Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders,
dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which
denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has
re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop,
for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of
that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned
case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari
and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and
to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would
then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the
petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community
of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property,
upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared
in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there
were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot
sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce
is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
2

concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.

5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga,
Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heirappellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding,
in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

xxx
4

xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is
not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well
as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx

xxx

xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R.
Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said
order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED
BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled
in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival
in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following
nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he
again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines
the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his
last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on
March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of
that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may
be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no
domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one,
while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It
is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand,
not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades
of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to
insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision
of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of therenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied
the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
8

back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain
of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet
there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather
than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as
to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French
court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of
action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its
own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers
to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
9

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign
law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a
few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the
main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of therenvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the
law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
nationality that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
10

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his
death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that
the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at
the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we
are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national
law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of
the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California

11

provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil.
293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

12

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of
the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration
that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme
of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason
they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the
following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
13

and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to
comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.

14

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution
of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made
in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement
as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

15

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who predeceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
16

Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy
Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in
the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c)
after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00
each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction
of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or
a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the
registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30,
1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or
Philippine law.

17

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this
Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
18

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositorsappellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after
paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to
allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2

San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42780

January 17, 1936

MANILA GAS CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:

19

This is an action brought by the Manila Gas Corporation against the Collector of Internal Revenue for the
recovery of P56,757.37, which the plaintiff was required by the defendant to deduct and withhold from the
various sums paid it to foreign corporations as dividends and interest on bonds and other indebtedness and
which the plaintiff paid under protest. On the trial court dismissing the complaint, with costs, the plaintiff
appealed assigning as the principal errors alleged to have been committed the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the dividends paid by the plaintiff corporation were subject to
income tax in the hands of its stockholders, because to impose the tax thereon would be to impose a
tax on the plaintiff, in violation of the terms of its franchise, and would, moreover, be oppressive and
inequitable.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that the interest on bonds and other indebtedness of the plaintiff
corporation, paid by it outside of the Philippine Islands to corporations not residing therein, were not, on
the part of the recipients thereof, income from Philippine sources, and hence not subject to Philippine
income tax.
The facts, as stated by the appellant and as accepted by the appellee, may be summarized as follows: The
plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. It operates a gas plant in the City of
Manila and furnishes gas service to the people of the metropolis and surrounding municipalities by virtue of a
franchise granted to it by the Philippine Government. Associated with the plaintiff are the Islands Gas and
Electric Company domiciled in New York, United States, and the General Finance Company domiciled in
Zurich, Switzerland. Neither of these last mentioned corporations is resident in the Philippines.
For the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, dividends in the sum of P1,348,847.50 were paid by the plaintiff to the
Islands Gas and Electric Company in the capacity of stockholders upon which withholding income taxes were
paid to the defendant totalling P40,460.03 For the same years interest on bonds in the sum of P411,600 was
paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric Company upon which withholding income taxes were paid
to the defendant totalling P12,348. Finally for the stated time period, interest on other indebtedness in the sum
of P131,644,90 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric Company and the General Finance
Company respectively upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totalling P3,949.34.
Some uncertainty existing regarding the place of payment, we will not go into this factor of the case at this
point, except to remark that the bonds and other tokens of indebtedness are not to be found in the record.
However, Exhibits E, F, and G, certified correct by the Treasurer of the Manila Gas Corporation, purport to
prove that the place of payment was the United States and Switzerland.
The appeal naturally divides into two subjects, one covered by the first assigned error, and the other by the
second assigned error. We shall discuss these subjects and errors in order.
1. Appellant first contends that the dividends paid by it to its stockholders, the Islands Gas and Electric
Company , were not subject to tax because to impose a tax thereon would be to do so on the plaintiff
corporation, in violation of the terms of its franchise and would, moreover, be oppressive and
inequitable. This argument is predicated on the constitutional provision that no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be enacted. The particular portion of the franchise which is invoked
provides:

20

The grantee shall annually on the fifth day of January of each year pay to the City of Manila and
the municipalities in the Province of Rizal in which gas is sold, two and one half per centum of
the gross receipts within said city and municipalities, respectively, during the preceding year.
Said payment shall be in lieu of all taxes, Insular, provincial and municipal, except taxes on the
real estate, buildings, plant, machinery, and other personal property belonging to the grantee.
The trial judge was of the opinion that the instant case was governed by our previous decision in the
case ofPhilippine Telephone and Telegraph Co., vs. Collector of Internal Revenue ([1933], 58 Phil.
639). In this view we concur. It is true that the tax exemption provision relating to the Manila Gas
Corporation hereinbefore quoted differs in phraseology from the tax exemption provision to be found in
the franchise of the Telephone and Telegraph Company, but the ratio decidendi of the two cases is
substantially the same. As there held and as now confirmed, a corporation has a personality distinct
from that of its stockholders, enabling the taxing power to reach the latter when they receive dividends
from the corporation. It must be considered as settled in this jurisdiction that dividends of a domestic
corporation, which are paid and delivered in cash to foreign corporations as stockholders, are subject to
the payment in the income tax, the exemption clause in the charter of the corporation notwithstanding.
For the foreign reasons, we are led to sustain the decision of the trial court and to overrule appellant's
first assigned error.
2. In support of its second assignment of error, appellant contends that, as the Islands Gas and Electric
Company and the General Finance Company are domiciled in the United States and Switzerland
respectively, and as the interest on the bonds and other indebtedness earned by said corporations has
been paid in their respective domiciles, this is not income from Philippine sources within the meaning of
the Philippine Income Tax Law. Citing sections 10 (a) and 13 (e) of Act No. 2833, the Income Tax Law,
appellant asserts that their applicability has been squarely determined by decisions of this court in the
cases ofManila Railroad Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue (No. 31196, promulgated December 2,
1929, nor reported), and Philippine Railway Co. vs. Posadas (No. 38766, promulgated October 30,
1933 [58 Phil., 968]) wherein it was held that interest paid to non-resident individuals or corporations is
not income from Philippine sources, and hence not subject to the Philippine Income Tax. The SolicitorGeneral answers with the observation that the cited decisions interpreted the Income Tax Law before it
was amended by Act No. 3761 to cover the interest on bonds and other obligations or securities paid
"within or without the Philippine Islands." Appellant rebuts this argument by "assuming, for the sake of
the argument, that by the amendment introduced to section 13 of Act No. 2833 by Act No. 3761 the
Legislature intended the interest from Philippine sources and so is subject to tax," but with the
necessary sequel that the amendatory statute is invalid and unconstitutional as being the power of the
Legislature to enact.
Taking first under observation that last point, it is to be observed that neither in the pleadings, the decision of
the trial court, nor the assignment of errors, was the question of the validity of Act No. 3761 raised. Under such
circumstances, and no jurisdictional issue being involved, we do not feel that it is the duty of the court to pass
on the constitutional question, and accordingly will refrain from doing so. (Cadwaller-Gibson Lumber
Co. vs. Del Rosario [1913], 26 Phil., 192; Macondray and Co. vs. Benito and Ocampo, P. 137, ante;
State vs. Burke [1912], 175 Ala., 561.)
As to the applicability of the local cases cited and of the Porto Rican case of Domenech vs. United Porto Rican
Sugar co. ([1932], 62 F. [2d], 552), we need only observe that these cases announced good law, but that each
21

he must be decided on its particular facts. In other words, in the opinion of the majority of the court, the facts at
bar and the facts in those cases can be clearly differentiated. Also, in the case at bar there is some uncertainty
concerning the place of payment, which under one view could be considered the Philippines and under another
view the United States and Switzerland, but which cannot be definitely determined without the necessary
documentary evidence before, us.
The approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within its jurisdiction without violating the due
process clause of the constitution. The taxing power of a state does not extend beyond its territorial limits, but
within such it may tax persons, property, income, or business. If an interest in property is taxed, the situs of
either the property or interest must be found within the state. If an income is taxed, the recipient thereof must
have a domicile within the state or the property or business out of which the income issues must be situated
within the state so that the income may be said to have a situs therein. Personal property may be separated
from its owner, and he may be taxed on its account at the place where the property is although it is not the
place of his own domicile and even though he is not a citizen or resident of the state which imposes the tax.
But debts owing by corporations are obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the hands of the
creditors. (Farmers Loan Co. vs. Minnesota [1930], 280 U.S., 204; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. vs. Kentucky
[1905], 199 U.S., 194 State Tax on Foreign held Bonds [1873, 15 Wall., 300; Bick vs. Beach [1907], 206 U. S.,
392; State ex rel. Manitowoc Gas Co. vs. Wig. Tax Comm. [1915], 161 Wis., 111; United States Revenue Act of
1932, sec. 143.)
These views concerning situs for taxation purposes apply as well to an organized, unincorporated territory or to
a Commonwealth having the status of the Philippines.
Pushing to one side that portion of Act No. 3761 which permits taxation of interest on bonds and other
indebtedness paid without the Philippine Islands, the question is if the income was derived from sources within
the Philippine Islands.
In the judgment of the majority of the court, the question should be answered in the affirmative. The Manila
Gas Corporation operates its business entirely within the Philippines. Its earnings, therefore come from local
sources. The place of material delivery of the interest to the foreign corporations paid out of the revenue of the
domestic corporation is of no particular moment. The place of payment even if conceded to be outside of tho
country cannot alter the fact that the income was derived from the Philippines. The word "source" conveys only
one idea, that of origin, and the origin of the income was the Philippines.
In synthesis, therefore, we hold that conditions have not been provided which justify the court in passing on the
constitutional question suggested; that the facts while somewhat obscure differ from the facts to be found in
the cases relied upon, and that the Collector of Internal Revenue was justified in withholding income taxes on
interest on bonds and other indebtedness paid to non-resident corporations because this income was received
from sources within the Philippine Islands as authorized by the Income Tax Law. For the foregoing reasons, the
second assigned error will be overruled.
Before concluding, it is but fair to state that the writer's opinion on the first subject and the first assigned error
herein discussed is accurately set forth, but that his opinion on the second subject and the second assigned
error is not accurately reflected, because on this last division his views coincide with those of the appellant.
However, in the interest of the prompt disposition of this case, the decision has been written up in accordance
with instructions received from the court.

22

Judgment affirmed, with the cost of this instance assessed against the appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2935

March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.
Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. The defendant appealed. On
the 12th day of October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with the clerk of the Supreme
Court. On the 5th day of December, 1905, the appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On
the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in
said cause until on or about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the respective parties were requested by this
court to prosecute the appeal under the penalty of having the same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon
the appellant, by petition, had the caused placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of
February, 1909.
The facts from the record appear to be as follows:
First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the United
States, the defendant, through a respective of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a
contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200
dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in
advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during
said period of travel.
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant,
he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses
incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period.
Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and was
paid half-salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to
make further compliance with the terms of the contract.

23

Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila to recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which amount the plaintiff claimed had
been paid to the defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half salary for the
period consumed in travel.
Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should
constitute a part of said contract.
To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his
special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had
thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered
into and was therefore not responsible under the law.
To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained.
Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower
court rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 265.90 dollars. The
lower court found that at the time the defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him from the said
plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff in the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this
judgment the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's special defenses.
2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts.
With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the legislative
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by the
Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the
plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5
of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of the contract. The right which the
defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact
that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of
said contract and were enforceable in favor of the defendant.
The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be
enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of
Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. The plaintiff [the
defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the
contract was made, male persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of
23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It
is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the time and place of the making of the
contract in question the defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that
matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the
place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its
performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy,
such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought. (Idem.)
24

The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila;
that he was an adult at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to
enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.
Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore:
First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the contract in
question; and
Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the
contract was made, he can not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.
We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

25

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.
Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.
Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et
al, defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of
P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
The facts are not disputed.
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short)
delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific
Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).
26

When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter,
petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the
recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was
informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was
registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific
Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to
one "Eugenio Baltao."
After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored
check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon
is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business
with Albenson.
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against
Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an
affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned
circumstances were stated.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a
business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed.
On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given
Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was
deemed to have waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity
to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings
with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having
issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and
exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed
against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the
signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary
investigation that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then
castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care and prudence in the performance of his duties, thereby
causing injustice to respondent who was not properly notified of the complaint against him and of the
requirement to submit his counter evidence.

27

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced
in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises,
Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not
of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and
had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio
Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa
Street, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants ordering
the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:
1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;
2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);
3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
5 costs.
Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile Insurance
Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment at the instance of plaintiff are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral damages
awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees from P100,000.00
to P50,000.00, said decision being hereby affirmed in all its other aspects. With costs against
appellants. (Rollo, pp. 50-51)
Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and Benjamin Mendiona
filed the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:
1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious
prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the
fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to Article
21 or Article 2176 of the Civil Code . . . .
2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an unjust criminal
case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by misdirection" and "was therefore,
28

actionable by itself," and which "became inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when . . .
(private respondent) was deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called
preliminary investigation . . . . "
3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and calculated", no
evidence having been adduced to support such a sweeping statement.
4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly and severally
liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.
5. Awarding respondents
5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of
sufficient evidence to show that such was actually suffered.
5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this
connection merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as a
businessman, there being no showing that the act complained of adversely
affected private respondent's reputation or that it resulted to material loss.
5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were
duly advised by counsel of their legal recourse.
5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify
such an award (Rollo, pp. 4-6).
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case
ofMadera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves
them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his
complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the
requirements of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent
Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the
scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a
right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines
72).

29

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA
778 [1989]).
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which
is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction
(Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or
duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with
acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the
basis for an award of damages.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article
20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the
respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the
bases for the award of damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not much difficulty
in ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given the
admitted fact that when there was an attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the
defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao
defendants had been dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and
persisted in filing a case a criminal case no less against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul
of the legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by the lower court and
heretofore quoted (supra).
Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right to complain.
But that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of
rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be validly
made the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances,
We see no cogent reason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What
prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was
their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was
issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check,
and yielded the following results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was
discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio
S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against whose
30

account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the
drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged to
one "Eugenio Baltao".
In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent demanding that he make
good the amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that
private respondent ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the
check in question. Private respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to check
the veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private
respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation made against his person, he should have
made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr.,
Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned
out later, was the issuer of the check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business
in the same building Baltao Building located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild steel
plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and
delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio
Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent
to make good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22.
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private
respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was
propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme.
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the
bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible
means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation
owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find
means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or
of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per
se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to
Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio
Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting
business in the same building he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner
acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under Article
2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more
specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper,
31

however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the
further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an
acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case
for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated,
a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited
are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled
that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable
cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal
prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very
great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be
sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case,
it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass
private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal
complaint against private respondent.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof
and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to
damages (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private
respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some
extent in determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or
reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more
assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S.
Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that
petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their
investigation pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored
check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the
wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having
been committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his counteraffidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro
upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.

32

Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such
right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously.
And an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs.
Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If
damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric
Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records show that the
same was based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of
the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown
he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against
him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the
amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of
Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade,
property, profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and
unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these
reasons, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor
of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive
manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs.
Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than the general rule.
Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is
eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of
the fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded
him on that ground.
In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of
the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed
by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA
577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of
rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of
trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding
unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948
dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
SO ORDERED.

33

Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
** "Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
"Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

34

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA PRODUCTION, INC., and
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. (hereafter ABS-CBN) seeks to
reverse and set aside the decision 1 of 31 October 1996 and the resolution 2 of 10 March 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44125. The former affirmed with modification the decision 3 of 28 April 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Civil Case No. Q-92-12309. The latter denied the
motion to reconsider the decision of 31 October 1996.
The antecedents, as found by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
In 1990, ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement (Exh. "A") whereby Viva
gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. Sometime in December 1991, in
accordance with paragraph 2.4 [sic] of said agreement stating that .
1.4 ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next twenty-four (24) Viva films for TV
telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties hereto, provided, however, that
such right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN from the actual offer in writing.
Viva, through defendant Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN, through its vice-president Charo
Santos-Concio, a list of three(3) film packages (36 title) from which ABS-CBN may exercise its
right of first refusal under the afore-said agreement (Exhs. "1" par, 2, "2," "2-A'' and "2-B"-Viva).
ABS-CBN, however through Mrs. Concio, "can tick off only ten (10) titles" (from the list) "we can
purchase" (Exh. "3" - Viva) and therefore did not accept said list (TSN, June 8, 1992, pp. 9-10).

35

The titles ticked off by Mrs. Concio are not the subject of the case at bar except the film ''Maging
Sino Ka Man."
For further enlightenment, this rejection letter dated January 06, 1992 (Exh "3" - Viva) is hereby
quoted:
6 January 1992
Dear Vic,
This is not a very formal business letter I am writing to you as I would like to express my
difficulty in recommending the purchase of the three film packages you are offering ABS-CBN.
From among the three packages I can only tick off 10 titles we can purchase. Please see
attached. I hope you will understand my position. Most of the action pictures in the list do not
have big action stars in the cast. They are not for primetime. In line with this I wish to mention
that I have not scheduled for telecast several action pictures in out very first contract because of
the cheap production value of these movies as well as the lack of big action stars. As a film
producer, I am sure you understand what I am trying to say as Viva produces only big action
pictures.
In fact, I would like to request two (2) additional runs for these movies as I can only schedule
them in our non-primetime slots. We have to cover the amount that was paid for these movies
because as you very well know that non-primetime advertising rates are very low. These are the
unaired titles in the first contract.
1. Kontra Persa [sic].
2. Raider Platoon.
3. Underground guerillas
4. Tiger Command
5. Boy de Sabog
6. Lady Commando
7. Batang Matadero
8. Rebelyon
I hope you will consider this request of mine.
The other dramatic films have been offered to us before and have been rejected because of the
ruling of MTRCB to have them aired at 9:00 p.m. due to their very adult themes.

