EN BANC

the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."cralaw virtua1aw library

[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Free Legal Assistance Group Anti-Death Penalty Task Force for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; REGARDED WITH DISFAVOR IN CASE AT BAR.
This is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in
her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the Accused-Appellant. This
court explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, promulgated on November 19, 1996,
that: "As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an
affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accuseds defenses, not the sole consideration
that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge." In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi
which cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the
affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on
the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial courts jurisdiction over the case.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RULE IS THAT THE CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE MISTAKE OF THE COUNSEL; EXCEPTION.
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. One of the recognized
exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in
effect, from having his day in court to defend himself.
3. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; POSSESSES POWER TO SECURE THE SOCIETY AGAINST THREATENED AND
ACTUAL EVIL. One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened
and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal
acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries
and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTY; DEATH SENTENCE; IMPOSABLE WHERE THE LAW ITSELF PROVIDES
THEREFOR. In Harden, we ruled: "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life." (81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948]). Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora
for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in
specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that: ". . . there are quite a
number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition on certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions." (88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951]) and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion, 249 SCRA
246, 253 [1995].
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR THE RESTORATION THEREOF. Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear
showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The constitutional exercise of this limited power to reimpose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that
Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which
latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize
the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement
that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first
be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision
require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate
criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes," for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence
of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEINOUS CRIME, DEFINED. In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No.
7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that: ". . . the crimes punishable
by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." Justice Santiago Kapunan, in
his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995) traced the etymological root of the word
"heinous" to the Early Spartans words, "haineus," meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the
Greek prefix "haton," denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. We find the foregoing definition or description to
be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate
consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to
exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory
penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. No. 7659, IDENTIFIES CRIMES WARRANTING MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY AS WELL AS
THOSE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH. Insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other
crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than
those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is
when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial
discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be
additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death
penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally
qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN IMPOSABLE. Construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal Code,
death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make
operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty, and (2) other
circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court to
cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of
circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man
is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is
capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal
situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTORATION THEREOF; RATIONALE. The death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a
person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty
through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so
caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from
doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in
the case of People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996 "Rape is the forcible violation of
the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect,
freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark
the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act . . . an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the
victim but the society itself."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for
the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during
which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
Accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister

motive of the victims grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused. We find no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.

messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the following matters:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On August 6, 1996, Accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).

a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to the criminal prosecution for rape against
the accused-appellant;

On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of
Accused-Appellant. The motion raises the following grounds for the reversal of the death
sentence:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint which deprived the
accused-appellant from adequately defending himself;

" [1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon by the offended party and her mother
before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.

c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance that placed the accused-appellant within
the coverage of the Death Penalty Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial court during the trial of the rape case.

[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial
prevented the accused-appellant from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the father or stepfather of the complainant
and in affirming the sentence of death against him on this basis.

Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that We can
tackle relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have
proceeded with the prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal. 2

[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and to due process,
due to the incompetence of counsel.

It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that
despite the admission made by the victim herself in open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she,
nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter
might do the same sexual assaults to other women." 3 Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance
must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing
the rape charges against the Accused-Appellant.

[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare, 4 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in
violation of Article III, Sec. 19 (I) of the 1987 Constitution.

"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit
of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accuseds defenses, not the sole consideration that can
result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create
doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." 5

[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.

b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987
Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellants former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which
cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit
of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the
criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial courts jurisdiction over the case.

II

It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings
below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in
our Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 1

The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. 6 One of the recognized
exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in
effect, from having his day in court to defend himself. 7

"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more
reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the appellate court." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now
impute incompetency had amply exercised the required ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and
skill expected of him relative to his clients defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from
the time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably
submitted the Accused-Appellants Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with
extensive discussion in support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency that could have
resulted from a failure to present any argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted
haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to
exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The alleged errors
committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of
conviction against the Accused-Appellant.

It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant before the sala of
then presiding Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, the defense attempted to prove that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the alleged victims maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the alleged victims private part; and
d) the accused was in Paraaque during the time of the alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the accused-appellant reiterated as
grounds for exculpation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) the ill-motive of the victims maternal grandmother in prompting her grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations
of the victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-appellant reveals that in their

III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for violation of law or custom,
religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin
and that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to
punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization throughout the later generations against
past barbarity and the institutionalization of state power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an
individual person with inherent human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to
serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil.
Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may
be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences
the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes of criminal behavior and the
purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the
enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death
penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty
in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our
legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death
penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel
and unusual punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases of Harden v.
Director of Prison, 8 People v. Limaco, 9 People v. Camano, 10 People v. Puda 11 and People v. Marcos, 12 In
Harden, we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United
States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." 13
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the
morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal
acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limacothat:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or
unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of
their private opinions." 14

destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too
presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial
should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve
human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in support of the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty." 16
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the debate that it instigated.
Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that "never in our history has there been a higher incidence of
crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith during the last decade." 17 Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an
unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless in the face of
a future upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested,
"although we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some amount of flexibility to future
legislation," 18 and his concern was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L.
Commissioner and now Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and Commissioner
Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Teodoro C. Padilla put it succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner
Bacani:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"BISHOP BACANI. . . . At present, they explicitly make it clear that the church has never condemned the right of the
state to inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. . . . So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right even from a moral standpoint of
imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of view, that right of the state is not
forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact . . . we have to accept that the state has the delegated authority from the Creator to impose
the death penalty under certain circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is needed for the sake of the common
good, but the issue at stake is whether or not under the present circumstances that will be for the common good.

and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. 15

MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy
during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of
deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the times. In 1941,
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the
government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the
death penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more laws,
among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes involving homicide
committed with an unlicensed firearm.

BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether
or not that delegation is forever under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine, under certain specified conditions or
circumstances, whether the retention of the death penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not
believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days or even a month, determine a positive
provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most
heinous crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and aggravating circumstances." 19

In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to the nullification of the 1973
Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who
was catapulted to power by the people.

What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision. The move to add the phrase,
"unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death penalty,"
came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed
reservations even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional
Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose
B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.

". . . [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion
of our legislature. Arguments pro and con have been given. . . . But my stand is, we should leave this to the
discretion of the legislature.

On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of rights to the rest of the
commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and
was originally worded as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece
of legislation and after repealing this piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that
the legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a constitutional body like ours. If we will
leave the matter of the death penalty to the legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature,
but let us not have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the Revised Penal Code imposing the
death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same
time say that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.

"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted.
Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."cralaw virtua1aw library
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus among the members of the Bill
of Rights Committee that the death penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they
proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitution or by the legislature and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the death penalty. Father
Bernasexplained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather
on whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature
or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is
that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is
never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be

. . . The temper and condition of the times change . . . and so we, I think we should leave this matter to the
legislature to enact statutes depending on the changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the
legislature composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we are not elected by the people and if we
are going to entrust this to the legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it to the
legislature 100 percent." 20
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23) commissioners voting in favor of the
amendment and twelve (12) voting against it, followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III,

Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."cralaw virtua1aw library
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal
Code and certain special criminal laws and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,
21 we stated that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" 22
thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it
seemed, limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium, which
we then, in People v. Masangkay, 23 People v. Atencio 24 and People v. Intino 25 divided into three new periods, to
wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as
the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the Revised
Penal Code. In People v. Munoz, 26 however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases and after extended
discussion, we concluded that the doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of
the issue was whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the
aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old one where the death penalty constituted the
maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read from said constitutional provision and the death penalty is only
suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total
inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited
the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided
into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel
that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to
reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained
intact.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares
the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough." 27
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in
which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate
proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and against capital punishment, the
Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of death penalty. The vote was explained,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Chair directed that a nominal voting be
conducted on the policy issue of death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo
stated that a vote of Yes would mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote against the reincorporation of
death penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
x

in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the death penalty, the Chair said that the
committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the
nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on
how the penalty would be imposed would be left to the discretion of the seven-man committee.
x

