irregular shape, designated on the accompanying plan under
the letters "A", "B", "C", and "D", containing a total area of 1,761 hectares 51 ares and 5
centares, equivalent to 17,615,105 square meters, and according to the last
assessment for the purpose of taxation assessed at P415,221.34, of which P59,904
corresponded to the portion of said hacienda included within the limits of the city of
Manila and P256,769 corresponded to that portion situated in the Province of Rozal.
The building constructed of strong materials, called the "Casa-Quinta" or "Casa de
Ingenieros," belonging also to said Roxas, is erected within parcel "C," occupying,
together with its appurtenances, an area of 8,430 square meters, and was assessed at
P98,557.34. It does not appear that said hacienda is mortgaged nor that any person has
any right to or any interest therein; and it is almost wholly occupied at the present time,
under lease, by about 429 tenants whose names, residences, and postal addresses, as
well as the residence of the owner of the property and of his attorney in fact, are stated
in the application.
In his writing of April 24 the petitioner requested the summoning of the persons therein
named, and stated in addition that the total area of the hacienda is 17,613,595.91
square meters, as specified in the corrections made to the technical description.

In another writing dated July 24, 1906, amending his former application, the petitioner
gives the postal address and names of several occupants of the property; and by other
amendments to his original petition dated August 30 and September 25, 1906,
rectifications are made in the boundaries of the hacienda, the last of which represents a
decrease of 1,446.70 square meters, or 14 ares and 46.70 centares which must be
deducted from the original description.
The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means
of subpoenas and notices published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason,
appeared and by a document dated September 10, 1906, set forth her opposition to the
registration and authentication of the title of the petitioner, Roxas, as regards the parcel
marked "C," for the reason that two old monuments which had separated their
respective properties had been pulled down and new ones erected without her consent,
and in her opinion the latter included a considerable portion of the land owned by her,
as may be seen on page 122, part IV, of the record.
The municipality of San Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested registration,
alleging that the land occupied by the municipal building and the public school had been
in the possession of the town from time immemorial, and that all the land occupied by
roads, highways, lanes, and public landing places belonged to the public domain and
should be excluded from registration in favor of the petitioner.
Under date of the 18th of September, 1906, the attorney for Alejandro Aguirre and
Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for registration alleging that
the two parcels of land owned by them had been improperly included within the bounds
of said hacienda in the parcel marked "C," the second said parcels, which is the only
subject of the respective bill of exceptions and appeal interposed by them, consists of a
building lot situated in Calle San Pedro, opposite the first parcel of land, which was the
subject of another bill of exceptions and appeal by the petitioner; said second parcels
measures 10 meters and 87 centimeters on its front and rear, and 9 meters and 20
centimeters along each of its sides, its boundaries being stated.
Evidence consisting of both oral testimony and documents, which appear in the record,
having been adduced by both parties in the suit, the judge, after a notation of default
having been entered against all the respondents, rendered his decision on the 17th of
October, 1906, overruling the opposition made by Julia Tuason, by the municipality of
San Pedro Macati, and by Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre as to the second parcel,
and ordered the registration of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati in favor of Pedro
Roxas, the petitioner herein, excluding the parcel of land with a frontage of 23 Spanish
yards and a depth of 24 Spanish yards occupied by the municipal building, which the
government has the right to use without the payment of rent therefor, so long as the
same is occupied by the said building or by another in substitution thereof and used for
the public good and for official purposes. The respondents, Julia Tuason, the
municipality of San Pedro Macati, and Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre, excepted to

16
said judgment and moved for a new trial on the ground that the same was contrary to
law and to the weight of the evidence; said motion was overruled, the respondents
again excepting. The respective bills of exceptions having been presented, the same
were forwarded in the ordinary manner.
The only subject of controversy between the petitioner, owner of the Hacienda of San
Pedro Macati, and the respondent Julia Tuason is the question of the boundary line,
between their respective contiguous premises.
The representative of the petitioner affirms that the real boundary of the hacienda on the
side that adjoins the land of Tuason was and still is a creek or sapa separating both
properties, and that in former years said creek was wider that at the present time.
The respondent, however, maintains that the boundary between the sitio called Suavoy,
formerly an island of that name, and the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati is determined
by straight lines drawn between some old monuments distant a few yards from the bank
of the said creek.
The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed by
monuments belonging to her or that the creek which divides the sitio or Island of Suavoy
from the land of the said hacienda is included within the respondent's land, since in the
bill of sale executed by the procurador general of the Augustinian friars on March 28,
1893, to Julia Tuason, no mention is made of monuments erected thereon nor of any
creek existing in the large tract of land purchased by her, except that the land is situated
in the barrio of Suavoy and that it is bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San
Pedro Macati.
Nor does the record show that there was more land on the side of the hacienda, forming
part of the barrio or sitio of Suavoy, not included in the tract acquired by Tuason from
the Augustinian Fathers, and that said creek traversed said barrio from one end to the
other, or the respondent's land, in order to affirm on good grounds that her land
extended to the opposite bank of the aforesaid creek.
From the fact that the land of Julia Tuason was bounded on two sides by the Hacienda
of San Pedro Macati it does not follow that the strip of a few meters in width on the bank
of the creek above referred to belonged to her, there being no evidence in support
thereof, and if her statement were true, she would have applied for a survey and
demarcation of her property in accordance with the area of the same stated in her title
deed; and if she did not do so it must be because she renounces its verification in this
manner or for some other reason.
Further than this, it is impossible to draw the above conclusion, inasmuch as the strip of
land, irregular in shape, running parallel to the creek and forming a portion of its bank,

