Specpro - Angel Notes

SPECIALPROCEEDINGS(REGALADOTEXT;CHUA)
PRELIMINARIES
ACTION
Anactionbywhichapartysuesanother
for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong
It is a formal demand of ones legal
rightsinacourtofjusticeinthemanner
prescribedbythecourtofbythelaw
It is absolute rule that there is an

adversarialparty
Generaljurisdiction
Usually constitute actions in personam,

whereinthedecisionofthecourtwould
onlybindthepartiesinthecase
Issuesdeterminedbythepleadings
Thereisaprescriptiveperiodinvolved
Therecanbeanawardfordamages
SPECIALPROCEEDING
Anapplicationtoestablishthestatusor
right of a party or a particular fact, or
anyremedyotherthananordinarysuit
inacourtofjustice
Generally
commenced
through
application, petition, or special form of
pleading
Publicationusuallynecessarytoacquire
jurisdiction
It is a general rule that there is no

adverse party (exception: in cases of
habeascorpusproceedings)
Constitute actions in remwherein

theseproceedingsbindthewholeworld
oncetheyareconcluded
Issuesdeterminedbylaw
Thereisnoprescriptiveperiodinvolved
Noawardofdamages
Generally, no default in special

proceedings
1
HAGANSV.WISLEZENUS
42PHIL880
FACTS:
Apetitionforcertiorariwasfiledagainstajudgewhoorderedtheappointmentof
assessors in a special proceeding. Of all the laws existing during the period, the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
only law which could possibly sanction the appointment of assessors is Act 190,
whichprovidedthatwhenthepartiesrequestfortheappointmentofanassessor,
thejudgewouldconsequentlyprovidethesame.
The trial court judge would be sustained if it is found that the provision also
contemplatedspecialproceedingswhenitmentionedaction.
HELD:
Thereisamarkeddistinctionbetweenan"action"anda"specialproceeding."An
actionisaformaldemandofone'slegalrightsinacourtofjusticeinthemanner
prescribedbythecourtorbythelaw.Itisthemethodofapplyinglegalremedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be
definedasanapplicationorproceedingtoestablishthestatusorrightofaparty,or
aparticularfact.Usually,inspecialproceedings,noformalpleadingsarerequired,
unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is
generally granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special
proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings for the
appointmentofanadministrator,guardians,tutors;contestofwills;toperpetuate
testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar,
etc.
Fromalloftheforegoing,inthepresentproceeding,thejudgeoftheCourtofFirst
Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is
herebyoverruledandtheprayerofthepetitionisherebygranted,anditishereby
ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge appointing the
assessors described in the petition be and the same is hereby annulled and set
aside;and,withoutanyfindingastocosts,itissoordered.
2
NATCHERV.COURTOFAPPEALS
366SCRA380
FACTS:
SpousesdelRosarioweretheownersofaparcelofland.Whenthewifedied,the
husband and the children extrajudicially partitioned the property. Graciano
likewise donated part of his share in the land to his children and consequently
dividedhisshareintotwosellingonelottoathirdpersonandtheotherlot,he
retainedashisown.Helatercontractedasecondmarriagetopetitioner.Before
hisdeath,hesoldthesecondlottopetitioner.Uponhisdeath,thechildrenfiled
anactionforannulmentoftitle,allegingthatbeforetheirfathersdeath,through
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fraudandforgery,petitionerunlawfullytransferredthelandtoher.Thetrialcourt
ruled that the deed of sale was void and against the law. nonetheless, the
conveyancecanbeconsideredasanadvanceinheritance.Thiswasreversedbythe
CourtofAppealshoweveronappealrulingthatthetrialcourtshouldn'truleon
matterswhichtheprobatecourthasproperjurisdictionover.
HELD:
Ascouldbegleanedfromtheforegoing,thereliesamarkeddistinctionbetweenan
action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a
court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
methodofapplyinglegalremediesaccordingtodefiniteestablishedrules.Theterm
"special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
thestatusorrightofaparty,oraparticularfact.Usually,inspecialproceedings,no
formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special
proceedings,theremedyisgrantedgenerallyuponanapplicationormotion."
Applyingtheseprinciples,anactionforreconveyanceandannulmentoftitlewith
damagesisacivilaction,whereasmattersrelatingtosettlementoftheestateofa
deceasedpersonsuchasadvancementofpropertymadebythedecedent,partake
ofthenatureofaspecialproceeding,whichconcomitantlyrequirestheapplication
ofspecificrulesasprovidedforintheRulesofCourt.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedentfallwithintheexclusiveprovinceoftheprobatecourtintheexerciseof
itslimitedjurisdiction.
Thus,underSection2,Rule90oftheRulesofCourt,questionsastoadvancement
madeorallegedtohavebeenmadebythedeceasedtoanyheirmaybeheardand
determinedbythecourthavingjurisdictionoftheestateproceedings;andthefinal
orderofthecourtthereonshallbebindingonthepersonraisingthequestionsand
ontheheir.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction,isdevoidofauthoritytorender anadjudicationandresolvetheissue
of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover,underthepresentcircumstances,theRTCofManila,Branch55wasnot
properlyconstitutedasaprobatecourtsoastovalidlypassuponthequestionof
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitionerNatcher.
3
VDA.DEMANALOV.COURTOFAPPEALS
349SCRA135
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate, leaving his spouse and children as heirs. Eight of
thesechildrenfiledforthesettlementoftheestateoftheirfather.Thetrialcourt
issued an order setting a date for hearing as well as publication of the same in
newspapers. Petitioners opposed and sought that they be heard on their
affirmativedefensesregardingthecasesdismissalaswellasthatthecourthasn't
acquired jurisdiction over them. The trial court issued an order overruling the
petitionerscontention.Itwassustainedbytheappellatecourtdespiteallegations
of the petitioners that the special proceedings applied for by respondents was
actuallyinthenatureofanordinarycivilactionfiledagainstthem.
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought 16 in the
complaint,orpetition,asinthecaseatbar,shallbecontrolling.Acarefulsrutinyof
thePetitionforIssuanceofLettersofAdministration,SettlementandDistribution
ofEstateinSP.PROC.No.9263626belieshereinpetitioners'claimthatthesameis
in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient
jurisdictionalfactsrequiredinapetitionforthesettlementofestateofadeceased
personsuchasthefactofdeathofthelateTroadioManaloonFebruary14,1992,
aswellashisresidenceintheCityofManilaatthetimeofhissaiddeath.Thefact
of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation
factsuponwhichallthesubsequentproceedingsintheadministrationoftheestate
rest. The petition is SP.PROC No. 9263626 also contains an enumeration of the
names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition,
the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the
intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlementoftheestateoftheirdeceasedfather,TroadioManalo.
JURISDICTION
EXTENTOFJURISDICTION
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Concurrent jurisdiction over guardianship and adoption cases is now

eliminatedandexclusivejurisdictionisnowvestedwiththeRTC
Municipal trial courts can likewise appoint guardians ad litem in proper
cases and where said incompetent is not represented by his parents or
judicialguardian
Municipal trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction over probate cases
involving a gross value of the estate not exceeding P20,000later
amendedbyincreasingittoP300,000andP400,000inMetroManila
ThewritofhabeascorpusmaybeissuedbytheSupremeCourt,Courtof
Appeals,andRTC
Specialjurisdictionisconferredtomunicipalcourtjudgesintheabsence
ofanyRTCjudge
Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
guardianship, custody, habeas corpus in relation to the latter, and
adoptionofchildrenandrevocationthereof
Publication of judicial orders and notices is often required in special
proceedingsforjurisdictionalpurposes
4
MANGALIMANV.GONZALES
36SCRA462
FACTS:
Petitionerwastheillegitimatedaughterofthedecedentandwasgivenalegacyof
1/8undividedportioninHaciendaEvangelista.Sinceshewasstillaminorduring
thistime,shewasplacedunderguardianship.Oneofthelegitimatechildrenwas
the administrator of the estate. On allegations that his fees werent paid yet, he
filed for a writ of execution. The whole Hacienda Evangelista was sold in public
auctiontorespondentadministrator,includingthatshareofpetitioner.Whenshe
cameofage,shetriedtoannulthesaletoherhalfbrotherbutshewasoverruled
onthegroundthattheguardianknewofthesaleandshouldhavefiledtheaction
to annul long before. She then discovered that the fees were actually paid and
through fraud and machinations, brotheradministrator was able to sell the
Hacienda to himself. She sought then the annulment of the sale again, in the
probate court, alleging anew the fraud employed. Her complaint was again
dismissed.
HELD:
The probate court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
reconveyance,inquestion.Theremedysoughtbypetitionerforthereconveyance
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
toherofhershareintheHaciendaEvangelistauponthegroundthatthesamewas
acquiredbyrespondentthroughfraudormisrepresentationcannotbeobtainedby
amerepetitionintheprobateproceedings.Thecourtoffirstinstance,actingasa
probatecourt,haslimitedjurisdictionandcantakecognizanceonlyof"mattersof
probate, both testate and intestate estates, ... and all such special cases and
proceedingsasarenototherwiseprovidedfor"Thejurisdictionofaprobatecourt
is limited and special, and this should be understood to comprehend only cases
relatedtothosepowersspecifiedinthelaw,andcannotextendtotheadjucation
ofcollateralmatters.
The petition filed by petitioner before the probate court which seemingly seeks
merely the reconveyance to her of her undivided share in a parcel of land which
originallyformedpartoftheestateofherfatherinfactcallsforthenullification,of
theorderofexecutionissuedbytheprobatecourtwhichisalreadyfinal,andofthe
subsequent sale of a property to respondent, upon the alleged ground of fraud.
The defense interposed by respondent is that petitioner's action to recover the
propertyisalreadybarredbyprescription,laches,andresjudicata.Thepetitionfor
reconveyancehasgivenrisetoacontroversyinvolvingrightsoverarealproperty
which would require the presentation of evidence and the determination of legal
questionsthatshouldbeventilatedinacourtofgeneraljurisdiction.
5
BAYBAYANV.AQUINO
149SCRA185
FACTS:
Private respondents, alleging themselves to be the nephews and nieces of a
decedent,soughtthesummarysettlementofthesamesestate.Theprobatecourt
orderedthesubmissionofaprojectofpartitiontogetherwiththeaccountingand
inventory of the properties. The property was then distributed and writs of
possessionwereissuedtotheprivaterespondents.Consequently,motionstocite
petitioners in contempt of court were filed, who allegedly interrupted private
respondentsintakingpossessionoftheland.Thepetitionersontheotherhand,
filedforquietingoftitleagainstthesheriffandotherprivaterespondents.Later,
the probate court found out that the land specified in the application was
registeredinthenamesofpetitioners.Itthenissuedanorderdenyingthemotion
for contempt of court and likewise ordered the petitioners to amend their
complaintagainstprivaterespondents.
HELD:
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The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the
ordertoamendthecomplaintfiledinCivilCaseNo.231RwasissuedinSpec.Proc.
No. 24R, so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not
parties in said special proceedings, it appears, however, that the petitioners
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, when
they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231R, wherein they prayed for
leavetoamendtheircomplaintinaccordancewiththeorderoftheprobatecourt
of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial Judge to
whomtheysubmittedtheircausevoluntarily.
We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of

discretion,amountingtolackofjurisdiction,indismissingthecomplaintfiledbythe
petitioners,fortheirallegedfailuretoamendtheircomplainttoexcludetherefrom
LotEwhichtherespondentJudgefound,inhisorderof30October1975,issuedin
the probate court, to be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelista and
Consuelo Baybayan. The findings of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of
LotEafterthehearingconductedinSpec.Proc.No.24Rdonotjustifytheorderto
amendthecomplaintsincethedeterminationoftheownershipofthesaidlotby
the respondent Judge presiding over a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not
final or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the right of an interested
partytoraisethequestionofownershipinaproperaction.
Itisawellsettledruleinthisjurisdiction,sanctionedandreiteratedinalongfineof
decisions,that"whenquestionsariseastoownershipofpropertyallegedtobea
partoftheestateofadeceasedperson,butclaimedbysomeotherpersontobe
his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be
determinedinthecourtsofadministrativeproceedings.TheCourtofFirstInstance,
acting,asaprobatecourt,hasnojurisdictiontoadjudicatesuchcontentions,which
must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdictionasacourtoffirstinstance."
6
FERNANDEZV.MARAVILLA
10SCRA589
FACTS:
Maravilla sought the probate of his late wifes will. The siblings sought denial of
probate on the ground that it wasn't signed on each and every page by the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
decedent. They likewise prayed for the appointment of their brother as special
administrator in lieu of the husband to protect their interest and also due to the
failure to file an inventory. The probate of the will in the meantime was denied
and to this, the husband appealed. Consequently, the brother was appointed as
administrator. The husband filed a petition for certiorari and for preliminary
injunction, praying therein the annulment of the brother as coadministrator and
the prohibition of the probate court from proceeding in his removal as
administrator.ThepetitionersmovedforthecertificationofthesametotheSCas
the amount involved exceeds the jurisdiction of the CA. Nevertheless, the CA
decidedinfavorofthehusband.
HELD:
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered
and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not
only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the
entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had
leftnodebts,uponthedissolutionofthemarriagebythedeathofthehusbandor
wife,thecommunitypropertyshallbeinventoried,administered,andliquidatedin
thetestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouse.Inanumberofcases
where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this
Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy
therein is that of the entire estate. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the
proceedings in probate (CAG.R. No. 27478R), considering that the amount
involvedthereinismorethanP200,000.00,theCourtofAppealscannotalsohave
original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondentintheinstantcase,whicharemerelyincidentalthereto.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of
the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator and to restrain the
probatecourtfromremovingrespondentasspecialadministrator.Itistherefore,a
contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or
valueoftheassetsofthewholeestateisthevalueincontroversy(4C.J.S.204).It
appearingthatthevalueoftheestateindisputeismuchmorethanP200,000.00,
the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in
question.
7
MANALOV.PAREDES
47PHIL938
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FACTS:
Hidalgo filed with the court her letters of administration of the estate left by her
deceased husband. In the same proceedings, the illegitimate children together
withthecommonlawwifeofthedecedent,askedfortheprobateofthesupposed
willofthedecedent.Publicationoftheapplicationwasproperlymadeaswellasa
guardian for the minoir children was appointed. When asked by the court to
producethewill,thecommonlawwifeadmittedtohavecoercedthehusbandto
signthewilltosecurethatthechildrenwouldbeleftsomethingoutofhisestate.
Thepartiesthensubsequentlyenteredintoanagreementwhereintheapplication
forprobatewaswithdrawnandconsequently,thecourtdeniedtheprobateofthe
will. Thereafter, using the same will, a cousin of the decedent filed another
applicationforprobate.Andupondenialofthejudgetopublictheapplicationor
giveduecoursetothesame,hefiledformandamus.
HELD:
Theproceedingfortheprobateofawillisaproceedinginrem(40Cyc.,p.1265),
and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the
publicationofthenoticeprescribedbysection630oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,
and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through the
publicationorderedbytheCourtofFirstInstanceofLagunaoftheapplicationfor
the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, filed by Justina Mendieta
andherminorchildrenLazaroandDariaMendietaandMelecioFule,testamentary
executor, through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, said court acquired
jurisdictionoverallsuchpersonsaswereinterestedinthesupposedwill,including
GelacioMalihan.Thecourthavingtriedsaidapplicationforprobate,hearingallthe
testimonyoftheattestingwitnessesofthesaidsupposedwill,theapplicantJustina
Mendietaforherselfandasguardianadlitemofherminorchildren,represented
bytheirattorneys,Messrs.MarcelinoLontokandMarcialAzada,ontheonehand,
and Laureana Hidalgo, widow of Francisco Villegas, represented by her attorney,
Jesus.E.Blanco,ontheother,havingsubmittedastipulationwhereintheformer
withdrewherapplicationandthelatterreservedcertainrightsovertheestateleft
byFranciscoVillegasinfavorofJustinaMendietaandherminorchildren;andthe
court having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died
intestate according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by said
judgment;andifanyofthemorotherpersonsinterestedwerenotsatisfiedwith
the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that
might have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of
mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the
probateofthesamewillinordertocompeltherespondentjudgetocomplywith
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
hisministerialdutyimposedbysection330oftheCodeofCivilProcedure;because
thisremedy,beingextraordinary,cannotbeusedinlieuofappeal,orwritoferror
(26 Cyc., 177; 18 R.C.L., par. 443); especially when the parties interested have
agreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they
pleased,eachofthemtakingwhatpertainedtohim(25R.C.L.,359).
RULE72
SUBJECTMATTERANDAPPLICABILITYOFGENERALRULES
Section1.Subjectmatterofspecialproceedings.Rulesofspecialproceedingsare
providedforinthefollowingcases:
(a)Settlementofestateofdeceasedpersons;
(b)Escheat;
(c)Guardianshipandcustodyofchildren;
(d)Trustees;
(e)Adoption;
(f)Rescissionandrevocationofadoption;
(g)Hospitalizationofinsanepersons;
(h)Habeascorpus;
(i)Changeofname;
(j)Voluntarydissolutionofcorporations;
(k)Judicialapprovalofvoluntaryrecognitionofminornaturalchildren;
(l)Constitutionoffamilyhome;
(m)Declarationofabsenceanddeath;
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(n)Cancellationofcorrectionofentriesinthecivilregistry.
Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special

provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable,applicableinspecialproceedings.
RELATIONTOPROVISIONSINTHERULESOFCOURT
Distinction between final and interlocutory orders in civil actions for

determiningtheissueofappealabilityisnotstrictlyapplicabletoorders
issuedinspecialproceedings
Rule 33 on judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to special

proceedings
CONSTRUCTIONOFTHERULESONSPECIALPROCEEDINGS
Liberalconstructionaslongasnosubstantiverightswillbeprejudicedor
violated
8
FERNANDEZV.MARAVILLA
Supra
HELD:
ThecasescitedbyrespondentwherethisCourtruledthattheseparatetotalclaim
of the parties and not the combined claims against each other determine the
appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the instant case, because
Section2,Rule75oftheRulesofCourtisexplicitthattheamountorvalueinvolved
or in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming,
arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it
shouldbenotedthatrespondentclaimsthewholeestateofatleastmorethan3/4
thereof.Saidclaim,reducedtoapecuniarystandard,onthebasisoftheinventory,
would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive
jurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.
Whileitistruethatquestionsoffacthavebeenraisedintheprobateproceedings
(Spec.Proc.No.4977,CFIofNegrosOccidental)whichwasappealedbyrespondent
totheCourtofAppeals,itbecomesimmaterial,inviewofSections17and31ofthe
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy
exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that
"allcaseswhichmaybeerroneouslybroughttotheSupremeCourt,ortotheCourt
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
ofAppealsshallbesenttothepropercourt,whichshallhearthesameasifithad
originallybeenbroughtbeforeit".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special

administrator,weagreewithrespondentthattherewasnoneedforit.Notethat
the Rules of Court contain no provision on special coadministrator, the reason
being,thattheappointmentofsuchspecialadministratorismerelytemporaryand
subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it
wouldnotonlybeunnecessarybutalsoimpractical,ifforthetemporaryduration
of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the
husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community property
devolvesmerelytoprotecttheinterestsofpetitionerswho,intheeventthatthe
disputedwillisallowedtoprobate,wouldevenhavenorighttoparticipateinthe
proceedingsatall.
SETTLEMENTOFESTATE
RULE73
VENUEANDPROCESS
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien,hiswillshallbeproved,orlettersofadministrationgranted,andhisestate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
timeofhisdeath,andifheisaninhabitantofaforeigncountry,theCourtofFirst
Instanceofanyprovinceinwhichhehadestate.Thecourtfirsttakingcognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
thatcourt,intheoriginalcase,orwhenthewantofjurisdictionappearsonthe
record.
Section2.Whereestatesettledupondissolutionofmarriage.Whenthemarriage
isdissolvedbythedeathofthehusbandorwife,thecommunitypropertyshallbe
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have
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died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate

proceedingsofeither.
RESIDENCE,ACCORDINGTOFULECASE
Meanshispersonal,actual,orphysicalhabitation,hisactualresidence,or
placeofabode
WHAT IS DETERMINED BY THE QUESTION OF RESIDENCE IN SETTLEMENT OF

ESTATES?
Determinativeofvenueanddoesntaffectthequestionofjurisdictionof
thecourt
As venue may be waived, the submission of all affected parties to said

proceedingisawaiverofobjectiontothiserror
However,wheretheproceedingwascommencedintheimpropervenue
anditwasquestionedseasonably,thepetitionshouldbedismissedand
shouldbeinstitutedinthepropercourt
WHICH COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF

IMPROPERVENUE?
The court in which the proceedings were first filed has the exclusive
jurisdictiontosettlethequestionofimpropervenue
It acquires exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all questions concerning the

settlementoftheestatetotheexclusionoftheothercourts
CANACOURTBEDIVESTEDOFJURISDICTIONUPONFILINGOFPETITION?
No, the court acquires jurisdiction upon the filing of the petition and it
cannotbedivestedofthesamethroughsubsequentactsofthepartiesor
throughfilinganotherpetitionforsettlementinanothercourt
HOW SHOULD THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BE LIQUIDATED UPON DEATH OF

EITHERORBOTHSPOUSES?
It shall be liquidated in the proceedings for the estate of the deceased

spouseandifbothdied,intheproceedingsofeitherestate
If separate proceedings have been instituted for each estate, both

proceedingsmaybeconsolidatediftheywerefiledinthesamecourt
WHEN MAY A PROBATE COURT PASS UPON QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP OF

PROPERTY?
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
1.
Theinterestedpartieswhoareallheirsofthedeceasedconsentthereto
andtheinterestsofthirdpartiesarentprejudiced
Provisionalmanneronly
2.
AT WHAT INSTANCES MAY THE PROBATE COURT ONLY ISSUE WRITS OF

EXECUTION?
1. To satisfy the contributive shares of the devisees, legatees and heirs in
possessionofthedecedentsassets
2. Toenforcepaymentofpartitionexpenses
3. To satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate
proceedings
4. Toexecuteagainstthebondexecutedbytheadministrator/executor
5. To satisfy administration fees pursuant to agreement (if we follow the
caseofMangaliman)
Section3.Process.Intheexerciseofprobatejurisdiction,CourtsofFirstInstance
mayissuewarrantsandprocessnecessarytocompeltheattendanceofwitnesses
ortocarryintoeffecttheirsordersandjudgments,andallotherpowersgranted
thembylaw.Ifapersondoesnotperformanorderorjudgmentrenderedbya
court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, it may issue a warrant for the
apprehensionandimprisonmentofsuchpersonuntilheperformssuchorderor
judgment,orisreleased.
Section 4. Presumption of death. For purposes of settlement of his estate, a

personshallbepresumeddeadifabsentandunheardfromfortheperiodsfixed
intheCivilCode.Butifsuchpersonprovestobealive,heshallbeentitledtothe
balance of his estate after payment of all his debts. The balance may be
recoveredbymotioninthesameproceeding.
9
SALAZARV.CFI
64PHIL78
FACTS:
Salazarfiledapetitionfortheprobateoftheallegedwillofhisdeceasedmother.
In opposition thereto, the respondent Rivera filed her counterpetition, wherein
sheallegedthatthewillshehasinpossessionisthetruewillofthedeceased.She
prayedthatthesecondwillbeadmittedtoprobateinstead.Atfirstorder,shewas
deniedbythecourtbutonamotionforreconsideration,shewasallowedtodoso,
with the proper publications, etc. accordingly made. This was opposed to by
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Salazar on the ground that Rivera was not able to pay accordingly the court fees
andthus,thecourthasnotacquiredjurisdictionoverthecase.
HELD:
Under the foregoing provisions, a Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to
probate a will when it is shown by evidence before it: (1) That a person has died
leaving a will; (2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the
province where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of a
nonresident,thathehasleftaestateintheprovincewherethecourtissituated,
and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the
courtandisinthepossessionthereof.
Thelawissilentastothespecificmannerofbringingthejurisdictionalallegations
beforethecourtbutpracticeandjurisprudencehaveestablishedthattheyshould
be made in the form of an application and filed with the original of the will
attachedthereto.Ithasbeenthepracticeinsomecourtstopermitattachmentofa
merecopyofthewilltotheapplication,withoutprejudicetoproducingtheoriginal
thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been
adaptedbysomeattorneystoforestallitsdisappearance,whichhastakenplacein
certaincases.
According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the
courthasacquiredjurisdictiontoprobatethesecondwill,inviewofthepresence
of all the jurisdictional facts abovestated. The respondent's counterpetition
should,inthiscase,beconsideredasapetitionfortheprobateofthesecondwill,
theoriginalofwhichwasfiledbyheronJuly20,1937.
Thepaymentofthefeesoftheclerkofcourtforallservicestoberenderedbyhim
in connection with the probate of the second will and for the successive
proceedings to be conducted and others to be issued,inaccordance with section
788,asamended,isnotjurisdictioninthesensethatitsomissiondoesnotdeprive
the court of its authority to proceed with the probate of a will, as expressly
provided for by section 630. It is the inevitable duty of the court, when a will is
presentedtoit,toappointhearingforitsallowanceandtocausenoticethereofto
begivenbypublication.
10
CAYETANOV.LEONIDAS
129SCRA522
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
FACTS:
Whenhisdaughterdied,thefatherexecutedanaffidavitexecutinginhisfavorthe
estate.Lateron, oneofthedecedentssisterssubmittedforprobatethealleged
willofthedecedent.ItwasshownthatthedecedentwasacitizenoftheUSand
thatshediedwhiletemporarilyresidingwithhersister.Thefatheropposedthisat
firstbutlateronwithdrewtheoppositionwhichwasaffirmedbyhismanifestation.
When the order admitting for probate was given by the court, the father alleged
thathewithdrewtheoppositionerroneouslythroughfraudemployedagainsthim.
This was however unsubstantiated. The father consequently died and leaving
petitionertosubstitutehim.
HELD:
Finally,wefindthecontentionofthepetitionastotheissueofjurisdictionutterly
devoidofmerit.UnderRule73,Section1,oftheRulesofCourt,itisprovidedthat:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitantofthePhilippinesatthetimeofhisdeath,whetheracitizenoranalien,
hiswillshallbeproved,orlettersofadministrationgranted,andhisestatesettled,
intheCourtofFirstInstanceintheprovinceinwhichheresidedatthetimeofhis
death,andifheisaninhabitantofaforeigncountry,theCourtofFirstInstanceof
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlementoftheestateofadecedent,shallexercisejurisdictiontotheexclusion
ofallothercourts.Thejurisdictionassumedbyacourt,sofarasitdependsonthe
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
originalcase,orwhenthewantofjurisdictionappearsontherecord.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was
alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual
resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now
estoppedfromquestioningthejurisdictionoftheprobatecourtinthepetitionfor
relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secureaffirmativerelief,againsthisopponentandafterfailingtoobtainsuchrelief,
repudiateorquestionthatsamejurisdiction.
11
INREKAWSINGCO
74PHIL239
ATENEOLAW2010
FACTS:
A resolution was issued by the court certifying the case to the /CA for further
proceedings,whereinaquestionoffactastowherethedecedentdiedwastobe
inquiredinto.Thiswasquestionedbythepetitioner.
HELD:
The law which provides that the estate of the deceased shall be settled in the
province where he last resided couldn't have been intended to have meant as
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter. such provision is
containedinalawofprocedureanddealsmainlywithproceduralmatters.
12
GARCIAFULEV.COURTOFAPPEALS
74SCRA189
FACTS:
Garcia Fule filed letters for administration of the decedent. She alleged that the
deceased last resided in Calamba. This was opposed by the respondent on the
groundthatthevenuewasimproperlylaidandthatjurisdictionoversubjectmatter
wasn'tacquired.Shequestionedtheappointmentofpetitioneraswellasspecial
administratixsincethelatterhasallegedlyadverseinterestovertheestate.
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitantofthePhilippinesatthetimeofhisdeath,whetheracitizenoranalien,
hiswillshallbeproved,orlettersofadministrationgranted,andhisestatesettled,
intheCourtofFirstInstanceintheprovinceinwhichheresidesatthetimeofhis
death,andifheisaninhabitantofaforeigncountry,theCourtofFirstInstanceof
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlementoftheestateofadecedent,shallexercisejurisdictiontotheexclusion
ofallothercourts.Thejurisdictionassumedbyacourt,sofarasitdependsonthe
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existenceofjurisdictiontomaketheappointmentsought,andshouldallegeallthe
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the
existence,andsitusifneedbe,ofassets,intestacy,wherethisisreliedupon,and
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise,tobeappointed.Thefactofdeathoftheintestateandhislastresidence
withinthecountryarefoundationfactsuponwhichallsubsequentproceedingsin
theadministrationoftheestaterest,andthatiftheintestatewasnotaninhabitant
ofthestateatthetimeofhisdeath,andleftnoassetsinthestate,nojurisdictionis
conferredonthecourttograntlettersofadministration.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
becausesuchlegalprovisioniscontainedinalawofproceduredealingmerelywith
proceduralmatters.Procedureisonething;jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatteris
another.Thepowerorauthorityofthecourtoverthesubjectmatter"existedand
wasfixedbeforeprocedureinagivencausebegan."Thatpowerorauthorityisnot
altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the
powerorauthorityshallbefullyandjustlyexercised.Therearecasesthoughthatif
thepowerisnotexercisedconformablywiththeprovisionsoftheprocedurallaw,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or
that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
onceraisesastrongpresumptionthatithasnothingtodowiththejurisdictionof
thecourtoverthesubjectmatter.Inplainwords,itisjustamatterofmethod,of
conveniencetotheparties.
DivergentclaimsaremaintainedbyVirginiaG.FuleandPreciosaB.Garciaonthe
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. One alleges
that he died in Calamba while the other alleges that it was in Quezon City as
evincedbythedeathcertificate.
Onthisissue,itisruledthatthelastplaceofresidenceofthedeceasedAmadoG.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedentatthetimeofhisdeath.Andmoreimportantly
ATENEOLAW2010
Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the