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA

In reply to Senator Taadas query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator would vote yes on the basic policy
issue, he could still vote no on the imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy issue of whether or not the death
penalty would be included in the scale of penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is
voted down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules, but if approved, a
special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be appointed and whatever course it will take will
depend upon the mandate given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentinos observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale
of penalties provided by the Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death
penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to
be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason to impose
the death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the crime is heinous."
28
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the
Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal
Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The
mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the committee would be the
determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered
his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death
penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not
define or punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the
Special Committee the work of drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for future deliberations of
this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death penalty was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death penalty, unless Congress should, for
compelling reasons reimpose that penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code
that was affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in the Revised Penal Code,
would be considered as having been repealed all provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having
been repealed by the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose such penalty on
heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were
actually affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision that our Special Committee had to
consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed
draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code are
actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were
totally repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And some of them had to be
amended because the Committee thought that amendments were proper." 29
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it would have been better if the
Senate were to enact a special law which merely defined and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes,
Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide the question whether or not death
penalty should be reimposed, and thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill

". . . [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that the death penalty is imposed in the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the
Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the death penalty has already been
imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised

Penal Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, restoring
the death penalty for some crimes that may be considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble is, when a special bill is presented and
we want to punish in the special bill the case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we
want to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do
the same merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler method of keeping the definition
of the crime as the same and merely adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in
these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal Code." 30
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members
of the Senate debated on its provisions.

enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which says that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the
bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is sufficient. The question of whether
there is due process will more or less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution with respect to due process itself which is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the
definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the reimposition of the death penalty is
subject to three conditions and these are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;

The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the
compelling reason for each and every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the
statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of
[heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of each and every crime in the
death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty
on February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, than before such
ratification. 31 Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for
the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the reimposition of the
death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative,
Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has done everything
in its command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called death penalty." 32 The problem,
Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the
criminal justice system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death
penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling reasons. As
an initial reaction to Senator Linas contentions, Senator Tolentino explained that the statement in the preamble is a
general one and refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may
not have the same degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose the
death penalty is enough compelling reason. 33
Equally fit to the task was Senator WigbertoTaada to whom the battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two
things: first, the definition of "heinous crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of
compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his
objections to the bill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Senator Taada. . . . But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or
elements as they are described in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery and
malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not supposed to be the exclusive
criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we
should consider the relation of the offense to society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these
offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves connected with the effect upon
society and the government have made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason
for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious
as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does the Gentleman believe that these
compelling reasons, which would call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately, distinctly and
clearly stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but
also one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty therefor?

2. There are compelling reasons; and

3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that
Congress is bound to state clearly the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime,
as well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I believe that whether we state the compelling
reasons or not, whether we state why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in
the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what the Supreme Court will fell as a
sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can
certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will go into the very
power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be entirely separate from the matter of
due process." 34
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated our international commitment in
support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however,
that in the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different committees which vote on them for
consideration in the plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration would
have no binding effect on signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound
by said covenant and protocol considering that these agreements have reached only the committee level. 35
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With
seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on
third reading on August 16, 1993.
The Senates vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993 was a vindication of, the House
of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on
the restoration of the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate
when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the House. House Bill No. 295 was
resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by twenty one (21)
Members of the House of Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos.
125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the
Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed the constitutional vesting in
Congress of the power to re-impose the death penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as
the nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the Committee. But the decision of the
Committee was to avoid stating the compelling reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute
measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements were made to show these compelling reasons. And that,
we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be sufficient notice as to what were considered
compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with the preamble already in
general terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble would be
applicable to each and every offense described or punishable in the measure.

Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
shall thereafter provide for it. . . .
The phrase unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it
was introduced as an amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished
by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review
it at the propitious time.

So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress to

Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I
quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future time, the people might want to
restore death penalty through initiative and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today.
x

I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition of the capital punishment. The
violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes are now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a
patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans,
the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them
because their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of
a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or
by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order,
or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two lovely daughters, will stand in the peoples
memory for many long years as the epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business executive, was and still is an outrage
that shocks the moral self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultman, a comely 16 year-old high school student who dreamt of becoming a
commercial model someday, at the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities
of Christians and non-Christians alike.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and BeebomCastanos, the lovely and promising couple from
the University of the Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn in
utter disgust.
x

and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely
eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details
of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros
Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the importation, manufacture and
sale of dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous crimes such as treason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery;
rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined
in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when
the owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in . . . RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any
occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is
one which, by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who
owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the allegiance is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which individuals owe to the government under which they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection which
they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of ones loved one being held against his or her own will in some unidentified . . .
house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of
any person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being punished by death is the fact that the
perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it
merely as a form of self-amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits are
perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over the personal shock and
suffering of their child but the stigma of the traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered the victims life
and permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience
of police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal hostility of the perpetrators against
their victims who are passengers and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no
one may be expected to be able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker,
the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the
sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of subjecting the passengers to
terrorism." 37
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the
Members of the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.

The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this body in restoring death penalty as a
positive response to the overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine
Law Center said, and I quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of Representatives cast their vote on
House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration on third reading. 38 The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes
against, and 2 abstentions

When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the
punishment they deserve, there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The
people will take the law upon their hands and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.

After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August
16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee convened to incorporate and consolidate them.

It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to our constituents and heed their plea
a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice and democracy, and without threat
that their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for
the victims. A law that will deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over and
above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the
death penalty." 36
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals
that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less
quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without
regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous

On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and
for Other Purposes," took effect. 39
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present time, criminal offenders have been
prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out
the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us
on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.
Now, Accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this courts affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the
first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is
unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the
death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription
against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellants proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellants view that Congress enacted R.A.

No. 7659 without complying with the twin requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.

(Sec. 11);

At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this
disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the following analysis.

(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);

(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty
"for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of
Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."cralaw virtua1aw
library

(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or
describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify
as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."cralaw virtua1aw library

(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);

In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous
crimes. Said clause provides that

(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);

(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);

(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);

(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and distribution of regulated drugs (id.);
". . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society."cralaw virtua1aw library
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 40 traced the etymological root of the
word "heinous" to the Early Spartans word, "haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from
the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime.
This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner
of commission of crime, its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the
sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where
R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as
regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of capital crimes without a specification of the elements that
make them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill:
first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes penalized by
mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);

(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec.
17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec.
19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death
but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of
the heinous elements in each of foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death.
The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would only be relevant
when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty
because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the
manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or
in any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society, which
circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked,
vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed in the following
crimes:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);

(1) Qualified bribery
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);

"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who
has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.

(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);

If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the following four circumstances: (a) the victim was
detained for more than three days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);

(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts

(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);

"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.

(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice; (b) a building where people usually
gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a
building for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or
government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in an inhabited place; or
regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the
rape is committed by two or more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed with homicide

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subject to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec. 10)

police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)

(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
x

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or
the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the
third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any
law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11)
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or
the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim
thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall
be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to
use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort,
the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section
20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is
a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty [of death] herein
provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is
allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20
of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers including members of police agencies
and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if
those found guilty or any of the same offenses are government officials, employees or officers including members of

(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory death penalty if convicted are
government officials, employees or officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of planting any dangerous drugs
punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the
latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be
imposed shall be in its maximum [of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or
mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a
quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the
integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual,
psychological, material and social preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death
of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped,
which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed
in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators
must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by
reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death.
The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called
to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with
the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the
heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659
which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to
aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime
provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised
Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to
make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2)
other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court to
cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of
circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man
is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is

capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal
situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever
existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to
reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is
replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of
R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that the death penalty be re-imposed
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved
around the persistent demand of the abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous crime and
statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact,
interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most
minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a
developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts
in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and
thrashing it to its demission.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and implemented before the death
penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason
contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to
that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of our
colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a
dramatic and significant change in the socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2,
1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of the
phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The
imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the
death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the
death penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher
incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the death
penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the
first place did not require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a
death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision
require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate
criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence
of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in
the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."cralaw virtua1aw library
We now proceed to answer accused-appellants other ground for attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659,
i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by
the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. 41 To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which
the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered
not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black
accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine
whether or not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to
the landmark case of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial
discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they
were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather,
we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the
determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die . . . .
x

