Professional Documents
Culture Documents
abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically
diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be
properly classified as a person who is
deprived of reason, and not one who is
demented. In People vs Valdez
2.
abuse
HELD:
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 innocent
There is absolute
necessity
testimony
for
the
of accused
whose
discharge
requested
is
2. There is no other
2.
There is absolute
necessity
for
the
testimony of accused
whose
discharge
is
requested
3. Testimony of said
accused
could
be
substantially
corroborated
in
its
material points
3. There is no other
direct evidence available
for proper prosecution
of
the
offense
committed, except the
testimony
of
said
accused
4. Testimony of said
accused
could
be
substantially
corroborated
in
its
material points
2.
b.
and
FACTS:
On Feb 27, 2007, Chase Callo-Claridad was
found dead in Ferndale Homes, Q.C, after being
stabbed twice in the chest. He was allegedly last
seen with Philip Esteban less than an hour before
the formers demise. [The facts were drawn based
the CA
2. W. O. N the CA committed a reversible
Supported
or
by
sworn
statements
(a)
7:45
p.m.,
respondent
Teodora
Alyn Esteban, on board
a vehicle bearing plate
respondent
Philip
Esteban, to St. Lukes
Medical Center, as the
at
latter also
suffered
allegedly
injuries
Cedar
Place;
and
on numerous occasions
and offered to pay for
for
of any misunderstanding
that occurred between
the concerned parties.
p.m.,
Mr.
Esteban
entered the village and
admitted that he was the
one who called for
assistance regarding an
incident that transpired
p.m.
Among
the
messages was: Ppnta n
their
vehicles
kunin
gulongyam
iniisip k prn n d tyo
magksma.
sbrang
appeal
HELD:
1.
FACTS:
On August 15, 1997, petitioners mother,
Lilia B. Organo (Lilia), was charged along with 6
others, for violation of RA No. 7080 (Plunder). The
information was raffled to the Sandiganbayan. Lilia
filed a motion to Quash information for lack of
jurisdiction and to defer the issuance of warrant of
arrest. The motion was denied and a warrant was
issued on September 29, 1997. Her subsequent
motion for reconsideration was also denied. In the
order denying the motion for reconsideration the
Sandiganbayan also noted that Lilia is still a fugitive
from justice and continues to evade arrest so that
jurisdiction over her person has not yet been
acquired by this Court [Sandiganbayan]. Eventually,
Lilia was arrested and detained by the NBA and was
then transferred to the Manila City Jail. Thus, this
petition for habeas corpus by herein petitioner,
Fleurdeliz Organo, Lilias daughter.
ISSUE: W. O. N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over a case of plunder when none of the accused
occupy salary grade 27 or higher as provided under
R.A. No. 6758
HELD:
No. Under Republic Act No. 6758 the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of
plunder unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying the positions with Salary
Grade `27' or higher, under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 in relation to their
office. The crime of `plunder' defined in Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was
provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the
People v Yparraguire
[G.R. No. 124391. July 5, 2000]
[1]
After his indictment and trial, accusedappellant appeals from his conviction for the crime
of rape of a mental retardate. [2]Pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is a
crime against person which may be prosecuted de
oficio. However, considering that the alleged rape
was committed in 1994, which was prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 8353, we apply the old law and
treat rape as a private crime.
Facts:
Charmelita D. Ruina, an invalid and mentally
retarded, was on her bed at the store of her mother
at the Public Market at Carrascal, Surigao del Sur,
where she and her mother lived, accused Elmer
Yparraguirre alias "Lalo" entered her room, the door
of which was not locked because her mother went to
the store of her elder sister. He undressed, SUCKED
her breast when she cried for help no one came,
then she resisted, he boxed her. He put his private
parts inside her, and then left. Her mother arrived
and reported it to her. The next day Elmer returned
to the store and told the mother he would not do it
again. Appellant did not testify in court but instead
relied on the lone testimony of his father, who
alleged that the complaint for rape was filed as a
result of a "misunderstanding" between appellant
and the mother of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was
signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the
complainant?
Held: No, The trial court acquired jurisdiction.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides in part:
"The offense of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents,
or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be. In
case the offended party dies or
People v Mariano
[G.R. No. L-47437. September 29, 1983.]
