Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration

Author(s): Jonathan Barnes

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1969), pp. 123-152
Published by: BRILL
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Aristotle'sTheory

BARNES

JONATHAN

The

Demonstration*

method which Aristotle follows in his scientific and philo-

sophical treatises and the method which he prescribes for scientific and philosophical activity in the Posterior Analytics seem
not to coincide. The task of explaining this apparent inconsistency is
recognised as a classical problem of Aristotelian exegesis. I shall first
present the problem, which I shall refer to as the Problem of Demonstration, in more detail; then discuss and reject three proposed
solutions; thirdly offer what I think is the correct solution; and finally
append some remarks on matters raised by this solution.
The solution which I think correct has been suggested by a number
of scholars but it has not, to my knowledge, been supported by detailed
argument; perhaps as a consequence of this, it has not been universally
accepted or even universally noticed. For this reason, it seems worthwhile to devote a somewhat protracted discussion to the problem and
its solution. Incidentally, some light may be shed on one of Aristotle's
more difficult and despised' works.
I
In the Posterior Analytics, in particular in the first eight chapters of
the first book, Aristotle expounds his theory of 'apodeictic' or demonstrative science. The theory concerns the logical form which the sciences
do or should exhibit; "science" is here of course to be understood in
the broad sense of the Greek "mat
[LI".
The details of Aristotle's theory are obscure, but its outline is clear:
a demonstrative science is an axiomatised deductive system comprising
a finite set of connected '0ro& qLL or demonstrations.2 A demonstration is a sort of syllogism3; that is, it has the form of one of the fourteen
* I wish to thank Professor J. L. Ackrill for his helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
1 E.g. Anscombe, 6. - I give references by author's name, followed where necessary by an opus number, followed by a page number; for details see the bibliography, pp. 151-52.
2 See below, pp. 147-149.
3 APr. A 4, 25b30: cf. A 23, 41bl; APst. A 2,71b8;
72a26.

123

syllogistic moods which Aristotle acknowledged as valid. It is differentiated froin other varieties of syllogism by the following characteristics: the premisses of a demonstration must be (a) true; (b)
necessary and universal; (c) immediate; and (d) causally related to
the conclusion, which must itself be true, necessary, and universal.4
Arguments which do not satisfy all these conditions are discussed
and sometimes countenanced in the Posterior Analytics; but their
presence in the work is spasmodic and furtive; the paradigm demonstration is an argument having the form Barbara LLL.5 For example6:
Having incisors belongs necessarily to every carnivore;
carnivore belongs necessarily to every dog.
Therefore: having incisors belongs necessarily to every dog.
This demonstration might be a member of the set which comprises
the demonstrative science of animal biology.7
My example was not taken from Aristotle. This points to the
problem; for in the whole of the Aristotelian corpus there is not, as
far as I am aware, a single example of a demonstration. The Posterior
Analytics quotes arguments which come close to demonstrative form ;8
but there is no perfect example. In the other treatises there is scarcely
a syllogism. There are arguments which might be said to show a degenerate syllogistic form; and there are arguments which can be brought
into perfect syllogistic form witlhout much violence to the text;
but even these cases are rare,9 as will be clear to anyone who tries to
formalise any of Aristotle's arguments. If the Organon were lost we
should have no reason to suppose that Aristotle had discovered and
was mightily proud of the syllogism.
This, then, is the Problem: on the one hand a highly formalised
theory of scientific methodology; on the other, a practice quite innocent
A 2, 71b20. Further, on (a): 71b25; A 9, 75b39; Top. A 1, 100a27;
on (b): APst. A 6, 74b5-39; A4, 73a25-74a3; on (d):esp. APst. B 11, 94a20-b26,
and cf.APr.B2, 53b9.
5 For the notation see McCall. "L" and "Q", the only operators I use in this paper,
mark necessity and two-sided possibility respectively.
6 For the formulation see Patzig, 8-13. - I assume that the necessity operators
have to be expressed in a proper demonstration; the best argument for this
assumption is that in 'degenerate' demonstrations (see below, pp. 18-20) the
possibility operator must be expressed.
7Fuller accounts of demonstration: Ross, 51-74; Joachim, xxii-xxx; and
Scholz; Beth, 31-37.
8 The closest are the vine-syllogisms, APst. B 16, 98b5-16.
9 See Wieland, 43 n. 1.
4APst.

124

of formalisation and exhibiting rich and variegated methodological

pretensions of its own: how are the two to be reconciled?
II
The first two answers to the Problem which I shall consider simply
deny that it arises: one of the two propositions on which it is based is
false - either Aristotle does use demonstrations in his treatises, or
else the description of an apodeictic science which I have given is
incorrect. It is often hard to say which of these two views a given
author is advocating.
(1) Those who pretend to find examples of genuine demonstration
throughout Aristotle cannot pretend that his text as it stands contains
any such arguments, and so they must base their claims on reformulations of Aristotle's actual words. Thus the Greek commentators
regularly paraphrase Aristotle's text in such a way as to impose
syllogistic form on its arguments10. An extreme form of this view,
that all the arguments in Aristotle are really demonstrations, is sometimes supported by the belief - never in my opinion seriously held by
Aristotle - that the syllogism is the only form of valid reasoning'1.
For if all valid arguments are syllogisms, then either Aristotle's
arguments are invalid (which is unthinkable) or else they are, despite
themselves, in syllogistic form. In this guise, the first answer to the
Problem hardly deserves mention; however, a less extreme version of
the view has also been canvassed: some at least of the arguments in
the treatises are demonstrations - and this is enough to solve the
Problem'2.

Attempts to uphold this position must, I suppose, be examined on

their individual merits; but I think that two general points are
enough to prove that these merits can never be great. First, the most
that such a view seems able to state is that some of Aristotle's arguments are in syllogistic form: but this is not to the point - if the
Problem is to be solved in this way Aristotle's arguments must be
shown to be in demonstrative form. This distinction, clearly marked
10

See Wieland, 59 n. 1.

11 Documentation in Patzig, 133. The view was asserted by Solmsen (1), 264,

as late as 1929; and see Mignucci, 158-169.

13 E.g. Kullmann; cf. Solmsen (3), 53 n. 1 (but see Elders, 53-58). A more extreme view seems to be hinted at by A. Mansion. 210-215, and During (2) 199 (but
see During (3), 22, 30, 91).

125

by Aristotle, has escaped some of his commentators. Secondly, as I

have said, the view can only be maintained if Aristotle's arguments
are reformulated. But the syllogism is defined in lormal terms; that
is to say, an argument which is non-syllogistic in form is thereby shown
not to be a syllogism and a lortiori not a demonstration. As well claim
that all arguments of the form "either not-P or Q; and P: therefore Q"
are examples of modus ponens because they can be reformulated

in the form "if P then Q; and P: therefore Q".13

(2) The second answer to the Problem is closely related to the first:
instead of reading rigorous demonstrations into the treatises it softens
the formal definition of demonstration to such a degree that it is
satisfied by the arguments of the treatises as they stand. I do not think
this view has ever been stated in plain terms; but it certainly lies
behind more than one account of Aristotle's scientific method14.
It is plain that the same reply can be given to this proposal as was
given to the first: Aristotle gives a formal and precise account of
demonstration in the Posterior Analytics and it is demonstration as
there defined which is to be the tool of science. Even the degenerate
demonstrations which the Analytics sometimes condones cannot
serve to support this view, since the requirement of syllogistic form is
never relaxed'5.
It is possible that this second proposal owes the little plausibility
it has to an ambiguity in the term "syllogism". According to Aristotle's
explicit definition,'6 an argument is a syllogism if and only if it is of
the following form:
Al, A2 . . . An F B
where n is greater than 217 and B is distinct from every At. If we call
such arguments D-syllogisms, it is plain that the class of valid arguments in the three Aristotelian figures of the syllogism - the class of
18

Aristotle would have taken the point; see the important remarks at A Pr.
A 32, 47 a 22-35.
14 E.g. Solmsen (1), 254-293; Grene, 97-103; 192 n. 1; Dirlmeier, 155-156 with
175. All these scholars must be using the words "demonstration" and "syllogism"
in a very relaxed sense.
16 The account of APst. B 11, 94b8-26 in terms of 'quasi-syllogisms' given by
Ross, 644 (see During (3), 103) is open to question.
I' APr. A 1, 24b18-20: cf. Top. A 1, 100a25-27; I 1, 165a1-2; Rhet. A 2,
1356bl6-18; also: APst. A 10, 76b38; B 5, 91b14. Comments in Ross, 291;
Patzig, 44-5.
17 APr. A 14, 34a17-18; 23, 40b35.