In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible caste aspect of law enforcement. Yet
we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively
applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised. . . .
x

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on cruel and unusual punishments."cralaw virtua1aw library
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme
Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these
statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or
standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their death penalty statutes now
bearing the procedural checks that were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the
constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, 42 Jurek v. Texas, 43 and Profitt
v. Florida. 44
Next, Accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the
crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of his
contention, Accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia. 45
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it
always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing capital punishment,
at least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from
the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia . . .
.
x

In Gregg [v. Georgia] . . . the Courts judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate murder was neither the
purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court
reserved the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. . . .
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
x

. . . [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the punishment for that crime,
has been dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furmans mandate, none of the States that
had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which
rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised
statutes Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for
those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina,
respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for
murder but not for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or replaced their
death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had
authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included
rape among the crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.
x

It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases,
but only where the victim was a child, and the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated
because the death sentence was mandatory. . . . The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United
States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two
other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child

The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures,
but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman.
. . . [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death
is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its
almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latters privilege of
choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the ultimate violation
of self. It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation, to over
come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the
female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the communitys sense of
security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the
person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.
Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is
not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is unique in its severity and
irrevocability . . . is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the public has manifested its rejection
of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state
legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape,
while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a womans spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and
psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the
context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the courts predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants
the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is
in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." We have
already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply because life was
taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience;
rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive
effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies
based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to
both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals
and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no
doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: 46
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape
deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes
grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act . . . an outrage upon decency and
dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital
punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life,
of course, over death." But dealing with the fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling with
even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life.
Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive
than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized
hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to
preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in
order that tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a . . .
necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do
otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of social
survival." 47
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIED 48 for LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and civilized, as well as, I wish to believe, a humane and
compassionate, being. The ancient edict of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" has since been abandoned by a
society that recognizes the good in every man and gives a transgressor an opportunity to reform. Somehow,
however, certain vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the taking of a human life continues, at least in
some penal systems, to be an acceptable punishment.
In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should impose the death penalty has recently been resolved
with the ratification, on 02 February 1987, of the Constitution by 76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III,
thereof, states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."cralaw virtua1aw library
Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political entity; it can merely apply and interpret the law. It cannot,
and it will not, spare itself from this constitutionally-mandated duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the
discharge of its grave responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act with greatest caution and strictest
circumspection for there can be no stake that can be higher, and no penalty that can be graver, than the extinction
by the State of human life.
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty now lies with the sound discretion of the law-making
authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the fundamental law has set forth,
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and
(2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.
It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a simple "reimposition" of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or just because of it.
The term "compelling reasons" should be enough to indicate that there must be a marked change in the milieu from
that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the
enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned from bad to worse.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the "heinous nature" of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture,
in the case of murder, the crime could become "heinous" within the Constitutional concept when, to exemplify, the
victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death, or in the crime of rape when the offended party
is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before us, the Constitutional fiat (now being raised for the first
time in the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in the imposition of the death penalty has not been satisfied.
I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua (the next lower penalty than death).
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law
reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for Reconsideration filed by his
previous counsel, 3 this transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its
Decision affirming the trial courts sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even

in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to
reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a
retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to
reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while
the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and
thus may no longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas
exclaimed, 6" (t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice
AmeurfinaMelencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding
the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an
exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption
of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes
but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to re-impose it on
condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution
is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly
limited:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons"
and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death
penalty. For claritys sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law, prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes;
and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing
said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1)
by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3)
by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in
general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2)
the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating
circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: In reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in
excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit,
is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous"
crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous." Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659
itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a
standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that
Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph
in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are

repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society."cralaw virtua1aw library
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its
bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective
juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity."
Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not
arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes.
It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be
the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty
once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16 Theres nothing really new
that Congress did which it could not have otherwise done had such provision not been included in our fundamental
law.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes
were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already so punishable by the
Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did not have any impact
upon the legislative action. It was effectively ignored by Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of
Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19
"So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to
the charters effectivity, Congress, I submit, has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the
Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it
would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the
intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and
subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter
debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by
Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez
agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim." 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not
just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were
admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I
also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to
show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of
extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the
same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier
penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and
inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never
be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization
of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the
future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation
(during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the
return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the
crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.).

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative EdcelLagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

"MR. LAGMAN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

MR. LAGMAN.

So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker?. . .

So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.

MR. LAGMAN.

So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the
justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The
Gentleman claims that is one of the compelling reasons. But before we dissect this particular "compelling reason,"
may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. GARCIA (P.)

MR. LAGMAN.
Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.

Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after
the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

MR. GARCIA (P.).

That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.

MR. LAGMAN.

Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know from the
distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice
a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any
compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

MR. LAGMAN.
Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice
demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question .

MR. LAGMAN.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the
reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987
Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed,
was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses
being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have
committed heinous crimes.
x

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice."
With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed
deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police
show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact
declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.
Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MR. LAGMAN.

MR. LAGMAN.
This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of
robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Obviously the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942
in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN.

Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132
or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the
poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal
Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

MR. GARCIA (P.)

As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is
misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN.
But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
The document speaks for itself ."cralaw virtua1aw library
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested
in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991:25cralaw:red
"Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 this was the year when the death penalty was abolished the persons arrested in drug-related cases
were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994,
there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts
per month, double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the
number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty-one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly;
while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above
P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn
between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to
P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately
thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with
another five percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they
earn in a month.
(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated
minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty
six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1)
earns P30,000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis;
fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990,
and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure
continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition
"would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof,
empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the
prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof.
This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition that the real
deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary
risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses can be argued indefinitely. 28 This
debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionallyimposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing
power.

(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry; of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport
and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting,
welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with
sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14)
sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers,
beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
clerks, janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk). About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6)
persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and
executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
(5) None of the DRCs use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly
less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand
Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray.
One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying
levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%),
fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating from high
school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all."cralaw virtua1aw library

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As
such, it should like any other guarantee in favor of the accused be zealously protected, 29 and any exception
thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right
pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that" (n)o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life
life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other
pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser
penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the
unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the peoples rights to health, a balanced ecology and
education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property, for people more than the state, and for life
more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death
penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most
basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment,
utility and expression.

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659
has militated against the poor and the powerless in society those who cannot afford the legal services necessary
in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The best
example to show the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality
was woefully omitted in the proceedings ill the trial court and even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance
Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible
language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The effect of
having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the
latter, a sense unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless of the unequal balance of the scales of
justice.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are
in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law
reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the
underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex
and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating,
whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that,
whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be a certain class or classes of people in our
society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are
consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel
neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither
improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their

situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
EN BANC
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the
non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of
protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be powered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a
position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves
individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor
provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty,
being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I
submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit
its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional right against the death penalty, which is really a
species of the right to life.
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a statute denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal
justice to the underprivileged.chanrobles.com:cralaw:nad
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside.
(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
(a) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these
circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous" .
(b) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of
the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable.
They must both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate "for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.

[G.R. No. 51770. March 20, 1985.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO GALIT, Defendant-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; PROCEDURE FOR PEACE OFFICER IN MAKING

ARREST AND CONDUCTING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. This Court, in the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile,
laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation, and which We reiterate: "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; A LONG QUESTION FOLLOWED BY A MONOSYLLABIC ANSWER DOES NOT SATISFY
REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW. A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there
should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation
and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted
by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; CONFESSION OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION, INADMISSIBLE. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are
inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and
every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only
to "cases of extreme gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40
40a "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend
society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."cralaw virtua1aw library
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both
are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which
man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment
only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only for reasons of
"absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional
burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH,
as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes
mentioned in its text.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim on the occasion of a robbery. He had been obtained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There
was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was
absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they
continued to maltreat and beat him. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl
full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain
inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the
investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his
will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.chanrobles law
library : red
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitlers Germany. But no it did not. It
happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prisioncorreccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage
caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the correction
or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments in a

cruel and humiliating manner.