36

As for the 10 titles I have choosen [sic] from the 3 packages please consider including all the
other Viva movies produced last year. I have quite an attractive offer to make.
Thanking you and with my warmest regards.
(Signed)
Charo Santos-Concio
On February 27, 1992, defendant Del Rosario approached ABS-CBN's Ms. Concio, with a list
consisting of 52 original movie titles (i.e. not yet aired on television) including the 14 titles
subject of the present case, as well as 104 re-runs (previously aired on television) from which
ABS-CBN may choose another 52 titles, as a total of 156 titles, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN
airing rights over this package of 52 originals and 52 re-runs for P60,000,000.00 of which
P30,000,000.00 will be in cash and P30,000,000.00 worth of television spots (Exh. "4" to "4-C"
Viva; "9" -Viva).
On April 2, 1992, defendant Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III,
met at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package proposal of Viva.
What transpired in that lunch meeting is the subject of conflicting versions. Mr. Lopez testified
that he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly agreed that ABS-CRN was granted exclusive film rights to
fourteen (14) films for a total consideration of P36 million; that he allegedly put this agreement
as to the price and number of films in a "napkin'' and signed it and gave it to Mr. Del Rosario
(Exh. D; TSN, pp. 24-26, 77-78, June 8, 1992). On the other hand, Del Rosario denied having
made any agreement with Lopez regarding the 14 Viva films; denied the existence of a napkin
in which Lopez wrote something; and insisted that what he and Lopez discussed at the lunch
meeting was Viva's film package offer of 104 films (52 originals and 52 re-runs) for a total price
of P60 million. Mr. Lopez promising [sic]to make a counter proposal which came in the form of a
proposal contract Annex "C" of the complaint (Exh. "1"- Viva; Exh. "C" - ABS-CBN).
On April 06, 1992, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-president for
Finance discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the
rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN.
On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received through his secretary, a handwritten note
from Ms. Concio, (Exh. "5" - Viva), which reads: "Here's the draft of the contract. I hope you find
everything in order," to which was attached a draft exhibition agreement (Exh. "C''- ABS-CBN;
Exh. "9" - Viva, p. 3) a counter-proposal covering 53 films, 52 of which came from the list sent
by defendant Del Rosario and one film was added by Ms. Concio, for a consideration of P35
million. Exhibit "C" provides that ABS-CBN is granted films right to 53 films and contains a right
of first refusal to "1992 Viva Films." The said counter proposal was however rejected by Viva's
Board of Directors [in the] evening of the same day, April 7, 1992, as Viva would not sell
anything less than the package of 104 films for P60 million pesos (Exh. "9" - Viva), and such
rejection was relayed to Ms. Concio.
On April 29, 1992, after the rejection of ABS-CBN and following several negotiations and
meetings defendant Del Rosario and Viva's President Teresita Cruz, in consideration of P60
37

million, signed a letter of agreement dated April 24, 1992. granting RBS the exclusive right to air
104 Viva-produced and/or acquired films (Exh. "7-A" - RBS; Exh. "4" - RBS) including the
fourteen (14) films subject of the present case. 4
On 27 May 1992, ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondents Republic Broadcasting
Corporation 5 (hereafter RBS ), Viva Production (hereafter VIVA), and Vicente Del Rosario. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12309.
On 27 May 1992, RTC issued a temporary restraining order 6 enjoining private respondents from proceeding
with the airing, broadcasting, and televising of the fourteen VIVA films subject of the controversy, starting with
the film Maging Sino Ka Man, which was scheduled to be shown on private respondents RBS' channel 7 at
seven o'clock in the evening of said date.
On 17 June 1992, after appropriate proceedings, the RTC issued an
order 7 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon ABS-CBN's posting of P35 million bond.
ABS-CBN moved for the reduction of the bond, 8 while private respondents moved for reconsideration of the
order and offered to put up a counterbound. 9
In the meantime, private respondents filed separate answers with counterclaim. 10 RBS also set up a crossclaim against VIVA..
On 3 August 1992, the RTC issued an order 11 dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by
RBS of a P30 million counterbond to answer for whatever damages ABS-CBN might suffer by virtue of such
dissolution. However, it reduced petitioner's injunction bond to P15 million as a condition precedent for the
reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction should private respondents be unable to post a counterbond.
At the pre-trial 12 on 6 August 1992, the parties, upon suggestion of the court, agreed to explore the possibility
of an amicable settlement. In the meantime, RBS prayed for and was granted reasonable time within which to
put up a P30 million counterbond in the event that no settlement would be reached.
As the parties failed to enter into an amicable settlement RBS posted on 1 October 1992 a counterbond, which
the RTC approved in its Order of 15 October 1992. 13
On 19 October 1992, ABS-CBN filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the 3 August and 15 October 1992
Orders, which RBS opposed. 15
On 29 October 1992, the RTC conducted a pre-trial. 16
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration, ABS-CBN filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition 17challenging the RTC's Orders of 3 August and 15 October 1992 and praying for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing said orders. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29300.
On 3 November 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order 18 to enjoin the airing,
broadcasting, and televising of any or all of the films involved in the controversy.

38

On 18 December 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 19 dismissing the petition in CA -G.R. No.
29300 for being premature. ABS-CBN challenged the dismissal in a petition for review filed with this Court on
19 January 1993, which was docketed as G.R. No. 108363.
In the meantime the RTC received the evidence for the parties in Civil Case No. Q-192-1209. Thereafter, on 28
April 1993, it rendered a decision 20 in favor of RBS and VIVA and against ABS-CBN disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, judgments is rendered
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff.
(1) The complaint is hereby dismissed;
(2) Plaintiff ABS-CBN is ordered to pay defendant RBS the following:
a) P107,727.00, the amount of premium paid by RBS to the surety
which issued defendant RBS's bond to lift the injunction;
b) P191,843.00 for the amount of print advertisement for "Maging
Sino Ka Man" in various newspapers;
c) Attorney's fees in the amount of P1 million;
d) P5 million as and by way of moral damages;
e) P5 million as and by way of exemplary damages;
(3) For defendant VIVA, plaintiff ABS-CBN is ordered to pay P212,000.00 by way
of reasonable attorney's fees.
(4) The cross-claim of defendant RBS against defendant VIVA is dismissed.
(5) Plaintiff to pay the costs.
According to the RTC, there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of the offer. The alleged
agreement between Lopez III and Del Rosario was subject to the approval of the VIVA Board of Directors, and
said agreement was disapproved during the meeting of the Board on 7 April 1992. Hence, there was no basis
for ABS-CBN's demand that VIVA signed the 1992 Film Exhibition Agreement. Furthermore, the right of first
refusal under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement had previously been exercised per Ms. Concio's letter to Del
Rosario ticking off ten titles acceptable to them, which would have made the 1992 agreement an entirely new
contract.
On 21 June 1993, this Court denied 21 ABS-CBN's petition for review in G.R. No. 108363, as no reversible error
was committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision and the case had "become moot and
academic in view of the dismissal of the main action by the court a quo in its decision" of 28 April 1993.
Aggrieved by the RTC's decision, ABS-CBN appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that there was a
perfected contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA granting ABS-CBN the exclusive right to exhibit the subject
39

films. Private respondents VIVA and Del Rosario also appealed seeking moral and exemplary damages and
additional attorney's fees.
In its decision of 31 October 1996, the Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that the contract between ABSCBN and VIVA had not been perfected, absent the approval by the VIVA Board of Directors of whatever Del
Rosario, it's agent, might have agreed with Lopez III. The appellate court did not even believe ABS-CBN's
evidence that Lopez III actually wrote down such an agreement on a "napkin," as the same was never
produced in court. It likewise rejected ABS-CBN's insistence on its right of first refusal and ratiocinated as
follows:
As regards the matter of right of first refusal, it may be true that a Film Exhibition Agreement
was entered into between Appellant ABS-CBN and appellant VIVA under Exhibit "A" in 1990,
and that parag. 1.4 thereof provides:
1.4 ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next twenty-four (24) VIVA
films for TV telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties
hereto, provided, however, that such right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN within
a period of fifteen (15) days from the actual offer in writing (Records, p. 14).
[H]owever, it is very clear that said right of first refusal in favor of ABS-CBN shall still be subject
to such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties thereto, and that the said right shall be
exercised by ABS-CBN within fifteen (15) days from the actual offer in writing.
Said parag. 1.4 of the agreement Exhibit "A" on the right of first refusal did not fix the price of
the film right to the twenty-four (24) films, nor did it specify the terms thereof. The same are still
left to be agreed upon by the parties.
In the instant case, ABS-CBN's letter of rejection Exhibit 3 (Records, p. 89) stated that it can
only tick off ten (10) films, and the draft contract Exhibit "C" accepted only fourteen (14) films,
while parag. 1.4 of Exhibit "A'' speaks of the next twenty-four (24) films.
The offer of V1VA was sometime in December 1991 (Exhibits 2, 2-A. 2-B; Records, pp. 86-88;
Decision, p. 11, Records, p. 1150), when the first list of VIVA films was sent by Mr. Del Rosario
to ABS-CBN. The Vice President of ABS-CBN, Ms. Charo Santos-Concio, sent a letter dated
January 6, 1992 (Exhibit 3, Records, p. 89) where ABS-CBN exercised its right of refusal by
rejecting the offer of VIVA.. As aptly observed by the trial court, with the said letter of Mrs.
Concio of January 6, 1992, ABS-CBN had lost its right of first refusal. And even if We reckon the
fifteen (15) day period from February 27, 1992 (Exhibit 4 to 4-C) when another list was sent to
ABS-CBN after the letter of Mrs. Concio, still the fifteen (15) day period within which ABS-CBN
shall exercise its right of first refusal has already expired. 22
Accordingly, respondent court sustained the award of actual damages consisting in the cost of print
advertisements and the premium payments for the counterbond, there being adequate proof of the pecuniary
loss which RBS had suffered as a result of the filing of the complaint by ABS-CBN. As to the award of moral
damages, the Court of Appeals found reasonable basis therefor, holding that RBS's reputation was debased by
the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-92-12309 and by the non-showing of the film "Maging Sino Ka
Man." Respondent court also held that exemplary damages were correctly imposed by way of example or
40

correction for the public good in view of the filing of the complaint despite petitioner's knowledge that the
contract with VIVA had not been perfected, It also upheld the award of attorney's fees, reasoning that with
ABS-CBN's act of instituting Civil Case No, Q-92-1209, RBS was "unnecessarily forced to litigate." The
appellate court, however, reduced the awards of moral damages to P2 million, exemplary damages to P2
million, and attorney's fees to P500, 000.00.
On the other hand, respondent Court of Appeals denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was "RBS
and not VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was filed by ABS-CBN."
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, ABS-CBN filed the petition in this case, contending that the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in
I
. . . RULING THAT THERE WAS NO PERFECTED CONTRACT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT VIVA NOTWITHSTANDING PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY PETITIONER TO THE CONTRARY.
II
. . . IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT RBS.
III
. . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT RBS.
IV
. . . IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF RBS.
ABS-CBN claims that it had yet to fully exercise its right of first refusal over twenty-four titles under the 1990
Film Exhibition Agreement, as it had chosen only ten titles from the first list. It insists that we give credence to
Lopez's testimony that he and Del Rosario met at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant, discussed the terms and
conditions of the second list (the 1992 Film Exhibition Agreement) and upon agreement thereon, wrote the
same on a paper napkin. It also asserts that the contract has already been effective, as the elements thereof,
namely, consent, object, and consideration were established. It then concludes that the Court of Appeals'
pronouncements were not supported by law and jurisprudence, as per our decision of 1 December 1995
in Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 23 which cited Toyota Shaw, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 24 Ang
Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 25 and Villonco Realty Company v. Bormaheco. Inc. 26
Anent the actual damages awarded to RBS, ABS-CBN disavows liability therefor. RBS spent for the premium
on the counterbond of its own volition in order to negate the injunction issued by the trial court after the parties
had ventilated their respective positions during the hearings for the purpose. The filing of the counterbond was
an option available to RBS, but it can hardly be argued that ABS-CBN compelled RBS to incur such expense.
Besides, RBS had another available option, i.e., move for the dissolution or the injunction; or if it was
41

determined to put up a counterbond, it could have presented a cash bond. Furthermore under Article 2203 of
the Civil Code, the party suffering loss or injury is also required to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission. As regards the cost of print advertisements,
RBS had not convincingly established that this was a loss attributable to the non showing "Maging Sino Ka
Man"; on the contrary, it was brought out during trial that with or without the case or the injunction, RBS would
have spent such an amount to generate interest in the film.
ABS-CBN further contends that there was no clear basis for the awards of moral and exemplary damages. The
controversy involving ABS-CBN and RBS did not in any way originate from business transaction between
them. The claims for such damages did not arise from any contractual dealings or from specific acts committed
by ABS-CBN against RBS that may be characterized as wanton, fraudulent, or reckless; they arose by virtue
only of the filing of the complaint, An award of moral and exemplary damages is not warranted where the
record is bereft of any proof that a party acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing an action. 27 In any case, free
resort to courts for redress of wrongs is a matter of public policy. The law recognizes the right of every one to
sue for that which he honestly believes to be his right without fear of standing trial for damages where by lack
of sufficient evidence, legal technicalities, or a different interpretation of the laws on the matter, the case would
lose ground. 28 One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. 29 If damage results front the filing of
the complaint, it is damnum absque injuria. 30 Besides, moral damages are generally not awarded in favor of a
juridical person, unless it enjoys a good reputation that was debased by the offending party resulting in social
humiliation. 31
As regards the award of attorney's fees, ABS-CBN maintains that the same had no factual, legal, or equitable
justification. In sustaining the trial court's award, the Court of Appeals acted in clear disregard of the doctrines
laid down in Buan v. Camaganacan 32 that the text of the decision should state the reason why attorney's fees
are being awarded; otherwise, the award should be disallowed. Besides, no bad faith has been imputed on,
much less proved as having been committed by, ABS-CBN. It has been held that "where no sufficient showing
of bad faith would be reflected in a party' s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause, attorney's fees shall not be recovered as cost." 33
On the other hand, RBS asserts that there was no perfected contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA absent any
meeting of minds between them regarding the object and consideration of the alleged contract. It affirms that
the ABS-CBN's claim of a right of first refusal was correctly rejected by the trial court. RBS insist the premium it
had paid for the counterbond constituted a pecuniary loss upon which it may recover. It was obliged to put up
the counterbound due to the injunction procured by ABS-CBN. Since the trial court found that ABS-CBN had no
cause of action or valid claim against RBS and, therefore not entitled to the writ of injunction, RBS could
recover from ABS-CBN the premium paid on the counterbond. Contrary to the claim of ABS-CBN, the cash
bond would prove to be more expensive, as the loss would be equivalent to the cost of money RBS would
forego in case the P30 million came from its funds or was borrowed from banks.
RBS likewise asserts that it was entitled to the cost of advertisements for the cancelled showing of the film
"Maging Sino Ka Man" because the print advertisements were put out to announce the showing on a particular
day and hour on Channel 7, i.e., in its entirety at one time, not a series to be shown on a periodic basis. Hence,
the print advertisement were good and relevant for the particular date showing, and since the film could not be
shown on that particular date and hour because of the injunction, the expenses for the advertisements had
gone to waste.

42

As regards moral and exemplary damages, RBS asserts that ABS-CBN filed the case and secured injunctions
purely for the purpose of harassing and prejudicing RBS. Pursuant then to Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code,
ABS-CBN must be held liable for such damages. Citing Tolentino, 34 damages may be awarded in cases of
abuse of rights even if the act done is not illicit and there is abuse of rights were plaintiff institutes and action
purely for the purpose of harassing or prejudicing the defendant.
In support of its stand that a juridical entity can recover moral and exemplary damages, private respondents
RBScited People v. Manero, 35 where it was stated that such entity may recover moral and exemplary damages
if it has a good reputation that is debased resulting in social humiliation. it then ratiocinates; thus:
There can be no doubt that RBS' reputation has been debased by ABS-CBN's acts in this case.
When RBS was not able to fulfill its commitment to the viewing public to show the film "Maging
Sino Ka Man" on the scheduled dates and times (and on two occasions that RBS advertised), it
suffered serious embarrassment and social humiliation. When the showing was canceled, late
viewers called up RBS' offices and subjected RBS to verbal abuse ("Announce kayo nang
announce, hindi ninyo naman ilalabas," "nanloloko yata kayo") (Exh. 3-RBS, par. 3). This alone
was not something RBS brought upon itself. it was exactly what ABS-CBN had planned to
happen.
The amount of moral and exemplary damages cannot be said to be excessive. Two reasons
justify the amount of the award.
The first is that the humiliation suffered by RBS is national extent. RBS operations as a
broadcasting company is [sic] nationwide. Its clientele, like that of ABS-CBN, consists of those
who own and watch television. It is not an exaggeration to state, and it is a matter of judicial
notice that almost every other person in the country watches television. The humiliation suffered
by RBS is multiplied by the number of televiewers who had anticipated the showing of the film
"Maging Sino Ka Man" on May 28 and November 3, 1992 but did not see it owing to the
cancellation. Added to this are the advertisers who had placed commercial spots for the telecast
and to whom RBS had a commitment in consideration of the placement to show the film in the
dates and times specified.
The second is that it is a competitor that caused RBS to suffer the humiliation. The humiliation
and injury are far greater in degree when caused by an entity whose ultimate business objective
is to lure customers (viewers in this case) away from the competition. 36
For their part, VIVA and Vicente del Rosario contend that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals do not support ABS-CBN's claim that there was a perfected contract. Such factual findings can no
longer be disturbed in this petition for review under Rule 45, as only questions of law can be raised, not
questions of fact. On the issue of damages and attorneys fees, they adopted the arguments of RBS.
The key issues for our consideration are (1) whether there was a perfected contract between VIVA and ABSCBN, and (2) whether RBS is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. It may be noted that the award of
attorney's fees of P212,000 in favor of VIVA is not assigned as another error.
I.

43

The first issue should be resolved against ABS-CBN. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons
whereby one binds himself to give something or to render some service to another 37 for a consideration. there
is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain
which is the subject of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation, which is established. 38 A contract
undergoes three stages:
(a) preparation, conception, or generation, which is the period of negotiation and bargaining,
ending at the moment of agreement of the parties;
(b) perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties come to agree on
the terms of the contract; and
(c) consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon in
the contract. 39
Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected upon mere meeting of the minds, Once there is
concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter, consideration, and terms of
payment a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance
must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and
without variance of any sort from the proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal,
constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer. Consequently, when something is desired
which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent
because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer. 40
When Mr. Del Rosario of VIVA met with Mr. Lopez of ABS-CBN at the Tamarind Grill on 2 April 1992 to discuss
the package of films, said package of 104 VIVA films was VIVA's offer to ABS-CBN to enter into a new Film
Exhibition Agreement. But ABS-CBN, sent, through Ms. Concio, a counter-proposal in the form of a draft
contract proposing exhibition of 53 films for a consideration of P35 million. This counter-proposal could be
nothing less than the counter-offer of Mr. Lopez during his conference with Del Rosario at Tamarind Grill
Restaurant. Clearly, there was no acceptance of VIVA's offer, for it was met by a counter-offer which
substantially varied the terms of the offer.
ABS-CBN's reliance in Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 41 and Villonco Realty Company v. Bormaheco, Inc., 42 is misplaced. In these cases, it was held that
an acceptance may contain a request for certain changes in the terms of the offer and yet be a binding
acceptance as long as "it is clear that the meaning of the acceptance is positively and unequivocally to accept
the offer, whether such request is granted or not." This ruling was, however, reversed in the resolution of 29
March 1996, 43 which ruled that the acceptance of all offer must be unqualified and absolute, i.e., it "must be
identical in all respects with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds."
On the other hand, in Villonco, cited in Limketkai, the alleged changes in the revised counter-offer were not
material but merely clarificatory of what had previously been agreed upon. It cited the statement in Stuart
v.Franklin Life Insurance Co. 44 that "a vendor's change in a phrase of the offer to purchase, which change
does not essentially change the terms of the offer, does not amount to a rejection of the offer and the tender of
a counter-offer." 45However, when any of the elements of the contract is modified upon acceptance, such
alteration amounts to a counter-offer.