personal,actualorphysicalhabitationofaperson,actualknowledgeorplaceof
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popularsense,thetermmerelymeansresidence,thatis,personalresidence,and
notlegalresidenceordomicile.Residencesimplyrequiresbodilypresenceinthat
particular place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular
lengthoftimeofresidenceisrequiredthough.Howeveritshouldbemorethan
temporary.
13
CUENCOV.COURTOFAPPEALS
53SCRA360
FACTS:
UponthedeathofSenatorCuenco,leavinghiswidowand2minorchildren,letters
for administration of the estate was filed by respondent in Cebu City, alleging
thereinthatthedeceaseddiedintestateandthathislastknownresidencewasin
CebuCity.Inthemeantime,thewidowfiledinQuezonCity,whereinthedeceased
has died, petition to admit into probate the last will and testament of the
decedent. Upon learning of the pending petition in Cebu City, she filed her
oppositionandmotiontodismissthepetitionbyrespondent.
HELD:
The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First
Instanceover"allmatterofprobate,bothoftestateandintestateestates."Onthe
otherhand,Rule73,sectionoftheRulesofCourtlaysdowntheruleofvenue,as
theverycaptionoftheRuleindicates,andinordertopreventconflictamongthe
differentcourtswhichotherwisemayproperlyassumejurisdictionfromdoingso,
the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estateofadecedent,shallexercisejurisdictiontotheexclusionofallothercourts."
ItshouldbenotedthattheRuleonvenuedoesnotstatethatthecourtwithwhom
theestateorintestatepetitionisfirstfiledacquiresexclusivejurisdiction.
TheRulepreciselyanddeliberatelyprovidesthat"thecourtfirsttakingcognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusionofallothercourts."
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
10
AfairreadingoftheRule sinceitdealswithvenueandcomitybetweencourtsof
equal and coordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the
petitionisfirstfiled,mustalsofirsttakecognizanceofthesettlementoftheestate
inordertoexercisejurisdictionoverittotheexclusionofallothercourts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviouslyhadhisconjugaldomicileandresidedwithhissurvivingwidowandtheir
minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating
that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take
cognizanceofthepetitionandholdthepetitionbeforeitinabeyance,andinstead
defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the
decedent'sallegedlastwill.
This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitionerwidow's filing with it a
motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyanceitsactiononthedismissalmotionanddeferredtotheQuezonCitycourt,
awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the
Cebucourt'sorderwasthatifthewillwasdulyadmittedtoprobate,bytheQuezon
Citycourt,thenitwoulddefinitelydeclinetotakecognizanceofLourdes'intestate
petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the
exerciseofjurisdictiontotheQuezonCitycourt,totheexclusionofallothercourts.
Likewisebyitsactofdeference,theCebucourtleftittotheQuezonCitycourtto
resolvethequestionbetweenthepartieswhetherthedecedent'sresidenceatthe
time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather
thaninCebuCityasclaimedbyrespondents.TheCebucourtthusindicatedthatit
would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead
defertotheQuezonCitycourt,unlessthelatterwouldmakeanegativefindingas
totheprobatepetitionandtheresidenceofthedecedentwithinitsterritoryand
venue.
Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionof
theestateofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestate
successionorinaccordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingfor
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settledjurisprudenceinthisjurisdiction,testateproceedingsforthesettlementof
the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
ATENEOLAW2010
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstateanadministratorhadalready
beenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnoverthe
estateinhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.Thishowever,is
understoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedor
isdisapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadverted
to,thisisaclearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriority
overintestateproceedings.
14
ONGSINGCOV.TAN
97PHIL330
FACTS:
Ongsingco was appointed as judicial guardian of her husband who was declared
incompetentinanearlierproceeding.Shetookoutrightpossessionoftwoparcels
of land which purportedly was owned by her husband. In the ongoing estate
proceedingsofFranciscosfirstwife,Tangco,theadministratorthereinprayedthat
Ongsingco be disallowed from harvesting the palay from the two parcels of land.
Theprobatecourtorderedaccordingly.
HELD:
Thedisputebetweenpetitionerandrespondentadministratorinvolving,asitdoes,
theownershipoftwoparcelsoflandsituatedinSantaRosa,NuevaEcija,andthis
question having been squarely raised in an action pending in the court of first
instance of said province, which was instituted by petitioner against respondent
administratorpreciselybecauseofthedisputethathadarisenbetweenthemover
said property, it is the sense of this Tribunal that respondent court exceeded its
jurisdictioninactinguponthesaidquestioninitscapacityasprobatecourt.Onthe
face of such issue which necessarily involves theownershipoftheproperties, we
considerofnoconsequencetheclaimthatwhatrespondentcourtmerelydidwas
tolookintotheidentityofsaidproperties.Thisquestionisnecessarilyimbibedin
thegreaterissueofownershipandbeinginterwovenonecanhardlydrawtheline
ofdemarcationthatwouldseparateonefromtheother.
15
EUSEBIOV.EUSEBIO
100PHIL593
FACTS:
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
11
ItisnotdisputedthatAndresEusebiowas,andhadalwaysbeen,domiciledinSan
Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties.
Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who
treatedhim,residedinQuezonCity,AndresEusebioboughtahouseandlotinsaid
City.Whiletransferringhisbelongingstothishouse,soonthereafter,thedecedent
sufferedastroke(probablyheartfailure),forwhichreasonDr.Eusebiotookhimto
his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until
he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila. On this date, he
contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left
ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease". Consequently, he
neverstayedorevensleptinsaidhouseatEspaaExtention.
HELD:
Inview,however,ofthelastsentenceofsaidsection,providingthat:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of

residenceofthedecedent,orofthelocationofhisestate,shallnotbecontestedin
asuitorproceedings,exceptinanappealfromthatcourt,intheoriginalcase,or
whenthewantofjurisdictionappearsontherecord.
Ifproceedingsforthesettlementoftheestateofadeceasedresidentareinstituted
in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the
courtinwhichthefirstcasewasfiledshallhaveexclusivejurisdictiontodecidesaid
issue,andwesoheldinthecaseofTacianaVda.DeBorjavs.Tan,L7792(July27,
1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue
had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the
correspondingproceedingsmay,thereafter,beinitiatedinthepropercourt.
Inconclusion,wefindthatthedecedentwas,atthetimeofhisdeath,domiciledin
SanFernando,Pampanga;thattheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizalhadnoauthority,
therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue
having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained
appellants'oppositionanddismissedappellee'spetition.
16
SANDOVALV.SANTIAGO
83PHIL784
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
Sandoval petitioned the admission to probate of the will of Marquez. She was
accordingly appointed as the executrix of the estate. Pending the probate
proceedings,theheirsextrajudiciallypartitionedtheestateamongthemselvesand
tookpossessionoftherespectiveproperties.Thiswasmadewithoutauthorityof
the court. When the judge ordered Sandoval to file a bond, petitioner averred
there was no need to do so as the heirs already took possession and partitioned
theproperties.
HELD:
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the respondent, Judge or Court of First
InstanceofQuezonProvince,whereinthedeceasedwasresidingatthetimeofhis
death, has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the testate estate of the
deceased Daniel Marquez and over the heirs and other person interested in the
estate of the deceased from the moment the application for the probate of the
decedent's will was filed with the said court and the publication required by law
weremade;andtheheirsofthedeceasedMarquezcouldnotdivesttheCourtof
First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividing
extrajudiciallytheestateofthedeceasedamongthemselves.
17
VDA.DEMANZANEROV.CFI
61PHIL850
FACTS:
WhileworkingasanassistantcityengineerinAlbay,Estebandied.hisbrotherin
Batangas,filedforthesettlementofhisestate,allegingthereinthatthedeceased
resided in Batangas prior to his death. Upon publication of the application and
setting the proceedings for hearing, no opposition was made by petitioner. And
whentheproceedingshaveended,whereintheinsurancecompanywasorderedto
payproceedstotheheirsoftheinsured,itwasonlythenshesurfacedandtriedto
fileapetitionforcertiorari.
HELD:
Accordingtotheabovecitedlegalprovision,thejurisdictionassumedbyaCourtof
FirstInstance,forthesettlementofanestate,sofarasitdependsontheplaceof
residenceofaperson,orofthelocationofhisestate,cannotbecontestedinasuit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
thewantofjurisdictionappearsontherecord.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
12
From the pleadings before us, which are copies of their originals attached to the
record in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the want of jurisdiction of said
court does not clearly appear. The communication of the municipal treasurer of
Tabaco,Albay,statingthatthedeceasedEstebanM.Manzaneroappearsinthelist
of registered voters, and the affidavit of the municipal president thereof stating
that the deceased resided before his death in Tabaco, Albay, do not form part of
therecordofthelowercourt.Itnotappearingfromtheordersofthelowercourt,
as disclosed by the copies thereof attached to the record of these certiorari
proceedings,thatsaidcourtlacksjurisdictiontotakecognizanceoftheapplication
forsummarysettlementbyreasonofthelegalresidenceofthedeceased,Esteban
M. Manzanero, certiorari does not lie, an appeal being specially provided in such
casebysection603oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.
REMEMBER CIVIL PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO LOUIE (94 SA CIVPRO FINALS ):

Jurisdictionisdeterminedfromtheallegationsinthepleadings,inthiscase,the
allegations of the petitioner in his petition. If there is opposition, then there
couldn'tbeanyquestionifitappearsintherecordornot.
18
BENEDICTOV.JAVELLANA
10PHIL197
FACTS:
Maximo made a claim against the administrator of the estate of his brother
respecting payment of a sum of money creditable for him in relation to a legacy
given to him by the latter. The administrator questions the claim filed, averring
thattheclaimshouldbefiledagainstallthelegateesandpartiestotheestateand
not to administrator alone. It would be seen from the will by the way that the
estatewasdistributedbylegacies.
HELD:
As to specific devices, section 729 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
exemption from the payment of debts and expenses if there is sufficient other
propertyandifitappearstothecourtnecessarytocarryintoeffecttheintention
of the testator; and, as the legacies stated in the aforesaid will consist of specific
property, less the annuity provided for by clause 6, which is made a special lien
uponthepropertyforbyclause6,whichismadeaspeciallienupontheproperty
bequeathedtoFranciscoandSofiaJalandoni,itisunquestionablethatinthiscase
thedebtsandexpensesoftheestatemustbepaidproratabythelegateesinthe
ATENEOLAW2010
mannerprovidedinthewill,orinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsections753
and754oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.
On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated
herein that any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the
authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee, or
partyininterestinatestateorintestatesuccessionmaymake,mustbeactedupon
anddecidedwithinthesamespecialproceedingsnotinaseparateactionandthe
same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take
cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be
calledupontomakedistributionandadjudicationofthepropertytotheinterested
parties,asmaybeseeninpartIIoftheCodeofCivilProcedure,fromsection551
forward.
19
CASIANOV.MALOTO
70SCRA232
FACTS:
Thenephewsandniecesofthedecedent,believingthatnowillwasleft,filedfor
the intestate proceedings. The will of the decedent was later found, on which it
wasindicatedthattwowouldgetbiggershares.Thesetwosoughttheannulment
oftheintestateproceedingsandtheprobateofthewill.Theyweredeniedbythe
court.Theytheninstitutedanewproceedingfortheadmissiontoprobateofthe
allegedwill.
HELD:
Theprobatecourthadnojurisdictiontoentertainthepetitionfortheprobateof
the alleged will of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the
motiontoreopentheproceedingswasdeniedbecausethesamewasfiledoutof
time.Moreover,itisnotpropertomakeafindinginanintestateestateproceeding
thatthediscoveredwillhasbeenrevoked.Asamatteroffact,theprobatecourtin
Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that
"MovantsshouldhavefiledaseparateactionfortheprobateoftheWill."13And
this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate
remedyofthepetitionersinthepremisesstatedinthepetitionisforpetitionersto
initiateaseparateproceedingfortheprobateoftheallegedwithinquestion."
Youcannotconvertanintestateproceedingintoatestateproceeding.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
20
13
CUIZONV.RAMOLETE
129SCRA495
FACTS:
Marcianoownedtwoparcelsoflandandadjudicatedthesameinfavorofhistwo
daughtersRufina and Irene. The lot of Irene was subsequently sold to
petitioners.TheTCThoweverwasn'tcancelledgiventhattheythoughttheyneed
not to because of the lifetime usufruct rights of Irene. Irene died later on and
Rufina adjudicated to herself the property in question in favor of all petitioners.
Respondents then filed in another court for letters of administration. In the
inventoryforthesame,theyincludedthedisputedpropertynotwithstandingthat
theownershipthereofisofpetitioners.Theprobatecourtthenorderedthatthe
land be sold in public auction and consistently, the respondents tried to force
themselvesintheland.
HELD:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possessionofthirdpartiesandmoreimportant,coveredbyatransfercertificateof
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.
Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27,
1979.Thus,itwasunnecessaryforthepetitionerstofirstapplyforreliefwiththe
intestatecourt.
Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale of
December29,1971waseffectedundersuspiciouscircumstancesandtaintedwith
fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged halfsister and sole heir of Irene
remainsopentoquestion,theseissuesmayonlybethreshedoutinaseparatecivil
actionfiledbytherespondentadministratoragainstthepetitionersandnotinthe
intestateproceedings.
21
BERNARDOV.COURTOFAPPEALS
7SCRA367
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
Spouses Capili were the owners of parcels of land. The husband died first and
testateproceedingswereheldwhereinhiswife,aswellbrothersandsisterswere
institutedasheirs.Thewifealsodiedlateronandwassubstitutedbyhercollateral
relatives. In the project of partition submitted by the executor, there was
oppositiononthegroundthatsomepropertieswereconjugalpropertiesandthus
part should not be included in the inventory. Consequently, two projects for
partition was submitted for hearing and the other party contends that the
propertiesindisputewereindeedexclusiveproperty.
HELD:
Inthecasenowbeforeus,thematterincontroversyisthequestionofownership
of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of
course,thewidow,nowrepresentedbecauseofherdeath,byherheirswhohave
been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared
voluntarily.Therearenothirdpartieswhoserightsmaybeaffected.Itistruethat
the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testatorhusband, but the
widowis,inadditiontoherownrighttotheconjugalproperty.Anditisthisright
thatisbeingsoughttobeenforcedbyhersubstitutes.Therefore,theclaimthatis
being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it
complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the
petitionersandthewidow,representedbydents)areallheirsclaimingtitleunder
thetestator.
22
URIARTEV.CFI
33SCRA252
FACTS:
Upon the death of Don Juan Uriarte, his alleged natural son filed for intestate
proceedings in the Negros Court. This was opposed to by one of the nephews,
allegingthatawillwasindeedexecutedinSpainandaskedforthesubmissionof
the said will. Meanwhile, one of the nephews, who was in possession of the
allegedwill,institutedintheManilaCopurtpetitionforprobateofthewill.Healso
soughttointerveneintheinstestateproceedingsinNegrosCourt.
HELD:
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
14
Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionof
theestateofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestate
successionorinaccordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingfor
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settledjurisprudenceinthisjurisdiction,testateproceedings,forthesettlementof
the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestateproceedingspendingbeforeacourtoffirstinstanceitisfoundithatthe
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstageanadministratorhadalready
beenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnoverthe
estateinhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.This,however,is
understoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedor
isdisapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadverted
to,thisisaclearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriority
overintestateproceedings.
Zamacona should have submitted for probate the will he has on hand with the
Negroscourt.
In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensiveadministrationofjusticetounnecessarilymultiplylitigation,especially
ifseveralcourtswouldbeinvolved.This,ineffect,wastheresultofthesubmission
of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent
HiginioUriartefiledanoppositiontoVicenteUriarte'spetitionfortheissuanceof
letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been
requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan
UriarteZamacona,filedhismotiontodismissSpecialProceedingNo.6344,hehad
submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from
which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the
petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special
proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the
samedeceasedperson.AsfarasHiginioUriarteisconcerned,itseemsquiteclear
that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he
hadexpresslypromisedtosubmitsaidwillforprobatetotheNegrosCourt.
Butthefactisthatinsteadoftheaforesaidwillbeingpresentedforprobatetothe
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the
ATENEOLAW2010
Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the
lattercourthadnojurisdictiontoconsidersaidpetition,albeitwesaythatitwas
notthepropervenuetherefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable

procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to
considerinthisconnectionthatpetitionerknewoftheexistenceofawillexecuted
by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his
opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate
withtheManilaCourtsinceAugust28,1962whenJuanUriarteZamaconafileda
motionforthedismissalofSpecialProceedingNo.6344.Allthesenotwithstanding,
it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
ProceedingNo.51396anOmnibusmotionaskingforleavetointerveneandforthe
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus
enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will
annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or
morespecifically,onOctober31,1962.Toallowhimnowtoassailtheexerciseof
jurisdictionovertheprobateofthewillbytheManilaCourtandthevalidityofall
theproceedingshadinSpecialProceedingNo.51396wouldputapremiumonhis
negligence.
23
PCIBV.ESCOLIN
56SCRA266
FACTS:
SpousesHodgesmadesimilarwills,whereinoneachwillitwasprovidedthatifone
predeceasestheother,theotherspousewouldgettheestatespropertiesandcan
useitinhis/herliking.Andincasethewidow/erdiesaswell,thepropertywillgo
tothesiblingsofthespousewhopredeceased.LinniediedaheadofCharlesand
the latter administered the estate of his wife. However, he wasn't able to
completely settle the estate when he died. Linnies sister took over in
administrationofbothestatesindifferentproceedingsandthisinturn,beganthe
long cycle of changes in administrators until the administration of both estates
endedupwithPCIB.Consequently,problemsensuedintheadministrationofthe
estates.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
15
HELD:
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the
marriageisdissolvedbythedeathofthehusbandorwife,thecommunityproperty
shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
thetestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouse.Ifbothspouseshave
died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision
allowsorpermitstheconjugalpartnershipofspouseswhoarebothdeceasedtobe
settledorliquidatedinthetestateorintestateproceedingsofeither,butprecisely
because said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in either
proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be
made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband's
estateinrespecttosuchliquidationwasdoneawaywithbyAct3176,thepertinent
provisionsofwhicharenowembodiedintherulejustcited.
Thus,itcanbeseenthatatthetimeofthedeathofHodges,therewasalreadythe
pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more
importantly,thattheformerwastheexecutorofthelatter'swillwhohad,assuch,
failedformorethanfiveyearstoseetoitthatthesamewasterminatedearliest,
which was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there
were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and there
being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent
attitude could only spell possible prejudice of his coheirs, whose rights to
inheritance depend entirely on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges'
shareinthecommunityproperties,andwhoarenowfacedwiththeposeofPCIB
that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the
settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All things
considered,Wearefullyconvincedthattheinterestsofjusticewillbebetterserved
by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges
exclusiveadministrationofallthepropertiesinquestion.Weareoftheconsidered
opinionandsoholdthatwhatwouldbejustandproperisforbothadministrators
of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated
fromeachother.
24
DELROSARIOV.DELROSARIO
67PHIL652
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
SpousesDelRosarioweretheownersofproperties.Thehusbanddiedfirstandno
intestateproceedingswereheldtosettlehisestateuntilthetimethatthewifealso
died.
HELD:
ActNo.3176onlyamendstheformerlawinthesensethatuponthedeathofany
ofthespousesthecommunitypropertyshallbeliquidatedinthetestamentaryor
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. But whatever law might be
applicable,andevenassumingthatitwasthatpriortoActNo.3176,theintestate
ofRamondelRosarionothavingbeencommenceduponhisdeathin1895untilhis
widow Florencia Arcega also died in 1933, and the testamentary proceedings of
FlorenciaArcegahavingbeensubsequentlyinitiated,wherein,amongotherthings,
the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the deceased Ramon del Rosario
shouldbemade,thependencyofthesetestamentaryproceedingsofthedeceased
wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same purpose (Zaide vs.
ConcepcionandQuintana,32Phil.,403).Attherate,theplaintiffshavearightto
interveneintheseproceedingsaspartiesinterestedintheliquidationandpartition
of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses Ramon del Rosario and
FlorenciaArcegaamongtheirheirs.
25
DOLARV.ROMANCATHOLIC
68PHIL727
FACTS:
Paulino contracted two marriages during his lifetime, leaving children behind in
bothmarriages.Thewidowwasappointedastheadministratixoftheestate.The
first project of partition wasn't approved due to the opposition of the heirs and
legacies. She again submitted a second project which wasn't also approved but
consequently,thecourtallowedhertotakepossessionoftheestatesproperties.
HELD:
UnlessthewidowTeopistaDolar,theheirsofthedeceasedbyhistwomarriages,
the representative of the legacy for P8,00, and the creditors of the estate,
otherwise come to an agreement, the partition should be made with the
intervention of all the interested parties according to law. All the debts and
administration expenses shall first be paid. (Section 753 of the Code of Civil
Procedure).Theconjugalpropertiesofthefirstmarriageshallbeliquidatedsoasto
determine those corresponding to the children had with the deceased Margarita
Doctura, as her heirs, and those corresponding to the deceased. Likewise, the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
16
conjugalpropertiesofthesecondmarriageshallbeliquidated,soastodetermine
the half corresponding to the widow Teopista Dolar and the] other half
corresponding to the deceased (article 1426 of the Civil Code). The properties
corresponding to the deceased, acquired during his first and second marriages,
constitutehisestate,whichshouldbepartitionedamonghiswidowTeopistaDolar
(articles931and834oftheCivilCode).
Therebeingforcedheirs,thelegacyofP8,000shouldbetakenfromthefreethird
only,withouttouchingtheobligatorylegitime,andtheotherthefreethird,soasto
determinethepropertiesfromwhichthelegacybeingbywayofusufruct,theheirs
may comply therewith or deliver to the legatee properties equivalent to the free
third (article 820, paragraph 3, of the Civil Code). The fruits of the properties
alreadyreceivedortobereceivedshallanswerforthelegacywithrespecttoone
thirdthereofonly,theremainingtwothirdsbeingthoseoftheheirs(article813of
the Civil Code). The legal usufruct of the widow should be taken from the third
availableforbetterment(article835oftheCivilCode).
26
ALFONSOV.NATIVIDAD
6PHIL240
FACTS:
Alfonso in his capacity as administrator of the estate, brought an action against
respondentsforthereturnofthelandtheywereallegedlywrongfullypossessing.
HELD:
BytheprovisionsofthenewCodeofCivilProcedureinthesettlementofestatesof
deceased persons it is necessary to appoint commissioners, before whom the
creditors of the deceased must present their claims within a time fixed by the
court.Thehusbandistheadministratoroftheconjugalpartnership.(Art.1412.)His
debts contracted during the marriage are its debts. (Art. 1418.) When a conjugal
partnershipisdissolvedbythedeathofthehusbanditwouldbeextremelydifficult
to settle his estate in accordance with the provisions of the present Code of
Procedure without settling the partnership affairs. It is difficult to harmonize the
newsystemwiththepartoftheoldwhichremains,butweconcludethatwhenthe
partnership is dissolved by the death of the husband the inventory which is
mentioned in article 1418 should be made, and the partnership affairs settled in
theCourtofFirstInstancewhichtakesjurisdictionofthesettlementofhisestate,
and in the same proceeding. This view being adopted, it follows as a necessary
consequencethattheexecutororadministratorappointedinthatproceedingmust
ATENEOLAW2010
be the person who is entitled to the custody of the property of the conjugal
partnershipwhilethesettlementisbeingmade.
Thisconstructionofthelawdoesnotdeprivethewife,thesurvivingpartner,ofall
intervention in the settlement of the affairs of the partnership, for in intestate
estates she is entitled to be appointed administratrix of her husband's estate,
unlesssomegoodreasonfornotappointingherisshown.
Applying these principles to the present case it appears that the partnership was
dissolved by the death of the husband; that its affairs should be settled in the
proceedingsforthesettlementofhisestate;thattheplaintiffistheadministrator
appointed in that proceeding; that the property in question belonged to the
partnership, and that therefore the plaintiff is entitled to maintain this action. In
the settlement of the affairs of the partnership hereafter, this, with all other
propertyofthepartnership,includingthedebtofPedroNatividad.
27
CRUZV.DEJESUS
52PHIL870
FACTS:
Plaintiffs sought the amendment of their complaint to liquidation and partition,
whereintheyallegedthatthedecedentdiedwithoutanydebtsonhandandthus,
they should be allowed to liquidate in the same partition proceedings. This was
denied by the court. The court ordered that the liquidation of conjugal property
shouldbemadeintheestateproceedingsbeforeanypartitionmaybemade.
HELD:
Itistobenotedthatthislegalprovisionestablishestwomethodsofliquidatingthe
propertyofaconjugalpartnership,ifthemarriageisdissolvedbythedeathofone
ofthespouses:thefirstbyatestateorintestateproceedingaccordingtowhether
thedeceaseddiedwithorwithoutawill;andtheotherbyanordinaryproceeding
forliquidationandpartition.
Accordingtothelegalprovisionquotedabove,whenthemarriageisdissolvedby
the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases,
passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate
proceedingsinstitutedtothatendiftherebeanydebtstobepaid,andwhenthere
is no debt pending, the liquidation and partition may be made in an ordinary
proceedingforthatpurpose.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
17
Since the complaint for partition alleges that there are no debts to pay, and as it
does not appear that there are any, said action will lie, for while it is true that it
praysforaliquidationofthepropertyoftheconjugalpartnershipdissolvedbythe
death of Juliana Nabong, said liquidation is implied in the action for partition
(RemolinoandBautistavs.Peralta,G.R.No.10834).1
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and hold, that in
accordance with section 685 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 3176, when
there are no debts to pay, the liquidation and partition of the property of the
conjugalpartnership,dissolvedbythedeathofoneofthespouses,maybemadein
anordinaryactioninstitutedforthatpurpose.
28
DELARAMAV.DELARAMA
7PHIL745
FACTS:
The trial court found in favor of plaintiff in the divorce proceedings against her
husband.Sheallegedadulteryandthereafter,shewasgrantedbythecourt,part
of the conjugal property, together with alimony, etc. The husband sought the
reversal of the decision on which he was granted reconsideration. The wife
appealedthesametotheSupremeCourtoftheUS.
HELD:
Therecouldbeliquidationofconjugalpartnershipinthesamedivorceproceedings
ifthedecreeofdivorceisgranted.
29
VILLCORTEV.MARIANO
89PHIL342
FACTS:
Calimoncontractedthreemarriages,thelatestwithrespondentMariano.Hehad
childrenduringhisfirstandsecondmarriages.Petitioners,aswidowandchildren
ofCalimon,filedfortherecoveryofparcelsoflandagainstthechildrenofthefirst
children and Mariano. Mariano alleged that the properties were exclusive
propertiesofCalimonand/oracquiredduringtheircoventuretogether.Shealso
filed a crossclaim against Canuta and the latters siblings for defrauding her
allegedly into signing a compromise agreement. The trial court found in favor of
ATENEOLAW2010
Canuta and her siblings, giving merit to the compromise agreement and it was
unnecessarytoundertakeliquidationandpartitionproceedings.
HELD:
Itwasunnecessarytopreparetheinventoryandmaketheliquidationbecausethe
parties interested, i.e., the heirs of Leon Calimon and his widow had already
reachedacompromisebymeansofExhibit1Mariano.Andsupposingthatallthose
lots were community property, still the said exhibit governs the rights of the
parties.AsimilardocumentsofrenunciationwasheldvalidandbindinginAntonio
vs. Aloc, 25 Phil. 147. And under the provision of article 1418 of the Civil Code,
inventoryshallnotberequiredif,afterthepartnershiphasbeendissolved,oneof
thespousesofhisorhersuccessorsshallhaverenounceditseffects.
30
CALMAV.TANEDO
66PHIL594
FACTS:
Esperanza brought suit against Eulalio for debts payable by the conjugal
partnership, when the wife died. The debts payable was incurred during the
existence of the conjugal partnership and was chargeable to the same. The wife
diedwithawillandappointedherdaughterasadministratixoftheestate.
HELD:
From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against
EulalioCalmaforthepaymentofthesumsofP948.34andP247,whichweredebts
chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio Calma as legal
administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta Macasaquit was living, had
ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in the
testamentaryproceedingsofFaustaMacasaquit.Hence,thisbeinganindebtedness
chargeableagainstconjugalproperty,nocomplaintforitspaymentcanbebrought
against Eulalio Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal
property;theclaimforthisamounthadtobefiledinthetestamentaryproceedings
ofFaustaMacasaquit.
31
OCAMPOV.POTENCIANO
89PHIL160
FACTS:
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
18
OcamposoldahouseandlottospousesPotencianounderapactoderectosale.
Upon death of one of the spouses, Paz still wanted to repurchase the house and
lot.Thechildrenleftbythespousesaverredthatitonlywouldpertaintotheshare
oftheirfathersincetheyalreadyinheritedthatofthoseoftheirmothers.CAruled
infavorofOcampoandruledthatitwasindeedamortgagewithacaveatthatthe
option agreement novated the mortgage agreement. The Potenciano children
alleged that the father had no authority to enter into the option agreement and
theyweresustainedbytheSC.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such
authority as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by
appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are now
obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the
marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership
affairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176 (approved on
November24,1924),nowsection2,Rule75,oftheRulesofCourt,whichprovides
that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the
partnershipaffairsmustbeliquidatedinthetestateorintestateproceedingsofthe
deceasedspouse(Moran,CommentsontheRulesofCourt,3rded.,Vol.II,p.324).
32
PRADOV.NATIVIDAD
47PHIL776
FACTS:
Casimiro and Maria married, and upon marriage, it was Casimiro who brought
propertyinsidetheconjugalproperty.Mariabroughtnone.Thereafter,Mariadied
outofpulmonarycomplications.Jose,theadministratorappointedfortheestate
of Maria brought an action against Casimiro on the ground that he refused to
liquidatetheconjugalpartnership.
HELD:
Atthetrialofthecase,evidencewasintroducedtendingtoshowtheexistenceof
said properties with their prices and fruits. Also evidence was introduced in an
attempt to show the true expenses incurred during the administration of the
conjugalpartnership.Withthatevidenceintherecord,itisnotnecessarytoorder
thedefendant,inhiscapacityasadministratoroftheestateofsaidpartnership,to
makeaformalliquidationthereof;becausewhatwasdoneduringthetrialofthe
case amounts to a liquidation, and to make another one would be to do double
ATENEOLAW2010
work,andwouldgiverisetonewcontroversieswhentheliquidationissubmitted
forthecontestingthereofbytheadverseparty.Thetrialcourthasnot,therefore,
committedanyerrorinnotorderingaformalliquidation.
33
DELARAMAV.DELARAMA
25SCRA437
FACTS:
SamefactsbasicallyfromtheearlierDeLaRamacase.
HELD:
Aspointedoutbythetrialjudge,thisinventoryappearstohavebeenpreparedby
or for the defendant for the purposes of this action; and in any event it was
prepared after this action was originally instituted and under conditions which
justified the trial judge in believing that the defendant had every opportunity to
interveneinitspreparationandtousehispersonalinfluencetohavethedocument
speak favorably to his contentions. Granting that it is true, as contended by
defendant, that this document was admitted in evidence without objection, it by
no means follows that the trial judge was bound to accept its contents as true
whereotherevidenceofrecorddiscloseditsinaccuraciesanditsfailurecorrectlyto
listthepropertiesinquestion.Itwasadmittedforwhatitwasworthasevidence,
butinverynatureofthings,itshouldnotbeheldasconclusiveofthetruthofits
contents.Wethinkthatthetrialjudgeisfullysustainedbytheevidenceofrecord
inhisfindingsthatthisinventoryfailedtosetforththetruestatusoftheaffairsof
the company, and we are of opinion, and so hold, that there was no error in his
findingsastothetruevalueofthepropertyinquestion.
What has been said sufficiency disposes of all the errors assigned. We are of
opinion, therefore, that there is nothing in the record which would justify us in
sustainingthecontentionsofthedefendantappellantastoerrorinthefindingsof
factorintheconclusionsdrawntherefromintheopinionfiledbythetrialjudge.
34
FULGENCIOV.GATCHALIAN
21PHIL252
FACTS:
UpontheappointmentasadministratixofJosefa,shebroughtacomplaintagainst
the defendants to take possession of alleged properties of Dionisio, which were
allegedlywithheldbydefendants.EvidenceshowsthatduringDionisiosmarriage
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
19
withBenita,hetookwithhimtotheconjugalpartnershipacertainsumofmoney
inMexicanpesos.IntheinventorymadebyJosefaoftheproperties,sheexcluded
therein the sum of money and consequently made the demand for the return of
thepropertiesheldbythedefendants.
HELD:
It is fact, proved by the record, that the conjugal partnership formed between
DionisioFulgencio,duringhislifetime,andBenitaGatchaliananddissolvedbythe
husband'sdeath,owedseverallargedebtsandthetestamentaryexecutrix,inthe
fulfillment of her duty, has a right to claim the possession of all the property
belonging to the estate of which she is the judicial administratrix, in order that,
pursuant law, she may make the required inventory and proceed, with the
authorizationofthecourt,topaythedebtsdulypresentedtothecommissionersof
appraisalappointedinthespecialproceedings.Itisanincontrovertibleprincipleof
lawthat,beforeproceedingwiththedivisionamongtheheirs,ofthepropertyleft
tothembythedeceasedpredecessorininterest,withoutprejudicetotherightsof
thesurvivingwidow,inrelationtoherownpropertywhichdoesnotformapartof
the conjugal partnership property nor is liable for the payment of the obligations
existingagainsttheconjugalpartnership.
Evidence was introduced to prove that the widow, Benita Gatchalian, on