"If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from the
prisoner, the offender shall be published by prisioncorreccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injures or
damage caused."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of People v. Cabrera, 1 has
consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them
as a grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice persist. Fortunately, such instances
constitute the exception rather than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit by the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CC-VII-2589 of said
court.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found
dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7)
wounded inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two weeks thereafter,
police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction
worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, or suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September
8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view
of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought
to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores
conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. 4
But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated JulingDulay and PablingDulay as his
companions in the crime. 5 As a result, he was charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an
information filed before the Circuit Criminal Curt of Pasig. Rizal, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and three of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by means
of force, intimidation and violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of said
Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad Fernando,
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount; that by reason or on the
occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said
cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal
act, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a
dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the
head and extremities, which directly caused her death, and the total amount of the loss is P10,000.00
including valuables and cash."cralaw virtua1aw library
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation of
his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding the accused guilty as
charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early morning of August 23, 1977, a 70year old woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked
to death by the accused and two others in her (victims) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.
"Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife
having an argument in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears
that on August 18, 1977, AccusedGalit and two others, namely, JulingDulay and a certain Pabling
accidentally met each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad
Fernando; that it was further agreed among them to enter the premises of the victims house at the back
yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside the premises, they will search every room, especially the
aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking for cash money and other valuables.
"Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 oclock in the afternoon,
Accused Francisco Galit and his two companions, JulingDulay and Pabling, as per their previous
agreement, met at the place where they formerly saw each other in Marikina, Rizal; that the three
conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they
stopped and they waited at the side of the road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 oclock that
night, the three repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that they entered the said

premises through the back wall of the house; that while entering the premises of said house, JulingDulay
saw a bolo, lying near the piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the back portion of
the wall of the house; that it was JulingDulay who first entered the house through the hole that they made,
followed by the accused Galit and next to him was Pabling, that it was already early dawn of August 23,
1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could not find
anything valuable inside the first room that they entered, JulingDulay destroyed the screen of the door of
the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the victim, the three accused decided to kill
first the victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for valuables; that JulingDulay, who was
then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim, who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a
moaning sound from the victim; that after the victim was killed, the three accused began searching the
room for valuables; that they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the victim,
where they found some money; that when the three accused left the room of the victim, they brought with
them some papers and pictures which they threw outside; that after killing and robbing the victim, the three
accused went out of the premises of the house, using the same way by which they gained entrance, which
was through the back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked towards the river bank where they
divided the loot that they got from the room of the victim; that their respective shares amount to P70.00 for
each of them; and that after receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left and went home.
"When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of accused Francisco Galit,
he overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling about the intention of accused Galit to save their
residence immediately; that he further stated that he overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other
two companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.
"As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than seven stab wounds. There
was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced
by the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs.C and C-2), and the pictures taken of the deceased victim
(Exhs.E, E-1 and E-2)."cralaw virtua1aw library
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime. He claimed that
he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed
the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation
as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a
conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not
supported by competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely testified
that he and the accused were living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because
the mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned home at about 4:00 oclock in the
morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that
he heard that the accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene",
the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him
not to leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about two
handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the accused had
done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about what he had
heard; and that a weeks later, Montalban policemen went to their house and arrested the accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace officers
to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall
be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even
fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged
confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as
follows:red:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alamkosainyoanginyongmgakarapatansailalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinasna
kung inyongnanaisin ay maaaringhindi kayo magbigay ng isangsalaysay, nahindirin kayo maaaringpilitin o
saktan at pangakuanupangmagbigay ng naturangsalaysay,
naanumananginyongsasabihinsapagsisiyasatnaito ay

maaaringlabansainyosaanuraangusapinnamaaaringilahadsaanumanghukuman o tribunal ditosaPilipinas,

nasapagsisiyasatnaito ay maaaringkatulunginmoangisangmanananggol at kung
sakalinghindimokayangbayaranangisangmanananggol ay maaaringbigyanka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at
alammonaangmgaitonakahandaka bang magbigay ng isangkusang-loobnasalaysaysapagtatanongnaito?

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Every really new question that comes before the courts is in the last analysis determined
by the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. In balancing conflicting solutions that one is perceived to tip
the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or
principle.

"SAGOT: Opo"

4 ID.; ID.; ID.; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" HISTORY. A skeleton history of the attitude assumed towards the backward
inhabitants of the Islands both before and after the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States is set forth in
the opinion. The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject are compiled in Book 6,
Title 3. A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government in its efforts to improve the conditions of such
inhabitants by concentrating them in "reducciones" is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands of January 14, 1881. Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question
as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one. Organic and statutory law
has given the subject consideration.

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law
that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known
to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI
for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence
because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any
confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is
any doubt as to the voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may deem proper
to take against the investigating officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby. SET ASIDE, and another one
entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from custody
immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. "Non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory expression. Legislative, judicial,
and executive authority has held that the term "non-Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degree of civilization. This has been the uniform construction of
executive officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The term "non-Christian" refers not to
religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE "MANGUIANES" The name "Manguian" signifies savage, mountaineer, pagan, negro.
The Manguianes are very low in culture.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY. From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the
Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the
United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine
when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the
United States.

17. SO ORDERED.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. With reference to the laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power
of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed
political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the Government.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

9. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. The maxim of constitutional law
forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected.

Aquino, J., took no part.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comrs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 14078. March 7, 1919. ]
RUBI, ET. AL. (manguianes), Plaintiffs, v. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, Defendant.
D. R. Williams and Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; VALIDITY; CONSTRUCTION;
HISTORY. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: "With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board." Beginning with Act No. 387, Sections 68-71, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos.
411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the province of
Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. Act No. 547 referred especially to the
Manguianes. All of these special laws with the exception of Act No. 1306 were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The last Administrative Code retains the provision which originated in
Act No. 387, enacted in 1202, in Section 2145 herein quoted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; GOVERNMENT POLICY. These different laws denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the
non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the method to be
followed for their advancement.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof,
to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the
decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity," of the case.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head. ]
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION. Since the term "non-Christian" is here construed to refer to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does
not discriminate between individuals on account of religious differences and is therefore not invalid.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL LIBERTY. Various conceptions of civil liberty are quoted in the opinion. Civil liberty may be
said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful
enjoyment of like freedom in others. Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for
that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. "Liberty" as understood in democracies is not license; it is "liberty regulated by law."
"Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of
rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The authority conferred upon executive officials by Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the citizen when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered.

18. ID; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. "Due process of law" is
defined and analyzed in the opinion. The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is
not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are not violated by Section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 since there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to regular methods of procedure; and it applies to all of a class.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together with
their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another."cralaw virtua1aw
library
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Confinement in reservations in accordance with Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICE POWER. The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection,
and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity."cralaw virtua1aw library
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to
exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
24. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of governmental activity.
25. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
26. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION. The fundamental objective of
governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their
educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization.
27. ID.; ID; ID.; ID.; ID. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of the Government
are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals is in fine, to
begin the process of civilization.
28. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and
to develop the resources of that great Island.
29. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION. Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of
the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is
toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration.
30. ID.; ID.; ID. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such
a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not
only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that maintained by such tribe, but such a mode of life
as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with
whom they are brought in contact.
35. ID.; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; BASIS; WHEN PROPERLY APPLICABLE.
The power to provide for the issuance of the reconcentration orders contemplated in Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom of action of
children and persons of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the
general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly exercised only
where certain individuals or groups of individuals are found to be of such a low grade of civilization, that their own
wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester v. Georgia [1832], 6
Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the
status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present
opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative
power of a state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights, if they have any, the political
existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered. To
imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and
the issues, next to give a history of the so-called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Chritans"
with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away from the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Per CARSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:" Whereas several attempts
and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,

31. STATUTES; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" DEFINED. The words "non-Christian" have a clear, definite and well settled
signification when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective applied to "tribes," "peoples" or
"inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the Islands.