44

In the case at bar, ABS-CBN made no unqualified acceptance of VIVA's offer. Hence, they underwent a period
of bargaining. ABS-CBN then formalized its counter-proposals or counter-offer in a draft contract, VIVA through
its Board of Directors, rejected such counter-offer, Even if it be conceded arguendo that Del Rosario had
accepted the counter-offer, the acceptance did not bind VIVA, as there was no proof whatsoever that Del
Rosario had the specific authority to do so.
Under Corporation Code, 46 unless otherwise provided by said Code, corporate powers, such as the power; to
enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of Directors. However, the Board may delegate such powers to
either an executive committee or officials or contracted managers. The delegation, except for the executive
committee, must be for specific purposes, 47 Delegation to officers makes the latter agents of the corporation;
accordingly, the general rules of agency as to the bindings effects of their acts would
apply. 48 For such officers to be deemed fully clothed by the corporation to exercise a power of the Board, the
latter must specially authorize them to do so. That Del Rosario did not have the authority to accept ABS-CBN's
counter-offer was best evidenced by his submission of the draft contract to VIVA's Board of Directors for the
latter's approval. In any event, there was between Del Rosario and Lopez III no meeting of minds. The
following findings of the trial court are instructive:
A number of considerations militate against ABS-CBN's claim that a contract was perfected at
that lunch meeting on April 02, 1992 at the Tamarind Grill.
FIRST, Mr. Lopez claimed that what was agreed upon at the Tamarind Grill referred to the price
and the number of films, which he wrote on a napkin. However, Exhibit "C" contains numerous
provisions which, were not discussed at the Tamarind Grill, if Lopez testimony was to be
believed nor could they have been physically written on a napkin. There was even doubt as to
whether it was a paper napkin or a cloth napkin. In short what were written in Exhibit "C'' were
not discussed, and therefore could not have been agreed upon, by the parties. How then could
this court compel the parties to sign Exhibit "C" when the provisions thereof were not previously
agreed upon?
SECOND, Mr. Lopez claimed that what was agreed upon as the subject matter of the contract
was 14 films. The complaint in fact prays for delivery of 14 films. But Exhibit "C" mentions 53
films as its subject matter. Which is which If Exhibits "C" reflected the true intent of the parties,
then ABS-CBN's claim for 14 films in its complaint is false or if what it alleged in the complaint is
true, then Exhibit "C" did not reflect what was agreed upon by the parties. This underscores the
fact that there was no meeting of the minds as to the subject matter of the contracts, so as to
preclude perfection thereof. For settled is the rule that there can be no contract where there is
no object which is its subject matter (Art. 1318, NCC).
THIRD, Mr. Lopez [sic] answer to question 29 of his affidavit testimony (Exh. "D") states:
We were able to reach an agreement. VIVA gave us the exclusive license to
show these fourteen (14) films, and we agreed to pay Viva the amount of
P16,050,000.00 as well as grant Viva commercial slots worth P19,950,000.00.
We had already earmarked this P16, 050,000.00.
which gives a total consideration of P36 million (P19,950,000.00 plus P16,050,000.00. equals
P36,000,000.00).
45

On cross-examination Mr. Lopez testified:

Q. What was written in this napkin?
A. The total price, the breakdown the known Viva movies, the 7 blockbuster
movies and the other 7 Viva movies because the price was broken down
accordingly. The none [sic] Viva and the seven other Viva movies and the sharing
between the cash portion and the concerned spot portion in the total amount of
P35 million pesos.
Now, which is which? P36 million or P35 million? This weakens ABS-CBN's claim.
FOURTH. Mrs. Concio, testifying for ABS-CBN stated that she transmitted Exhibit "C" to Mr. Del
Rosario with a handwritten note, describing said Exhibit "C" as a "draft." (Exh. "5" - Viva; tsn pp.
23-24 June 08, 1992). The said draft has a well defined meaning.
Since Exhibit "C" is only a draft, or a tentative, provisional or preparatory writing prepared for
discussion, the terms and conditions thereof could not have been previously agreed upon by
ABS-CBN and Viva Exhibit "C'' could not therefore legally bind Viva, not having agreed thereto.
In fact, Ms. Concio admitted that the terms and conditions embodied in Exhibit "C" were
prepared by ABS-CBN's lawyers and there was no discussion on said terms and conditions. . . .
As the parties had not yet discussed the proposed terms and conditions in Exhibit "C," and there
was no evidence whatsoever that Viva agreed to the terms and conditions thereof, said
document cannot be a binding contract. The fact that Viva refused to sign Exhibit "C" reveals
only two [sic] well that it did not agree on its terms and conditions, and this court has no
authority to compel Viva to agree thereto.
FIFTH. Mr. Lopez understand [sic] that what he and Mr. Del Rosario agreed upon at the
Tamarind Grill was only provisional, in the sense that it was subject to approval by the Board of
Directors of Viva. He testified:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, and after that Tamarind meeting ... the second meeting
wherein you claimed that you have the meeting of the minds between you and
Mr. Vic del Rosario, what happened?
A. Vic Del Rosario was supposed to call us up and tell us specifically the result of
the discussion with the Board of Directors.
Q. And you are referring to the so-called agreement which you wrote in [sic] a
piece of paper?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, he was going to forward that to the board of Directors for approval?
A. Yes, sir. (Tsn, pp. 42-43, June 8, 1992)
46

Q. Did Mr. Del Rosario tell you that he will submit it to his Board for approval?
A. Yes, sir. (Tsn, p. 69, June 8, 1992).
The above testimony of Mr. Lopez shows beyond doubt that he knew Mr. Del Rosario had no
authority to bind Viva to a contract with ABS-CBN until and unless its Board of Directors
approved it. The complaint, in fact, alleges that Mr. Del Rosario "is the Executive Producer of
defendant Viva" which "is a corporation." (par. 2, complaint). As a mere agent of Viva, Del
Rosario could not bind Viva unless what he did is ratified by its Board of Directors. (Vicente
vs. Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210; Arnold vs. Willets and Paterson, 44 Phil. 634). As a mere agent,
recognized as such by plaintiff, Del Rosario could not be held liable jointly and severally with
Viva and his inclusion as party defendant has no legal basis. (Salonga vs. Warner Barner [sic] ,
COLTA , 88 Phil. 125; Salmon vs. Tan, 36 Phil. 556).
The testimony of Mr. Lopez and the allegations in the complaint are clear admissions that what
was supposed to have been agreed upon at the Tamarind Grill between Mr. Lopez and Del
Rosario was not a binding agreement. It is as it should be because corporate power to enter into
a contract is lodged in the Board of Directors. (Sec. 23, Corporation Code). Without such board
approval by the Viva board, whatever agreement Lopez and Del Rosario arrived at could not
ripen into a valid contract binding upon Viva (Yao Ka Sin Trading vs. Court of Appeals, 209
SCRA 763). The evidence adduced shows that the Board of Directors of Viva rejected Exhibit
"C" and insisted that the film package for 140 films be maintained (Exh. "7-1" - Viva ). 49
The contention that ABS-CBN had yet to fully exercise its right of first refusal over twenty-four films under the
1990 Film Exhibition Agreement and that the meeting between Lopez and Del Rosario was a continuation of
said previous contract is untenable. As observed by the trial court, ABS-CBN right of first refusal had already
been exercised when Ms. Concio wrote to VIVA ticking off ten films, Thus:
[T]he subsequent negotiation with ABS-CBN two (2) months after this letter was sent, was for an
entirely different package. Ms. Concio herself admitted on cross-examination to having used or
exercised the right of first refusal. She stated that the list was not acceptable and was indeed
not accepted by ABS-CBN, (TSN, June 8, 1992, pp. 8-10). Even Mr. Lopez himself admitted that
the right of the first refusal may have been already exercised by Ms. Concio (as she had). (TSN,
June 8, 1992, pp. 71-75). Del Rosario himself knew and understand [sic] that ABS-CBN has lost
its rights of the first refusal when his list of 36 titles were rejected (Tsn, June 9, 1992, pp. 1011) 50
II
However, we find for ABS-CBN on the issue of damages. We shall first take up actual damages. Chapter 2,
Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code is the specific law on actual or compensatory damages. Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary
loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. 51 The indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the
loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain. 52 In contracts and quasi-contracts the
damages which may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherwise, It
case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the natural and probable consequences of
the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time
47

of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall
be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation. 53 In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of, whether or not such damages has been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. 54
Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit. 55
The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. It arose
from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged knowledge of lack of cause of action. Thus
paragraph 12 of RBS's Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim under the heading COUNTERCLAIM
specifically alleges:
12. ABS-CBN filed the complaint knowing fully well that it has no cause of action RBS. As a
result thereof, RBS suffered actual damages in the amount of P6,621,195.32. 56
Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be comprehended under the above law on actual
damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as
follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for tile same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
It may further be observed that in cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the damages which the
defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable from the injunctive bond. 57 In this case, ABS-CBN
had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even went to the
Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the matter, Clearly then, it was not necessary for RBS to file a
counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the counterbond.
Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka Man" for lack of sufficient
legal basis. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order and later, a writ of preliminary injunction on the
basis of its determination that there existed sufficient ground for the issuance thereof. Notably, the RTC did not
dissolve the injunction on the ground of lack of legal and factual basis, but because of the plea of RBS that it
be allowed to put up a counterbond.
As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered
as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. 58

48

The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 59 They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.
The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification. 60 Even when claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a
party's persistence in a case other than erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. 61
As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. Article 2217 thereof
defines what are included in moral damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they may be
recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be recovered in breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under item
(10) of Article 2219, thereof which reads:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered.
and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 62 The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will
serve to obviate then moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 63 Trial courts
must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
trial court. 64
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person
and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot,
therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a
nervous system. 65 The statement in People v. Manero 66 and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB 67 that a
corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a
corporation.
The basic law on exemplary damages is Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. These are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. 68 They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; 69 in quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted with
gross negligence;70 and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. 71
It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or
quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21
of the Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2)
which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of
the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction; while
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements; (1) there is an act which is
49

legal, (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy, and (3) and it is done with
intent to injure.72
Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious
and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. 73 Such must be
substantiated by evidence. 74
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the
merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft
contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If
damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria. 75
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No, 44125 is hereby REVERSED except as to unappealed award of attorney's fees in favor of VIVA
Productions, Inc.1wphi1.nt
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez and Pardo JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154259

February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

50

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim
assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July
2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions
of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the
screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he
was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart,
who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration
of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him
for which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of
fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with
the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet
dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he
was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary
thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at
the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka
na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing
distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he
was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out
of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages,
Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages
and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past
twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an
exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60)
of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those
invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr.
Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to
inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the
group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want
to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did
not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes
did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung
whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim
requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto,i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party
as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she
decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr.
Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total
nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na
kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her
51

surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on
her.331awphi1.nt
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story
to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered
to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he
was not properly dressed and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place,
but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she
invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of
Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that
Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday
celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the
host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the
violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because
he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the
party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave
the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . .,
for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence
therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one]
cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into
the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached
Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach
appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave
the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to
approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts
invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
...

52

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under
Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said
acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach
of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA,
et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys
fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon
in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in
I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN
FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR
DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH
HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION"
III.
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS
REGARD
V.
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

53

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to
self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay
Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the
same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such
findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim
did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr.
Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests.
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who
could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already
spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet
appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the
party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not
to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the
celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect
badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of
the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely
ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a
formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:

54

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How
close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony
of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower
court was correct in observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was
made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could
have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in
civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story
up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart
who invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. 58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea
for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nt
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.61 These
55

standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There
is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was
perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October
1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the
statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr.
Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The
lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that
Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited
Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any illmotive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If
at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social
equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety
(Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and
the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was
"an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch;
56

and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed
that he had income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion
reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo
P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally
married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus
[Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
57

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan
City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,
they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22,
1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared
in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were
able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked
money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did
not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of
the marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when they exchanged their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to
Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one
time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified
that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his
first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in
jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum,
to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount
ofP200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage
had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability
58

for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for
bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must
be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private
complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that
the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court inUnited States v. Pealosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on the
Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code,
which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG
further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first
marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the
State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and
sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to
the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry
the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the
absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of
Appeals16to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to
reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE
59

CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED

FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD
OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been
"absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for
seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to
succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was
able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her
whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death
of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present.
The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the
rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code
does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a
judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the
validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was
already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out
that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioners
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG
cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

60

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado
con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for
the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death
like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has
been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a
third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion
fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view
that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or
voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code
of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are
three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence,
and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a
second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the
essential elements of the crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an

61

intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification
from which another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been
done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a
consideration of the whole evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution
also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family
Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As
a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony
by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996,
he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He
should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first
wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such
judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal
intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty
of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or
useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on
mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."
Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society
require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to
serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging
stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
62

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life
and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence
of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period
provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on
a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true,"
is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties
believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second
marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not
only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive
death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.

63

In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of
the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must
have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to
Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to
contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion
spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is
not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re
Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or
she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he
or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no
benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a

64

superfluous and meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper proceedings" in Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of
the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years.
The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or "before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is
erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the
prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively
dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is
not true.53A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of
the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349
seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a
second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if
it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the
view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code,
the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for
the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he
cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse
must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in
case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the
good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are
now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with
65

possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The
judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in
some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.60 Before
such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of
the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse before the other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in
favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of
the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that
the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for
bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce
evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced
evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the
petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del
Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe,
por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG,
likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act
or omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must
66

be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must
be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article
2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of
this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party
has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not
have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to
those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as
in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender
may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner
is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code.
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According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act
with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are:
(a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its
own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the
said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On
the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter
provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for
specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her
that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his
parents made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years
or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already
married to another beforethey were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the
fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a
single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man
who it turned out was not her lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did
not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at
p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful
68

rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they
consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94,
186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but was
willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the
plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to
punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24,
supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified
that because of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was
embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldnt sleep" but "couldnt eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost
quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys reasonable allowance of
$1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App.
Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery.
As held inJekshewitz v. Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of
such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he
has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his
having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from
his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems
to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a
crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing
her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship
and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition
that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman
v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the
law by herself but upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on
her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson
v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68
Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was
induced solely by the defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract

69

illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
isAFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
70

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
Decision 1of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October
1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry
on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course
at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she
was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such
other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred
in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative
Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
71

respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment;
he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative
of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that
as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City
since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,
Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay
the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent
were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits
to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him,
(e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino
customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did
72

not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity
and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim
was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship
and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was
good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they
were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to
live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4
o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a
result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him
of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her
parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay
captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the
truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his
desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for
the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and
friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as
CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for
lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial
court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
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First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years
old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a
virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as
described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban
life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he
went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town
fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and
on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in
the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there
was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must
indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love
affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp.
6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before
he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman,
just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country
girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil
74

Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the
single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or
injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the
private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such
Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian
ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred
in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now
his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed
his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in
view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had
filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is
clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the
rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact
of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus,
inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
75

misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,

L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590
Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this
case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The
reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We
quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable
has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself
more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which
has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept
of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.

76

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen
years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore,
though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But
under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight
to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an AngloAmerican or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are
to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
77

cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court
denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around
thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been
moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed.
The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura,
27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducementand the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect,
and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
78

opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles
of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short
all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the
Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this
Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages
may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos,
7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there
is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because
here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission
is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The
court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
79

circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not
constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable
under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case
for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's
sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to
him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down inBatarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their
relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later.
Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a
waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a
man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance.
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that
may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth,
inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then,
from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman
so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal
of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of
lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is
not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime;
equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has
been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the
original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
80

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same
room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor
of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED,
with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

81

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and
serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and
set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the
82

parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings
the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the
petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a
motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would
confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable
element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955
but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties
and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that
chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to
this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as
ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the
belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be
duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of
Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and
valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due
to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani
vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced
before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed
out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by
Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did
not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40
Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to
law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of
promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as
reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not
an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code
the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury

83

to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes
it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from
again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised
as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral
and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid
of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... ,
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar,
JJ.,concur.

84

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the former, his
mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's complaint and set aside the resolution 2dated October 21,
1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the dispositive portion of its
decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor
Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to
pay complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay
attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.

85

It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment,
support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao,
10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges,
among others, that sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located
at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited
Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and
courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting
something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married
man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan
is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that
Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at
the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a
waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000. As
relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied
having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
cause of action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and
litigation expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint impleading as coplaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975,
the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his previous
answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion of which
reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino
the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and
by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored
his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on
the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of
Ivan Mendez.

86

In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's motion for
reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read as
follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan Mendez
ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral
damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital and medical bills
incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his own
illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all the rights,
privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such status; to give a permanent monthly
support in favor of plaintiff Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of
P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the complaint was
dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of the trial and in not
affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate court committed a
misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first
or second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive and not a
conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court
of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been
properly assigned and as could be established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive
even on this Court (Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors of law committed by the
Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the
evidence on record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158
SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not
proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael
Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this Court as
the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial court initially entertained such posture. It
ordered the recognition of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for
reconsideration, it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's
87

testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of
November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she could not
remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and
Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on
direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of
September, October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly pointed out by
private respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that
"the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days", the
conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in
the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in
November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated
February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty.
Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances of her pregnancy while still
fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the
duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is belied by
Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan
who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her
boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to
establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory
that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of
Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if
sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's
Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN,
December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she
been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation
with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a
married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated
their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving
force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

88

Footnotes
1 Penned by Association Justice Simeon Gopengco and concurred in by Associate Justices
Oscar Victoriano and Jose Melo.
2 Issued by Judge Antonio M. Martinez.
3 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
4 Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17396

May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

89

Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts
alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an
unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral
damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status,
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the
complaint.1wph1.t
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the
time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town.
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because
of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him
as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each
other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs
reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to
their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant
who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and
sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a
crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4"
by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on
the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
90

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no
news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married
man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair
was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of
plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for
the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection
Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the
defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and
sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply
fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and
in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an
unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot
lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter
to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house
of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his
visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When
the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going
to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who
is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from
the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not
only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against
appellee.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

91

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39019 January 22, 1988
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO
O. CHAVES, and JUAN O. CHAVES, respondents-appellees.