contracting marriage with the now deceased Dionisio Fulgencio, brought to the
conjugal partnership, property worth about twelve thousand pesos, being
paraphernalia of the wife's exclusive ownership; but once included among the
propertyoftheconjugalpartnership,ademandforitsexclusiononthepartofits
legitimateownercouldproperlybemadeonlyaftertheformationoftheinventory
ofthepropertythatconstitutestheestateofherdeceasedhusband.
35
LUKBANV.REPUBLIC
98PHIL574
FACTS:
Lourdes married Francisco and after a big quarrel, Francisco left and was never
heard of again. Lourdes also inquired with his friends and family but to no avail.
He was nowhere to be found. And now, she files a petition to declare the
presumption of death of her husband for the purpose of securing a second
marriage.
HELD:
ATENEOLAW2010
While it istruethat a special proceeding is an applicationtoestablish a statusor

rightofaparty,oraparticularfact,thatremedycanbeinvokedifthepurposeisto
seekthedeclarationofdeathofthehusbandbutnottoestablishapresumptionof
death.
RULE74:SETTLEMENTOFESTATE
Section1.Extrajudicialsettlementbyagreementbetweenheirs.Ifthedecedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the
estateamongthemselvesastheyseefitbymeansofapublicinstrumentfiledin
theofficeoftheregisterofdeeds,andshouldtheydisagree,theymaydosoinan
ordinaryactionofpartition.Ifthereisonlyoneheir,hemayadjudicatetohimself
the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of
deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument
or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the
office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an
amountequivalenttothevalueofthepersonalpropertyinvolvedascertifiedto
underoathbythepartiesconcernedandconditioneduponthepaymentofany
justclaimthatmaybefiledundersection4ofthisrule.Itshallbepresumedthat
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administrationwithintwo(2)yearsafterthedeathofthedecedent.
Thefactoftheextrajudicialsettlementoradministrationshallbepublishedina
newspaperofgeneralcirculationinthemannerprovidedinthenestsucceeding
section;butnoextrajudicialsettlementshallbebindinguponanypersonwhohas
notparticipatedthereinorhadnonoticethereof.
MODESOFSETTLEMENTOFESTATE
1. Testate
2. Partition
3. Extrajudicialsettlement
4. Summarysettlement
5. Intestateproceedingswhereinadministratorisappointed
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
20
6. Executionofaffidavitadjudicatingtohimselfifheisthesoleheir
GENERAL RULE: JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION; EXCEPTION: SUMMARY

SETTLEMENTOFTHEESTATE
When a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially

administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator
Exception: Section 1, Rule 74when all the heirs are of legal age and
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator
EXTRAJUDICIALSETTLEMENT:REQUIREMENTS
1. Thedecedentleftnowill
2. Thedecedentleftnodebts
3. Heirsareoflegalageorifthereareminors,theyaredulyrepresentedby
theirguardiansauthorizedforthatpurpose
4. Throughapublicinstrument,theyextrajudiciallypartitiontheestate
5. Bondshallbefiledequivalenttothevalueofthepersonalpropertyunder
oath
6. Publicationrequirementspublishedonceaweekforthreeconsecutive
weeksinnewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince
SOLEADJUDICATION:REQUIREMENTS
1. Thereisonlyoneheir
2. Hemayexecuteanaffidavitfiledwiththeregisterofdeeds
3. Bondshallbefiledequivalenttothevalueofthepersonalpropertyofthe
decedentunderoath
4. Publicationrequirementspublishedonceaweekforthreeconsecutive
weeksinnewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince
SUMMARYSETTLEMENT:REQUIREMENTS
1. GrossvalueoftheestatedoesntexceedP10,000
2. Thedecedentmayhaveorhavenotleftawill
3. The aforementioned fact should be made to the court through petition
notlessthanonemonthnormorethan3monthsfromthedateoflast
publication
4. Noadministratororexecutorneedbeappointed
5. Publicationandnoticerequirements
ATENEOLAW2010
Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. Whenever the gross

value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate,
doesnotexceedtenthousandpesos,andthatfactismadetoappeartotheCourt
ofFirstInstancehavingjurisdictionoftheestatebythepetitionofaninterested
person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor
more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice
which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince,andaftersuchothernoticeto
interest persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
withouttheappointmentofanexecutororadministrator,andwithoutdelay,to
grant,ifproper,allowanceofthewill,ifanytherebe,todeterminewhoarethe
personslegallyentitledtoparticipateintheestate,andtoapportionanddivideit
amongthemafterthepaymentofsuchdebtsoftheestateasthecourtshallthen
findtobedue;andsuchpersons,intheirownright,iftheyareoflawfulageand
legalcapacity,orbytheirguardiansortrusteeslegallyappointedandqualified,if
otherwise,shallthereuponbeentitledtoreceiveandenterintothepossessionof
theportionsoftheestatesoawardedtothemrespectively.Thecourtshallmake
suchorderasmaybejustrespectingthecostsoftheproceedings,andallorders
andjudgmentsmadeorrenderedinthecoursethereofshallberecordedinthe
officeoftheclerk,andtheorderofpartitionoraward,ifitinvolvesrealestate,
shallberecordedintheproperregister'soffice.
Section3.Bondtobefiledbydistributees.Thecourt,beforeallowingapartition
in accordance with the provisions of the preceding section, my require the
distributees,ifpropertyotherthanrealistobedistributed,tofileabondinan
amounttobefixedbycourt,conditionedforthepaymentofanyjustclaimwhich
maybefiledunderthenextsucceedingsection.
Section4.Liabilityofdistributeesandestate.Ifitshallappearatanytimewithin
two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance
withtheprovisionsofeitherofthefirsttwosectionsofthisrule,thatanheiror
otherpersonhasbeenundulydeprivedofhislawfulparticipationintheestate,
such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the
courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such
lawfulparticipation.Andifwithinthesametimeoftwo(2)years,itshallappear
thattherearedebtsoutstandingagainsttheestatewhichhavenotbeenpaid,or
thatanheirorotherpersonhasbeenundulydeprivedofhislawfulparticipation
payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
21
that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall
contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances
require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real
estatebelongingtothedeceased,orboth.Suchbondandsuchrealestateshall
remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full
periodoftwo(2)yearsaftersuchdistribution,notwithstandinganytransfersof
realestatethatmayhavebeenmade.
Section5.Periodforclaimofminororincapacitatedperson. Ifonthedateof
theexpirationoftheperiodoftwo(2)yearsprescribedintheprecedingsection
thepersonauthorizedtofileaclaimisaminorormentallyincapacitated,orisin
prison or outside the Philippines, he may present his claim within one (1) year
aftersuchdisabilityisremoved.
36
UTULOV.VDA.DEGARCIA
66Phil302(1938)
FACTS:
JuanGarciadiedintestateleavinghischildren,oneofwhomisLuzGarcia,andhis
wifeasheirs.Duringthependencyoftheintestateproceedings,Luzdiedandshe
leftnolegitimatedescendants.Heronlyheirswerehermotherandhusband.Her
husband then applied for judicial administration of the property, absent any will
fromhislatewife.Thiswasopposedtobythemotherhowevershewasoverruled
andthecourtdecidedinthehusbandsfavor.
HELD:
As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the
general rule that when a person dies living property in the Philippine Islands, his
propertyshouldbejudiciallyadministeredandthecompetentcourtshouldappoint
a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the
deceasedleftnowill,orincasehehadleftoneshouldhefailtonameanexecutor
therein.Thisrule,however,issubjecttotheexceptionsestablishedbysections596
and597ofthesameCode,asfinallyamended.Accordingtothefirst,whenallthe
heirsareoflawfulageandtherearenodebtsduefromtheestate,theymayagree
inwritingtopartitionthepropertywithoutinstitutingthejudicialadministrationor
applyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator.Accordingtothesecond,ifthe
ATENEOLAW2010
property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary
partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property
constitutingtheinheritanceamongthemselvespursuanttolaw,withoutinstituting
thejudicialadministrationandtheappointmentofanadministrator.
Construingthescopeofsection596,thiscourtrepeatedlyheldthatwhenaperson
dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the
appointmentofanadministratoraresuperfluousandunnecessaryproceedings
37
HERNANDEZV.ANDAL
78Phil196(1947)
FACTS:
TheHernandezsiblingssoldapartofaparceloflandtheyinheritedfromtheirlate
father. The share they sold to the Andals allegedly were coowned by the
intervenors based on an oral partition agreement made amongst them. Here
comes petititoner who wanted to repurchase the parcel of land from the Andals
but it was disputed that the Andals didn't want to sell the same to her at her
offeredprice.Then,itsohappenedthatallegedlytheAndalssoldthesamelandto
theintervenorsinstead.TheintervenorsthenallegethatHernandezwasactingin
badfaithsinceitwasherdelayingtacticsthatresultedtothedelayedsaletothe
Andalsandthepermissiontoundergothesametransaction.
HELD:
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a
contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of
authoritiesholdstheaffirmativeview;otherauthoritiessayno.Thereasonforthe
rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that
partitionisnotaconveyancebutsimplyaseparationanddesignationofthatpart
of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. The differences in the
conclusionsreachedare"dueperhapstovariedphraseologyofthestatutes"inthe
several states. However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in
section335oftheformerCodeofCivilProcedure,andnowinRule123,section21,
oftheRulesofCourt,thelawhasbeenuniformlyinterpretedinalonglineofcases
tobeapplicabletoexecutoryandnottocompletedorexecutedcontracts.Inthis
jurisdictionperformanceofthecontracttakesitoutoftheoperationofthestatute.
Thestatuteoffraudsdoesnotdeclarethecontractsthereinenumeratedvoidand
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
22
ofnolegaleffect,butonlymakesineffectivetheactionforspecificperformance.In
theUnitedStates,eveninthosestateswheretheaffirmativeviewofthequestion
hasbeenfollowed,"theweightofauthorityupholdstherulethatanoralpartition
iseffectivewhenseveralpossession istakenunder it bytherespectiveparties to
theagreement."
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of

equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly
performed.
Asageneralproposition,transactions,sofarastheyaffecttheparties,arerequired
to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of
providingevidencetoprovethetransactions.Writtenformexactedbythestatute
offrauds,forexample,"isforevidentialpurposesonly."ThedecisionsofthisCourt
which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too,
requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in
ordertovalidatetheactorcontractbutonlytoinsureitsefficacysothatafterthe
existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be
compelledtoexecutethedocument.
Issection1ofRule74constitutiveandnotmerelyevidentialofpartition?Inother
words, is writing the act that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There
are no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative
answertothesequestions.Itmustbenotedthatwherethelawintendsawriting
orotherformalitytobetheessentialrequisitetothevalidityofthetransactionsit
says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally
enactedinEnglandandasenactedinsomeofthestates,usesthewords"utterly
void"withstatutetransactionsrequiredtobeinwritingareabsolutelyvoidand
notmerelyvoidableifnotmadeinthemannerindicated.Againarticle633ofthe
CivilCodesaysthatdonationmaybevalidonlywhenmadeinapublicdocument.
Article146oftheMortgageLawmakesknownitsintentiontohavetheexecution
of a public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to the
validityofthecontractbyusingthisphrase:"inorderthatvoluntarymortgages
may be legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also
employsforthesamepurposesimilarexpressionwithreferencetotheexecution
ofapublicdocument:"inorderthatmortgagemaybevalidlyconstituted."And
withrespecttotheformalitiesoflastwillsandtestaments,section618ofActNo.
190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass upon any
ATENEOLAW2010
estate real or personal nor change or affect the same, unless it be written etc."
Otherexamplesmightbementioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the

required public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an
inherentelementofitseffectivenessasbetweentheparties.AndthisCourthad
noapparentreason,inadoptingthisrule,tomaketheefficacyofapartitionas
between the parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its
registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable
support. We can think of possible factors against the proposition that a public
documentanditsregistrationwerecontemplatedasnecessaryingredientstogive
lifetoacontractofpartitionsothatwithoutthemnooralpartitioncanbindthe
parties.
38
TORRESV.TORRES
10SCRA185(1964)
FACTS:
Oneofthechildrenofthedecedentprayedforthelettersofadministrationforthe
estateofhisparent.Thiswasopposedtobyanotherheironthegroundthatitwas
unnecessary to undergo judivcial administration since there was a previously
concluded extrajudicial partition amongst them. Petitioner doesn't deny the
existence of this partition however, he alleges that the same didn't took into
consideration some valuable properties of the decedent as well as the existing
obligationleftbythesame.
HELD:
Thisisnottooverlooktheallegationthattheestatehasanoutstandingobligation
ofP50,000.00.Itistobenoted,however,thatappellant,asheretoforeobserved,
did not specify from whom and in what manner the said debt was contracted.
Indeed, the bare allegation that, "the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00
from third persons" cannot be considered as concise statement to constitute a
causeofaction.Itmustbeforthisreasonthatthelowercourt,notwithstandingthe
existenceofsuchavermentinappellant'ssupplementalanswertotheopposition,
dismissedthepetitionfiledbysaidappellant.
Nordoestheunverifiedstatementthatthereareotherpropertiesnotincludedin
thedeedofextrajudicialpartitioninthepossessionofoneoftheheirs,justifythe
institution of an administration proceeding because the same questions that may
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
23
ariseastothem,viz,thetitlethereandtheirpartition,ifproventobelongtothe
intestate, can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of
partition.
39
ARCILLASV.MONTEJO
26SCRA197(1968)
FACTS:
GeronimoArcillasfiledapetitionforthecancellationoftitleinthenameofhislate
father. He asked in the same petition that the title to the property reflect the
shares of each sibling laid down in the petition. He alleged that portions of the
landweresoldtoVicenteArcillas,alsoanheir.Petitionerontheotherhandfileda
petitionfortheissuanceoflettersofadministrationfortheestate,includingasone
of the properties the land in question. Respondents opposed this on the ground
thatitwasunnecessarytoundertakeadministrativeproceedingsastherewasonly
onepropertyinvolvedandthattherewasnodebtspayable.
HELD:
Havingdecidedtoinstituteadministrationproceedingsinsteadofresortingtothe
less expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or
ordinaryactionforpartition,theheirsmaynotthenberebuffedintheexerciseof
theirdiscretiongrantedundersection1ofRule74oftheRulesofCourtmerelyon
thegroundthattheexpensesusuallycommoninadministrationproceedingsmay
deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses
incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been
voluntarilyassumedbytheheirsthemselvessothattheymaynotinthefuturebe
heard to complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's
claimastotheallegedexistenceofotherpropertiesofthedeceasedasidefromthe
lotinquestioncanbemoreadequatelyascertainedinadministrationproceedings
ratherthaninanyotheraction.
Understandablytheallowanceofthehearingofthe"cadastral"motion,supposedly
broughtundertheauthorityofsection112ofAct496,cannotbesustained.While
thissectionauthorizes,amongothers,apersonininteresttoaskthecourtforany
erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoatehaveterminatedandceased,"andapparentlytheNovember12petition
comeswithinitsscope,suchreliefcanonlybegrantedifthereisunanimityamong
the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
ATENEOLAW2010
partyininterest;otherwisethecasebecomescontroversialandshouldbethreshed
out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs (see
Puguid v. Reyes, L21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein). In the
instantcasetheobviouslackofunanimityamongthepartiesininterest,manifestly
demonstratedbypetitioners'expressobjectiontothecancellationofTCTNo.RT
244,sufficientlyremovestheNovember12petitionfromthescopeofsection112
of Act 496. Besides, the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are
summaryinnatureandhenceinadequateforthelitigationofissueswhichproperly
pertaintothecasewheretheincidentbelongs.
40
ERM8CV.MEDELO
64SCRA359(1975)
FACTS:
Oneofthegrandchildrenofthedeceasedspousesfiledforsummarysettlementof
theestate.Therebeingnooppositionthereto,hewasorderedtomakeaproject
ofpartition.Thecourtapprovedthesame.However,amotionforreconsideration
was filed by one of the children of the deceased spouses, alleging that the lot in
issueshouldn'tbeincludedintheinventoryasthesamewasownedbyhim.The
trialcourtoverruledhismotionanddecidedinfavorofthesummarysettlement.
HELD:
Thepolicyofthelawistoterminateproceedingsforthesettlementoftheestateof
deceased persons with the least loss of time. This is specially true with small
estatesforwhichtherulesprovidepreciselyasummaryproceduredispensingwith
the appointment of an administrator together with the other involved and
cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination of the assets of the
deceased and the persons entitled to inhirit therefrom and the payment of his
obligations.Definitely,theprobatecourtisnotthebestforumfortheresolutionof
adverseclaimsofownershipofanypropertyostensiblybelongingtothedecedent's
estate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular
administrationproceedings,itisnotpropertodelaythesummarysettlementofa
deceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that certain
propertiesdonotbelongtotheestatebuttohim.Suchclaimmustbeventilatedin
anindependentaction,andtheprobatecourtshouldproceedtothedistributionof
theestate,iftherearenootherlegalobstaclestoit,forafterall,suchdistribution
mustalwaysbesubjecttotheresultsofthesuit.Fortheprotectionoftheclaimant
theappropriatestepistohavetheproperannotationoflispendensentered.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
41
24
CARREONV.AGCAOILI
1SCRA521(1961)
FACTS:
WhenBonifacioCarreondied,hiswidowadjudicatedtoherselftheparcelofland
whichtheyacquiredduringhislifetime.Shedidn'tdisclosethatshehadchildren
withBonifacio.Shewasgranted,subjecttotheannotationinthetitleofSection4,
Rule74.Thereafter,sheobtainedaloanfromthebankandassecurity,mortgaged
oftheland.Shewasnotabletopaytheloanontimeandlookedforabuyerfor
the land. There came Agcaoili who bought the same. The loan was paid., the
mortgagesubsequentlyreleased.
Consequently,thechildrenofCelerinasoughttheannulmentofthesaletoAgcaoili
on the ground of fraud employed by their mother in adjudicating the land to
herselfnotwithstandingthatshehadchildrenwhowerealsoheirstothedeceased
Bonficacio.
HELD:
On the transfer certificate of title issued to Agcaoili there was annotated a
statementthatitwassubjecttoSection4,Rule74oftheRulesofCourt.Thiswas
anannotationcarriedoverfromCelerina'stransfercertificate.Section4,Rule74,
providesthefollowing:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within
twoyearsafterthesettlementanddistributionofanestateinaccordancewiththe
provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other
personhasbeenundulydeprivedofhislawfulparticipationintheestate,suchheir
orsuchotherpersonmaycompelthesettlementoftheestateinthecourtsinthe
mannerhereinafterprovidedforthepurposeofsatisfyingsuchlawfulparticipation.
And if within the same time of two years, it shall appear that there are debts
outstandingagainsttheestatewhichhavenotbeenpaid,orthatanheirorother
personhasbeenundulydeprivedofhislawfulparticipationpayableinmoney,the
courthavingjurisdictionoftheestatemay,byorderforthatpurpose,afterhearing,
settletheamountofsuchdebtsorlawfulparticipationandorderhowmuchandin
what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may
issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the
preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both.
Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors,
ATENEOLAW2010
heirs, or other persons for the full period of two years after such distribution,
notwithstandinganytransfersoftherealestatethatmayhavebeenmade.
The above lien is effective only for a period of two years. From September 28,
1946, when a transfer certificate of title was issued to Celerina, to September 8,
1949 when the deed of sale in favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more
thantwoyearshadelapsedWesustainthelowercourt'sopinionthatthenceforth
therighttohavesuchliencancelledbecamevestedonappelleeAgcaoiliandthat
thesamehadbecomefunctusoficio.Andtherebeingnofraudinthetransaction
onthepartofappellee,norproofthatheknewofanylegalinfirmityinthetitleof
his vendor, we find no reason to apply the proposition that he is deemed to be
holdingthelandintrustforthechildrenofCelerinaDauag.
42
MCMICKINGV.SYCONBIENG
21Phil211(1912)
FACTS:
Margarita Jose died intestate and left properties here and abroad. Palanca
qualifiedasadministratoroftheestateandtookpossessionofallthepropertiesof
thedecedent.OcampoandanotherservedassuretiesofPalanca.WhenOcampo
died,Palancawasorderedtofileanadditionalbondinreplacementofthesurety
given by Ocampo. Ocampos estate was in turn administered by Velasco, with
several persons serving as his sureties. The estate was extrajudicially partitioned
bytheheirsandtheyundertooktopayanydebtsoftheestate.Lateron,Palarca
wasremovedfromofficeforhisrefusaltorenderaccountingofthepropertieshe
took in administration. McMicking took his stead and consequently filed a claim
against the estate of Ocampo, arising allegedly from the surety it undertook for
Palarca.
HELD:
Inthecaseatthebarweareoftheopinionthat,underthebroadandliberalpolicy
which we must adopt in the interpretation and application of the provisions
referred to, the decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, in the
form,inthemannerandforthepurposesexpressed,fallswithintheprovisionsof
saidsectionsandmaybetermed,therefore,andweholdittobe,apartitionofthe
property of a decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of those
sections.Thefactofthepriorappointmentofanadministratorandthefilingofan
inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as the right of the
ownerstopartitionisconcerned.Theonlyrequisiteforsuchpetitionprescribedby
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
25
thelawisthat"therearenodebts...orallthedebtshavebeenpaidbytheheirs."
Whentheconditionisfulfilledthepartitioncantakeplace,nomatterwhatstage
the administration may have reached. By this it is, of course, not meant that the
partition after the appointment of an administrator will interfere with the rights
acquired by third person dealing with said administrator within the limits of his
authorityandpriortothepartition;northattheadministratorcanbedeprivedof
the property of which he is legally in possession without proper proceedings and
theconsentofthecourt.
As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an

