Professional Documents
Culture Documents
accompanied
with
a
claim
for
reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours
of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
In the case at bar, respondent alleges that due to the continued and
prolonged exposure to textile dust seriously inimical to his health, he
suffered work-contracted disease which is now irreversible and
incurable, and deprived him of job opportunities. 52 Clearly, injury
and damages were allegedly suffered by respondent, an element of
quasi-delict. Secondly, the previous contract of employment between
petitioner and respondent cannot be used to counter the element of
"no pre-existing contractual relation" since petitioner's alleged gross
negligence in maintaining a hazardous work environment cannot be
considered a mere breach of such contract of employment, but falls
squarely within the elements of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code since the negligence is direct, substantive and
independent. 53 Hence, we ruled in Yusen Air and Sea Services
Phils., Inc. v. Villamor 54 that: TSADaI
When, as here, the cause of action is based on a quasidelict or tort, which has no reasonable causal connection
with any of the claims provided for in Article 217,
jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. 55
It also bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief
under the Labor Code of the Philippines. He neither claims for
reinstatement nor backwages or separation pay resulting from an
illegal termination. The cause of action herein pertains to the
consequence of petitioner's omission which led to a work-related
disease suffered by respondent, causing harm or damage to his
person. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and
jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts. 56
Our ruling in Portillo, is instructive, thus:
There is no causal connection between private
respondent's claim for damages and the respondent
employers' claim for damages for the alleged "Goodwill
Clause" violation. Portillo's claim for unpaid salaries did
not have anything to do with her alleged violation of the
employment contract as, in fact, her separation from
employment is not "rooted" in the alleged contractual
violation. She resigned from her employment. She was not
dismissed. Portillo's entitlement to the unpaid salaries is
not even contested. Indeed, Lietz Inc.'s argument about
legal compensation necessarily admits that it owes the
money claimed by Portillo. 57 HEIcDT
Further, it cannot be gainsaid that the claim for damages occurred
after the employer-employee relationship of petitioner and
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 25,
2008 and Resolution 2 dated August 28, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA). The assailed Decision annulled and set aside the
rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Fourth
Division, Cebu City and affirmed the rulings of the Labor Arbiter
(LA), which held that petitioner voluntarily resigned and was not
constructively dismissed.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. (FTCP) is a
non-stock, non-profit, and non-government organization duly
incorporated under the Philippine laws in 1989. Its objective is to
provide food, clothing, educational supplies and other necessities
of indigent children worldwide. 3 Respondents Dr. Virginia Lao,
Hercules Paradiang and Benjamin Escobia were members of the
FTCP Board of Trustees (Board) and Executive Committee
(Execom) of FTCP. 4
Petitioner Rosalinda Paredes was FTCP's National Director. Her
functions and duties include project management, fund accessing,
income generation, financial management, and administration of
the organization. She also signed all the FTCP checks and
approved all requisitions and disbursements of FTCP funds. 5 As
per FTCP's By-laws, it was also her duty to execute all resolutions
and/or decisions of the Board. 6
Petitioner was first hired by FTCP in 1999 as Country Director.
Her contract was renewed several times until her last contract for
the period from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2007. Her initial
salary was US$1000.00 and then later, she was paid P70,000.00
aside from other benefits and allowances. 7
On August 12, 2005, forty-two (42) FTCP employees signed a
petition letter addressed to the Board expressing their complaints
against alleged detestable practices of petitioner, to wit: seeking
exemption from policies which she herself had approved;
withholding organization funds despite approval of its release;
procuring health insurance for herself without paying her share of
the premium; and receiving additional fees contrary to the terms
of her contract. 8
The next day, August 13, 2005, the staff of FTCP called Lao to
a meeting to submit their petition. They included Atty. Edgar
Chatto, then Chairman of the Board, in the meeting when they
realized that it was only her and Escobia who were present. The
group was edgy and demanded for outright solution. However, the
three Board members told them that they should follow a process.
9
Petitioner learned from Atty. Chatto that Program Manager
Primitivo Fostanes and his co-employees prepared a petition
questioning her leadership and management of FTCP. She filed an
administrative complaint against Fostanes on August 24, 2005,
but the same was not acted upon. 10
When the Board convened for a meeting on August 28, 2005,
petitioner was not allowed to participate. She was only allowed to
join the meeting after three hours. As ex officio member of the
Board and as head of the secretariat, she was always present in
every meeting to discuss her reports, programs and proposals. 11
During the meeting, the Board discussed the animosity
between the petitioner and the staff of FTCP and how they would
address the issue since they have inadequate grievance
mechanism for issues involving top management. 12 According to
Lao, petitioner became combative in issuing memos and filing of
administrative charges. 13 Atty. Chatto recounted that when
petitioner heard about the protesting senior management and
staff, her initial reaction was to resign but then she asked that the
complaints be put in writing. 14 After their discussion, they called
the representatives of the complaining staff and petitioner to air
their side.
Consequently, the Board decided that: Acting Board Chair Lao
will issue a back-to-work memorandum and status quo to ensure
that all the scheduled tasks be accomplished; there will be a
Supervisory Team, composing of Lao and Escobia, that will draw a
definite work plan and be compensated; the Supervisory Team will
not replace the functions of the National Director; and FTCP will
hire an independent professional management and financial
auditor. 15 CAIHTE
Petitioner sent letters to the Board inquiring about the scope
of audit. When the Board did not respond, her lawyers demanded
Lao to address petitioner's concerns regarding the management
and financial audit and that the manual of operations be strictly
followed. 16 In another letter, her lawyers informed individual
respondents that petitioner raised the legality and propriety of the
conduct of the audit, thus, they requested that they desist from
conducting the audit. The letter also indicated that failure to do so
would implead them as respondents in a preliminary injunction
case that they would file. 17
to
SO ORDERED. 30
Undaunted, petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC. In
its Decision 31 dated March 28, 2007, the NLRC reversed and set
aside the decision of the LA and ruled in her favor, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated 08 November 2006 is REVERSED
and SET aside and a new one is entered, to wit:
1. Ordering respondent Feed the Children Philippines,
Inc. to pay the complainant of her salaries and
allowances corresponding to the unexpired portion of her
contract in the aggregate amount of One Million Six
Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Nine hundred and 00/100
(P1,685,900.00), broken down as follows:
Salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion
P1,610,000.0
of the contract
0
Transportation
b.
