A.C. No.

6705

March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Sagucio, was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc., until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. When employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a
criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago, Atty. Sagucio
was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal
complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article
288 11 in relation to Article 11612 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the violation of engaging in the private
practice of law while working as a government prosecutort respondent received
retainers fee from Taggat employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondents act of receiving fees from Taggat for legal services while
serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation
of Rule 1.01.
RULING:
Yes.Under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory
prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his]
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." Respondents admission that
he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor
is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted
several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met
respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask
complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as
respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant
in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with
malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases
respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear,
pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,
ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not amount to a
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for,
is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of
impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said
that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because
of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.

2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his
cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of
the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the
public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be
in the practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.

Petition for Leave to Reclaim Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay

540 SCRA 424 Civil Law Private International Law Nationality Theory Practice of Law is
Reserved for Filipinos
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In order for him to take
advantage of Canadas free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in 2004. In 2006
however, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he returned to the
Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved and
limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar. So
when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his Filipino
citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed to have never been
terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after
reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his practice of law,
to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.

Aguirre vs. Rana, BM 1036, June 10, 2003

FACTS: Edwin L. Rana passed the 2000 Bar Eams. However, Before he took the oath and signed
the roll of attorneys, he represented Vice-Mayor Candidate George Bunan and signed a pleading
as counsel of Bunan. A complaint was filed against him for unauthorized practice of law. He also
appeared as counsel for the REFORMA LM-PPC party. Rana contends that he decided to assist
Bunan not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He explains that he did not sign the
pleading as a lawyer and did not represent himself as an attorney in the pleading.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rana is qualified to be a member of the Bar.
RULING: No. Rana engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar. He appeared as counsel for Bunan before taking the lawyers
oath.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it
is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites
for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
Father Ranhilio C. Aquino vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua, AC No 5095, Nov. 28, 2007
FACTS: Father Aquino, Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, alleged that Atty. Pascua of
Cagayan falsified 2 documents by making it appear that he notarized an affidavit-complaint
without them appearing in his Notarial Register. Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the 2
documents, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal
secretary. The complainants maintain that his omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear
case of falsification.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Atty. Pascua are excusable.
RULING: No.
His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a
dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff. A
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.
He was found guilty and suspended for 3 months.
In Re: Judge Jaime V. Quitain
FACTS:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges
were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National

Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was
dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.
The Court Administrator and then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum dated Sept. 3, 2004
to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states that after careful perusal of the
documents and records available, including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quintan,
they find that there are reasonable grounds to hold him administratively liable.
Judge Quintain's Personal Data Sheet he submitted with the Judicial and Bar Council,
reveals that he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in having answered
Question No. 24 with "Yes" but without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed form the
government service.
Question No. 24: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a
sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal or any
other government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country or
found guilty of an administrative offense or imposed any administrative sanction?
ISSUE: Whether Judge Quintain should be administratively liable.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of
grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required
qualifications to be a member of the Bench.
The court find respondent guilty of dishonesty. Section 8(2), Rule 140[25] of the Rules of
Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules, provides the following
sanctions:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He
deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a
letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his
irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable
resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision
of the administrative case.
He was sanctioned to pay the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet
to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges the Court likewise ordered the forfeiture
of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain was entitled to, and he is
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality
or agency of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations.

Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia

FACTS:
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the
practice of law, but the SC denied his petition.
This case is a petiton for review of an administrative case with plea for reinstatement in
the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia who was 71 years old and barred from the practice of
law for fifteen years.Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and
redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
On Jan. 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia of
3 administrative offenses that led to Mejia's disbarment. These are the following:
(1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use, part of the sum of two funds entrusted
to him for payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to Bernardo, and expenses for the
registration of title of Bernardo's another property
(2) falsification of documents such as: a special power of attorney, a deed of sale, and a deed of
assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo's
favor
(3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtain
from Bernardo in the amount of 50,000 and thereafter, replacing said check with others known
also to be insufficiently funded.
On July 29, 1992, the SC rendered a decision disbaring Atty. Mejia.
ISSUE:
Whether Mejia shall be reinstated to practice law.
RULING:
Yes. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured
the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the
Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia.
Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also
knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After
all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
Petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
In the Matter of JAMES JOSEPH HAMM
Arizona Supreme Court No. SB-04-0079-M
211 Ariz 458, 123 p.3d 652, 2005
Petitioners: James Hamm
Petition: To review the recommendation provided by Committee on Character and Fitness (the
Committee) denying the Petitioners application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona (the
Bar).
FACTS: Hamm, the Petitioner, was sentenced to life in prison for one-count of first degree murder
to which he pled guilty. Prior to serving his sentence, Hamm had been separated from his wife
with whom he had a son and had supported himself by selling and using marijuana, other drugs
and drinking alcohol.
The crime for which Hamm was sentenced to life imprisonment is for the murder of Morley and
Well, who were killed by Hamm along with two accomplices, Garland Wells and Bill Reeser. The
three robbed and killed Morley and Well by shooting them with a gun and leaving their bodies
lying in the dessert.
While in prison, Hamm exhibited good conduct and became a model prisoner which earned him a
conditioned parole. Hamm was released after serving nearly seventeen years in prison. From
conditioned parole, Hamm absolutely discharged on December 2001.

While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State University College of Law. In July 1999,
Hamm passed the Arizona bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and Fitness Report
with the Committee.
In its report, the Committee stated that, in reaching its conclusions, it considered the following:
Hamms unlawful conduct, which included the commission of two violent execution style
murders and his testimony as to the facts surrounding the murders
Hamms omissions on his Application and his testimony in explaining his failure to disclose all
required information.
Hamms neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or violation of a longstanding child support
court order and his testimony as to his failure to comply with the court order.
Hamms mental or emotional instability impairing his ability to perform the functions of an
attorney including his testimony as to any diagnosis and treatment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hamm can be admitted to the Bar.
HELD: No, the Supreme Court decided that Hamm failed to prove his burden that he is of good
moral character on the following grounds:
Hamm failed to show rehabilitation from past criminal conduct by not accepting full responsibility
for serious criminal misconduct - Staples murder although he accepted responsibility for the
death of Morley.
Hamm was not completely up-front in his testimony to the murder of which he claims that he
only intended to rob and not to kill. This is contrary to the facts he accepted the gun and brings
it with him in the car, shot Morley without attempting robbery and shot hit again to ensure he is
dead and shot Staples when he attempted to escape.
Hamms failure to fulfill his long overdue obligation to support his child who he was aware
existed.
Hamms failure to disclose the incident involving him and his wife, Donna, when he submitted his
application to the Committee. This incident gave rise to Hamm being questioned by the law
enforcers which should have been reflected by Hamm in the application Question 25.
Hamms act of quoting lines from Supreme Courts decision and use the same in the introduction
for his petition.
ROLLY PENTECOSTES v. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
529 SCRA 146 (2007)
The clerk of court has the duty to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and public
property.
Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court North Cotabato, was administratively charged with grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which
was placed under his care and custody.
The administrative case against Atty. Hermenegildo stemmed from a sworn affidavit complaint
filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which
was recovered by members of the Philippine National Police of Mlang, North Cotabato from
suspected carnappers.
The release order for the motorcycle was issued but Pentecostes refused to receive it because it
was already cannibalized and unserviceable.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North
Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Rabang recommended that the
administrative complaint against Atty. Hermenegildo be dismissed because there was no proof of
Pentecostes claim that the vehicle was cannibalized from the time that it was under Atty.
Hermenegildos custody until its transfer to Philippine National Police (PNP) of Kabacan. The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Hermenegildo is guilty of misconduct
HELD:

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and public
property committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of
Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court) which provides all exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the
case/s involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and
safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, Atty.
Hermenegildo was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to
keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping
elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.
The Court said no explanation was offered by Atty. Hermenegildo, however, for turning over the
motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, Atty. Hermenegildo was mandated to secure prior
consultations with and approval of the trial court.
Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of
the motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records, with
nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. These circumstance are viewed with disfavor as it
reflects badly on the safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to Atty. Hermenegildo as
clerk of court.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of
our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration
of justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records
and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to
their charge.
CASE DIGEST: CYNTHIA ADVINCULAVS. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA (AC No. 7204)
FACTS: The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on
the grounds of Gross Immorality.
The complainant sought for legal advice from the respondent regarding her collectibles from
Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed to settle its accounts with the complainant. Thus,
the possibility of filing a case against Queensway Travel and Tours was discussed.
After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ride home. As
the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek and
embraced her tightly.
Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. On the road, the
complainant felt sleepy for no obvious reason. The respondent suddenly stopped the car in the
vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. This time, the respondent forcefully held her
face, kissed her lips and held her breast. The complainant managed to escape and decided to
hire another lawyer for her case. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the
respondent apologized.
The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered that there was
no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything was spontaneous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the practice of law
RULING: It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. We
explained in Barrientos v. Daarol that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but
also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and

honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
Acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,
forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if
considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL
GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE
MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003
Facts:
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set in compliance with Section
39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws. IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a
term of two years. The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors
following the rotation rule. All the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2)
National Presidents each. Thus, following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional
Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will
automatically become the EVP the next term, then the post of IBP National President on his last
term.
Petitioners filed a petition seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from
being elected as Governor of Eastern Mindanao on the ground that he lacks the requisite of
moral aptitude. They also contend that respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme
Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law; that he could have been disbarred in the United States for
misappropriating his clients funds; and that he actively campaigned for the position of Eastern
Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention.
Issue:
Won respondent De Vera be disqualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region.
Ruling:
No. respondent De Vera cannot be disqualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao
Region. The court ruled that the conviction of respondent De Vera of indirect contempt does not
involve moral turpitude and cannot be serve as a basis to consider him immoral. In the case
of Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. Thus, in this case,
respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he
voiced his views on the Plunder Law.
Furthermore, On the administrative complaint filed against respondent De Vera while he
was still practicing law in California, the petitioners failed to show how the administrative
complaint affects respondent De Veras moral fitness to run for governor. Also, the allegation that
respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the
Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any
proof to substantiate the same.

IRRI vs NLRC
G.R. No. 97239, May 12, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent Nestor Micusa, labourer of International Rice Research Institute was found
guilty of homicide with the presence of mitigating circumstaces of (a) incomplete self-defense
and (b) voluntary surrender for stabbing to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los
Banos, Laguna. IRRIs Human Resouce Development Head, J.K Pascual urged Micosa to resign
from employment in view of his conviction in the case of homicide as he is bound under IRRIs
Employment Policy and Regulation which states that an employer who has been convicted of a
criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service.
Issue:
WON Micosas conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime involving moral turpitude, is
a valid ground for his dismissal.
Ruling.
No. The court ruled that Micosas conviction of the crime of homicide is not a valid ground for his
dismissal as the crime has not been classified as involving moral turpitude as it only resulted
from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim. The facts
shows that the victim drove his fist unto Micosas face while the latter was urinating; that the
victim forcibly rubbed Micosas face into the filthy urinal; and that Micosa pleaded to the victim
to stop but was ignored, thus stabbing the victim several times. These facts only shows that
Micosa has no intention to slay the victim but only to defend his person. Also, the appreciation of
self-defense and voluntary surrender demonstrates Micosas character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.
Thus, moral turpitude is not involve in every criminal act and is not shown in every known and
intentional violation of the statute which makes it vague and indefinite term, the meaning of
which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
a laborer is bound by IRRIs Employment Policy and Regulations which states that an employee
who has been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from
the service.
Roberto soriano vs. Atty. Manuel dizon
Facts:this is a case of disbarment filed against the accused due to his conviction of frustrated
homicide.the case stemmed from a traffic altercation by the respondent with the complainant. In
the course of their trouble,respondent was able to hit the neck of the complainant by his revolver
making the complainant physically paralyzed.the manner which the respondent attacked the
complainant and a credible corroboration of witnesses as to the crime lead the conviction of the
respondent of the said crime but later the rtc suspended the sentence by granting the
respondent a probation.respondent banking his defense on a concocted story and alibi which
later disregarded by the court due to existence of credible documentary and testimonial
evidence.
Issue: whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude? Whether his conviction
warrants disbarment?
Ruling: the court resolved the matter by declaring the actuation of the respondent in the crime of
frustrated homicide involved moral turpitude.the court also consider the rtcs findings of
treachery as a further indications of skewed morals of respondent.it is also glaringly clear that
respondent seriously transgressed canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility thru his
possession of an unlicensed fire arm and his unjust refusal to satisfy civil liabilities.the court
remind him both the attorneys oath and code of professional responsibility.the appalling
vindictiveness and,treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his

