You are on page 1of 21

G.R. No.

164687
2009

February 12,

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC v


ANGELA V. MADAYAG,
FACTS:
On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V.
Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)
of
Urdaneta,
Pangasinan
an
application for registration of a parcel
of land with an area of 1,492 square
meters located in Barangay Anonas,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached to the
application was a tracing cloth of Survey
Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land
Management
Services
(LMS)
of
the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando
City.

Meanwhile, petitioner formally filed with the


DENR a petitionfor cancellation of the
survey plan sometime in March 2002/
On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 in the
land registration case, alleging that the
court should await the DENR resolution of
the petition for the cancellation of the
survey plan "as the administrative case is
prejudicial to the determination" of the
land registration case.
RTC granted the motion.
Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the
mandatory requirements in land registration
proceedings, the RTC agreed with the
petitioner that the cancellation of the
survey plan would be prejudicial to the
petition for land registration.9

On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime


Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Chief, Regional Survey Division, DENR,
Region I, demanding the cancellation of
the respondents survey plan because
the lot encroached on the properties it
recently purchased from several lot owners
and that, despite being the new owner of
the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the
survey conducted on June 8, 2001.

ISSUE:

On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its


formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it
had recently bought seven parcels of land in
Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as
Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in ConsolidationSubdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329,
approved
by
the
Land
Registration
Commission on August 26, 1976, and
previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on
December 29, 1970. These parcels of land
are covered by separate certificates of title,
some of which are already in the name of
the petitioner while the others are still in the
name of the previous owners.

The fundamental purpose of the Land


Registration Law (Presidential Decree
No. 1529) is to finally settle title to real
property in order to preempt any
question on the legality of the title
except claims that were noted on the
certificate itself at the time of
registration
or
those
that
arose
subsequent
thereto.
Consequently,
once the title is registered under the
said law, owners can rest secure on
their ownership and possession.

WoN the suspension of the proceedings in


the land registration case is legal and proper
pending the determination and resolution of
the administrative case before the DENR
HELD:
No.

Without delving into the jurisdiction of the


DENR
to
resolve
the
petition
for
cancellation, we hold that, as an incident

to its authority to settle all questions


over the title of the subject property,
the land registration court may resolve
the underlying issue of whether the
subject
property
overlaps
the
petitioners
properties
without
necessarily having to declare the
survey plan as void.

> The 2nd case is a petition for letters of


adiministration over the intestate estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban. This
involves a prayer to be declared as
administrator. This case eventually ended in
the same manner as the first case - the
Titulo de Prorpriedad was declared void and
of no legal force, therefore the lands
covered by the Titulo are not within the
estate of the deceased.

It is well to note at this point that, in its bid


to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote
the
expeditious
resolution
of
cases,
Presidential
Decree
(P.D.)
No.
1529
eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and
the latters limited jurisdiction when acting
merely as a land registration court. Land
registration courts, as such, can now
hear and decide even controversial and
contentious cases, as well as those
involving substantial issues. When the
law confers jurisdiction upon a court,
the latter is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction to make it effective. It may,
therefore, hear and determine all questions
that arise from a petition for registration.

> Issue: W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is


null and void and therefore the lands
covered or claimed under such title are not
included in the estate of the deceased...
HELD:
> YES. The Titulo is null and void. It has
been defeated by the title of the defendants
under the Torrens system.
> It is settled that by virtue of PD no 892
which took effect on Feb 16 1976 the syte of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law was abolished and all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should cause their
lands covered thereby to be registered
under the Land Registration Act within 6mos
from date of effectivity of the said decree.
> Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title)
with the said decree should have been
presented during trial.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARIANO


SAN PEDRO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
> This is a claim of a huge parcel of land
covering lands in the provinces Nueva ecija,
Bulacan, and in cities including Quezon city.
> This case involves 2 cases, which prior to
being decided by the SC were consolidated.
The first case was a complaint for recovery
of possession and damages against
Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In the
complaint, it was alleged that the
defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz) were able
to secure from the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City titles to a portions of the
claimed estate. In the end, the lower courts
ruled in favor of Ocampo - Dela Cruz,
declaring
that the Torrens titles of the defendants
cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish
title, Titulo Propriedad no. 4316.

FUDOT v CATTLEYA LAND


FACTS: On 1992, Cattleya Land (Respondent)
intended to buy the parcels of land owned by
Spouses Tecson. However, only 6 out of 9 lots
were annotated since 3 of those are subject to
attachment.
On 1995, Fudot (Petitioner) presented for
registration before the Register of Deeds the
owners copy of the title of the subject
property, together with the deed of sale
purportedly executed by the Tecsons in favor
of
petitioner
on 19
December
1986. Respondent opposed the petitioners

application but the ROD had already registered


the Deed of Sale in favor of Fudot.
Respondent filed its Complaint for Quieting Of
Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation
Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Tagbilaran City.
Asuncion filed
a
complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she
never signed any deed of sale covering any
part of their conjugal property in favor of
petitioner and that her husband had an
amorous relationship with the petitioner.
On 31 October 2001, the trial court
rendered its decision:] (i) quieting the title or
ownership of the subject land in favor of
respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale
between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid;
(iii) ordering the registration of the subject land
in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing
respondents claim for damages against the
Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence;
(v) dismissing Asuncions claim for damages
against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and
(vi) dismissing petitioners counterclaim for
lack of the required preponderance of
evidence.
According to the trial court, respondent
had recorded in good faith the deed of sale in
its favor ahead of petitioner. Moreover, based
on Asuncions convincing and unrebutted
testimony, the trial court concluded that the
purported signature of Asuncion in the deed of
sale in favor of petitioner was forged,
thereby rendering the sale void.
ISSUE: IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF
REGISTERED LANDS, AS BY SALE, WHICH
LAW SHALL GOVERN, ARTICLE 1544 OF
CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS
SYSTEM?
HELD: In the first place, there is no double
sale to speak of. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code,
which provides the rule on double sale, applies
only to a situation where the same property is
validly sold to different vendees. In this case,
there is only one sale to advert to, that
between the spouses Tecson and respondent.
The act of registration does not validate
petitioners
otherwise
void
contract.