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this
province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people,

32. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. The tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribe is, or is not of the
"low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American
occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of
connection with some civilized community."cralaw virtua1aw library
33. ID.; ID.; STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION OF INHABITANTS NOT NON-CHRISTIAN. The legislative and
administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific
tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term
"non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a
mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership
the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative and judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly
civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or
practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to
expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the members of the tribe.
34. ID.; ID.; ID. So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of a particular
province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to
remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that
degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent

"Whereas it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, That under Section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of
the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead
applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
"2. That said Resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of
the Interior of February 21, 1917.
"3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order No. 2 which

says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"THAT THE INDIOS BE REDUCED INTO POBLACIONES(COMMUNITIES).

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.

"In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that
they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a
civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means most
convenient to the attainment o these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and
other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of New Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of
glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a
desire to serve God and our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities,
and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are
deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they can not profit from the aid of our ministers and from
that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized the
convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the
viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into
reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences,
so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those
already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to
pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we
hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the
encomenderos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title."cralaw
virtua1aw library

"Whereas said resolution has been duly approved by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21,
1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, Jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2145 of
the Revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubis place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty
days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
"4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the
governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.
"5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are
liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
"6. That the undersigned has no information that DoroteoDabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if
he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711." It thus
appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor
and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners,
however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount
question which the court is called upon to decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval
of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board." In connection with the above-quoted provision, there should be noted Section 2759 of the same Code,
which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Chritian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall refuse to
comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred
and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days."cralaw virtua1aw library

"LAW VIII.
"Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THAT THE REDUCCIONES BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
"The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters, lands, and
mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and a passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their
live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
"LAW IX
"Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560.
THAT THE INDIOS IN REDUCCIONES BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
"With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not be
deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no
change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that
they may cultivate them and profit therefrom."cralaw virtua1aw library

The substance of what is now found in said Section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this
section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916;
Section 62, Act No. 1397; Section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to
the Manguianes; Section 69, Act No. 387.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is
also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category,
and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized
elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities
towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.

"THE SAME AS ABOVE. "THAT THE REDUCCIONES BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING,
VICEROY, OR COURT.

II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

"LAW XIII.

"No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove the pueblos or
the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the
royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent
to it by offering or giving information to that end. And, because these claims are often made for private interests and
not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be
considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or
encomendero who should violate this law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title
III, in the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"LAW XV.

"LAW I.

"Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.

"The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21,1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February
19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of
the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20. 1578.

THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMAN IN THE REDUCCIONES, WHO SHALL BE INDIOS.
"We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if there
be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a

big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen. If there be less than eighty indios
but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine
others, in the presence of the priests, as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios."cralaw virtua1aw
library
"LAW XXI.
"Philip II, in Madrid, on May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January
10, 1589. Philip III, at Tordesillas, on July 12,1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For
this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
"THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE INDIOS, THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, MESTIZOS, AND
MULATTOES.
"We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattoes, or mestizos to live in the reducciones and towns of
the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are
men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid
the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes,
besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also
some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to
their salvation, increase, and tranquility. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of
the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors,
and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the
ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are
children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they shall not be
affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents." (Law of the Indies, vol. 2,
pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less
advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of a
nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on the other-hand, it is the duty to conscience and to
humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which, living in the
obscurity of ignorance, lack all the notions which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may
be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
"It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the nonChristian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of
the metropolis.
"It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important question,
and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have
even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity,
but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken.
Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded
against, thus giving way for the majority of these races to persist in their mode of living and customs of isolation.
"As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the
prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in
the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for
civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all
the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the
unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the
provincial prelates of the Orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the
meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as
well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
"For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"DECREE.
"1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Island of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common law,
save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are based upon the differences of instruction, of the customs,
and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.

"2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided into three
classes: one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home;
another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of
those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests,
and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races
learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to
their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
"3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means which
their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlements already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet;
for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring,
as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day
of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect
the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to
render personal services other than those previously indicated.
"4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located in fertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the
inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a
new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices
the least their interests; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes within the
reach of the sound of the bell.
"5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed
precisely of native Christians, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulation based upon
that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
"6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties affecting
them and the liberty which they have as to where and how they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof,
with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions
allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in
commerce or any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
"7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall be
fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.
"8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all who
have settled and who profess our sacred religion shall by this fact alone be exempt for eight years from rendering
personal labor.
"9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountain igorots) the
following advantages in return for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession
of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way they deem most productive;
support during a year, and clothes upon affecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the
same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be
Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect,
and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from
contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those
who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the
authority of the province or district.
"10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, have
the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place
them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, that the location of these towns be
distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivation, and
provided further that the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already
constituted.
"11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace,
protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing
from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for this purpose, the Captain Generals
Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their
dwelling- houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall
necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive
to the successful accomplishment of the same.
"12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missionaries, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authority, civil

as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
"13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the
Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.

547:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE
MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted the Philippine Commission, that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent
commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations
that may be brought to it for consultation by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
"15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in bringing about due
compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions." (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)

"SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That
the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act
Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya.

B AFTER ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines, was
President McKinleys Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by
section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained
undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted,
namely:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which
they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."cralaw virtua1aw library
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of Section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in
view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature,
composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian
portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
commonly known as the Jones Law. This law transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority
theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (Sec. 12). It divided the Philippine
Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva
Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized
to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not
represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (Sec. 16). The law established a bureau to be
known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives (Sec. 22).

"SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized, when
he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisoned for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
"SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge
and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall
be exercised to this end, and to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
"SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced
sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixtyseven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of
such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
"SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby expedited in
accordance with section two of An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of
laws, passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
"SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, December 4, 1902."cralaw virtua1aw library
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396 and 1397. The last
named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in question.
These different laws, if they mean anything, denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for
their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinleys instructions to the Commission.

Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognize a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act No.
82, the Municipal Code; Act No. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Charter of the city of Manila;
Act No. 787, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special
Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization
of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio Charter; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 and
1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning
with Act No. 387, Sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having
reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753 855, 1113,
1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra. Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela,
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No.

The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in
Section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in Section 22 of the Jones Law., They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippine Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into Sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau.
Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550,
1397 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These
terms can be found in Sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; Sections 701-705, 2145,
2422, 2426 Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, as
well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and
pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; Sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408,
Sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."cralaw virtua1aw library

If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious
signification. Obviously, Christians would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be
those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited Section
2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuniga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of
Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez,
"Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I, p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many
laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory"
of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition
in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly."
The Philippine Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of
the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in Article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article,
preceding Section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The
specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These
are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local selfgovernment. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of whom are Christians and
some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. (Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of
1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so again the geographical conception is likewise inadequate. The
reason is that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated on the civilization or lack of civilization
of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The
so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward
Philippine peoples, commonly known as the non-Christian tribes." (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose
of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to
legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and Sections 701 et seq., and
Sections 2422 et seq., of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of nonChristian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity."cralaw virtua1aw library
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Tubban [Kalinga]
([1915], 29 Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with Article 423 of
the Penal Code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the
court makes use of the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called nonChristians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders No. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of
an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as
a second marked extenuating circumstance."cralaw virtua1aw library
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of executive officials who have been called upon to interpret and
enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating
to the so-called non-Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the
Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governors of provinces, organized under
the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was
circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SIR: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-Christians