126

F-syllogisms - is only a small sub-class of the class of D-syllogisms,

whereas the class of D-syllogisms is a large subclass of the class of
all valid deductive arguments. Although it is hard to find F-syllogisms in Aristotle's treatises, it is not hard to find D-syllogisms there;
and since Aristotle allows us to call D-syllogisms "syllogisms" simpliciter, we might conclude that the treatises contain syllogisms.

Moreover, since the technical term

is

"&768rLiL;"

often used by

Aristotle in its non-technical sense of "proof"'8 we might talk of Fdemonstrations and D-demonstrations, the latter forming a substantial
subclass of the class of proofs - we can conclude in a similar way that
the treatises contain aOC7r[ELq.
These conclusions are, of course, vain. The demonstrations with
which the Posterior Analytics is concerned are unequivocally a special
sort of F-syllogism'9; the search for D-syllogisms is wasted labour.
The same equivocation may also have helped the first answer to the
Problem to gain adherents; at any rate, it is easy to understand how
D-syllogisms might be thought coextensive with valid arguments, and
we have already seen that identifying syllogisms with valid arguments
tends to support one version of the first answer.
(3) The third answer to the Problem has far more in its favour
than either of its predecessors. It maintains that the range of application of the theory of demonstration is not the totality of the sciences:
only the mathematical sciences (arithmetic, geometry, stereometry,
mechanics, harmonics and perhaps optics) are candidates for the
demonstrative method; other, less rigorous, sciences require other,
less rigorous, methods. Hence we should not expect to find demonstrations in Aristotle's treatises.
This view, or variants on it, has had numerous advocates20. It is
best seen, I think, as a conclusion drawn from the following two
premisses: (A) the theory of demonstration has close connexions with
mathematics; and (B) the mathematical sciences are identical with
the rigorous sciences. Both these premises raise matters of considerable
intrinsic interest, and so I shall deal with them at some length.
-

(A) The relation between demonstration and the mathematical

sciences is undeniably close. Aristotle himself, despite the old slander
18 See below, pp. 138-9; Ross, 501; Patzig, 185 n. 12. In APr. A 1-22 there are
27 occurrences of "&iv6U?L4L" or "cbto8xyvuvaL" in the non-technical sense
(and 38 of "?d5" or "8cLxvuvmL").
19 E.g. APst. A 14.
'o See esp. Grote, 210; also Steinthal, I 192; Kullmann.

127

that he was no mathematician, appears to single out mathematics

as the paradigm of demonstrative science21;and the commentators,
from Alexander onwards, have underlined the connexion22.
If we look at the matter a little more nearly, there seem to be four
distinct lines joining demonstration to mathematics. (i) A good number
of the examples cited by Aristotle in illustration of his theory are
mathematical23. (ii) Aristotle's logical terminology may be derived
in large part from the technical vocabulary of contemporary mathematics24. (iii) It is a familiar fact that the late fifth and early fourth
centuries B. C. witnessed immense strides forwardin the mathematical
sciences, their sister sciences being for the most part outrun and
overshadowed. Thus "[mathematics] alone afforded a science so
advanced as to allow the investigation of the characteristicsof, and the
Furthermore,
discovery of the factors constant to, all a-riTaf,25.
this advance may have included an attempt to axiomatise geommetry: Proclus tells us that three men, Hippocrates in the fifth, Leon
and Theudios in the fourth century, composed Elements26;and modern
scholars have tried to give flesh to his skeletal account by moving
portions of Euclid's Elementsback to the fifth century27.If Aristotle's
theory of demonstration inspired and influenced Euclid,28was not
the theory in its turn inspired and influenced by a pre-Euclideanbook
of Elements?
(iv) Theudios is the man most often singled out as Aristotle's pattern29, and he leads us to the fourth link between mathematics
and the theory of demonstration; for Theudios was a member of the
21APst. A 14, 79a 17-19; cf. A 1, 71a3.
22 Alexander, In Met. 265, 4-5; cf. e.g. Eucken, 56-66; Maier, 1.398; Solmsen
(1), 81; 119; 235 etc.; Lee; S. Mansion, 158-159; Owen, 164-6. In general,
Heath (2).
23 E.g. Maier, 1.398 n. 4; Solmsen (1), 79; S. Mansion, 158; Ross, 75; Heath (2),
1; von Fritz (2), 43; During (3), 58.
24 See esp. Einarson.
25 S. Mansion, 159.
26 Proclus, In prim. Euclid. Element. lib. comm., 66.4-67.15,

Hippocrates:

rpWTiO . . .

xmd-r& G-roLXeCX

cuV0CeVOXLS)

7v.V pTV~Z0VU0O&VWV
Ir

T xnloeL

(c) Theudius: ?u't5o4 8 6 Mayv-5

xmr&. %rv &xxnv TBLXoao9pLa
tptX75V

(v.I.

6pLXi3V)

xal

XT

XPt

ed. Friedlein:

(a)

xcxaltOLXELM aUvkypaoev.(b) Leon:

Te

ctLXVU1dVGV &kL[LeXCarpOV.

gv -rOtJ.oLv
98oEeV ?IVTvcxL
8LOcxp(V
xal
?ot4
xal1 7roX?Ba Trcv
yap tm asromxelm xxocxq auv&rtev

OX0OlXCdYEpCX &7r0o7)aCV.

See Szabo (1) and (2); Heath (1), I 170-217; 319-330.

See Szabo (2), 72; 95; 104-106; von Fritz (2), 45-63; 99-103; Berka - for varying shades of opinion. Also Ross, 56-59; Heath (3), I 117-124.
29 See Heath (1), I 321; Ross, 52; 56; 635; Berka. On Theudios: von Fritz (1).
27

28

128

Academy. Mathematics was a subject of intense interest in the Academy: the leading mathematicians of the day were members of, or
associated with, the Platonic circle30; Plato himself is said to have
encouraged and directed mathematical research3l - and it is plain
that Plato's later philosophy was strongly influenced by mathematical
considerations32.It is hardly likely that Aristotle was ignorant of or
unaffected by the apparently fruitful intercourse between the two
disciplines of mathematics and philosophy. If Aristotle does take
mathematics as the science zwr'e'oX'v,it is only what we might expect
a student of the Academy to do33.
There is no doubt something in each of these points; however, their
strength has, I think, generally been exaggerated, and it is worth
passing some brief comments on each.
(i'). On my count, the examples Aristotle uses in the Posterior
Analytics can be classified as follows:
Book A
Book B
Total

Mathematical Non-mathematical
50
36
19
46
69
82

These figures cannot pretend to be exact, since it is not always clear

just how examples should be individuated; however, I do not think
that any count could give the total proportion of mathematical
to non-mathematical illustrations as greater than 1 : 134.
These figures are still interesting: mathematics more or less balances
all the other sciences put together; and the figures from the first
Proclus, In prim. Euclid. 66.8-68.4.
Acad. philos. Index Hercul. 15-19 ed. Mekiler; Proclus, In prim. Euclid.,
211.18-212.4; Diog. Laert. 3.24.
32 The fullest recent study is that of Gaiser (see 20-27; 41-201; 296-305; 423-425;
and below p. 132).
t Ross, 75.
84 The figures for the Prior Analytics are as follows:
Mathematical
Non-mathematical
APr. A
13
136
APr. B
6
56
Total
19
192
Book A breaks down thus:
A 1-12
4
56
A 13-22
0
35
A 23-46
9
45
N.B. Example tokens, not types, are counted.
80

31

129

book, which, it could be claimed, is the more important in the present

context, are more favourable to mathematics35. It should be remarked,
however, that the examples over which Aristotle spends most time
are almost all taken from the non-mathematical sciences: thunder,
eclipses, deciduous trees, the Persian war, post-prandial perambulation36. Mathematics provided the ready cases, the other sciences the
interesting ones.
(ii'). The second tie between mathematics and demonstration must
also be treated with caution. Einarson, whose influential article
provides the basis for the tie, was himself circumspect. ". . . in the
frequent absence of external evidence, the origin of the term must be
determined by its own superior applicability to one field or the other

[i.e. mathematics or logic]"37.

