Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Department 17
RiCQ
PROCEEDINGS
Stephen M. Gaggero v. Knapp, Petersen and Clarke, et al.
BC286924
Motion to Quash Defendants' Notice of Third Deposition of Plaintiff Stephen M.
Gaggero and for Protective Order
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero's Motion to Quash Defendants' Notice of Third
Deposition of Plaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero and for Protective Order is partially granted.
The court grants Plaintiff s request to quash the deposition notice attached as Exhibit N to
Plaintiff s motion. The court orders that Plaintiff s submit to a final deposition session
that is to be conducted in one day, not to exceed 10 hours on a date that is mutually
agreeable to the parties. Should the defendants not complete the deposition in one day
they may come into court and upon a showing of good cause seek additional time to
conclude the deposition. The party responsible for the inability to complete the
deposition will be assessed sanctions. The mutually agreeable date is ordered by the
court to be
[date]
. Plaintiffs deposition is to take place on
that date and shall not exceed 10, hours.
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Honorable Richard~Rico
Department 17
The Second pistrict Court of Appeal in Kerner v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App.
4th 84, 112, fn. 13 (2012) acknowledges that California recognizes "a nonstatutory
implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege in some circumstances when the client
puts the privileged communication directly at issue in litigation and disclosure is essential
to a fair adjudication." See Kerner, Id., citing Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Utilities
Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 31, 40-43. The case ofSteiny & Co. v. California Elec. Supply
Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th 285 (2000) does not deal with the attorney-client privilege in
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that "[w]here privileged information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness
requires that it be disClosed for the litigation to proceed." See ld., at p. 392.
In Rutgard v. Haynes (S.D. Cal 1995) 185 F.R.D, 596, 599 the court held that a
client impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege when he/she puts in issue otherwise
attorney-client privileged information. As to the specific facts in that case, the Rutgard
court stated, "by claifning damages to recover the amount of the settlement of the
malicious prosecution case, Plaintiff has waived the attorney-client privilege between
himself and [successor counsel] by putting "in issue" the reasonableness of that
settlement, and [successor counsel's] actions in defending him and recommending that
settlement." See ld., at p. 599-600. 1
A party cannot selectively waive the attorney-client privilege. When a party has
disclosed a significant part of privileged information, that party "cannot be allowed, after
disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder." See Merritt v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 721, 731 (1970). Based on fairness and/or waiver, the privilege
cannot continue to exist. See ld. In Merritt, the court addressed the fairness and waiver
of privilege by stating the following:
We feel that plaintiff has misconstrued the reasoning and rationale of
respondent court. That court neither expressly nor impliedly held that any
plaintiff who brings an action against an insurer for bad faith refusal to
settle waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to the prior
negligence aqtion. Indeed such a sweeping declaration was not necessary
to support the court's ruling of January 2, 1970. The court simply found
that plaintiff had initiated a lawsuit in which he has placed in issue the
decisions, coticlusions and mental state of his then attorneys, particularly
as to their coruusion and disability allegedly caused by defendant's
conduct which precluded them from making a settlement offer. It is
obvious both 'from the issues framed and the contents of the depositions of
plaintiffs priqr counsel that plaintiff would rely heavily upon evidence to
be given by his said counsel and that he would be using his prior counsel
to prove matter which they could only have learned in the course of their
employment. Thus it was not merely the initiation of the lawsuit but
rather the maimer of its prosecution which constituted the waiver. The
respondent court so held. [Citations omitted.] Inasmuch as the attorneyclient privilege does tend to suppress otherwise relevant facts, it is to be
strictly construed. See ld., at p. 730.
Because the "theory 'of plaintiffs lawsuit placed in issue the conduct and state of mind of
his personal injury counsel in failing to propose a settlement," the Merritt court found a
waiver ofthe work product privilege. See ld.
See also Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Ca1.3d 591,603-605 (1984) and 2,022 Ranchv.
Superior Court, 113 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1395 (2003) [court said that "[t]he attorney-client
or attorney work product privilege may be impliedly waived by placing the contents of
the privileged communications at issue in the case"].
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Here, both the allegations of this action and of the Bezek action address the same
allegedly negligent conduct by Plaintiff s attorneys where Plaintiff was allegedly
damaged in' excess of $15 million. In a legal malpractice action, the cli~nt must prove
that "but for" the attorney's negligence, the client would not have suffered the resulting
damages. The "but for" test is the standard in an attorney malpractice action. See Viner
v. Sweet, 30 Cal. 4th 1232, 1240-1241 (2003). "The law in California is well established
that when legal malpractice involves negligence in the prosecution or defense of a legal
claim, the case-within-a-case methodology must be used." See Orrick Herrington &
Sutcliffe v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1052,1054 (2003).
The only way to fairly allow Defendant to properly assert a defense and operate in
the case-within-a-case methodology in this action is to permit the disclosure of the
documents sought in the subpoena so that Defendant can fairly determine the damages
that Plaintiff claims to have suffered as a result of Defendant's conduct.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero's Motion to Quash Subpoena for
Production of Documents is denied. the court finds that the Plaintiffhas'put in issue the
documents requested-in the subpoena and has therefore waived the privilege. The court
finds that it is fair and just to permit disclosure of the subpoenaed documents so that
Defendant, Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, can properly defend itself and assess whether or
not Plaintiff has mitigated has alleged damages. the documents subpoenaed are ordered
to be produced.