YAP, J.:
In an action for recovery of damages for embarassment, humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride, caused
to herein private respondents, by reason of the disconnection of their electrical service by the petitioners, the
then Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXIV, rendered a decision dated
December 13,1967, ordering herein petitioners jointly and severally to pay private respondents the sum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages
and, One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees, and dismissing petitioners' counterclaim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals and in toto the trial court's decision. Their Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric power for the
consumption of the general public in Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of MERALCO.
Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for damages,
together with their children, Isaac O. Chaves, Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and Isaac Jr. and
Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr. and Isaac, Jr. were practicing lawyers and Rosendo
was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school teacher.
The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiff Isaac Chaves became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the year 1953 when he
and his family were residing at No. 211-D Rubi, Manila. In connection with the contract for
electrical service, he deposited the sum of P5.00 (Exh. "A") with defendant MERALCO on
February 12, 1953. This deposit in the name of plaintiff Isaac Chaves was retained by
MERALCO and made to apply to subsequent contracts for electrical service entered into after
subsequent transfers of the Chaves family to other residences and up to the time this family
went to reside at the place aforementioned, at No. 2656 Mercedes Street, Singalong, Manila. ...
At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs
and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9,1965, for the sum of P7.90
92

(Exhibit "C"), and the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the amount of P7.20 (Exhibit
"C"). Juana O. Chaves, however, informed Yambao that these bills would be paid at the
MERALCO main office.
Accordingly, on April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the defendant's main office at San
Marcelino, Manila, but paid only the bill marked as Exhibit 'C" leaving the other bill Identified as
Exhibit "C-l" unpaid.
Past 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21,1965, MERALCO caused the electric service in
plaintiff's residence to be discontinued and the power line cut off.
The next day, April 22, 1965, at about 9:00 a.m., plaintiff Rosendo O. Chaves went to the
MERALCO main office and paid the amount of P7.20 for the bill marked as Exhibit "C-l", and the
sum of P7.00 for the subsequent bill corresponding to the period from March 10 up to April 8,
1965 (Exhibit "C-2") after his attention was called to the latter account. Rosendo O. Chaves then
sought the help of Atty. Lourdy Torres, one of the defendants' counsel, and, thereafter, the
power line was reconnected and electric service restored to the Chaves residence at about 7:00
p.m. of that same day. 1
Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein respondent. However, since only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioners, 'for the sake of argument and for the purpose of giving focus on the legal issues', do not take issue
with such finding.
Petitioners contend that in the absence of bad faith, they could not be held liable for moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees. The failure to give a notice of disconnection to private respondents might
have been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by itself does not constitute bad faith or fraud; it must be
shown that such a failure was motivated by in or done with fraudulent intent.Petitioners also maintain that '
private respondents were in arrears in the payment of their electricity bills when their electric service was
connected, no moral damages may be recovered by them under the 'clean hands' doctrine enunciated in
Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Company, CA-G.R. No. L-9683-R, May 26, 1964.
In its decision, the respondent Court of Appeals held that MERALCO's right to disconnect the electric service of
a delinquent customer "is an absolute one, subject only to the requirement that defendant MERALCO should
give the customer a written notice of disconnection 48 hours in advance." This requirement is embodied in
Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission which provides as follows:
Section 97. Payment of bills. A public service, may require that bills for service be paid within
a specified time after rendition. When the billing period covers a month or more, the minimum
time allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the specified time, service may be
discontinued for the non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours' written notice of such
disconnection has been given the customer: Provided, however, that disconnections of service
shall not be made on Sundays and official holidays and never after 2 p.m. of any working day:
Provided, further, that if at the moment the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders
payment of the unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the operator who is to effect the
disconnection, the said agent or employee shall be obliged to accept tender of payment and
issue a temporary receipt for the amount and shall desist from disconnecting the service. 2
93

The respondent court stressed the importance and necessity of the 48-hour advance written notification before
a disconnection of service may be effected. Said the court:
... It sets in motion the disconnection of an electrical service of the customer by giving the
notice, determining the expiration date thereof, and executing the disconnection. It, therefore,
behooves the defendant MERALCO that before it disconnects a customer's electrical service,
there should be sufficient evidence that the requirements for the disconnection had been duly
complied with, otherwise, the poor consumer can be subjected to the whims and caprices of the
defendant, by the mere pretension that the written notice had been duly served upon the
customer. 3
We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from. One can not deny the vital role which a public utility
such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby
municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most people
in these areas justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying
electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it
has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions
under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service
to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection
of the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar case, 4 where we
said:
... petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice
constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is
indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This
is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article
2219 of the Code. Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which
provides that wilfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Likewise, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that being in arrears in the payment of their bills, the private
respondents are not entitled to moral damages under the doctrine that "he who comes to court in demand of
equity, must come with clean hands." We rejected this argument in the Manila Gas Corporation case, supra,
wherein we held that respondents' default in the payment of his bills "cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat
or null the claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in
ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent ... is entitled."
Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent court in affirming the trial court's
decision. The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

94

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18630

December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee
herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the
tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to
defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love
and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the
latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation,
plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month;
that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry
plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn
child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby,
plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.

95

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with
the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its
support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin
to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733,
September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs.
SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the
Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the
Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article
21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in
law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the

96

idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56).
She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions
and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence
of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the
female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while
defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served
with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December,
1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and
professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people
in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in
July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and
acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December,
1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and
promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by
a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
97

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded
with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his
wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not
visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts
of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for
one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all
sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the
child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement,
since the child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of
First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 136185

October 30, 2000

EDUARDO P. LUCAS, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MAXIMO C. ROYO and CORAZON B. ROYO, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

98

This is a petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 which affirmed the holding of the
trial court2 that the civil case for collection of a sum of money with damages filed by respondent-spouses
Maximo C. Royo and Corazon B. Royo against Eduardo P. Lucas was unwarranted and without sufficient
basis, but with the modification that the award of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses shall be
deleted for lack of clear proof of malice in filing the case. The Resolution denying petitioner Lucas motion for
reconsideration is likewise assailed.
Petitioner Eduardo P. Lucas was a seller, canvasser and collector in Royos Homemade Candy and Bakery
(ROYOS), a factory in Laguna engaged in the manufacture of candies and bread. The factory is owned by
respondent-spouses Maximo C. Royo and Corazon B. Royo. Lucas was assigned to specific market areas to
sell ROYOS products. Assisting him were a helper, a checker and a driver. In procuring orders from
customers, Lucas was provided with order slips and official receipts, as well as a notebook where the sales,
cash collections and indebtedness of customers were listed (sales and collection notebook). After each
collection, the order slips and the sales and collection notebook were turned over to Maximo C. Royo and/or
Corazon B. Royo for checking of entries.
On 6 January 1992 Maximo Royo and Corazon Royo filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money plus
damages against Lucas alleging among others that in 1991 the latter defrauded them of P177,191.30 by
collecting the indebtedness of customers without remitting the amount to them, by altering the list in the sales
and collection notebook after the cash collections had been checked and remitted to them, and by making it
appear that the indebtedness of customers had been paid when Lucas actually pocketed the amount. The
Royos likewise alleged that a demand letter dated 19 October 1991 was sent to Lucas for the return of the
amount but he refused.
According to Corazon, she began to suspect that Lucas was defrauding them on 21 August 1991, thus she
instructed Carlito Flores, one of their workers, to place Lucas under close watch, especially on what he did with
the sales and collection notebook. On 21 September 1991, returning from a trip from Fairview, Quezon City,
Carlito Flores reported that he saw Lucas tear pages from the sales and collection notebook while they were
along Calauan, Laguna. Corazon did not say anything, but the following day Lucas was dismissed from his
employment.
Lucas denied the charge. He argued that it was impossible for him to defraud the Royos nor alter the lists in
the sales and collection notebook as strict measures were imposed upon all sellers /canvassers/agents with
respect to their remittances. He argued likewise that he could not have torn the pages from the sales and
collection notebook on their return trip to Laguna because he was in full view of his companions as he was
seated beside the driver and the checker while Carlito Flores was seated at the back.
Petitioner Lucas opined that the actual reason for his dismissal was his having informed the Office of the Social
Security System (SSS) of the Royos' failure to report their employees for SSS coverage.3 After his termination,
he filed another case against the Royos before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal
dismissal and violation of labor laws. He surmised that the complaint by the spouses against him was merely
instituted in retaliation for the cases he had filed and to harass him if not weaken his resolve to pursue the
cases he had filed.
In his compulsory counterclaim, Lucas stated that the Royos had informed his friends, customers and business
associates of the fraud he allegedly committed against them while spreading rumors that he was a swindler
and a manloloko. As a consequence of such rumors, Lucas claimed that his name was sullied, his reputation
99

tarnished, and he suffered deep anguish and distress as his family was also affected by the rumors. According
to him, his credit standing among the banks and his creditors was destroyed. In fact, Rogelio C. Cariaga, one
of his creditors, withheld the release of his P100,000.00 loan which he intended to use to finance and expand
his fishpond and piggery business. As this did not materialize, he incurred losses in the amount of P150,000.00
for unrealized profit. To protect and defend himself against the accusations hurled against him, he employed
the services of a lawyer for P45,000.00 plus P1,200.00 per appearance. He demanded that he be
paid P100,000.00 as actual damages in view of the loan withheld, P150,000.00 as unrealized profit from his
fishpond and piggery business, P500,000.00 for moral damages, P200,000.00 for exemplary damages, plus
attorneys fees. On 8 March 1993 the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Royos for failure to prove the
allegations therein by preponderance of evidence. The court likewise found that the filing of the case was
unwarranted, uncalled for and without sufficient basis, and thus, ordered the spouses Maximo and Corazon
Royo to pay Lucas P25,000.00 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. As for Lucass counterclaim, the
court a quo denied his claim for compensatory damages arising from unrealized profit from his fishpond and
piggery business for being purely speculative, and doubted whether the complaint was the cause for the denial
of his loan as he was a close family friend of his creditor.4 As for his claim for moral damages due to the rumors
supposedly spread by the Royos, the court a quo denied his claim on the ground that the spouses were merely
expressing their sentiments and belief after being aggrieved.5
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Royo spouses claimed that the court a quo erred in failing
to appreciate the evidence showing the failure of Lucas to remit the amount representing collection from the
customers and in awarding damages to him.6 For his part, Lucas alleged that the court a quo erred in (a)
holding that his expected profit from his fishpond and piggery project was purely speculative, (b) failing to
award him moral and exemplary damages, and (c) disregarding the testimony of witness Cristina Arguil
concerning the damaging rumors spread by the Royo spouses.
On 22 June 1998 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint of the
Royos but deleted the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses in favor of Lucas as it found no clear
proof of malice in the filing of their suit. Lucas moved for reconsideration, particularly of the decision deleting
the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses but his motion was denied.
Petitioner argues in this petition against the denial of his attorneys fees and litigation expenses as he claims
that the records are replete with evidence showing respondents malice. He likewise claims that the Court of
Appeals failed to resolve the other assigned errors identified in his brief in CA-G.R. No. CV-41269: (a) the court
a quos holding that the expected profit of defendant-appellant in his fishpond and piggery projects was purely
speculative; (b) its failure to grant compensatory, moral and exemplary damages on the ground that Maximo
and Corazon Royo were merely expressing their sentiments and belief that they were aggrieved; and, (c)
disregarding the testimony of Cristina Arguil concerning the rumors spread by the spouses.7
Thus at the crux of this petition are two (2) issues: (a) whether the filing of a complaint for collection of a sum of
money plus damages against petitioner, found to be unsubstantiated and without cause, merits an award of
damages and attorneys fees in his favor; and, (b) whether the spreading of rumors derogatory to the character
of petitioner entitles him to an award of moral and exemplary damages.
The trial court and the appellate court were one in holding that the complaint that respondents Maximo and
Corazon Royo had filed was unwarranted, baseless and without sufficient leg to stand on. Hence, what
remains unresolved is whether malice attended the filing of the complaint or whether it was a case of malicious
prosecution that petitioner should be entitled to damages.
100

For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper the following elements must concur: (a) the fact of the prosecution
and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated in an
acquittal; (b) in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and, (c) the prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice, i.e., by improper or sinister motive.8 The element of malice and the
absence of probable cause must be proved.9 There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was
false and baseless to entitle the victims to damages.10 The two (2) elements must simultaneously exist,
otherwise, the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
In the instant case, Corazon Royo admitted that the sales and collection notebook was checked by their
checker everyday after its surrender but, during the period of November 1990 to 21 September 1991, she was
not notified of any anomaly.11 She likewise admitted that she looked at their records only after terminating
Eduardo P. Lucas and after the latter had filed complaints against them before the SSS and the NLRC.12 The
foregoing suggest that the entries in the sales and collection notebook were regular to begin with and
respondent Corazon Royo was scrutinizing, if not manipulating them, in order to contrive an offense with which
to pin petitioner for having filed cases against them. Her actions in the interim in which the civil complaint was
filed thus suggest that respondent spouses were motivated more by a desire to harass and vex petitioner
rather than by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights.
While free access to the courts is guaranteed under Sec. 11, Art. III, of the Constitution, it does not give anyone
the unbridled license to file any case against another, whatever his motives may be. That right is coupled with
the responsibility to show that the institution of the action arose from a legitimate cause of action arising from
injury or grief and not done merely to spite or inconvenience another. And whoever files a case against another
shall be responsible for the consequences thereof whenever his act of filing infringes upon the rights of
others.13
Petitioner claims that the filing of the collection case tarnished his name and honor, and ruined his reputation in
his community, particularly among the businessmen of Laguna. He presented as witness, Rogelio C. Cariaga,
a creditor, who testified that upon learning of the case filed against Lucas he withheld the release of the latters
requested loan as he did not want to risk the loss of his money.14 In his letter of 18 January 1992 addressed to
petitioner and his wife, Cariaga explained the reason for his failure to accommodate Lucas' and his wifes
requested loan, to wit -15
Ginoo at Ginang Lucas:
Ikinalulungkot ko sa ngayon na pansamanatala na hindi muna kayo mabigyan ng halagang Isang Daang
Libong (P100,000.00) Piso, dagdag sa puhunang inotang para sa inyong negosyo.
Ang balita tungkol sa kasong inyong hinaharap sa Royos Candy ay nangangailangan nang kaunting
panahong pag-aaral upang ang nasabing halaga ay aking maisa-alanga-alang at hindi malagay sa
pakikipagsapalaran x x x x
Ang inyong lingkod,
(Sgd.) ROGELIO C. CARIAGA

101

Any personal relationship between petitioner and Cariaga appeared to be of no moment then to the
prospective creditor as his primordial concern was the guaranteed payment of the loan that could hardly be
expected from one who allegedly defrauded his employers.
Petitioner claims that the loan was intended as additional capital for the development and expansion of his
fishpond and piggery business the denial of which resulted in a sizable loss of income for which he should be
compensated. As proof thereof, he presented a feasibility report on his planned input and projected earnings.
We find no merit in the argument. Indeed, the failure to develop and expand their fishpond and piggery
business was due to the denial of the loan expected from Cariaga. However, the expected profits are at best
speculative for which respondents cannot be held accountable. In determining actual damages, the court
cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the
award of actual damages becomes erroneous.16 Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same must be
sufficiently proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given.17 As it is
only the denial of the loan that was sufficiently proved, petitioner must be given an equitable amount as
compensatory damages.
With regard to the second issue, petitioner asserts that respondent-spouses had been informing his business
associates and neighbors that he defrauded them and had been spreading rumors that he was a swindler and
a cheat. He presented Joey Vistal, son of a business associate of his,18 who testified that he met respondentspouses on 29 August 1992 at Divisoria, Manila, when they introduced themselves to him. The spouses asked
him if he knew their agent Lucas, which he acknowledged. They then told him that Lucas was a manloloko as
he would ask for leftover candies from them on the pretense of using the candies as fish feeds when he would
actually mix the candies with the unsold ones returned to the spouses.19 Petitioner also presented Cristina
Arguil, a former employee at the ROYOS. She testified that she was at the house of the spouses, attending a
fiesta, when she heard Corazon Royo tell her visitors that she was defrauded and cheated in the amount
of P177,000.00 by Eduardo Lucas.20 Petitioner claims that as a result of respondent spouses' rumormongering,
his name and reputation were tarnished and he and his family suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish,
which should entitle him to P500,000.00 as moral damages.
One of our most guarded and valued rights is our freedom of expression. However, the freedom to express
ones sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another.
Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.
Respondent-spouses exceeded the bounds of ordinary conversation and overstepped their protected right of
expression. The allegations that petitioner was a cheat and that he defrauded them of a sum of money, then
unfounded, amounted to calumnious remarks which could destroy, so it is claimed, petitioners name and
reputation among his business associates and neighbors. It is apparent that respondent spouses were more
motivated by a desire to lash out at petitioner rather than by an impetus to express their sentiments and their
belief out of outrage or grief.1wphi1 Malice, which is the doing of an act conceived in the spirit of mischief or
criminal indifference to the rights of others or which must partake of a criminal or wanton nature, is presumed
from any defamatory imputation, particularly when it injures the reputation of the person defamed.21 Thus,
respondent-spouses should be made to pay moral damages to petitioner and, as respondent-spouses acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or oppressive manner, the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages should
likewise be awarded to him to deter others from emulating their example.