But it is clear that the test of 'superior

applicability' is not a very satisfactory one: the crucial question of the

origin of a given term must often remain open. Indeed, we may go
further: it is certain that mathematics was to some extent influenced
by Aristotelian terminology38; and it is known that mathematical
vocabulary was fluid - indeed a matter of strife39 - in the fourth
century: these facts indicate, I think, that when a term is found both
in Aristotle and in post-Aristotelian mathematics (in a technical sense)
the scales are weighted in favour of Aristotelian origin.
Furthermore, the scope of Einarson's results should not be exaggerated: for a considerable number of the most important items of
Aristotle's logical vocabulary there is no question of a mathematical
itself40.
ancestry - and one of those items is the word "a7ot6OLiL"
Finally, Einarson's assertions do not apply to demonstration in
particular but to syllogistic as a whole. Hence an additional premiss
is needed if the second point is to bind together mathematics and
demonstration.
(iii') If Aristotle modelled his theory of demonstration on some
See von Fritz (3), 34.
Thunder: APst. B 10, 94a3-9 etc.; eclipses: B 8, 93a30-b8; deciduousness:
B 16, 98b5-16; Persian War: B 11, 94a36-b8; peripatos: B 11, 94b8-26.
37 Einarson, 36.
38 See von Fritz (2), esp. 45-63; 99-103; also Mugler, 67; 172; 187 for further
examples.
" See Speusippus frag. 46; 47 Lang.
40 The only preAristotelian mathematical uses seem to be Archytas, DK
47B4, and possibly Democritus, DK 68B299; the mathematicians preferred
"biroyaLvew" or "8eExvuvocL"to "&7rOexvuVoL" (Mugler, 73-75; 113-115).
35

36

130

pre-Euclidean axiomatisation of geometry, then there must have been

such an axiomatisation in existence by the middle of the fourth
century B.C. The question of the origins of axiomatised deductive
mathematics is controversial: the honour of founding that science
has been variously attributed to fifth century mathematicians working
under the influence of Eleatic logic4l, to Plato or the mathematicians
associated with him42, and to Aristotle himself43. I shall only make a
few rather superficial comments, without pretending to do justice
to this difficult problem.
First, it must be emphasised that our question is not one of purely
mathematical progress: mathematicians might have been advancing
by 350 B.C. stringent proofs of complex theorems and yet not have
developed an axiomatic science. Indeed, this is the very view expressed
by Heath: "there is .. . probably little in the whole compass of the Elements of Euclid . .. which was not in substance included in the recognised content of geometry and arithmetic by Plato's time, although the
form and arrangement of the subject-matter and the method employed
in particular cases were different from what we find in Euclid".44
This point is of crucial importance, since it is the method, and not
the substance, of mathematical advance that is alleged to have influenced Aristotle.
What, then, is the evidence for pre-Euclidean axiomatisations of
mathematics? It is simply the passage from Proclus to which I have
already referred. And in particular, it is the threefold occurrence there
of the word "elements" ("a-rotytcx"). This is not the best of testimony.
If the word is due to Proclus himself, then the evidence is too late to
be valuable. If, on the other hand, it stems from Eudemus' Histories,
which Proclus may be epitomising,45 then the evidence is too early
to be surely understood: for we do not know how reliable Eudemus is
as an historian (did he, in particular, impose contemporary terminology
and ideas on his precursors as Aristotle notoriously did?) and we do
not even know what Eudemus, who wrote before Euclid's Elements
were out, may have understood by the term "element"46.
Moreover, there seem to be reasons for scepticism with regard to
See Szabo (1), (2), (3).
An account in Szabo (2), 99-104.
43 von Fritz (2).
"4 Heath (1), I 217 (my italics).
45 See Wehrli, 114-115; more sceptically Heath
(3), I 35-38.
46 See Diels, 27; Burkert, 189-196.

"'

42

131

the existence of pre-Euclidean axiomatised systems. In the first

place, it is hard to believe that so little recognition would have been
given to such magnificent achievements had they been made (Theudius
is unknown outside Proclus, and Hippocrates is mentioned by Aristotle with disdain47); secondly, Plato's well-known strictures on contemporary mathematics in the Republic seem scarcely compatible with
the knowledge of an axiomatisation of geometry; and thirdly, logical
theory, upon which any deductive system is to some degree dependent,
is known to have been in an undeveloped state when Aristotle turned
his hand to it.48
Hippocrates, Leon, and Theudios were no doubt admirable mathematicians; but it is, I think, unlikely that Aristotle had before his
eyes anything like a Euclidean axiomatisation of geometry on which
he might pattern his Posterior A nalytics.
(iv') What role did mathematics play in Plato's philosophy? The
fullest attempt to answer the question is that of Gaiser; the details of
his answer are highly speculative, but his basic thesis is worth setting
out, if only because he argues for a very close relation between Plato's
philosophy and mathematics. In brief, Plato is supposed to have
held that the realm of mathematics was structurally isomorphic with
the whole realm of reality of which it formed a part. This isomorphism
enabled him to explain the structural relationships of reality as a
whole; in particular, the troublesome notions of 'separation' (X&ptap6q)
and 'participation' (LE'OE?)could be illuminated by reference to the
corresponding relations in the mathematical model.
There is no need to go further; it is quite clear that such a use of
mathematics would have been anathema to Aristotle; the two cornerstones of the theory, the separation of mathematical objects and their
explanatory powers, are both explicitly denounced by him49 - Gaiser
himself characterises Aristotle's metaphysics as a 'demathematisation'
of ontology50. If this view of the relationship between mathematics
and philosophy in the Academy is even roughly correct, the point
for which it was cited may be turned: far from leading Aristotle
toward mathematical pastures, the Academic concentration on the

DK 42A2; A3.
E.g. Robinson.
'9 Met. M 2, 1076a38 -3, 1078b6 (separation) and A 9, 991 b9-21 (explanatory
power) are the most obvious passages.
50 Gaiser, 318; 320; 432 n. 292.

4"
48

132

subject and its associated philosophical phantasies5l were likely to

drive him away from the darkness of numbers and into the clear light
of biology.
There are thus reasons for thinking that mathematics was not as
closely associated with Aristotle's theory of demonstration as is often
supposed52.Let us turn now to the second part of the thesis we are
considering, the view that (B) the mathematical sciences are identical
with the rigoroussciences. It is worth quoting at length from a familiar
passage in the NicomacheanEthics:
"Ourpropositionswill be satisfactory if they are as clear (8LsaxarnOet) as the subject-matter permits; for rigour (ro'
a6xptpe') should
not be sought to a like degree in all propositions any more than in
artifacts.... We should be satisfied, then, if, when speaking about
such matters and from such premisses,we reveal the truth roughly
and in outline - i.e. if, when speaking about what is for the most
part and from such premisses, our conclusions too are of such a
sort. ...

There seems to be little difference between allowing a

mathematician to get away with arguments of probability and

demanding demonstrations from an orator"53.
Mathematics is rigorous since its propositions are not about what is
"for the most part". A second point leads to the same conclusion:
one of the characteristics of a rigorous science is that its subjectmatter is abstract, that the things it studies are without matter".
This requirement is of course satisfied by mathematics.
Unfortunately, this argument goes a great deal further than it
pretends. If a science deals with what is "for the most part", it is not
rigorous. The notion of "what is for the most part" runs through the
whole of Aristotle's treatises on Nature; indeed, what is for the most

"I Gaiser (325-329) and, more strongly, Solmsen ((2), 225) regard Aristotle's
rejection of Plato's numerology as a regression, on the grounds that Plato
was nearer the modern conception of a physical science. This is absurd: Plato's
or rather Gaiser's recreation of it - is the merest mumbo-jumbo;
system
Aristotle was well aware that painstaking research must precede theory-construction, and it is perverse to reproach him for this epoch-making advance
over Plato.
5" See also Allan, 129; 144.
53 EN. A 3, 1094b11-14; 19-22; 25-27.
54 APst. A 27, 87a33-34; Met. a 3, 995 a 14-17. - There are many passages in
Aristotle bearing on the distinction between more and less rigorous sciences;
the distinction is worked out by Plato, Phlb. 55 C-59 D.