Registration is a mere ministerial act by which


a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be
inscribed in the records of the Office of the
Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of
the certificate of title covering the land subject
of the deed, contract, or instrument. While it
operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or
instrument to others, it does not add to its
validity nor converts an invalid instrument into
a valid one as between the parties, nor
amounts to a declaration by the state that the
instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in
the land. The registration of petitioners void
deed is not an impediment to a declaration by
the courts of its invalidity.
Justice Jose Vitug, who explained that the
registration contemplated under Art. 1544
has been held to refer to registration under
P.D. No. 1529, thus:
The
registration
contemplated under Art.
1544 has been held to refer
to registration under Act
496 Land Registration Act
(now
PD
1529) which
considers the act of registration
as the operative act that binds
the land (see Mediante v.
Rosabal,
1
O.G.
[12]
900, Garcia v. Rosabal, 73 Phil
694). On lands covered by the
Torrens System, the purchaser
acquires
such
rights
and
interest as they appear in the
certificate of title, unaffected
by
any
prior
lien
or
encumbrance
not
noted
therein. The purchaser is not
required to explore farther than
what the Torrens title, upon its
face,
indicates.
The
only
exception
is
where
the
purchaser
has
actual
knowledge of a flaw or defect in
the title of the seller or of such
liens or encumbrances which,
as to him, is equivalent to
registration
Fudot vs. Cattleya Land Inc. (533 SCRA
351)
Knowledge gained by first buyer of second

sale cannot defeat first buyers rights,


except where the second buyer registers in
good faith the second sale ahead of the
first. It is essential to merit the protection of
Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code, that the
second realty buyer must act in good faith
in registering his deed of sale.
HEIRS OF PABAUS v YUTIAMCO- later
KRIVENKO VS REGISTER OF DEEDS, GR
NO. L-630, NOVEMBER 15, 1947; 79
PHIL 461
(Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified
from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and


its registration was denied by the Register
of Deeds on the ground that being an alien,
he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.
When the former brought the case to the
CFI,
the
court
rendered
judgement
sustaining the refusal of the Register of
Deeds.

Issue: WON an alien may own private lands


in the Philippines.

Held. No. Public agricultural lands


mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935
Constitution, include residential, commercial
and industrial lands, the Court stated:
Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited
to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be
defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves

who may alienate their agricultural lands in


favor of aliens.
Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural lands will be transferred
or
assigned
except
to
individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.

CAMILLO
F.
BORROMEO,
vs.
ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR ,G.R. No.
159310 February 24, 2009
FACTS:
Wilhelm
Jambrich,
an
Austrian,
met
respondent
Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar.
They fell in love and lived together. They
bought a house and lot and an Absolute
Deed of Sale was issued in their names.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale
was presented for registration, it was
refused on the ground that Jambrich was an
alien and could not acquire alienable lands
of the public domain. Consequently, his
name was erased but his signature
remained and the property was issued on
the name of the Respondent alone. However
their relationship did not last long and they
found
new
love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was
engaged in business. Jambrich was indebted
to the petitioner for a sum of money and to
pay his debt, he sold some of his properties
to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor.
However, when the Petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment it found out
that said land was registered in the name of
Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint
against respondent for recovery of real
property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to
the properties in question and may not
transfer and assign any rights and interest
in
favor
of
the
petitioner
2. Whether or not the registration of the
properties in the name of respondents make
him
the
owner
thereof
HELD:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as
between respondent and Jambrich, it was
Jambrich who possesses the financial
capacity to acquire the properties in
dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties, Jamrich was the source of funds
used to purchase the three parcels of land,
and to construct the house. Jambrich was

the owner of the properties in question, but


his name was deleted in the Deed of
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.
Nevertheless, his signature remained in the
deed of sale where he signed as a buyer.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer
all his rights, interest and participation over
the subject properties to petitioner by virtue
of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the
fact that the disputed properties were
acquired during the couples cohabitation
does not help the respondent. The rule of
co-ownership applies to a man and a
woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, but otherwise capacitated to
marry each other does not apply. At the
case at bar, respondent was still legally
married to another when she and Jambrich
lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship and no co-ownership exists
between the parties. It is necessary for each
of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in
order to able to lay claim to any portion of
it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a
means of confirming the existence with
notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the
true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely
make her the owner.
G.R. No. 155051
May 29, 2007
RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
LINGAYEN- DAGUPAN, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the
Decision2 dated 15 October 2001 and the
Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478.

The Facts
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot
736), is located in the Poblacion of
Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total
area of about 1,300 square meters and is
part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739
also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is
known as Imeldas Park, while on Lot 739 is
a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is
bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II5201-A and on the south by the national
road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of
Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary)
which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3
on the north, is titled in the name of
respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Lingayen
(respondent)
under
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An
annotation on TCT 6375 states that the
ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both
respondent
and
the
Municipality
of
Binmaley.
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered
the construction of the fence separating Lot
736 from the national road to prevent
the caretelas from parking because the
smell of horse manure was already
bothering the priests living in the
seminary.3 The concrete fence enclosing Lot
736 has openings in the east, west, and
center and has no gate. People can pass
through Lot 736 at any time of the day.4
On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and
approved
Resolution
Nos.
1045 and
6
105. Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736
from an institutional lot to a commercial lot.
Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal
mayor to enter into a contract of lease for
25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a
portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252
square meters.7

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director


of the seminary, discovered that a sawali
fence was being constructed enclosing a
portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the
Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando
Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the
seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor
Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the
construction of the building for the Rural
Bank of Anda should be stopped.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested
Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali
fence and restore the concrete fence. On 20
May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed
respondent that the construction of the
building of the Rural Bank of Anda would
resume but that he was willing to discuss
with respondent to resolve the problem
concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a
complaint
for
Abatement
of
Illegal
Constructions, Injunction and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24
August 1998, the trial court ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Lingayen-Dagupan]:
1. Making the writ of preliminary
injunction permanent;
2. Ordering the defendants to cause
to be restored the concrete wall with
iron railings, to cause to be removed
the sawali fence, both at the expense
of the defendants, jointly and
severally, and

3. Condemning the defendants to pay


jointly and severally, to the plaintiff
the
amount
of P25,000.00
as
litigation expenses, attorneys fees in
the amount of P50,000.00 and the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.8

public use, it is a property of public


dominion and it is not susceptible of private
ownership. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and
105 are void for being enacted beyond the
powers of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley. The contract of lease between the
Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank
of Anda is therefore void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed


the decision with the modification that the
awards of litigation expenses, attorneys
fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court
of Appeals subsequently denied the motion
for reconsideration of the Municipality of
Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda.