REMEDIAL
LAW;
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RIGHT OF PARENTS TO
FILE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IN BEHALF OF
UNEMANCIPATED CHILDREN; PREFERENTIAL RIGHT
NOT GIVEN TO THE FATHER. It is not sanctioned
by Section 4 of Rule 110 nor by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code whose provisions do not
categorically specify that the father has the
preferential right to file the complaint for seduction,
abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos. It is
noteworthy that the father and mother jointly
exercise parental authority over their legitimate
children who are not emancipated. It is their duty to
represent their emancipated children in all actions
which may redound to their benefit [Arts. 311 and
316, Civil Code].
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT INITIATED BY THE
MOTHER, A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RULES. "Under the circumstances, the complaint
filed by the mother was a sufficient compliance with
Article 344 and Section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred
jurisdiction on the court to try the case (People v.
Pastores, L-29800, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 498,
508; People v. Bangalao, 94 Phil. 354; U.S. v.
Gariboso, 25 Phil. 171]. The fathers passivity should
not preclude the mother from securing redress for
the outrage committed against her daughter."
Facts:
Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had
been confined as a mental patient at the National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since
February 26, 1971 up to May 3, 1974 when she was
People v Torrecampo
[G.R. No. 139297. February 23, 2004]
Facts:
JOVITO CASPILLO was found stabbed and
decapitated in his rented room. For his death,
brothers RENATO alias Bong and RENE
TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias with murder in an
Information. In convicting appellants, the trial court
relied on the following circumstances: (a) at about
9:00 A.M. on November 11, 1994, Erlinda saw Jovito
very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw
appellant Renato and his sister Nora pass by,
followed shortly by appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard
a commotion inside the room of Jovito and after a
few minutes saw appellants emerging from the room
with Nora in tow; (d) Cherry heard a loud banging
from the room of Jovito so she went outside and saw
Nora frantically pounding at the door, then Nora was
pulled inside the room; (e) after thirty (30) minutes,
Cherry witnessed a seemingly weak Nora being
assisted by appellant Renato coming out of the
room; and, (f) Cherry likewise observed appellant
Rene leaving the room with his hands and clothes
covered with blood.
Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for
purposes of conviction must have the following
elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proved; and, (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[7] The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.
In the instant case, the circumstances
enumerated by the trial court establish an unbroken
chain of events showing the complicity of appellants
but she did not say that he was still sleeping when
the attack commenced. Even assuming that
treachery was proved, it could not be considered a
generic aggravating circumstance. Sections 8 and 9
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Matalam v. Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 165751
Facts:
An information dated 15 November 2004 was
filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M.
Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable
refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I.
Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim,
Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria
Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil.
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation, the
public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names
of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam and
changing the committed offense to illegal dismissal
from the service of DAR-Maguindanao the
complaining employees to their damage and
prejudice amounting to P1,,606,788.50 by way of
unpaid salaries.
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that
the amended information charges an entirely new
cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended
information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay
the backwages ordered by the Civil Service
Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and
illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining
witnesses. He insists that the amended information
charging a separate and entirely different offense
cannot be admitted because there would be a
serious violation of due process of law. He claims he
is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was
not informed that he is being charged for the alleged
dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he
was not given the opportunity to explain.
Sandignbayan contends that given the
foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused
Matalam are not, after all, in any way prejudiced
because an inquiry to the allegations in the original
cause of action would certainly and necessarily elicit
substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the
allegations in the new cause of action contained in
the Amended Information. To remand this case
again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a
waste of time considering that accused, in his
counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively
his defense on the new allegations contained in the
Amended Information sought to be admitted. And
People v. Tabongbanua
GR. No. 171271
Facts:
Accused was employed as a family driver by
Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked
as the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate
Circle, a law firm operated as a sole proprietorship,
and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. On February 12, 2001, at
around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused
drove Atty. Sua Kho to her condominium unit at
1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun
M.M. After handing his employers bag to Marissa
Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the
kitchen where he drank a glass of water.
Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her
employer screaming, and she saw the accused
stabbing her with their kitchen knife which
eventually led to the death of Atty. Sua-Kho. The
accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of
self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified, didnt want
her husband to know that she had been taking trips
with a company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to
Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay.