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1. Motion to Quash
Non-parties Joseph Praske individually and as trustee/ ofAquas ante Foundation,
trustee of Giganin Trust, and trustee of Arenzano Trust's ("Moving Parties") Motion to
Quash Subpoenas for Production of Documents and for Protective Order on Behalf of
Third Parties Joseph Praske, Trustee of Aquasante Foundation, Trustee of Giganin Trust,
and Trustee of Arenzano Trust is denied. Moving Parties seek to quash the subject
subpoenas and document requests on the grounds that they' seek irrelevant information as
it has already been established that Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero will not rely on the Trusts
during trial as a potential source of funding for the subject properties. In support of this
argument, Moving Parties cite to four items: (1) testimony by Defendant Steven Ray
Garcia stating that a Mr. Bezek believed Gaggero was "worth more than $40 million," (2)
testimony by Defendant Andre Jardini stating that his "impression ... is that [Gaggero]
was worth at least $30 million," (3) evidence that Plaintiff's counsel "during an informal
telephone conference with the Honorable Richard E. Rico ... confirmed that Plaintiffs
would not rely on the trusts during trial as a potential source offunding for the 938, 940
and 944 properties," and (4) the Court of Appeal's finding that Plaintiff had created a
'triable issue of fact as to whether he had the financial ability to purchase the properties.
See Alperin Decl., ~ 5 & Exs. 1-3. This indirect evidence is insufficient to establish that
Plaintiff will not rely on the Trusts during trial as a potential source of funding.
Moving Parties also argue in their reply that Plaintiff has already produced
documents establishing his capacity to purchase the subject properties and that the Trusts'
right to privacy outweighs any need for the subpoenaed documents. The Court declines
to address these arguments as they were raised for the first time in the reply. See Balboa
Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 ("points raised in a reply brief for
the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present
them before").
On these grounds, the motion is denied.
2. Motion for Sanctions
Defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M. Harris and
Andre Jardini's Motion for Evidentiary and Monetary Sanctions is denied. Although this
motion is entitled "Motion for Evidentiary and Monetary Sanctions," the memorandum of
points &nd authorities only addresses terminating sanctions. Trial courts should only
exercise their authority to issue terminating sanctions "in extreme situations, such as
when the conduct was clear and deliberate, where no lesser alternatives would remedy the
situation [Citation], the fault lies with the client and not the attorney [Citation], and when
the court issues a directive that the party fails to obey." Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 789, 799; see also Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2008) 155
Cal.App.4th 736, 740 ("California courts have inherent power to terminate litigation for
deliberate and egregious misconduct when no other remedy can restore fairness"). Here,
Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff produced responsive documents on September 28
and October 1,2012 in response to the Court's August 27,2012 order compelling further
production. See Wakily Decl., ~ 10. However, Defendants waited four months before
filing a motion to sanction this behavior and did not seek lesser sanctions. Accordingly,
Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff s misconduct is so egregious that "any sanction
other than dismissal [would be] inadequate to ensure a fair trial." . SlesiYJ-ger (2008) 155
Cal.App.4th at 740. On these grounds, the Court finds that terminating"sanctions are not
warranted and the motion is denied.
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RANDALL A. MILLER
(Bar No. 116036)
JONATHAN A. FELDHEIM (Bar No. 249537)
AUSTA WAKlLY
(BarNo. 257424)
MILLERLLP
515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2201
Telephone: 800.720.2126
Facsimile: 888.749.5812
Attorneys for Defendants KNAPP, PETERSEN &
CLARKE, STEVEN RA Y GARCIA, STEPHEN M.
HARRlS, and ANDRE JARDINI
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
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CASE NO.:
BC286924
v.
KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE, a
Califomia corporation; STEVEN RAY
GARCIA, an individual; STEPHEN M.
HARRlS, an individual; .ANDRE JARDINI,
and individual; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive
Defendants.
Hearing: March 8, 2013
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Department: 17
Complaint Filed: December 12, 2002
Trial Date:
March 19, 2013
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 8, 2013 the Motion to Quash the four subpoenas
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HARRlS and ANDRE JARDINI (collectively "KPC") served for documents from and depositions
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of (1) Joseph PIaske, individually; (2) Joseph Praske as Trustee of the Giganin Trust; (3) Joseph .
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Praske as Trustee of Arenzano Trust and (4)lJoseph Praske as Trustee of Aquasante Trust
NOTICE OF RULING ON MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR JOSEPH PRASKE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE FOR AQUASANTE
F01TNnATTON ANn GTGANTN ANn ARRN7.ANO
TR1T~T~
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(collectively ''Non-Party Trusts") came on for hearing and the Court, having issued a tentative
ruling and after hearing oral argllllent, made the following Order:
3) The Non-Party Trusts are to produce all responsive documents requested in the
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subpoenas within 10 days of the hearing;
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4) Joseph Praske, as Trustee of the Giganin Trust, Arenzano Trust and Aquasante
Foundation, is to appear for deposition within 30 days of this hearing unless the parties
agree otherwise.
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TR1T~T~
PROCEEDINGS
Stephen M. Gaggero v. Knapp, Petersen and Clarke, et aI.