The Court of Appeals also ruled that since


neither the respondent nor the Municipality
of Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis
for the monetary awards granted by the trial
court.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The issue in this case is whether Resolution


Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Binmaley are valid.

The trial court found that Lot 736 is not


covered by any Torrens title either in the
name of respondent or in the name of the
Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held
that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot
736 is property of public dominion, it is
outside the commerce of man. Thus, the
Sangguniang
Bayan
of
Binmaley,
Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it
adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105
converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot
to a commercial lot and authorizing the
municipal mayor to enter into a contract of
lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of
Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot
736 .
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that Lot 736 is property of public
dominion and is used by the public as a
pathway. Respondent and the Municipality
of Binmaley are mere claimants with no
sufficient evidence to prove their ownership
of Lot 736. The Court of Appeals held that
property of public dominion is intended for
the common welfare and cannot be the
object of appropriation either by the state or
by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for

The Issue

The Ruling of the Court


The petition has no merit.
Both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley admit that they do not have title
over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the
Aggregate Survey Section of the Land
Management Services in Region I testified
that no document of ownership for Lot 736
was ever presented to their office.9
Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its
alleged open, continuous, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of Lot 736.
However, the records reveal otherwise. Even
the witnesses for respondent testified that
Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway,
parking space, and playground.10
On the other hand, the Municipality of
Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant
of Lot 736 based on the Property
Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll
of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot
Data Computation in the name of the
Municipality of Binmaley. However, these
documents
merely
show
that
the

Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant


of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey
Division of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, San Fernando City,
La Union testified that the cadastral
survey11 of Lot 736, which was surveyed for
the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had
not been approved.12 The cadastral survey
was based on the Lot Data Computation 13 of
Lot 736 which was likewise contracted by
the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.
The records show that Lot 736 is used as a
pathway going to the school, the seminary,
or the church, which are all located on lots
adjoined to Lot 736.14 Lot 736 was also used
for parking and playground.15 In other
words, Lot 736 was used by the public in
general.
Both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot
736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired
by anyone through purchase or grant or any
other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains
part of the public domain and is owned by
the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:16
There being no evidence whatever that the
property in question was ever acquired by
the applicants or their ancestors either by
composition
title
from
the
Spanish
Government or by possessory information
title or by any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be public domain. For it is
well settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the
government." It is indispensable then that
there be a showing of a title from the state
or any other mode of acquisition recognized
by law. The most recent restatement of the
doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes follows: "The applicant, having failed
to establish his right or title over the
northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in
the present controversy, and there being no

showing that the same has been acquired


by any private person from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, the property
is and remains part of the public domain."
This is in accordance with the Regalian
doctrine which holds that the state owns all
lands
and
waters
of
the
public
domain.17 Thus, under Article XII, Section 2
of the Constitution: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the state."
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate
to themselves public or government lands
without
prior
grant
from
the
18
government. Since Lot 736 is owned by
the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus,
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and
consequently, the contract of lease between
the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural
Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is
also void.
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the
petition.
We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October
2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August
2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS AND
NAGUIT, G.R. NO. 144057 (JANUARY 17,
2005)
Alienation
Facts:

of

Public

Agricultural

Lands

On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition


for registration of title of a parcel of land.
The
application
sought
a
judicial
confirmation of imperfect title over the land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Angeles opposed the

petition. The court issued an order of


general default against the whole world
except as to Angeles and the government.

applicants possession under a bona fide


claim of ownership could even start
Held:

The evidence revealed that the subject


parcel of land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in
1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim
in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject
property and confirmed the sale made by
his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or
1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started
occupying
the
same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her
attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements,
planted trees in addition to existing coconut
trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on
the
subject
land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had
occupied the land openly and in the concept
of owner without any objection from any
private person or even the government until
she filed her application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is
in
open,
continuous
and
exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since
the subject land was declared alienable only
on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, as required by Section
14 of the Property Registration Decree,
since prior to 1980, the land was not
alienable
or
disposable.

Section 14 of the Property Registration


Decree, governing original registration
proceedings,
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12,
1945,
or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the
provisions
of
existing
laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the
filing of an application for registration of title
under Section 14(1) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June
12,
1945
or
earlier.

Issue:

The OSG's interpretation would render


paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.

Whether or not it is necessary under Section


14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
that the subject land be first classified as
alienable and disposable before the

The more reasonable interpretation of


Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the

The OSG suggested an interpretation that


all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant.

application for registration of title is filed. If


the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if
the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of
registration of title under Section 14(1) had
been met by Naguit. The parcel of land had
been declared alienable; Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession and occupation of the land
evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at
the time she purchased the property; as
well as the tax declarations executed by the
original owner Urbano in 1954, which
strengthened one's bona fide claim of
ownership.

to prove that the land is an alienable


and disposable land.
7 CA ruled in favor of the republic
reasoning that the possession of the
land before it is declared alienable
and disposable cannot be included in
the computation of possession of the
land, thus Malabanan did not adhere
to the period requirement of the law.
Issue:
Can the heirs of Malabanan register the
land?
Held:
No.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner:
1

14(1): With respect to agricultural


lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of alienable property as
disposable may be counted in
computing the period of possession.
(Naguit Doctrine)

14(2): possession of the land for more


than 30 years ipso jure converts the
land into private property, regardless
of its classification. So long as during
the time of application, it is classified
alienable and disposable.

HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC


GR 179987, Apr 29, 2009
Facts:
1
2

4
5
6

Mario Malabanan applied for the


registration of 71,324 sq. meters of
land.
He claims that he bought the land
from Eduardo Velazco who also claims
that his great grandfather owned the
land
Malabanan submitted a certification
from DENR CENRO stating that the
land is alienable and disposable in
1982.
The prosecutor did not oppose the
registration.
RTC granted Malabanans request for
registration.
Republic
interposed
an
appeal
claiming that Malabanan did not
adhere to the requirement of time
required by the law and the he failed

OSG:
1

The land should have been declared


alienable and disposable prior to June
12, 1945. (Herbieto Doctrine)

14(2): 14(2) speakes of private lands.


The Court has yet to decide a case
that presented 14(2) as a ground for
application. Assuming that the 30
year period can run against public
land, the period only runs after the
land has been declared alienable and
diposable.

COURT:
1

14(1): 14(1) of CA 141 is virtually the


same as 48(b) of PD 1529. 48(b) is

more descriptive in nature of the right


enjoyed by a possessor. 14(1) seems
to presume the pre-existence of a
right.
If the position of OSG is to be followed
that the land has to be declared
alienable and disposable prior to June
12, 1945, then all lands not classified
as alienable and disposable AFTER
June 12, 1945 cannot be registered.
As explained in Naguit, it is sufficient
that the land is declared alienable
and disposable at the time that it is
registered. Hebierto Doctrine is
indeed obiter dictum.
2

14(2): 14(2) provides the registration


of land whose possession is after June
12, 1945. It involves application of
those who acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under
the provisions of the existing law.
The law mentioned in the provision
refers to the Civil Code. Under the CC,
prescriptive acquisition may be
ordinary or extra ordinary. It is
therefore proper to refer to CC on the
provisions of property.
Article 422 is controlling in the
conversion of the land of public
dominion to patrimonial property. It is
only
when
a
land
becomes
patrimonial
that
it
becomes
susceptible to prescription. There
must be an express declaration by
the State that an alienable and
disposable land is no longer intended
for public service. It is only after such
express declaration that the period
may begin to run.
CONCLUSION:
14(2) applies for the case at bar.
Possession of the land is traced back
to 1948. Since the land in question
has no express declaration of being
patrimonial, Malabanan failed to
adhere to the period as required by
law.

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD


ASSOCIATION INC., REPRESENTED BY
ITS INCUMBENT PRESIDENT, GREG

SERIEGO, VS. BASES CONVERSION


DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. NO. 192896, JULY 24, 2013
Facts: Dream Village, composed of more
than 2,000 families have been occupying
the disputed lot continuously, exclusively
and notoriously since the year 1985. Said lot
used to be a part of the Hacienda de
Maricaban,
which
was
subsequently
purchased by the government of the United
States of America (USA) and was converted
to Fort William McKinley. Later on, USA
transferred 30 hectares of it to the Manila
Railroad Company, while the rest were still
in the name of US Government. Finally, on
December of 1956, the US government
ceded Fort William McKinley to the Republic
of the Philippines (RP) and was renamed
Fort
Bonifacio,
reserved
for
military
purposes. On January 1986, President
Marcos Issued Proclamation No. 2476
declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio
alienable and disposable, thus allowing sale
to the settlers of home lots in Upper
Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and
Western Bicutan. President Corazon Aquino
on
the
other
hand
amended
the
proclamation of Pres. Marcos and limited the
lots which were open for disposition. On
March of 1992, the Bases conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) was created
to oversee and accelerate the conversion of
Clark
and
Military
Reservations
to
productive civilian uses, which then
authorized the President of the Philippines
to sell the lands covered in whole or in part,
specifically to raise capital for the BCDA.
BCDA asserted its title to Dream Village
owing to the fact that BCDAs titles over Fort
Bonifacio are valid and commercially
valuable to the agency, however, due to the
passage of time, was contended to have
been abandoned to Dream Village, and that
BCDAs right over it has already prescribed.
Issue: Whether the area occupied by
Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition
by prescription.
Ruling: No. Property of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription
(Art.1113, NCC). Also, under Article 422 of

the Civil Code, public domain lands become


patrimonial property only if there is a
declaration that these are alienable or
disposable, together with an express
government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of
national wealth. Only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run. It is also
stipulated under PD 1529 that before the
acquisitive prescription can commence, the
property must expressly declared by the
State that it is no longer intended for public
service or the development of national
wealth, and that absent such express
declaration, the land remains to be property
of
public
dominion.
Subsequent
proclamations over vast portions of
Maricaban exempted the lot where Dream
Village was situated from being open for
disposition, thus Fort Bonifacio remains a
property of public Dominion of the State
because although declared alienable and
disposable, it is reserved for some public
service or development of national wealth,
and thus, the acquisitive prescription
asserted by Dream Village has not even
begun to run. Thus, the area occupied by
Dream Village is still not susceptible of
acquisition by prescription.
REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL
295 SCRA 359, September 10, 1998
FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent
Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in
Opol, Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an
application for saltwork purposes for the
said area but the Director of Forestry
rejected the same.
Sometime in 1965, the Provincial
Board of Misamis Oriental passed a
resolution reserving a certain lot as a school
site. This lot unfortunately included the lot
of Doldol.
Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School
filed a complaint for accion possessoria with
the RTC, the court ruled on schools power.
On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of teh court ruling that Doldol was
entitledto the portion he occupied, he
having possessed the same for 32 years
(1959-1991).

ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the


better right to possess the land in dispute?
HELD: No. The Public Land Act requires that
the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession and occupation of the same
must either be since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are
complied with the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of
title/certificate of tile being issued.
The evidence presented shows that
the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable in accordance with the District
Foresters Certification. Doldol thus meets
the first requirement.
Consequently, Doldol could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the disputed
land since his occupation of the same
started only in 1955, much later than June
12, 1945. Not having complied with the
conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot be
said to have acquired a right to the land or a
right to assert a right superior to the school
given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved
the lot for Opol National School.
The privilege occupying public lands
with a view of pre-empting confers no
contractual or vested right in the land
occupied and the authority of the President
to withdraw such lands for sale or
acquisition by the public, or to reserve them
for public use, prior to divesting by the
government
of
title
thereof
stands
eventhough this may defeat the imperfect
right of settler.
Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement
on them can be acquired (Solicitor General)
In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the
better right of possession over the
land in dispute.
OH CHO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS G.R. NO.
48321, AUGUST 31, 1946

FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from
the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas,

which they openly, continuously and


adversely possessed since 1880. On January
17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of
this land. The Solicitor General opposed on
the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said
land and also because he was an alien.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a
decree
of
registration

DECISION

HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to
the lot, which may be confirmed under the
Land
Registration
Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception
to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before
the
Spanish
conquest.
The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the
lot by his first predecessor in interest began
in
1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not
entitled to a decree of registration of the lot,
because he is an alien disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would
have been entitled toa decree of registration
had they applied for the same. The
application for the registration of the land
was a condition precedent, which was not
complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the
most they had was mere possessory right,
not title. This possessory right was what was
transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is
an alien, the possessory right could never
ripen to ownership by prescription. As an
alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring
title over public land by prescription.
G.R. No. 164356

HEIRS OF MARGARITO PABAUS, namely,


FELICIANA P. MASACOTE, MERLINDA P.
CAILING, MAGUINDA P. ARCLETA,
ADELAIDA PABAUS, RAUL MORGADO
AND LEOPOLDO MORGADO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF AMANDA YUTIAMCO, namely,
JOSEFINA TAN, AND MOISES, VIRGINIA,
ROGELIO, ERLINDA, ANA AND ERNESTO,
all surnamed YUTIAMCO, Respondents.

July 27, 2011

Subject of this controversy are three


adjoining parcels of land located in
Barangay Cabayawa, Municipality of Tubay,
Agusan Del Norte. Lot 1, Plan Psu-213148
with an area of 58,292 square meters, and
Lot 2, Plan Psu-213148, consisting of 1,641
square meters, are registered in the name
of Amanda L. Yutiamco under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1044 and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T1428,5 respectively. Lot 2994, Pls-736, with
an area of 35,077 square meters, is owned
by Margarito Pabaus and covered by OCT
No. P-8649.6
OCT No. O-104 was issued pursuant to
Judicial Decree No. R-130700 dated July 9,
1970 which covered Lots 1 and 2. A
separate title, TCT No. T-1428, was
subsequently issued to Amanda Yutiamco
for Lot 2, thus partially canceling OCT No. O104. Meanwhile, OCT No. P-8649 was issued
to Margarito Pabaus on March 12, 1974
pursuant to Free Patent No. (X-2)102.
On December 26, 1996, respondents
Josefina Tan, and Moises, Virginia, Rogelio,
Erlinda, Ana and Ernesto, all surnamed
Yutiamco, representing themselves as the
heirs of Amanda L. Yutiamco, filed a
Complaint7 for Cancellation of OCT No. P8649, Recovery of Possession and Damages
against the heirs of Margarito Pabaus,
namely, petitioners Feliciana P. Masacote,
Merlinda P. Cailing, Maguinda P. Arcleta,

Adelaida Pabaus, Raul Morgado and


Leopoldo Morgado. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 4489 in the RTC of Butuan
City, Branch 1.
Respondents alleged that petitioners
illegally entered upon their lands, harvested
coconuts therein and built a house on the
premises, thus encroaching a substantial
portion of respondents property. Despite
repeated demands and objection by Moises
Yutiamco, petitioners continued to occupy
the encroached portion and harvest the
coconuts; petitioners even filed a criminal
complaint against the respondents before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Respondents averred that OCT No P-8649
issued to Margarito Pabaus is invalid as it
substantially includes a land already
covered by Decree No. N-130700 and OCT
No. O-104 issued on July 9, 1970 in the
name of Amanda Yutiamco. When Moises
Yutiamco caused a resurvey of the land, the
relocation plan confirmed that the free
patent title of Margarito Pabaus overlapped
substantially the lot covered by OCT No. O104.
In their Answer with
Counterclaim,8 petitioners admitted having
gathered coconuts and cut trees on the
contested properties, but asserted that they
did so in the exercise of their rights of
dominion as holders of OCT No. P-8649.
They also contended that it was
respondents who unlawfully entered their
property and harvested coconuts therein.
Citing a sketch plan prepared by Engr.
Rosalinda V. De Casa, petitioners claimed it
was the respondents who encroached Lot
1708, Cad-905 which is within and part of
OCT No. P-8649. It was pointed out that with
the claim of respondents of an alleged
encroachment, respondents land area
would have increased by 5,517.50 square
meters (or a total of 65,447.5) while that of
petitioners would be decreased to only
29,546 square meters. Petitioners likewise

averred that the complaint states no cause


of action since the case was not referred
forbarangay conciliation and respondents
cause of action was, in any event, already
barred by prescription, if not laches.
In the pre-trial conference held on March 12,
1997, the RTC issued an Order9 which
directed the conduct of a relocation survey
to determine if the land covered by
petitioners title overlaps those in
defendants titles. The three commissioners
who conducted the said survey were Engr.
Romulo Estaca, a private surveyor and the
court-appointed commissioner, Antonio
Libarios, Jr., the representative of
respondents, and Engr. Regino Lomarda, Jr.,
petitioners representative.10 It was agreed
that the relocation survey shall be done by
having the commissioners examine the
titles in question and then survey the land
to determine if there was indeed an
overlapping of titles and who has better
right to the contested lands.11
During the same pre-trial conference,
petitioners manifested their intention to file
an amended answer. The RTC gave them
five days within which to seek leave of court
to file the amended answer but they failed
to comply. Thus, the court considered
petitioners to have waived the filing of said
pleading.
At the continuation of the pre-trial
conference on June 23, 1997, the trial court
informed the parties of the following
findings in the Relocation Survey
Report12 dated May 27, 1997:
xxxx
That, Lot 2, Psu-213148 covered by TCT#T1428 issued in favor of Amanda L.
[Yutiamco] is inside the lot covered by
OCT#[P]-8649, issued in favor of Margarito
Pabaus;