102

Petitioner contends that he was constrained to hire the services of a counsel to defend himself against the
imputations made by respondent-spouses. However, he admitted that there was no existing contract between
him and his lawyer to prove the claimed amount of P45,000.00 plus appearance fees. Be that as it may, it is
readily apparent that petitioner sought the services of a lawyer to argue his cause, even to the extent of
elevating the matter to this Court; thus, the former award of P25,000.00 is reinstated as it is considered
sufficient.
As regards moral damages, a good reputation once lost is hard to regain. Hence, the amount of P50,000.00
should be considered reasonable. On the other hand, the compensatory damages of P100,000.00 previously
awarded should be reduced to P25,000.00 as it is merely intended to compensate for the loan the projected
profits of which are at most speculative.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 22 June 1998 declaring the collection case filed by
respondent-spouses Maximo C. Royo and Corazon B. Royo against petitioner Eduardo P. Lucas as
unwarranted but deleting the award for attorneys fees and litigation expenses, is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that respondent-spouses are ordered to pay petitioner Eduardo P. Lucas P25,000.00 for
compensatory damages,P50,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P25,000.00
for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

103

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.NO. L-36249 March 29, 1985
ANIANO OBAA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETO SANDOVAL, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioner seeks a review of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court (in CA-G.R. No. 44345-R) ordering him
in an action for Replevin to return to Aniceto SANDOVAL, private respondent herein, 170 cavans of rice or to
pay its value in the amount of P37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint until fully
paid.
SANDOVAL is the owner and manager of the "Sandoval and Sons Rice Mill" located in Rosales, Pangasinan.
He is engaged in the buying and selling of palay.
On November 21, 1964, SANDOVAL was approached by a certain Chan Lin who offered to purchase from him
170 cavans of clean rice (wagwag variety) at the price of P37.26 per cavan, delivery to be made the following
day at petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union, with payment to be made thereat by Chan Lin to
SANDOVAL's representative. SANDOVAL accepted the offer as he knew petitioner and had had previous
transactions with him.
As agreed, the 170 cavans of rice were transported the following day on a truck belonging to SANDOVAL to
petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union. Chan Lin accompanied the shipment. Upon arrival thereat, the
goods were unloaded but when the truck driver attempted to collect the purchase price from Chan Lin, the
latter was nowhere to be found. The driver tried to collect from petitioner, but the latter refused stating that he

104

had purchase the goods from Chan Lin at P33.00 per cavan and that the price therefore had already been paid
to Chan Lin.
Further demands having been met with refusal, SANDOVAL, as plaintiff, filed suit for replevin against
petitioner, then the defendant, before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, which ordered petitionerdefendant to pay to SANDOVAL one-half () of the cost of the rice or P2,805.00.
On appeal by petitioner-defendant to the then Court of First Instance of La Union, the parties agreed to adopt
SANDOVAL's testimony before the Municipal Court. After trial de novo, judgment was rendered dismissing the
complaint against petitioner-defendant.
On appeal to respondent Appellate Court, SANDOVAL obtained a reversal in his favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and another one entered ordering
defendant-appellee to return the one hundred and seventy cavans of rice to plaintiff- appellant
or to pay its value in the amount of P 37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid and with costs against the appellee. 1
Before us, petitioner-defendant takes issue with the following Appellate Court findings:
From the evidence presented by the parties, it is evident that this is a simple case of swindling
perpetuated by Chan Lin at the expense of the plaintiff and the defendant. The act of Chan Lin
in purchasing plaintiff's rice at the price of P 37.25 per cavan and thereafter offering the same
goods to defendant at a much lower price is an indication that it was never his intention to
comply with his obligation to plaintiff. It is clear that Chan Lin's only purpose in entering into said
contract with plaintiff was to acquire the physical possession of the goods and then to pass
them on to defendant on the pretext that he is the owner thereof. Premises considered,
therefore, Chan Lin cannot be considered as the owner of the goods at the time the same was
said to have been sold to the defendant-appellee. Considering that defendant acquired the 170
cavans of rice from a person who is not the owner thereof, it is therefore clear that he acquired
no greater right than his predecessor-in-interest.
Finally, on principle of equity, it is but proper that plaintiff-appellant be allowed to recover the
one-hundred and seventy cavans of rice or its value. Being the undisputed owner of the above
mentioned goods, the appellant cannot be deprived of its ownership without the corresponding
payment. 2
We agree with petitioner-defendant that there was a perfected sale. Article 1475 of the Civil Code lays down
the general rule that there is perfection when there is consent upon the subject matter and price, even if neither
is delivered.
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
xxx xxx xxx

105

Ownership of the rice, too, was transferred to the vendee, Chan Lin, upon its delivery to him at San Fernando,
La Union, the place stipulated 3 and pursuant to Articles 1477 and 1496 of the same Code:
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.
Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is
delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any manner
signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
At the very least, Chan Lin had a rescissible title to the goods for the non-payment of the purchase price, but
which had not been rescinded at the time of the sale to petitioner.
However, from petitioner-defendant's own testimony before the Court of First Instance, he
admits that three days after the delivery, he was repaid the sum of P5,600.00 by Chan Lin, who
was then accompanied by SANDOVAL's driver, and that he had delivered the rice back to them.
On rebuttal, however, the driver denied that the rice had ever been returned. 4 The driver's
version is the more credible, for, as SANDOVAL's counsel had manifested in open Court, if
return of the rice had been effected, they would have withdrawn the complaint. 5 Following is the
admission made by petitioner-defendant:
Q After the third day ... when that request for you to hold the rice was already
overdue, what happened?
A This is what happened. Chan Lin and the driver with the same truck that they
used to unload the rice, came to me.
Q What day was that?
A That was I think, Thursday, about 4:30 P.M.
Q Do you know the date?
A November 26, I think.
Q What did they do when this driver and Mr. Chan Lin came back?
A They told me that they wanted the rice back and give my money back.
Q Did they give you your money back?
A Yes.
Q How much?
A They gave me P5.600.

106

COURT:
Q They gave you that amount?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GUALBERTO:
Q Did they tell you why they were getting back the rice and giving you back your
money?
A Yes. The complete rice, and Vallo (SANDOVAL's driver) told me, he wanted to
return the rice to the ricemill, that is what Vallo and the Chinese agreed with
Aniceto Sandoval.
Q Did the Chinese tell you that he made agreement with Sandoval to get back
the rice?
A Yes.
COURT:
Q Did you receive the money?
A Yes , sir 6
Having been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin , the sale, as between them, had been voluntarily
rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby divested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he
should return the rice to Chan Lin, but since even the latter, again from petitioner-defendant's own testimony
above-quoted, was ready to return the rice to SANDOVAL, and the latter's driver denies that the rice had been
returned by petitioner-defendant cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another by
holding on to property no longer belonging to him. 7 In law and in equity, therefore, SANDOVAL is entitled to
recover the rice, or the value theref since hewas not paid the price therefor.
WHEREFORE, albeit on a different premise, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.

107

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158253

March 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent.
DECISION
108

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing
the Decision1 dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 10538, granting the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap
(respondent) against the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, 1992.
Respondent, doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin
Construction), was pre-qualified together with two other contractors. Since respondent submitted the lowest
bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.3 On November 4, 1992, a Contract
Agreement was executed by respondent and petitioner.4 On September 25, 1992, District Engineer Rafael S.
Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.5 Accordingly, respondent
undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs.6
On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted
a final inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and
specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the District Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final
Acceptance.7
Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.8 The DPWH prepared the
Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the
District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the
contractors license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The District
Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction
for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and effective although its contractors license had
already expired when the projects were contracted.10
In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department opined
that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the Contractors License Law, does not
provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly
prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without
prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor and the
government officials or employees concerned.11
In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer requested clarification from the DPWH Legal Department
on whether Carwin Construction should be paid for works accomplished despite an expired contractors license
at the time the contracts were executed.12
In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department, recommended
that payment should be made to Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal opinion.13 Despite such
recommendation for payment, no payment was made to respondent.

109

Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner
before the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to
disapprove the claim.15
Following the submission of respondents Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,16 the RTC issued an Order dated
March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss.17 The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was
likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.19
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State.20
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, ordering the latter, thru its District Engineer at Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
to pay the following:
a) P457,000.00 representing the contract for the concreting project of Sitio 5 road, Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga plus interest at 12% from demand until fully paid; and
b) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed
project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the long standing and
consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself at the expense of another.22
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.23 On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision sustaining
the Decision of the RTC. It held that since the case involves the application of the principle of estoppel against
the government which is a purely legal question, then the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply; that by its actions the government is estopped from questioning the validity and binding effect
of the Contract Agreement with the respondent; that denial of payment to respondent on purely technical
grounds after successful completion of the project is not countenanced either by justice or equity.
The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision dated April 28, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the interest shall
be six percent (6%) per annum computed from June 21, 1995.
SO ORDERED.24

110

Hence, the present petition on the following ground:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:
(a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND
(b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE
RESPONDENTS MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.25
Petitioner contends that respondents recourse to judicial action was premature since the proper remedy was
to appeal the District Auditors disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant to Section 48, Presidential Decree
No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; that the COA
has primary jurisdiction to resolve respondents money claim against the government under Section
2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of
cause of action.
Respondent, on the other hand, in his Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code provisions relating to
human relations. He submits that equity demands that he be paid for the work performed; otherwise, the
mandate of the Civil Code provisions relating to human relations would be rendered nugatory if the State itself
is allowed to ignore and circumvent the standard of behavior it sets for its inhabitants.
The present petition is bereft of merit.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes.29 The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.30
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.31
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There
are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c)
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;32 (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot;33 (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public

111

interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.34 Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present
case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to
a contractor with an expired contractors license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for the completed work
despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of
respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled
to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts.35Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The
final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.36 The issue
does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the COA disapproved respondents claim against the
Government, and, under Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the administrative remedy available to respondent is an
appeal of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of
exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for specific performance and damages was not
prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch VIII):38
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and wait until the Commission on Audit and the Ministry of
Public Highways had acted on the claims for compensation for the lands appropriated by the government. The
road had been completed; the Pope had come and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be paid for the properties
taken from them. Given this official indifference, which apparently would continue indefinitely, the private
respondents had to act to assert and protect their interests.39
On the question of whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects,
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a
bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of
contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of
any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use
an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction,
be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.40 This rule derived from the
maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from
112

construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.41 Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.42
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered
into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of
the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment,
however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari
(no man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury) states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience, x x x guides human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society to the end that
law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."43 The rules thereon apply
equally well to the Government.44Since respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and
acceptance by petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the
finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of
respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

113

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164349

January 31, 2006

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZCATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to
an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon
Branch of the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a
telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village,
Quezon City1 reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." For RCPIs services, Grace paid P10.502 for
which she was issued a receipt.3
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no response was received from her,
Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any
financial aid.
Immediately after she received Graces letter, Zenaida, along with her husband Fortunato Catibog, left on
January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother Editha left for Quezon City on January
28, 1991 and brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined from
January 30, 1991 to March 21, 1991.

114

The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991.4 On inquiry from RCPI
why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery
thereof as it was another messenger who previously was assigned to deliver the same but the address could
not be located, hence, the telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger finally found
the address on February 15, 1991.
Edithas husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5, 1991,5 demanded an explanation from the
manager of the Service Quality Control Department of the RCPI, Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by letter of
March 13, 1991,6 as follows:
Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly processed in accordance with our
standard operating procedure. However, delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of
circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI. Among others, during the transmission
process, the radio link connecting the points of communication involved encountered radio noise and
interferences such that subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in the receiving teleprinter machine.
Our internal message monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus, a repeat transmission was made and
subsequent delivery was effected. (Underscoring supplied)
Verchezs lawyer thereupon wrote RCPIs manager Fabian, by letter of July 23, 1991,7 requesting for a
conference on a specified date and time, but no representative of RCPI showed up at said date and time.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses,
filed a complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early
demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice,8 for which they prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages9 and attorneys fees.10
After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue11 was denied12 by Branch 5 of the RTC of
Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer, alleging that except with respect to Grace,13 the other plaintiffs had no privity
of contract with it; any delay in the sending of the telegram was due to force majeure, "specifically, but not
limited to, radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the
telegraphic message";14 the clause in the Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace absolved it from
liability for any damage arising from the transmission other than the refund of telegram tolls;15 it observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; and at all events, any cause of action had been
barred by laches.16
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the questioned telegram was not apparently the
proximate cause of the death of Editha," ruled out the presence of force majeure. Respecting the clause in the
telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court held that it partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion.
Finding that the nature of RCPIs business obligated it to dispatch the telegram to the addressee at the earliest
possible time but that it did not in view of the negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter and the
concomitant delay in delivering the telegram on time, the trial court, upon the following provisions of the Civil
Code, to wit:
115

Article 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being at fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the "omission of the diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, or
the place."
In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram to the addressee is of an urgent
nature. Its essence is the early delivery of the telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of
its employees, the defendant failed to discharge of its obligation on time making it liable for damages under
Article 2176.
The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
rendered judgment against RCPI. Accordingly, it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, to wit:
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount:
1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as attorneys fees; and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.18
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27, 2004,19 affirmed the trial courts decision.
Hence, RCPIs present petition for review on certiorari, it raising the following questions: (1) "Is the award of
moral damages proper even if the trial court found that there was no direct connection between the injury and
the alleged negligent acts?"20 and (2) "Are the stipulations in the Telegram Transmission Form, in the nature
"contracts of adhesion" (sic)?21
RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection between its delay in transmitting the
telegram and Edithas death.22
RCPIs stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract with
regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:

116

Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (Underscoring supplied)
Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained:
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance
justify,prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not
permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the
promissee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his
bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, or
his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or his "restitution
interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis
for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who
has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to
excuse him from his ensuing liability.23(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It took 25 days,
however, for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected
the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not
locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss. Ones negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing
damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the
result of a persons participation whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
xxxx
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event that could not be
foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an exclusion of human
intervention from the cause of injury or loss.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the telegram at the soonest
possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she
could have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
117

In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:

Considering the public utility of RCPIs business and its contractual obligation to transmit messages, it should
exercise due diligence to ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at the given address and
shouldprovide a system whereby in cases of undelivered messages the sender is given notice of non-delivery.
Messages sent by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent than those which can
wait for the mail.25
xxxx
People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep emotional stress or pressing
financial needs. Knowing that messages about the illnesses or deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a
family, important business transactions, and notices of conferences or meetings as in this case, are coursed
through the petitioner and similar corporations, it is incumbent upon them to exercise a greater amount of care
and concern than that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to inform senders of the non-delivery of
messages should be undertaken.26
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of the telegram, as well as the basis for
the award of moral damages, thus:27
The request to send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the existence of urgency that private
respondents allegations that time was of the essence imports. A check drawn against a Manila Bank and
transmitted to Sorsogon, Sorsogon will have to be deposited in a bank in Sorsogon and pass thru a minimum
clearing period of 5 days before it may be encashed or withdrawn. If the transmittal of the requested check to
Sorsogon took 1 day private respondents could therefore still wait for 6 days before the same may be
withdrawn. Requesting a check that would take 6 days before it could be withdrawn therefore contradicts
plaintiffs claim of urgency or need.28
At any rate, any sense of urgency of the situation was met when Grace Verchez was able to communicate to
Manila via a letter that she sent to the same addressee in Manila thru JRS.29
xxxx
As far as the respondent courts award for moral damages is concerned, the same has no basis whatsoever
since private respondent Alfonso Verchez did not accompany his late wife when the latter went to Manila by
bus. He stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week before he proceeded to Manila. 30
When pressed on cross-examination, private respondent Alfonso Verchez could not give any plausible reason
as to the reason why he did not accompany his ailing wife to Manila.31
xxxx
It is also important to consider in resolving private respondents claim for moral damages that
private respondent Grace Verchez did not accompany her ailing mother to Manila.32

118

xxxx
It is the common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wifes side as much as possible. The fact that private
respondent Alfonso Verchez stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week convincingly demonstrates that he
himself knew that his wife was not in critical condition.33
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPIs arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it bears repeating, anchored.
Since RCPI breached its contract, the presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut
this presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Graces co-respondents following Article 2176 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPIs liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that it observed the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. Article 2180 of the Civil Code so provides:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the presence of the following requisites
to justify the award is in order:

119

x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the
case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.34
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein respondents was correctly
appreciated by the CA in this wise:
The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of appellees on time, disturbed their filial
tranquillity. Family members blamed each other for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that involved the
life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes.35
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites are present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under
the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After RCPIs first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace of the non-delivery thereof and
waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again, knowing as it should know that time is of the essence in
the delivery of telegrams. When its second long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it, again,
waited for another 12 days before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation
indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite is thus also present.
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral damages in cases of breach of
contract where the defendant was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligation.36
As for RCPIs tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxxx

120

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another. (Emphasis supplied)
RCPIs negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only
of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity"
among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts
and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the
Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order, as is the award of
attorneys fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to protect their rights.
Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the "Telegram Transmission Form" is not a
contract of adhesion. Thus it argues:
Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of adhesion as held by the respondent
court. The said stipulations were all written in bold letters right in front of the Telegram Transmission Form. As a
matter of fact they were beside the space where the telegram senders write their telegraphic messages. It
would have been different if the stipulations were written at the back for surely there is no way the sender will
easily notice them. The fact that the stipulations were located in a particular space where they can easily be
seen, is sufficient notice to any sender (like Grace Verchez-Infante) where she could manifest her disapproval,
leave the RCPI station and avail of the services of the other telegram operators.37 (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the readability of the stipulations nor their
physical location in the contract determines whether it is one of adhesion.
A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form of contract,
which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. One party prepares the
stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto, giving
no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal
footing.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable, since it is construed strictly against the
party who drafted it or gave rise to any ambiguity therein, it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or
subversive of public policy when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining
party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to
bargain on equal footing.39
This Court holds that the Court of Appeals finding that the parties contract is one of adhesion which is void is,
given the facts and circumstances of the case, thus well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

121

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107383

February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final
and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that
reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered
petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in
Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to
J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's
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attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's
complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in
evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial
court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty.
Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this
Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order
temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes
cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for
respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath,
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his
use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the
decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this
Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was
dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective
again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
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The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

124

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD dIVISION
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents),respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas
College liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student
with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas College.
They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of
the club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was
against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo
informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a
candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the
Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:

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Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of this Office
disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club,
an exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and ByLaws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the
Club to student for financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said
resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and
members of the Club upon proper application duly approved by the majority of the members of
the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the
funds of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the matter and having been
convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of the Club, that
Office rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or decision, it is
contended that approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary
for its effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the Club had no
valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed
based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any force and effect and the treasurer,
Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto
are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are deemed guilty of
misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez
and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that
the Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and
that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the members of the
Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution became the basis for the extension
on of loans to some officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its
Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the superintendent because the adviser of the
Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club that he will cause the approval of
the Constitution and By-Laws by the Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been
inducted to office on October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise
allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the Superintendent
in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and members thereof by dropping
them from membership therein. However, this Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had
acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and
members of the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to
discharge finds to students in need of financial assistance and other humanitarian purposes had
been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was
given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality.
Aside from misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily
explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent
for approval despite his assurance to the Club president that he would do so. With this finding of
negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties
as such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the questioned
order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from this
school or any organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full
scholar of the school and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question
would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with
honors in this year's commencement exercises.
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In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs that appellant
Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers involved in this case,
be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled
thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the case.
On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as
ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the
decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy
of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the
decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director ordering
him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in
the program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being
awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of the
latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director
denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic records
of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against the
petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and
Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo. The
court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per investigation of
Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit
L it was the defendant who inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9,
1965. In fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If
the defendant he not approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the
officers into office and allow the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was
through his own act that the students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the
defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser,
who made the students believe that he was acting as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's
personality. (Exhibit "L").
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Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he kaew as early
as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss
Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew that the letter of Director
Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that
he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give
honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be
true that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted
of only three pages, and the portion which directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any
award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last
paragraph of the same. How did he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice. When
his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of
Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss
Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently
dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him to
furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss Delmo about
the decision, since he said he mailed back the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter
on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter that he had returned the decision
(Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why a night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency
to the parties in the case, because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination of
the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary telegram and not
night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the
decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors
and citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who
cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home out by his own testimony despite his
knowledge that his decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by
Director Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not
deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of
Director Bernardino which the defendant received hours before the commencement executory
on May 3-4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he
would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment
and not that of r Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim
And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho
bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged by
Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous arrogance,
oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o
and instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral
damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and
P2,000.00 attorney's fees.

128

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the
New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed
that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty
and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129
SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that
it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it
was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he
received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he
undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had
the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision.
This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court
correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he could
have used his discretion and plain common sense by informing her about it or he could have
directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or
announced it during the commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours before the
commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the
honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the
prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss
Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme
disappointment and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the
rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly
disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for
damages in his personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)

129

Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case of Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16
SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in addition to what they are already
entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as
moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116192 November 16, 1995

EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.