unworthiness to continue as member of the bar.thus the court,disbarred the respondent and
odered the name of the latter be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES,
RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior
courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should
take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing
the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension
for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All

lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in
order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed
to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has
jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may
compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
Requesting Exemption From Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005 FACTS: On
September 22, 2004, Atty Cecilo Arevalo, Jr. sought the exemption from the payment of IBP dues
in the amount of P12,035.00 in the years between 1977-2005.
Atty. Cecilio Arevalos contention is that when he was admitted in the Philippines Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippines Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, and then migrated to and worked
in, the USA until his retirement in 2003. He maintained that he cannot be made to pay the IBP
dues because, when he is working in the Philippine Civil Service, the Civil Service Law prohibits
the practice off ones profession while in the Government service, also when he was in the USA
the IBP dues cannot extend to him.
On November 16, 2004, the IBP submitted its comment, that the membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the roll of attorneys
as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the
payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP board of governors; the policy of the IBP board
of governors of no exemption of payment of annual dues is but an implementation of the Courts
directives for all members of the IBP to help defray the cost of integration of the Bar. It is
maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption, of payment of annual dues as requested
by Atty Arevalo, what is allowed is the voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership.
What he could have done was to inform the secretary of IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so
that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, reliving him from his obligation
to pay dues could have been stopped. On February 25, 2005, in reply to the letter of the IBP,
Atty. Arevalo questions the policy of the IBP board of governors of the non-exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged
in active or inactive practice. Asserting that the said policy is a suffers constitutional infirmities,
such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he
was inactive in the practice of law.
HELD: NO. The Integration of the Philippines Bar means that official unification of the entire
lawyer population, which requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and retention of his name in the Roll of attorneys of
the Supreme Court. The Court stated that there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and in integration of the Philippine Bar. The fee required by the IBP is a
necessary consequence of membership in the IBP for the integration of the Philippine Bar to
defray the expenses of regulation of the profession, Lawyers, which no one is exempt.
SANTOS V LLAMAS
FACTS: On Feb. 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr. a member of the bar, filed a
complaint against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar

membership dues. Santos claimed that Llamas, for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data in his pleadings, as the latter only indicates IBP Rizal
259060 for at least three years already, as show by the pleadings filed by Llamas in various
courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997. On April 18, 1997, Santos filed a certification by the then IBP
president of the IBP that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he
has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present. On July 7,
1997, Llamas was required to comment on the complaint and in his comment, Llamas alleged
that he was exempt from payment of IBP dues under R.A. 7432, Sec. 4, for being a senior citizen
since 1992 and that he was engaged only in limited practice of law. Llamas, also added, that if
despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never
in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is
willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges
and penalties. On Dec. 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues.
ISSUE/S: WON Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD: Yes, Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RATIO: Llamas violated Canon 7 which states that A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. Although Llamas failure to pay his IBP dues may be in good faith, his act of
indicating IBPRIZAL 259060 in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and
the courts the he had paid his IBP dues is contrary with the duty of upholding the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. Llamas failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in
the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of his
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application
of the law, the Court ruled to impose the penalty of one year suspension upon Llamas from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later