133

part forms the most important and largest part of what is by nature55.
Propositions about what is for the most part cannot be necessary
propositions; hence they cannot take part in demonstrations: hence
the natural sciences, being non-rigorous and "for the most part" are
not demonstrative sciences. But we may not stop here: Aristotle
frequently insists that the only objects of knowledge are universal
and necessary propositions56; it seems to follow that, not only are the
natural sciences not demonstrative sciences, they are not sciences
at all - for their propositions are not the sort of thing that can be
known. What then becomes of Aristotle's greatest advance over
Plato, the admission of natural phenomena into the realm of knowledge?
This confrontation between the necessity of things knowable and
the contingency of nature seems to me to be an Aristotelian dilemma
no less important and instructive than the more familiar clash between the universality of things knowable and the particularity of
things real. I shall digress to enquire whether Aristotle had any way
out of this quandary.
In one vein he states baldly that we can have knowledge of what is
for the most part57. Indeed, he sometimes allows that such knowledge can be demonstrative - these are the degenerate demonstrations
to which I referred earlier and which are discussed in two chapters
of the Posterior Analytics58. What is for the most part is connected
with what is contingent ('v8rXsaOL): at Prior Analytics A 3, 25b14,
Aristotle speaks of "those things which are said to be contingent by
being for the most part and being by nature", and he states that "for
the most part" is one meaning of the modal operator "contingent"59.
It is no long step from here to the view that Aristotle's 'problematic'
syllogistic was meant to do for the natural sciences whatever his
APr.A3,25bl4;
A8,777al9-21;PA.Pr2,663b28;
55E.g.GA.A19,727b29;
13, 32b4-13. Some examples of 'the for the most part': HA. Z 17, 571a26;
H 3, 583b3-8; Rhet. B 5, 1382b5-8; EN. r 1, 1110a32; 0 13, 1161a27. The
other constituent of what is by nature - the necessary (e.g. Phys. B8, 198b 35;
GA. A 4, 770bl 1) - comes into its own in Cael., GC. and Meir..
56 Necessary: e.g. APst. A 4, 73a21; 6, 74b6; universal: e.g. A 6, 74b5-12;
A 33, 88b31.
57 Met. E 2, 1027a20-21 (= K 8, 1065a4); cf. Phys. B 5, 197a19.
B 12, 96a8-19. Cf. APr. A 27, 43b32-36; Rhet. A 2,
58 APst. A 30, 87b19-27;
1356b 16-18; 1357 a22-32.
50 See APr. A 13, 32b4-13; Rhet. A 2, 1357a27. - The anomalous reference to
contingent principles at APst. A 32, 88b7, is best understood in this light:
the contingent principles are 'for the most' part propositions.

134

syllogistic or theory of demonstration did for the mathematical sciences60.

This view gives a pleasing symmetry to Aristotle's philosophy of
science; but it will not do. The phrase "for the most part" is not a posnot only do
sible interpretation of the modal operator "vaZero";
many of the problematic syllogisms fail to yield valid arguments when
their operator is read as "for the most part", but the proposition which
lies at the very heart of this part of Aristotle's syllogistic, "Qp+-+Q-p"
("A proposition is contingent if and only if its negation is contingent")
turns out, on this reading, to be necessarily false - if "For the most
part men go gray" is true, then "For the most part men do not go
gray" is false, and vice versa.
Theophrastus and Eudemus, Aristotle's successors, clearly stated
this objection6l; it is possible that they were only setting down
remarks which Aristotle himself had made62 - at least, that would
explain why the Analytics hints at but fails to develop the apparently
promising notion of non-apodeictic demonstration.
For Aristotle to take this way out of his quandary was, in effect,
to abandon his conviction that only the necessary can be known.

'apodeictic'

60 This view was probably held by Theophrastus and Eudemus (see n. 61); it is
clearly stated by Alexander (In APr. 39.1640.5; 164.15-165.15) and by Philoponus (In APr. 61.14-62.1; 154.7-19); it was restated and discussed by Becker,
76-83.
61 And thereforerejected Aristotle's conversion-rule: xacl 'rocira vL66 'ApLaroTrp
oC
Uoro5
)<6 *ot 8A &rocpOt
0e69pMaroq xxl Eu`8j%.oqxal #r ot H?acxrMvLxot
Po0BovWra
LV, &T7etgi) 0l1)
XMITVa
.LkVCL
ntp6r, &V8eX(LiVtV
v8(XopLiv7v &7r6cpMatv &VrLarpk,9?LV
ri
so A g
t
7ro?U' kvaeX6,Levov 7rep) o5 6 X6yoq. oi yo&p auXXoyLaoI
i76 TEXV
In APr.
7rpo0Px0OVrVTML Mt 7repl T6 4a ?7r1 rT6 7rOX6&V8X6.Levov gXouaLv. [Ammonius],
45.42-46.1 = Eudemus F13 Wehrli; cf. ib. 49.6-12 = F14W; Anon. In APr.

ap. Galenou Eisagoge, ed. Mynas, Paris, 1844, p. 100 = F15W; Scholia in Ar.
ed. Brandis, 150a3-10. See also Bochelski (1), 74.
These fragments are important: they demonstrate that Theophrastus and
Eudemus were concerned to create a modal calculus of contingency which could
be applied to the statements of the natural sciences (and this strongly suggests
that they thought Aristotle to have had the same concern, and hence that
Aristotle actually did have that concern); and they also shed interesting light
on the well known modifications which Theophrastus and Eudemus made to
Aristotle's modal syllogistic. For it is clear that their rejection of 'two-sided'
possibility, which is usually regarded as a purely logical move, was grounded
on extralogical considerations, in particular on the formal requirements of the
proposed interpretation of the calculus.
62 Becker, 82, reads the objection into APr. A 13, 32b13-18; but for a better
reading of this passage see Ross, 326-329.

135

To abandon this conviction would have been an excellent thing in itself; unfortunately, Aristotle seemns to have felt it desirable to keep
some modality on knowable propositions, and his revised view was
that propositions could only be known if they were prefixed by one
of the modal operators "necessarily" and "for the most part". This
view is as untenable as the other. The only obvious alternative open
to Aristotle if he was to escape the dilemma was to deny that what
was by nature was for the most part. He appears to have tried this
escape-route too; in two passages at least he plays with the view that
it is only our ignorance that makes us think that what happens by
nature happens for the most part - further research will always
enable us to replace our "for the most part" proposition by a necessary
proposition63. The point is an interesting one and deserves elaboration;
however, since Aristotle does not appear to have devoted much attention to it, I shall leave it as it stands.
The third answer to the Problem of Demonstration has led us to
some central difficulties in Aristotle's philosophy of science. How,
then, does the answer fare as an answer to the Problem? First, it is
worth noting that it is consistent with neither of the two routes by
which Aristotle tried to escape from his epistemological quandary:
if we take the first route and countenance non-necessary demonstrations, then the third answer would lead us to expect such non-necessary demonstrations in the treatises; and if we take the second route
and allow that what is by nature is by necessity, then the distinction
on which the third answer was based collapses. The third answer would
have either to find a third escape-route, or else to maintain that
Aristotle left the whole question in a state of confusion.
Secondly, while sciences cannot be more or less demonstrative, they
can be more or less rigorous: there are no such things as - the rigorous"
sciences to be equated with the demonstrative sciences - indeed,
even at the top of the rigour-scale Aristotle makes distinctions and
states that arithmetic is more rigorous than geometry. It is clear from
this that there can be no simple connexion between rigour and demonstration.
Thirdly, the third answer suggests that we ought to find demonstrations in Aristotle's mathematical treatises; yet the de Caelo,
which counts as mathematical in the broad sense, does not contain
demonstrations and none of Aristotle's shorter discussions of mathe63

APst. A 8, 75b33-36; B 16, 98b29-38; cf. Joachim, xxvii-xxviii.