Be 286 924
1. Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Production of Documents and for Protective
Order on Behalf of Third Parties Joseph Praske, Trustee of Aq1Jasa.n,te
Foundation, Trustee of Giganin Trust, and Trustee of Arenzano Trust
2. Motion for Evidentiary and Monetary Sanctions
TENTATIVE RULING
1. Motion to Quash,
Non-parties Joseph Pra,ske individually and as trustee o{Aquasante FO~1.datioIl"
trustee of Giganin Trust, and trustee of Arenzano Trust'.s ("Moving Parties") Motion to
, Quash Subpoenas for Production of Documents,and for ProtectiveOider on Behalf of
Third Parties Joseph Praske, Trustee of Aquasant~ Foundation, Trustee of Giganin Tr-q.st,
and Trustee of Arenzano Trust is denied. Moving Parties seek to quash the subject
subpoenas and document requests on the grounds that they' seek irrelevant information as
it has already been established that Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero will not rely on the Trt;l.sts
during tri:;tl as a potential source of funding for the subj ect properties. In support of this
argument, Moving Parties cite to four items: (1) testimony by Defendant Steven Ray
Garcia stating that a Mr. Bezek believed Gaggero was "worth more than $40 million," (2)
testimony byDefendant Andre Jatdini stating that his "impression ... is that [GaggeroJ.
was worth at least $30 million," (3) evidence that Plaintiff's counsel "during an informal
telephone conference with the Honorable Richard E. Rico ... confmned th:;tt Plaintiffs
would not rely on the trusts during trial as a potential sourye of funding for the 938, 940
and 944 properties," and (4) the COU1i of Appeal's fi.J;J.ding that PI/'lintiffhad create!. a
'triable issue of fact as to whether he had the financial ability to purchase the p)':operties.
See Alperin Decl., "If 5' & Exs. 1-3. This indirect evidence is insu.:ffi.cien,tto establish that
Pl'l-intiff will not rely on the Trusts during trial as a potential source of funding.
Moving Parties also ~gue in th~ir reply that Plaintiff has already product:;d
documents establishing his capacity to purchase the subject properties a:o,d that the Trusts'
right to privacy outweighs any need for the subpoenaed documents. The Court declines
~o address these argument:;; as they were raised for the first time in the reply. See Ealboa
Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 ("points raised ill a reply brieffor
the first time will not be considered uDless good r;:ause is shown for the failure to present
them before"). '
On these grounds, the motion is denied.
2. Motion for Sanctions
Defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen, M. Harris Qn,d
Andre J ardini' s Motioll'for Evidentiary and Monetary Sanctions is denied. Altho1Jgh this
motion is entitled "Motion for Evidentiary and Monetary Sanctions," t?-e memor~dum of
points ?Ild authorities only addresses terminating sanctions. Trial courts should only
exercise their authority to issue terminating sanctions "in extreme situations, such as
when the conduct was clear and deliberate, where no lesser alternatives would remedy the
situation [Citation], the fault lies with the client and not the attoDl~y [Citation], and when
the court issues a directive that the party fails to obey." Del Junc;o v. Hufnagel (2007)
150 Cal.AppAth 789, 799; see also Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2008) 155
Cal.App.4th 736, 740 ("California courts have inherent power to termulate litigation for
ddiberate and egregious misconduct when no other remedy can. restore fairness"). Here,
Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff produced responsive documents on September 28
and October 1,2012 in response to the Court's August 27,2012 order compelling furth~r
production. See Wakily Decl., 11 10. However, DefendaIl,ts waited four months before
filing amotion to sanction this behavior and did l~ot seek lesser sanctions. Accordingly, .
pefen4ants have not shown that Plaintiff s miscond.uct is egregiol!-s that "any sanctioll
other than dismissal [would be] inadequate to ensl!-fe):l.cfair triSJ.." Slesirrger (2008) 155
Cal.AppAth at 740. On these grounds, the Court finds that tenninating'!sa;nctions are not
warranted and the motion is denied.
so
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PROOF OF SERVICE
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I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to
the within action. My business address is Miller LLP, 515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150, Los
Angeles, CA 90071-2201. On March 12,2013 I served the within documents:
NOTICE OF RULING ON MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR JOSEPH PRASKE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE FOR AQUASANTE FOUNDATION AND GIGANIN
AND ARENZANO TRUSTS
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by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax nUl11ber(s) set
forth below on this date before 5 :00 p.m.
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by placing the dOCtlllent(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon
fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set
forth "below.
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I dec1m:e tmder penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California thatthe above is
true and COlTect.
Executed on March 12,2013, at Los Angeles, California.
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SERVICE LIST
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Max Blecher
Howard Alperin
BLECHER COLLINS PEPPERMAN & JOYE,
P.C.
515 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1750
Los Angeles, CA 90071-3334
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PROOF OF SERVICE
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DOCUMENTS:
Notice of Ruling on Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Production of
Documents and for Protective Order for Joseph Praske, Individually
and as Trustee for Aquasante Foundation and Giganin and Arenzano
Trusts
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RANDALL A. :MILLER
(Bar No. 116036)
JONATHAN A. FELDHEW (Bar No. 249537)
AUSTA WAKILY
(BarNo. 257424)
MlLLERLLP
515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2201
Telephone: 800.720.2126 .
Facsimile: 888.7495812
NAR 272013
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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v.
CASE NO.:
BC286924
Defendants.
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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 20, 2013 in Department 17 of the above-
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entitled court, .Judge Rico presiding, held a Status Conference to set a new trial date.