has always up to the present time been occupied by tenants of said hacienda as being
an integral portion thereof, even at the time when the land now owned by Julia Tuason
belonged to the Augustinian Fathers, the original owners thereof.
It is so affirmed by Rafael Rivera, the collector of rents of the hacienda, and by two
tenants thereof, Tomas Medina and Santos Tenorio; the two last named were lessees
for about thirty years and twenty-seven years, respectively, of certain portions of the
hacienda with their respective part of said strip, as a prolongation and integral part of
the lands of the hacienda, and they were never molested or interfered with by the
Augustinian Fathers or their tenants, nor later by Julia Tuason, who later acquired the
adjoining land on the other side of the creek, or by her tenants; these latter when
cultivating the land did not cross the creek, it being recognized as the boundary line
between both properties; that in 1871 the said creek was wider than at present, having
then a width of about 4 Spanish yards, small bancas plying on it around the Island of
Suavoy,. and some of the monuments of the hacienda were 4 meters distant from the
bank, others 2 meters, and some 1 meter; that the witness Santos Tenorio was present
at an interview held between an Augustinian priest named Martinez, in charge of the
land at the time, and the owner of the hacienda, Bonifacio Roxas, in connection with the
boundary line of the two adjoining estates, and after some explanations the said creek
was settled as the limit in spite of the fact that the old monuments were already in
existence at some distance from the bank in the direction of the hacienda; and that in
1882, when the first-named witness, Rafael Rivera, took charge of his office of collector,
the owner of the hacienda pointed out to him the said creek as the limit of his property,
everybody asserting that Suavoy was at that time an island, although two of the
witnesses of the respondent stated that said creek was only a canal.
The proven fact that said creek was wider in 1871, when it had a width of about 4
Spanish yards, is the best explanation as to why some of the monuments of the
Hacienda of San Pedro Macati are now at some distance from the bank of the same,
and no legal reason whatever exists why the slow increase which has taken place on
the hacienda's side should be considered as belonging to the respondent, inasmuch as
the latter does not own the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that the
slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both properties equally since the
respondent has not been able to show or prove that her land has been thereby reduced.
Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession to real property
reads: lawphil.net
The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of
the currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.
The provision in this article is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on account
of the accretion, has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the hacienda
inasmuch as it has increased all along the bank of the creek, the gradual effect of the

17
currents; and even though the law does not require an express act of possession of the
accretion which has enlarged the estate, it is certain that the owner of the hacienda has
possessed it for more than thirty years through his tenants, who have been cultivating
their respective parcels of land together with the corresponding portion of the said strip
down to the bank of said creek.
For these considerations the question of the situation of the old monuments and the
placing of new ones in the intervening space is of no importance, inasmuch as it has
already been shown that the respondent has no title to the accretion which by
spontaneous increase formed the strip of land between the creek and the monuments,
and no proof is offered in the record that the land of Julia Tuason reached the other side
of the creek toward the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.
In conclusion: The result of the evidence, as stated in the judgment appealed from,
does not maintain the claim of the respondent; on the contrary, it has been shown in a
convincing manner that the present natural limit of both properties is the aforesaid
creek; therefore, the opposition filed by Julia Tuason is untenable.
As to the opposition filed by the municipality to the registration applied for, the judgment
appealed from is held to be in accordance with the law and the merits of the case
because, as is therein set forth, the petitioner, Pedro Roxas, is the owner of the building
lots and portions of land to which the said opposition refers; the municipality of San
Pedro Macati has only the usufruct of the plot occupied by the municipal building as
long as the same or any other building of a public and official nature is erected thereon;
the municipality can not dispose of it as a property of its own because, according to the
documents offered in evidence by the petitioner, the Spanish Government had
recognized the dominion of the petitioner's predecessor over the land occupied by said
municipal building and by the town cemetery, and the grant made by the owner was
ever understood to be only of the usufruct thereof so long as used for public purposes,
the same being returnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such purpose.
In connection with the land occupied by the public school of said town, no opposition
based on ordinary or on extraordinary prescription may be made by the municipality
because the plot was granted only for the purpose of erecting thereon a public school,
and the possession thereof, on the part of the municipality, was simply usufructuary, the
government of the Province of Manila having recognized the title thereto which
pertained to the petitioner, owner of the said hacienda, whereof the said plot forms a
part; moreover, the possession thereof by the municipality has been but for a few years
only. The school building having been destroyed, the land was abandoned many years
ago, and for this reason prescription can not be invoked because the possession
thereof was interrupted and ceased many years since; in view thereof, the decision of
the lower court respecting the petition of the municipality is held to be in accordance
with the law and the merits of the case.