but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the
purposes of Acts 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
"It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in
civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation
non-Christians as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate
for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to
their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
"The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person baptized
has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member
of so-called wild tribes of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced
Christianity.
"The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly
organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
"I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above
expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act." (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say
on the subject:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification has
as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand. . . . I believe the term carries the same
meaning as that expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is
indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for to hold that it is indicative of religious
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The
question arose for ruling relative to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the
Secretary of the Interior , was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of
the Collector of Internal Revenue. This construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular
letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The internal revenue law exempts members of non-Christian tribes from the payment of cedula taxes. The
Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form
of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other persons are exempt; he has interpreted it
to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the
cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so
long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter
of a mans form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is
more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a
member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his
religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula
tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax,
inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all of the Jews,
East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city
are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and others are quite widely scattered
throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial
towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that
civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject
thereto.
(Sgd.) "JNO. S. HORD,
"Collector of Internal Revenue."
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the
Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from
members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purpose of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions
and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

unconstitutional as making distinctions based on the religion of the individual."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not profess
Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the
cedula tax law is concerned. . . .
"Whenever any member of a non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal
relations he may have had and attaches himself to some civilized community, becoming a member of the body
politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that
community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other
taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period
the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be
furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to play the tax for former years.
"In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factor in determining whether or not a man is subject to the
regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of
or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of
advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so
called Remontados and Montescos will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as
the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized
tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and
members of other recognized non-Christian tribes.
"Very respectfully, (Sgd.)
"ELLIS CROMWELL,"
Collector of Internal Revenue,
"Approved:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(Sgd.) "GREGORIO ARANETA,
"Secretary of Finance and Justice."
The two circulars above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1,
promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable VictorinoMapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript
of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary requested the
opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the
Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a
Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling
same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after
quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that the person in question remains a nonChristian, so that in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable
to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions
placed upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise."cralaw virtua1aw library
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative
Code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all
non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipinos or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to
those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence,
roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order. . . .
"The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in
tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life,
did not intend to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the
difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
"The phrase non-Christian inhabitants used in the provisions of Articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (Articles
2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only
because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its literal meaning would make the law null and

The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than Dr. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population into Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or
Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq.) The present Director of the Census,
Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and
Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in
the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a subdivision under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and
Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the term refers to culture and not
to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join
in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to geographical area, and,
more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various stages approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided
them into four classes.
Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro. Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H.
Pardo de Tavera in his Etimologia de losnombres de Razas de Filipinas, says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies savage, mountainer, pagan, negro. It may be that the se of
this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants
of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but
its employment in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day
forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies ancient, from which we can deduce that the name was
applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by
the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The Manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547,
have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States
for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the socalled non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation
of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage."
The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The
Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress
passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the
Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object
sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into
agriculturists."cralaw virtua1aw library
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States v. Kagama ([1886], 118 U. S.,
375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then
proceeds to indite a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshalls opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, supra), as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution,
to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
"Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of America towards the Indians who were found
here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians
a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they
asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other
nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its land, or

any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in
which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make
such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relations are equally difficult to define.
They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union or of the State within whose limits they resided."cralaw virtua1aw library

purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government
almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority. . . . Whether such
an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not, need not be
questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must
be upheld. "The decision concluded as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The opinion then continues:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That an Indian is a person within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the right to
sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined
or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States.

"It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards
of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This
has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen. . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It
must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the later case of United States v. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U. S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the
status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating
liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of
the different superintendents charged with guarding their interests and found that these Indians are dependent upon
the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said
"that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection,
were subjected to restraints and official supervision in the alienation of their property." And finally, we note the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes,
but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to
the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and
protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."cralaw virtua1aw library
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule
the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U. S., 488; U. S. v.
Celestine [1909], 215 U. S., 278; U. S. v. Sandoval, supra; Worcester v. Georgia, supra; U. S. v. Rogers [1846], 4
How., 567; The Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall., 616; Roff v. Burney [1897], 168 U. S., 218; Thomas v. Gay
[1898], 169 U. S., 264; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock [1903], 187 U. S., 553; Wallace v. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415;
Conley v. Bollinger [1910], 216 U. S., 84; Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U. S., 286; U. S. v. Lane [1913],
232 U. S., 598; Cyr v. Walker [1911], 29 Okla., 281; 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States
sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such
measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U. S. v.
Thomas [1894], 151 U. S., 577.)

"The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte, has the
custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof.
"3. That no rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent
has been directed to do.
"4. That the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and have
the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass
on forbidden ground. And,
"5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the
relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered."cralaw virtua1aw library
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the
Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the
Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse
[1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians
have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian
policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in
Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial
authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its
full responsibility.

All this is borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas
corpus, is that of United States v. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of
habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who
have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without
aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of
violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of,
and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated some
place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government;
and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the
respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order,
he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The
second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators
for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In
discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealings with the friendly
tribe of Poncas. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected,
we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not been violated in this instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed
in a multitude of cases, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion,
as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S.
v. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity" of
the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of
the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this
"necessary" ?
The case of West v. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U. S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the
Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to
the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes

provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and
agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all
matters arising out of the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view
of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of
Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was
necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the
Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, if any is needed, Union Bridge Co. v. U. S. [1907], 204 U.
S., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court; U. S. v. Lane [1914], 232 U. S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule,
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised
by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge "when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged
with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select
sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says
that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as
language can express, it provides for the segregation of non-Christians and none other." The inevitable result, then,
is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their
religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."cralaw virtua1aw library
Counsels premise once being conceded, his argument is unanswerable the Legislature must be understood to
mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore
stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of
legislative action.
We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals on account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the Presidents instructions to the Commission,
the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and these provisions, it has been said, "are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo v. Hopkins [1886],
118 U. S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by
every other." (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
"Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a
legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the
more liberty we have . . . That man is free who is protected from injury." (II Websters Works, p. 393.)

restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any
other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is
a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere within
which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the
exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the
safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great
dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public
may demand." (Harlan, J., in Jacobson v. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U. S., 11.)
"Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual." (ApolinarioMabini.)
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are
necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in lawful ways;
to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes
to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose ones
employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free
men. (There can be noted Cummings v. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall., 277, Wilkinson v. Leland [18293, 2 Pet., 627;
Williams v. Fears [1900], 179 U. S., 274; Allgeyer v. Louisiana [1896], 165 U. S., 578; State v. Kreutzberg [1902],
114 Wis., 530. See 6 R. C. L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is "liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the
natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and
equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained
in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power. (See Hall v. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U. S., 539: Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruz [1914], 189
Ala., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of
the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as
has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice
are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a
stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado v.
California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed
in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. v. Ling Su Fan
[1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law
depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer v. Peabody
[1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is
applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.

"Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not to
desire." (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws.)
We break off with the foregoing statements, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to ones own will. It is only
freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others." (Field, J., in
Crowley v. Christensen [1890], 137 U. S., 86.)
"Liberty does not import absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist

in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippines. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has,
by adoption, with necessary modifications, of Sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code,
prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary,
peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges v. U. S. [1906], 208 U.
S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact
involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey v. Alabama [1910], 219 U.
S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must
come a description of the police power under which the State must act if Section 2145 is to be held valid.

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has
adopted as the polaris of his administration The advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to
equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the
following measures:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild
habitat and settle in organized communities.
"(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by
the non-Christian people.
"(c) The extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the
extension of government control.

E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the far
reaching scope of the power, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep, and that among its purposes is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. peace, morals, education, and good order of the people,
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity. (See Barbier v. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27.) What we are most interested in is the right of the
government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the law of overruling necessity. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View v. Rose Hill
Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam
the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles
that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police
power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be no doubt that the exercise of
the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of
government." (Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U. S. v. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any
constitutional provision has indeed been violated by Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor
to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention
should be effectuated.

"(d)Construction of roads and trails between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social and
commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
"(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
"(f) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of
Mindanao and Sulu."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Secretary adds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people.
These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate
the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their
wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities, thus bringing them under the control
of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their
children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are
being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and
political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country." (See Report of the
Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians,
and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,
defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal
terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be
remembered, assigned as reasons for the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successful method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following: (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the
Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to that place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that
creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be
encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly
unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained
during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and
development.
"Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But
the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the
press:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the
influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and
make depredations, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."