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Waldly of Miller LLP appeared for defendants, Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia,
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Stephen M. Harris, and Andre Jardini (Defendants). Max Blecher and Kristen Peters of Blecher
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Collins Pepperman & Joye appeared on behalf of plaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero. David Chatfield
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of Westlake Law Group appeared on behalf of the non-party witness Joseph Praske as the Trustee
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-1NOTICE OF RULING AT TRIAL SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE .
Austa
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RANDALL A. MILLER
(Bar No. 116036)
JONATHAN A. FELDHEIfY[ (Bar No. 249537)
AUSTA WAKILY
(BarNo. 257424)
MILLERLLP
515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2201
Telephone: 800.720.2126
Facsimile: 888.749.5812
Attorneys for Defendants KNAPP, PETERSEN &
CLARKE, STEVEN RAY GARCIA, STEPHEN M.
HARRIS, and ANDRE JARDINI
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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CASE NO.:
BC286924
v.
NOTICE OF RULING AT TRIAL SETTING
KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE, a STATUS CONFERENCE
California corporation; STEVEN RAY
GARCIA, an individual; STEPHEN M.
HARRIS, an individual; ANDRE JARDINI, Hearing:
March 20,2013
and individual; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive
Time:
8:30 a.m.
Defendants.
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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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entitled court, Judge Rico presiding, held a Status Conference to set a new trial date.
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Wakily of Miller LLP appeared for defendants, Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia,
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Stephen M. Harris, and Andre Jardini (Defendants). Max Blecher and Kristen Peters of Blecher
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Collins Pepperman & Joye appeared on behalf of plaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero. David Chatfield
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of Westlake Law Group appeared on behalf ofthe non-party witness Joseph Praske as the Trustee
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-1NOTICE OF RULING AT TRIAL SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE
Austa
of the Giganin Trust, Arenzano Trust, and Aquasante Foundation (Trusts). The Court made the
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1) Trial is set for October 1, 2013 at 9:00 am. The Final Status Conference is set for
3) Counsel for the Trusts requested a stay as to the March 8, 2013 Discovery Order
because of their filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. The Court granted the request
and has stayed the March 8, 2013 Discovery Order pending the hearing on the Motion
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4) The Court upon the request of Counsel for Defendants continued the deadline for
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hearings on discovery motions. The new deadline will be set according to the October
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MILLERLLP
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. By:
~~())))~~~{))",-----IJ~fJJ_ _
AUSTA w1JGLY, ESQ.
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Attorneys for Defendants, KNAPP, V'ETERSEN &
CLARKE, STEVEN RAY GARCIA, STEPHEN M.
HARRIS and ANDRE JARDINI
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-2NOTICE OF RULING AT TRIAL SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a resident o{the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to
the within action. My business address is Miller LLP, 515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150, Los
Angeles, CA 90071-2201. On March 21, 2013 I served the within documents:
by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon
fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set
forth below.
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by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set
forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m.
I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence
for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same
day with postage thereon fully 'prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on
motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter
date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct.
Executed on March 21, 2013, at Los Angeles, California.
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-1PROOF OF SERVICE -NOTICE OF RULING AT TRIAL SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE
SERVICE LIST
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PROOF OF SERVICE
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I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to
the within action. My business address is Miller LLP, 515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150, Los
Angeles, CA 90071-2201. On March 21,2013 I served the within documents:
by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set
forth below on this date before 5 :00 p.m.
by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon
fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set
forth below.
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I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence
for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same
day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on
motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter
date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct.
Executed on March 21,2013, at Los Angeles, California.
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-3PROOF OF SERVICE -NOTICE OF RULING AT TRIAL SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE
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SERVICE LIST
Nancy Lucas Ezzell, Esq.
KAUFMAN DOLOWICH VOLUCK &
GONZOLLP
11755 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, California 90025
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-4PROOF OF SERVICE -NOTICE OF RULING AT TRIAL SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE
Further, as to the merits, defendants argue that now that the trial has been
continued, any issues with Jacobson's honeymoon are moot and there is no logical reason.
why plaintiff still wants to augment his expert designation. Defendants point out that
plaintiff has not provided any facts regarding the "communication breakdown." Also,
plaintiff does not meet the requirements for obtaining leave to augment because section
2034.610 does not permit a party to subtract an available expert so as to add another
expert to provide the same exact areas of testimony. Also, defendants claim that plaintiff
has refused to produce experts Jacobson or Gribin for deposition even though defendants
have noticed their depositions and repeatedly asked for available dates. (Feldheim Decl.
~~4-13.) Defendants argue that plaintiff has also failed to satisfy section 2034.620. If the
court is inclined to grant leave, defendants request that it be conditioned upon plaintiff
agreeing to pay defendants its litigation fees and costs incurred pursuant to section
2034.620(d) due to plaintiff's failure to comply with the expert discovery procedures.
In response, plaintiff indicates that the court suggested/directed plaintiff to file the
instant motion at the hearing on February 22,2013 and that the court extended-all pretrial
deadlines according to the new October 1,2013 trial date. (Blecher Decl. ~~11-13.)
Thus, the argument that the motion is untimely lacks merit. Also, plaintiff claims to have
met the requirements under CCP 2034.610 et seq.