29,900.00
allowances
Representation
c.
46,000.00
allowances
P1,685,900.0
Total
0;
========
===
a.
and
2. Ordering respondent Feed the Children Philippines,
Inc. to pay complainant of moral damages in the amount
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); and
exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
Respondents Dr. Virginia Lao, Hercules Paradiang
and Benjamin Escobia are absolved from any liability for
lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED. 32 HEITAD
have
her
that they could have not known that it was recantation when it
appeared in the blotter that they only saw the page they were
made to sign. Respondents also presented an affidavit 56
attesting that petitioner intimidated an employee by telling her
that she would file suits against those who defamed her when the
employee refused to recant her signature in the petition against
her.
For petitioner, the fact that the effectivity of her resignation
was moved to November showed the eagerness of Lao, Paradiang
and Escobia to get rid of her. 57
We held that the act of the employer moving the effectivity of
the resignation is not an act of harassment. The 30-day notice
requirement for an employee's resignation is actually for the
benefit of the employer who has the discretion to waive such
period. Its purpose is to afford the employer enough time to hire
another employee if needed and to see to it that there is proper
turn-over of the tasks which the resigning employee may be
handling. 58
Such rule requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation becomes
discretionary on the part of management as an employee who
intends to resign may be allowed a shorter period before his
resignation becomes effective. 59
Thus, the act of respondents moving the effectivity date of
petitioner's resignation to a date earlier than what she had stated
cannot be deemed malicious. This cannot be viewed as an act of
harassment but merely the exercise of respondent's management
prerogative. We cannot expect employers to maintain in their
employ employees who intend to resign, just so the latter can
have continuous work as they look for a new source of income.
Petitioner alleged that the CA erred when it ruled that she
should pay respondents' claims for damages. She maintained that
they were not duly proven and that they clearly did not arise from
an employer-employee relationship.
This Court held that the "money claims of workers" referred to
in Article 217 60 of the Labor Code embraces money claims which
arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee
relationship, or some aspect or incident of such relationship. 61
Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis in clarifying the scope of
Article 217, it is evident that paragraphs 1 to 5 refer to cases or
disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-
labor. Thus, the Constitution and the law equally recognize the
employer's right and prerogative to manage its operation
according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play. 65
It is settled that the law serves to equalize the unequal. The
labor force is a special class that is constitutionally protected
because of the inequality between capital and labor. This
constitutional protection presupposes that the labor force is weak.
However, the level of protection to labor should vary from case to
case; otherwise, the state might appear to be too paternalistic in
affording protection to labor. 66 Petitioner could not expect to
have the same level of ardent protection that the laws bestow
upon a lowly laborer be given to her, a high ranking officer of
respondent FTCP. As proven, she was considered on equal footing
with her employer and even had the occasion to demand the
renewal of her contract by sending an e-mail to the organization's
founder. 67 SDAaTC
We cannot subscribe to petitioner's allegation that the CA
ruled against labor when it resolved the factual issues of the case.
As discussed, it is well within the powers and jurisdiction of the CA
to evaluate the evidence alleged to have been capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, or as in the
present case, for considering petitioner's bare allegations without
support of substantial evidence. This Court finds that the CA did
not violate the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Hence, the
resolution of the doubt as to whether petitioner voluntarily
resigned or was constructively dismissed based on the evidence
on record was proper and was not against labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari, dated
October 23, 2008, of petitioner Rosalinda G. Paredes is hereby
PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in its Decision dated March 25, 2008, that petitioner was not
constructively dismissed, is hereby AFFIRMED. However, the
awards of P34,438.37 and P109,208.36 for the unpaid debt of
petitioner and reimbursement of the FTCP Provident Fund,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Perez * and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
||| (Paredes v. Feed the Children Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 184397 ,
[September 9, 2015])
For its part, WBGI averred that the Labor Arbiter (LA) had no
jurisdiction over the complaint because Vital is not an employee,
but a mere incorporator and stockholder of WBGI, hence, no
employer-employee relationship exists between them. 12 AIDSTE
The LA Ruling
In a Decision 13 dated May 3, 2006, the LA found that the
issues between Vital and WBGI are intra-corporate in nature as
they arose between the relations of a stockholder and the
corporation, and not from an employee and employer relationship.
14 Thus, the LA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, 15
prompting Vital to file his complaint 16 for payment of unpaid
salaries, separation and retirement benefits, and damages on July
19, 2007 before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 8694. 17
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 18 dated December 12, 2011, the RTC, acting as
a special commercial court, oppositely found that Vital was an
employee of WBGI and thereby, upheld his claim of P845,000.00
and P250,000.00 in unpaid salaries and separation pay. However,
the RTC offset these amounts, including the P500,000.00 due from
WBGI's acquisition of Vital's shares of stocks, against the
P923,843.59 payable to WBGI from ERJ Enterprises, thus, awarding
Vital the net amount of P671,156.41, with legal interest from date
of demand until full payment, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and
costs of suit plus litigation expenses. 19
The RTC ratiocinated that since the positions of Internal
Auditor and Personnel Manager were not provided for in WBGI's
By-Laws, Vital was not a corporate officer but an employee
entitled to employment benefits. It also maintained that it had
jurisdiction to rule on the main intra-corporate controversy,
together with the question of damages and employment benefits.