136

matics and none of his many mathematical illustrations, examples and

analogies is marked out by being couched in demonstrative form.
Finally, nowhere in the Posterior Analytics does Aristotle as much as
hint that his theory of demonstration is intended only for the mathematical sciences. On the contrary, he strongly implies that he is talking
of scientific knowledge and the sciences in general64; and, as we have
seen, many of the examples he uses to illustrate points in the theory
are drawn from non-mathematical sciences.
The failure of these attempts to solve the Problem of Demonstration
gives rise to the suspicion that the problem cannot be solved: it simply
reflects an inconsistency in Aristotle's thoughts about scientific method.
Why is the inconsistency there? Perhaps it is yet another result of
Aristotle's schizophrenia, the rationalist disciple of Plato warring with
the empiricist doctor and biologist65. Perhaps it is to be explained by a
genetic hypothesis, the Analytics representing an early and outdated
phase of Aristotle's thought. Or was the theory of demonstration an
empty formal exercise66 or an admittedly inaccessible ideal67, worked
out in a moment of idleness or optimism? There is no particular reason
to accept any of these accounts: if the inconsistency is to be left unresolved, the most honest course is to reproach Aristotle for omitting
to describe his scientific method, and trying instead to fob us off with
the irrelevant theory of demonstration68.
III
However, pessimism such as this is premature; in this section I shall
present what I think to be the correct solution to the Problem of
Demonstration.
The Problem only arises if it is assumed that the theory presented
in the Posterior Analytics was intended by Aristotle to give an account
of the sort of activities which his treatises report. Although this
assumption has not often been expressed6", it is clear that without it
"6See Joachim, xxii n. 2. The only discordant text is APst. A 8, 75b24; but I
think that this can be explained away (cf. Met. Z 15, 1039b28; M 3, 1077b20-22).
6$ E.g. de Lacey, 4 cf. Zeller, 797-806.
66 E.g. During (3), 92.
67 E.g. Maier, 1.398; Grene, 58.
68 E.g. Lloyd, 413.
69 But see, e.g. Pacius,
269; Zabarella, 447-448; Solmsen (1), 250; Scholz, 271
n. 23; Grene, 69; Owens, 164.

137

no Problem arises: for if the Posterior A nalytics was never intended

to provide the theoretical substructure for Aristotle's scientific research, then there can be no question of inconsistency between the
research and the theory.
But the assumption is false: the theory of demonstrative science
was never meant to guide or formalise scientific research: it is concerned exclusively with the teaching of facts already won; it does not
describe how scientists do, or ought to, acquire knowledge: it offers a
formal model of how teachers should impart knowledge70.
I shall give four arguments in support of this contention.
(1) First, there is an argument from etymology. The word "Ci7o8etxlike the Latin ancestor of the English "demonstrate", originally
VuvoCL",
meant "show", "reveal". Aristotle plays on this sense when he writes:
"For he [sc. the definer]" will not like the demonstrator make it
clear from agreed premisses that necessarily if they are the case
something else is the case (for this is demonstration) . ."'
An &C7r68eLtL4
later came to be more than a mere showing; it is a making
public-in this sense it occurs in the first sentence of Herodotus' Histories:
"Herodotus of Halicarnassus herein publishes his enquiry..."72
followed by a clause
Opinions are made public, and "&7to8ExvuvaC"
in oratio obliqua and meaning "show that . . ." is common from the
mid-fifth century. This is the informal forebear of Aristotle's rigorous
and formalised expression.
An instructive passage from Xenophon's Memorabilia may round off
this brief account:
"What, Hippias", he [sc. Socrates] said, "haven't you noticed
that I never stop showing what I think to be just?" - "Then what's
your argument?" he said. - "I show it not by argument," he said,
"but by action . . . . 73
A variant on this view has been forcibly stated by Wieland, 20; 43; 53; 98;
216. But Wieland has not offered much by way of argument. For earlier hints,
see: Grote, 209; 573; Maier, 2.233; Solmsen, 241; Kapp (1), 1058.13; Kapp (2),
86; S. Mansion, 52 n. 51; 125; 168; Weil, 284; 303; Wilpert, 255; Randall, 33;
40-41; Allan, 140-141; von Fritz (3), 28; Owen, 164.
71 APst. B 7, 92a35-37; cf. Poet. 6, 1450a7; b 11; Top. I 10, 171b1-2. Teaching
and making clear or revealing are more or less identified by Plato, Crat. 428 D;
433 B etc.
70

72 Hdt.

1.1: 'HpoU6rou 'A,Lexapv1aaiNoq La-roptbn

Xen. Hell. 2.3.11.

73 Xen. Mem. 4.4.10: TE gi;

CX'Itrtar,

p, oix

07t68eCLt

A nice example

6tt &yc' a 8oxdt

a&0n,aaL

- xcxt 7totog 8'

etvoct oCfi9v 7rOcWoILu M7O'geKxvu'LcVo;
....
Et 86 ,u'o6ycp, gyn, a&X?'pyw ahro8elxvuF

138

B.

aOL, gn,

o6ro;

at

IoL &xcxum

6 ;k6yoq &atrv;

The play on words nicely illustrates the connexion between the revelation or making plain of a thing, and the showing that a thing is
the case; Hippias takes Socrates' words in the latter way when they
were meant in the former.
It is true that "'Tzo Lx-uvCv"is common in Plato74 in the sense of
"show that"; and Aristotle, who himself uses the word in this sense,75
may have had precisely this colourless usage in mind when choosing
a name for his new theory. However, it is legitimate to ask why
Aristotle chose this particular word: he did not borrow a word from
the domain of the mathematicians, he did not adopt any of the usual
words for research and discovery - he took hold of and sharpened to
technical precision a set of words whose associations were entirely
with the imparting and publishing of knowledge and not at all with
its search and discovery. This at least suggests that he was concerned
with imparting rather than with acquiring knowledge.
(2) The opening words of the Posterior Analytics set the scene for
the theory of demonstration:
"All teaching and all learning that is based on reason comes from
pre-existing knowledge." 76
This is clear: on stage are a teacher and a pupil, to whom he imparts
knowledge in a formal manner ("based on reason" - Aristotle means
to rule out acquisition of skills, like a young bird's learning to fly
or a child's learning to talk). That this is the scene is confirmed
by the next few sentences. Aristotle explains that both syllogistic
and inductive arguments "make the teaching" through precognised
facts. These arguments are then contrasted with rhetorical arguments,
whose function is to persuade.77 The phrase" make the teaching"
and the contrast between the end of demonstration and that of rhetoric serve to underscore the impression left by the first sentence of
the book.
The reference to teaching at the beginning of the book is not isolated.
The different kinds of proposition which can occur in demonstrations
are defined in terms of the learner's relation to them: a 'thesis' is a
principle which cannot be proved but which the person who is about

74 E.g. Phdo. 77AD (five occurrences); Rep. 472D; Gorg. 454A; Phdr. 245B;
Legg. 887 A.
75 See above, n. 18.
76 APst. A 1, 71al-2; cf. Top. Z 4, 141a26-31; Met. A 9, 992b30-32.
7 APst. A 1, 71a6-9:
...
TrV MLOCaaxaCM(
noLouvTaL
. . .