130

REGALADO, J.:
The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No.
32263 1reversing the decision of the regional trial court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994 denying
herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.
This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by herein private respondent Generosa
S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case No. 899, which complaint alleges these material facts:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-A of the subd.
plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT No. T-147219, located at Bo.
Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan, containing as area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the title is
hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof and for taxation purposes, the same is declared in the
name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of the tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B" of this
complaint;
3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the
same is being used and occupied by the defendant where a house was constructed thereon;
4. That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it was found out by
the Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching on her lot for about 71 square meters,
copy of the relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached as Annex "C" hereof;
5. That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like to remove the old fence so
that she could construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her property, the
defendant vehemently refused to let the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence and menacingly
alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the said fence to construct a new one, she would take action
against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;
6. For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the fence
encroaching on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief;
7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay of Mabuco for
settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced by a
certification to file action issued by the Lupon secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman,
copy of the certification to file action is hereto attached as Annex "D" hereof;
8. Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she is poor but
nevertheless she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent to the
defendant for conference and/or settlement but the defendant stood pat that she will not allow
the removal of the fence, thus depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said
portion of her lot (71 square meters) which is being occupied by the defendant for several years,
xerox copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex "E" of this complaint;

131

9. That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to have the fence
dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is deprived of the possession and she was forced
to hire the services of counsel for which she contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus
acceptance of P1,000.00 until the termination of this case before this Honorable Court. 2
xxx xxx xxx
On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the defendant to file her answer to the
complaint. 3 This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that Section 15(e) of the Rule on Summary
Procedure does not allow the filing of motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other
papers. 4 Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her "Answer with Motion to Dismiss." 5 Plaintiff filed
and ex-parte motion reiterating her contention that the filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer with motion
was barred for reason that her preceding motion for extension of time to file an answer is a prohibited
pleading. 6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court, finding merit in plaintiff'sex-parte motion, ordered that
defendant's answer be stricken from the records for having been filed out of time. 7 The case was then
submitted for decision.
On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
ordering the latter:
1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant and allowing the plaintiff to
remove the old fence permanently and (to) make the necessary enclosure of the area pertaining
to the herein plaintiff containing an area of 280 square meters, more or less;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees. No
pronouncement as to damages;
3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit. 8 (Corrections in parentheses supplied.)
Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the same was denied by the trial court
for lack of merit in its order dated March 2, 1993. 9
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No DH-121-93, defendant
assailed the jurisdiction of the court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court rendered judgment,
stating in part as follows:
A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the adversaries led this
court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the
instant appealed case based on (the) reason that the said case should be one of question of
ownership oraccion rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry as the(re) was no allegation
of prior possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required by law and jurisprudence.
Absence of allegations and proof by the plaintiff in forcible entry case of prior possession of the
disputed lot (sic) cannot be said that defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal
remedy sought by the plaintiff is not the proper one as it should have been accion

132

publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria, as the case may be, and the forum of which is the
Regional Trial Court.
This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the defendant/appellant considering
that the resolution on jurisdiction renders the same moot and academic. 10 (Corrections in
parentheses ours.)
Therein plaintiffs motion for reconsideration having been denied in said lower court's order dated August 12,
1993, 11 she elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, purportedly on
pure questions of law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil action for certiorari, referred the case to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. 12
On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 13 reversing the
decision of the regional trial court and reinstating that of the municipal circuit trial court, hence the present
petition.
The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by
the averments in the complaint. 14 Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can only be properly resolved by
an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals that the
action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which
must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square meters
involved.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible
entity, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.15
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then
the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other
hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which
must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand. 16
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's alleged entry into the land, that is,
whether the same was legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon the land and constructed
the house and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner's possession became legal before
private respondent made a demand on her to remove the fence. The complaint merely avers that the lot being

133

occupied by petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party to the case, and that said lot is enclosed by a
fence which private respondent claims is an encroachment on the adjacent lot belonging to her.
Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said fence was already in existence on
that lot at the time private respondent bought her own lot and it was only after a relocation survey was made
that it was found out that petitioner is allegedly encroaching on the lot of the former. Consequently, there is
here no contract, express or implied, between petitioner and private respondent as would qualify it as a case of
unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that the possession of the disputed portion of said lot was acquired by
petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.
Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner's possession of the controverted portion was by
mere tolerance since that fact was never alleged in the former's basic complaint, and this argument was raised
in her later pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue that private respondent
tolerated a state of affairs of which she was not even then aware. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as
one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from
the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. 17
Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and gave rise to the ejectment suit, to hold
otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine, for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the violation of which right authorizes the speedy redress in the
inferior court provided for in the Rules. If a period of one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before
suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved possessor is deemed to have waived his
right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No
matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription from setting in and summarily throw him out
of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable, especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 18
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. 19 The complaint must
show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 20
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court. 21
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived
of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial
court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession
thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for
more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his
134

possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the
rules on summary ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the
law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of a controverted proprietary right,
the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a
court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. 22
On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised
in the petition at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32263 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is REINSTATED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., is on leave.

135

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40062 May 3, 1989
MONTELIBANO ESGUERRA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.A. MACHINERIES, INC., JOSE TINO and MANUEL DORE respondents.
G.R. No. L-40102 May 3, 1989
G.A. MACHINERIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MONTELIBANO ESGUERRA, respondents.
Dominguez, Fortuno, & Gervacio for petitioner, Montelibano Esguerra in L-40062.
Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso & Cudala for petitioner in L-40102.

BIDIN, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari filed by G.A. Machineries, Inc. in L-40102 entitled G.A. Machineries
Inc. v. Montelibano Esguerra et al. and by Montelibano Esguerra in L-40062 entitled Montelibano Esguerra v.
Court of Appeals, et al., seeking to reserve and set aside the October 23, 1974 Decision of the Court Appeals
** in CA-G.R. No. 46900-R "Montelibano Esguerra v. G.A. Machineries Inc., et al.," setting aside the
September 23, 1969 Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite; and the January 14, 1975
Resolution of the same appellate Court denying the motions for reconsideration of said decision.
This is a case for the recovery of a Ford-Trader cargo truck, alledgedly, unlawfully seized by the agents of G.A.
Machineries, Inc. (GAMI for short). This said cargo truck, on October 21, 1964, was sold by GAMI to Hilario
136

Lagmay and Bonifacio Masilungan. Subsequently, the right to the same was bought by Montelibano Esguerra,
the latter assuming the unpaid purchase price of P20, 454.74. In so doing, Esguerra executed in favor of GAMI
a promissory note and a chattel mortgage over the said truck (Partial Stipulation of Facts, par. 4, Record on
Appeal, p. 99). On February 20, 1966, Esguerra having defaulted in his obligation and GAMI having granted
his request for extension, a new chattel mortgage and a new promissory note were executed (Ibid., pars. 5 and
6, pp. 99-100) to secure the unpaid balance of P16,000.00 plus 1% per month, payable in monthly installments
of P1,000.00, the first installment to be due on March 15, 1966 and the succeeding monthly installments on the
15th day of each month. On May 18, 1966, Esguerra had paid GAMI the total sum of P1,297.00 (Ibid., par. 7,
p. 100), broken down as follows:
AMOUNT PAID DATE
P400.00 March 22, 1966
397.87 April 18, 1966
200.00 May 4, 1966
150.00 May 12, 1966
150.00 May 18, 1966
On June 3, 1966, the said truck was taken by GAMI'S agents while the same was in the possession of
Esguerra's driver, Carlito Padua; and the same had remained in the possession of GAMI, notwithstanding
demands for its return by Esguerra.
On June 20, 1966, Esguerra filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV,
Tagaytay City, presided by Hon. Jose G. Colayco, to recover said truck and for damages. The said complaint
was docketed therein as Civil Case No. TG-64. In the said complaint, Esguerra alleged among others, that due
to his failure to pay the installments due, the agents of GAMI, Jose Tino and Samuel Dore representing
themselves as deputy sheriffs and with use of force, threats and intimidation, seized the cargo truck in question
from his driver, Carlito Padua, while unloading gravel and sand in Pasay City; and that despite repeated
demands, GAMI refused and failed to return the same.
GAMI, et al. filed their answer with a counterclaim, alleging as affirmative defense that the plaintiff gave his
consent to the taking of the truck by the agents of the corporation on condition that he be allowed to recover its
possession upon payment of his back accounts (Record on Appeal p. 102). After trial, the lower court, in a
Decision dated September 23, 1969, dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim as follows:
Since it is admitted that Esguerra was in arrears in the payment of his account, the G.A.
Machineries, Inc. therefore could exercise its option under the contract of mortgage to take
possession of the truck without court action as long as the mortgagor agreed (Luna vs.
Encarnacion, G.R. L-4637, June 30, 1952). Having chosen this remedy however, the mortgagee
has no further action against Esguerra to recover the unpaid balance of the purchase price (Art.
1484, (3), Civil Code of the Phil.).

137

WHEREFORE, the complaint as well as the counterclaim are hereby dismissed, without costs.
(Rollo, L-40062, pp. 24-31).
On appeal by Esguerra, the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the trial court that it was not unlawful on
the part of GAMI to repossess the cargo truck in question as Esguerra gave his consent to the repossession.
However, said appellate court, took exception to GAMI's failure to sell at public auction said truck. It held that
while it is true the chattel mortgage contract, the mortgagee can take possession of the chattel but such taking
did not amount to the foreclosure of the mortgage. Otherwise stated, GAMI should have foreclosed the
mortgage. Thus, in a Decision promulgated on October 23, 1974 (Ibid., pp. 34-35), respondent appellate court
set aside the appealed decision and entered another one; the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside, and another entered,
sentencing the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P2,000.00 in concept of attorney's fees
and P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, respectively, with costs
against said appellee.
Both Esguerra and GAMI, et al. moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but in a Resolution dated
January 14, 1975 (Ibid., p. 57), both motions were denied. Hence, the instant petitions.
Acting on GAMI'S petition, docketed as G.R. No. L-40102, the First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated
March 5, 1975, required Esguerra to comment (Ibid., p. 48), while the petition of Esguerra, docketed as G.R.
No. L-40062, was denied by the same Division of this Court in a Resolution dated March 7, 1975 (Rollo of G.R.
No. L-40062, p. 62).
On April 4, 1975, Esguerra, in compliance with the March 5, 1975 Resolution of the First Division of this Court,
filed his comment (Rollo of G.R. No. 40102, pp. 56-59).
On April 18, 1975, Esguerra filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the March 7, 1975 Resolution denying his
petition in G.R. No. L-40062, (Rollo, pp. 69-72).
In the Resolution of May 16, 1975, the resolution of March 7, 1975, was reconsidered and both petitions were
given due course. (Rollo of G.R. No. L-40102, p. 75).
Esguerra raised three (3) assignments of errors, to wit:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL
THE PROVISION OF THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE AUTHORIZING THE RESPONDENTMORTGAGEE TO REPOSSESS THE CARGO TRUCK IN CASE OF DEFAULT IN THE
PAYMENT OF ANY OBLIGATION.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN AFTER SETTING
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM AND AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO PETITIONER, THE SAID RESPONDENT COURT DENIED PETITIONER'S MAIN
138

PRAYER IN HIS COMPLAINT, WHICH IS TO ORDER THE RETURN OF PETITIONER'S

CARGO TRUCK AND TO PAY UNEARNED INCOME OF PETITIONER.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT FINALLY ERRED WHEN AFTER DECLARING THAT THE
TAKING OF APPELLANT'S TRUCK BY THE APPELLEE WITHOUT HAVING PROCEEDED TO
SELL IT AT PUBLIC AUCTION BUT APPROPRIATING SAME IN PAYMENT OF APPELLANT'S
INDEBTEDNESS AS NOT LAWFUL, SAID RESPONDENT COURT DID NOT ORDER THE
RETURN OF SAID TRUCK OR THE SALE THEREOF AT PUBLIC AUCTION.
GAMI, on the other hand, likewise, raised three (3) assignments of errors, to wit:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, THAT PETITIONER, AS AN
UNPAID SELLER MORTGAGE, WAS LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO FORECLOSE THE
MORTGAGE OVER THE CHATTEL IN QUESTION AND TO SELL SAID CHATTEL AT PUBLIC
AUCTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT PETITIONER, AS SUCH UNPAID SELLER, LEGALLY
REPOSSESSED THE CHATTEL IN QUESTION AND THAT RESPONDENT MONTELIBANO
ESGUERRA GAVE HIS CONSENT TO PETITIONER'S REPOSSESSION THEREOF.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE RIGHT OF
HEREIN PETITIONER TO CANCEL A CONTRACT OF SALE UPON NON-PAYMENT OR
DEFAULT OF THE BUYER.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO
RESPONDENT MONTELIBANO ESGUERRA IN THE FORM OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, MORAL
DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the mortgage vendor of personal property sold on installment is
legally obligated to foreclose the chattel mortgage and sell the chattel subject thereof at public auction in case
the mortgagor-vendee defaults in the payment of the agreed installments.
The Chattel Mortgage Contract provides:
Should the mortgagor fail to make any of the payments as herein before provided or to pay the
interest that may be due as provided herein or should he fail to comply with anyone of the
obligations or conditions herein set forth, then the whole amount remaining unpaid under this
mortgage shall automatically become due and demandable, and the mortgage on the property
herein described may be foreclosed by the mortgagee either judicially or extra-judicially, at the
option of the mortgagee in accordance with law. In case of foreclosure, it is expressly agreed
that the sale may be made by the mortgagee itself and the mortgagor expressly consents that
139

the mortgaged property may be taken by the mortgagee outside of the municipality or city where
the mortgagee may conveniently sell the same. And in case of sale, the mortgagor further
agrees to pay to the mortgagee an additional sum equivalent to twenty five (25%) per centum of
the principal and interest due and unpaid, as liquidated damages which this mortgage is given
as security and shall become a part thereof, and the mortgagor hereby waives reimbursements
of the amounts heretofore paid by him to the mortgagee. (Decision CA-G.R. No. 46900-R, Rollo
p. 37)
Esguerra admitted that he is in arrears in the payments of his account. Consequently, the mortgagee, under
the above cited provision of the mortgage contract has the option to foreclose the mortgage either judicially or
extrajudicially and in case of foreclosure, it was expressly agreed by the parties that the mortgagee may take
the property outside the municipality or city where the mortgagee may conveniently sell the same.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that there was no forcible taking of the cargo truck.
Esguerra consented to the repossession of the truck or at least did not make any objection thereto. He simply
requested that he been given a chance to settle the account, which was evidently granted as on the following
day, June 14, 1966, appellant sent his wife with P500.00 with which to partially settle his account (Rollo p. 40).
Under the circumstances, both courts concluded that it was not unlawful on the part of the appellee to
repossess the cargo truck in question.
It is well settled that these findings are binding on the Supreme Court (Rizal Cement Co. Inc. v. Villareal, 135
SCRA 575 [1985]; Collector of Customs Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3 [1985]), as it is
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court (Baniqued v. Court of Appeals, 127
SCRA 636 [1984]).
However, the respondent appellate court did not err in holding that while the mortgagee can take possession of
the chattel, such taking did not amount to the foreclosure of the mortgage. Otherwise stated, the taking of
Esguerra's truck without proceeding to the sale of the same at public auction, but instead, appropriating the
same in payment of Esguerra's indebtedness, is not lawful.
As clearly stated in the chattel mortgage contract, the express purpose of the taking of the mortgaged property
is to sell the same and/or foreclose the mortgage constituted thereon either judicially or extrajudicially and
thereby, liquidate the indebtedness in accordance with law.
More than that, even if such automatic appropriation of the cargo truck in question can be inferred from or be
contemplated under the aforesaid mortgage contract, such stipulation would be pactum commissorium which is
expressly prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil Code and therefore, null and void (Tan Chun Tic v. West Coast
Life, 54 Phil., 361 [1933]; Reyes v. Nebrija 98 Phil. 639 [1955]; Ranjo v. Salmon, 15 Phil. 436 [1910]; Paras,
'Civil Code of the Philippines', pp. 814-815; Vol. V, Seventh Edition).
Having opted to foreclose the chattel mortgage, respondent GAMI can no longer cancel the sale. The three
remedies of the vendor in case the vendee defaults, in a contract of sale of personal property the price of
which is payable in installment under Article 1484 of the Civil Code, are alternative and cannot be exercised
simultaneously or cumulatively by the vendor-creditor. In Cruz vs. Filipinas Investment and Finance
Corporation (23 SCRA 791, [19681; the Supreme Court construing Article 1484 of the Civil Code, held:

140

Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the payment of two or more of
the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any one of these three
remedies either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to
foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was constituted. These
remedies have been recognized as alternative, not cumulative, that the exercise of one would
bar the exercise of the others. It may also be stated that the established rule is to the effect that
the foreclosure and actual sale of a mortgaged chattel bars further recovery by the vendor of
any balance on the purchaser's outstanding obligation not so satisfied by the sale.
It will be observed, however, that the award of exemplary damages is apparently unwarranted, there being no
showing that the mortgagee acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or oppressive manner (Dee Hua Liong
Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 714 [1986]). The trial court did not find blatant fault on the part
of the mortgagee for not immediately proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgage, especially so where the
filing of the instant case has put a legal obstacle to it. On the other hand, the appellate court is of the view and
rightly so that the mortgagee should have immediately foreclosed the mortgage and offered the truck for sale
at public auction as provided under the chattel mortgage contract.
It will be recalled, that under the chattel mortgage contract, the mortgagee is expressly authorized to sell the
mortgaged property and the mortgagee had already commenced foreclosure of the chattel mortgage (par. 13,
amended answer) but the sale presumably could not be immediately made because of the request of the
mortgagor himself to give him a chance to settle his account.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award
of exemplary damages is deleted. Respondent GAMI is hereby ordered to foreclose the chattel mortgage by
selling the subject cargo truck at public auction and liquidate the indebtedness in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez Jr., Feliciano and Cortes JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22579

February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner,

vs.

141

HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is
whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife
against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment
of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent,
Judge Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense,
of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay,
which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First
Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her
marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation
allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner
as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay,
the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the
ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage
with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending
the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent
Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to
set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13,
1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10)
days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of
the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari,
the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This
Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as
above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the
first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that
"there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that
'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal
case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void
on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It
continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
142

nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced
v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in
the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have
a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be
determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the
validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the
second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the
conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which
he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be
a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of
Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court,
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at
bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's
guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground
of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with
her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed
in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party
complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could
have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial
question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge
abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved.
With costs.1wph1.t
143

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.

144

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14534

February 28, 1962

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to
enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of
Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by
respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No.
3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having
been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against
respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation.
On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same
year. 1wph1.t
On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings
therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20,
1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of
not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
(People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question we further said must
be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court
(People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment
of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
145

according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the
action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime
of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with
respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is
within the jurisdiction of said court.
In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the
first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for
annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the
same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he
entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon,
JJ., concur.