administrators' bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of the
principalprecedesthatofthesurety.IfVelascoincurrednoliability,thenhissurety
incurred none. The question that naturally suggests itself is, then, In what was
Velascoatfaultorinwhatdidhefail?Whenthepersonsinterestedintheestateof
MarianoOcampoagreedvoluntarilyuponapartitionanddivisionoftheproperty
ofsaidestateandtheactualpartitionfollowed,thematterpassedoutofthehands
ofVelascoasadministrator.Thepartiestothepartitionstoodinvokingtheirrights
undersection596and597.Velascowashelpless.Hewaspowerlesstopreventthe
partiesfromtakingthepropertytowhichtheywereentitledundertheagreement,
it being conceded that they were actually entitled thereto in law. Those sections
were applicable to the situation and there was nothing that Velasco could do to
prevent the estate from being divided according to their provisions. In giving his
consent to the partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the
courttheretohedidnowrong.
Moreover,thesuretiesofanadministratorsoappointedcannotbeheldliablefor
propertywhichbyforceoflawhasbeentakenfromtheprincipalanditsownership
andcontrolturnedovertoothers.Theirobligationisthattheirprincipalshallobey
thelawinthehandlinganddistributionoftheestate.Theirobligationisdischarged
whentheestateislegallyturnedovertothoseentitledthereto. Thelawrequires
theprincipaltoturnitovertothosewhobringthemselveswithintheprovisionsof
section 596. Having turned over the whole estate under thecompelling powerof
thelaw,hisobligationceased.Theresponsibilityofthesuretiesceasedatthesame
time.Withouttheirconsentanotherobligationcouldnotbeimposeduponthemin
relationtothesameprincipal,andthesameproperty,orapartthereof,especially
after the lapse of two years. Their undertaking was that their principal should
dischargeoneobligation,nottwo.
ATENEOLAW2010
Wehavenotoverlookedthecontentionthatatthetimethispartitiontookplace
there was a contingent claim against the estate partitioned, namely, the claim
which would arise on the contingency that the administrator for whom Mariano
Ocampo was surety might default or otherwise fail to perform his duties thus
rendering Mariano Ocampo liable on his bond; and that contingent claim, being
oneexpresslyrecognizedbysections746to749oftheCodeofCivilProcedureasa
claimentirelypropertopresent,nopartitionofthisestateundersection596and
597 was legally possible until such claim was provided for by the petitioning
parties. This contention goes upon the assumption that a partition under the
sections of the Code of Civil Procedure so often referred to is void unless every
debt is paid or provided for by the petitioning parties, and may therefore be
entirelydisregardedbythecreditorholdingaclaimeitherunpaidorprovidedfor.
We do not believe that this assumption is warranted. In the first place, we must
rememberthatthepartitionproceedingsinquestionareproceedingsoutofcourt.
Consequently there is no prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims.
The appointment of commissioners, the publicationofnoticetocreditors,andall
the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are not
requiredinpartitionoutofcourt.Thelawissilentastohowtheclaimsaretobe
ascertained, presented and determined. We must assume, therefore, that the
method of ascertaining them and determining their validity was left to the good
senseandsoundjudgmentofthepersonsconcerned.
In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made by

sections596and597forthepaymentofaclaimdiscoveredbythemorpresented
afterthepartition.Thatisoneofthemainprovisions.Itisanecessarydeduction,
therefore,thatitwasnottheintentionofthelawtopronouncethepartitionvoid
ofnoeffectsimplybecausenotallofthedebtswerepaidbeforethepartitionwas
made.Thefactofnonpaymentcannot,then,becausebythecreditorasareason
for attacking the partition directly; that is, by asserting that, inasmuch as a
payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such
partitioncannotlegallyandvalidlytakeplacewhileadebtisoutstanding.Whilea
partition manifestly fraudulent in inception and result might possibly be attacked
directlybyanactiontosetaside,aquestionwhichwedonotdiscussordecide,the
manner of attacking the partition prescribed by the law is the one, generally
speaking, preferably to be followed; and that is to throw into administration so
much of the estate as is necessary to pay the outstanding claim. The method,
thoughindirect,accomplishesabetterresultthanadirectattack.
43
PEREIRAV.COURTOFAPPEALS
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
26
174SCRA154(1939)
FACTS:
PereirawasanemployeeofPALuntilhedied.hewassurvivedbyhiswidowand
sister. His sister then filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate.
Notwithstanding opposition from the widow, she was appointed as administratix.
Itwasthepetitionerscontentionthatjudicialadministrationisunnecessarygiven
therewasnoestateleftbythehusbandandthatnodebtsarepayable.
HELD:
Thegeneralruleisthatwhenapersondiesleavingproperty,thesameshouldbe
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator,intheorderestablishedinSection6,Rule78,incasethedeceased
leftnowill,orincasehehadleftone,shouldhefailtonameanexecutortherein.
An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this
exception,whenalltheheirsareoflawfulageandtherearenodebtsduefromthe
estate,theymayagreeinwritingtopartitionthepropertywithoutinstitutingthe
judicialadministrationorapplyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator.
Section1,Rule74oftheRevised Rules of Court, however,does not precludethe

heirsfrominstitutingadministrationproceedings,eveniftheestatehasnodebtsor
obligations,iftheydonotdesiretoresortforgoodreasonstoanordinaryaction
for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselvesastheymayseefit,ortoresorttoanordinaryactionforpartition,the
saidprovisiondoesnotcompelthemtodosoiftheyhavegoodreasonstotakea
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceedingeveniftheestatehasnodebtsissanctionedonlyiftheheirshavegood
reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
eitherinoroutofcourt,theestateshouldnotbeburdenedwithanadministration
proceedingwithoutgoodandcompellingreasons.
Thus,ithasbeenrepeatedlyheldthatwhenapersondieswithoutleavingpending
obligationstobepaid,hisheirs,whetherofageornot,arenotboundtosubmitthe
propertytoajudicialadministration,whichisalwayslongandcostly,ortoapplyfor
theappointmentofanadministratorbytheCourt.Ithasbeenuniformlyheldthat
in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator
aresuperfluousandunnecessaryproceedings.
ATENEOLAW2010
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the

estateofadeceasedwhentheheirsarealloflegalageandtherearenocreditors
willdependonthecircumstancesofeachcase.
44
JEREZV.NIETES
30SCRA905(1969)
FACTS:
When Nietes died, his widow was appointed as administratix of his estate. She
submitteddulyaprojectofpartitionandaccountingandwasdulyapprovedbythe
order of the court. upon closing of the intestate proceedings, here came the
illegitimatechildrenofthedeceasedallegingthatthepartitionwascontrarytolaw
astheyweredeprivedoftheirrespectiveshares.Uponthismereunsubstantiated
motion,thetrialcourtjudgereopenedtheproceedingshastily.
HELD:
Wedosonowanddefinitelyholdthatratherthanrequireanypartywhocanallege
agrievancethathisinterestwasnotrecognizedinatestateorintestateproceeding
tofileaseparateandindependentaction,hemaywithinthereglementaryperiod
securethereliefthatishisduebyareopeningofthecaseevenafteraprojectof
partitionandfinalaccountinghadbeenapproved.
It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final accounting was
submitted by the counsel for petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as administratrix, on June
14, 1966, respondent Judge approved the same and declared closed and
terminatedtheintestacythenextday,June15,1966.Subsequently,onaverified
petition by private respondents, filed on June 29, 1966, based on the assertion
made that they should have had a share in the estate as illegitimate children but
that they were omitted in the aforesaid project of partition, they sought to be
allowed to intervene and "to have the project of partition rejected for being
contrarytolaw."Suchapleading,withoutmore,resultedinthequestionedorder
ofJuly30,1966,reopeningtheproceedingsandreconsideringtheapprovalofthe
project of partition and final accounting, to enable the private respondents "to
presentwhateverevidencetheymayhavetoshowtheirrighttoparticipateinthe
estate of the deceased." Although the recognition of their right to intervene
appearedtobetentativeandconditional,itcannotbedeniedthattheyweregiven
astandingsufficienttosetasidetheprojectofpartition.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
27
Respondent Judge acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of private
respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge to
allowintervention.Theremustbeproofbeyondallegationsinsuchmotiontoshow
the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by
respondentJudgecouldbeconsideredpremature.
RULE75
PRODUCTIONOFWILL.ALLOWANCEOFWILLNECESSARY
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall pass

eitherrealorpersonalestateunlessitisprovedandallowedinthepropercourt.
Subjecttotherightofappeal,suchallowanceofthewillshallbeconclusiveasto
itsdueexecution.
WILL,DEFINED.
Anactwherebyapersonispermitted,withtheformalitiesprescribedby
law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effectafterhisdeath.
Section2.Custodianofwilltodeliver.Thepersonwhohascustodyofawillshall,
withintwenty(20)daysafterheknowsofthedeathofthetestator,deliverthe
willtothecourthavingjurisdiction,ortotheexecutornamedinthewill.
Section3.Executortopresentwillandacceptorrefusetrust.Apersonnamedas
executor in a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of
thetestate,orwithintwenty(20)daysafterheknowsthatheisnamedexecutor
ifheobtainedsuchknowledgeafterthedeathofthetestator,presentsuchwill
tothecourthavingjurisdiction,unlessthewillhasreachedthecourtinanyother
manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptanceofthetrustorhisrefusaltoacceptit.
Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect. A person who
neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without
excused satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand
pesos.
Section5.Personretainingwillmaybecommitted.Apersonhavingcustodyofa
will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to
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deliverthesame,whenorderedsotodo,tothecourthavingjurisdiction,maybe
committedtoprisonandtherekeptuntilhedeliversthewill.
RULE76
ALLOWANCEORDISALLOWANCEOFWILL
DEFINITIONOFPROBATE
Probateisaspecialproceedingforestablishingthevalidityofawill
It seeks to prove that instrument submitted is the will of the testator,

that it was executed according to the formalities required by law, and
thatthetestatorhadthetestamentarycapacityatthetimeofexecution
KINDSOFPROBATEPROCEEDINGS
1. Postmortem where the proceedings are held after the death of the
testator
2. Antemortem where the testator tests the validity of his will before the
probatecourtduringhislifetime
ADVANTAGESOFANTEMORTEMPROCEEDINGS
1. Fraud, intimidation, and undue influence are minimized because the
courtswillhaveaneasiertimedeterminingthementalconditionofalive
testatorthanadeadone
2. If the will doesn't comply with the requirements of law, it can be
correctedimmediately
3. Ifprobatedduringthelifetimeofthetestator,theonlyquestionleftafter
thetestatorsdeathwouldbetheintrinsicvalidityofthedispositions
QUESTIONSTOBEDETERMINEDBYTHEPROBATECOURT
1. Questionofidentityofthewill
2. Questionofthedueexecutionofthewillinaccordancewithformalities
requiredbylaw
3. Questionoftestamentarycapacity
NECESSITYFORPROBATE
Certainsafeguardsmustbeinplacetopreventforgeryandotheractsof
unscrupulousindividualsandatthesametime,toinsurethatthetestator
understoodandmeantwhatheplacedinthewill
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
28
NATUREOFAPROBATEPROCEEDING
KindofspecialproceedingsanctionedundertheRulesofCourt
Itisaproceedinginrem,itisbindingonallpersonsininterestwhether
theyappeartocontesttheprobateornot
Theadmissionofwilltoprobatehasalltheeffectsofajudgment,andis
entitledtogoodfaithandcreditinothercourts
NATUREOFPROBATEORDERS
When a probate order has been issued and no timely appeal was filed,
theorderbecomesfinalandbindinguponthewholeworld
Upon such finality, the case can no longer be opened for petition for
annulmentofthewill
PURPOSEOFPROBATEPROCEEDINGS
Probatecourtshavelimitedjurisdiction
Mainpurposeoftheproceedingsistodeterminethefollowing
o Identityofthewill
o Testamentarycapacityofthetestator
o Compliance of the will itself with the formalities required by
law
Once these three things have been established, then the court issues a
probateorder
Theprobateorderthenhaslimitedjurisdictiontodeterminewhatmayor
maynotbeincludedintheinventoryofthetestatorsestate
Theissueofownershipisdeterminedprovisionallybytheprobatecourt
inordertogiveeffecttothewill
WHENJURISDICTIONVEST
Uponfilingofpetitionforprobate
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MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
29
Section1.Whomaypetitionfortheallowanceofwill.Anyexecutor,devisee,or
legateenamedinawill,oranyotherpersoninterestedintheestate,may,atany
timeafterthedeathofthetestator,petitionthecourthavingjurisdictiontohave
the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.
Thetestatorhimselfmay,duringhislifetime,petitionthecourtfortheallowance
ofhiswill.
WHOMAYFILEAPETITIONFORPROBATEOFAWILL
1. Testatorduringanantemortemprobate
2. Legateesordevisees
3. Heirs
4. Anyotherpersoninterestedintheestate
ANY DEFECT IN THE PETITION SHALL NOT RENDER THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE
WILL
The rules provide that no defect in the petition shall render void the
allowance of the will, or the issuance of letters testamentary or of
administrationwiththewillannexed
Ifthereisanydefect,thenthecourtwouldjustorderthepartiestomake
thenecessaryamendments
Section2.Contentsofpetition.Apetitionfortheallowanceofawillmustshow,
sofarasknowntothepetitioner:
(a)Thejurisdictionalfacts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testatorordecedent;
(c)Theprobablevalueandcharacterofthepropertyoftheestate;
(d)Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersareprayed;
(e)Ifthewillhasnotbeendeliveredtothecourt,thenameofthepersonhaving
custodyofit.
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But no defect in the petition shall render void the allowance of the will, or the
issuanceofletterstestamentaryorofadministrationwiththewillannexed.
PETITIONFORPROBATECONTAINSTHEFOLLOWING
1. Thejurisdictionalfacts;
2. The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of
thetestatorordecedent;
3. Theprobablevalueandcharacterofthepropertyoftheestate;
4. Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersareprayed;
5. If the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
havingcustodyofit.
Section3.Courttoappointtimeforprovingwill.Noticethereoftobepublished.
Whenawillisdeliveredto,orapetitionfortheallowanceofawillisfiledin,the
courthavingjurisdiction,suchcourtshallfixatimeandplaceforprovingthewill
whenallconcernedmayappeartocontesttheallowancethereof,andshallcause
notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
Butnonewspaperpublicationshallbemadewherethepetitionforprobatehas
beenfiledbythetestatorhimself.
Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or

personally.Thecourtshallalsocausecopiesofthenoticeofthetimeandplace
fixedforprovingthewilltobeaddressedtothedesignatedorotherknownheirs,
legatees,anddeviseesofthetestatorresidentinthePhilippinesattheirplacesof
residence,anddepositedinthepostofficewiththepostagethereonprepaidat
leasttwenty(20)daysbeforethehearing,ifsuchplacesofresidencebeknown.A
copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as
executor,ifhebenotthepetitioner;also,toanypersonnamedascoexecutornot
petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of
the notice at lest (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to
mailing.
Ifthetestatorasksfortheallowanceofhisownwill,noticeshallbesentonlyto
hiscompulsoryheirs.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
30
Section5.Proofathearing.Whatsufficientinabsenceofcontest.Atthehearing
compliancewiththeprovisionsofthelasttwoprecedingsectionsmustbeshown
before the introduction of testimony in support of the will. All such testimony
shallbetakenunderoathandreducedtowriting.Itnopersonappearstocontest
the allowance of the will, the court may grant allowance thereof on the
testimonyofoneofthesubscribingwitnessesonly,ifsuchwitnesstestifythatthe
willwasexecutedasisrequiredbylaw.
In the case of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
whoknowsthehandwritingandsignatureofthetestatorexplicitlydeclarethat
thewillandthesignatureareinthehandwritingofthetestator.Intheabsenceof
anysuchcompetentwitness,andifthecourtdeemitnecessary,experttestimony
mayberesortedto.
IFTHENOTARIALWILLISUNCONTESTED,HOWMANYSUBSCRIBINGWITNESSES
ARENEEDEDTOTESTIFY?
Onlyonesubscribingwitnessmaytestifyifthewillisuncontested
Ifthewilliscontested,allsubscribingwitnessesmusttestify
WITHRESPECTTOHOLOGRAPHICWILLS,HOWMANYWITNESSESMUSTTESTIFY?
At least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declaring that the will and signature are in the
handwritingofthetestator
In the absence of such competent witness and/or if the court deems it

necessary,experttestimonymayberesortedto
Section6.Proofoflostordestroyedwill.Certificatethereupon.Nowillshallbe
provedasalostordestroyedwillunlesstheexecutionandvalidityofthesame
beestablished,andthewillisprovedtohavebeeninexistenceatthetimeofthe
death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally
destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its
provisionsareclearlyanddistinctlyprovedbyatleasttwo(2)crediblewitnesses.
When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and
certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be
filedandrecordedasotherwillsarefiledandrecorded.
Section 7. Proof when witnesses do not reside in province. If it appears at the

time fixed for the hearing that none of the subscribing witnesses resides in the
province,butthatthedepositionofoneormoreofthemcanbetakenelsewhere,
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the court may, on motion, direct it to be taken, and may authorize a

photographiccopyofthewilltobemadeandtobepresentedtothewitnesson
hisexamination,whomaybeaskedthesamequestionswithrespecttoit,andto
thehandwritingofthetestatorandothers,aswouldbepertinentandcompetent
iftheoriginalwillwerepresent.
Section8.ProofwhenwitnessesdeadorinsaneordonotresideinthePhilippines.
Iftheappearsatthetimefixedforthehearingthatthesubscribingwitnessesare
dead or insane, or thatnone of them resides in the Philippines, the court may
admit the testimony of other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator, and
thedueexecutionofthewill;andasevidenceoftheexecutionofthewill,itmay
admitproofofthehandwritingofthetestatorandofthesubscribingwitnesses,
orofanyofthem.
STAGESOFAPROBATEPROCEEDING
1. Probate proper where the court determines the existence of
testamentarycapacity,dueexecutionandidentityofthewill
2. Thecourtshallthenissueanorderallowingthewill
3. Second stage is the distribution, where for the purposes of judicial
orderliness,thewillmustbeenforcedinaccordancewiththeprovisions
of the will so long as the will doesn't violate the law, especially the
provisionsonlegitimeandthequalificationsofthebeneficiarytosucceed
Section9.Groundsfordisallowingwill.Thewillshallbedisallowedinanyofthe
followingcases:
(a)Ifnotexecutedandattestedasrequiredbylaw;
(b)Ifthetestatorwasinsane,orotherwisementallyincapabletomakeawill,at
thetimeofitsexecution;
(c)Ifitwasexecutedunderduress,ortheinfluenceoffear,orthreats;
(d)Ifitwasprocuredbyundueandimproperpressureandinfluence,onthepart
ofthebeneficiary,orofsomeotherpersonforhisbenefit;
(e)Ifthesignatureofthetestatorwasprocuredbyfraudortrick,andhedidnot
intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature
thereto.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
31
GROUNDSFORDISALLOWANCE
1. Noncompliance
2. Insanityormentallyincapable
3. Duressorfear
4. Undueinfluence
5. Fraud
Section 10. Contestant to file grounds of contest. Anyone appearing to contest

thewillmuststateinwritinghisgroundsforopposingitsallowance,andservea
copythereofonthepetitionerandotherpartiesinterestedintheestate.
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will

contested.Ifthewilliscontested,allthesubscribingwitnesses,andthenotaryin
thecaseofwillsexecutedundertheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,ifpresentinthe
Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death,
absence,orinsanityofanyofthemmustbesatisfactorilyshowntothecourt.If
all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the
provincewherethewillhasbeenfiled,theirdepositionmustbetaken.Ifanyor
all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember
having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may
nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and
attestedinthemannerrequiredbylaw.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3)
witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of
any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
mayberesortedto.
Section 12. Proof where testator petitions for allowance of holographic will.
Wherethetestatorhimselfpetitionsfortheprobateofhisholographicwilland
no contest is filed, the fact that the affirms that the holographic will and the
signature are in his own handwriting, shall be sufficient evidence of the
genuinenessanddueexecutionthereof.Iftheholographicwilliscontested,the
burdenofdisprovingthegenuinenessanddueexecutionthereofshallbeonthe
contestant.Thetestatortorebuttheevidenceforthecontestant.
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Section13.Certificateofallowanceattachedtoprovewill.Toberecordedinthe
Office of Register of Deeds. If the court is satisfied, upon proof taken and filed,
thatthewillwasdulyexecuted,andthatthetestatoratthetimeofitsexecution
was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, and
undueinfluence,orfraud,acertificateofitsallowance,signedbythejudge,and
attested by the seal of the court shall be attached to the will and the will and
certificatefiledandrecordedbytheclerk.Attestedcopiesofthewilldevisingreal
estateandofcertificateofallowancethereof,shallberecordedintheregisterof
deedsoftheprovinceinwhichthelandslie.
45
FERNANDEZV.DIMAGIBA
21SCRA428
FACTS:
Dimagiba submitted a petition for probate of the will of the late delos Reyes,
institutingtheformerasthesoleheir.OppositionwaslaterenteredbyFernandez
and others. They alleged themselves to be intestate heirs and they oppose the
probate on grounds of forgery amongst others. They were overruled and the
probatewasallowed.Theylaterintroduceevidencethatthewillwasrevokedby
allegeddeedsofsaleexecutedallegedlybythetestatrixbutagain,theprobatewas
upheld.Theytriedtoappealthedecisionofthetrialcourtbuttheappellatecourt
heldthattheprobatehadbecomefinalduetolackofopportuneappealfromthe
oppositors.
HELD:
Astothefirstpoint,oppositorsappellantscontendthattheorderallowingthewill
toprobateshouldbeconsideredinterlocutory,becauseitfailstoresolvetheissues
ofestoppelandrevocationpropoundedintheiropposition.Theappellant'sstandis
untenable.Itiselementarythataprobatedecreefinallyanddefinitivelysettlesall
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessingofhislastwillandtestament,irrespectiveofwhetheritsprovisionsare
valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and
appealable;anditissorecognizedbyexpressprovisionsofSection1ofRule109,
that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a)
allowsordisallowsawill."
46
MERCADOV.SANTOS
66SCRA215
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
32
FACTS:
Mercadosoughttheprobateofthewillofhislatewife.Thewillwasdulyprobated
andfiveyearsaftersaidproceedings,thefiveintervenorsfiledforthereopeningof
theproceedings.Theirmotionwasdenied.Thereafter,theyfiledonfourdifferent
instances the same complaint for alleged forgery and falsification employed by
Mercado.ThispromptedMercadotobeimprisonedandhadtofileforbailseveral
times.Hethenfiledforinjunctionwiththeappellatecourt.
HELD:
The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually
consideredasconclusiveastoitsdueexecutionandvalidity,andisalsoconclusive
thatthetestatorwasofsoundanddisposingmindatthetimewhenheexecuted
thewill,andwasnotactingunderduress,menace,fraud,orundueinfluence,and
thatthewillisgenuineandnotaforgery.
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of

notice by Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive
noticetothewholeworld,andwhenprobateisgranted,thejudgmentofthecourt
isbindinguponeverybody,evenagainsttheState.
47
SUMILANGV.RAMAGOSA
21SCRA1369
FACTS:
Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of the decedent Ramagosa, wherein the
former was the sole heir to the estate. The probate was opposed by the
respondentsallegingthatthewillwasmadeunderduressandnotintendedtobe
the decedents last will and testament. When the petitioner finished adducing
evidence on his behalf, the oppositors didnt adduce their own but instead, they
movedforthedismissaloftheprobateproceedings,allegingthatthecourtdidnt
havejurisdictionasthewillwasallegedlyrevokedbylawwhenthedecedentsold
theparcelsofland,subjectofthewill,topetitioners.Themotionwasdeniedon
thegroundthatitgoesintotheintrinsicvalueofthewill,whichtheprobatecourt
doesnthavejurisdictiontosettle.
HELD:
The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and
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thecompliancewiththeformalrequisitesorsolemnitiesprescribedbylawarethe
only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the
intrinsicvalidityorefficacyoftheprovisionsofthewillorthelegalityofanydevise
orlegacyispremature.
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on the
groundthatthetestatorhadimpliedlyrevokedhiswillbyselling,priortohisdeath,
thelandsdisposedoftherein.
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for
probate.Probateisonethingthevalidityofthetestamentaryprovisionsisanother.
Thefirstdecidestheexecutionofthedocumentandthetestamentarycapacityof
thetestator;thesecondrelatestodescentanddistribution.
48
BALANAYV.MARTINEZ
64SCRA452
FACTS:
BalanayJr.filedapetitionfortheprobateofthewillofhislatemother,whichwas
opposedbyhisfatherandsiblings.Thefatherclaimstohavebeenpreteritedand
that there was an illegal partition of the conjugal properties. Balanay Jr. then
presenteddocumentsallegedlyexecutedbythefatherwithdrawinganyopposition
to the probate proceedings as well as the renunciation of whatever share in the
estate of his late wife. The opposition was then overruled by the court and
proceedingscontinued.However,duringtheproceedings,onewhowasallegedly
Balanaysnewcounselfiledamotionforthedismissaloftheprobateproceedings
onthegroundthatthewillisvoidforillegallypartitioningtheconjugalassetsand
constitutedacompromiseonfuturelegitime.Themotionincludedthatthetestate
proceedings should be dismissed and replaced with an intestate one. The court
sustainedthemotionanddismissedtheproceedings.BalanayJr.thenaverredthat
he didnt authorized Montinolla to file the same motion and that the court
shouldntdismisstheproceedings.Thetrialcourtheldthatitdidntdecidesolely
onthebasisofthemotionfiledbutduetothereadingoftheprovisionsofthewill
itself.
HELD:
Inviewofcertainunusualprovisionsofthewill,whichareofdubiouslegality,and
becauseofthemotiontowithdrawthepetitionforprobate(whichthelowercourt
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
33
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validityhadbeenestablished.Theprobateofawillmightbecomeanidleceremony
if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated,thecourtshouldmeettheissue.
It was wrong however for the probate court to convert the proceedings into an
intestate one. The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions
containedinawilldoesnotresultintheinvalidityoftheotherdispositions,unless
itistobepresumedthatthetestatorwouldnothavemadesuchotherdispositions
if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where
someoftheprovisionsofawillarevalidandothersinvalid,thevalidpartswillbe
upheldiftheycanbeseparatedfromtheinvalidwithoutdefeatingtheintentionof
thetestatororinterferingwiththegeneraltestamentaryscheme,ordoinginjustice
tothebeneficiaries"
49
PASTORV.COURTOFAPPEALS
122SCRA885
FACTS:
Pastor Sr. died and was survived by his wife, who later also died, 2 legitimate
childrenPastor Jr., and Sofia, and one illegitimate child Quemada Pastor Jr.
QuemadaPastorJr.soughttheprobateoftheallegedholographicwillofhisfather.
The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
QUEMADAconsistingof30%ofPASTOR,SR.'s42%shareintheoperationbyAtlas
ConsolidatedMiningandDevelopmentCorporation(ATLAS)ofsomeminingclaims
inCebu.Hewassubsequentlyappointedasthespecialadministratoroftheestate
and by purview of this authority, he instituted actions against Pastor Jr. for the
reconveyance of some properties of the estate, which covers the legacy
bequeathed to Quemada. This was opposed by Pastor Jr. and his wife but was
overruled.ProbateproceedingscommencedandQuemadakeptonaskingforthe
paymentofhislegacies.
Whilethereconveyancesuitwasstillpending,thePROBATECOURTissuedthenow
assailedOrderofExecutionandGarnishment,resolvingthequestionofownership
oftheroyaltiespayablebyATLASandrulingineffectthatthelegacytoQUEMADA
wasnotinofficious.
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Theorderfoundthataspertheholographicwillandawrittenacknowledgmentof
Pastor,Jr.oftheabove60%interestintheminingclaimsbelongingtothePastor
Group, 42% belonged to Pastor, Sr. and only 33% belonged to Pastor, Jr. The
remaining25%belongedtoE.Pelaez,alsoofthePastorGroup.Theprobatecourt
thusdirectedATLAStoremitdirectlytoQuemadathe42%royaltiesduedecedent's
estate,ofwhichQuemadawasauthorizedtoretain75%forhimselfaslegateeand
todeposit25%withareputablebankinginstitutionforpaymentoftheestatetaxes
and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his
assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of
QuemadafromthetimeofPastor,Sr.'sdeath,whichamountedtoovertwomillion
pesos.
Theorderbeing"immediatelyexecutory",QuemadasucceededinobtainingaWrit
ofExecutionandGarnishment.PastorJr.soughtreconsideration.
HELD:
Inaspecialproceedingfortheprobateofawill,theissuebyandlargeisrestricted
totheextrinsicvalidityofthewill,i.e.,whetherthetestator,beingofsoundmind,
freelyexecutedthewillinaccordancewiththeformalitiesprescribedbylaw.Asa
rule, thequestion of ownership is an extraneousmatter whichthe Probate Court
cannotresolvewithfinality.Thus,forthepurposeofdeterminingwhetheracertain
propertyshouldorshouldnotbeincludedintheinventoryofestateproperties,the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional,notconclusive,andissubjecttothefinaldecisioninaseparateaction
toresolvetitle.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific

properties.Onthecontrary,itismanifestthereinthatownershipwasnotresolved.
Foritconfineditselfto thequestionofextrinsicvalidityofthewin,andtheneed
for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and
approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities
prescribedbylaw."Itdeclaredthattheintestateestateadministrationaspectmust
proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and
possessionofrealandpersonalpropertiesinCivilCase274TbeforeBranchIXof
theCFIofCebu."Thenagain,theProbateOrder(whileindeeditdoesnotdirectthe
implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
administrationaspectmustproceed"unless...itisproven...thatthelegacyto
be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
34
estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of
legitime(anaspectofintrinsicvalidity)wasinfactnotresolved.Finally,theProbate
Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing Quemada to remain as special
administratorofestatepropertiesnotcoveredbytheholographicwill,"considering
thatthis(Probate)Ordershouldhavebeenproperlyissuedsolelyasaresolutionon
theissueofwhetherornottoallowandapprovetheaforestatedwill."
Itwas,therefore,errorfortheassailedimplementingOrderstoconcludethatthe
Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining
properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive
portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the
legacyindispute.
With respect to the intrinsic validity of the will, there was no appropriate
determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate.
Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for, as of
December 5, 1972. The net assets of the estate not having been determined,
therefore, the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be
ascertained. All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to
determine whether the legacy of Quemada a fixed share in a specific property
rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased would
produceanimpairmentofthelegitimeofthecompulsoryheirs.
Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in
otherrespects.ItwasobviouslyforthisreasonthataslateasMarch5,1980more
than 7 years after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court scheduled on
March25,1980ahearingontheintrinsicvalidityofthewill.
50
USV.CHIUGUIMOO
36PHIL917
FACTS:
Joaquin Cruz was a wealthy Chinese merchant who resided permanently in a
certainmunicipality.WhenhevisitedChina,hemarriedUyChuanandhadachild
with her. When he returned, he then met Maria who he also married. He then
decidedtoreturntoChinabuthewasntabletocomebackashedied.Beforehis
death, he executed a will which named his brother, defendant in this case, and
another person as heir. The brother filed a petition for the probate but didnt
producethewill.HethennegotiatedwithMariafortherenunciationofhershare
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intheestateinexchangeformoney.Thereafter,criminalactionwasfiledagainst
defendant for refusing to produce the will of his deceased brother as well as to
distributetheestate.
HELD:
The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice and
maketheorderinquestionundersection629oftheCodeofCivilProcedurewhich
providesthetestatorneglectswithoutreasonablecausetodeliverthesametothe
courthavingjurisdiction,afternoticebythecoursesotodo,hemaybecommitted
to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in
closeconfinementuntilhedeliversthewill.
Itisouropinionthatthisprovisioncanonlybeappliedwhenacourtisactinginthe
exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased
persons;andwhereadministrationproceedingsarenotalreadypending,thecourt,
beforetakingactionunderthissection,shouldrequirethattherebebeforeitsome
petition,information,oraffidavitofsuchcharacterastomakeactionbythecourt
underthissectionappropriate.
Theproceedingsinthiscase,undersection628oftheCodeoftheCivilProcedure,
is an ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section (628) is a
specialstatutoryoffenseandisproperlyprosecuteduponcomplaintorinformation
as other criminal offenses created by law. The fact that this penal provision is
containedintheCodeofCivilProceduredoesnotmaketheproceedingtoenforce
thepenaltyacivilproceedinginanysense.Theremedyprovidedinsection629of
the Code of Procedure is evidently a totally different remedy, having no relation
with that provided in section 628; and it is in our opinion not permissible in a
prosecutionunderthelastmentionedsectiontosuperimposeuponthepenaltyof
fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed in
section629.
Imayfurtherbeobservedthatonegracedifficultyinapplyingtheremedyprovided
insection629inaprosecutionundersection628isthattoenforcetheproduction
ofthewillbtheaccusedatsuchtrialwouldvirtuallycompelhimtoconvicthimself,
since the mere production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had
possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint; and it seems probable that
thiswouldconstituteaninfringementofthatprovisionoflawwhichsaysthatina
criminalactionthedefendantshallbeexemptfromtestifyingagainsthimself.(See
Gen.OrdersNo.58,sec.15.)
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
35
From what has been said it follows that the order of commitment made by the
lower court remanding the accused to jail should be vacated and if subsidiary
imprisonment should be imposed for insolvency the defendant shall, under the
provisionsofActNo.2557,becreditedwiththetimeduringwhichhewasconfined
inpursuanceoftheorderofthelowercourt,Withthismodificationthejudgment
ofthecourtbelowshouldbeaffirmedwithcostsagainsttheappellant.
51
RODRIGUEZV.DEBORJA
17SCRA418
FACTS:
AfterthedeathofFr.Rodriguez,apurportedwillofhiswassubmittedforprobate.
Maria and Angela Rodriguez sought the examination of the will but later on
withdrawnthesame.Instead,theyfiledforthesettlementoftheintestateestate
of Fr. Rodriguez, alleging therein that the decedent didn't leave any will. One of
theirallegationsisthattheiractionprecludedtheprobateproceedingsintheother
court. The same parties, petitioners herein, sought the dismissal of the probate
proceedings,butwasdenied.
HELD:
Intestatesuccessionisonlysubordinateorsubsidiarytothetestate,sinceintestacy
onlytakesplaceintheabsenceofavalidoperativewill.Thus,followingthesame
principle, it is only when the testate succession is invalidated could an intestate
successionbeinstitutedintheformofpreestablishedaction.
52
TEOTICOV.DELVAL
13SCRA406
FACTS:
Aguirrediedandleftawill,whichprovidedamongothersalegacyinfavorofRene
Teotico,thehusbandofherniece.ThewillwassubmittedforprobatebyVicente
TeoticobutwasopposedagainstbytheadoptedchildofAguirressister.Oneof
theallegationswasthatthelegacytoTeoticowasvoidonthegroundthatTeotico
wasthephysicianwhoadministeredmedicalattentiontoAguirrebeforeherdeath.
Vicente in turn filed a motion to dismiss the opposition on the ground that she
doesnthaveanylegalpersonalitytointervene.Intheendoftheproceedings,the
willsvaliditywassustainedbytheprobatecourtbutthelegacywasheldvoid.The
petitionersoughtreconsiderationofthedecisiontonullifythelegacy.
ATENEOLAW2010
HELD:
Questiononthelegalpersonalityofoppositortointervene
Beforeapersonmayinterveneinestateproceedings,heshouldhaveaninterestin
theestate,orinhiswill,orinthepropertytobeaffectedbyiteitherasanexecutor
orasaclaimantoftheestate,andaninterestedpartyhasbeendefinedasonewho
wouldbebenefitedbytheestatelikeacreditor.
Whereunderthewillsterms,anoppositorhasnointerestintheestateeitheras
an heir, executor or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affectedbythewill,norwouldsheacquireanyinterestinanyportionoftheestate
asalegalheirifthewillweredeniedprobate,itisheldthatsaidoppositorcannot
intervene.
Questiononintrinsicvalidityofthewill
Oppositiontotheintrinsicvalidityorlegalityoftheprovisionsofthewillcannotbe
entertainedinProbateproceedingbecauseitsonlypurposeismerelytodetermine
ifthewillhasbeenexecutedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofthelaw."
Pursuanttotheforegoingprecedentsthepronouncementmadebythecourtaquo
declaringinvalidthelegacymadetoDr.ReneTeoticointhewillExhibitAmustbe
setasideashavingbeenmadeinexcessofitsjurisdiction.Anotherreasonwhysaid
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunitytodefendthevalidityofthelegacyforhewasnotallowedtointervene
in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the
dispositionoftheestateinfavorofsomerelativesofthedeceasedshouldalsobe
setasideforthesamereason.
53
FERNANDOV.CRISOSTOMO
90SCRA585
FACTS:
FernandowastheguardianofRufinoSr.andhischildren.Whenthefatherdied,he
became the guardian of the children. He then filed a motion for the approval of
the extrajudicial partition of the estate of spouses Rufino Crisostomo and Petra
Fernando.Theguardianadlitemopposedthisandwassustainedbythetrialcourt.
ApetitionwasthenfiledforthereopeningoftheintestateproceedingsbyGerman
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
36
Crisostomo. A corresponding prayer for the appointment of an additional

administratoroftheestate.ThiswasopposedbytheFernandoandinsteadmoved
for the dismissal of the intestate proceedings on the ground that he already had
possessionofthepropertyinfavorofthechildren.
HELD:
Itwillbeseenfromtheabovethattheprincipalissueinthiscaseastowhetherthe
intestateproceedingsshouldbedismissedhasalreadybeendecidedbythisCourt
inthecertiorariproceedingsasfarbackasJuly2,1948,withtheexceptionthatif
there had been errors committed in the appointment of the guardian (not in the
institution of the intestate proceedings, which had been declared within the
jurisdiction of the court) those errors in the appointment may be corrected in an
appeal.Afterexaminingtherecord,wedonotseeanyerrorintheappointmentof
German Crisostomo and Pacita Fernando as coadministrators as they were the
brother and sister, respectively, of the deceased, no evidence having been
presentedbytheappellantwhythosepersonsshouldnotbeappointed,eitheron
accountoftheirincompetencyorlackofmoralqualifications.We,therefore,affirm
theorderofthecourtappointingthem.
ItshouldbeborneinmindthattheaboveresolutionsofthisCourtconstitute res
judicataand"thelawofthecase"withregardtothisappealandtheycannolonger
bequestionedorputinissueinthepresentcase.Itresultsthen,thattheclaimof
theappellantthattheintestateproceedingsshouldbedismissedhastobedenied
and, as all the other questions are dependent on said issue, they should also be
decidedadverselytotheappellant.
54
ARAUJOV.CELIS
6PHIL459
FACTS:
Rosario Araujo owned property inherited from her late mother. She wed the
defendantsson.Shediedwithnodescendantsandascendantsbutonlycollateral
relatives. These relatives wanted the properties in question be delivered by the
father of Rosarios husband as they were allegedly the surviving heirs of Rosario.
GregorioCelisasamatterofdefensedidntdenythepossessionoftheproperties
butallegedthathewasentitledtothesame.Heallegedlyinheritedthesamefrom
hislatesonwhointurninheritedthepropertyfromRosario.
HELD:
ATENEOLAW2010
Asthecourtbelowproperlyfound,theonlyimportantanddecisivequestioninthis
case is whether or not Rosario Darwin executed a legal and valid will in the form
and manner alleged by the defendant. If so the defendant's right to the property
wouldbeunquestionable.Ifnotsothecontrarywouldnecessarilybetheresult.
Thispointastothewill,however,wasnotasclearlyestablishedasitshouldhave
been. The defendant introduced no will in evidence, offered secondary parol
evidenceastoitscontentsundertheclaimthattheoriginalwillhadbeenlost.The
courtallowedthisevidenceovertheobjectionoftheplaintiffs,andthisisoneof
the errors assigned by them on this appeal. The plaintiffs' objection to the
admissionofsuchevidencewaswelltakenandthatitcouldthereforehavebeen
sustained.
Thelossoftheallegedoriginalwillhasnotbeensufficientlyestablished.
Further,thewitnesstestifiedthatthewill,acopyofwhichhesawandhadinhis
possession,wassignedbytwowitnessesonly.Awillsignedbytwowitnessesonly
could not under any circumstances be valid under the law in force at the time
referredtobythewitness,andlegallyspeakingsuchwillcouldnotthenhavebeen
probatedorrecorded.
Thecaseisremandedtothelowercourtforfurtherproceedings.
55
LIMBILLIANV.SUNTAY
63PHIL793
FACTS:
JoseSuntaydiedinChina.Hemarriedtwice,havingmanychildrenduringhisfirst
marriageandasonduringhissecond.Whenhedied,oneofthechildrenfromthe
first marriage instituted intestate proceedings. On the same proceedings, the
second wife instituted for probate of the will of Jose. She alleged that before
leaving for China, she was handed a sealed envelope purporting to be the will of
thetestator.Itwassnatchedallegedlybythechildrenofthefirstmarriage.This
wasofcoursedeniedbythechildren.Witnesseshoweverattestedtothefactof
thewill.
HELD:
In our opinion, the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document
contained in the envelope. Oppositors' answer admits that, according to Barretto
he prepared a will of the deceased to which he later became a witness together
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
37
withGoTohandManuelLopez,andthatthiswillwasplacedinanenvelopewhich
wassignedbythedeceasedandbytheinstrumentalwitnesses.Incourttherewas
presentedandattachedtothecaseanopenandemptyenvelopesignedbyJoseB.
Suntay,AlbertoBarretto,GoTohandManuelLopez.Itisthusundeniablethatthis
envelope Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by the
deceased drafted by Barretto and with the latter, Go Toh and Manuel Lopez as
attesting witnesses. These tokens sufficiently point to the loss of the will of the
deceased.,acircumstancejustifyingthepresentationofsecondaryevidenceofits
contentsandofwhetheritwasexecutedwithalltheessentialandnecessarylegal
formalities.
Thetrialofthiscasewaslimitedtotheproofoflossofthewill,andfromwhathas
taken place we deduce that it was not petitioner's intention to raise, upon the
evidence adduced by her, the other points involved herein, namely, as we have
heretoforeindicated,whetherExhibitBisatruecopyofthewillandwhetherthe
latter was executed with all the formalities required by law for its probate. The
testimonyofAlbertoBarrettobearsimportantlyinthisconnection.
Wherefore,thelossofthewillexecutedbythedeceasedhavingbeensufficiently
established, it is ordered that this case be remanded to the court of origin for
furtherproceedingsinobediencetothisdecision,withoutanypronouncementas
tothecosts.Soordered
56
BASAV.MERCADO
61PHIL632
FACTS:
The judge allowed the probate of the will of Ines Basa. The administrators
inventory was then duly approved and he was held to be the sole heir of the
testatrix. The petitioners thereafter came forth and prayed for the reopening of
theproceedingsonthegroundthatthecourtdidnthavejurisdictionduetonon
compliancewithpublicationrequirements.
HELD:
Itisheldthatthelanguageusedinsection630oftheCodeofCivilProceduredoes
not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full
weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first
publication of the notice need not be made twentyone days before the day
appointedforthehearing.
ATENEOLAW2010
57
DEARANZV.GALANG
161SCRA628
FACTS:
JoaquinInfantefiledapetitionfortheprobateofthewillofMontserratInfanteand
he likewise named the legatees and devisees and their corresponding addresses.
The court ordered for the publication of notice of the hearing in newspapers of
general circulation once a week, for three consecutive weeks. It however didnt
sendpersonalnoticestothedeviseesandlegatees.Nooppositionwasfiledduring
the reglamentary period and thus, the court accepted evidence ex parte from
privaterespondent.Thepetitionersthenmovedforreconsiderationontheground
ofjurisdictionalissues.
HELD:
Itisclearfromtheaforecitedrulethatnoticeofthetimeandplaceofthehearing
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known
heirs,legatees,anddeviseesresidinginthePhilippinesattheirplacesofresidence,
ifsuchplacesofresidencebeknown.Thereisnoquestionthattheresidencesof
herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The
petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of
thelegateesanddeviseesofthetestator.Butdespitesuchknowledge,theprobate
courtdidnotcausecopiesofthenoticetobesenttopetitioners.Therequirement
ofthelawfortheallowanceofthewillwasnotsatisfiedbymerepublicationofthe
noticeofhearingforthree(3)weeksinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationinthe
province.
58
INREESTATEOFJOHNSON
39PHIL156
FACTS:
EmilH.Johnson,anativeofSwedenandanaturalizedcitizenoftheUnitedStates,
died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, by which he disposed of an estate, the
value of which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an
holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is
signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by
section618oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Thiswill,therefore,wasnotexecutedin
conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by
inhabitants of the Philippines, and hence could not have been proved under
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
38
section 618. However, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of
thecityofManilafortheprobateofthiswill,onthegroundthatJohnsonwasat
thetimeofhisdeathacitizenoftheStateofIllinois,UnitedStatesofAmerica;that
the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence
could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.Thissectionreadsasfollows:
Willmadeherebyalien.AwillmadewithinthePhilippineIslandsbyacitizenor
subjectofanotherstateorcountry,whichisexecutedinaccordancewiththelaw
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be
proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
allowed,andrecordedinthePhilippineIslands,andshallhavethesameeffectasif
executedaccordingtothelawsoftheseIslands.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in
numberandmaybestated,inthesamesequenceinwhichtheyaresetforthinthe
petition,asfollows:
(1)EmilH.JohnsonwasaresidentofthecityofManilaandnotaresidentof
theStateofIllinoisatthetimethewillinquestionwasexecuted;
(2)Thewillisinvalidandinadequatetopassrealandpersonalpropertyinthe
StateofIllinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the
petitioner;and
(4)Theorderinquestionwasbeyondthejurisdictionofthecourt.
HELD:
Principally, the issue being raised by petitioner is the citizenship of the testator.
Assuming that he became a US citizen, he apparently lost the same when he
residedinthePhilippines.However,therewasnolawinforcebyvirtueofwhich
any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine
Islands;anditwas,therefore,impossibleforthetestator,evenifhehadsodesired,
toexpatriatehimselffromtheUnitedStatesandchangehispoliticalstatusfroma
citizenoftheUnitedStatestoacitizenoftheseIslands.Thisbeingtrue,itistobe
presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his
status as a citizen of the United States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans
ATENEOLAW2010
living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose their
citizenshipintheStateoftheirnaturalizationornativity.
The court wasn't unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it
and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, he
immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in
accordancewiththatprovisionoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution
oftheUnitedStateswhichsaysthateverycitizenoftheUnitedStatesisacitizenof
the State where in he resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is that a
persontransferringhisdomicilefromoneStatetoanotherloseshiscitizenshipin
the State of his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new
abode. The acquisition of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That
situation however has no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of an
AmericanStatecomestoresideinthePhilippineIslands.Herehecannotacquirea
new citizenship; nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he
broughtwithhim.
With respect to the issue of compliance with the rules pertaining to execution of
willsinIllinois,thelowercourtmayhaveerredwhenittookjudicialnoticeofthe
state laws of Illinois but even so, the remedy isnt available to the petitioner any
longer. First, because the petition does not state any fact from which it would
appearthatthelawofIllinoisisdifferentfromwhatthecourtfound,and,secondly,
becausetheassignmentoferrorandargumentfortheappellantinthiscourtraises
noquestionbasedonsuchsupposederror.Thoughthetrialcourtmayhaveacted
uponpureconjectureastothelawprevailingintheStateofIllinois,itsjudgment
could not be set aside, even upon application made within six months under
section 113 of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it should be made to appear
affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in
general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and
personalpropertyintheStateofIllinois,butthisismerelyaconclusionoflaw.The
affidavitsbywhichthepetitionisaccompaniedcontainnoreferencetothesubject,
andwearecitedtonoauthorityintheappellant'sbriefwhichmighttenttoraisea
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear,
therefore,thatthispointcannotbeurgedasofseriousmoment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not
properly admissible to probate because it contains provisions which cannot be
giveneffectconsistentlywiththelawsofthePhilippineIslands;anditissuggested
thatasthepetitionerisalegitimateheirofthetestatorshecannotbedeprivedof
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
39
the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary
successionsintheseIslands.Uponthispointitissufficienttosaythattheprobate
of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of
probatebeingconclusiveonlyasregardsthedueexecutionofthewill.
59
ABUTV.ABUT
45SCRA326
FACTS:
Gavina sought to substitute her deceased brother as a party to the probate
proceedingsofthewilloftheirlatefather.Originally,Generosofiledapetitionfor
probate of the will of his father. He was a child from the second marriage.
Opposition was entered by the children of the first marriage but they were
overruledandGenerosowasappointedexecutor.Whenhedied,Gavinasoughtto
substitutebutthecourtinsteadconsequentlydismissedtheproceedingsasnonew
publicationwasallegedlymade.
HELD:
We find the dismissal of the original petition for probate and the refusal of the
probatecourttoadmittheamendedpetitionwithoutanewpublicationthereofto
be untenable. The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the
originalpetitionanduponcompliancewithSections3and4ofRule76.
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all
personsinterestedinsaidwillorinthesettlementoftheestateofthedeceased.
The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in the
originalpetition didnotrequirethatnoticeoftheamendedpetitionbepublished
anew.
Jurisdictionofthecourtonceacquiredcontinuesuntiltheterminationofthecase,
and remains unaffected by subsequent events. The court below erred in holding
thatitwasdivestedofjurisdictionjustbecausetheoriginalpetitionerdiedbefore
thepetitioncouldbeformallyheard.Partieswhocouldhavecomeinandopposed
the original petition, as herein appellees did, could still come in and oppose the
amendedpetition,havingalreadybeennotifiedofthependencyoftheproceeding
bythepublicationofthenoticethereof.
ATENEOLAW2010
The admission of the amended petition, of course, does not mean that Gavina
Abut's prayer that she be appointed administratrix with the will annexed is
necessarily meritorious. It simply recognizes that since the lower court has
acquiredjurisdictionovertheres,suchjurisdictioncontinuesuntilthetermination
ofthecase.Thefirstquestionthatthelowercourtshouldhearanddecideisthe
probate of the will; and the question of whether or not Gavina Abut should be
appointedadministratrixmustbedecidedonthebasisofthefactstobepresented
andafterthewillisprovedandallowed,asprovidedinSection6ofRule78.
60
RODELASV.ARANZA
119SCRA16
FACTS:
RodelassoughttheprobateofthewillofRicardoBonilla.Thiswasopposedonthe
groundthatwhatwaspresentedwasthephotostaticcopyoftheholographicwill
andnottheoriginal.Theoppositionmaintainedthatfirst,thecopywasn'tthetrue
copyoftheholographicwillandthatitsexistencemaynotbeprovedbysecondary
evidence.
HELD:
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The
probatemaybeuncontestedornot.Ifuncontested,atleastoneIdentifyingwitness
isrequiredand,ifnowitnessisavailable,expertsmayberesortedto.Ifcontested,
at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will
has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be
probatedbecausethebestandonlyevidenceisthehandwritingofthetestatorin
saidwill.Itisnecessarythattherebeacomparisonbetweensamplehandwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyedholographicwillmaynotbeprovedbythebaretestimonyofwitnesses
whohaveseenand/orreadsuchwill.Thewillitselfmustbepresented;otherwise,
itshallproducenoeffect.Thelawregardsthedocumentitselfasmaterialproofof
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
40
court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed

holographicwillmaybeadmittedbecausethentheauthenticityofthehandwriting
ofthedeceasedcanbedeterminedbytheprobatecourt.
61
GANV.YAP
104PHIL509
FACTS:
FelicidadYapdiedfromaheartattack.Daysafterherdeath,FaustoGanpetitioned
that her alleged holographic will be admitted to probate. The husband opposed
theexistenceofsaidwill,maintaininghiswifedidn'tleftanywill.
During the court proceedings, the will wasn't really presented as evidence but
instead,witnesseswhoallegedlysawthewillwerepresentedtotestify.Allegedly,
sincethetestatrixwassufferingfromalongtimeheartailment,sheexpressedher
intent to execute a will to her cousin. She allegedly didn't want her husband to
know about it. Asking the help of her nephew, she drew a holographic will. But
afterhedeath,thiswasallegedlylost.
HELD:
In the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are
demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they
are"entirelywritten,dated,andsignedbythehandofthetestatorhimself."The
law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity,andasitsownsafeguard,sinceitcouldatanytime,bedemonstrated
to be or not to be in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a
holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one
witnesswhoknowsthehandwritingandsignatureofthetestatorexplicitlydeclare
thatthewillandthesignatureareinthehandwritingofthetestator.Ifthewillis
contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any
such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it
necessary,experttestimonymayberesortedto."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the
holographicwill.Theymaybemistakenintheiropinionofthehandwriting,orthey
maydeliberatelylieinaffirmingitisinthetestator'shand.However,theoppositor
may present other witnesses who also know the testator's handwriting, or some
expertwitnesses,whoaftercomparingthewillwithotherwritingsorlettersofthe
deceased,havecometotheconclusionthatsuchwillhasnotbeenwrittenbythe
ATENEOLAW2010
hand of the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such
contradictorytestimonymayuseitsownvisualsense,anddecideinthefaceofthe
document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by the
testator.
Obviously,whenthewillitselfisnotsubmitted,thesemeansofopposition,andof
assessingtheevidencearenotavailable.Andthentheonlyguarantyofauthenticity
thetestator'shandwritinghasdisappeared.
Normally, the relatives of the decedent are allowed to inspect the document to
testify as to whether the will was executed by the testator. They are given the
opportunity to oppose or abide by the will. But this is frustrated, when the
document itself is not presented to them as evidence. Furthermore, it is notable
that commentators have the common submission that before the court allows
distribution of property in accordance with a holographic will, the testators
handwritingandsignaturemustbepresented.
Takingalltheabovecircumstancestogether,thecourtreachedtheconclusionthat
theexecutionandthecontentsofalostordestroyedholographicwillmaynotbe
provedbythebaretestimonyofwitnesseswhohaveseenand/orreadsuchwill.
The above could easily been adopted as a rule for holographic wills by the Court
butinthiscase,ithesitatedtoapplytheruleandtackledfurtheronthesufficiency
oftheevidencepresentedbyGanandtheothers.
Inthecaseofordinarywills,itisquitehardtoconvincethreewitnesses(fourwith
the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their liescouldbechecked andexposed,
theirwhereaboutsandactsontheparticularday,thelikelihoodthattheywouldbe
called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were
intimatesortrustedfriendsofthetestatortheyarenotlikelytoendthemselvesto
anyfraudulentschemetodistorthiswishes.Lastbutnotleast,theycannotreceive
anythingonaccountofthewill.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only
one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable
imitationofthehandwritingandsignatureofthedeceased,hemaycontrivetolet
three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter,
havingnointerest,couldeasilyfallforit,andincourttheywouldinallgoodfaith
affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost the forger may
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
41
havepurposelydestroyeditinan"accident"theoppositorshavenowaytoexpose
thetrickandtheerror,becausethedocumentitselfisnotathand.Andconsidering
thattheholographicwillmayconsistoftwoorthreepages,andonlyoneofthem
need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most
importantones,maygoundetected.
Iftestimonialevidenceofholographicwillsbepermitted,onemoreobjectionable
featurefeasibilityofforgerywouldbeaddedtotheseveralobjectionstothiskind
ofwills.
Furthermore, in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be
testifyingtoafactwhichtheysaw,namelytheactofthetestatorofsubscribingthe
will;whereasinthecaseofalostholographicwill,thewitnesseswouldtestifyasto
their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can
not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the
handwritingitselfisnotathand.
Giventhis,theCourtfinallyagreedwiththetrialjudgeindisbelievingthedubious
testimonies.First,whywouldthetestatrixshowthewillpreciselytorelativeswho
didn'tevenhadashareintheinheritance.Second,ifshetrulywantedtoconceal
thewillfromherhusband,whynotjustentrustitwithherbeneficiaries.
62
GAGOV.MAMUYAC
49PHIL902
FACTS:
Gago filed a petition for the probate of the will of Miguel Mamuyac. This was
opposedonthegroundthatthetestatorexecutedanewwillandtestament.Gago,
onasecondtime,petitionedtheprobateofthelaterwillofMiguel.Thisagainwas
opposedbythesameoppositorsonthegroundthatwhatwaspresentedwasjusta
nd
carboncopyoftheoriginal2 willandthatthesamewasrevokedbythetestator
duringhislifetime.
HELD:
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive
proof,notdenied,whichwasacceptedbythelowercourt,thatwillinquestionhad
beencancelledin1920.Thelawdoesnotrequireanyevidenceoftherevocation
orcancellationofawilltobepreserved.Itthereforebecomesdifficultattimesto
prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or
ATENEOLAW2010
revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from
evidenceshowingthatafterduesearchtheoriginalwillcannotbefound.Wherea
willwhichcannotbefoundisshowntohavebeeninthepossessionofthetestator,
whenlastseen,thepresumptionis,intheabsenceofothercompetentevidence,
thatthesamewascancelledordestroyed.Thesamepresumptionariseswhereitis
shownthatthetestatorhadreadyaccesstothewillanditcannotbefoundafter
hisdeath.Itwillnotbepresumedthatsuchwillhasbeendestroyedbyanyother
person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the
presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly,
beingweakorstrongaccordingtothecircumstances,isneverconclusive,butmay
beovercomebyproofthatthewillwasnotdestroyedbythetestatorwithintentto
revokeit.
Inviewofthefactthattheoriginalwillof1919couldnotbefoundafterthedeath
of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same
hadbeencancelled,itisconcludedthattheconclusionsofthelowercourtarein
accordancewiththeweightoftheevidence.Inaproceedingtoprobateawillthe
burdenofproofsisupontheproponentclearlytoestablishnotonlyitsexecution
butitsexistence.Havingproveditsexecutionbytheproponents,theburdenison
thecontestanttoshowthatithasbeenrevoked.
63
ALDANESEV.SALUTILLO
47PHIL548
FACTS:
AldanesefiledapetitionfortheprobateofthewillofAvila.Afterduepublication,
Salutillo and others opposed the probate. During the proceedings, Aldanese
movedforthetakingofdepositionsofwitnessestothewill.Thiswasopposedby
the respondents on the ground that the witnesses should be physicially present
during the witnesses to give their testimonies. The probate court sustained the
respondents.
HELD:
In our opinion the court below erred in holding that the depositions in question
were inadmissible in evidence in the probate proceedings. It is true that the rule
prevailinginthisjurisdictionisthatwhenawilliscontestedtheattestingwitnesses
mustbecalledtoprovethewillorashowingmustbemadethattheycannotbe
had,butthatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheymustbebroughtbodilybefore
the court. It is their testimony which is needed and not their actual personal
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
42
presence in the court room. As far as we can see, there is nothing in the leading
case, Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), cited by the appellees, to justify a
differentconclusion;inthatcasenoeffectwasmadetoproducethetestimonyof
thetwosubscribingwitnessesthoughtheirabodewasknowntotheproponentof
thewill.
In the present case, the will was presented for probate in Cebu; the attesting
witnesses were living in Manila and were beyond the process of the court for
compulsoryattendance.Theywerecalledtotestifyandproducedbeforeanofficer
legally authorized to take their testimony in the form of depositions. The notice
required by section 361, supra, was duly given and the opponents given the
opportunity to be present and to crossexamine the witnesses. In the
circumstances, this must certainly be considered a sufficient "calling" of the
witnessesandsatisfiesthelaw.
The depositions in question appear to be in due form and would ordinarily be