139

to learn need not already possess; an axiom, by contrast, is a principle

which anyone who is going to learn anything must already possess78.
Later, a 'hypothesis' is distinguished from a postulate solely by the
fact that the former states what seems to be the case to the learner,
while the latter is "the contrary of the learner's opinion".79
There are also three passages from outside the Analytics which deserve quoting.
(i) The first of these is the most considerable:
"There are four kinds of conversational argument: pedagogic
and dialectic and peirastic and eristic . . . About the apodeictic
arguments we have spoken in the Analytics; about the dialectic
and peirastic we have spoken elsewhere [i.e. in the earlier parts
of the Topics]: let us now speak about the agonistic and eristic
arguments".80
Here Aristotle explicitly calls the demonstrative arguments which he
has discussed in the PosteriorAnalytics pedagogicarguments.
(ii) The second reason why rhetoric is useful is said by Aristotle to be
this:
"Again, there are some whom, even if we have the most rigorous
knowledge, it is not easy to persuade by speaking from this
knowledge: for argument in accordance with knowledge is teaching, and this is impossible . "81
An argument in accordance with knowledge cannot persuade some
people because they are impervious to instruction; by "an argument
in accordance with knowledge" Aristotle must mean a demonstrative
argument (for rhetoric is being defended against the charge that
demonstrative argument can do all that it can do, and do it better):
and thus this passage too equates demonstrative arguments with
pedagogic arguments.
(iii) In the NicomacheanEthics Aristotle says:
"Neither there [in the case of mathematics] does the argument
teach the principles, nor here [in the case of ethics], but virtue
either natural or ingrained by habit governs right thinking about
the principle".82
A Psi. A 2, 72a15-17; cf. Met. r 3, 1005b5; 15-17.
A Pst. A 10, 76b23-34.
80 Top. I 2, 165a38-bll:
X6yoLLat8cxx?txoE (a39) are the same as
xo( (b9); cf. H 11, 161a25; see Wieland, 227.
81 Rhet. A 1, 1355 a24-27.
Is EN. H 8, 1151 a17-19.
78

79

140

X6yoL i&7O8LXTL-

In asserting that argument does not teach the principles, Aristotle

implies that it does teach the theorems deduced from the principles.
Here again, teaching is the properfunction of demonstrative argument.
Before leaving this point let us note how important the subject of
teaching was in Aristotle's eyes - indeed, "we exist for the sake of
understandingand learning".83The ability to teach what he knows is a
mark of the wise man,84and every 'art' is necessarily capable of teaching about its subject-matter85. There were also notorious paradoxes
concerning the pedagogue's art88.
(3) We have just seen that demonstrations occur in the context of
formal instruction. Such instruction is one, and the most important,
type of conversation or dialogue: and although demonstration is in
places sharply distinguished from dialectic proper87,it is also, as we
have seen, called one of the four types of dialogue-argument. The
connexion between demonstration and conversational argument
-

dialectic in the wide and non-technical sense - provides another

link between demonstration and teaching88.

The evidence for this link is difficult to assess. On the one hand,
we find texts such as these: "The demonstrative premiss is an assumption of one half of a contradictory pair (for the demonstrator
does not question - he assumes)"; "It is not possible for the demonstrator to question because the same thing is not provable from
contradictories"; "Teaching is different from conversing and... it
is necessary for the teacher not to question but himself to make
things clear, and for the conversationalist to question".89 Demonstration does not proceed by question and answer: for if the teacher
did ask questions, he might get the wrong answer, and then he could
not demonstrate his point since nothing can be proved from a false
premiss.
Protr. frag. 11 Ross = B17 During.
Met. A 2, 982 a 12-14; 28-30.
86 Rhet. A 2, 1355b25-29.
86 E.g. that posed at Euthyd. 275D-277C - cf. Top. I 4, 165b30-34; a more
Aristotelian puzzle: Phys. F 3, 202 a31-b 22.
87 See Top. I 10, 171bl; cf. Solmsen (3), 53. But for demonstration as a type of
dialectic argument see Top. 1 2, 165a38; APst. A 12, 77b9-14; also Met. K 6,
1063blO.
88 On the connexion between syllogistic in general and conversational argument
see Kapp (1) and (2).
89 APr. A 1, 24a23-25; APst. A 11, 77a33-34; Top. I 10, 171bl-2 (cf. 11, 172a
15-20).
88

84

141

It is disconcerting to find, side by side with these categorical statements, untroubled references to demonstrative questions: the greater
part of Posterior Analytics A 12 is devoted to certain problems which
demonstrative questions raise, and there is a briefer note on questions
in A 690. These references cannot be explained away. In A 6, Aristotle
contrasts demonstrative questions with "questions about what is by
accident"; he clearly means the word "question" to have its literal
sense in this phrase, and therefore it must also bear its literal sense
in the phrase "demonstrative question". As to A 12, Aristotle displays
an example of a demonstrative question in the text: it reads "Is
every circle a figure?". Moreover, the chapter is rich in the technical
vocabulary of dialectic9l.
If we cannot brush aside the references to demonstrative questions,
we cannot embrace them wholeheartedly either; there is a flat contradiction in the text. I am inclined to think that the passages referring
to questions represent fragments of an early lecture-course, surviving
by oversight or other mischance into the final version of the Posterior
Analytics. But however that may be, A 6 and 12 clearly show the close
dependence of the theory of demonstration on the formalised questionanswer conversation. We must imagine that the pedagogic Moot,
no less than the agonistic or the peirastic, was a feature of life in the
Academy92. If we want an informal precursor of such formal sessions,
we may look to Socrates' instruction of the slave in the Meno. Aristotle's polished theory of demonstration eventually refined the formal
teaching still further in that it did away with answers (and hence with
questions) altogether; but its origins are to be found in pedagogic
conversation.
(4) The fourth argument starts from the notion of induction. Induction is mentioned in company with demonstration in more than
one context; in general, Aristotle believed that "we learn either by
90 APst. A 12, 77a36-b39; A 6, 75a22-27.
91

Apart from "&porFiv" etc. there occur: IVTdepCamL,a&roxplveaOoct,8tLcXiyeCa0L,

lva-ocat, X6yov TniXeLv, np6,rmcLr.- Syllogistic, originally at least, was

8topEiLv,

is a sort of question: Top. A 4, 101 b 27-36;

a branch of erotetic logic; a 7rp6TxaLq
0 2, 158a14-24. This is still clearly visible in the APr.: 24a25; 27; bi; 42a39;
47a16; 18; 21; 64a36; 66a26; 37; 39.
- Two further indications of the conversational nature of i&76UcLEL: demonstrative WTpopXTXmrm,APst. B 14-15;

A 31, 88a12 (cf. Top. A 11, 104bl-17);

hearer: A 24, 85b22 (cf. Met. F 3, 1005b5).

92On Moots, see Ryle.
93 APst. A 18, 81a40; cf. EN. Z 3, 1139b26-28. See Patzig, 132.

142

and a

induction or by demonstration" 3. Now induction is closely connected

with teaching; indeed, according to Ross the technical use of the word
derives from its non-technical meaning of "lead on", so
iStIyILV"
that "the root idea involved in Aristotle's usage of the words ?C'&yeLV
and e7rxywy' is ... that of leading someone from one truth to another"94
- of teaching. More solid evidence for the connexion can be found in
the Posterior Analytics where Aristotle speaks of induction and the
inducer "making things known" and "revealing" things to his associates95. Thus demonstration and induction are paired together with
regard to their function; the function of induction is to instruct:
therefore the function of demonstration is to instruct.
This conclusion is confirmed by a passage from Posterior Analytics
B 5: Aristotle states that division (a) "is not a (demonstrative)
syllogism" and yet (b) imparts knowledge. This sounds, apparently,
somewhat paradoxical, so he adds a parallel: "the inducer (a) does not
demonstrate and yet (b) he reveals something" 96. The first statement
could not seem paradoxical except on the supposition that demonstrative syllogisms provide the primary means of imparting knowledge,
and the second statement confirms that this was Aristotle's supposition.
These four arguments show that the theory of demonstration is a
formalisation of didactic conversation in j ust the same way as syllogistic in general is a formalisation of conversational argument in
general. However, they do not show that the theory was not also
intended to guide the working scientist in his researches. We must
now ask what evidence there is for a connexion between demonstration
and research.
At first sight there seems to be evidence in abundance: words for
hunting and finding, studying and searching, occur in swarms in the
Analytics. However, a closer inspection takes the sting from them.
The words fall into four groups: (1) &i'pa: the hunting metaphor is
familiar from Plato; it makes four appearances in the Analytics97.
Ross, 47; cf. 481-5; and see Kapp (2), 75-87.
APst. A 18, 81b2-6 (at b 3 read "Ta-n" for "gatx") - see A 3, 72b29 and Ross,
566 - and B 5, 91 b32-35.
"6 APst. B 5, 91b32-35: &O& auXoytat6q 6pLq oux gaL,
?X\' et?p,
&XXov
9'