146

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22759

March 29, 1968

MANUEL R. JIMENEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. AVERIA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite and OFELIA V. TANG and
ESTEPANIA DE LA CRUZ OLANDAY, respondents.
David F. Barrera for petitioner.
Alfredo I. Raya and Raul A. Manalo for respondents.
Jimenez vs. Averia.
DIZON, J.:
In Criminal Case No. TM-235 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite respondents Ofelia V. Tang and
Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were charged with estafa, the information filed alleging that, having received
from Manuel Jimenez the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat known as "Basnig",
with the obligation on their part to return the money on January, 30, 1963 in case they should fail to buy the
fishing boat, they misappropriated the amount aforesaid, to the damage and prejudice of Jimenez.
Before arraignment, the accused filed Civil Case No. 6636 against Jimenez in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon contesting the validity of a certain receipt signed by them on October 26, 1962 (Annex "A" of the
present petition) wherein they acknowledged having received from him the sum of P20,000.00 with which to
purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories, and the further sum of P240.00 as agent's commission,
with the obligation, on their part, to return the aforesaid amounts on January 30, 1963 in case they were unable
to buy the fishing boat. Their complaint alleged that they had never received any amount from Jimenez and
that their signatures on the questioned receipt were secured by means of fraud, deceit and intimidation
employed by him. Several days later, they filed a motion in the aforementioned criminal action to suspend
proceedings therein on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 6636 of the

147

Court of First Instance of Quezon was a prejudicial question. The respondent judge granted the motion in an
order dated October 18, 1963.
The petition now before Us is one for certiorari predicated upon the proposition that in issuing the order
just mentioned, the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Properly, however, the action is for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the relief prayed being for this Court
"to order the Hon. Court of Cavite Province to proceed with the case and to order the Hon. Court at Quezon
Province to dismiss the civil case".
The issue to be decided is whether the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned
heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense that it must be first resolved before the proceedings in the
criminal case for estafa may proceed.
A prejudicial question has been define to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which,
(question ) is a logical antecedent of the issued involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal (Encyclopedia Juridical Espaola, p. 228). In People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February
17, 1954, We held in connection with this subject that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be
determinative of the case before the court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must be lodged
in another tribunal.
Applying the above considerations to the instance case, it will be readily seen that the alleged prejudicial
question is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties charged with estafa, because even on the
assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil case was vitiated by
fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing, to the degree
required by law, that they had actually received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for
him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise
failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be tenable had
they been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action.
Were We to sanction the theory advanced by the respondents Tang and De la Cruz Olanday and
adopted by the respondent judge, there would hardly be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it
being the easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing an
independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the issue that he had not received from the
latter the amount alleged to have been misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to
be interposed by the party charged in the criminal proceeding.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Court of First Instance of Cavite to
proceed without undue delay with the trial of Criminal Case No. TM-235, with the result that the order
complained of suspending the proceedings therein until after Civil Case No. 6636 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon has been resolved is hereby set aside. With cost against the respondent except the respondent
judge.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

148

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner,
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South
Cotabato, respondents.
Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
149

This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they inherited from their
parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the private respondent's counsel in this petition is
the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose action is being questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.*
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The
sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same
property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1 On the same date, she filed a complaint for the
nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 2
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing
the criminal case on the ground that:
. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of the
respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a
prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the
case of Ras vs.Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement
that "a criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a prejudicial question to a
civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries
of their signatures to the Deed." 3
The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1990. She then came to this Court for
relief in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction under BP
129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar circumstances involved.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may
not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge
trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also
stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of the accused under the
double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment in his behalf is the son
and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office.
He has made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal
was issued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for the order in view of the
alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated in the regional trial court. He concedes, however,
150

that the order may have been premature and that it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that
double jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered
a motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did indeed commit grave abuse of
discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7, 1988,
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear provision of the abovequoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the original provision in the Rules of Court
before they were amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be made only upon petition and not at the
instance of the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if the person
who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the
respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's misapprehension of the concept of a
prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. 4 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 5
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension
of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused". 6
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal
action that is prejudicial to the civil action.

151

The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere in the decision of Ras
v.Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are
not analogous to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a
civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared
valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold the property to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in
the first deed of sale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed against Ras based on the same
double sale that was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the
criminal case), claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of
his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a suspension of the criminal action
was in order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in the
light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial
question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in
Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis
Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the
very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence
as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then
there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A
conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice
and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged
prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he
had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the
alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary
that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then he did
not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the sale is
distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense in the civil
case forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale had to be threshed out first. Resolution of that
question would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast,
there was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not
been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained
then if the issue raised in the civil action would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify
suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same
152

issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may
proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Section
6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense
in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias on
the part of the respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence" and "should administer justice impartially." He is
hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the warning that commission of
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17,
1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for
further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
153

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre
Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and
another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it
was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to
this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn,
may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even
if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

154

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those
persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that
Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it"
adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus
be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become
entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the
Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico
que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los
propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las
condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya
existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1
Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife
to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

155

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action
for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.

156

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz,
ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal,
Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as
against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her
aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she
had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant.
As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years
157

later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and
the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez
streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a twomonth old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this
time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know
of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be
error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the
case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura
abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del
Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights
and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In
fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its prenatal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of
a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had
for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton,
52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an
unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development
of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found,
and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second
abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition
of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not
158

seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of
record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion
which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than
mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged
of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in
mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of
abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be
the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical
necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned;
and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the
act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal
basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for
their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may
warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

159

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5426

May 29, 1953

RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of
states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro,
deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which

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was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was
elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in
Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st.
The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with
regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his
mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The importance
of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the
fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C.
Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known
as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the
building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were
trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela
Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's
wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As
they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The
others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club,
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter
be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but
unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughterin-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years
old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the other
sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived
the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and

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the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory
presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death of only one
of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now
in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was
shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his father and the witness, and that
the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during
the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All
we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the
German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have
been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by
the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is
available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there
is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than
her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that
the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like
these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela
Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she and her
deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is
the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A second
reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the
same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the
source of combats. During the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It
is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying
the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their
end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin;
then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii)
of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New
Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack
of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article
33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute necessity
there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the
reasons to be presently set forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

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When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (1)
shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the
survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes,
according to the following rules:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent
one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the
absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of
rights from one to the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be
available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it
present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific
evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts
are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation
that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the
deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one died before
the other it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other
may be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue does not mean
circumstances which would shown, or which would tend to show, probably that one died before the
other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W.vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence
alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances by
which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested
by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere
surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to
probably, then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the
evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there
are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step
in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship between Angela
Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose?
For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony, which was
described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to
credence."

163

Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr.,
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? A. We were out 15 meters away from the
building but I could see what was going on.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the shooting of
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly,
Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? A. Possible, but not
probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? A. Well, a few minutes after we
have dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin
Navarro, Sr.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact that Pilar,
Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive
evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her
actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her
come out of that building so I presumed she died there.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin
Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were
shooting people outside, so we thought of running away rather than be roasted.
xxx

xxx

164

xxx

Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? A. to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? A. On the ground near the entrance, because most of the
people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can
remember they were among those killed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left the
place? A. That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside
especially those trying to escape.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A . There were many people
shot because they were trying to escape.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you explain that? A.
They were trying to escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship
between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is
believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at,
namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the
other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters
from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or
less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so
that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five
or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building
were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and
were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape.
She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing
themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a
condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It
strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so
imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40
165

minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse
that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and
the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to
warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro
could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are
against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only
remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides, the
building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their
ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been
killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was
sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five
seconds between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not
require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules
of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but
if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs.
State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California
courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be
such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re
Wallace's Estate,supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an
inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to
prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary
facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?"
(1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the
inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person
who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight,
but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do the
facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory that
the mother outlived her son is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience,
engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by,
which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by
Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested
that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in
consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which has been
discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well
considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions
are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions
raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1
166

Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and
contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not
impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an
agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a
question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by
substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which
reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come
within the exception to the general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the decedents'
estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs.
Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

167

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979
ERNESTO CEASE, CECILIA CEASE, MARION CEASE, TERESA CEASE-LACEBAL and the F.L. CEASE
PLANTATION CO., INC. as Trustee of properties of the defunct TIAONG MILLING & PLANTATION
CO.,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Seventh Division), HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, BENJAMIN CEASE and FLORENCE
CEASE, respondents.

GUERRERO, J:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 45474, entitled "Ernesto Cease,
et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al." 1 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition instituted by the petitioners against the respondent judge and
the private respondents.

168

The antecedents of the case, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the antecedents are not difficult to understand; sometime in June 1908,
one Forrest L. Cease common predecessor in interest of the parties together with five (5) other
American citizens organized the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company and in the course of its
corporate existence the company acquired various properties but at the same time all the other
original incorporators were bought out by Forrest L. Cease together with his children namely
Ernest, Cecilia, Teresita, Benjamin, Florence and one Bonifacia Tirante also considered a
member of the family; the charter of the company lapsed in June 1958; but whether there were
steps to liquidate it, the record is silent; on 13 August 1959, Forrest L. Cease died and by
extrajudicial partition of his shares, among the children, this was disposed of on 19 October
1959; it was here where the trouble among them came to arise because it would appear that
Benjamin and Florence wanted an actual division while the other children wanted
reincorporation; and proceeding on that, these other children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia and
aforementioned other stockholder Bonifacia Tirante proceeded to incorporate themselves into
the F.L. Cease Plantation Company and registered it with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on 9 December, 1959; apparently in view of that, Benjamin and Florence for their
part initiated a Special Proceeding No. 3893 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the
settlement of the estate of Forest L. Cease on 21 April, 1960 and one month afterwards on 19
May 1960 they filed Civil Case No. 6326 against Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia Cease together
with Bonifacia Tirante asking that the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Corporation be declared
Identical to F.L. Cease and that its properties be divided among his children as his intestate
heirs; this Civil Case was resisted by aforestated defendants and notwithstanding efforts of the
plaintiffs to have the properties placed under receivership, they were not able to succeed
because defendants filed a bond to remain as they have remained in possession; after that and
already, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 6326 specifically on 21 May, 1961 apparently on
the eve of the expiry of the three (3) year period provided by the law for the liquidation of
corporations, the board of liquidators of Tiaong Milling executed an assignment and conveyance
of properties and trust agreement in favor of F.L. Cease Plantation Co. Inc. as trustee of the
Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co. so Chat upon motion of the plaintiffs trial Judge ordered that
this alleged trustee be also included as party defendant; now this being the situation, it will be
remembered that there were thus two (2) proceedings pending in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon namely Civil Case No. 6326 and Special Proceeding No. 3893 but both of these were
assigned to the Honorable Respondent Judge Manolo L. Maddela p. 43 and the case was finally
heard and submitted upon stipulation of facts pp, 34-110, rollo; and trial Judge by decision dated
27 December 1969 held for the plaintiffs Benjamin and Florence, the decision containing the
following dispositive part:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring that:
1) The assets or properties of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company
now appearing under the name of F.L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee, is
the estate also of the deceased Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided, share and
share alike, among his six children the plaintiffs and the defendants in
accordance with Rule 69, Rules of Court;

169

2) The Resolution to Sell dated October 12, 1959 and the Transfer and
Conveyance with Trust Agreement is hereby set aside as improper and illegal for
the purposes and effect that it was intended and, therefore, null and void;
3) That F.L. Cease Plantation Company is removed as 'Trustee for interest
against the estate and essential to the protection of plaintiffs' rights and is hereby
ordered to deliver and convey all the properties and assets of the defunct Tiaong
Milling now under its name, custody and control to whomsoever be appointed as
Receiver - disqualifying and of the parties herein - the latter to act accordingly
upon proper assumption of office; and
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed;
the instant case to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action
inherently essential for partition.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, December 27, 1969., pp. 122-a-123, rollo.
upon receipt of that, defendants there filled a notice of appeal p. 129, rollo together with an
appeal bond and a record on appeal but the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the judgment was in fact interlocutory and not appealable p. 168 rollo and this
position of defendants was sustained by trial Judge, His Honor ruling that
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by plaintiffs is hereby
dismissed as premature and the Record on Appeal is necessarily disapproved as
improper at this stage of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, April 27, 1970.
and so it was said defendants brought the matter first to the Supreme Court, on mandamus on
20 May, 1970 to compel the appeal and certiorari and prohibition to annul the order of 27 April,
1970 on the ground that the decision was "patently erroneous" p. 16, rollo; but the Supreme
Court remanded the case to this Court of Appeals by resolution of 27 May 1970, p. 173, and this
Court of Appeals on 1 July 1970 p. 175 dismissed the petition so far as the mandamus was
concerned taking the view that the decision sought to be appealed dated 27 December, 1969
was interlocutory and not appealable but on motion for reconsideration of petitioners and since
there was possible merit so far as its prayer for certiorari and prohibition was concerned, by
resolution of the Court on 19 August, 1970, p. 232, the petition was permitted to go ahead in
that capacity; and it is the position of petitioners that the decision of 27 December, 1969 as well
as the order of 27 April, 1970 suffered of certain fatal defects, which respondents deny and on
their part raise the preliminary point that this Court of Appeals has no authority to give relief to
petitioners because not
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
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and that the questions presented cannot be raised for the first time before this Court of Appeals;
Respondent Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated December 9, 1970 dismissed the petition with costs
against petitioners, hence the present petition to this Court on the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED I. IN SANCTIONING THE WRONGFUL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BEYOND THE LIMITS OF
AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY LAW UPON THE LOWER COURT, WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO HEAR,
ADJUDGE AND ADJUDICATE (a) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for the settlement of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease,
simultaneously and concurrently with (b) Civil Case No. 6326, wherein the lower Court ordered Partition under Rule 69, Rules of
Court THE ISSUE OF LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES COMMONLY INVOLVED IN BOTH ACTIONS
HAVING BEEN RAISED AT THE OUTSET BY THE TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION COMPANY, AS THE
REGISTERED OWNER OF SUCH PROPERTIES UNDER ACT 496.
II. IN AFFIRMING - UNSUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER NOR CITATION OF ANY LAW TO
JUSTIFY - THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION THAT SUBJECT PROPERTIES, FOUND BY THE LOWER
COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS AS ACTUALLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER
CORPORATION AND/OR ITS PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, THE TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION
COMPANY, DURING ALL THE 50 YEARS OF ITS CORPORATE EXISTENCE "ARE ALSO PROPERTIES OF
THE ESTATE OF FOREST L. CEASE."
III. IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITRARY CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT ITS DECISION OF
DECEMBER 27,1969 IS AN "INTERLUCUTORY DECISION." IN DISMISSED NG THE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF MANDAMUS, AND IN AFFIRMING THE MANIFESTLY UNJUST JUDGMENT RENDERED WHICH
CONTRADICTS THE FINDINGS OF ULTIMATE FACTS THEREIN CONTAINED.
During the period that ensued after the filing in this Court of the respective briefs and the subsequent
submission of the case for decision, some incidents had transpired, the summary of which may be stated as
follows:
1. Separate from this present appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. L-35629 (Ernesto Cease, et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, et al.) which challenged the
order of respondent judge dated September 27, 1972 appointing his Branch Clerk of Court, Mr. Eleno M.
Joyas, as receiver of the properties subject of the appealed civil case, which order, petitioners saw as a virtual
execution of the lower court's judgment (p. 92, rollo). In Our resolution of November 13, 1972, issued in G.R.
No. L-35629, the petition was denied since respondent judge merely appointed an auxilliary receiver for the
preservation of the properties as well as for the protection of the interests of all parties in Civil Case No. 6326;
but at the same time, We expressed Our displeasure in the appointment of the branch clerk of court or any
other court personnel for that matter as receiver. (p. 102, rollo).

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2. Meanwhile, sensing that the appointed receiver was making some attempts to take possession of the
properties, petitioners filed in this present appeal an urgent petition to restrain proceedings in the lower court.
We resolved the petition on January 29, 1975 by issuing a corresponding temporary restraining order enjoining
the court a quo from implementing its decision of December 27, 1969, more particularly, the taking over by a
receiver of the properties subject of the litigation, and private respondents Benjamin and Florence Cease from
proceeding or taking any action on the matter until further orders from this Court (pp. 99-100, rollo). Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of Our resolution of January 29, 1975. After weighing the
arguments of the parties and taking note of Our resolution in G.R. No. L-35629 which upheld the appointment
of a receiver, We issued another resolution dated April 11, 1975 lifting effective immediately Our previous
temporary restraining order which enforced the earlier resolution of January 29, 1975 (pp. 140-141, rollo).
3. On February 6, 1976, private respondents filed an urgent petition to restrain proceedings below in view of
the precipitate replacement of the court appointed receiver Mayor Francisco Escueta (vice Mr. Eleno M. Joyas)
and the appointment of Mr. Guillermo Lagrosa on the eve of respondent Judge Maddela's retirement (p. 166,
rollo). The urgent petition was denied in Our resolution of February 18, 1976 (p. 176, rollo).
4. Several attempts at a compromise agreement failed to materialize. A Tentative Compromise Agreement
dated July 30, 1975 was presented to the Court on August 6, 1976 for the signature of the parties, but
respondents "unceremoniously" repudiated the same by leaving the courtroom without the permission of the
court (Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 11) as a result of which respondents and their counsel were
cited for contempt (p. 195, 197, rollo) that respondents' reason for the repudiation appears to be petitioners'
failure to render an audited account of their administration covering the period from May 31, 1961 up to
January 29, 1974, plus the inclusion of a provision on waiver and relinquishment by respondents of whatever
rights that may have accrued to their favor by virtue of the lower court's decision and the affirmative decision of
the appellate court.
We go now to the alleged errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
As can be gleaned from petitioners' brief and the petition itself, two contentions underlie the first assigned
error. First, petitioners argue that there was an irregular and arbitrarte termination and dismissal of the special
proceedings for judicial administration simultaneously ordered in the lower court . s decision in Civil Case No.
6326 adjudicating the partition of the estate, without categorically, reasoning the opposition to the petition for
administration Second, that the issue of ownership had been raised in the lower court when Tiaong Milling
asserted title over the properties registered in its corporate name adverse to Forrest L. Cease or his estate,
and that the said issue was erroneously disposed of by the trial court in the partition proceedings when it
concluded that the assets or properties of the defunct company is also the estate of the deceased proprietor.
The propriety of the dismissal and termination of the special proceedings for judicial administration must be
affirmed in spite of its rendition in another related case in view of the established jurisprudence which favors
partition when judicial administration become, unnecessary. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the
dismissal at first glance is wrong, for the reason that what was actually heard was Civil Case No. 6326. The
technical consistency, however, it is far less importance than the reason behind the doctrinal rule against
placing an estate under administration. Judicial rulings consistently hold the view that where partition is
possible, either judicial or extrajudicial, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reason. When the estate has no creditors or pending obligations to be paid, the
beneficiaries in interest are not bound to submit the property to judicial administration which is always long and

