Psychological Incapacity Cases

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G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting
later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial
Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On
18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last
long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the
frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the
couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending
a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America
to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in
July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed
with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly
been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed
a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit

evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its noncompliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of
non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,
Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in
sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not
lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of
judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack
of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and
yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa

concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word
"mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one
but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code,
the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said
that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even
if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
"even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first
one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way
of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage
but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that
it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there

should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage
and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in
the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of
the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation
be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the
bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity
of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect
in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a
lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when
there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that
it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable"
has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is
incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on
if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations,
the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in
the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from
the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create

the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting,
they have decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it
and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having
been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period
of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted
by
Mr.
Justice
Josue
N.
Bellosillo
in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem

generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck,
the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be
the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal
terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a realinability
to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to
the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver
the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the

rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations,
which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted
by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in
the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook
II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment
of
drug
addiction,
habitual
alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are

established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We
should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article
1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are
doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all,
can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based
on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case ofSantos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present
case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of

Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable
of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that
he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985
at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws
on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of
the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had

been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting
and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends
of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions
during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they
followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and
the
family
and
emphasizes
the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of

the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already

ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of
their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the

Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand,
joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a

marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were

assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
The Case
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.

1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit
which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation
when she was still single.
DECISION
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the
marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.
Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles
126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and
52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children.
In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their
custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of
respondent.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military

service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures
that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure
to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would
also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and
was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In
1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling
"magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she
would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put
up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October
16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already
living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children
left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for
their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after
them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were
renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan,
the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive
to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial

evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated.
The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering
from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not
physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside
the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."7
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.

Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records,
pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
The Court's Ruling
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically

incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."3
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or

psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for
a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity

had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various

tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage
should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself.
Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root

cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also
be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225
of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations
must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological
findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the

application
and
the
interpretation
of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9 were laid
down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

xxx
xxx
xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated
by
the
Court
in Santos
v.
Court
of
Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
courts.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence

presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.1wphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce
law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage
for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED and
assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage

to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still
subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as
the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155800
Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a

child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months
later.
March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad
truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is
always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in
the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale,
dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition
for
Review
on
Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After
careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial
court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner
was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of
the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent
church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog,
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her

obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was
neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent
affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not
a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker"
in
the
commercial
industry
worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was
the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted
the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that
Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus,
she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a
higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but
told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the
extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts.
When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he
separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a

reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant
lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the
basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner
was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed
her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner
because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching
her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and
had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for
two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an
executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of
Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She
told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she
was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon
show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written
by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband
but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic
matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner,
and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she
supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
ofP7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a

child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance
was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for
a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of
tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondents psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence
and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost
anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among othershad been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world
of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to
her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due
discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals
ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent
was
impaired
by
a
lack
of
due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by
the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the
RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of
psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein
that the evidence conclusively establish respondents
psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure
that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise
guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the
veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the
appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient
to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of
petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as
the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has
yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was
handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse
was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous
on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room
for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did
not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36,
even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The
concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity
has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting
marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such
persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages
with underage parties and persons already married, among
others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce
under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either
party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was
cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of
1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity
was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the
Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable

marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage
void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a
vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely
given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The
initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a
specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa,
both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is
not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have
given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was
nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of
his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of
Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino
opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article
45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time,
Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological
incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through
Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability
to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized
that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same
time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to

allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage,
it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that
the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably
useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this
case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first
in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is
but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee
had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages
already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of
Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it
must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole
source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though
the concept may have been derived from canon law, its
incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed,
while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely

persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower
courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common
legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower
courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also
falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of
what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1
and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life. Voidab initio marriages under Article 36 do
not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the
present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos."
prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the
Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement
however was dispensed with following the implementation of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to
the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals
participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from
the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed
binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently
establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving
the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon

which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any
event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as
credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic

relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of

nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
xxx
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity

has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in
the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories,
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to
petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.81
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is

paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if
carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not
abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie
every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme
is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the
fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and
if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair
with different women, then that is pathological and we call that
paranoid jealousy.
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were

further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses
from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had
headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided
to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that
seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these
actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes
towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards
the person, and it is also something that endangers human
relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our
thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s]
their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if
you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of
the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the
marriage?
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza,
who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and
ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page
six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say
about this, Mr. witness?
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be

considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only
the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that
respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie
[and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the
physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology
utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their
medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs
common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity
hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as
the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from
her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies
about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health,
her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a
position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up
letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the
parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before
the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that
any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic
on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable
to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent
allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the
essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the

marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family
Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46
which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the
previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under
Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this
case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult
to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take
into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was
made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners
efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate
ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without
the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial
consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in
possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from
the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude
required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and
Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting
a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient
evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived
at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we
must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from
a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed
such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter
would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement
in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this
score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not
testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded
that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents
condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the
experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and
the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997
and made explicit the requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article
36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of

canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the
doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer
to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations
that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological
incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months
before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained
silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was
incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the
incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an
action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required
a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only
with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed
by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot
be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was
no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a
declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their
expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this
case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually
incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this
case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since
the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC
more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence,
we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to
contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing
as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her
persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate
court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed
commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides
these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization
of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the
Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case
No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null
and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result
of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered
that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after
Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,
that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her
American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was

afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in
1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in
1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines
and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada
Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70,
and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to respondent
Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other
allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal
person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus
on certain occasions but it was because of the latters
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their
household. She could not have been extravagant since the family
hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for
abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job
and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she
left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the
U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed
out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which
she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void;
and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective PreTrial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to
present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the
Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December
1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands
surname, Micklus.9
Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take
the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children,
Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California,
U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders 12 and
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the
witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition
was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had
been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case
progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her
evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs
testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for
family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her
own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married
to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the
case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her
marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time
of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal

Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material
things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity
was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare
the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of
the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons
for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or
she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court
cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be
extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to
defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital
covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled
in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential
marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not

countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by
affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do

not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not
in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at
bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained
that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after
a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already
become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable
laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of
the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines
for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity
was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party

would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed
down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below
and solidarity.
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."

prior thereto.
job
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
courts
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there
is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus
before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other

corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register
of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961;
and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest
son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer
to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such
a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the
essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that
hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the
family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her
American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless,
the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or
grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is
no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of
this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must
still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the
policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact
date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984,
after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the
same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still
a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she
was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and
legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the
law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to

ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings
could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.35While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over
when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.
Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of
the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case ofAncheta v. Ancheta36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198
(1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority
of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General
to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal

to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations

where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to
every individual problem.39
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and
the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of
their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to
file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with
or without the memoranda.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539,
dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada RosalIyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141917
February 7, 2007
BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA MERCADO
ZAMORA, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor

General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal
within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of
the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the
validity and existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity,
and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 5, 1999 and January 24,
2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525, entitled "Bernardino S. Zamora
v. Norma Mercado Zamora," which affirmed the dismissal of a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The facts1 are:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970
in Cebu City. After their marriage, they lived together at No. 50-A
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any child.
In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a
nurse. She returned to the Philippines for a few months, then left
again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu City
until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
anchored on the alleged "psychological incapacity" of private
respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code.
To support his position, he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by
the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that
she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged
that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United
States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that
throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than
three years.
On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to
have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as
she is a nurse by profession and that she would from time to time
borrow her husbands niece and nephews to care for them. She
also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage,
alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two
affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children
with them.

On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision thus:
...
Plaintiff consented to defendants trip to the United States in
1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there because she
wanted to help her husband build a big house at the Beverly
Hills, Cebu City. Defendants testimony was corroborated by
Paulina Martinez, a former househelp of the Zamoras.She
always wanted to live in the Philippines before her husband
committed infidelity.
One reason why defendant seldom saw her husband while she
was in the Philippines was because of the infidelity committed by
her husband. No less than plaintiff himself admitted that he has a
child with a certain [x x x]. The court is also convinced that he has
two children with a certain [y y y]. The infidelity on the part of the
plaintiff was one of the contributing factors which led to the
estranged relationship between him and defendant.
This appeal does not fall in the category of psychological

incapacity as defined in the aforementioned cases. The mere
refusal of the appellee to bear a child is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, since even if such allegation is true, it is
not shown or proven that this is due to psychological illness.
As correctly stated by the appellee in her brief, the appellant

even failed to present any psychologist or other medical expert to
prove the psychological incapacity of defendant-appellee. This
WE feel is a fatal omission on the part of the appellant,
considering
the
doctrine
laid
down
in
the Santos and Molina cases (supra).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Cebu City is hereby
AFFIRMED. Appeal DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5
[N]othing in the evidence of plaintiff show[s] that the defendant

suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed to
comply with her essential marital obligations. There is no
evidence of psychological incapacity on the part of defendant so
that she could not carry out the ordinary duties required in
married life. Neither has it been shown that there was an
incurable defect on the part of defendant.
...
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the complaint.
Without special pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed to the CA which rendered a Decision on
August 5, 1999 affirming the ruling of the trial court. The pertinent
portions of the CA decision read:
Without delving further into both parties allegations, we must

deny this appeal.
In the case of Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals,3the High Court
ruled that, "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."
Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,4 it was held that
"mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was

denied by the CA in its Resolution dated January 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight
and substance affecting the result of the present case;
2) Whether or not Article 68 of the Family Code is applicable to
this case;
3) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or
psychiatrists is still desirable, if evidence in this case already
shows the psychological incapacity of private respondent;
4) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or
psychiatrists is still desirable, considering that the private
respondent is a resident of the United States and living far away
from the Philippines for more than twenty (20) years:
5) Whether or not private respondents refusal to live with
petitioner under one roof for more than twenty (20) years, her
refusal to bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary life
in the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough
indications of psychological incapacity to comply with essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.6
Briefly, the issue is whether there can be a declaration of nullity
of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues as follows:
First, there is nothing in Santos v. CA, 7 upon which private
respondent relies, that requires as a conditio sine qua non the
presentation of expert opinion of psychologists and psychiatrists
in every petition filed under Article 36 of the Family Code. This
Court merely said in that case that "[t]he well-considered opinions
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable."
However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable to

determine whether private respondent has been living abroad
and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a
child; and whether she has made her residence abroad
permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship; and
out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent

that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no
proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before
or at the inception of the marriage.
Second, Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage

contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Among
the essential marital obligations embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the same Code is to procreate children through sexual
cooperation which is the basic end of marriage. To live together
under one roof for togetherness spells the unity in marriage. The
marriage had been existing for twenty four years when private
respondent filed a legal separation case against petitioner.
Throughout this period, private respondent deliberately and
obstinately refused to comply with the essential marital obligation
to live and cohabit with her husband.
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to

disturb the findings and conclusions reached by the trial court
and the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1999 and
January 24, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525 are
AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2011
This Court rules as follows:

It is true, as petitioner noted, that the case of Santos v. CA8 did
not specifically mention that the presentation of expert opinion is
a vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage grounded on psychological
incapacity referred to under Article 36 of the Family Code. Even
in the subsequent case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 9 (also
known as the Molina case10 ), wherein the Court laid down the
guidelines11in the interpretation and application of the
aforementioned article, examination of the person by a physician
in order for the former to be declared psychologically
incapacitated was likewise not considered a requirement. 12 What
is important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos,13 is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
states:1awphi1.net
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of
the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.14
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence
presented, considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince
the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned.
Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that
private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His
allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear
a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by wellestablished facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court
of the existence of these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) May 27, 2004 Decision2 and December 15, 2004
Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial
courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties marriage. The
fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed
Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena
Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship
and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.
They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon
Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an
extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth
to a son in March 1983.5
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her
Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.6Meanwhile,
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more
children.7

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and
their children. He left his four children from his marriage with
Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and
a driver.8 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the
children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with
their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on
weekends.9
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns
permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn
acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the
US.10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and
chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the
Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger
children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on,
the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of
alleged weekend plans with their father.11
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from
his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. 12 He alleged
that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her
psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their cohabitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she
played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in
the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone
discovered in flagrante delicto.13
During trial,14 Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns
alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his
brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded
to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with
a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the
said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside. 15 At rebuttal, Tyrone
elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist,
while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange
of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the
latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental
rights.16 They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose
Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates),
and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr.
Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations
regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual
mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may
reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present
when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter
disregard of her significant others. 18 Malyns NPD is manifest in

her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19
Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder "may have
been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in
her family background and upbringing, which the psychologist
gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal
role model.20
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her
interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law),
and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court
testimony.21
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted
in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly
inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority,
while her kids and husbands needs became secondary. Malyn is
so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her familys
needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with
friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute
psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time
are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial
duties.23 Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity
as grave and incurable.24
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial
transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr.
Dayan), Malyns expert witness.25 He clarified that he did not
verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns
"habits" because he believed it is the courts duty to do
so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the
factual allegations are indeed true.
Malyns version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.27 While she
admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as
Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three
times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only. 28 And in
those instances, she always had Tyrones permission and would
often bring the children and their respective yayas with her.29 She
maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and
wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She,
however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically
abusive husband.30 On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to
keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to
go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them
not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette
ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom
doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their
bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that
Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave
her P300 to leave the house.31 She never returned to their
conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones
wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve
came from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and
had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.32
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that
Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she
was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her
brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room,
but maintained being fully clothed at that time.33 Malyn insisted
that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental
rights under duress.34
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report