From the foregoing the motion is timely (the court did in fact direct plaintiff to
file the instant motion) but there is insufficient reason to grant the motion. Plaintiff
originally made an ex parte request to substitute Jacobson because he would be
unavailable for a deposition before the then scheduled trial date. At the hearing the court
advised the attorneys that the issue of Jacobson's unavailability was a moot point because
the court was going to be engaged in another trial at the time of the then scheduled trial
date. Indeed the court was engaged and was unable to conduct the trial as originally
scheduled. The court advised plaintiff s counsel that if he still wished to change his
expert he would have to file a motion and the court would determine if such a change was
permissible, hence the instant motion.
It is first noted that plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See
Blecher Decl. ~~3-9.) As to the merits of the motion, since the trial has been continued,
Jacobson is presumably available for the October 1,2013 trial date. Thus, the only
reason given by plaintiff to substitute Jacobson out is a "communication breakdown."
All of the conditions under CCP 2034.620 have not been met. Given that the
honeymoon issue is moot and Jacobson is presumably available, there is essentially no
reason for a substitution. Accordingly, the motion is denied.
Defendants request that if the court denies the motion, defendants be permitted
under CCP 2024.050(a) ("On motion of any party, the court may grant leave to
complete discovery proceedings, or to have a motion concerning discovery heard, closer
to the initiaJ trial date, or to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set. This
motion shall be accompanied by a'meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.")
Specifically permitting defendants to make a motion for sanctions. This seems
unnecessary and defendants could simply have sought sanctions under CCP 2034.630
("The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney
who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to augment or amend expert witness
information, unless it fmds that the one subj ect to the sanction acted with substantial
justification orthat other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." )
The Motion of plaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero ("plaintiff') to Augment Plaintiff s
Expert Witness Designation is DENIED. The court fmds that the motion is timely and
was permitted by the court at the February 22,2013 hearing. However, in light of the
fact that the court date has been continued and that expert witness Jacobson's
unavailability is no longer an issue, the court fmds insufficient reason to grant the relief
requested. The court declines to grant defendants leave to file a motion for sanctions
under CCP 2024.050(a).
DEPT. 17
04/18/13
HONORABLE
Richard E. Rico
JUDGE
A. ORTIZ
HONORABLE
DEPUTY CLERK
15
B. CHAVEZ, C.A.
Deputy Sheriff
8:30 am BC286924
NONE
Reporter
Plaintiff
Counsel
STEPHEN M GAGGERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
Ntc related case sent to D-l pe
order of 05-06-03 in BC286925
Legal Malp
BC286924/BC286925
NO APPEARANCES
Defendant
Counsel
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
MAXWELL M. BLECHER
BLECHER COLLIN PEPPERMAND & JOYE, P.C.
515 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET, SUITE 1750
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90071-3334
AUSTA WAKILY
MILLER LLP
CITY NATIONAL PLAZA
515 SOUTH FLOWER STREET, SUITE 2150
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90071-2201
JONATHAN A. FELDHEIM
MILLER LLP
CITY NATIONAL PLAZA
515 SOUTH FLOWER STREET, SUITE 2150
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90071-2201
KRISTEN M. PETERS
BLECHER COLLINS PEPPERMAN & JOYE
515 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET, SUITE 1750
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90071-3334
Page
3 of
.:.t-:";':;
DEPT. 17
MINUTES ENTERED
04/18/13
COUNTY CLERK
DEPT. 17
04/18/13
HONORABLE
Richard E. Rico
JUDGE
A. ORTIZ
HONORABLE
DEPUTY CLERK
15
B. CHAVEZ, C.A.
Deputy Sheriff
8:30 am BC286924
NONE
Reporter
Plaintiff
Counsel
STEPHEN M GAGGERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
Ntc related case sent to D-l pe
orde~ of 05-06-03 in BC286925
Legal Malp
BC286924/BC286925
NO APPEARANCES
Defendant
Counsel
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Page
4 of
DEPT. 17
MINUTES ENTERED
04/18/13
COUNTY CLERK
DEPT. 17
04/18/13
HONORABLE
Richard E. Rico
JUDGE
A. ORTIZ
HONORABLE
DEPUTY CLERK
ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR
15
B. CHAVEZ, C.A.
Deputy Sheriff
8:30 am BC286924
NONE
Reporter
Plaintiff
Counsel
STEPHEN M GAGGERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
Ntc related case sent to D-l pe
order of 05-06-03 in BC286925
Legal Malp
BC286924/BC286925
NO APPEARANCES
Defendant
Counsel
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Officer/Clerk
By:
A.
O~TIZ
Page.
2 of
DEPT. 17
MINUTES ENTERED
04/18/13
COUNTY CLERK
04/18/13
HONORABLE
DEPT. 17
Richard E. Rico
JUDGE
A. ORTIZ
HONORABLE
DEPUTY CLERK
ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR
15
B. CHAVEZ 1 C.A.
Deputy Sheriff
8:30 am BC286924
NONE
Reporter
Plaintiff
Counsel
STEPHEN M GAGGERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
Ntc related case sent to D-1 pe
order of 05-06-03 in BC286925
Legal Malp
BC286924/BC286925
NO APPEARANCES
Defendant
Counsel
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Order
The Court, issues order dated 4/18/13 consisting of 2
pages 1 filed this date and incorporated herein by
reference to the Court file.
IIThis court upon review of the Court of Appeal order
dated April 8 2013 and received by this court on
April 18 will modify its previous ruling as follows:
1
Page
1 of
DEPT. 17
MINUTES ENTERED
04/18/13
COUNTY CLERK
,1.'1 1:
~ ..