"It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor
of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid,
and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always
having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago." (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino
people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently
working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have
on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate
neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands.
What the Government wished to do by bringing them into a reservation was to gather together the children for
educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. This
method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation,
has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if
they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some
cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes
protection for the Manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not
precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low
degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the
law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and

persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are
punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before.
If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Island of Mindoro, and its, as yet,
unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.

and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public
domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to
concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are
roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives. of the Government. For as people
accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless
a penalty is provided for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of
organizing them politically will come to naught."cralaw virtua1aw library

To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

"Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the Manguianes) are engaged
in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing
any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people
with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.

"There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not practise liberty in a
rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
"Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being
deprived thereof without due process of law?
x

"But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law
apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?
"To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty
is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains
and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense.
"In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of
either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more
in accord with humanity and with national conscience."cralaw virtua1aw library
x

"The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the education
and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the
Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will
become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of
most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their
personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the
Government to lead this people in the path of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood
only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been
erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the
Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus
be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, any
challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.

In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could he not,
however, be kept away from certain localities? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of
Congress of 1802 (2 U. S. Stat. at L., p. 141) punished those intruders who should cross the line into an Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided
for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar laws were accepted and
followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a
prison at the mercy of unscrupulous officials. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have
little or no motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor
to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open
for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular
case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seem that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily
hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the rights and liberties of the
individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has as sailed
the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Not now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor
now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an
issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperative a power to restrain the
individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the
particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is,
and for a long time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political
theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the
Government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has
exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that Section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of
the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble v. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided
to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that the object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their
children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done for them
in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together
in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.

"We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that
comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of
the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public
welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is
wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as
sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."cralaw virtua1aw library

"But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other place under penalty of
imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life,
do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrant,

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in
vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days
to the present. The idea is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of

nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to
be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole.
The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate
branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-interference on the part of
the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which
he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn v.
Nelson [1911], 222 U. S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the court
must take "a chance," it should be, with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general
governmental policy, and with a view to the courts performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that
broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of
the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This
is the ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed against petitioners. So ordered.

8. ID.; ID. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands.
9. ID.; ID. Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in
the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances.
10. ID.; RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint
of liberty. The essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
11. ID.; ID. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively
as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.
12. ID.; ID. The true principle should be that if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his
power to obey the order of the court, and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do
so.
13. ID.; ID. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person
before the application for the writ, is no reason why the writ should not issue.
14. ID.; ID. The place of confinement is not important to the relief if the guilty party is within the reach of process
so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 14639. March 25, 1919. ]
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO ET AL., Petitioners, v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., Respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza, for Petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF DOMICILE; LIBERTY; HABEAS CORPUS; CONTEMPT. One hundred
and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by
orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor
of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the
Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to
comply with the order of the court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2)
criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was never intended effectively and promptly to meet a situation
in which there is restraint of liberty. That the act may be a crime and that the person may be proceeded against is
also no bar to the institution of habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles,
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.
4. ID.; ID. The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in
American jurisprudence.
5. HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
6. ID.; PARTIES. Where it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is proper
for the writ to be submitted by some person in his behalf.
7. ID.; JURISDICTION. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the Court of First Instance.

15. ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT. For respondents to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas
corpus, three courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these persons
could not safely be brought before the Court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 87.)
16. CONTEMPT OF COURT. The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that
respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
17. ID. When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid
excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him
either imprisoned or fined.
18. ID. An officers failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has
power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.
19. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS. The Government of the
Philippine Islands is a government of laws. The court will assist in retaining it as a government of laws and not of
men.
20. ID.; ID. No official, however high, is above the law.
21. ID.; ID. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant
democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic
principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary permit a
government of men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for
other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the
best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been

permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities
quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers;
with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the
Constabulary for a guard of soldiers, At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders
from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression
that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their
unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

habeas corpus. In sub- stance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had
succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao
who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation free, renounced the right through sworn
statements; that fifty- nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police
of the city of Manila Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz,
fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de
losrecurridos, (reply to respondents memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as
laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The
governor and the hacenderoYigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women
were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the
serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of
this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine
relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and
a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society,
and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights,
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove
that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night
to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was
made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned
them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need
not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally re- strained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was
made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted
certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for
Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their
custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the hacienda of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to a question of
a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the
writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero
of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel
for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner. On the day
named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced
in court by the respondents. It has since been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila
through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal
appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original
petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer
thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in
Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contented with their life in Mindanao and did not
wish to return to Manila. Respondent Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the
Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province
of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that
he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the
mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that
the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to
do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents
Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless
the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further
stated that the question of whether the respondents were in con- tempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and
policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13,
1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their
own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by
their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final
decision. We will now proceed to do so.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law did the Mayor and
the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within
the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of Congress. The GovernorGeneral can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine
Commission and Section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and
punishment by a court of justice of any person who is common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any
citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States
have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common
prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination. or establish a quarantine, or place a
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for
any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of
that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of
society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply
imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction.
Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands even the President of the United States, who has often been
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If
the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render
the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of
the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official
can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so.
And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country,
then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will
we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 Eng.
Stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and
to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. v. Lee [1882], 106
U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man
may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself." (Yick Wo v. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of
habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the
courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil

action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may
still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to
meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines
who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by
virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not
more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
"Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro
and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty
pesetas." (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer
has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously
as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the
persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge
Cooley in a case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by
one unlawfully confined, to be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a
crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow
process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the
writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance
in this instance. The fiscal has argued (1) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court
should not assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the persons in question are not restrained of their liberty by
respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila
only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not pressed with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the
deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a
petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal
liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
courts jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made
therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should
have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary
expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of
first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court
or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 79; Code of
Civil Procedure, Sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an
inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this
instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any
means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with
their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case
involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken
cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the
application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says
counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in
Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush,
this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first
principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were

prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly
waived this right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries
of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim
that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We
believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power
to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under
no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, these same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to
avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange
as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of
habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the
State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State.
The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice,
and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C.J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue.
Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions,
and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which
was laid before us. . . .
"It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended
upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could
declare in his speech on the petition of right that Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign,
and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it
should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and
soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without
delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought
to their notice. . . .
"The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state
seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
England that the court of kings bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes
were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
"The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and
served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer
or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by
compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if
he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the
ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are
usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to. the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process,
so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not
increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The
important question is, where is the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy." (In the matter
of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers v. Mitchell [1881], 57
Iowa, 193; Breene v. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of England by
the Respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queens Bench Division upon the application of the
mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a
certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ
had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible
for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R.,

said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

"A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant
to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt
of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the
judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it
could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the
writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any
lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the
writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some
anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt.
But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a
contempt in disobeying the writ after it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands." (The
Queen v. Barnardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com.
Law Rep. [N.S. ], 233; The Queen v. Barnardo, Gossages Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have
shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided.
While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading
of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a
substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see
this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive
investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to
have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention.
Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington;
that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas
corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis
had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the
return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in
court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should
produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be
released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in
Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States v. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.
C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb v. Connolly [1883], 111 U. S., 624; Church on Habeas Corpus, 2nd
ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defenses offered by the respondents constituted
a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondents complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court
awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or
be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to
present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4,
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the
record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of
his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do
so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question
being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the courts order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit
that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could
have presented affidavits to show ,that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be
present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented
with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return.
That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back
to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao,
and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the
non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar
facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossages
case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought
about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to
use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in
the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other
words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That
the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze
the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this
connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police
force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person
and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the
respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officers failure to produce
the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed
in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that
any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their
chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful
mitigating circumstance. The hacenderoYigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction
by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to
fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court,
his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into
this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who
was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate
women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of Section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the
penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties
aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him
as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that
since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of
the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to
lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and
embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as
extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive such
an amount is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent
Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days
the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the
Replica al Memorandum de losRecurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision
may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83988. September 29, 1989.]
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLES RIGHTS (ULAP),
Petitioners, v. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND,
Respondents.

manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged
fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims
that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

SYLLABUS

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; BEDROCK OF THE REGIME OF LAW AND CONSTITUTIONALISM.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec.
2.) It is also the bedrock the right of the people to be left alone on which the regime of law and
constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and
even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain command of the
Constitution.
2. ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; BURDEN OF PROVING REASONABLENESS INCUMBENT UPON THE STATE.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the
aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I
submit that in that event, the burden is the States, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The
petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident"
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
3. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE ALONE OF A SEARCH WARRANT MAKES CHECKPOINT SEARCHES UNREASONABLE.
The absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by
itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto
themselves a roving one at that.
4. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR NOT SIMPLY A POLICEMAN ON THE BEAT. The American cases the majority refers
to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause." What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman
on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire
with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your
face.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and
banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of
checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and
Advocates for Peoples Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the
IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples Right (ULAP) v.
Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were
violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved. 5
Petitioner Valmontes general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmontes right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits,
are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the
National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and

fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the
State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are
peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required
warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at "establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any
time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on
pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of
democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its
stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of
security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic
checkpoints to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion
might impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we
can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M.
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National
Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, Respondents.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed
wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I vote then, to grant the petition.