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costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court, especially when judicial administration
is unnecessary and superfluous. Thus When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil, 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317). Syllabus, Intestate estate of the
deceased Luz Garcia. Pablo G. Utulo vs. Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302.
Where the estate has no debts, recourse may be had to an administration proceeding only if the
heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons. (Intestate Estate of Mercado vs. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383)
In the records of this case, We find no indication of any indebtedness of the estate. No creditor has come up to
charge the estate within the two-year period after the death of Forrest L. Cease, hence, the presumption under
Section 1, Rule 74 that the estate is free from creditors must apply. Neither has the status of the parties as
legal heirs, much less that of respondents, been raised as an issue. Besides, extant in the records is the
stipulation of the parties to submit the pleadings and contents of the administration proceedings for the
cognizance of the trial judge in adjudicating the civil case for partition (Respondents' Brief, p, 20, rollo). As
respondents observe, the parties in both cases are the same, so are the properties involved; that actual
division is the primary objective in both actions; the theory and defense of the respective parties are likewise
common; and that both cases have been assigned to the same respondent judge. We feel that the unifying
effect of the foregoing circumstances invites the wholesome exception to the structures of procedural rule, thus
allowing, instead, room for judicial flexibility. Respondent judge's dismissal of the administration proceedings
then, is a judicious move, appreciable in today's need for effective and speedy administration of justice. There
being ample reason to support the dismissal of the special proceedings in this appealed case, We cannot see
in the records any compelling reason why it may not be dismissed just the same even if considered in a
separate action. This is inevitably certain specially when the subject property has already been found
appropriate for partition, thus reducing the petition for administration to a mere unnecessary solicitation.
The second point raised by petitioners in their first assigned error is equally untenable. In effect, petitioners
argue that the action for partition should not have prospered in view of the repudiation of the co-ownership by
Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company when, as early in the trial court, it already asserted ownership and
corporate title over the properties adverse to the right of ownership of Forrest L. Cease or his estate. We are
not unmindful of the doctrine relied upon by petitioners in Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 wherein this Court
held that in an action for partition, it is assumed that the parties by whom it is prosecuted are all co-owners or
co-proprietors of the property to be divided, and that the question of common ownership is not to be argued,
not the fact as to whether the intended parties are or are not the owners of the property in question, but only as
to how and in what manner and proportion the said property of common ownership shall be distributed among
the interested parties by order of the Court. Consistent with this dictum, it has been field that if any party to a
suit for partition denies thepro-indiviso character of the estate whose partition is sought, and claims instead,
exclusive title thereto the action becomes one for recovery of property cognizable in the courts of ordinary
jurisdiction. 2
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Petitioners' argument has only theoretical persuasion, to say the least, rather apparent than real. It must be
remembered that when Tiaong Milling adduced its defense and raised the issue of ownership, its corporate
existence already terminated through the expiration of its charter. It is clear in Section 77 of Act No. 1459
(Corporation Law) that upon the expiration of the charter period, the corporation ceases to exist and is
dissolvedipso facto except for purposes connected with the winding up and liquidation. The provision allows a
three year, period from expiration of the charter within which the entity gradually settles and closes its affairs,
disposes and convey its property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the
business for which it was established. At this terminal stage of its existence, Tiaong Milling may no longer
persist to maintain adverse title and ownership of the corporate assets as against the prospective distributees
when at this time it merely holds the property in trust, its assertion of ownership is not only a legal
contradiction, but more so, to allow it to maintain adverse interest would certainly thwart the very purpose of
liquidation and the final distribute loll of the assets to the proper, parties.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its reasoning that substance is more important than form when it
sustained the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, thus a) As to the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, of course, at first glance, this was
wrong, for the reason that the case trial had been heard was Civil Case No. 6326; but what
should not be overlooked either is Chat respondent Judge was the same Judge that had before
him in his own sala, said Special Proceedings No. 3893, p. 43 rollo, and the parties to the
present Civil Case No. 6326 had themselves asked respondent Judge to take judicial notice of
the same and its contents page 34, rollo; it is not difficult to see that when respondent Judge in
par. 4 of the dispositive part of his decision complained of, ordered that,
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed;
the instant case to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action
inherently essential or partition. p. 123, rollo,
in truth and in fact, His Honor was issuing that order also within Civil Case No. 632 but in
connection with Special Proceedings No. 389:3: for substance is more important Chan form, the
contending par ties in both proceedings being exactly the same, but not only this, let it not be
forgotten that when His Honor dismissed Special Proceedings No. 3893, that dismissal
precisely was a dismissal that petitioners herein had themselves sought and solicited from
respondent Judge as petitioners themselves are in their present petition pp. 5-6, rollo; this Court
must find difficulty in reconciling petitioners' attack with the fact that it was they themselves that
had insisted on that dismissal; on the principle that not he who is favored but he who is hurt by a
judicial order is he only who should be heard to complain and especially since extraordinary
legal remedies are remedies in extermies granted to parties ' who have been the victims not
merely of errors but of grave wrongs, and it cannot be seen how one who got what he had
asked could be heard to claim that he had been the victim of a wrong, petitioners should not
now complain of an order they had themselves asked in order to attack such an order
afterwards; if at all, perhaps, third parties, creditors, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, might have
been prejudiced, and could have had the personality to attack that dismissal of Special
Proceedings No. 3893, but not petitioners herein, and it is not now for this Court of Appeals to
protect said third persons who have not come to the Court below or sought to intervene herein;

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On the second assigned error, petitioners argue that no evidence has been found to support the conclusion
that the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of Forrest L. Cease; that on the
contrary, said properties are registered under Act No. 496 in the name of Tiaong Milling as lawful owner and
possessor for the last 50 years of its corporate existence.
We do not agree. In reposing ownership to the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the trial court indeed found strong
support, one that is based on a well-entrenched principle of law. In sustaining respondents' theory of "merger
of Forrest L. Cease and The Tiaong Milling as one personality", or that "the company is only the business
conduit and alter ego of the deceased Forrest L. Cease and the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are
actually properties of Forrest L. Cease and should be divided equally, share and share alike among his six
children, ... ", the trial court did aptly apply the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding the legal
fiction of distinct and separate corporate personality and regarding the corporation and the individual member
one and the same. In shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge narrated the undisputed factual
premise, thus:
While the records showed that originally its incorporators were aliens, friends or third-parties in
relation of one to another, in the course of its existence, it developed into a close family
corporation. The Board of Directors and stockholders belong to one family the head of which
Forrest L. Cease always retained the majority stocks and hence the control and management of
its affairs. In fact, during the reconstruction of its records in 1947 before the Security and
Exchange Commission only 9 nominal shares out of 300 appears in the name of his 3 eldest
children then and another person close to them. It is likewise noteworthy to observe that as his
children increase or perhaps become of age, he continued distributing his shares among them
adding Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the time of his death only 190 were left to his name.
Definitely, only the members of his family benefited from the Corporation.
The accounts of the corporation and therefore its operation, as well as that of the family appears
to be indistinguishable and apparently joined together. As admitted by the defendants
(Manifestation of Compliance with Order of March 7, 1963 [Exhibit "21"] the corporation 'never'
had any account with any banking institution or if any account was carried in a bank on its
behalf, it was in the name of Mr. Forrest L. Cease. In brief, the operation of the Corporation is
merged with those of the majority stockholders, the latter using the former as his instrumentality
and for the exclusive benefits of all his family. From the foregoing indication, therefore, there is
truth in plaintiff's allegation that the corporation is only a business conduit of his father and an
extension of his personality, they are one and the same thing. Thus, the assets of the
corporation are also the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the father of the parties herein who are all
legitimate children of full blood.
A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the doctrine of disregarding or piercing the veil
of corporate fiction. Generally, a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from
that of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. By
virtue of this attribute, a corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of its
stockholders or those of the legal entities to which it may be connected, and vice versa. This separate and
distinct personality is, however, merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote the ends of
justice (Laguna Transportation Company vs. Social Security System, L-14606, April 28, 1960; La Campana
Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, L-5677, May 25, 1953). For this
reason, it may not be used or invoked for ends subversive of the policy and purpose behind its creation
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(Emiliano Cano Enterprises, Inc. vs. CIR, L-20502, Feb. 26, 1965) or which could not have been intended by
law to which it owes its being McConnel vs. Court of Appeals, L- 10510, March 17, 1961, 1 SCRA 722). This is
particularly true where the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend
crime (Yutivo Sons Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, L-13203, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 160),
confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues (R. F. Sugay & Co. vs. Reyes, L-20451, Dec. 28, 1964), perpetrate
deception or otherwise circumvent the law (Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs. reason de Paterno, L-2886, Aug. 22,
1952, 49 O.G. 721). This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or
business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another corporate entity (McConnel vs. Court of
Appeals, supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Norton Harrison Co., L-7618, Aug. 31, 1964).
In any of these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded, and the corporation will be
treated merely as an association of persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as one,
the one being merely regarded as part or the instrumentality of the otter (Koppel [Phil.] Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil.
496, Yutivo Sons Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, supra).
So must the case at bar add to this jurisprudence. An indubitable deduction from the findings of the trial court
cannot but lead to the conclusion that the business of the corporation is largely, if not wholly, the personal
venture of Forrest L. Cease. There is not even a shadow of a showing that his children were subscribers or
purchasers of the stocks they own. Their participation as nominal shareholders emanated solely from Forrest
L. Cease's gratuitous dole out of his own shares to the benefit of his children and ultimately his family.
Were we sustain the theory of petitioners that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction or abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in deciding Civil Case No. 6326 as a case for partition when the
defendant therein, Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. as registered owner asserted ownership of the
assets and properties involved in the litigation, which theory must necessarily be based on the assumption that
said assets and properties of Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. now appearing under the name of F.
L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee are distinct and separate from the estate of Forrest L. Cease to
which petitioners and respondents as legal heirs of said Forrest L. Cease are equally entitled share and share
alike, then that legal fiction of separate corporate personality shall have been used to delay and ultimately
deprive and defraud the respondents of their successional rights to the estate of their deceased father. For
Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company shall have been able to extend its corporate existence beyond the
period of its charter which lapsed in June, 1958 under the guise and cover of F. L, Cease Plantation Company,
Inc. as Trustee which would be against the law, and as Trustee shall have been able to use the assets and
properties for the benefit of the petitioners, to the great prejudice and defraudation. of private respondents.
Hence, it becomes necessary and imperative to pierce that corporate veil.
Under the third assigned error, petitioners claim that the decision of the lower court in the partition case is not
interlocutory but rather final for it consists of final and determinative dispositions of the contentions of the
parties. We find no merit in petitioners' stand.
Under the 1961 pronouncement and ruling of the Supreme Court in Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, 1 SCRA
1188 (and the sequel case of Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga, 2 SCRA 356), the lower court's dismissal of
petitioners' proposed appeal from its December 27, 1969 judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the
ground of prematurity in that the judgment was not final but interlocutory was in order. As was said in said
case:

176

It is true that in Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934 and other cases it was held - contrary to the rule
laid down in Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328; Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 - that in a partition
case where defendant relies on the defense of exclusive ownership, the action becomes one for
title and the decision or order directing partition is final, but the ruling to this effect has been
expressly reversed in the Fuentebella case which, in our opinion, expresses the correct view,
considering that a decision or order directing partition is not final because it leaves something
more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, namely, the
appointment of commissioners, the proceedings to be had before them, the submission of their
report which, according to law, must be set for hearing. In fact, it is only after said hearing that
the court may render a final judgment finally disposing of the action (Rule 71, section 7, Rules of
Court). (1 SCRA at page 1193).
It should be noted, however, that the said ruling in Zaldarriaga as based on Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, XIV
Lawyers Journal 305 (May 27, 1942), has been expressly abandoned by the Court in Miranda vs. Court of
Appeals, 71 SCRA 295; 331-333 (June 18, 1976) wherein Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, laid
down the following doctrine:
The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to now declare as is
clearly indicated from the compelling reasons and considerations hereinabove stated:
- that the Court considers the better rule to be that stated in H. E. Heacock Co. vs. American
Trading Co., to wit, that where the primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who
between plaintiff and defendant is the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the
disputed property, "the judgment . . . rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on
the merits as to those questions, and [that] the order of the court for an accounting was based
upon, and is incidental to the judgment on the merits. That is to say, that the judgment . . . [is] a
final judgment ... that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to the judgment;
that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgment as rendered ... "(as is widely held by a
great number of judges and members of the bar, as shown by the cases so decided and filed
and still pending with the Court) for the fundamental reasons therein stated that "this is more in
harmony with the administration of justice and the spirit and intent of the [Rules]. If on appeal
the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, it would not in the least work an injustice to any of
the legal rights of [appellee]. On the other hand, if for any reason this court should reverse the
judgment of the lower court, the accounting would be a waste of time and money, and might
work a material injury to the [appellant]; and
- that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which expressly reversed
the Heacock case and a line of similar decisions and ruled that such a decision for recovery of
property with accounting "is not final but merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable" and
subsequent cases adhering to the same must be now in turn abandoned and set aside.
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting decisions mostly in partition
proceedings and exemplified by Ron vs. Mojica 8 Phil. 928 (under the old Code of Civil
Procedure) that an order for partition of real property is not final and appealable until after
the actual partition of the property as reported by the court appointed commissioners and
approved by the court in its judgmentaccepting the report. lt must be especially noted that such
rule governing partitions is now so expressly provided and spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of
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Court, with special reference to Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11, to wit, that there must first be a
preliminar, order for partition of the real estate (section 2) and where the parties-co-owners
cannot agree, the court appointed commissioners make a plan of actual partition which must
first be passed upon and accepted by the trial court and embodied in a judgment to be rendered
by it (sections 6 and 11). In partition cases, it must be further borne in mind that Rule 69, section
1 refers to "a person having the right to compel the partition of real estate," so that the general
rule of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are
terminated will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and
denies the adverse party's right to any partition, as was the ruling inVillanueva vs.
Capistrano and Africa vs .Africa, supra, Fuentebellas express rehearsal of these cases must
likewise be deemed now also abandoned in view of the Court's expressed preference for the
rationale of the Heacock case.
The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations of public policy and of sound
practice in the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action call for considering such judgments for recovery
of property with accounting as final judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore
become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period) with
the accounting as a mere incident of the judgment to be rendered during the course of the
appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the execution stage upon final
affirmance on appeal of the judgment (as in Court of Industrial Relations unfair labor practice
cases ordering the reinstatement of the worker with accounting, computation and payment of his
backwages less earnings elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in
Fuentebelia for the contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that would follow from throwing the
door open to multiplicity of appeals in a single case" of lesser import and consequence.
(Emphasis copied).
The miranda ruling has since then been applied as the new rule by a unanimous Court in Valdez vs. Bagasao,
82 SCRA 22 (March 8, 1978).
If there were a valid genuine claim of Exclusive ownership of the inherited properties on the part of petitioners
to respondents' action for partition, then under the Miranda ruling, petitioners would be sustained, for as
expressly held therein " the general rule of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution
proceedings are terminated will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property
and denies the adverse party's right to any partition."
But this question has now been rendered moot and academic for the very issue of exclusive ownership
claimed by petitioners to deny and defeat respondents' right to partition - which is the very core of their rejected
appeal - has been squarely resolved herein against them, as if the appeal had been given due course. The
Court has herein expressly sustained the trial court's findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
assets or properties of the defunct company constitute the estate of the deceased proprietor (supra at page 7)
and the defunct company's assertion of ownership of the properties is a legal contradiction and would but
thwart the liquidation and final distribution and partition of the properties among the parties hereof as children
of their deceased father Forrest L. Cease. There is therefore no further hindrance to effect the partition of the
properties among the parties in implementation of the appealed judgment.

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One last consideration. Parties are brothers and sisters, legal heirs of their deceased father, Forrest L. Cease.
By all rights in law and jurisprudence, each is entitled to share and share alike in the estate, which the trial
court correctly ordained and sustained by the appellate court. Almost 20 years have lapsed since the filing of
Special Proceedings No. 3893 for the administration of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease and Civil Case No. 6326
for liquidation and partition of the assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co., Inc. A succession of
receivers were appointed by the court to take, keep in possession, preserve and manage properties of the
corporation which at one time showed an income of P386,152.90 and expenses of P308,405.01 for the period
covering January 1, 1960 to August 31, 1967 as per Summary of Operations of Commissioner for Finance
appointed by the Court (Brief for Respondents, p. 38). In the meantime, ejectment cases were filed by and
against the heirs in connection with the properties involved, aggravating the already strained relations of the
parties. A prudent and practical realization of these circumstances ought and must constrain the parties to give
each one his due in law and with fairness and dispatch that their basic rights be enjoyed. And by remanding
this case to the court a quo for the actual partition of the properties, the substantial rights of everyone of the
heirs have not been impaired, for in fact, they have been preserved and maintained.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
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KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at
which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from
an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In
his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be
issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March
20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before
the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head
Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the
head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed
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her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along
with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and
clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to
1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3)
canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of
amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy,
and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that
what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In
an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the
District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides,
the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she
was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to

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be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore,
is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the
case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and
orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only
as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent
indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition).
Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro
Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on
March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded
to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted
by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has
not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
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fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTCTacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991,
the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila
and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate
of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile.
She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a
resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case
of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile
by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention
to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in
Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative
of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return
to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
"since childhood."
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To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of
Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers
only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the
First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that
she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it,
no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of
the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass
showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First
District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this
court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be
classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections

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Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under
Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application
of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in
agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to
the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose
is established it is residence.22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid
this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place
of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

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For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the
fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession
or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have
placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually
means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile
or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that
is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision
in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical residence.30

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In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the
1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned
entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as
seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement.
The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his
or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in
the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was
"since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the
COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when
herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the
First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa,
not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence
or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the
second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in
Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

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In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the
Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the
time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously
lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile
ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then,
in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro
Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a
given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to
study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives
with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and
without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in
the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or
business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or
business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one
and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification
in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that
petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC
was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not
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only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile,
which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to
Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally
point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born
in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her
adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to
her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These wellpublicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC
did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she
did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned
her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to
Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
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Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity
or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one
of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use
of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two
concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms
imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while
in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses
her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido
transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means
wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual
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residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation
is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the
family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to
domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not
only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with
the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles
(of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a
single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband
has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the
husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further
explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision
must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one
another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has
been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence
is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not
an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence,
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our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with
each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for
obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one).
In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in
such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her
husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife
could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the
Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of
those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England,
formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice
was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and
in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England,
could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes
Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who
had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby,
36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of
the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order
of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in
the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
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effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she
had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property;
and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed
by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged
by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan,
Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as
a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family
Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly
different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in
the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil
Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concernedaffecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to
mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation
therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this
was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living
in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the
PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair,
having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts
of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding
from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of
origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to
assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of
selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
domicile different from her husband.

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In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we
are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed
resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the
theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a
mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by
several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was
held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time
of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident
of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to
be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision
after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our
courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having
failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is
evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of
the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
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distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws
were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals,
including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny
an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.

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