The attorney for Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre excepted to the decision of the 17th
of October, 1906, whereby their claim to the second parcel of land, as stated in their
petition, was dismissed; their bill of exceptions, entered in the general register under No
3788, was duly forwarded, but notwithstanding the fact that the time prescribed has
been exceeded, the appellants have not filed their brief nor notified the appellee
regarding the same; therefore, the latter by a petition dated June 26, 1907, requested
that their appeal be considered as having been abandoned; this request is held to be
well based and in accordance with the law.
Therefore, by virtue of the considerations above set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed as regards the respondents who have
appealed, Julia Tuason and the municipality of San Pedro Macati; the appeal of
Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre is hereby declared to be abandoned, each of the
appellants to pay their respective share of the costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.lawphil.net

G.R. No. L-17652

June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN
CALALUNG, respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that
of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing
petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to
and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without
petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a
parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of
Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased
mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in
whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title).

18
Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the
bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and
an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been
added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square
meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon
the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer
(dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that
they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since
prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision
adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering
respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and
to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by
the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan
River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was
formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the
surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by
them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative
of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the
northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more
than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the
declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C.
Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since
1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman,
but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of
4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only
declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax
Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give
credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled
Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this
declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared
the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become

the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New
Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation
(Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the
mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs
(Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that
the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of
no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the
part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary,
in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not
require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting
that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have
acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in
September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January
25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years;
hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts.
1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and
parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it
could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another
person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on
September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly
stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of
alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by
the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has
supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil
Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that
they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the
real issue in this case. The Courta quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs,
on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the
original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the
accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession";

19
and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month
of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription
before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite
correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of
the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession
thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the
certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would
virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein,
of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that
is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has
stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion
of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration
Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has,
are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition
area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in
the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17,
1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court,
regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession.
Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first
time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under
occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the
land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded
in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is
located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is
corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro
Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three
terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that
since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession
of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he
said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The
area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight
and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness,
Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in

question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the
land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners,
that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that
they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo
Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes
or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the
said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he
claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey
included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to
the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square
meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession
from 1933 to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover,
supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the
disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948,
they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse
they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of
the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration.
The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain
a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in
their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally
theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally
deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the
evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately
after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their
rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,
prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the
alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article
366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion
becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered
by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the
registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso

20
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under
the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must
be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never
sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after
petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on
June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject
to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical
possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the
alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these
facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented
by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the
pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance
with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioners. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN
LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO
BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the
east in the province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor,
Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were
covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was
issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio
Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on
the western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these
occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents,
namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878,
7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who
owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession in
1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares
were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application No.
W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession
was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug). On the other
hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of
Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for
Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its
eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh.
E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug
on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to
its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad,
and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on

21
the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross
the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on
their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same
lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.
On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a
complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and
its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a
separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.
On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:
In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio
Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as
their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana
Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots
9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these
defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo
Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.
In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru,
Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora,
Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias
Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun,
Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or
any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876,
7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and
7892, together with its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs
Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement as to
damages which were not properly proven and to costs.
SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.)
(pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in
Civil Case No. 344-T, only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero
Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But

upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution
pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and
Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented
evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendantsappellants.
In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals erred:
1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private
respondents' estate as a result of accretion;
2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which
used to pertain to petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private
respondents from being the owners thereof; and
3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the
accretion is not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the
course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed
The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the
private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they
were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a
finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of
the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters. (366)
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