That, Portion of Lot 1, Psu-213148 covered


by OCT#O-104, issued in favor of Amanda L.
[Yutiamco] containing an area of 15,675 Sq.
M. is inside the lot covered by OCT#P-8649,
issued in favor of Margarito Pabaus;
That, there is actually an overlapping in the
issuance of title[s] on the above-mentioned
two (2) parcels of land, please refer to
accompanying relocation plan and can be
identified through color legend;
That, the Technical Description of Lot 1, Psu213148 of OCT#O-104 has been properly
verified and checked against approved plan
of Psu-213148, approved in the name of
Amanda L. [Yutiamco];
Finally, that during the relocation survey
nobody objected and oppose[d] the findings
conducted by the undersigned.
x x x x13
The Report was accompanied by a
Relocation Plan14 which was certified by
Engr. Estaca as accurately indicating the
boundaries of the subject properties. Engr.
Libarios, Jr. and Engr. Lomarda, Jr. also
signed the Relocation Plan, expressing their
conformity thereto.
In the pre-trial conference held on July 17,
1997, petitioners counsel sought leave of
court to file an amended answer. In their
Amended Answer with
Counterclaim,15 petitioners reiterated that in
Engr. De Casas sketch plan which was
plotted in accordance with the description in
the cadastral survey, it was respondents
who encroached and claimed Lot 1708, Cad905 within and part of OCT P-8649. They
further alleged
xxxx
10. That plaintiffs[] title to the
property in [question], known as
O.C.T. No. 104 and TCT No. 1428 both

registered in the name of Amanda


Yutiamco were both secured thru
fraud, if not the said properties are
situated away, for a distance as
adjoining of defendants property,
under the following circumstances:
10.a. The subject property was
surveyed by a private surveyor
Antonio A. Libarios, Jr. on November 3
and 5, 1960, nonetheless, his license
as Geodetic Engineer was issued only
on November 11, [1965];
10.b. Base[d] on this fact, the survey
plan or relocation survey was
approved by the Director of Land[s],
Nicanor G. Jorge on June 9, 1965;
10.c. Perspicacious examination of
the technical description of
plaintiffs[] title under OCT No. 104
and TCT No. 1428, the BLLM is
marked as No. 4, which the tie line of
PSU No. 213148, as compared [to]
defendants[] title under OCT No. P8649, the BLLM is marked as No. 1,
which the tie line of PLS 736;
11. Actually, based on the foregoing
observation, the properties of
plaintiffs are away situated with the
property of defendants; should
plaintiffs insisted (sic) based on the
relocation survey conducted by the
commissioner appointed by this
Honorable Court, which defendants
believed that there was a maneuver
to hoax and hoodwink themselves,
into believing that plaintiffs properties
are situated in the heart of
defendants property, then their titles,
covering their properties were
secured thru fraud, which annulment
of the same is proper and within the
bounds of the law.
x x x x16

At the trial, plaintiffs presented as witnesses


Moises Yutiamco (adopted son of Amanda
Yutiamco), Figuracion Regala, Sr. (former
barangay captain of Tubay), Antonio
Payapaya (tenant of Moises Yutiamco) and
court-appointed commissioner Engr. Estaca,
while the defendants presented Raul P.
Morgado (one of the heirs of Margarito
Pabaus), Francisco Baylen (retired Land
Management Officer/Deputy Land Inspector
of the Bureau of Lands, Butuan City), Engr.
Rosalinda V. De Casa (Geodetic Engineer I,
DENR) and Ambrocio P. Alba (retired Land
Management Officer-Chief of Lands
Management Services, CENRO-Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte).

WHEREFORE, premises considered,


judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, as
follows:

On October 8, 1999, the RTC rendered


judgment in favor of the respondents and
against the petitioners. Said court gave
credence to the finding in the Relocation
Survey Report that petitioners lot overlap
respondents lands. It held that since the
land in dispute was already under the
private ownership of the respondents and
no longer part of the public domain, the
same could not have been the subject of a
free patent. As to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty
invoked by the petitioners as far as the
issuance of the free patent and title, the
trial court pointed out that this cannot be
appreciated in view of the testimony of
Engr. De Casa that in conducting the
cadastral survey, she was not able to secure
a copy of the title of the landholdings of
Amanda Yutiamco from the Register of
Deeds, which is a vital document in the
scheme of operations. The trial court thus
applied the rule that in case of two
certificates of title issued to different
persons over the same land, the earlier in
date must prevail. Hence, respondents OCT
No. O-104 is superior to petitioners OCT No.
P-8649 which is a total nullity.

2. Declaring the plaintiffs as the true


and legal owner of the property
subject of this case;

The fallo of the RTC decision reads:

1. Declaring as null and void ab


initio [Original] Certificate of Title No.
[P]-8649 and ordering defendants and
all those claiming any right under
them to vacate the land covered by
said title and deliver possession
thereof to the plaintiffs and/or
otherwise refrain and desist
perpetually from exercising any act of
dispossession and encroachment over
the subject premises;