The Court of Appeals disregarded
appellants claim of self-defense for lack of evidence
and fo being incredible considering the number and
location of wounds sustained by the victim and his
flight from the crime scene. As regards the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to
the rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of
Appeals noted that these circumstances were
included as amendments to the information after
the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence.
As such, the same should not be allowed because it
will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that such amendment
should not be allowed
Held:
Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, provides that an amendment after the plea of
the accused is permitted only as to matters of form,
provided leave of court is obtained and such
amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was
employed as a collector-messenger by City Service
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in
messengerial services. He was assigned to the main
office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati
City. His primary task was to collect checks payable
to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also
delivered invoices to Caltexs customers. After a
daily electronic report from Phil. Commercial &
Industrial Bank (PCIB), it was discovered that
unknown to the department, checks have been
cleared and were missing. Investigation revealed
that said savings account where checks were
deposited had actually been opened by petitioner;
the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by
him under Gutierrezs name. A bank teller from the
Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz,
positively identified petitioner as the person who
opened the savings account using Gutierrezs name.
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18,
1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges. Pretrial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The
prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the
Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices
(SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence. Petitioner opposed the pleading,
contending that the private complainant was
represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the
Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was
only after the prosecution had rested its case that
SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor
representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos
and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their
appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as
private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the
private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence,
the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should
be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the
Informations were amended to change the private
complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be
prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the
Informations can no longer be amended because he
had already been arraigned under the original
Informations.
Issue: WON the amendment constitute a violation of
petitioners due process
Held:
No. Section 14. Amendment or substitution
A complaint or information may be amended, in
Soberano v. People
GR. No. 154629
Facts:
In November 2000, the prominent public
relations practitioner, Salvador Bubby Dacer,
together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was
abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila.
Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones,
metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in
Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were
positively identified by their dentists and by forensic
pathologists from the University of the Philippines.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information[13] dated 17 September 2001 was filed
by the prosecution. The Amended Information --(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B.
Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as
they are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for
P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt.
Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao
II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion,
Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information in an Opposition[14] dated 28 September
2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit
Amended Information and the discharge of accused
Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied.
The petitioners further aver that even if it is
only a simple discharge under Section 14 of Rule
110, it is still necessary to seek prior leave of court.
The prosecution simply filed an Amended
Information excluding Jimmy and William Lopez,
Pacoy v. Cajigal
GR. No. 157472
Facts:
On July 4, 2002, an Information for
Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner.
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment,
petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial
conference and trial on October 8, 2002.
However, on the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing
the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as
having qualified the crime to Murder. The accusatory
portion remained exactly the same as that of the
original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victims name
fromEscuita to Escueta.
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for
pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be
re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for
petitioner objected on the ground that the latter
would be placed in double jeopardy, considering
that his Homicide case had been terminated without
his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the
case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the
amended Information for Murder, the public
respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
Issue: WON the amendment was merely in form or
was in substance
Held:
The court ruled that it was merely in form.
There were no changes in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Since
the amendment was merely formal, amendment
may be filed even after plea provided with leave and
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
While the respondent judge erroneously
thought that disrespect on account of rank qualified
the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic
aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the amendment of the Information after petitioner
had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Homicide, since the amendment made was only
Crespo v. Mogul
GR. No. L-53373
Facts:
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K.
de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice,
Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated
April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching
thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the
private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.
Issue: The issue raised in this ease is whether the
trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits
Held:
Yes. The filing of a complaint or information
in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When
after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the
trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested,
the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by
the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution
of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court.
Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of
Fronda-Baggao vs People
December 10, 2007
Facts: Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor
of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Bangued, same province, four separate Informations
for illegal recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade;
hence, the cases against her were archived. On July
25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested.[2]
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with
the trial court a motion to amend the Informations.