22
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a
period of 49 years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on
the other side has become greater in area than the original lands of
the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is
imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be measured
after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these
cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is
overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin
alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so.
Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said
so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that
when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions
of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have
happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by the
overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be
destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and
Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan
River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was
gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares
described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was
resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No.
3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew
from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as
the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian
owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because,
if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the
destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances
and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may
prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of
accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).itc-asl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it
reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other
side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to
this situation.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates

from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to
another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the
same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land
retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a
result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private
respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The private
respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by
avulsion to the other side of the river.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur

23
granted Free Patent No. 045802-1165 which led to the issuance to him of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-665 over an area of 18,787 square meters. Because of
these incidents, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bracnh 73, Antipolo City a
complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2418.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 144208

September 11, 2007

EFREN TANDOG, FELIX TANDOG, FELIPE TANDOG, JOSEFINO TANDOG, HELEN

TANDOG, CATALINA TANDOG, ROMEO TANDOG, DOMINGO TANDOG, CATALINA
SANTOS, MARIA BAUTISTA CATANYAG, ARTEMIO CATANYAG, ANGELES
CATANYAG, APOLONIA CATANYAG, ADORACION CATANYAG, ARCELY
CATANYAG, and AMPARO CATANYAG, all represented by EFREN
TANDOG, petitioners,
vs.
RENATO MACAPAGAL, SPOUSES ALFONSO and MARINA CALDERON, and the
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 dated July 31, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57812.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:
The subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147,991 square meters situated at
Sitio Inarawan, Barangay Inuman, San Isidro, Antipolo City.
The above-named petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since
time immemorial. They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in
1945. He was survived by his nephews and nieces, now deceased, except Maria
Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiros grand nieces and grand nephews (herein
petitioners) have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they found
that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina Calderon
and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses Calderon used
falsified documents to justify their possession of 20,116 square meters of the land which
they sold to the government. For his part, Renato Macapagal applied for and was

Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners allegations

in their complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their property in 1958
and, since then, have been in possession of the same. They planted trees and crops
thereon. Also, they have been paying the corresponding realty taxes. She does not
know petitioners who are all strangers in the place.
Before the hearing of the case, or on July 20, 1993, petitioners and Macapagal entered
into a Compromise Agreement.2 Petitioners acknowledged therein his ownership of the
portions of the land consisting of 18,787 square meters covered by OCT No. P-665.
This agreement was approved by the trial court.
After petitioners had presented their evidence, spouses Calderon filed a demurrer to
evidence. In an Order dated March 20, 1995, the trial court granted their motion and
dismissed the complaint.
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2000
affirming the Order of the trial court dismissing their complaint. The appellate court held:
Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, a claimant must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or
casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in
real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title
must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding."
Under the maxim "expresio unius est exclusio alterius," these grounds are
exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may
not be considered valid for the same action. (Titong v. CA, G.R. No. 111141,
March 6, 1998)
The appellants had nothing to show for this. The most that they did was to
mark a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY & OR RIGHTS OR
INTERESTS THEREIN as Exh. "D" and a SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
as Exh. "E", which allegedly are the falsified documents used by the appellees
as basis for their claim over the subject lot. x x x
xxx
Under Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, it is clear that for the
evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the

24
mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party. (Vda de Oate v. CA, G.R. 116149, Nov. 23, 1995) Any evidence which a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be
offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected. x x x
It does not help either that the testimonies presented are on the whole hearsay
and unreliable as to the existence and right of the amorphous Casimero
Policarpio and the hereditary link between him and the appellants.
Hence, this present petition.
Petitioners contend that the allegations of spouses Calderon that they purchased their
property and Macapagals claim that he applied for a Free Patent are judicial
admissions which they (petitioners) consider as cloud upon their interest in the disputed
property.
The petition must fail.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by
mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is
subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis for the asserted right.
Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has been
held to constitute a removable cloud on title.3

While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a cloud on

their (petitioners) interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been proved.
The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify their possession
were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in evidence by
petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may have been marked
as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in evidence, cannot
be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.4
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. 5 Petitioners failed
to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to prove that Casimiro
Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Their testimonies can
not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that pedigree may be proved by
acts or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is
necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b) the act or
declaration is made by a person related to the subject by birth or marriage; (c) the
relationship between the declarant or the actor and the subject is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration; and (d) the act or declaration was made ante litem
motam, or prior to the controversy.6
Records show that petitioners failed to establish by evidence any or all the above
requisites.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57812. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.