20
Aggrieved, WBGI elevated the case to the CA on appeal. 21
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 22 dated September 30, 2013, the CA dismissed
the appeal, agreeing with the RTC's finding that Vital was an
employee of WGBI. While the CA observed that the RTC's award of
employment benefits to Vital was improper, as the same was
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters, it still ruled
on said claim, reasoning that it has the eventual authority to
review the labor courts' decision on the matter. 23
INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated May 23,
2006 and Resolution 3 dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 84281. These assailed Decision and Resolution set aside the
Decision 4 dated November 28, 2003 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring Joseph Basso's (Basso)
dismissal illegal, and ordering the payment of separation pay as
alternative to reinstatement and full backwages until the date of
the Decision. HTcADC
The Facts
Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign
corporation organized and existing under the laws of and
domiciled in the United States of America (US). It is licensed to do
business in the Philippines. 5 Basso, a US citizen, resided in the
Philippines prior to his death. 6
During his visit to Manila in 1990, Mr. Keith R. Braden (Mr.
Braden), Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines, Inc.
(Continental), offered Basso the position of General Manager of
the Philippine Branch of Continental. Basso accepted the offer. 7
It was not until much later that Mr. Braden, who had since
returned to the US, sent Basso the employment contract 8 dated
February 1, 1991, which Mr. Braden had already signed. Basso
then signed the employment contract and returned it to Mr.
Braden as instructed.
On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine
operations of Continental, with Basso retaining his position as
General Manager. 9
On December 20, 1995, Basso received a letter from Mr.
Ralph Schulz (Mr. Schulz), who was then CMI's Vice President of
Marketing and Sales, informing Basso that he has agreed to work
in CMI as a consultant on an "as needed basis" effective February
1, 1996 to July 31, 1996. The letter also informed Basso that: (1)
he will not receive any monetary compensation but will continue
being covered by the insurance provided by CMI; (2) he will enjoy
travel privileges; and (3) CMI will advance Php1,140,000.00 for the
payment of housing lease for 12 months. 10
On January 11, 1996, Basso wrote a counter-proposal 11 to
Mr. Schulz regarding his employment status in CMI. On March 14,
1996, Basso wrote another letter addressed to Ms. Marty
Woodward (Ms. Woodward) of CMI's Human Resources Department
inquiring about the status of his employment. 12 On the same
day, Ms. Woodward responded that pursuant to the employment
contract dated February 1, 1991, Basso could be terminated at will
upon a thirty-day notice. This notice was allegedly the letter Basso
received from Mr. Schulz on December 20, 1995. Ms. Woodward
also reminded Basso of the telephone conversation between him,
Mr. Schulz and Ms. Woodward on December 19, 1995, where they
informed him of the company's decision to relieve him as General
Manager. Basso, instead, was offered the position of consultant to
CMI. Ms. Woodward also informed Basso that CMI rejected his
counter-proposal and, thus, terminated his employment effective
may have been properly pleaded but it was not proved in the labor
tribunals.
Having disposed of the issue on jurisdiction, we now rule on
the first and third issues.
The Court of Appeals may review the
factual findings of the NLRC in a
Rule 65 petition.
CMI submits that the Court of Appeals overstepped the
boundaries of the limited scope of its certiorari jurisdiction when
instead of ruling on the existence of grave abuse of discretion, it
proceeded to pass upon the legality and propriety of Basso's
dismissal. Moreover, CMI asserts that it was error on the part of
the Court of Appeals to re-evaluate the evidence and
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Basso.
We disagree.
The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions
via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court was settled in our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v.
NLRC. 60 The general rule is that certiorari does not lie to review
errors of judgment of the trial court, as well as that of a quasijudicial tribunal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not
go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and
to weigh their probative value. 61 However, this rule admits of
exceptions. In Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, 62 we
stated:
In the review of an NLRC decision through a special
civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only to
issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains
from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and
agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the
NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to
delve into factual matters where, as in the instant case,
the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor
Arbiter.
In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction may look into the records of the case
and re-examine the questioned findings. As a corollary,
this Court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to
basis for the loss of trust, or that the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee is responsible for misconduct,
which renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. 69
CMI alleges that Basso committed the following:
(1) Basso delegated too much responsibility to the General
Sales Agent and relied heavily on its judgments. 70
(2) Basso excessively issued promotional tickets to his friends
who had no direct business with CMI. 71
(3) The advertising agency that CMI contracted had to deal
directly with Guam because Basso was hardly available.
72 Mr. Schulz discovered that Basso exceeded the
advertising budget by $76,000.00 in 1994 and by
$20,000.00 in 1995. 73
(4) Basso spent more time and attention to his personal
businesses and was reputed to own nightclubs in the
Philippines. 74
(5) Basso used free tickets and advertising money to promote
his personal business, 75 such as a brochure that jointly
advertised one of Basso's nightclubs with CMI.
We find that CMI failed to discharge its burden to prove the
above acts. CMI merely submitted affidavits of its officers, without
any other corroborating evidence. Basso, on the other hand, had
adequately explained his side. On the advertising agency and
budget issues raised by CMI, he explained that these were blatant
lies as the advertising needs of CMI were centralized in its Guam
office and the Philippine office was not authorized to deal with
CMI's advertising agency, except on minor issues. 76 Basso
further stated that under CMI's existing policy, ninety percent
(90%) of the advertising decisions were delegated to the
advertising firm of McCann-Ericsson in Japan and only ten percent
(10%) were left to the Philippine office. 77 Basso also denied the
allegations of owning nightclubs and promoting his personal
businesses and explained that it was illegal for foreigners in the
Philippines to engage in retail trade in the first place. TIADCc
Apart from these accusations, CMI likewise presented the
findings of the audit team headed by Mr. Stephen D. Goepfert,
showing that "for the period of 1995 and 1996, personal passes
for Continental and other airline employees were noted (sic) to be
issued for which no service charge was collected." 78 The audit
cited the trip pass log of a total of 10 months. The trip log does
not show, however, that Basso caused all the ticket issuances.