admissible, but the record indicates that the failure of the opponents to be
presentedattheexaminationofthewitnesseswasduetothefactthattheywere
misledbythepetitioner'sactioninseekingspecialauthorizationfromthecourtfor
thetakingofthedepositions.Intheinterestofjusticewethereforethinkthatthe
depositions should be retaken and the opponents given another opportunity to
examinethewitnesses.
64
CABANGV.DELFINADO
34PHIL291
FACTS:
CabangsoughttheprobateofthewillofCelestinoDelfinado.Thiswasopposedby
respondentDelfinado.Duringtheproceedings,thepetitionerfailedtopresenttwo
ofthesubscribingwitnessesofthewillandbasedontheordersofthecourtand
records,noreasonwasadducedforfailingtopresentthewitnesses.Thequestion
thenarisesonwhetherthesameshouldbesustainedandthewillbeallowedtobe
probated.
HELD:
The rule that no will shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, unless
"attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses," is a matter of
substantive law and an element of the will's validity. The rule that the attesting
witnessesmustbecalledtoproveawillforprobateisoneofpreferencemadeso
ATENEOLAW2010
bystatute.Thisruleofevidenceisnottobeconfusedwithrulesofquantity.There
have been several reasons given for this rule of preference for the attesting
witnesses,onereasonbeingthatthepartyopposingtheclaimofproperexecution
ofthewillhasarighttothebenefitofcrossexaminingtheattestingwitnessesasto
fraud,duress,orothermattersofdefense.Thelawplacesthesewitnesses"around
the testator to ascertain and judge of his capacity" for the purpose of preventing
frauds.Thesoundnessoftheruleiswellillustratedinthecaseunderconsideration.
Here the attesting clause was omitted and the testator signed by mark. The
petitioner produced only one of the attesting witnesses. Had there not been a
contest,thiswouldhaveprobablybeensufficientundersection631.Whilethereis
no testimony in the record to the effect that the testator could neither read nor
write, there is conclusive evidence that he could sign his name. This fact is
establishedbytheproductionofExhibit1,whichallagreethetestatordidsign.The
testator'ssignaturetothedocumentshowsthathecouldwrite,atleasthisname,
in a plain, clear manner, indicating a fairly good knowledge of writing. Had the
proponent shown that the other two subscribing witnesses were not within the
jurisdiction of the court and could not, therefore, be called, the due execution of
thewillwouldstillbeverydoubtful.Believing,aswedo,thatitwastheintentionof
theLegislaturethatthesubscribingwitnessesmustbecalledorgoodandsufficient
reasonshownwhytheycouldnotbehad,andbeingsupportedbytheauthorities
abovecitedandquoted,wemustconcludethattheproponentdidnotcomplywith
theprovisionsofthelawinthepresentationofhercase.
65
AVERAV.GARCIA
42PHIL145
FACTS:
AverapetitionedfortheprobateofthewillofEusebioGarcia.Thiswasopposed
againstbytherespondents.Averapresentedonlyoneofthesubscribingwitnesses
andadducednoreasonwhytheothertwowerentpresented.Acaveatthoughto
this case was that from the time petition was filed by Avera till the time of the
hearing, no opposition was made. It was only during the same day as of the
hearingwhereinoppositionwasentered.
HELD:
Uponthefirstpoint,whileitisundoubtedlytruethatanuncontestedwillbaybe
provedbythetestimonyofonlyoneofthethreeattestingwitnesses,nevertheless
in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after an elaborate
examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
43
instituted,alloftheattestingwitnessesmustbeexamined,ifaliveandwithinreach
oftheprocessofthecourt.
Inthepresentcasenoexplanationwasmadeatthetrialastowhyallthreeofthe
attestingwitnesseswerenotproduced,buttheprobablereasonisfoundinthefact
that,althoughthepetitionfortheprobateofthis willhadbeenpendinguntilthe
datesetforthehearing,noformalcontestwasentereduntiltheverydaysetfor
the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in
goodfaiththeprobatewouldnotbecontested,repairedtothecourtwithonlyone
of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was
contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a
postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting
witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not
produced,itdoesnotinitselfsupplyanybasisforchangingtheruleexpoundedin
the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this
court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the
execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting
witnesses.
66
SOLIVIOV.CA
182SCRA119
FACTS:
This case is regards the estate of the late author Esteban Javellana Jr. When he
died, he was survived by only his maternal aunt, petitioner Solivio and paternal
aunt, respondent Villanueva. Wishing to fulfill the decedents wish to place his
propertiesintoafoundation,Soliviofiledapetitionforthelettersofadministration
of the estate be issued to her and consequently be appointed as a special
administrator. The petition was later amended to declare her as sole heir of the
decedent.ThecourtruledinSoliviosfavorandsheexplainedthatshedidthisto
facilitate the formation of the foundation among other reasons. Subsequently,
Villanuevabelatedlysoughtthereconsiderationoftheorderofthecourt,averring
that Solivio wasnt the only heir of the decedent but to this, she was overruled.
Shethenfiledacaseforreconveyanceandpossessionofproperty,whichthetrial
courtdecidedinherfavor.
HELD:
ATENEOLAW2010
Afteracarefulreviewoftherecords,wefindmeritinthepetitioner'scontention
that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for
partitionandrecoveryofhershareoftheestateofEstebanJavellana,Jr.whilethe
probateproceedingsforthesettlementofsaidestatearestillpendinginBranch23
ofthesamecourt,therebeingasyetnoordersforthesubmissionandapprovalof
theadministratix'sinventoryandaccounting,distributingtheresidueoftheestate
totheheir,andterminatingtheproceedings.
Itistheorderofdistributiondirectingthedeliveryoftheresidueoftheestateto
thepersonsentitledtheretothatbringstoaclosetheintestateproceedings,puts
an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his
duties. The assailed order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of
EstebanJavellana,Jr.didnottolltheendoftheproceedings.Asamatteroffact,
the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the
settlementoftheestate."
67
MANALOV.PAREDES
Supra
HELD:
Theproceedingfortheprobateofawillisaproceedinginrem(40Cyc.,p.1265),
and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the
publicationofthenoticeprescribedbysection630oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,
and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through the
publicationorderedbytheCourtofFirstInstanceofLagunaoftheapplicationfor
the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, filed by Justina Mendieta
andherminorchildrenLazaroandDariaMendietaandMelecioFule,testamentary
executor, through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, said court acquired
jurisdictionoverallsuchpersonsaswereinterestedinthesupposedwill,including
GelacioMalihan.Thecourthavingtriedsaidapplicationforprobate,hearingallthe
testimonyoftheattestingwitnessesofthesaidsupposedwill,theapplicantJustina
Mendietaforherselfandasguardianadlitemofherminorchildren,represented
bytheirattorneys,Messrs.MarcelinoLontokandMarcialAzada,ontheonehand,
and Laureana Hidalgo, widow of Francisco Villegas, represented by her attorney,
Jesus.E.Blanco,ontheother,havingsubmittedastipulationwhereintheformer
withdrewherapplicationandthelatterreservedcertainrightsovertheestateleft
byFranciscoVillegasinfavorofJustinaMendietaandherminorchildren;andthe
court having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died
intestate according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by said
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
44
judgment;andifanyofthemorotherpersonsinterestedwerenotsatisfiedwith
the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that
might have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of
mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the
probateofthesamewillinordertocompeltherespondentjudgetocomplywith
hisministerialdutyimposedbysection330oftheCodeofCivilProcedure;because
thisremedy,beingextraordinary,cannotbeusedinlieuofappeal,orwritoferror
(26 Cyc., 177; 18 R.C.L., par. 443); especially when the parties interested have
agreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they
pleased,eachofthemtakingwhatpertainedtohim(25R.C.L.,359).
68
RIERAV.PALMAROLI
40PHIL105
FACTS:
PonswasaSpanishresidentwhodiedinthePhilippines.Subsequently,theConsul
General submitted for probate his purported will. The will was admitted to
probate. This was later on opposed by the widow of the decedent, alleging that
due to uncontrollable circumstances, she wasnt able to outright enter her
opposition.ShepetitionedtheSC,throughsection513,toreconsiderthedecision
of the lower court, averring regularities in the formalities of executing the will.
Section513providesSEC.513.WhenajudgmentisrenderedbyaCourtofFirst
Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and the Court of First Instance
which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy
existsinthatcourt,thepartysodeprivedofahearingmaypresenthispetitionto
the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such
judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have such
judgmentsetaside...
HELD:
FromwhathasbeensaiditwillbeseenthatthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt
to entertain a petition of the character of that now before us begins in point of
timewhentheperiodhaspassedwithinwhichitwascompetentfortheCourtof
First Instance to entertain an application under section 113; and apart from the
requirementthattheapplicationmustbemadetotheSupremeCourtwithintwo
monthsafterthepetitionerfirstlearnsoftherenditionofjudgmentagainstwhich
reliefissought,thereisnoabsolutelimittotheperiodwithinwhichtheapplication
may be made. But of course if relief from a judgment is sought by timely
ATENEOLAW2010
application in the Court of First Instance, and the application is there denied, no
petitionbasedonthesamegroundwillthereafterbeentertainedintheSupreme
Court under section 513, as the proper remedy in that case would be to appeal
fromtheactionoftheCourtofFirstInstance.
It is manifest from this that the remedy given in section 513 can have no
applicationtotheorderofMay20,1918,legalizingthewillofJuanPonsyColl;and
this is necessarily fatal to the petition before us. This consequence follows
regardlessofanyirregularitiesthatmayhaveoccurredintheCourtofFirstInstance
inadmittingthewilltoprobateandregardlessofanyerrorwhichthatcourtmay
havecommittedintheactiontakenupontheproofsubmittedatthehearing.Itis
not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed, or that the
document probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in which the
decedent actually gave expression to his desires with regard to the disposition of
hisproperty.Butiffraudhadbeenchargedas,forinstance,ifitwereallegedthat
the purported will is forged document the remedy, if any exists, would not be
foundinaproceedingundersection513,butinanoriginalactionintheCourtof
FirstInstance.Itthusbecomesunneccessarytoinquirewhetherthewillinquestion
was in fact executed in conformity with the requirements of law either of these
IslandsorofSpain.
Asaresultofthisdecisionitcannotbedeniedthat,withoutanyfaultonthepartof
thepetitionerorherattorneys,shehasbeendeprivednotonlyoftheopportunity
of opposing the will and appealing from the order of probate but also of the
opportunityofapplyingtotheCourtofFirstInstanceforreliefundersection113.
Evenassumingthatshecouldhaveprocuredthedisallowanceofthewillbyeither
ofthosemethods apointuponwhichnopronouncementcanherebemade it
is obvious that the impossibility of her thus obtaining relief was due to
circumstances peculiar to this case; and the possibility of occassional hardship
cannotaffectthevalidityofourprocedurefortheprobateofwills.
Ashasbeenrepeatedlystatedinthedecisionsofthiscourt,theprobateofawill,
whileconclusiveastoitsdueexecution,innowiseinvolvestheintrinsicvalidityof
itsprovisions.If,therefore,uponthedistributionoftheestateofJuanPonsyColl,
itshouldappearthatanyprovisionofhiswilliscontrarytothelawapplicabletohis
case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition made by
law must prevail. The petitioner is therefore free to appear in the Court of First
Instance at the proper juncture and discuss the questions of the validity of such
provisionsofthewillasaffectherinterestsadversely;andsofaraswecansee,on
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
45
thefactsbeforeus,thisisheronlyrecourse.Butifthewillinquestionwasinfact
proved as the will of a Spanish subject under section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the intrinsic validity of its provisions must be determined under the
Spanishlawapplicabletothistestator.
69
MANAHANV.MANAHAN
58PHIL448
FACTS:
ThenieceofthedeceasedManahanpetitionedfortheprobateofherwill.Since
no opposition was entered and evidence was received, the will was probated.
After more than a year, respondent Manahan filed a motion for reconsideration
and new trial but was denied. She alleged among others that she is the sister of
thetestatrixandthatshewasentitledtonotice,etc.
HELD:
First, respondent was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and
neitherhadshetherighttoexpectit,inasmuchasshewasnotaninterestedparty,
not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her
allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not
conferonhertherighttobenotifiedonthegroundthatthetestatrixdiedleavinga
willinwhichtheappellanthasnotbeeninstitutedheir.Furthermore,notbeinga
forcedheir,shedidnotacquireanysuccessionalright.
Second, the court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in
question,whichistheonlypronouncementrequiredofthetrialcourtbythelawin
orderthatthewillmaybeconsideredvalidanddulyexecutedinaccordancewith
thelaw.Inthephraseologyoftheprocedurallaw,thereisnoessentialdifference
between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words
authenticationandprobatearesynonymousinthiscase.Allthelawrequiresisthat
the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential
external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the
document,asawill,isvalidandeffectiveintheeyesofthelaw.
Lastly, once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions
relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot
impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separateorindependentactionorproceedings
ATENEOLAW2010
RULE77
ALLOWANCEOFWILLPROVEDOUTSIDEOFTHEPHILIPPINES
Section1.WillprovedoutsidePhilippinesmaybeallowedhere.Willsprovedand
allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the
Philippines.
Section2.Noticeofhearingforallowance.Whenacopyofsuchwillandofthe
orderordecreeoftheallowancethereof,bothdulyauthenticated,arefiledwith
a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person
interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place
forthehearing,andcausenoticethereoftobegivenasincaseofanoriginalwill
presentedforallowance.
Section3.Whenwillallowed,andeffectthereof.Ifitappearsatthehearingthat
the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the shall so allow it, and a
certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge,andattestedby the seal ofthe
court,towhichshallbeattachedacopyofthewill,shallbefiledandrecordedby
the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proves and
allowedinsuchcourt.
Section4.Estate,howadministered.Whenawillisthusallowed,thecourtshall
grantletterstestamentary,orlettersofadministrationwiththewillannexed,and
such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of
thetestatorinthePhilippines.Suchestate,afterthepaymentofjustdebtsand
expensesofadministration,shallbedisposedofaccordingtosuchwill,sofaras
such willmay operate upon it; and the residue, ifanyshallbedisposed ofas is
providedbylawincasesofestatesinthePhilippinesbelongingtopersonswho
areinhabitantsofanotherstateorcountry.
Art.815.WhenaFilipinoisinaforeigncountry,heisauthorizedtomakeawillin
anyoftheformsestablishedbythelawofthecountryinwhichhemaybe.Such
willmaybeprobatedinthePhilippines.(n)
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
46
Art.816.ThewillofanalienwhoisabroadproduceseffectinthePhilippinesif
madewiththeformalitiesprescribedbythelawoftheplaceinwhichheresides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
thosewhichthisCodeprescribes.(n)
Art.817.AwillmadeinthePhilippinesbyacitizenorsubjectofanothercountry,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a
citizenorsubject,andwhichmightbeprovedandallowedbythelawofhisown
country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the
Philippines.(n)
ATENEOLAW2010
HOWCANAWILLPROVEDABROADPRODUCEEFFECTINTHEPHILIPPINES?
1. Petitionforallowanceofwill
2. Dulyauthenticatedcopyofthewill
3. Dulyauthenticatedorderordecreeoftheallowance
4. Thewillshouldbethefollowing
a. If accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of
placeinwhichheresides,or
b. Inaccordancewithformalitiesobservedinhiscountry,or
c. InaccordancewithformalitiesobservedinthePhilippines
5. In accordance to Suntay v. Suntay, it must be proved that the foreign
courtorderingtheallowanceisaprobatecourt
6. InaccordancetoFluemerv.Hix,ifthewillwasmadeinaforeigncountry,
itmustbeshownthatthewillwasmadeinaccordancetothelawsofthe
same,andnecessarily,acopyofthelaw(s)mustbeproducedorproved
incourt
7. In case there is failure to prove the laws and procedure of the foreign
country,thenitispresumedtobethesamewithPhilippinelaw
70
SUNTAYV.SUNTAY
95PHIL500
FACTS:
SuntaywasaFilipinocitizenwhodiedinAmoy,China.Hehadpropertiesinboth
the Philippines and China, and was survived by his children from the first and
second marriages as well as by his second wife. After his death, petition for
intestateproceedingsandconsequently,forlettersforadministrationofhisestate
wasfiledbyoneofhissonsfromhisfirstmarriageandwasdulyallowedthesame
bythecourt.Anotherpetitionwasfiledconsequently,thistimebythewidow,for
the probate of the alleged will of the testator. But the probate proceeding was
dismissed, for the alleged loss of the will and failure to adduce evidence on its
execution.Subsequently,thesonfromthesecondmarriagefiledamotioninthe
intestateproceedingtoadmittheallegedwillhefoundofhisfatherinChina,but
wasdeniedbythecourt.
HELD:
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his
motherareestoppedfromaskingfortheprobateofthelostwilloroftheforeign
willbecauseofthetransferorassignmentoftheirshareright,titleandinterestin
theestateforthevalidityandlegalityofsuchassignmentscannotbethreshedout
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
47
in this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and
testamentexecutedinthePhilippinesoroftheforeignwillallegedlyexecutedin
AmoyandclaimedtohavebeenprobatedinthemunicipaldistrictcourtofAmoy,
Fookienprovince,RepublicofChina.
Astothewillclaimedtohavebeenexecutedon4January1931inAmoy,China,the
lawonthepointinRule78.Section1oftheruleprovides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such
country,maybeallowed,filed,andrecordedbytheproperCourtofFirstInstance
inthePhilippines.
Section2provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed
with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person
interested,inthecourthavingjurisdiction,suchcourtshallfixatimeandplacefor
the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presentedforallowance.
Section3provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the
courtshallsoallowit,andacertificateofitsallowance,signedbytheJudge,and
attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will,
shallbefiledandrecordedbytheclerk,andthewillshallhavethesameeffectasif
originallyprovedandallowedinsuchcourt.
ThefactthatthemunicipaldistrictcourtofAmoy,China,isaprobatecourtmust
beproved.ThelawofChinaonprocedureintheprobateorallowanceofwillsmust
alsobeproved.ThelegalrequirementsfortheexecutionofavalidwillinChinain
1931shouldalsobeestablishedbycompetentevidence.Thereisnoproofonthese
points.Moreover,itappearsthatalltheproceedingshadinthemunicipaldistrict
court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy
does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal
districtcourtofAmoyisaprobatecourtandontheChineselawofprocedurein
probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as
thoseprovidedforinourlawsonthesubject.Itisaproceedingsinremandforthe
validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
ATENEOLAW2010
interestedpartiesmustbemade.Theinterestedpartiesinthecasewereknownto
resideinthePhilippines.Theevidenceshowsthatnosuchnoticewasreceivedby
the interested parties residing in the Philippines. The proceedings had in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the
standardofsuchproceedingsinthePhilippinesforlackofnoticetoallinterested
parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties. In
viewthereof,thewillandtheallegedprobatethereofcannotbesaidtohavebeen
done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probateorallowanceofawilland,therefore,thewillreferredtothereincannotbe
allowed,filedandrecordedbyacompetentcourtofthiscountry.
71
FLUEMERV.HIX
54PHIL610
FACTS:
Edward Hix allegedly executed a will in West Virginia where he was allegedly
residing. When he died, the special administrator of his estate petitioned the
probateofthewillbutwasdeniedbythecourt.Heallegedamongothersthatthe
willwasexecutedinWestVirginiaandinaccordancewiththerulesprovidedinthe
saidjurisdiction.
HELD:
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The
courtsofthePhilippineIslandsarenotauthorizedtotakeAmericanUnion.Such
laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met.
There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the
extractfromthelawattestedbythecertificateoftheofficerhavingchargeofthe
original,underthesaleoftheStateofWestVirginia,asprovidedinsection301of
theCodeofCivilProcedure.Noevidencewasintroducedtoshowthattheextract
from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.
Inaddition,thedueexecutionofthewillwasnotestablished.Theonlyevidenceon
thispointistobefoundinthetestimonyofthepetitioner.Asidefromthis,there
was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
48
presenceoftwocompetentwitnesses,ofthatthesewitnessessubscribedthewill
inthepresenceofthetestatorandofeachotherasthelawofWestVirginiaseems
to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by
someothermeans.
Itwasalsonecessaryforthepetitionertoprovethatthetestatorhadhisdomicile
inWestVirginiaandnotestablishthisfactconsistedoftherecitalsinthewilland
the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings
originallyinthePhilippines,thepetitionerviolatedhisowntheorybyattemptingto
havetheprincipaladministrationinthePhilippines.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, petitioner presented an

unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the
documentsattachedtothepetition.Oneofthesedocumentsdisclosesthatapaper
writing purporting to be the will was presented for probate in West Virginia, and
ordered to be recorded and filed. In this connection, it is to be noted that the
applicationfortheprobateofthewillinthePhilippineswasfiledearlierthanthat
in West Virginia. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the
Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary
administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with
Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to
have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no
showingthatthedeceasedleftanypropertyatanyplaceotherthanthePhilippines
andnocontentionthatheleftanyinWestVirginia.
72
MICIANOV.BRIMO
50PHIL867
FACTS:
The judicial administrator of Brimos estate submitted a plan of partition, which
was opposed by the decedents brother. He alleged that the same was in
accordancewiththedeniedwillofhisbrother,fornotcomplyingwithlawsofhis
Turkishnationality.
HELD:
Thebrotherisoverruled.HefailedtostatewhatTurkishlawshavebeenviolated
bythewillinquestion.Hehimselfacknowledgedthisfactwhenhedesirestobe
ATENEOLAW2010
giventheopportunitytoprovehispoint.Assuch,theTurkishlawsarepresumed
tobethesameasPhilippinelaws.
73
LEONANDGHEZZIV.MANUFACTURERSLIFEINSURANCE
90PHIL459
FACTS:
ButlerwasaformerPhilippineresidentwhodiedinthestateofNewYork.Hiswill
was probated and it contained a residuary clause, which provided that after
legacieshavebeendistributedandjustdebtspaid,theresidualestateshallbepaid
toMercedesdeLeoninannuity.Incompliancewiththewill,Ross(administratorin
NewYork)boughtanannuityinherfavorwiththeinsurancecompany.Mercedes,
probably wanting to take the money in whole, filed a petition for probate of the
samewillwiththeManilacourt.Sheprayedthatthecourtorderedtheinsurance
companybringforththemoneydueallegedlytoher.
HELD:
TheimportantthingtoinquireintoistheManilacourt'sauthoritywithrespectto
the assets herein involved. The general rule universally recognized is that
administrationextendsonlytotheassetsofadecedentfoundwithinthestateor
countrywhereitwasgranted,sothatanadministratorappointedinonestateor
countryhasnopoweroverpropertyinanotherstateorcountry.
Itismanifestfromthefactsbeforesetoutthatthefundsinquestionareoutside
thejurisdictionoftheprobatecourtofManila.Havingbeeninvestedinanannuity
in Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the
money.Thepartywhoseappearancetheappellantseeksisonlyabranchoragency
ofthecompanywhichholdsthefundsinitspossession,theagency'sintervention
beinglimitedtodeliveringtotheannuitantthechecksmadeoutandissuedfrom
the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been
transferredorremovedtotheManilaBranch.
EvenifthemoneywereinthehandsoftheManilaBranch,yetitnolongerforms
part of Butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed
completelyintothehandsofthecompanyinvirtueofacontractdulyauthorized
andvalidlyexecuted.Whetherconsideredasatrustorassimpleconsiderationfor
the company's assumed obligation, which it has been religiously performing, of
payingperiodicalallowancestotheannuitant,theproceedsofthesalecannotbe
withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
49
annuitant,theresiduarylegateemayclaimtheremainder,iftherebeany.Neither
the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the
annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and except
upontheconditionsagreeduponinthecontractforannuity.
RULE78
LETTERSTESTAMENTARYANDOFADMINISTRATION,WHENANDTOWHOM
ISSUED
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No

personincompetenttoserveasexecutororadministratorwho:
(a)Isaminor;
(b)IsnotaresidentofthePhilippines;and
(c)Isintheopinionofthecourtunfittoexecutethedutiesofthetrustbyreason
of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by
reasonofconvictionofanoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitude.
WHO DETERMINES WHETHER A PERSON IS UNFIT TO BE AN

ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR?
Thecourthasthediscretiontodecidewhetheroneisunfitornot
CANTHECOURTNOTAPPOINTTHENAMEDEXECUTORINTHEWILL?
Yesiftheexecutorfailstocomplywithhisdutiesasanexecutor
EXECUTOR
ADMINISTRATOR
Person named in the will to administer the

decedents estate and carry out the
provisionsthereof
Personappointedbythecourttoadminister
the estate where the decedent died
intestateorwherethewillwasvoidandnot
allowed to probate, or where no executor
wasnamedinthewill,ortheexecutorwas
named in the will, or the executor named
therein is incompetent or refuses to serve
assuch
Section 2. Executor of executor not to administer estate. The executor of an

executorshallnot,assuch,administertheestateofthefirsttestator.
ATENEOLAW2010
Section3.Marriedwomenmayserve.Amarriedwomanmayserveasexecutrix
or administratrix, and the marriage of a single woman shall not affect her
authoritysotoserveunderapreviousappointment.
Section4.Letterstestamentaryissuedwhenwillallowed.Whenawillhasbeen
proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the
personnamedasexecutortherein,ifheiscompetent,acceptsthetrust,andgives
bondasrequiredbytheserules.
Section5.Wheresomecoexecutorsdisqualifiedothersmayact.Whenallofthe
executorsnamedinawillcannotactbecauseofincompetency,refusaltoaccept
the trust, or failure to give bond, on the part of one or more of them, letters
testamentarymayissuetosuchofthemasarecompetent,acceptandgivebond,
andtheymayperformthedutiesanddischargethetrustrequiredbythewill.
Section6.Whenandtowhomlettersofadministrationgranted.Ifnoexecutoris
namedinthewill,ortheexecutororexecutorsareincompetent,refusethetrust,
orfailtogivebond,orapersondiesintestate,administrationshallbegranted:
(a)Tothesurvivinghusbandorwife,asthecasemaybe,ornextofkin,orboth,
inthediscretionofthecourt,ortosuchpersonassuchsurvivinghusbandorwife,
ornextofkin,requeststohaveappointed,ifcompetentandwillingtoserve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow,ornextofkin,neglectsforthirty(30)daysafterthedeathoftheperson
toapplyforadministrationortorequestthatadministrationbegrantedtosome
otherperson,itmaybegrantedtooneormoreoftheprincipalcreditors,ifmay
begrantedtooneormoreoftheprincipalcreditors,ifcompetentandwillingto
serve;
(c)Ifthereisnosuchcreditorcompetentandwillingtoserve,itmaybegranted
tosuchotherpersonasthecourtmayselect.
ATWHATINSTANCESMAYCOADMINISTRATORSBEAPPOINTEDBYTHECOURT?
1. To have the benefit of judgment and perhaps, at all times, to have
differentinterestsrepresented
2. Where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
representedinthemanagementoftheestate
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
3.
4.
5.
50
Wheretheestateislarge,orfromanycause,anintricateandperplexing
onetosettle
Tohaveallinterestedpartiessatisfiedandtherepresentationtoworkin
harmonyforthebestinterestsoftheestate
When a person is entitled to the administration of an estate desires
anothercompetentassociatedwithhiminoffice
74
GUERREROV.TERAN
13PHIL212
FACTS:
TeranwaspreliminarilytheadministratoroftheestateofAntonioMunoz.Heonly
servedasadministratoroftheestateforaperiodandwassubsequentlychanged
whenMariaMunozwasappointedasguardianofthepropertiesoftheheirsinthe
estateofAntonio.Mariawashoweverchangedasguardian/administratorwhenit
wasshownshewasntaresidentofthePhilippines.Subsequently,Guerrerofileda
case against Teran for differences in account of the properties of the wards the
former represents. Teran counterclaimed that it was the other way around
Guerrero was the one who owed him. The trial court held that Teran was
accountableforannamountofmoney.
HELD:
The administrators of an estate belonging to minors is liable to them for the
management of their interests therein from the time of his acceptance of the
appointment until his removal or release. If such administrator has in the
meantime, permitted other persons to intervene in the management, the
responsibilityfortheiractsfallsuponhim.Theadministratorhowevermayhavea
rightofactionagainstsuchpersonsforanylossoccasionedbytheirnegligenceor
corruption.Inthecaseatbar,Teranwouldbeheldliableforaccountsduringthe
periodhewastheadministrator of the estate. Therecordsfailed to adducethat
losseswereincurredduringthesaidperiod.However,Teranacknowledgesthathe
owedaminimalamountofmoneytoGuerrero.
WithrespecttotheissueoftheremovalofMunozasadministratorbyvirtueofher
nonresidencestatus,thereisnothinginlawwhichrequiresthecourtstoappoint
residents only as administrators or executors. However, notwithstanding lack of
statutoryrequirements,thecourtswillfinddifficultyinsafeguardingtheinterests
of the wards by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally
subjecttotheirjurisdiction.
ATENEOLAW2010
75
SIOCANAVASV.GARCIA
44PHIL711
FACTS:
Siocaisthewidowofthedecedent.Shequestionedthecourtfornotappointing
herasadministratorofherlatehusbandsestatebutinstead,appointedanother.
HELD:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient
reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying
suchpreferentialrightsisunsuitable,thecourtmayappointanotherperson.The
determination of a person's suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a
great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it
appearsaffirmativelythatthecourtbelowwasinerror.
Inthepresentcasethecourtbaseditsrulingonthefactthatitappearedfromthe
record in Civil Case No. 1041 of the same court, that the appellant had adverse
interest in the estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as
administrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostilitytothoseimmediatelyinterestedintheestate.(18Cyc.,93,94.)Thecourt
below therefore stated facts which may constitute sufficient grounds for setting
asidetheappellant'spreferentialrightsandwhich,intheabsenceofprooftothe
contrary,mustbepresumedsufficient.
76
MERCADOV.VDA.DEJAEN
64PHIL75
FACTS:
MonsignorGorordoleftawillwhenhedied.Inthesaidwill,heinstitutedhissister
assoleheirandincaseofherdeath,hisnieces.HelikewiseinstitutedMercadoas
theexecutoroftheestateandinhisabsence,Espina.Mercadowasdulyappointed
as executor and the heirs opposed this on several grounds. They alleged that
Mercadowasunfitandincapableoffurtheringhisdutiesasexecutor.Itisalleged
thathewouldbebiasasalegacywasprovidedforhisparish.Themotionofthe
heirswasdeniedbythecourt.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
51
HELD:
Thereasonsadvancedbytheappellantsdonotseemtocarrysufficientweightto
warrant the reversal of the appealed orders. When the retired bishop Monsignor
Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo chose Father Emiliano Mercado as executor and
administrator of his estate after his death, he must have had good and sufficient
reasonstherefore,andhiswillmustberespected.Theevidenceshowsthatwhen
the deceased bishop made his will naming said priest in preference to anybody
else, he was in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under the
circumstances,itisnotonlyjustbutalsorighttofullycomplywithhislastwill;and
thisispreciselywhatthelowercourtdidinconfirmingtheappointmentofFather
Mercado as executor herein. As a matter of fact, section 641 of Act No. 190
providesthatwhenawillhasbeenprobedandallowed,thecourtisboundtoissue
letterstestamentarythereontothepersonnamedasexecutorthereinprovidedhe
accepts the trust and gives the bond as required by law, which Father Emiliano
Mercado certainly did willingly before assuming his trust. While it is true, as the
appellantscontend,thatthisprovisionofthelawshouldnotbestrictlyinterpreted
becausethecourtwouldbedeprivedofitspowernottoappoint,incertaincases,
onewhoisunworthyofthetrust,notwithstandingthefactthathewasnamedas
suchbythetestator(sec.653,ActNo.190);itisalsotruethatinordertodothis,
the unworthiness, incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of such person must be
manifestandrealandnotmerelyimaginary.
77
OZAETAV.PECSON
93PHIL416
FACTS:
CarlosPalancawasabletoleaveawillbeforehedied.HenamedthereinOzaetaas
executorofthewillincaseofunavailabilityofGeneralRoxas.WhenPalancadied,
Roxas died after and Ozaeta was prompted to file a petition for the probate of
Palancaswill,withtheprayerofbeingappointedasaspecialadministrator.The
heirs opposed the appointment. The bank previously appointed as administrator
resignedongroundsofconflictofinterest.
HELD:
It should be noted at the outset that Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, under the
provisions of which the order appealed from was made, grants discretion to the
probatecourttoappointornottoappointaspecialadministrator.Itissilentasto
thepersonthatmaybeappointedasspecialadministrator,unlikesection6ofRule
79, which expressly gives the order of preference of the persons that may be
ATENEOLAW2010
appointedregularadministrator.Theappointmentofspecialadministratorsisnot
governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators.
However,thatwhilethechoiceofthepersonlieswithinthecourt'sdiscretion,such
discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical
andinaccordwithfundamentallegalprinciplesandjustice.Thefactthatajudgeis
granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his
personallikesanddislikesprevailover,orhispassionstorule,hisjudgment.Such
discretion must be based on reason and legal principle, and it must be exercised
within the limits thereof. And there is no reason why the same fundamental and
legalprinciplesgoverningthechoiceofaregularadministratorshouldnotbetaken
intoaccountintheappointmentofthespecialadministrator.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary

concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
naturalthatthetestatorshoulddesiretoappointoneofhisconfidence,onewho
canbetrustedtocarryouthiswishesinthedisposaloftheestate.Thecurtailment
ofthisrightmaybeconsideredasacurtailmentoftherighttodispose.Andasthe
rights granted by will take effect from the time of death, the management of his
estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable,
whennoreasonableobjectiontohisassumptionofthetrustcanbeinterposedany
longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the
duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor
uponhisapplication.Itisthetestatorthatappointshisexecutor,asthequestion
as to his peculiar fitness for such a position or his want of ability to manage the
estatecannotbeaddressedtothediscretionofthecountyjudge.
Inthecaseatbar,thewillhasalreadybeenadmittedtoprobate,andrespondent
judgehimselfhasexpresslyappointedpetitionerasadministrator.Theonlyreason
orground,therefore,forsuspendinghisappointment,andfortheappointmentof
aspecialadministrator,whoisnotthepetitionerhimself,isaverytechnicalone.It
also appears that the Philippine Trust Company, which had acted as special
administratorforaperiodofonlyafewmonths,hassubmittedabillforP90,000.
This would cut deep into the income of the estate, and if the new special
administratorappointedbytherespondentjudgetakesoffice,itisnotimprobable
that the estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost of
administration.Underthesecircumstances,itwouldseemunreasonabletorefuse
toappointthepetitionerasspecialadministrator.Todosowouldbedelayingthe
fulfillment of the wishes of the testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary
expense.//
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
52
78
DEGUZMANV.LIMCOLIOC
68PHIL673
FACTS:
Limcolioc opposed the appointment of Apolinario de Guzman as coadministrator
of the estate of the deceased. It turns out that Apolinario is the brother of the
present administrator, Nicolasa. The estate is that of their fathers and is
composedofmanyfisheriesandotherproperties.
HELD:
Asheldinthecaseinvolvingthesameparties,theprincipalconsiderationreckoned
withintheappointmentoftheadministratoroftheestateofadeceasedpersonis
theinterestinsaidestateoftheonebeappointedassuchadministrator.Thisisthe
sameconsiderationwhichthelawtakesintoaccountinestablishingthepreference
of the widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death,
because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal
partnership. But this preference established by law is not absolute, if there are
other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than the
surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the
preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, and if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is
anotherwhohasmoreinterestthereinthanthesurvivingspouse,thepreference
establishedinthelatter'sfavorfallstotheground.
Thesamereasonsareapplicabletothecaseunderconsideration,inasmuchasthe
appointed coadministrator, Apolinario de Guzman as brother of Nicolasa de
Guzmanwhomthelatterneedstohelpherintheadministrationoftheproperties
left by their deceased father, many of which consist in fisheries situated in the
provinces is as interested as his sister in that said properties be duly
administeredandconservedforthebenefitoftheheirs.ItistruethatApolinariode
Guzman's father, Proceso de Guzman, in life, filed a complaint against his son on
thegroundthatthelatter,asadministratorofhisfather'sestate,misappropriated
cash,butsaidcomplaintwasdismissedattheinstanceofthefatherhimself.Inthe
presentcase,asidefromthefactthatApolinariodeGuzman,ascoadministrator,
will administer properties in which he has a greater share than that of the
oppositor,thechildlesswidowofthedeceasedbyasecondmarriage,andwillact
merely as a helper of his sister, there is no ground to believe that he would
squandersaidpropertiesandtheproductsthereof.
ATENEOLAW2010
79
GONZALESV.AGUINALDO
190SCRA112
FACTS:
In the estate proceedings of Ramona Gonzales, two of her four children were
appointed as coadministratix. While one was in the US to accompany her sick
husband to treatment, the other filed a motion in court for her removal. It was
alleged that there is conflict between the two coadministratrices as well as
continuedmisunderstandings.Withoutreallyhearingthesideoftheadministratrix
soughttoberemoved,thecourtissuedanorderforherremoval.
HELD:
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principalconsiderationreckonedwithistheinterestinsaidestateoftheonetobe
appointedasadministrator.ThisisthesameconsiderationwhichSection6ofRule
78takesintoaccountinestablishingtheorderofpreferenceintheappointmentof
administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that
thosewhowillreapthebenefitofawise,speedy,economicaladministrationofthe
estate,or,ontheotherhand,suffertheconsequences ofwaste,improvidenceor
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administertheestatecorrectly.
Administratorshavesuchaninterestintheexecutionoftheirtrustasentitlethem
toprotectionfromremovalwithoutjustcause.Hence,Section2ofRule82ofthe
Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court to
removeanadministrator.
Whileitisconcededthatthecourtisinvestedwithamplediscretionintheremoval
of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order to
justifyaremoval.Theremustbeevidenceofanactoromissiononthepartofthe
administratornotconformabletoorindisregardoftherulesortheordersofthe
court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the
administrator. In making such a determination, the court must exercise good
judgment,guidedbylawandprecedents.
Inthepresentcase,thecourtreliednotonthefactsallegedbythemotionsfiledby
the parties but on the alleged conflicts and misunderstandings between the co
administrators. Yes, coadministrators must have harmonious relationships with
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
53
each other. Nonetheless, but mere disagreements without misconduct doesnt

justifyremoval.
RULE79
OPPOSINGISSUANCEOFLETTERSTESTAMENTARY.PETITIONANDCONTESTFOR
LETTERSOFADMINISTRATION
Section 1. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition

for administration. Any person interested in a will may state in writing the
groundswhyletterstestamentaryshouldnotissuetothepersonsnamedtherein
asexecutors,oranyofthem,andthecourt,afterhearinguponnotice,shallpass
upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the time, be filed for
lettersofadministrationwiththewillannexed.
Section2.Contentsofpetitionforlettersofadministration.Apetitionforletters
ofadministrationmustbefiledbyaninterestedpersonandmustshow,sofaras
knowntothepetitioner:
(b)Thenames,ages,andresidencesoftheheirs,andthenamesandresidences
ofthecreditors,ofthedecedent;
(c)Theprobablevalueandcharacterofthepropertyoftheestate;
(d)Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersofadministrationareprayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for
lettersofadministrationisfiledinthecourthavingjurisdiction,suchcourtshall
fixatimeandplaceforhearingthepetition,andshallcausenoticethereoftobe
giventotheknownheirsandcreditorsofthedecedent,andtoanyotherpersons
believedtohaveaninterestintheestate,inthemannerprovidedinsections3
and4ofRule76.
Section4.Oppositiontopetitionforadministration.Anyinterestedpersonmay,
by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the
incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the
ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and may pray that
letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or person named in the
opposition.
ATENEOLAW2010
Section5.Hearingandorderforletterstoissue.Atthehearingofthepetition,it
must first be shown that notice has been given as hereinabove required, and
thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of their
respectiveallegations,andifsatisfiedthatthedecedentleftnowill,orthatthere
is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters of
administrationtothepartybestentitledthereto.
Section 6. When letters of administration granted to any applicant. Letters of

administrationmaybegrantedtoanyqualifiedapplicant,thoughitappearsthat
there are other competent persons having better right to the administration, if
such persons fail to appear when notified and claim the issuance of letters to
themselves.
80
JOHANNESV.HARVEY
43PHIL175
FACTS:
Carmen died while residing in Singapore. She was survived by her husband and
brothersandsisters.EstateproceedingswereheldinSingapore.Herhusbandwas
appointed as the administrator. Thereafter, estate proceedings was instituted by
oneofthedeceasedsbrotherinthePhilippines.Thehusbandopposedthis.
HELD:
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a
persondiesintestateowningpropertyinthecountryofhisdomicileaswellasina
foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in
the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration,
while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason
forthelatterisbecauseagrantofadministrationdoesnotexpropriovigorehave
any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United States.
Theancillaryadministrationisproper,wheneverapersondies,leavinginacountry
other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
assetsofthedecedent,liableforhisindividualdebtsortobedistributedamonghis
heirs.
The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late
CarmenTheodoraJohannesinSingapore,StraitsSettlements.Whatissoughtinthe
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
54
Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary

administration,conformabletotheprovisionsofsections601,602,and603ofthe
CodeofCivilProcedure.Thepropercourseofprocedurewouldbefortheancillary
administrator to pay the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts,
and remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the
nextofkin.Suchadministrationappearstoberequiredinthisjurisdictionsincethe
provisions of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit of the
settlementofcertainestateswithoutlegalproceedings,havenotbeenmet.
81
GUTIERREZDEOCAMPOV.CALDERON
59PHIL631
FACTS:
The decedent was a bachelor and left no ascendants. He was survived by his
brotherandsister,aswellashisillegitimatechildren.Therebeingnoforcedheirs,
he instituted his illegitimate children as his beneficiaries upon his death. His
brotherandsisteropposedthis.
HELD:
Asstatedabovetheappellantsinthiscasearenotforcedheirsofthedeceasedand
thereforehavenorighttoanypartofthepropertyleftbythetestator,oncehehad
disposed of the same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would be
entitled to intervene in this case and protect their interest in so far as they may
have been prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore that they have not been
injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced heirs whose rights
havebeenprejudicedhavearighttointerveneinacaseofthischaracter.
82
TRILLANAV.CRISOSTOMO
89PHIL710
FACTS:
Crisostomoandothersappealedthedenialoftheirpetitionforreliefofjudgment
oftheprobateofthewillofthedeceased.Theyallegedthatthejudgmentallowing
the probate of the later will was procured by fraud, that the court erred when it
didntsetadateforprovingtheprobateoftheAugust1948willandthefailureto
provewasduetothecourtsownfaultandnegligence.
HELD:
ATENEOLAW2010
The petitionersappellants having failed to show that the judgment of the lower
courtofJanuary5,1948,probatingthewilloftestatrixofOctober19,wasobtained
throughfraud,thelowercourtdidnotcommitanyerrorindenyingtheappellant's
petitionforreliefundersec.2,Rule38oftheRulesofCourt,andthereforeitisnot
necessaryforustodiscussandpassupontheotherpropositionsoftheappellant.
Besides, even assuming without deciding, that under sec. 3 of Rule 77, the court
shallsetasideadateforprovingawillevenwithoutpetitionwhenitisdeliveredto
the,courthavingjurisdiction,ascontendedbytheappellants,thelowercourtwas
rightinnotsettingadateforprovingthewillofAugust16,1948,becausethiswill
wasexpresslyandabsolutelyrevokedbythewillofOctober19,1948,executedby
the same executrix or deceased, which was filed for allowance on November 1,
1948, with the same court. According to the attorneys for the appellant, the will
datedAugust16,1948,wassenttogetherwithawritingcalled"Manifestation"by
registeredmailonOctober30,1948,fromManilatotheCourtofFirstInstanceof
Bulacan,byAttorneyMr.TomasV.Barnes,andsaidwillmusthavebeenreceived
by the Clerk of Said Court on or after November 1, 1948, the date when the
subsequentwillofOctober19,wasfiledforprobate.Itstandstoreasonthatiftwo
willsarepresentedforallowancebutoneofthemrevokedwillcannotbeincluded
intheprobateofthelattersubsequentwill,becauseitwouldbeawasteoftimeto
allowtherevokedwillifthesubsequentrevokingwillisallowed.Therevokedwill
maybeprobatedandallowedonlyifthesubsequentrevokingwillisdisallowed.
83
GUTIERREZV.VILLEGAS
5SCRA313
FACTS:
IreneSantosdiedandwassurvivedbyherhusbandandtwonieces,daughtersof
her deceased brother. Her husband filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, naming himself and the two nieces as the surviving heirs of the
decedent. He was later named by the court as administrator. Thereafter, an
unverifiedmanifestationwasfiledbyAdelaGutierrez,oneofthenieces,incourt,
attestingtoadeedofassignmentconveyingallherinterestinparticipatinginthe
proceedings to her sister. On a later date however, another manifestation was
filedbyAdela,allegingthatthedeedofassignmentmentionedintheearlierfiled
manifestationwasprocuredbytheadministratorbyfraudandthatshesignedthe
samebymistake.Sheallegedthatshewasmisledbythehusbandinsigningsaid
manifestation in exchange for money loaned to her by her sister, and that she
continuously seeks to participate in the intestate proceedings of her aunt. She
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
55
thenfiledamotiontotransferthespecialproceedingsinthesamebranchwherea
caseforthenullityofdeedofassignmentwasfiled.Thismotionwasdenied.Adela
then sought that the administrator be ordered to furnish her all records of the
proceedings. The administrator opposed this on the ground of the earlier filed
manifestation.Thecourtorderedinfavoroftheadministrator.
HELD:
It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable
partytotheproceedingsinquestion.Herinterestintheestateisnotinchoate,it
was established at the time of death of Irene Santos. While it is true that she
executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be
annulled, which action is now pending. Although Adela had filed a manifestation
dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed
DeedofAssignment,therecord,neverthelessfailstoshowthatactionthereonhad
been taken by the probate Court. Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among coheirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
shouldpurporttobeasale,anexchange,acompromise,oranyothertransaction
(Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the coheirship of
appelleeintheestateunderprobate.Itappearing(ifWeassumethedueexecution
of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial
partition,courtapprovalisimperative,andtheheirscannotjustdivestthecourtof
its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of
assignmentanddesistance.
The motion in question is not one of intervention, but solely a plea to enforce a
rightandthatistoreceivepleadingsandordersrelatedtothecase.Evidently,the
use of the word "intervention" in the manifestation and pleadings presented by
Adela was resorted to for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all she
wanted to convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in the
case for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing the
manifestationdroppingherselffromtheproceedings(butwhichshelaterinformed
thecourttohavebeensecuredthrufraud),herstandingmighthavebeenaffected.
Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit or action by
which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either
joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with
defendantinresistingtheclaimsofplaintiff,ordemandingsomethingadverselyto
bothofthem;theactorproceedingbywhichathirdpersonbecomesapartyina
suitpendingbetweenothers;theadmission,byleaveofcourt,ofapersonnotan
original party to pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party
ATENEOLAW2010
theretofortheprotectionofsomerightorinterestallegedbyhimtobeaffectedby
suchproceedings.TheaforementionedcircumstancesdonotfitAdelaasshewas
notathirdpartytotheproceedingsbutrather,anoriginalpartytherein.
84
DURANV.DURAN
20SCRA379
FACTS:
Pio Duran died intestate and was survived by his surviving spouse Josephine, his
brothersandsisters,togetherwithhisnephewsandnieces.Attheonset,oneof
his brothers, Cipriano, for a consideration, signed a deed of conveyance,
bequeathingallishisinterestintheestateofhisdeceasedbrother.After,hefiled
apetitionforthelettersofadministrationofhisbrothersestate,andforhimtobe
named as the administrator. The widow opposed this on the ground of lack of
interestintheestatebyvirtueofthedeedofconveyancesignedbyCipriano.The
courtruledinfavoroftheoppositionanddismissedthepetition.
HELD:
TheRulesofCourtprovidesthatapetitionforadministrationandsettlementofan
estatemustbefiledbyan"interestedperson"(See.2,Rule79).Appellantscontend
thatthedeedofassignmentexecutedbyCiprianodidnotoperatetorenderhima
personwithoutinterestintheestate.RelyingonInreIreneSantos,L11848,May
31,1962,theyarguethatanassignmentbyoneheirofhisshareintheestatetoa
coheir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement court to be
effective;andthattheassigningheirdoesnotlosehisstatusasapersoninterested
intheestate,evenaftersaidassignmentisapprovedbythecourt.
ThesituationintheSantoscaseinvolvesanassignmentbetweencoheirspendente
lite,duringthecourseofsettlementproceedings,properlyandvalidlycommenced.
At the time of said assignment, therefore, the settlement court had already
acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a result, any assignment
regardingthesamehadtobeapprovedbysaidcourt.Andsincetheapprovalthe
court is not deemed final until the estate is closed the assigning heir remains an
interestedpersoninproceedingsevenaftersaidapproval,whichcanbevacatedis
given.
In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement
proceedingwaspending.Thepropertiessubjectmatteroftheassignmentwasnot
underthejurisdictionofasettlementcourt.Allowingthattheassignmentmustbe
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
56
deemedapartitionasbetweentheassignorandassignee,thesamedoesnotneed
courtapprovaltobeeffective asbetweentheparties.Anextrajudicialpartitionis
valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for
extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of
bindingcreditorsandnonparticipatingheirsonly.
RULE80
SPECIALADMINISTRATOR
Section1.Appointmentofspecialadministrator.Whenthereisdelayingranting
letterstestamentaryorofadministrationbyanycauseincludinganappealfrom
the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administratortotakepossessionandchargeof the estateof the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed.
Section2.Powersanddutiesofspecialadminsitrator.Suchspecialadministrator
shalltakepossessionandchargeofthegoods,chattels,rights,credits,andestate
of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator
afterwardsappointed,andforthatpurposemaycommenceandmaintainsuitsas
administrator.Hemaysellonlysuchperishableandotherpropertyasthecourt
orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceasedunlesssoorderedbythecourt.
Section 3. When powers of special administrator cease. Transfer of effects.