96

'rp6nov yvwplaLV 7roLEL.xod 'ro5'ro 0?kv o&v

8CeXVuaLV, O'XX'

.u,

8-Xoz

ov
&'o7rov-

yap 6 &&ysv

t:a&s M7ro-

mt

97 APr. A 30, 46all; APst. A 14, 79a24-25; A 31, 88a3; B 13, 96a22; cf. Bonitz,
Index, 330b25-30.

143

In only one case is there any suspicion that demonstration is the

hunter's weapon:
"Secondly, it is possible to hunt knowledge of the essence through
this [sc. the first figure] alone"98.
This passage must be considered along with one from the second group.
(2) x64L4. There are only two cases in the Posterior Analytics.
One is about consideration of particulars and so is irrelevant. The other
occurs just before the last passage quoted:
"The mathematical sciences carry out their demonstrations
through this figure, e.g. arithmetic, geometry, optics - and in
general those sciences which make enquiry (ax4Lv) about the
cause" .
All Aristotle is asserting here is that those sciences which consider
causes also use first figure demonstrations. It seems reasonable to
read the O'pozpassage in the same way: when Aristotle says that knowledge of essence is hunted through the first figure, he is using a brachylogy; what he means is that sciences which hunt essences also use first
figure syllogisms.
(3) E'upeaL4. I have noticed three occurrences of the word; none is
concerned with demonstration.'00
(4) Zi-InraL. This is by far the most frequent of the words suggesting
research rather than teaching - there are about 25 occurrences in the
Posterior Analytics, all but four'0' of which are to be found in the compass of three chapters, B 1, B 2, and B 8. One quotation is enough
to deal with all these occurrences:
". . . in all our searches we seek either if there is a middle or what
the middle is".102
It is clear from this that demonstrations cannot be the instrument
of our search, for what we are seeking is the material from which
demonstrations may be constructed.
Chapters B 1 and B 2 yield two further points. First, they are clearly
*8 APst. A 14, 79a24-25:

?(&tLv &k a,flL,V

?trm rt-v roU 'Ti

8t& [6vou o6rouOUqpe5amL

8uvcx.r6v.
9" APst. A 14, 79a18-21 (cf. APr. A 13, 32b20). The other passage is APst.
A 13, 79a6.
100 APst. B 1, 89b27; B 2, 89b36; B 8, 93a35.
101 APst. A 24, 85b28; B 10, 93b32; 13, 97b7; 17; 99a30. - These passages
contain no relevant difficulties.
102 APst. B 2, 90a5-6: au,u(meW &pox&v&%&aLoc
47Xre1v i Et lart
atq arwxa?aL
aov.
[k
&a-rLt6
s
w
,kaov

144

comparable to A 27-31 of the Prior Analytics: in B 1-2 Aristotle tells

how to go about constructing a demonstration, in A 27-31 he gives
more general advice on the construction of syllogisms. The comparison
shows once again the dialectical background to demonstration - B 1
and 2 contain, as it were, directions to the pedagogue on how to construct his lessons. Secondly, in B 1-2 Aristotle plainly implies that our
searches must precede demonstration; he states as much at APr. A 30,
46a 17-27. This strongly implies that demonstrationscannot themselves
be used as instruments of research.
An examination of the numerous references to research and discovery in the Posterior Analytics'03does not support the view that
demonstration was ever intended to be a research-technique;indeed,
the reverse is implied by the most important of these references.
To end this section, I shall consider shortly three diverse objections
to the thesis that the theory of demonstrationhas a pedagogicpurpose.
First, it might be argued that the thesis merely displaces the
Problem of Demonstration: Aristotle's treatises are reports of his
lectures or lessons, and lessons ought, according to the thesis, to be
given by means of demonstrative argument: but there are no demonstrative arguments in the treatises and so the thesis does not answer
the Problem. However, this objection is not a strong one: those of
Aristotle's treatises which could plausibly be called "lessons" are in
the form of lecture-notes (notes more or less fully written out in
advance by the lecturer and perhaps in some cases notes taken by
some member of his audience); and they bear all the marks of constant
revision. From this it is plain that Aristotle did not intend his treatises
to be pieces of formal instruction: they are progress-reports,not textbooks, and as such they need not - indeed cannot - have pedagogic

form: a series of demonstrations is appropriate to the setting out of

knowledge securely achieved; it is inappropriate to the sharing of
tentative philosophical or scientific explorations.
The second objection is this: although demonstration must follow
the collection of facts, may it not through its function of arranging
those facts, be the means of acquiring a new and important type of
knowledge - knowledge of causal links? Thus while the scientist discovers the facts, the demonstrator explains them and thereby makes
a vital contribution to knowledge. I think that this view has been
widely held; but it is clearly mistaken: if we are given two syllogisms
103 The status of i768ettLq vis-a-vis

NTjat in de An. A 1, 402al1-22 is less clear.

145

one of which, in Aristotelian parlance, is of 'the that' and the other of

'the wherefore', we shall not be able to read off from the premisses
and conclusions which is which - to decide which syllogism is causal
we need information which the syllogisms themselves cannot provide'04.
Aristotle never indicates how this causal information is to be acquired;
but since, as we have seen, he plainly distinguishes searching for the
right middle term for a causal syllogism (i.e. searching for the cause)
from demonstrating a conclusion through the middle term, he must
have been aware that the information could not come from the
demonstration itself.
The third objection turns on an old puzzle: if demonstration is to
impart knowledge, then syllogisms must be able to yield new knowledge
- but just this question, Can a syllogism increase our knowledge?
has been the cause of bitter philosophical controversy.105
However, this objection can be turned to our advantage. For
suppose that we are teaching a pupil by demonstrative means;
we assume that he has grasped the relevant logical laws and we tell
him a pair of propositions which are to serve as premisses; we then
draw the conclusion. The question is: Has the pupil acquired any
new knowledge by our taking this last step? It is hard to see the importance of the question: the point surely is that the pupil does know
the fact expressed by the conclusion - the precise moment at which
he came to know it is of no pedagogic interest. Indeed, if it were the
case that, in some sense at least, the pupil knew the conclusion before
it was enunciated, that would be all to the good; the task of teaching
might be simplified.
Contrast the case of the working scientist. He wants to discover
whether or not a certain proposition is true, and he constructs two
propositions which are true and from which the proposition in question
follows syllogistically. Here the question whether the syllogism can
yield new knowledge does at least seem to be pertinent: for if anyone who knows the premisses and the syllogistic laws must also know
the conclusion, it seems to follow that the premisses cannot provide
the scientist with the independent evidence for the truth of the conclusion which he is looking for. Considerations of this sort have led
philosophers to say that scientific argument is typically non-deductive.
This comes out clearly if we look at Aristotle's two syllogisms about the
non-twinkling of the planets, APst. A 13, 78a28-b4.
105 E.g. Kapp (1), 1053-1055.

104

146

This is not, of course, intended as an answer to the problem of

syllogistic discovery (which is not as silly a problem as has sometimes
been supposed). The point is merely that, rather than constituting
an objection to the thesis I have been advocating, the existence of
this problem might be a slight argument in its favour: for, granted
that the demonstrative syllogism is designed for teacher-pupil situations, the problem simply does not arise.

IV
In developing the theory of demonstration and in constructing his
notion of a demonstrative science, Aristotle was not telling the scientist how to conduct his research; he was giving the pedagogue advice
on the most efficient and economic method of bettering his charges.
The theory of demonstration offers a formal account of how an
achieved body of knowledge should be presented and taught. The
presupposition of the theory, that such bodies of knowledge exist,
seems to us to be optimistic to the point of fatuity; Roger Bacon put
it briefly: "Aristotle's successors corrected him on certain matters
and added much to his works - and much will continue to be added
till the end of the world"106. But in this respect Aristotle was an
optimist; he thought that he was at the end of the world and he believed that the majority of the sciences were complete or nearly
completel07 (in fact his own methods of research were influenced
by this belief). Hence the question of how best to impart this vast
and perfect body of knowledge was a pressing one; the theory of
demonstration might soon be put into practice.
Is Aristotle's answer to this question of any interest? It has at least
a certain elegance. Aristotle might have set his demonstrative sciences
out in a table like this: Si: alo - all - . . .IF alml
S2: a20 F a2l F ...