More, half of the trips in the log occurred from March to July of
1996, 79 a period beyond the tenure of Basso. Basso was
terminated effectively on January 31, 1996 as indicated in the
letter of Ms. Woodward. 80
CMI also accused Basso of making "questionable overseas
phone calls". Basso, however, adequately explained in his Reply
81 that the phone calls to Italy and Portland, USA were made for
the purpose of looking for a technical maintenance personnel with
US Federal Aviation Authority qualifications, which CMI needed at
that time. The calls to the US were also made in connection with
his functions as General Manager, such as inquiries on his tax
returns filed in Nevada. Basso also explained that the phone lines
82 were open direct lines that all personnel were free to use to
make direct long distance calls. 83
Finally, CMI alleged that Basso approved the disbursement of
Php80,000.00 to cover the transfer fee of the Manila Polo Club
share from Mr. Kenneth Glover, the previous General Manager, to
him. CMI claimed that "nowhere in the said contract was it likewise
indicated that the Manila Polo Club share was part of the
compensation package given by CMI to Basso." 84 CMI's claims
are not credible. Basso explained that the Manila Polo Club share
was offered to him as a bonus to entice him to leave his then
employer, United Airlines. A letter from Mr. Paul J. Casey, former
president of Continental, supports Basso. 85 In the letter, Mr.
Casey explained:
As a signing bonus, and a perk to attract Mr. Basso
to join Continental Airlines, he was given the Manila Polo
Club share and authorized to have the share re-issued in
his name. In addition to giving Mr. Basso the Manila Polo
Club share, Continental agreed to pay the dues for a
period of three years and this was embodied in his
contract with Continental. This was all done with my
knowledge and approval. 86
Clause 14 of the employment contract also states:
Club Memberships: The Company will locally pay annual
dues for membership in a club in Manila that your
immediate supervisor and I agree is of at least that value
to Continental through you in your role as our General
Manager for the Philippines. 87
Taken together, the above pieces of evidence suggest that
the Manila Polo Club share was part of Basso's compensation
package and thus he validly used company funds to pay for the
transfer fees. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by
the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. 88
Finally, CMI violated procedural due process in terminating
Basso. In King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac 89 we detailed
the procedural due process steps in termination of employment:
To clarify, the following should be
terminating the services of employees:
considered
in
30. Art 217, Arts. 261-262 (1), Jurisdiction; Art 290, Prescription of
ULP
UST FACULTY UNION V UST
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 203957. July 30, 2014.]
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION,
petitioner, vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
G.R. No. 203957 is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision 2
promulgated on 13 July 2012 as well as the Resolution 3
promulgated on 19 October 2012 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 120970. The CA set aside the 8 June 2011 Decision 4 and
29 July 2011 Resolution 5 of the Fourth Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 10-003370-08, as well
as the 24 September 2010 Decision 6 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in
NLRC-NCR Case No. 09-09745-07.
In its 24 September 2010 decision, the LA ordered the University of
Santo Tomas (UST) to remit P18,000,000.00 to the hospitalization
and medical benefits fund (fund) pursuant to the mandate of the
1996-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The LA also
ordered UST to pay 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's
fees. The other claims were dismissed for lack of merit.
In its 8 June 2011 decision, the NLRC ordered UST to remit to the
University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) the amounts of
P80,000,000.00 for the fund pursuant to the CBA and P8,000,000.00
as attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award. The
NLRC denied. UST's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
In its 13 July 2012 decision, the CA found grave abuse of discretion
on the part of NLRC and granted UST's petition. The CA set aside the
decisions of the NLRC and the LA, without prejudice to the refiling of
USTFU's complaint in the proper forum. The CA denied USTFU's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The CA recited the facts as follows: cAIDEa
In a letter dated February 6, 2007, [USTFU] demanded
from [UST], through its Rector, Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P.
("Fr. Arceo"), remittance of the total amount of
P65,000,000.00 plus legal interest thereon, representing
deficiency in its contribution to the medical and
hospitalization fund ("fund") of [UST's] faculty members.
[USTFU] also sent [UST] a letter dated February 26, 2007,
accompanied by a summary of its claims pursuant to their
1996-2001 CBA.
On March 2, 2007, Fr. Arceo informed [USTFU] that the
aforesaid benefits were not meant to be given annually
but rather as a one-time allocation or contribution to the
the fourth year (2) [sic] of the 1996-2001 CBA, it did not
remit any amount at all during the fifth year of the said
Agreement.
[USTFU] claimed that during the period of the 1996-2001
CBA, [UST] should have remitted the total amount of
P25,000,000.00 instead of P8,000,000.00 only. Thus, a
deficiency of P17,000,000.00. [USTFU's] assertion is based
on the following illustration:
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Actual
Total
1996- 1997- 19982000amount
1999-00
amount
97
98
99
01
to
remitte
[be]
d
remitted
2M
2M did 2M did 2M did 2M did
remitte not
not
not
not slide
d
slide
slide
slide
1M 1M did 1M did 1M did
remitte not
not
not slide
d
slide
slide
1M
1M did 1M did
remitte
not
not slide
d
slide
4M
4M did
not
remitted
slide
2M
10M
1M
4M
1M
3M
4M
8M
8M
Total
25M
=====
=====
=
[USTFU] added that after the fifth year of the CBA, i.e.