3. Ordering defendants to render an


accounting to the plaintiffs with
respect to the income of the coconuts
in the area in conflict starting from
December 26, 1996 up to the time
reconveyance as herein directed is
made, and to deliver or pay to the
plaintiffs the income with legal
interest thereon from the date of
filing of the complaint in this case[,]
which is December 26, 1996, until the
same is paid or delivered; and
4. Ordering defendants to pay the
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
amount of P13,175.00 by way of
actual damages, P50,000.00 by way
of moral damages, the sum of
P30,000.00 by way of attorney's fees
and the cost of litigation in the
amount of P720.00.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
and emphasized that petitioners are bound
by the findings contained in the Relocation
Survey Report and the Relocation Plan

because not only did they agree to the


appointment of the three commissioners but
the commissioner representing them also
manifested his conformity to the findings. It
noted that neither party posed any
objection while the survey was ongoing and
that petitioners disputed the findings only
after it turned out adverse to them. Since
the settled rule is that a free patent issued
over a private land is null and void and
produces no legal effects whatsoever, and
with the trial courts finding that the
properties of respondents and petitioners
overlapped as to certain areas, the CA held
that the trial court correctly declared as void
the title of the petitioners. Moreover, the CA
cited previous rulings stating that "a
certificate of title over a land issued
pursuant to the Public Land Law, when in
conflict with one obtained on the same date
through judicial proceedings, must give way
to the latter," and that "a certificate of title
issued pursuant to a decree of registration
and a certificate of title issued in conformity
therewith are on a higher level than a
certificate of title based upon a patent
issued by the Director of Lands."18
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the instant
petition arguing that -I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT DECISION THAT
PETITIONERS LOT NO. 2994,
COVERED BY OCT NO. P-8649[,]
REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF
MARGARITO PABAUS OVERLAPPED
RESPONDENTS[] LOT 2 AND LOT 1,
[RESPECTIVELY] COVERED [BY] TCT
NO. T-1428 AND OCT NO. O104...BOTH REGISTERED IN THE
NAME OF AMANDA YUTIAMCO.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED


REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING [ON]
THE FINDING OF PRIVATE SURVEYOR
OR GEODETIC [ENGR.] ROMULO S.
ESTACA APPOINTED BY THE COURT
WHO DISTURBED THE CADASTRAL
SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT THRU THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES.19
Petitioners contend that the original
technical description of Lot 2994, as per the
1961 public land survey20, clearly showed
that respondents property lies south of the
land applied for by Margarito Pabaus. The
matter of encroachment was likewise
refuted by Engr. De Casa who conducted the
cadastral survey CAD 905 in Tubay and
plotted the subject lots on the cadastral
map.21 They likewise assailed the relocation
survey undertaken solely by the courtappointed commissioner, Engr. Estaca while
the other two surveyors did not perform
their respective tasks or confirm the ground
verification conducted by Engr. Estaca. With
the admission by Engr. Estaca that there
were five missing corners, there was no
precise and accurate ground verification
made on the alleged overlapping.
Petitioners cite the testimony of Engr. De
Casa which was based on the cadastral map
she herself prepared showing the respective
locations of the subject lots. They assert
that the three government witnesses
testified that the property of Margarito
Pabaus was surveyed based on existing
official records, and that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty
should be upheld.
Respondents, for their part, assert that
petitioners assignment of errors delve on
factual matters which are not proper
subjects of an appeal before this Court.
They echo the trial courts conclusion that
petitioners title is void since it covers
private land.

As a general rule, in petitions for review, the


jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the CA is limited to reviewing
questions of law which involves no
examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them. The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts; it is not its function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again.22 Accordingly,
findings of fact of the appellate court
affirming those of the trial court are
generally conclusive on this Court.

surveyors chosen by the parties expressed


their conformity with the finding of
encroachment or overlapping indicated in
the Relocation Plan27 submitted to the court
by Engr. Estaca. Said plan showed that the
area in conflict is on the northeastern
portion wherein petitioners OCT No. P-8649
overlapped with respondents title (OCT No.
O-104) by 15,675 square meters.

Nonetheless, jurisprudence has recognized


certain exceptions to the general rule that
findings of the fact by the Court of Appeals
are not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
One such exception is when such findings
are not sustained by the evidence. 23 Another
is when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts or overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.24

We rule in the negative.

The case of overlapping of titles


necessitates the assistance of experts in the
field of geodetic engineering. The very
reason why commissioners were appointed
by the trial court, upon agreement of the
parties, was precisely to make an evaluation
and analysis of the titles in conflict with
each other. Given their background,
expertise and experience, these
commissioners are in a better position to
determine which of the titles is valid. Thus,
the trial court may rely on their findings and
conclusions.25
However, in overlapping of titles disputes, it
has always been the practice for the court
to appoint a surveyor from the government
land agencies the Land Registration
Authority or the DENR to act as
commissioner.26 In this case, the trial court
appointed a private surveyor in the person
of Engr. Estaca who actually conducted the
relocation survey while the two other

Were the respondents able to prove their


claim of overlapping?

Survey is the process by which a parcel of


land is measured and its boundaries and
contents ascertained; also a map, plat or
statement of the result of such survey, with
the courses and distances and the quantity
of the land.28A case of overlapping of
boundaries or encroachment depends on a
reliable, if not accurate, verification
survey.29To settle the present dispute, the
parties agreed to the conduct of a relocation
survey. The Manual for Land Surveys in the
Philippines (MLSP)30 provides for the
following rules in conducting relocation
surveys:
Section 593 - The relocation of corners or reestablishment of boundary lines shall be
made using the bearings, distances and
areas approved by the Director of Lands or
written in the lease or Torrens title.
Section 594 - The data used in
monumenting or relocating corners of
approved surveys shall be submitted to the
Bureau of Lands for verification and
approval. New corner marks set on the
ground shall be accurately described in the
field notes and indicated on the original
plans on file in the Bureau of Lands. (Italics
supplied.)
In his Report, Engr. Estaca stated that he
was able to relocate some missing corners
of the subject lots:

xxxx
By April 26, 1997, the whole survey team
together with Mr. E. Concon and
representatives from the Plaintiffs and
De[f]endants returned to the area in
question to relocate missing corners of Lot
1, Psu-213148 of OCT#O-104; Lot 2, Psu213148 of TCT#T-1428; and OCT#P-8649.
We were able to relocate the following
corners of: Cors. 2 & 4 of Lot 1, Psu-213148
of OCT#O-104; cors. 7 & 8 of Lot 1, Psu213148 of OCT#[O]-104 which are identical
to cors. 15 & 16 of OCT#P-8649,
respectively. We laid out missing cors. 3 & 2
of Lot 2, Psu-213148 of TCT#T-1428 and
missing cors. 1 & 3 of Lot 1, Psu-213148 of
OCT#O-104. All missing corners which were
relocated were not yet planted with
cylindrical concrete monuments pending
court decision of the case.
x x x x31
On cross-examination, Engr. Estaca testified
as follows:
xxxx
Q In your report, you stated that
there missing corners: 3 and 2 of Lot
2; and missing corners 1 and 3 of Lot
1. Which of these three documents,
Exhibit S which is OCT No. O-104 or
Exhibit T which is TCT No. T-1428 or
OCT No. P-8649 in which there are
missing corners?
A TCT No. T-1428 has 3 missing
corners; and OCT No. O-104 has 2
missing corners.
Q When you say missing corners,
what do you mean by that?
A Well, based on the technical
description, we were not able to
locate the corners because it might
have been moved or lost.

Q And when you say corners, you are


referring to cylindrical concrete
monuments?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you agree with me Mr. Witness
that in order to locate the missing
corners to proceed with the relocation
survey, you have to make a point of
reference?
A Yes.
Q And that point of reference is found
in the title itself?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you agree with me that the
point of reference is BLLM?
A No, that is a point of tie line. But
the point of reference can be any of
the corners within the property. If you
have say ten corners, you can base
from the existing corners. In other
words, localize your location. Unless
the whole property is lost, meaning
all missing corners are not reliable
then you have to tie from known
BLLM (Bureau of Lands Location
Monument) That is established by a
geographic position.
Q Do you agree with me that in order
to have an accurate relocation
survey, to determine and to locate
the missing corners, you have to base
the relocation survey on the tie line?
A It depends. There are tie lines which
are located "40 kilometers" from that
point. The big error is there. So we
will not adopt all monuments.
Anyway, they interrelated to each
other. You can determine it by doing
relocation survey. You can check it out

by their positions. So the allowable


for that is only 30 centimeters.
xxxx
Q Finally, in your resurvey report
which is Exhibit Q, you mentioned
that there were missing corners which
were relocated and you said certain
basis for the relocation if there are
missing corners and you said that the
river is not a reliable point or basis.
What did you base on your relocation
survey considering that there are
missing corners?
A Based on other existing
monuments, sir.
Q What for example?
A Based on my report, I stated from a
known corners identified as cors. 10
and 9 of Lot 1, PSU 213148 of OCT
#O-104 which are identical to corners
1 and 17 of OCT #P-8649.
Q Is this already covered in your
report?
A Yes, and it is found on par. 2 of my
report.
x x x x32
The MLSP laid down specific rules regarding
tie lines, point of reference and overlapping
of adjoining titled lands. In this case, records
failed to disclose that the basis for
relocating the missing corners was
submitted to the Bureau of Lands (now Land
Management Bureau) for verification and
approval as required by Section 594. This is
crucial considering that the court-appointed
commissioner is a private surveyor and not
a government surveyor from the LRA or
LMB-DENR. It bears stressing that in every
land dispute, the aim of the courts is to
protect the integrity of and maintain

inviolate the Torrens system of land


registration, as well as to uphold the law; a
resolution of the parties dispute is merely a
necessary consequence.33
On the part of petitioners, their only
evidence to support their opposition to the
claim of encroachment by the respondents
is the cadastral map which indicated the
boundary of respondents property at the
south of petitioners lot. But as admitted by
Engr. De Casa, during the cadastral survey
they conducted from 1986 to 1996, they did
not send a written notice to the landowner
Amanda Yutiamco and that she plotted the
boundaries of her property based merely on
a tax declaration because the cadastral
survey team failed to obtain copies of OCT
No. O-104 and TCT No. T-1428 from the
Registry of Deeds.34 The MLSP specifically
required that relocation of boundary lines is
to be made using the bearings, distances
and areas approved by the Director of Lands
or indicated in the Torrens titles. Hence, said
cadastral map is not competent proof of the
actual location and boundaries of
respondents Lots 1 and 2, Psu213148.1awphi1
Indeed, we have ruled that if the land
covered by free patent was a private land,
the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction
over it. Such free patent and the
subsequent certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto are a nullity.35The
aggrieved party may initiate an action for
cancellation of such title. In the recent case
of De Guzman v. Agbagala,36 the Court
reiterated:
The settled rule is that a free patent issued
over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever.
Private ownership of land - as when there is
a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly
registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession, by present or previous

occupants - is not affected by the issuance


of a free patent over the same land,
because the Public Land [L]aw applies only
to lands of the public domain. The Director
of Lands has no authority to grant free
patent to lands that have ceased to be
public in character and have passed to
private ownership. Consequently, a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of
a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding
only if the land covered by it is really a part
of the disposable land of the public
domain.37
Considering, however, that the claim of
overlapping has not been clearly
established, it is premature to declare the
free patent issued to Margarito Pabaus null
and void. Instead, the Court deems it more
appropriate to remand the case to the trial
court for the conduct of a
verification/relocation survey under the
direction and supervision of the LMB-DENR.
In the event that respondents claim of
encroachment of 15,675 square meters is
found to be correct, the corresponding

adjustment in the metes and bounds of


petitioners property should be reflected in
OCT No. P-8649 which title will then have to
be partially, not totally, voided and the
corresponding amendment as to the precise
area and technical description of Lot 2994,
PLS 736 be entered by the Registry of
Deeds.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 10,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 65854 and Judgment dated October 8,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan
City, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4489 are SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the said
RTC which is hereby directed to order the
Land Management Bureau of the DENR to
conduct verification/relocation survey to
determine overlapping of titles over Lots 1
and 2, Psu-213148 and Lot 2994, PLS 736
covered by OCT No. O-104, TCT No. T-1428
and OCT No. P-8649, respectively, all of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Agusan
del Norte.
SO ORDERED.

You might also like