He prayed that the four separate Informations for
illegal recruitment be amended so that there would
only be one Information for illegal recruitment in
large scale. The trial court denied the motion for lack
of merit but granted such motion after a motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied by the trial court. After that the
Petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order but the same was
denied
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether the four Informations for illegal
recruitment could be amended and lumped into one
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Held:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
RULE 111
Cruz vs CA
August 29, 2002
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged
petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification
of Public Document before the Manila Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in
the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of
a parcel of land stating that she was the sole
surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact
she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the
offended party did not reserve the right to file a
separate civil action arising from the criminal
offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the
criminal case.
court of appeals
Hence this petition,
Issue:
Whether or not the jurisdiction over Civil
Case filed by BOC, involving collection of
unpaid customs duties and taxes of
petitioner, belongs to the Sandiganbayan
and not to the RTC, as it can be considered
the civil aspect of the Criminal Cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan, hence, deemed
instituted in the latter.
Held:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Accordingly, as can be gleaned from the
Complaint for Collection of Money with
Damages, filed by the Government against
petitioner, what the former seeks is the
payment of customs duties and taxes due
from petitioner, which remain unpaid by
reason of the cancellation of the subject
TCCs for being fake and spurious. Said
Complaint has nothing to do with the
criminal liability of the accused, which the
Government wants to enforce in the
criminal
cases
filed
before
the
conclusively
bound
by
the
outcome
thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded
the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion - including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly,
petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case,
which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman,
its employee.
Just because the present petitioner
participated in the defense of its accused-employee
does not mean that its liability has transformed its
nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its
participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact
remains that since the accused-employees
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary
liability of the employer ipso factoattaches.
According to the argument of petitioner,
fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction
could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon
the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction
should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer
splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second,
for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly
evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity
for this single case to be final as to the accused who
jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is
dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental
to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of
the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of
his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability
has
also
become
immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that
the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent
on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Rotea vs Halili
September 30, 1960
Facts:
On August 17, 1952, while Angel Bascon was driving
a bus belonging to Fortunato F. Halili along the
national road of Makati, Rizal, it collided with a
Rosado bus as a result of which Jose Rotea, a
passenger of the Halili bus, was injured. As a
consequence, a criminal complaint for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Makati against
Bascon, and the offended party having reserved his
right to file a separate civil action, after trial, Bascon
was found guilty of the lesser crime of serious
physical injuries thru simple imprudence and
sentenced to a penalty of 3 months and 10 days
of arresto mayor. In addition, the court ordered him
to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P513.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of
insolvency, to pay P3,000.00 as liquidated damages,
P10,000.00 by way of exemplary or corrective
damages, and the costs.
The decision having become final, a writ of execution
was issued upon Rotea's request to enforce the civil
liability awarded in his favor, but the writ was
returned unsatisifed because Bascon was insolvent.
Rotea made several demands upon Halili to make
good his subsidiary liability, he being the employer
of Bascon, and having ignored said demands, Rotea
filed on March 19, 1955 against Halili the present
action in the court of first instance of Manila praying
that Halili be declared subsidiarily liable for the
indemnity awarded in his favor in the criminal case
consisting in the sum of P13,513.00 as liquidated and
exemplary damages, and that he be awarded
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs. After
trial, the court found for plaintiff ordering defendant
to pay an indemnity in the amount of P3,513.00,
with legal interest thereon from the filing of the
complaint until its payment, to pay P500.00 as
attorney's fees, and the costs. The court denied
plaintiff's claim for P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Plaintiff appealed directly to this court
assigning several errors.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in
modifying said indemnity by reducing it to P3,513.00
as actual and liquidated damages, eliminating
therefrom the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Held:
We have no quarrel with the contention that when a
civil action is based upon the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code resulting from the indemnity awarded to
the offended party in a criminal action the court has
no other function than to render decision based
upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case
and has no power to amend or modify if even if in its
opinion an error has been committed in the decision.
For, as this court has aptly said: "To allow an
employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the
criminal case would be to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court"
(Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99
Phil., 670; 52 Off. Gaz. [11] 5145). But the situation
differs when the court in the criminal case has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, in which
case the decision should be ignored because being
null and void it never existed in contemplation of
law. This is the situation herein obtained. The
decision rendered in the criminal case insofar as the
indemnity is concerned is null and void for having
been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction of
the court of first instance, and this is so because the
offended party has made an express reservation of
his right to institute a separate civil action to recover
the indemnity and the amount awarded is far
beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court where the case originated. The trial court,
therefore, was justified in ignoring the decision in
the criminal case and in rendering judgment
according to its discretion based upon the evidence
on hand.