2001 onwards, [UST] ought to remit the amount of
P8,000,000.00 ([2]M+1M+1M+4M) annually to the
Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. Hence, for the
school year 2001-2002 up to the school year 2005-2006,
an additional amount of P24,000,000.00 (8M x 3) should
have been remitted by [UST] to the aforesaid fund. All in
all, the total amount yet to be remitted had ballooned to
P81,000,000.00. prLL
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
P2M
P2M + P1M
P2M + P1M
P4M (Renegotiated)
P4M
TOTAL REMITTANCE
=
=
=
=
=
=
P2M
P3M
P3M
P4M
P4M
P16M
=======
199798
199899
Year 5
2M
2M
1M
2M
1M
1M
2M
2M
1M
1M
1M
1M
4M
4M
2M + 3M + 4M + 8M +
8M =
25M
==== ==== ==== ==== ===== ======
=== === ==== ===
==
===
Since it is undisputed that [UST] remitted the amount of
PhP8,000,000.00 only, there is still a deficiency of
PhP17,000,000.00 corresponding to the 1996-2001 CBA.
cICHTD
xxx xxx xxx
For the 2001-2006 CBA:
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Total
amount
2005that
06
should
be
submitted
Year 4
2M
2M
3M
2M
3M
3M
2M +
5M +
8M +
===== ===== =====
==
==
==
2M
3M
3M
8M =
23M
==== ======
===
==
Year 2
2007-08
8M +
8M +
Year 3
Year 4
2008-09 2009-10
8M +
8M +
Year 5
2010-11
Total amount
that should be
submitted
8M =
40M
The NLRC computed UST's total liability for school years 1996-1997
up to 2010-2011 at P80,000,000.00. The records show that UST
SO ORDERED. 17
USTFU filed its motion for reconsideration 18 before the CA. USTFU
maintained that the LA and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint.
In a resolution 19 promulgated on 19 October 2012, the CA denied
USTFU's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. HaIATC
USTFU filed the present petition for review 20 before this Court on 7
December 2012.
The Issues
USTFU enumerated the following grounds warranting allowance of its
petition:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals departed from the
usual course of judicial proceedings in holding that
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction
over the complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP)
filed by USTFU.
2. The Court of Appeals acted in a way not in accord with
the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in
holding that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction
over the instant case despite the fact that Article XIII
("Grievance Machinery") of the CBA is not applicable.
3. The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts in not finding
that under Art. XXII of the CBA, the Permanent
University-Union Committee (PUUC) is the proper
forum to resolve the dispute between UST and
USTFU. However, Art. XXII does not provide for a
"voluntary arbitration" clause and therefore, USTFU
validly filed the complaint for ULP before the Labor
Arbiter.
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in its appreciation of evidence in
not finding that the parties agreed to have the
dispute resolved by the labor tribunals and UST had
actively participated in the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which is tantamount to a
recognition of the jurisdiction of the said bodies.
5. The Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of
proceedings in referring back the case to voluntary
ARTICLE XXII
PERMANENT UNIVERSITY-UNION COMMITTEE (PUUC)
Permanent UNION-UNIVERSITY Committee (PUUC).
The UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION realize that
notwithstanding this CBA, there will remain problems and
irritants which will require the continuing attention of
both parties. Symbolic of the mutual good faith of the
parties, they have agreed to establish a permanent
committee, where the UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY
UNION are equally represented, to address these
problems as they arise.
a. Within thirty (30) days from signing of this Agreement,
the Committee shall meet. The members of the
Committee are the following:
1) For the ADMINISTRATION:
a) Rector or his representative;
b) Vice Rector for Academic Affairs or his
representative;
c) Vice Rector for Finance or his representative;
and
d) Appointee of the Rector.
2) For the FACULTY UNION:
a) President of the UNION;
b) Executive Vice President of the UNION or his
representative;
c) Secretary General or his representative; and
d) Appointee of the UNION President.
b. The regular meetings of this Committee shall be held
at least bi-monthly or as the need arises.
c. The decision reached in the PUUC Meetings shall be
binding to all UNIVERSITY functionaries. 24
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In the
present case, USTFU alleged that UST committed unfair labor
practice in its blatant violation of the economic provisions of the
1996-2001 CBA, and subsequently, the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011
CBAs. UST, meanwhile, has consistently questioned USTFU's act of
bringing the case before the LA, and of not submitting the present
falls
under
Section
1's
definition
of
grievance:
"[a]ny
misunderstanding concerning policies and practices directly affecting
faculty members covered by this [collective bargaining] agreement
or their working conditions in the UNIVERSITY or any dispute arising
as to the meaning, application or violation of any provisions of this
Agreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member may
have against the UNIVERSITY." Section 2 excludes only termination
and preventive suspension from the grievance procedure. TcHCDI
USTFU's focus is on the 1996-2001 CBA's provisions about the
grievance process rather than the provision about the subject
matters covered by the grievance process. Despite UST's alleged
violation of the economic provisions of the CBA by its insufficient
remittances to the fund, a dispute arising as to the meaning,
application or violation of the CBA, USTFU used Step I in Section 3,
and ignored Steps III and IV, to rule out any referral to voluntary
arbitration. USTFU concludes that the 1996-2001 CBA's provisions on
grievance machinery only refer to a grievance of a faculty member
against UST, and that said provisions do not contemplate a situation
where USTFU itself has a grievance against UST.
USTFU argues that the PUUC is the proper forum to resolve the issue,
and that the filing of a complaint before the LA is proper in the
absence of a voluntary arbitration clause in the 1996-2001 CBA's
Article XXII: Permanent University-Union Committee. However, as
provided in the 1996-2001 CBA, PUUC is established for "continuing
problems and irritants which will require the continuing attention" of
UST and USTFU. Clearly, the PUUC addresses matters not covered by
the CBA.