,\:
r""1
,"
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
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S~EPHEN M. GAGGERO,
15
Plaintiff,
16
17
,[
vs.
:1
o. BC 286924
18
19
) Case
)
)
)
' )
Defendants.
:I
--~-----------------------------
20
,I
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This court upon review of the Court of Appeal rder dated April 8, 2013 and received b
23
"
~I
'l
25
o.
26
ourr (1981)
27
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Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Ca1.3d 31, 40-4 ; cf. Schlumberger Limited v. SuperiOi
115 CaJ.App.3d 386, 393), and Attorn y Bezek shall prepare a privilege 10<
denti1fying purported protected work product he see s to withhold for purposes of fmiher
onsiideration of the distinction between absolutely pr tected material and material subject
I
. !
1
ORDER
. ':.I
;
~ua11fied protection that may be overcome ifi n the interests of fairness (Code Civ. Pro.
I
I
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8
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9
,I
"
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2
ORDER
04/26/13
HONORABLE
DEPT. 17
Richard E. Rico
JUDGE
A. ORTIZ
HONORABLE
DEPUTY CLERK
ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR
11
B. CHAVEZ, C.A.
Deputy Sheriff
1:30 pm BC286924
R. RODRIGUEZ, C. S . R.
Plaintiff
, Counsel
STEPHEN M GAGGERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
Ntc related case sent to D-l pe
order of 05-06-03 in BC286925
Legal Malp
BC286924/BC286925
Defendant
D. CHATFIELD,
J. FELDHEIM,
Reporter
(X)
(X)
Counsel
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Page
1 of
DEPT. 17
MINUTES ENTERED
04/26/13
COUNTY CLERK
04/26/13
HONORABLE
DEPT. 17
Richard E. Rico
A. ORTIZ
JUDGE
DEPUTY CLERK
HONORABLE
11
B. CHAVEZ
C.A.
R. RODRIGUEZ
Deputy Sheriff
1:30 pm BC286924
Plaintiff
Counsel
STEPHEN MGAGGERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
Ntc related case sent to D-l pe
order of 05-06-03 in BC286925
Legal Malp
BC286924/BC286925
Defendant
Counsel
C. S . R.
D. CHATFIELD
J.
FELDHEIM
Reporter
(X)
(X)
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Page
2 of
DEPT. 17
MINUTES ENTERED
04/26/13
COUNTY CLERK
04/26/13
HONORABLE
DEPT. 17
Richard E. Rico
JUDGE
A. ORTIZ
HONORABLE
DEPUTY CLERK
ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR
11
B. CHAVEZ, C.A.
Deputy Sheriff
R. RODRIGUEZ, C. S. R.
Reporter
,.~.,;.
1:30 pm BC286924
Plaintiff
Counsel
STEPHEN M GAGGERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
Ntc related case sent to D-l pe
order of 05-06-03 in BC286925
Legal Malp
BC286924/BC286925
D. CHATFIELD,
J. FELDHEIM,
Defendant
Counsel
(X)
(X)
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Executive Officer/Clerk
By:
MAXWELL M. BLECHER
BLECHER COLLIN PEPPERMAND & JOYE, P.C.
515 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET, SUITE 1750
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90071-3334
JONATAN A. FELDHEIM
MILLER LLP
515 SOUTH FLOWER STREET, SUITE 2150
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90071-2201
.:u
Page
3 of
DEPT. 17
MINUTES ENTERED
04/26/13
COUNTY CLERK
.....,
APR 2i20Y
:~:;~j:~g~:~(,
4
5
6
7
10
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
11
12
13
14
15
Plaintiff,
vs.
RULING
Defendants.
--------------------------------)
16
17
18
This court having taken Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero' s motion to augment his expe
itness list under submission now rules as follows. For good cause and no prejudice to defendan
19
he court will grant the request on the following conditions: 1) the deposition of the augmente
20
21
22
xpert witness will take place within the next 30 days and 2) plaintiff shall pay the costs of th
xpert witness in question, that is plaintiff will be responsible for paying the expert witness fees.
23
24
IT IS SO ORDERED
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28
1
RULING
APR 2i20Y
:~:;~j:~g~:~(,
4
5
6
7
10
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
11
12
13
14
15
Plaintiff,
vs.
RULING
Defendants.
--------------------------------)
16
17
18
This court having taken Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero' s motion to augment his expe
itness list under submission now rules as follows. For good cause and no prejudice to defendan
19
he court will grant the request on the following conditions: 1) the deposition of the augmente
20
21
22
xpert witness will take place within the next 30 days and 2) plaintiff shall pay the costs of th
xpert witness in question, that is plaintiff will be responsible for paying the expert witness fees.
23
24
IT IS SO ORDERED
25
28
1
RULING
PROCEEDINGS
,I
i:
The motion of non-parties Joseph Praske, individuall and as tru '~ee of the
Aqua,sarj.te Foundation, trustee of Giganin Trust, and the Ar nzao Trust i: ollective
"Praske 1f) for reconsideration of the court's March 8,2013 ling is DEllED. There is a
strict rec1uirement of diligence in moving for reconsideratio . The movi i~g party must
present ~ satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the e idence or fferent facts
earlier. Garcia v. Heimadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674,690. In this cas 'I the court finds
that Pra~ke has not provided any explanation for failing to p ovide the e :~dence or
differen~ facts earlier.