that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency,
narcissism, and compulsiveness.39
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had
relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good
relationship with her kids.40 As for Tyrone, he has commitment
issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as
a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is
psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.41
Childrens version
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by
surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial
custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation
action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was
subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them,
provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they
would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she
played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being
neglected or feeling abandoned.
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone

who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested
by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and
physical violence.35 Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical
psychologist, as her expert witness.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents
but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical
abuse inflicted on her mother.42 The two elder kids also recalled
that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in
school.43
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria

for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual
narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found
Malyn a "lousy" mother because of her mahjong habit, 36 while
Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and
physical abuse.37 Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and
Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems
because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to
the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are
summarized below:
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp
and driver during the time that their dad was abroad. 44 While they
did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle
Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of
them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a
common recollection that the househelp would call their mother
to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of
them was sick.45
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very
beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even
after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn
first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and
affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she
could take him or leave him. But the minute she started to care,
she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the
most important person in his life. She became relationshipdependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to
care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus
on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was
overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of
commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in
his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His
interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun
dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn
adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short
temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was
a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he
was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and
Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high
conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage.
The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out
of control Their individual personalities broke through,
precipitating the demise of their marriage.38
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila
Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones
confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was
commendable for the support she gave to her spouse. 46 He
likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was
not a drug dependent.47
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones
allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel
room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he
nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He
likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.48
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly
part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they
would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a
male musician-friend afterwards.49
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre
(Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as
the minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and
Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in
partner, Jocelyn;50 and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria.
While both parents are financially stable and have positive
relationships with their children, she recommended that the

custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the
interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to
be more available to the children and to exercise better
supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that
even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made
efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective
schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the
children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to
their needs and to devote time with them.51
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since
the couples de facto separation, simply left the children for
several years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while
he lived with his second family abroad. 52 The social worker found
that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment
of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative
years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a
reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court53
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the
trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under
the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this
paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties
entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it
entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential
obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their
children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The
incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be
pervasive, grave and incurable.54
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.55
Ruling of the Court of Appeals56
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA.1wphi1 The
CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by
the facts on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations
against each other do not support a finding of psychological
incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity
and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal
separation.57Moreover, the psychological report submitted by
petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the
diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to
satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the
declaration of nullity of marriage.58
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration 59 but the same was
denied on December 15, 2004.60
Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the

factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the
best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has
presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the
stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, selfobsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of
respondents NPD;61
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave
and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential
martial obligations;62 and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family
background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.63
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their
marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on
petitioners part.64
Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden
of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.65She argues that
the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social
worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive
mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was
negligent and irresponsible.66
She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth.
Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even
Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged
psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.67 Fr. Healys
testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrones version
of the facts.68
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court
Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its
conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent
apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with
Motion
for
Leave
to
Withdraw
Comment
and
Memorandum.69 She manifested that she was no longer disputing
the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis
of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to
dispose of the case with justice.70 Her manifestation and motion
were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.71
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers
from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error
in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and
factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by
Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations.72 The burden of proving psychological incapacity is
on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must
have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged
acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence
refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played
mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that sheneglected her duties
as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with
the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they
were with their mother when she played mahjong in their
relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than
his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent
that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two
of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that
could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while
there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged

constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or
her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an
alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but
Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other
men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove
that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that
one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per
se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually
engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there
is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not
once did the children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food
they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and
take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites
the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second
elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link
their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no
factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There
is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight
of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings
which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,
infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the
best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may
be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December
15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166357
January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011, 1 the Court
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error
in setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of legal and
factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged
acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence
refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played
mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties
as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with
the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they
were with their mother when she played mahjong in their
relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than
his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent
that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two
of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that
could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while
there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged
constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons
orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario
(an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but
Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other
men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove
that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that
one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per
seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually
engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there
is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not
once did the children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food
they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and
take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites
the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second
elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link
their academic short comings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no
factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There
is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight
of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings
which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,
infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the
best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may
be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December
15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the
Court to take a thorough second look into what constitutes
psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court
as supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and
consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective
essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the
party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the
Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity,

the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an
insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the
Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the
meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with
less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow
some resiliency in its application."4 Illustrative of the "less
specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological
incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the
provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis,
because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect
by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon
Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court
of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee and the relevant materials on psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it
obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article
36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and
construed independently of "but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some
guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code, as follows:

and solidarity.
incapacity must be psychological not physical, althoughits
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos."
prior thereto.
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
whatis decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously
to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court
should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on
"all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
"trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in
order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.
Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent
and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence
or non-existence of a partys psychological incapacity should be
final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of
the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to
be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where
the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the

facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court
should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. 13 It is not
enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial
court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only
because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage
as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the
fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null
and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal
existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the
Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of
marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our
society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded
due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside
the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and
Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely
based on the petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and
unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within
the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they
were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the
petitioners testimony, as well as on her interviews of the
petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her
findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it
was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After
all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant
in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who
had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself.
Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight
to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for
by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein
to enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of
psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and

interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like
the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos 19 that there
is no requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because
what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the
person concerned need not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed
state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting
such other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert
opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as
conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in
the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The
experts findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. 22 This is
so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and
technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias
should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation
had been based on the parties upbringing and
psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates expertopinion
should be considered not in isolation but along with the other
evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological
incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the expert
findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondents
own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed
that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent tendencies"
to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondents psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved
and seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be
around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too,
values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of
her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she
tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for
rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding
in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to
those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that
others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely,
placed an enormous value on having significant others would
depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different
person clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly
demanding reassurance that she was the most important person
in his life. She became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon
Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the respondent,
observing that the respondent obtained high scores on

dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73
percental round and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw
obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the
acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very
significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as
acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79;
under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but
corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the
respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly
testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite
familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less, could you
please tell me in more laymans terms how you arrived at your
findings that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask
about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a vehicular
accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was
prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinners
role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly
took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own
mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and
responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings
considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an
indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told
petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a
mother because she herself never experienced the care and
affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in
her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to
indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the
tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care,
lets say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain
it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did
interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I
gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a
young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could
not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on
the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father
actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that
respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from
a deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this. In her
several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one
boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention, this need for
love on other people.
put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to

inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own
beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few
responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that
she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the
impact. How about the impact on the relationship of the
respondent with her husband?
Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point
of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the
assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh
and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law
expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and
Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code
Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healys expert testimony,
we have once declared that judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by
current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought,
and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the
concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of
the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the
respondents level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to
her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill
her obligation to her husband and toher children. She had her
own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely
secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the
obligations of marriage which everybody takes for granted. The
concentration on the husband and the children before everything
else would be subordinated to the marriage withher. Its the other
way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong,
they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you
call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself
is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not
psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based
on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can
you say to that claim of respondent?
A : Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the

loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and
then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism.
When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and
prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in
her life.
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity

because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with
regards to her own children.
xxxx
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that

she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle,
inconsistent pattern has been manifested running through their
life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a
model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism.

How do you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is
grave, slight or .?
A : I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her
family and that causes serious obligations which she has ignored
and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism
afflicting respondent was already existing at the time or marriage
or even thereafter?
xxxx

A : When you get married you dont develop narcissism or
psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage
and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept
these responsibilities. And now you show that you dont accept
them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you dont care
about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or
congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and
still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model
at Hyatt and then Rustans, it began to inflate her ego so much
that this became the top priority in her life. Its her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent
even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious
after the marriage because she was neglecting such fundamental
obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or
clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?
A : Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It
was found in her family background situation. Say, almost for
sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the
breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her job
and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual
situation for a young girl and her position in the family was
exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that
pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along
with it and putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law,
Father Healys opinions and findings commanded respect. The
contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the
judicial determination of the parties psychological incapacity was
substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial
court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity
of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court
an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as
psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard
his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those
of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of
justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were

asked togive professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered
a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations
of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life;
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions
since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves
a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions,
on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair
the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological

conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a

psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding

conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher

inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or
sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis
was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem
to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry
out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there
is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended
consequences of strictly applying the standards set in
Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in
adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted,
as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,
thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as
aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual
separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even

emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court
has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for
the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently,
as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes
to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like,
tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the
remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court
should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's
psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as

aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as
follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven
that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected
her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week.
She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always
withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that
theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their
relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his
own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of
his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could
have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were
in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no
dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not
have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities
of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she
fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have
known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling
and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive
mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on
her very young children. We do find to be revealing the
disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 the parties eldest
son in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of
his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong,
viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parents separation, do
you remember any habit or activity or practice which your mother
engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes
to play mahjong a lot, and I cant remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong

frequently. How frequent, do you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I
cant
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one
session?
WITNESS : Really long cuzwe would go to my aunts house in
White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch then leave,
we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY.
PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers
& sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess
shed go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental
duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions
was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist
desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that
regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her
own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens
moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty
as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over
the person and property of their unemancipated children,
parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for
and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority
shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards
the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide
for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate
in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry
and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in
them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and
mental health at all times;
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision

to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational

materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here

that the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years he
was often out seeking other women. Im referring specifically to
page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment
scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by
petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person
to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given
his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this
person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into
consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the
petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically
incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so
without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her
answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the
petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity was
substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
A : Sir, its difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his
womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only
20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized
during his marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally
immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of

the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to perform his
duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also
to be fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was
behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had
noticed already some of those short temper of the petitioner but
she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even
the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also
had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so.
But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one
who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying
even those kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the
petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw
was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not
duly stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage except
that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry
her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on

whether the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner
was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake.
Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you
to answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to
prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the
defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of
her husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The
courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the
petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may
exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological
incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be
deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted
ways. By now, they must have already accepted and come to
terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed

in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties
had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to
the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater
injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage,
and then force them and their children to endure some more
damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero
decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to
give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel
the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical
purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the
ruling the Court makes today.1wphi1 It is not, in effect, directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate
children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is
a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not
constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his
life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital
obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the
beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage.
Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the
marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as
the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking
down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life,"
thus:
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of
what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1
and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of
the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the
State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are
not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208790
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common

legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration
of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and
2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also
falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
January 21, 2015
GLENN VIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
MARY GRACE PAREL-VIAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and
Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the
Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Vifias
(Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Vifias (Mary Grace) as null and
void.
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years
old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City,

Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant,
however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Glenn alleged that the infants death was caused by Mary
Graces heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
concluded that Mary Grace and Glenns relationship is not

founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to
each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of
declaring the nullity of the couples marriage.12
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a

bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she
shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary
Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was
filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary
Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to
regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house.
She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked
heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace
refused to perform even the most essential household chores of
cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not
exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind
courtship.6
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about
the death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she
were single and was unmindful of her husbands needs. She was
self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her
about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left
their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that
she left for an overseas employment in Dubai.7
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latters friends.
They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family
and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The
foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of
insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life.8
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe,

serious, grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is
incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already been
deeply embedded within her system as it was found to have
started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it has
caused
her
to
be
inflexible,
maladaptive
and
functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual
dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by
grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with
her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,]
which utterly distorted her perceptions and views especially in
terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in
[Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of
entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn],
she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her
marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x
She is too headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do
things her own way and would not pay close attention to what her
husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled
for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being
too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x
She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at
night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which
was still going on up to the present time. x x x.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college

graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an
overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the
time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in
Dubai and romantically involved with another man.10
The root cause of [Mary Graces]personality aberration can be

said to have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable
factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,]
which is the crucial stage in the life of a person as thisis the time
when the individuals character and behavior are shaped. [Mary
Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and
tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon]
their children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel
the love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who
were supposed to bethe first to show concern [for] her. x x x She
has acquired a domineering character as she was not taught to
have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had
from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the
eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always
followed with regards to making decisions and always mandates
people to submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very
essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set of
unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume
mature roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young
mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to
restrain herself from doing ill-advised things even if she isamply
aware of the depravity of her actions.
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and

physically harmed Glenn during the couples fights. Mary Grace
is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and
family-oriented.11
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical

antecedence as it was already inher system even prior to the
solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining
ours)
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a

Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for
the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional

guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by
Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found
him as "amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of
maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Graces personality
through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin,
Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in
college.

Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace
through her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer
and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito
were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary
Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact
opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his
work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the
psychological report dated December 29, 2008.
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision 16 declaring
the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on
account of the latters psychological incapacity. The RTC cited
the following as grounds:
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the]
grant of the petition. Reconciliation between the parties under the
circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is best
that the legal bond between them be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the
miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic
Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who
does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are
separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned
[Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for
the insistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts
of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are
obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. x x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace]
was in a quandary on what it really means. x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary
Grace] failed to comply with the basic marital obligations of
mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his
best to have their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not
cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her
marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a
clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the
subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and
was able to gather sufficient data and information about [Mary
Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder of[Mary
Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so
permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this
personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already
pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It
has become grave, permanent and incurable.17 (Underlining ours
and italics in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order 18dated
December 1, 2010.
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent
evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from
fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision

failed to cite the root cause of Mary Graces disorder. Further, the
RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr.
Tayags statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary
Graces condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and
conclusions sansdetails. Besides, what psychological incapacity
contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital
obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown,
but these do not warrant the grant of Glenns petition. Mary
Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this
does not translate into a psychological illness.19
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSGs
appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed
decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage
between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA
stated the reasons below:
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, asso expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was
carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made her
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He
likewise alleged that she refused to communicate with him to
save the marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our
mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a
case of psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenns] testimony was corroborated by [Dr.
Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a psychological
examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was
conducted only on him and no evidence was shown that the
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive
value in determining the psychological incapacity of a person as
she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the
psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this
field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist stated that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she
makea conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she
admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,]
hence, the information provided to her may be subjective and
self-serving. Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root

causeof the spouses psychological incapacity which should also
be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriageand shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225
of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations
must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
and explained in the decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did
not establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
[Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We
reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically
or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently
proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to say:
"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] suchroot cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists."
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of
the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves". It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party evenbefore the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume." Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the aforecited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our
unity of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and
emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7,

2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration22filed by Glenn.
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of
whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTCs
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged according to
its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge should pains
takingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain
from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.23 Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v. Marcos, 24 the
Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the
respondent spouse to be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a
nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her
testimony should be considered as decisive evidence. 26 Besides,
the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the
witnesses should be respected.27
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes
that the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere
reiterations of the matters already resolved by the CA.28
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination orassessment of the
respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily
fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the
person concerned need not be resorted to."29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of
Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence
offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Mary Graces condition. The evidence merely
shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined
to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai
and is romantically-involved with another man. She has not been
maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the
latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand,
is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary
Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latters acts and traits do not necessarily
indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is
emphatic that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
an adverse integral element in the respondents personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations had to be shown and was not
shown in this cited case.

In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit
with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never
proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise,
the respondents act of living with another woman four years into
the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that
respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady
and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in
later.
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account;

she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctors
probes.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently indepth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed
to identify the root cause of the respondents narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of
the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayags conclusion in her Report i.e., that the
respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces
of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable" is an unfounded statement, not a necessary
inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the
petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her
own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be
made with respect to the respondents condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondents
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence
as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take

cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like,
do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness
that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining
ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each
other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The
foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses
under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Graces departure
from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere
difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to
live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally
examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present
more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the formers condition. Glenn,
however, failed in this respect. Glenns testimony is wanting in
material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of
Glenn. Glenns statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn
and Rodelito both referred to Mary Graces traits and acts, which
she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof on
the antecedence of Mary Graces alleged incapacity. Glenn even
testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each
other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and
well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayags assessment of Mary Graces condition, the
Court finds the same as unfounded.1wphi1 Rumbaua34provides
some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the
respondents psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose
bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does notdisqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve
the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in
the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners

narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be
a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
"believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used
love as adeceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him." x x x.
xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed
to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married,
respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect
that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and
responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain
howshe came to the conclusion that respondents condition was
grave and incurable. x x x
xxxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to
the respondents exact condition except in a very general way. In
short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but
disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the
respondent can besaid to be suffering from narcissistic
personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave
and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of
the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondents
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of
the petitioners case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her
diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner
related toher. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent

proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in
this case, particularly about the respondents early life and
associations, and about events on orabout the time of the
marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and
report appearto us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves
around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner
related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a
ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say
this because only the baser qualities of the respondents life were
examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed
and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on
having a job, his determination to improve himself through
studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the
marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what
character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage,
for example, why the respondents family opposed the marriage
and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for
the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be
sure, these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of
the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital
developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x x
x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary

Graces status as the eldest among her siblings,36 her fathers
being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother,
a housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and
explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace
warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couples marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to
obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the
antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity, but such
difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what
the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenns
marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
obligations as Glenns spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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Page 1 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit

Page 2 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there

Page 3 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem

Page 4 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are

Page 5 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

Page 6 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

Page 7 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military

Page 8 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.

The Court's Ruling

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root

In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the

Page 9 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence

Page 10 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage

G.R. No. 155800

Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a

March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her

Page 11 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a

Page 12 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable

Page 13 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely

Page 14 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure

Page 15 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro

this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of

Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be

Page 16 of 44 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity | amgisidro