USTFU's adamant refusal to consider voluntary arbitration ignores
Articles 261 to 262-A of the Labor Code,as well as Steps III and IV of
Section 3 of the 1996-2001 CBA.
Accrual of Cause of Action and
Prescription of Claims
USTFU's claims arose from UST's alleged failure to contribute the
correct amounts to the fund during the 1996-2001 CBA. However,
USTFU did not complain of any violation by UST during the lifetime of
the 1996-2001 CBA. Neither did USTFU complain of any violation by
UST during the lifetime of the succeeding 2001-2006 CBA. It was
only on 6 February 2007 that USTFU sent a demand letter to UST
Rector Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P., for the claimed hospitalization and
medical benefits under the 1996-2001 CBA. On 2 March 2007, UST,
through its Rector, Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P., informed USTFU,
through its President, Dr. Gil Gamilla, that "the hospitalization and
UST's
UST's alleged
claims 28
1996 to 2001
CBA
SY 1996-1997
SY 1997-1998
SY 1998-1999
1999
Memorandum
of Agreement
SY 1999-2000
SY 2000-2001
2001 to 2006
CBA
SY 2001-2002
SY 2002-2003
SY 2003-2004
SY 2004-2005
SY 2005-2006
2006-2011 CBA
SY 2006-2007
SY 2007-2008
SY 2008-2009
SY 2009-2010
SY 2010-2011
Total
remittances 29
balances
P2,000,000.00
P3,000,000.00
P4,000,000.00
P2,000,000.00
P1,000,000.00
P1,000,000.00
0
P2,000,000.00
P3,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P4,000,000.00
-
P4,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P2,000,000.00
P5,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
P6,000,000.00
P3,000,000.00
0
0
0
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
0
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
0
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
0
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
0
P8,000,000.00
P8,000,000.00
0
P105,000,000.0
P79,000,000.00 P26,000,000.00
0
========= ========== ==========
====
===
===
a.
The
UNIVERSITY will continue to slide in the amounts
set aside in the 2001-2006 CBA to augment the
fund. Fifty percent of the amount due shall be remitted
within a month from the start of the first semester and the
other fifty percent within a month from the start of the
second semester of the academic year. These sums of
money shall be remitted without necessity of demand on
the part of the union and may not be garnished or held by
the university on account of disputes in hospital billings
between the University and the Union.
xxx xxx xxx 33
USTFU claims that UST's contributions should have been cumulative,
with the amount appropriated for each year carried over to the
succeeding years and is chargeable to the tuition fee increment.
||| (UST Faculty Union v. UST, G.R. No. 203957, [July 30, 2014])
executory unless appealed to the NLRC within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the decision. Consistent with Article 223, Section 1,
Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules also provides for a ten (10)-day
period for appealing the LA's decision. Under Section 4 (a), Rule VI
20 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, the appeal shall be in the form of a
verified memorandum of appeal and accompanied by proof of
payment of the appeal fee, posting of cash or surety bond (when
necessary), certificate of non-forum shopping, and proof of
service upon the other parties. Failure of the appealing party to
comply with any or all of these requisites within the reglementary
period will render the LA's decision final and executory.
Indisputably, Llamas did not file a memorandum of appeal from the
LA's decision. Instead, he filed, within the ten (10)-day appeal period,
a motion for reconsideration. Under Section 15, Rule V of the 2005
NLRC Rules, motions for reconsideration from the LA's decision are
not allowed; they may, however, be treated as an appeal provided
they comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal. The
NLRC dismissed Llamas' motion for reconsideration treated as an
appeal for failure to attach the required certificate of non-forum
shopping per Section 4 (a), Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules.
The requirement for a sworn certification of non-forum shopping was
prescribed by the Court under Revised Circular 28-91, 21 as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, 22 to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum shopping. Revised Circular 28-91, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, requires a sworn
certificate of non-forum shopping to be filed with every petition,
complaint, application or other initiatory pleading filed before the
Court, the CA, or the different divisions thereof, or any other court,
tribunal or agency. HIaTCc
Ordinarily, the infirmity in Llamas' appeal would have been fatal and
would have justified an end to the case. A careful consideration of
the circumstances of the case, however, convinces us that the NLRC
should, indeed, have given due course to Llamas' appeal despite the
initial absence of the required certificate. We note that in his motion
for reconsideration of the NLRC's May 30, 2006 resolution, Llamas
attached the required certificate of non-forum shopping.
Moreover, Llamas adequately explained, in his motion for
reconsideration, the inadvertence and presented a clear justifiable
ground to warrant the relaxation of the rules. To recall, Llamas was
able to file his position paper, through his new counsel, only on
December 20, 2005. He hired the new counsel on December 19,
2005 after several repeated, albeit failed, pleas to his former counsel
to submit, on or before October 25, 2005 per the LA's order, the
required position paper. On November 29, 2005, however, the LA
rendered a decision that Llamas and his new counsel learned and
received a copy of only on January 5, 2006. Evidently, the LA's
findings and conclusions were premised solely on the petitioners'
pleadings and evidence. And, while not the fault of the LA, Llamas,
nevertheless, did not have a meaningful opportunity to present his
case, refute the contents and allegations in the petitioners' position
paper and submit controverting evidence.