!i
11
I!
'I
Ii!I
III:
the discovery motion deadline based on the new trial date. (Wakily Decl. ~~5, 9.) The
court ordered defense counsel to give notice, at which point plaintiff objected. (Id. at
~~11-20.)
The March 20,2013 minute order does not state that the discovery and motion
cutoff dates were continued in accordance with the new trial date. Defendants' notice of
ruling (filed March 21,2013) does state that discovery and motion cutoff dates were
continued. Plaintiff filed an objection on March 28,2013.
From the foregoing, it does not appear that the issue was addressed by the court at
the March 20,2013 trial setting conference. Wakily may have brought the issue up, but
this seems to have been largely ignored by plaintiff and the court. Given the confusion
regarding plaintiff's continued refusal to provide the expert witness initially disclosed for
a deposition, it was the court's intention to allow defendants to continue completing their
discovery including any motions to compel. The court fmds good cause to allow the
. alscovefYissues fooe resolved fiinelyjuS1: asitiil1oweapliiiritiffffieopporturu.tY to-- .
"augment" his expert witness when the ostensible reason for the need to augment the
expert witness no longer existed. Plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' motions is
DENIED.
Defendants Knapp, Petersen and Clarke ("KPC"); Steven Ray Garcia; Stephen M.
Harris; and Andre Jardini ("defendants") filed three motions to compel further responses.
Each motion is addressed below:
(1) Supplemental Special Interrogatories
Supplemental special interrogatory no. 1 asks that plaintiff "review his answers to
special interrogatories previously served on him in this action. If, for any reason, any
answer is on longer correct or complete, he is requested to identify the answer and state
whatever information is necessary to make it correct and complete as of the date of their
answer to this interrogatory." (Separate Statement p. 5.)
In response, plaintiff stated that he "has made a good faith effort to review his
prior responses to Defendants' interrogatories in this action. All of the answers set forth
in Plaintiffs [sic] Responses to Defendant's interrogatories previously served are correct
and complete." Plaintiff also incorporated a Preliminary Statement into the response,
which contains boilerplate statements regarding future investigation and evidence, nonwaiver of objections, etc. (Separate Statement p. 2.)
Plaintiff's response is clearly proper as it is unclear what further response could
be compelled. Defendants are really taking issue with plaintiff's Preliminary Statement.
Defendants have cited no specific authority to show that such statements are not allowed.
Defendants suggest that plaintiff must properly investigate the matters at issue in the
interrogatories and that plaintiff has not done so because of statements in the Preliminary
Statement such as that "The responses which are set forth herein are based upon the
current knowledge of Plaintiff and upon such investigation as was reasonable for Plaintiff
to undertake under the circumstances of the Interrogatories." These statements are so
2
"
In opposition, the non-parties argue that defendants failed to meet and confer
prior to filing the instant motion and instead waited until three business days before the
deadline to file their motions to request an extension of the deadlines for filing the
motions. (Cathfield Declaration ~7.) It is confirmed by the moving papers that defense
counsel sent a meet and confer letter counsel for the non-parties on 4/16/13. (Wakily
Decl. ~21, Exhibit G.) Wakily claims that she was unable to review the deposition
transcripts earlier because she was working on an earlier deadline for filing a motion to
compel as to Gaggero's discovery response. (Id. at ~16.)
In light of the conduct of plaintiff in this case (who was the witness for the nonparty entities), the court may find that the motions are warranted. These parties have
basically refused to produce any documents or provide any meaningful information that
would allow defendants to evaluate and defend against plaintiff's claims. The motions
are GRANTED as to resumption of the depositions and production of documents.
It is noted that defendants are also correct to argue that defendant's separate
statement does not comply with eRC 3.1345(c), which provides that the text of each
question and response must be provided. In light of the defects with the separate
statement and defendants' lack of meaningful meet and confer efforts, the court will
decline to grant defendants sanctions.
,/
In response, defendants claim that the Court of Appeal's order did not address the
new fact that plaintiff now claims that attorney Bezek lost his case at trial because of
KPC's conduct in the initial handling of the lawsuit. This new claims places Bezek's
decisions, strategy, and conclusion directly at issue in this lawsuit and KPC should be
allowed to obtain information on plaintiffs new theory. Alternatively, plaintiff should be
precluded from claiming that KPC's conduct impaired Bezek's handling of the lawsuit
while preventing KPC from confirming the statements from Bezek.
Defendants' argument is unpersuasive. As plaintiff correctly argues, there are no
new or different facts to warrant reconsideration of the court's 4/18/13 order. It seems
that defendants were aware ofplaintiffs contention that KPC's conduct contributed to his
trial counsel's loss at trial prior to subsequent discovery responses "affirming" this
contention. This is not new or different facts warranting reconsideration of the court's
ruling. Defendants also make arguments about a privilege log. (Motion pp. 7-9.) These
arguments are unnecessary as the court's 4/18/13 order already directed attorney Bezek to
prepare a privilege log.
The motion of defendants Knapp, Petersen and Clarke ("KPC"); Steven Ray
Garcia; Stephen M. Harris; and Andre Jardini ("defendants") for reconsideration of the
court's 4/18/13 order is DENIED.