[G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.]

SYLLABUS

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so straight-forwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the
existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It
is also the bedrock the right of the people to be left alone on which the regime of law and constitutionalism
rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation."
(Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day by
virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12,1980), yet another martial
law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures,
the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at
EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the
aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I
submit that in that event, the burden is the States, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The
petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident"
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable,
and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants"
unto themselves a roving one at that.
That" [n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But
the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it(they) is(are) not, for one
simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle . . . or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwells Big
Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve routine
checks compelled by "probable cause." What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but
armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I
have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore correct
here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence . . . and on individuals right against a warrantless
search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the
same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time
around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONES COUNTRY, NOT AMONG THE
RIGHTS GUARANTEED. The right to return to ones country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW. It is the courts well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.]
3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. It is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
4. ID.; ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT A GRANT OF ALL THE
POWERS INHERENT THERETO. As the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed
out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a
grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the
legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred
members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive
power which is vested in one official the President.
5. ID.; PRESIDENTS POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; EXTENT AND LIMITATION. Consideration
of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete
understanding of the extent of and limitations to the Presidents powers under the 1987 Constitution. Although the
1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
6. ID.; PRESIDENTS RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE; THE
POWERS INVOLVED. The power involved is the Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is
not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that
the needs of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency,
but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision.
7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE
PHILIPPINES; TO BE TREATED AS ADDRESSED TO THE RESIDUAL UNSTATED POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on
the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

8. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. The present Constitution
limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review
but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are
involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
9. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO
THE PHILIPPINES, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We find that from the pleadings filed by the
parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, there exist factual bases for the Presidents decision. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion
that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
State and instigate more chaos. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; ITS PROVISIONS PROTECT ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES AND
UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. "The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No
doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281
[1866]).
2. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION. It is a well-settled
doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to determine what
matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial
power. More properly, however, it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.
4. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL POWER VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS, BEYOND
PROHIBITION OR EXAMINATION BY THE COURT REQUIRED FOR ITS EXISTENCE. For a political question
to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or Congress, the exercise of
which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power against a civil right which claim
is not found in a specific provision is dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public
officials to strike where they please and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire Government
is bound by the rule of law. The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no
law has been enacted specifying the circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national
security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the Executive.
5. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; RIGHT TO TRAVEL INCLUDES RIGHT TO TRAVEL OUT
OF OR BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of a court.
Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further provides that the right to travel, and this
obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
6. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE NO LONGER UTILIZED BY THE COURT; COURT COMPELLED TO
DECIDE THE CASE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. The framers of the Constitution believed that the free
use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional
difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly extending
judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power.
Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr.
Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly
amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a
convenient resort to the political question doctrine. We are compelled to decide what would have been nonjusticeable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.
7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We do not
have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the respondents
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the implications of a

Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion. In the first place, there has never been a pronouncement by the
President that a clear and present danger to national security and public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family
are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only after the present petition was filed that the alleged danger to
national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino
herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing need to
preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. Neither ground satisfies the criteria of national
security and public safety. The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or what the majority calls "catalytic
effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger to national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult
problem or any troublesome person can be substituted for the Marcos threat as the catalysing factor. It was
precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., JovitoSalonga, and
scores of other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate period which led the framers
of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this right.

DECISION

CORTES, J.:

Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Courts decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of
national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic
under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7
by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos
spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even
from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987
Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs.
Aquinos presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col.
Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people,
both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message
they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy
over the military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in the military establishment
and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency and the secessionist
movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have
set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively control while the separatists are virtually free
to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these groups determination to wrest power from the
government. Not only through resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they been successful in
creating chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation
attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on
the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after
causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three
years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.
The Issue

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following
issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines?

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

a. Is this a political question?

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health"

On the other hand, the respondents principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question
which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family
have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without reference
to attendant circumstances.

b. Assuming that she has made that finding,

(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the
President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?

(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the Presidents decision, including the grounds
upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?
c. Is the Presidents determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear
and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the Presidents decision to bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his
family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.]

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a
determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its
nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? This is still
a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the
Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not
decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum
for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support
thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired
by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.chanrobleslawlibrary : rednad
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines,
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article 12

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines for
reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, King Farouk
of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the
deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign
Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We,
however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties formulation of the issues, we
are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the
import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt.
1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt. 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to
travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right

involved is the right to return to ones country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter ones country as separate and distinct rights. The
Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art.
12(1)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by
such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights
and freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which one cannot
be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to ones country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily
deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of
effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar
as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the
Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the
right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its
resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution.
Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has
the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,
pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the
President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
and decided to bar their return.

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He
said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle
everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers
ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article II in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.." . . [The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from
Washington to the early 1900s, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincolns dictatorship, he
concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger, who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. It remained, of course, an agency of government
subject to unvarying demands and duties no matter who was President. But, more than most agencies of
government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each Presidents distinctive
temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, idiosyncrasies, compulsions,
phobias recast the White House and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was
a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact
on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President
understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the
electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or
weakened the constitutional order. [At 212-213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration
of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete
understanding of the extent of and limitations to the Presidents powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935
Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere
figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was
also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government
and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.cralawnad

Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To
recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has
blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." [At 157.] Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that" [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1]," [t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and" [t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation
of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive
and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power;
and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government." [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a
combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy
of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that" [t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art.
VII, Secs. 14-23].chanrobles law library
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated
powers the breadth and scope of "executive power" ? Petitioners advance the view that the Presidents powers are
limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius." [Memorandum for
Petitioners, p. 4; Rollo p. 233.] This argument brings to mind the institution of the U. S. Presidency after which ours
is legally patterned. **

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President
is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office
unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the countrys foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928),
on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of
stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are
not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties
devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not
legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority
of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one
among which the powers of government are divided . . . [At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement
for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what
are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. . . .
x

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or
that the Constitution reqiures.[At 210-211.]

similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.chanrobleslawlibrary : rednad
The Extent of Review

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that" [t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people" and that" [t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such
does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of
government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any
decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and
adhere to them.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind
that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government
exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that" [s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art.
II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the
deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars
believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither
absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although
couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public
interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988].
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of
rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt,
it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the Presidents duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the Presidents duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that
an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The
American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times
when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-inchief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces,
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been recognized by
members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo,
p. 321.] The Resolution does not question the Presidents power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the Presidents sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the
President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example,
question the Presidents recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action
may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally
undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before
us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the
scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When
political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official
concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would
appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which
specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v.
Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448] that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in
the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or
to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act .. [At 479-480.].
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do
exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in
deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser,
wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the Presidents decision.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a
well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power,
urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier
narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate
and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has
given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return
of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camels back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against

the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted
her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived
as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the peoples sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk
from that responsibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought
about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in
foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the
root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual
and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.