Faced with these circumstances, i.e., Llamas' subsequent compliance
with the certification-against-forum-shopping requirement; the utter
negligence and inattention of Llamas' former counsel to his pleas
and cause, and his vigilance in immediately securing the services of
a new counsel; Llamas' filing of his position paper before he learned
and received a copy of the LA's decision; the absence of a
meaningful opportunity for Llamas to present his case before the LA;
and the clear merits of his case (that our subsequent discussion will
show), the NLRC should have relaxed the application of procedural
rules in the broader interests of substantial justice. Indeed, while the
requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, this requirement should not, however, be interpreted too
literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable
practice of forum-shopping. 23
Under Article 221 (now Article 227) 24 of the Labor Code,"the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process." 25 Consistently, we
have emphasized that "rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. A strict and rigid application
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice should not be allowed . . . . No procedural
rule is sacrosanct if such shall result in subverting justice." 26
Ultimately, what should guide judicial action is that a party is given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense
rather than for him to lose life, honor, or property on mere
technicalities. 27
Then, too, we should remember that "the dismissal of an employee's
appeal on purely technical ground is inconsistent with the
constitutional mandate on protection to labor." 28 Under the
Constitution 29 and the Labor Code, 30 the State is bound to protect
labor and assure the rights of workers to security of tenure
from work. Quite the contrary, the petitioners' July 15, 2005
memorandum, in fact, supports, if not strengthens, Llamas' version
of the events that led to his filing of the complaint, i.e., that as a
result of the July 13, 2005 incident, the petitioners refused to give
him the key to his assigned taxi cab unless he would sign the
resignation letter.
Moreover, and as the CA pointed out, Llamas lost no time in filing the
illegal dismissal case against them. To recall, he filed the complaint
on July 18, 2005 or only two days from the third time he was refused
access to his assigned taxi cab on July 16, 2005. Clearly, Llamas
could not be deemed to have abandoned his work for, as we have
previously held, the immediate filing by the employee of an illegal
dismissal complaint is proof enough of his intention to return to work
and negates the employer's charge of abandonment. 41 To reiterate
and emphasize, abandonment is a matter of intention that cannot
lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts of the employee. 42
The CA, therefore, correctly regarded Llamas as constructively
dismissed for the petitioners' failure to prove the alleged just cause
abandonment for his dismissal. Constructive dismissal exists
when there is cessation of work because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely. Constructive dismissal
is a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made
to appear as if it were not. In constructive dismissal cases, the
employer is, concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its
conduct and action were for valid and legitimate grounds. 43 The
petitioners' persistent refusal to give Llamas the key to his assigned
taxi cab, on the condition that he should first sign the resignation
letter, rendered, without doubt, his continued employment
impossible, unreasonable and unlikely; it, thus, constituted
constructive dismissal.
In sum, the CA correctly found equitable grounds to warrant
relaxation of the rule on perfection of appeal (filing of the certificate
of non-forum shopping) as there was patently absent sufficient proof
for the charge of abandonment. Accordingly, we find the CA legally
correct in reversing and setting aside the NLRC's resolution rendered
in grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the
petition. We AFFIRM the decision dated August 13, 2008 and the
resolution dated November 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CEB-S.P. No. 02623.
SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the May 2, 2013 Decision 1 and the September 9, 2013
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124763,
which dismissed, for being moot and academic, the petition for
certiorari filed under Rule 65 questioning the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in a case for disability benefits.
The Antecedents
Respondent Mauricio Picar, Jr. (Picar) was employed by petitioner
Sealion Shipping Limited-United Kingdom through its local manning
agent Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. (petitioners), as Chief
Cook continuously for several contracts from April 2005 until his last
employment contract in 2010, on board the vessel, "MV Toisa
Paladin." The last contract was for a fixed duration of three (3)
months which commenced on September 5, 2010 with a basic salary
of US$630.00 exclusive of overtime pay and other benefits. 3
On September 24, 2010, Picar experienced high fever, chilling,
lumbar back pain, and difficulty in urinating accompanied with blood.
He was referred for medical treatment to the Maritime Medical
Center PTE, Ltd. in Singapore (MMC). He was diagnosed with Urinary
Tract Infection (UTI) and Renal Calculus. After his check-up, he was
required to go back to the vessel and take a rest. On September 28,
2010, he was brought back to MMC where he was confined until
October 1, 2010. On October 2, 2010, he was repatriated. 4
Upon his arrival in Manila, Picar was referred to Dr. Natalio G. Alegre
(Dr. Alegre) at St. Luke's Medical Center (SLMC). On October 21,
2010, he underwent sonography of his kidneys and urinary bladder,
which showed "renal cyst on his right kidney; calyceal lithiasis, right;
and normal urinary bladder; slightly enlarged prostate gland was
noted." Dr. Alegre repeatedly recommended that he undergo
extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy for the dissolution of his right
kidney stone. 5
On February 23, 2011, Picar consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr.