S,,: a,,o F a,,,

F
**

F a2m2

anmn

Each Si is an independent science consisting of the string of propositions a1o. . . almi. Its axioms are represented by the first member of
Quoted in During (1), 261, T8.
Some texts: Top. I 34, 183a37-184b8; Pol. B 5, 1264al-5; de Phil. frag. 8
Ross; Protr. fragg. 5; 8 Ross. Comments, esp. on the Academic background,
in Gaiser, 218-276 and notes. The question needs more discussion than can be
given it here.

106

107

147

the string, and each subsequent member follows from its predecessor
in accordance with the rules of syllogistic inference. There are n
sciences, and the totality of knowablefacts is n + ml + m2 + .. + mn
The sum of attainable knowledgecan be set out neatly on a blackboard.
Since each science contains only a finite number of propositions'08,
the blackboard need not even be of infinite extension.
The neatness of the system is spoilt by the fact that its rules of
inference are syllogistic: for each aj, if it is to entail its successor,
must be of the form "A x B, B x C" (where "x" ranges over "a", "e",
"i" and "o" and their converses); and if it is to be entailed by its predecessor, it must be of the form "A x C".Since no propositioncan have
both these forms, the aij's cannot both be entailed by their predecessors and entail their successors.
Aristotle seems to have been aware of this infelicity. In chapter A 25
of the Prior Analytics he discusses chains of syllogisms; and although
he does not relate his discussion to the problems of demonstrative
science, there are some indications that demonstration was not very
far from his mind109.
Aristotle considers, in effect,110two different ways of constructing
chains of syllogisms. The first way is explained at 42 a 1-5, and exemplified at 42a6-31: suppose that we have five propositions (each, of
course, of the form "A x B"), A, B, C, D, and E; then we can arrange
these in an inferencechain, thus:
C, D - B; A, B F E.
Other possible arrangements are noted, but it is interesting that
Aristotle does not consider the possibility of adding two more propositions, F and G, and thus providing A as well as B with a 'prosyllogism'. If chains of this sort are extended so as to include all the
propositions of a science, the result will look like this:
Si: ail,

a12

F a13;

ai3,

a14

F a15;

. . .; ain-2,

ain-1 F ain.

As each conclusion is reached a new axiom is conjoined with it and

the pair of propositions thus formed gives rise in turn to a new conclusion. It is clear that the number of theorems (derived conclusions)
108

This is implied by the argument of APst. A 19-23; but cf. A 32, 88b 6 and 1(0.

10* See 41b36 and 42a31; more importantly, what Aristotle says here about

inference-chains only holds good if the syllogisms of the chains are all in Barbara,
the demonstrative mood par excellence.
110The aims of the chapter are more complex than this suggests; but these
complexities do not affect the question under consideration.

148

in such a science will be just one less that the number of its axioms."1
(If the conjoined propositions are not axioms but theorems already
proved

the possibility which Aristotle does not envisage - the case

is essentially similar: the theorems will again outnumber the axioms

by one, although the axioms will have to be set out at the start of the
inference-chain and not added as the chain grows.)
The second type of chain is described at 42b5-26. Here we start
with an ordered set of connected'12propositions; that is to say, with
a sequence of propositions of the form "A x B" so arranged that the
second term of each proposition is identical with the first term of its
successor, if it has a successor, and with no other term of the sequence.
It follows from this ordering that the propositions of the sequence
are syllogistically independent: no member of the set is derivable
from any combination of the other membersof the set. Let the members
of this set, the initial set, be numbered 1, 2,

. . .,

n. Then conclusions

are derived as follows: first, each proposition i (wherei < n) is combined with its successor and a conclusion is drawn from each combination.
The set of these conclusions, the second-orderset, will contain propositions 1/2, 2/3, . . ., n-i/n. Each member i/j of the second-order set

is combined with every other member of the second-orderset and with

every member of the initial set; the conclusions, if any, drawn from
these combinations form a third-order set whose members can be
numbered i//j/k, j/k//h/l, etc.. A correspondingoperation is performed
on the third-order set, and the process is repeated until no higher
ordersets can be generated.Repeated propositionsare then eliminated.
The workings of such a system are best seen from an example:
I
1
2
3
4

AaB
BaC
CaD
DaE

II

III

1/2 AaC
2/3 BaD
3/4 CaE

1//2/3
2//3/4
1/2//3
2/3//4
1/2//3/4

IV
AaD
BaE
AaD
BaE
AaE

1///2//3/4
1///2/3//4
1//2/3///4
1/2//3///4

AaE
AaE
AaE
AaE

IL1 At APr. A 25, 42b4, Aristotle says that the conclusions are half as many
as the premisses; that is, when a proposition occurs twice in the chain he
counts it twice, once as a conclusion and once as a premiss. At APst. A 32,
88b334, he says that "the principles are not much fewer than the conclusions".
If, as seems likely, he has this sort of chain in mind, then his remark is just a slip.
I Aristotle's word is "auvexi" (42b6); its opposite is "&aXUvtouX="(42a21);
see Bonitz, Index, 117b33-35; 723a60-61.

149

Here the initial set has four members and there are six non-redundant
conclusions. If this type of chain were applied to a science, the initial
set would be the set of axioms for the science and the non-redundant
conclusions would be the derived theorems of the science. The number
of theorems is a function of the number of axioms: if there are n
axioms there are in(n - 1) theorems.
Aristotle did not notice this - or any other - property of such
systems. He says that "the conclusions are much more numerous
both than the terms and than the premisses". This is true when there
are five or more premisses; and as most sciences might be expected
to have more than five premisses, it might seem that this type of
inference chain would be more economical than the first type in the
sense that it would yield more theorems per axiom; and so Aristotle
might have done best to prefer the second to the first type as a pattern
for the sciences. Ross thinks that he did this; at all events he believes
that the first sort is merely an aberration on Aristotle's part113.
However, although Aristotle never debates the rival merits of the
two types of chain, where in the Posterior Analytics he talks about
chains of inferences the process of contintually conjoining new axioms
to already won conclusions seems usually to be in his mind114. Moreover, only this type of chain preserves the linear movement from theorem to theorem which is such an obvious and desirable feature of the
first unsatisfactory table of the demonstrative sciences.
Even if Aristotle had consciously adopted one of the patterns we
have just been considering, his notion of a demonstrative science
would have been far from perspicuous in all its details. There remain
many difficulties and curiosities in the theory which have not been
touched upon here; and some of these difficulties are far graver than
Aristotle ever realised. Above all, the theory suffers by having its
inferences restricted to syllogisms. It would be absurd to praise the
Posterior Analytics as a model for scientists or for the teachers of science.
Nevertheless, Aristotle's theory deserves admiration and not contempt:
it was the first, and for many centuries the only, attempt to develop
the notion of an axiomatised deductive system, and as such it deserves
at least the historian's attention; and incidentally it contains and
11

Ross, 603.
11"See esp. APst. A 12, 78a14-21, where Aristotle states baldly that the sciences
increase by this method and gives no hint of any alternative types of chain.
Cf. A 10, 76blO (cf. Top. A 1, 100a28-29; Rhet. A 2, 1357a7-9); A 19-23; B 15;
18; APr. B 5, 58a15-20; 19, 66a38-bl; 21, 66b26-30; 25, 69a29-33.

150

suggests a number of epistemological propositions which still engage

the interest of the philosopher. If it is realised that the theory was
never intended as an essay in scientific methodology, these substantial
merits can be the better appreciated and the PosteriorAnalytics need
no longer be dismissed as an unfortunate reconnaissanceof one of the
more barren fields of scholasticism.
OrielCollege,Oxford
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