,I
PROCEEDINGS
Defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M. Harris and
Andre Jardini's Motion to Compel Request for Production of Documents re: Request for
Production of Documents (Set One) and Document Request With Notice of Deposition is
granted. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants negligently advised
Plaintiff of "any risk of his losing his right to purchase the properties," and that "as a
result of Defendants' negligence, [Plaintiff] lost the right to purchase the 938 Property,
and lost the right of first refusal for the two other properties .... " SAC, ~ 26. Defendants
now seek documents evidencing Plaintiff s ability to purchase those properties. Plaintiff
objects on the grounds that these documents are irrelevant to this case, however, they are
clearly relevant as Plaintiff is claiming damages in this action based on his loss of the
right to purchase these properties .. Furthermore, documents relating to the trusts at issue
are also relevant based on testimony in the underlying case that Plaintiff was to purchase
these properties with funds from an estate plan Praske implemented, and identifying these
trusts as part of that estate plan. See Wakily Decl., Ex. R (Plaintiffs counsel: "The
evidence will be [] that Mr. Gaggero commanded more than sufficient resources - that's
what the law requires - - to close this transaction. And the sources were a personal trust.
And you're going to hear testimony not only from Mr. Gaggero, but from Mr.
Praske ... It's a trust that he funded, and the particulars ofthat trust were created by an
estate planning lawyer by the name of Mr. Praske.")
In the alternative, Plaintiff claims that these documents are not in his possession,
custody or control because Joseph Praske is in possession ofthem. See Opposition to
Separate Statement at pp. 57-57 & 67-70. Plaintiff further states that Praske is not his
attorney citing to Praske's declaration. Id. However, Praske does not state in his
declaration that he is not Plaintiffs attorney. See Praske Decl. Furthermore, at the postmediation status conference, Plaintiff's counsel confirmed that Praske was Plaintiff's
estate planning attorney. See Wakily Decl., ~~ 2-6. As Plaintiff's attorney possesses the
sought-after financial documents, they are in Plaintiffs control and should be produced.
In the alternative, Piaintiff argues that these financial documentsare protected by
the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine andlor right to privacy. See
Opposition to Separate Statement at p. 59. It is Plaintiff's burden as the responding party
to justify the validity ofthe objections asserted against production. See Kirkland v. Sup.
Ct. (Guess?, Inc.) (2000) 95 Cal.AppAth 92,98. Here, Plaintiff has not adequately
explained why documents relating to his ability to purchase the subject properties fall
under these privileges or should be protected from production due to his right to privacy
when they are directly relevant to his claim for damages in this case. On these grounds,
the motion is granted as to Requests for Productions Nos. 1-3 & 7-10 in the Notice of
DepositIOn and Request for Production of Document forJPlaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero.
Plaintiff also generally contends that he- has withheld documents pursuant to
"attorney-client privilege, work product privilege, right to privacy, and confidential or
proprietary privilege," however, the privilege logs produced by Plaintiff only identify
documents withheld pursuant to the attorney-client and work product privileges. See
Opposition at 4:19-22. If Plaintiff is withholding additional documents on the grounds of
"right to priyacy, and cQnfidential or promietary privilege," Plaintiff is ordered to>
p'roduce those documents on the grounds that Plaintiff has not justified these objections in
his opposition to this motion. Defendants also request that the Court require Plaintiffto.remove improper boilerplate objections which make it difficult to determine the extent
that Plaintiff has complied with each discovery requests, however, as Plaintiff state
he has only withheld documents pursuant to "attorney-client privilege, work product
privilege, right to privacy, and confidential or proprietary privilege," Defendants' request
is moot.
Defendants also seek to compel Plaintiff to categorize the documents he produced
on the grounds that 16,500 documents were produced as "loose files" or "unlabeled" files
and appear substantially displaced. In response, Plaintiff contends that he has produced
these documents as they were kept in the ordinary course of business. c.c.P. 2031.280
provides that "[a]ny documents produced in response to a demand for inspection,
copying, testing, or sampling shall either be produced as they are kept in the usual course
of business, or be organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in the
demand." It is not credible that Plaintiff kept such a large number of documents without
any apparent order or labeling system, therefore, Plaintiff is ordered to orga$e and label
those documents to correspond with the categories in each aemand
Lastly, Defendants ask that Plaintiff be required to amend his privilege log to
include specific factual descriptions of the documents withheld. However, Plaintiff has
adequately identified the majority of documents-I-iS:t~Q-il:lihe privilege log, including the
number of pages of each document, thtdate of each ~ent, a description of its
contellt, the author, recipient and what'priviregeisCfaimed. See W~ily Decl., Exs. I~ N
& Q; see Hernandez v. Sup. Ct. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285,292 ("The purpose of a
'privilege log' is to provide a specific factual description of documents in aid of
substantiating a claim of privilege in connection with a request for document
production."). Defendants identify two examples of insufficient entries where Plaintiff
failed to identify the recipient of a document but referred to "unknown counsel," and
where Plaintiff sent documents to his personal assistant, Bob Haber. Plaintiff has not
explained why he cannot identify who the "unknown counsel" is who received that
particular document, and is ordered to identify this individual. With respect to the
documents received by Haber, Plamtiff adequately expiaim-that-Haber was
Plaintiffs counsel's legal assistant at the time he received the document ee Chatfield
Decl., ~ 5. On these grounds, no further revisions to the privilege log are ordered.
.Sanctions are awarded to Defendants in the amount~See Wakily Decl.,
~34;seeC.C.P.2031.310(h).