Vicaldo) who also diagnosed him to be suffering from Right Renal
Calculus, Essential Hypertension. Dr. Vicaldo considered his illness as
work aggravated/related and declared him unfit to resume work as a
seafarer in any capacity. 6
Picar then filed a complaint for permanent disability compensation,
balance of sick wages, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
||| (Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. v. Picar, Jr., G.R. No. 209383,
[March 11, 2015])
Rank-and-File (PWU)
June 1, 1989 June 1, 1992 June 1, 1994
Grade
to
to
to
May 31, 1992 May 31, 1994 May 31, 1997
I-II
50
60
65
II-III
60
70
78
III-IV
70
80
95
IV-V
80
110
120
V-VI
100
140
150
VI-VII
120
170
195
VII-VIII
170
230
255
VIII-IX
220
290
340
IX-X
260
350
455
On August 18, 1997 and with the previous collective bargaining
agreements already expired, PHILEC selected Lipio for promotion
from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII 7 to Foreman I under Pay Grade
B. 8 PHILEC served Lipio a memorandum, 9 instructing him to
undergo training for the position of Foreman I beginning on August
25, 1997. PHILEC undertook to pay Lipio training allowance as
provided in the memorandum:
This will confirm your selection and that you will undergo
training for the position of Foreman I (PG B) of the Tank
P350.00
P815.00
P815.00
P815.00
P255.00
P605.00
P1,070.00
P1,070.00
Pay Grade
Step
Increase
I-II
II-III
III-IV
IV-V
V-VI
VI-VII
VII-VIII
VIII-IX
IX-X
P80.00
P105.00
P136.00
P175.00
P224.00
P285.00
P361.00
P456.00
P575.00
P456.00
P1,031.00
Third month
Fourth month
P1,031.00
P1,031.00
With respect to Ignacio, Sr., he was holding the position of DTAssembler under Pay Grade VII when he was selected to train for the
position of Foreman I under Pay Grade X. Thus, for his first month of
training, Ignacio, Sr. should be paid training allowance equal to the
step increase under pay grade bracket VII-VIII. For the second month,
he should be paid an allowance equal to the step increase under pay
grade bracket VII-VIII plus the step increase under pay grade bracket
VIII-IX. For the third and fourth months, Ignacio, Sr. should receive an
allowance equal to the amount he received for the second month
plus the amount equal to the step increase under pay grade bracket
IX-X, thus: 26
First month
Second month
Third month
Fourth month
P361.00
P817.00
P1,392.00
P1,392.00
Pay Grade
Pay Grade
Scale
Step Increase
Scale under
the
Step Increase
under the
Supervisory
CBA
Rank-and-File
CBA
VIII-IX
P340.00
A
P290.00
IX-X
P455.00
A-B
P350.00
To preserve the hierarchical wage structure within PHILEC's
enterprise, PHILEC and PWU allegedly agreed to implement the
uniform pay grade scale under the "Modified SGV" pay grade
system, thus: 34
Step
Increase
Pay Grade
Rank-and-File Supervisory
I-II
II-III
III-IV
IV-V
V-VI
VI-VII
VII-VIII
VIII-IX
A
IX-X
A-B
X-XI
B-C
XI-XII
C-D
D-E
E-F
P65.00
P78.00
P95.00
P120.00
P150.00
P195.00
P255.00
P350.00
P465.00
P570.00
P710.00
P870.00
P1,055.00
interpretation
or
implementation
of
collective
bargaining
agreements. Should the parties agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall also resolve the parties' other
labor disputes, including unfair labor practices and bargaining
deadlocks. Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code provide:
ART. 261. JURISDICTION OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS OR
PANEL OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS.
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement, except those which are gross in character,
shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and
shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean
flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional
Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment
shall not entertain disputes, grievances, or matters under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance
Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
ART. 262. JURISDICTION OVER OTHER LABOR DISPUTES.
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,
upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide
all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices
and bargaining deadlocks.
In Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees, 70 this court ruled that the proper remedy against
the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is an appeal before
the Court of Appeals. This court first characterized the office of a
Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators as a quasi-
it did not. Since this "Modified SGV" pay grade scale does not appear
in PHILEC's collective bargaining agreement with PWU, PHILEC
cannot insist on the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale's application.
We reiterate Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision dated August 13,
1999 where he said that:
. . . since the signing of the current CBA took place on
September 27, 1997, PHILEC, by oversight, may have
overlooked the possibility of a wage distortion occurring
among ASSET-occupied positions. It is surmised that this
matter could have been negotiated and settled with PWU
before the actual signing of the CBA on September 27.
Instead, PHILEC, again, allowed the provisions of Art. X,
Sec. 4 of the CBA to remain the way it is and is now
suffering the consequences of its laches. 123 (Emphasis
in the original)
We note that PHILEC did not dispute PWU's contention that it
selected several rank-and-file employees for training and paid them
training allowance based on the schedule provided in the collective
bargaining agreement effective at the time of the trainees' selection.
124 PHILEC cannot choose when and to whom to apply the
provisions of its collective bargaining agreement. The provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement must be applied uniformly and
complied with in good faith.
Given the foregoing, Lipio's and Ignacio, Sr.'s training allowance
should be computed based on Article X, Section 4 in relation to
Article IX, Section 1 (f) of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective
bargaining agreement. Lipio, who held the position of Machinist
before selection for training as Foreman I, should receive training
allowance based on the following schedule:
First month
Second
month
Third month
Fourth
month
P456.00
P1,031.00
P1,031.00
P1,031.00
P361.00
P817.00
month
Third month
Fourth
month
P1,392.00
P1,392.00
corresponding
all dismissed
In this respect, the law and the rules provide the mode and
the periods within which a party may enforce his right.
The most relevant rule in the instant case is Section 8, Rule
XI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which states that:
Section 8. Execution by Motion or by Independent
Action. A decision or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes
final and executory. After the lapse of such period, the
judgment shall become dormant, and may only be
enforced by an independent action within a period of ten
(10) years from date of its finality.
In the same manner, pertinent portions of Sections 4 (a) and
6, Rule III, of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment, provide
as follows:
Section 4. Issuance of a Writ. Execution shall
issue upon an order, resolution or decision that finally
disposes of the actions or proceedings and after the
counsel of record and the parties have been duly
furnished with the copies of the same in accordance with
the NLRC Rules of Procedure, provided:
a) The Commission or Labor Arbiter shall,
motu proprio or upon motion of any interested
party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment
only within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. Execution by Independent Action. A
judgment after the lapse of five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory and before it is barred by
prescription, may only be enforced by an independent
action.
Similarly, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which can
be applied in a suppletory manner, provides:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent
action. A final and executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before
it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also
be enforced by motion within five years from the date of
Andy Balite
Delfin
Anzaldo
Monaliza
Bihasa
13th month
pay
P162,969.0P17,511.00
4
158,299.44
17,511.00
116,506.62
17,511.00
Attorney's
fees
P18,048.00
17,511.00
13,401.75
i.e.,
the
immediate
execution
of
reinstatement pending
unjustified acts.
appeal
was
due
to
the
respondents'