Pendingsuits.Whenletterstestamentaryorofadministrationaregrantedonthe
estateofthedeceased,thepowersofthespecialadministratorshallcease,and
he shall forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the goods, chattels,
money, and estate of the deceased in his hands. The executor or administrator
mayprosecutetofinaljudgmentsuitscommencedbysuchspecialadministrator.
85
DEGUZMANV.ANGELES
162SCRA347
FACTS:
ElainedeGuzmanfiledapetitionfortheintestateproceedingsofherlatehusband.
After,shefiledamotionfortheissuanceofwritofpossessionofvehiclesallegedly
ownedbytheconjugalpartnership which were currently in the possessionof the
ATENEOLAW2010
petitioner,herfatherinlaw.Shefollowedthisupbyfilinganexpartemotionfor
the appointment as special administrator of the estate of her late husband. The
court ordered notice to be made to all interested parties but no notice was ever
received by the petitioner. The court then appointed Elaine as special
administratrix. Another order was issued by the court for the taking into
possessionofthevehiclesinpetitionerspossession.Thisorderhaddifficultybeing
executed. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the courts orders on the
groundthatithadnotacquiredjurisdictionduetolackofpublicationandnotice,as
requiredbytherules.
HELD:
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired
jurisdictionovertheproceedingsuponthefilingofapetitionforthesettlementof
anintestateestatebytheprivaterespondentsincethepetitionhadallegedallthe
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and
creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de
GuzmanpursuanttoSection2,Rule79oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
Differentiation must be made however between the jurisdiction of the probate

courtovertheproceedingsfortheadministrationofanestateanditsjurisdiction
over the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the
deceased person but the determination of the properties comprising that estate
must follow established rules. The probate court must cause notice through
publicationofthepetitionafteritreceivesthesame.Thepurposeofthisnoticeis
to bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the
judgmentthereinbecomesbindingonalltheworld.Wherenonoticeasrequired
by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to
have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the
settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to
notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be
deprivedofhisrighttopropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.
Verily,noticethroughpublicationofthepetitionforthesettlementoftheestateof
a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders
affectingotherpersons,subsequenttothepetitionvoidandsubjecttoannulment.
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised

RulesofCourtwascausedtobegivenbytheprobatecourtbeforeitactedonthe
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
57
motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to

issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the
widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of
ManolitodeGuzman.
86
GARCIAFULEV.CA
Supra
HELD:
87
ROXASV.PECSON
82PHIL407
FACTS:
Pablo Roxas was survived by his widow, adulterous child, and brother and sister.
The siblings instituted intestate proceedings, praying that Maria be appointed as
special administratrix. This proceeding was however dismissed at the instance of
the filing of petition by the widow for the probate of her husbands alleged will.
Correspondingly to this was the prayer to be appointed as the special
administratrix. The probate was consequently denied for the failure of the
witnesses to sign in the presence of the testator. However, the widow was still
appointed as administratrix. This was appealed by the siblings who wanted
themselvestobeadministrators.Thecourtsubsequentlyorderedthewidowtobe
specialadministratrixwithrespecttoconjugalpropertiesandthesisterasspecial
administratrixwithrespecttothecapitalpropertiesofthedeceased.
HELD:
There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising his discretion
and appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, had taken into
considerationthebeneficialinterestofthepetitionerintheestateofthedecedent
and her being designated in the will as executrix thereof. But the respondent's
subsequent act of appointing her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or
community property, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or
exclusivepropertyofthedecedent,doesnotseemtobeinconformitywithlogicor
reason.Thepetitionerhasorclaimstohavethesamebeneficialinterestafterthe
decisionofthecourtdisapprovingthewill,whichisnowpendingonappeal,asshe
had prior to it, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the
appellatecourt.
ATENEOLAW2010
Besides,evenifthewillisnotprobated,thewidowinthepresentcasewouldhave,
underthelaw,therightofusufructoveronehalfoftheexclusivepropertyofthe
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. The beneficial interest
required as a qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate of a
decedentistheinterestinthewholeestateandnotonlyinsomepartthereof.The
petitioner being entitled to onehalf in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of
the decedent, she would have as much if not more interest in administering the
entireestatecorrectly,inordertoreapthebenefitofawise,speedy,economical
administration of the state, and not suffer the consequences of the waste,
improvidence or mismanagement thereof. The good or bad administration of the
propertymayaffectratherthefruitsthanthenakedownershipofaproperty.
Thereisabsolutelynoreasonforappointingtwoseparateadministrators,specially
iftheestatetobesettledisthatofadeceasedhusbandasinthepresentcase,for
according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only after the dowry and
parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugal
partnershiphavebeenpaid,thecapitalorexclusivepropertyofthehusbandmay
be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach; and if the
estateinventoriedshouldnotbesufficienttopaythedowryandtheparaphernaof
the wife and the debts, charges and obligations of the partnership, the provision
relatingtoconcurrenceandpreferenceofcreditsshallbeobserved.Iftwoseparate
administrators are appointed as done in the present case, in every action which
one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased, the
defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiff has no
causeofaction,becausethepropertyorcreditinissuebelongstotheclasswhichis
being administered by the other administrator, which can not be done if the
administratoroftheentireestateisonlyone.
Asunderthelawonlyonegeneraladministratormaybeappointedtoadminister,
liquidateanddistributetheestateofadeceasedspouse,itclearlyfollowsthatonly
onespecialadministratormaybeappointedtoadministertemporarilysaidestate,
becauseaspecialadministratorisbutatemporaryadministratorwhoisappointed
toactinlieuofthegeneraladministrator."Whenthereisdelayingrantingletters
testamentaryorofadministrationoccasionedbyanappealfromtheallowanceor
disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special
administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questionscausingthedelayaredecidedandexecutorsoradministratorsthereupon
appointed,"(sec.1,Rule81).Althoughhispowersanddutiesarelimitedto"collect
andtakechargeofthegoods,chattels,rights,credits,andestateofthedeceased
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
58
and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed,
andforthatpurposemaycommenceandmaintainsuitsasadministrator,andmay
sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administratorshallnotbeliabletopayanydebtsofthedeceased."
Inviewofalltheforegoing,weholdthatthecourtbelowhasnopowertoappoint
twospecialadministraticesoftheestateofadeceasedhusbandorwife,oneofthe
community property and another of the exclusive property of the decedent, and
therefore the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
renderingorissuingtheordercomplainedof,andthereforesaidorderisherebyset
aside,withcostsagainsttherespondents.
88
PIJUANV.VDA.DEGURREA
18SCRA898
FACTS:
Manuela Ruiz was the surviving legitimate spouse of Carlos Gurrea. They were
previously living in Spain when the husband subsequently left her, lived in the
Philippineswiththeirson.Healsolivedwithacommonlawwifewhilebeinginthe
country.WhenManuelafollowedhiminthecountry,shefiledforsupportandthe
courtruledinherfavor.Carloslaterondiedandallegedlyleftawilldisinheriting
Manuela and their son, as well as instituting Pijuan as executor. The will was
submitted for probate and pending proceedings, Manuela not only prayed for
supportpendentelitebutlikewise,forappointmentasadministrator.
HELD:
Upon the other hand, the lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea because of
absence of proof as regards the status, nature or character of the property now
underthecustodyoftheSpecialAdministrator.Precisely,however,onaccountof
suchlackofproofthereon,weareboundbylawtoassumethattheestateofthe
deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, onehalf of
whichbelongspresumptivelytoMrs.Gurrea,asidefromsuchpartoftheshareof
the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as one of the compulsory
heirs, if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if probated, if the
provisionthereindisinheritingherwerenullified.Inasmuchastheaforementioned
estate is worth P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special
administrator, it is clear to us that the continuation of the monthly alimony,
pendentelite,ofP1,000,authorizedinsaidCivilCaseNo.5820,isfairlyjustified.
ATENEOLAW2010
ItisnexturgedbyMrs.Gurreathatthelowercourterredindenyingherpetition
forappointmentasadministratrix,for,aswidowofthedeceased,sheclaimsaright
of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the
languageofthisprovision,saidpreferenceexists"ifnoexecutorisnamedinthewill
ortheexecutororexecutorsareincompetent,refusethetrust,orfailtogivebond,
orapersondiesintestate."Noneoftheseconditionsobtains,however,inthecase
atbar.ThedeceasedCarlosGurreahasleftadocumentpurportingtobehiswill,
seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died
intestate.Again,saiddocumentnamesMarceloPijuanasexecutorthereof,anditis
not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not
refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his
appointmentasexecutor,and,uponhisappointmentasspecialadministrator,has
assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference
accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving
spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to
thatofaspecialadministrator,andthattheorderappointingthelatterlieswithin
thediscretionoftheprobatecourt,andisnotappealable.
89
TANV.GOCHIONGLEE
46PHIL200
FACTS:
Duringthelifetimeofthedeceased,Gowastheencargado.Whenhedied,Gowas
appointedpreliminarilyasthespecialadministratoroftheestate.Hedidhisduties
without opposition from anyone. Later, his appointment as special administrator
ceased and he began acting as the general administrator. He then asked
permissionforthecontinuousoperationofthetwostoresownedbytheestate,for
which the court granted him to do so. He religiously submitted reports and
accountsfortheestate,withoutagainanyopposition.Hethenceasedfrombeing
administratorandhewasreplacedbyTan.Hewasthereafterorderedbythecourt
to pay certain accounts, to which he denied for allegedly already having paid for
thesame.
HELD:
The permission to operate the stores was granted to Go Chiong Lee on the same
datewhenhewasrelievedasspecialadministratorandappointed"administrador
definitivo"oftheestate.Heproceededtoactundersuchauthorityforoverayear
without being challenged by anyone. It would now be preposterous to suppose
that the power to run the stores actually granted by the trial judge continued
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
59
merelyforaninfinitesimalmomentoftimeonMay25,1920,betweentheprecise
moment when Go Chiong Lee acted under it as special administrator, and the
succeeding moment when he became the administrator. The only reasonable
deductionisthatthepowersofthespecialadministratorhavingceased,andthatat
the same time that they ceased permission was given to operate the stores, this
authority was intended for the administrator, or if intended for the special
administrator, was transmitted to the general administrator as soon as he was
appointed.
ThattheattorneyofthedefendantGoChiongLeehadknowledgeoftheaddition
totheorderofthecourtnamingGoChiongLeeadministrator,bywhichthelatter
wasboundtorenderwrittenmonthlyreportsofhisadministration,isestablished,
butthatsubsequentlythecourttacitlymodifieditsorder,islikewisedisclosedby
therecord.Theadministratorwasrepeatedlyenjoinedtosubmitaccountswithout
specifying monthly accounts. On three occasions the administrator rendered his
accountswithoutprotestfromanysource.
Thatmonthlyreportswouldhavepossessedanyparticularvirtueoverthereports
actuallysubmitted,toplacethecourtonitsguardandthustoprotecttheestate
from losses, is hardly plausible. On the contrary, that the losses sustained by the
estateresultedfromtherisknecessarilyattendingtheoperationofthetwostores,
isamuchmorereasonableassumption.Atleasttheonlytestimonyrefutingthatof
theformeradministratorcomesfromoneVidalReynes,atailorbyprofession,and
isnotatallimpressive.
Thestandardofresponsibilityoftheadministratorisbestmeasuredasinessence
the responsibility of a bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretion
honestly and in good faith, or he will become personally liable, to those who are
interested in the estate, for waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where an
administrator,entrustedwiththecarryingonofanestate,actsingoodfaithandin
accordance with the usual rules and methods obtaining in such business, he will
notbeheldliableforlossesincurred.
RULE81
BONDOFEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS
Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount. Conditions. Before an

executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters
ATENEOLAW2010
testamentary or administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the

courtdirects,conditionedasfollows:
(a)Tomakeandreturntothecourt,withinthree(3)months,atrueandcomplete
inventoryofallgoods,chattels,rights,credits,andestateofthedeceasedwhich
shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other
personforhim;
(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the
will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at
anytimecometohispossessionortothepossessionofanyotherpersonforhim,
and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on
thesame,orsuchdividendsthereonasshallbedecreedbythecourt;
(c)Torenderatrueandjustaccountofhisadministrationtothecourtwithinone
(1)years,andatanyothertimewhenrequiredbythecourt;
(d)Toperformallordersofthecourtbyhimtobeperformed.
Section2.Bondofexecutorwheredirectedinwill.Whenfurtherbondrequired.If
thetestatorinhiswilldirectsthattheexecutorsservewithoutbond,orwithonly
hisindividualbond,hemaybeallowedbythecourttogivebondinsuchsumand
withsuchsuretyasthecourtapprovesconditionedonlytopaythedebtsofthe
testator; but the court may require of the executor a further bond in case of a
change in his circumstance, or for other sufficient case, with the conditions
namedinthelastprecedingsection.
Section 3. Bonds of joint executors and administrators. When two or more

personsareappointedexecutorsoradministratorsthecourtmaytakeaseparate
bondfromeach,orajointbondfromall.
Section4.Bondofspecialadministrator.Aspecialadministratorbeforeentering
upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs,
conditionedthathewillmakeandreturnatrueinventoryofthegoods,chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or
knowledge,andthathewilltrulyaccountforsuchasarereceivedbyhimwhen
requiredbythecourt,andwilldeliverthesametothepersonappointedexecutor
oradministrator,ortosuchotherpersonasmaybeauthorizedtoreceivethem.
RULE82
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
60
REVOCATIONOFADMINISTRATION,DEATH,RESIGNATION,ANDREMOVALOF
EXECUTORSORADMINISTRATORS
Section 1. Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings thereupon. If

afterlettersofadministrationhavebeengrantedontheestateofadecedentasif
hehaddiedintestate,hiswillisprovedandallowedbythecourt,thelettersof
administration shall be revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the
administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, and render his
accountwithsuchtimeasthecourtdirects.Proceedingfortheissuanceofletters
testamentary or of administration under the will shall be as hereinbefore
provided.
Section 2. Court may be remove or accept resignation of executor or

administrator.Proceedingupondeath,resignation,orremoval.Ifanexecutoror
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to
law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly
providedbytheserules,orabsconds,orbecomesinsane,orotherwiseincapable
or insuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its
discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies,
resign, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer
thethetrustalone,unlessthecourtgrantsletterstosomeonetoactwithhim.If
there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be to any
suitableperson.
Section3.Actsbeforerevocation,resignation,orremovaltobevalid.Thelawful
acts of an executor or administrator before the revocation of his letters
testamentary or of administration, or before his resignation or removal, shall
have the like validity as if there had been no such revocation, resignation, or
removal.
Section 4. Powers of new executor or administrator. Renewal of license to sell

real estate. The person to whom letters testamentary or of administration are
granted after the revocation of former letters, or the death, resignation, or
removal of a former executor or administrator, shall have the like powers to
collect and settle the estate not administered that the former executor or
administrator had, and may prosecute or defend actions commenced by or
againsttheformerexecutororadministrator,andhaveexecutiononjudgments
recovered in the name of such former executor or administrator. An authority
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granted by the court to the former executor or administrator for the sale or
mortgageofrealestatemayberenewedinfavorofsuchpersonwithoutfurther
noticeorhearing.
90
SOCIEDADDELIZZARGAHERMANOSV.ABADA
40PHIL124
FACTS:
1. Caponong died with debts payable to the Sociedad. Caponongs widow
wasdulyappointedasadministratrix,togetherwiththeappointmentof
commissionerstoappraisetheestateaswellastofacilitatepaymentof
accountsleftbythedecedent.
2. In the meanwhile, the widow leased the Hacienda Coronacion to a
certain Zayco and when she married her codefendant Alvarez, Zayco
transferredtheleasetoAlvarez.
3. The plaintiffs after 7 years from the death of Caponong then sued the
widowinherownpersonalcapacityandasadministratrix.Theyalleged
that the widow owed them money, which she used in exploiting the
Hacienda.
4. The widow in turn admitted to her debt payable. The guardian of the
minor children of Caponong then sought to intervene, and was allowed
todoso,andaverredthattheestatedidntoweanythingtotheplaintiffs.
5. Thereafter, the parties alleged that they had all reached an amicable
settlementandsoughtthedismissaloftheproceedings.Thecourtduly
dismissedthecomplaint.Atthispointintime,theintestateproceeding
wasstillpending.
6. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought attachment of properties for
satisfaction of the debt notwithstanding the compromise agreement.
They averred that the defendants were not complying with the
agreementandsoughtsatisfactionofthedebt.
7. Priortoattaching,thedefendantsfiledanamendedanswer,wherethey
averred that the commissioners only allowed n amount of money to be
paid, that the properties sought to be attached were owned by the
children and that the interest of the widow was limited to usufructuary
rights.
8. Defendants were in turn sustained by the court and consequently, the
claims against the minor children were dropped and the court held the
widowliablefornamountofmoney.Tothis,sheappealed.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
61
HELD:
Thelawdeclaresthatcommissionersshallpassuponallclaimsagainsttheestate.
Theyhaddonesointhiscase.Thelawfixedthelimitoftheestate'sliability.The
courtcouldnotchargeitwithdebtsthatwereneverowedbyit.Theadministratrix
could only charge the estate with the reasonable and proper expenses of
administration.
The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the commissioners passed on
their claim. Part of this has been paid, and there was a balance due plaintiffs of
P8,555.78atthetimeofthetrial,plusinterest.Theplaintiffs,aftertheirclaimhad
been presented and allowed by the commissioners, made advances to the
administratrixtilltheirclaimwasmorethanP68,000.
ItisurgedthatthemajorpartofthisdebtofP68,000is administrationexpenses,
andassuchischargeableagainsttheassetsoftheestate.Noreasonisgivenwhy
theexpenseofadministrationshouldbesogreat,andtheevidencefailstosustain
thisposition.
The administration expense would be the necessary expenses of handling the

property, of protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and possibly
producing a crop, but if plaintiffs, holding a claim originally for less than P13,000
against the estate, let the administratrix have money and effects till their claim
grow to P68,000 they can not be permitted to charge this amount as expense of
administration. They might be allowed to charge it against the current revenue
from the hacienda or the net proceeds of the "exploitation of the hacienda" for
whichitwasobtainedandused,asplaintiffsallege,butitcannotrelatebacktothe
presenting of their claim to the commissioners, and be a charge against the
inheritance of the heirs, or even a claim to prorate with other creditors' claims
allowedbythecommissioners.Byexpenseofadministrationweunderstandtobe
thereasonableandnecessaryexpenseofcaringforthepropertyandmanagingit
tillthedebtsarepaid,asprovidedbylaw,andofdividingit,ifnecessary,soasto
partitionitanddelivertotheheirs.
Thecourtcouldnotapproveasettlementsaddlingupontheestatedebtsitnever
owed,andifitdid,itsapprovalwouldbeanullity.
To give effect to the compromise as written would result in great wrong, and
destroy every chance the minor children had to participate in the inheritance of
theirfather.
ATENEOLAW2010
91
WARNERBARNESV.LUZONSURETY
95PHIL924
FACTS:
WarnerBarnesfiledacaseforrecoveryofsumofmoneyfromLuzonSurety.Thisis
premisedonthefailureofthedeceasedadministratrixoftheestateofGonzagato
complywiththeconditionsofherbond,andtopaytheallegedclaimsofWarner
from the estate. Luzon Surety alleged that until the time that the administratrix
died,thecourtdidntallowheryettopayWarnersclaims.Luzonalsoallegedthat
were it not for her untimely death, the administratrix could have complied
faithfullywithherobligationsaswellastheconditionsimposedbythebond.The
trialcourtruledinfavoroftheplaintiffandordereddefendanttopay.
HELD:
Itwasproperforthecourttodecideontheclaimagainstthesuretybond.While
the probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture and enforcement of an
administrators bond, it doesnt mean that the same may not be litigated in an
ordinary civil action brought before the court of first instance. Moreover, where
there are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased
administrator, the creditor may enforce then his bond against the surety which
bounditselfjointlyandseverallyinthecasewherethebondwasfiled.
92
WILSONV.REAR
55PHIL44
FACTS:
CharlesRearwasmurderedwhilebeinginhisplantationinCotabato.Wilsonwas
appointedasadministrator.Thecommissionerswereabletomaketheinventory
of the properties of the estate and likewise, the claims against it. The
administrator was then allowed, with the approval of the heirs, to sell all the
properties,duetothefactthattherewasntsufficientmoneytosettletheclaims.
Afterthesaleandpayment,theadministratorfileditsfinalreportandaccounting.
Thiswasapprovedbythecourtnotwithstandingnumerousobjectionsonthepart
oftheheirs.
HELD:
Wilson was appointed and qualified as administrator, and the law imposed upon
him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the estate in a
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
62
businesslike manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate without any
unreasonableorunnecessarydelay.Hewasnotappointedtoactfororonbehalfof
the creditors, or to represent the interests of the heirs only. He should have
administeredtheaffairsoftheestatefortheuseandbenefitalikeofallinterested
persons, as any prudent business man would handle his own personal business.
Whenappointed,itisthelegaldutyoftheadministratortoadminister,settle,and
close the administration in the ordinary course of business, without any
unnecessarydelay.Neitherdoesanadministrator,inparticular,withoutaspecific
showingoranorderofthecourt,haveanylegalrighttocontinuetheoperationof
the business in which the deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the
assetsoftheestateinthepaymentofoperatingexpenses.Yet,intheinstantcase,
theadministratoronhisownvolitionandwithoutanyauthorityorprocessofcourt
continued the operation of the plantation, and in the end, as shown by his own
report,theestatewasdiminishedandlost.
93
LUZONSURETYV.QUEBRAL
127SCRA295
FACTS:
Luzon Surety issued administrator bonds in favor of administrator Quebral with
respect to two estate proceedings. Indemnity agreements were entered into for
the payment of the premiums due. Because the premiums were not yet paid in
full, Luzon Surety sought payment. In the meanwhile, Quebral filed a motion in
courtforthecancellationofthebondsbyvirtueoftheapprovaloftheprojectof
partitionandliquidation.
HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to
putupabondforthepurposeofindemnifyingthecreditors,heirs,legateesandthe
estate.Itisconditioneduponthefaithfulperformanceoftheadministrator'strust.
Havinginmindthepurposeand intent of the law,the suretyis thenliableunder

theadministrator'sbond,foraslongastheadministratorhasdutiestodoassuch
administrator/executor.Sincetheliabilityofthesuretiesiscoextensivewiththat
oftheadministratorandembracestheperformanceofeverydutyheiscalledupon
toperforminthecourseofadministration,itfollowsthattheadministratorisstill
duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in
considerationofthesuretyship.
ATENEOLAW2010
ItisshownthatthedefendantappellantPastorT.Quebrar,stillhadsomethingto
doasanadministrator/executorevenaftertheapprovaloftheamendedprojectof
partitionandaccounts.
Thecontentionofthedefendantsappellantsthattheadministrator'sbondceased
to be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project of partition and
statementofaccountsonJune6,1957iswithoutmerit.Thedefendantappellant
Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for
administrationisforthepurposeofliquidationoftheestateanddistributionofthe
residueamongtheheirsandlegatees.Andliquidationmeansthedeterminationof
alltheassetsoftheestateandpaymentofallthedebtsandexpenses.Itappears
that there were still debts and expenses to be paid. To allow the defendants
appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity Agreements by non
payment of the premiums would ultimately lead to giving the administrator the
power to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify his liability under the
Administrator'sBonds.Asalreadystated,thisiscontrarytotheintentandpurpose
of the law in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection of the
creditors,heirs,legatees,andtheestate.
94
COSMEDEMENDOZAV.PACHECO
64PHIL134
FACTS:
Sorianowastheformeradministratoroftheestate.Toensurecompliancewithhis
duties,hewasmadetoissueabond,whereindefendantsactedassureties.When
the new administratrix was appointed, the former administrator had accounts
payable to the estate. And since he had insufficient funds, the bond was made
answerable.However,havingrealpropertiestosatisfypartiallythepayables,only
a small balance was left to be paid. The sureties sought to be excused from
payment but was overruled. On appeal, the case was remanded to the lower
court. And on the second time it reached the appellate court, the sureties
questionedthejurisdictionoftheprobatecourttoorderexecutionofthebond.
HELD:
It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is
empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount
thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty.
Possessed,asitis,withanallembracingpowerovertheadministrator'sbondand
overadministrationproceedings,aCourtofFirstInstanceinaprobateproceeding
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
63
cannotbedevoidoflegalauthoritytoexecuteandmakethatbondanswerablefor
theverypurposeforwhichitwasfiled.Itistruethatthelawdoesnotsayexpressly
or in so many words that such court has power to execute the bond of an
administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as
eloquentlyasifitwerephrasedinunequivocalterm.Whentheaccountabilityofan
administrator's bond is spoken of in the very provisions dealing with and bearing
directlyonadministrationproceedings,itwouldinvolveastrainedconstructionto
hold,asappellantswouldhaveusdo,thatwhereanadministratorisheldliablefor
adevastravitforhavingsquanderedandmisappliedpropertywhichhewasinduty
boundtomarshalandconserve,theestateiswithoutaremedytogoagainstthe
administrator'sbondinthesameprobateproceedings,butinanactionoutsideof
andseparatefromit.Inthisconnection,itshouldbeobservedthatsection683of
theCodeofCivilProcedureprovidesthat"Uponthesettlementoftheaccountof
an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety in
respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to such
accounting, and may have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided." There is
here afforded to a person who may be held liable as surety in respect to an
administrator's account the right, upon application, to be admitted as a party to
theiraccounting,fromwhichwemaynotunreasonablyinferthatasurety,likethe
appellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond
duringtheprocessofaccounting,thatis,withintherecognizedconfinesofprobate
proceedings,andnotinanactionapartanddistinctfromsuchproceedings.
95
GUSTILOV.SIAN
53PHIL155
FACTS:
Agripino was appointed as the administrator of his late fathers estate. His own
motherandfellowheirsmovedforhisremoval,forallegedlybeingnegligentinhis
duties as well as for incurring exorbitant and illegal accounts. Agripino in the
meanwhile submitted reports which didnt coincide with each other and he even
prayedthathebeallowedamonthlysalarythatcreditorsoftheestateopposedto.
Thecourtconsequentlyorderedhisremovalaswellas theexecutionofthebond
hefiled.
HELD:
Acarefulexaminationofthefactsrevealedinthisrecordconcerningtheactivities
of Agripino S. Gustilo, as administrator of Angel Gustilo, convinces this court that
heisnotafitpersontobeadministratorofthisestateandthathehasnotinfact
ATENEOLAW2010
administereditsofarwithdueregardtotherightsofotherpersonsininterest.Itis
the opinion of the court, therefore, that he should be removed and required to
renderhisaccountsasadministrator,inaccordancewiththesecondassignmentof
error.
Thethirdassignmentoferror,takingexceptiontotherefusalofthetrialcourtto
ordertheforfeitureofthebondoftheadministrator,inouropinioncontemplates
anorderthatwouldbepremature.
96
DEGALAV.CENIZAANDUMIPIG
78PHIL791
FACTS:
Umipig was appointed as administrator of the estate of Mina. Petitioner Degala
sought his removal and upon being denied by the court, filed a petition for
certiorari. Among others, he alleged that Umipig is a stranger to the estate and
thathehasanadverseinteresttotheestate,andassuch,shouldberemovedas
soonaspossible.
HELD:
Undertheveryruleinvokedbythepetitioner,theremovalofanadministratorlies
withinthediscretionofthecourtappointinghim.Thesufficiencyofanygroundfor
removal should thus be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in first
place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformabletoorindisregardoftherulesortheordersofthecourt.Wecannot
merelysubstituteourwayofthinkingforthatofalowercourtinmattersunderits
discretionary power. And in the case at bar, we cannot hold that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion, particularly in view of the circumstance that
theallegedgroundsforremovalarenotinfactweighty.
First, the fact that the former administrator is his counsel doesnt automatically
mean that he has an adverse interest in the estate. Second, it doesnt
automatically mean that when he has failed to pay some taxes, it was done
willfully. It might be the case that there was lack of funds to sustain payment.
Third,whetherthestatementofaccountswasfiledontimeandwhetherthesame
iscompleteandcorrect,aremattersaddressedtothejudgmentanddiscretionof
the respondent Judge. It may not be amiss to add that the latter will of course
know when to resort to the bond filed by the respondent administrator who, by
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
64
theway,isnotaloneinthetrust,itappearingthathiscounselhasbeenappointed
specialcoadministrator.
RULE83
INVENTORYANDAPPRAISAL.PROVISIONFORSUPPORTOFFAMILY
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. Within

three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall
returntothecourtatrueinventoryandappraisalofallrealandpersonalestate
of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisementofsuchestate,thecourtmayorderoneormoreoftheinheritance
taxappraiserstogivehisortheirassistance.
WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INVENTORIED AND APPRAISED BY THE

ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR?
Realorpersonalestateofthedecedent
ARE ONLY THOSE PROPERTIES WHICH IS IN HIS POSSESSION THAT SHOULD BE

INVENTORIEDANDAPPRAISED?
No
Inpossessionorhascomeintohisknowledge
Section 2. Certain article not to be inventoried. The wearing apparel of the

surviving husband or wife and minor children., the marriage bed and bedding,
and such provisions and other articles as will necessarily be consumed in the
substinenceofthefamilyofthedeceased,underthedirectionofthecourt,shall
notbeconsideredasassets,noradministeredassuch,andshallnotbeincluded
intheinventory.
Section 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or

incapacitatedchildrenofadeceasedperson,duringthesettlementoftheestate,
shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
providedbylaw.
97
CHUATANV.DELROSARIO
57PHIL411
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
Santa Juana was the administratrix of the estate of Chua Piaco. She filed a case
againstdelRosario,theadministratrixoftheestateofChuaToco,Piacosadopted
son. Santa Juana demanded del Rosario to render an accounting on allegedly
deliveredfundsintrustbytheChuaPiacotoChuaToco,whichdelRosarioallegedly
refusedtodo.JudgmentonthiscasewasrenderedagainstSantaJuanahowever.
And in the present case, plaintiffs are the presumptive heirs of Chua Piaco who
soughtpartitionoffunds.Thelowercourtsustainedthedefenseofresjudicata.
HELD:
Itisthedutyoftheadministratorofthetestateorintestateestateofadeceasedto
presentaninventoryoftherealestateandallgoods,chattels,rights,andcreditsof
the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge, in accordance
with the provisions of section 668 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to manage
themaccordingtosection643ofthesameCode;andinorderthathemayhavein
his power and under his custody all such property, section 702 of the aforesaid
Code authorizes him to bring such actions for the purpose as he may deem
necessary.Section642inprovidingfortheappointmentofanadministratorwhere
thereisnowillorthewilldoesnotnameanexecutor,seekstoprotectnotonlythe
estateofthedeceasedbutalsotherightsofthecreditorsinorderthattheymaybe
able to collect their credits, and of the heirs and legatees in order that they may
receivetheportionoftheinheritanceorlegacyappertainingtothemafterallthe
debts and expenses chargeable against the deceased's estate have been paid.
Undertheprovisionsofthelaw,therefore,thejudicialadministratoristhelegal
representativenotonlyofthetestateorintestateestate,butalsoofthecreditors,
andheirsandlegatees,inasmuchasherepresentstheirinterestintheestateof
thedeceased.
Santa Juana, as administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Chua Piaco, was
thelegalrepresentativenotonlyofsaidestatebutalsoofitscreditorsandheirs.In
view of this relation of agent and principal between her and the plaintiffs in the
present case, the decision rendered against Benedicta Santa Juana, as such
administratrix, in the former case is conclusive and binding upon said plaintiffs in
thepresentcase..
Afinaljudgmentuponthemeritsrenderedagainstthejudicialadministratrixofan
intestateestate,assuch,inacasewheresheisplaintiffandtheadministratrixof
anotherintestateestate,assuchisthedefendant,inwhichsheseekstosecurean
accounting of funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the deceased,
representedbytheplaintiffadministratrix,totheotherdeceased,representedby
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
65
the defendant administratrix, constitutes res judicata in another case where the
heirs of the alleged donor are plaintiffs and the administratrix of the supposed
trusteeisdefendant,andinwhichthepartitionofthesamefundsandtheproducts
thereofissoughtbetweentheheirsofboth,underthesameallegationoftrust,the
allegedtrusteebeingtheadoptedchildofthedonor.
98
ADAPONV.MARALIT
69PHIL411
FACTS:
Pedro Adapon petitioned the probate of his late fathers will and it was duly
probated.Hewasappointedastheadministratoroftheestateanddulyfiledthe
inventoryofproperties.Thesecondwifeofhislatefatheropposed.Shealleged
that the administrator failed to account for certain properties owned by the
testator.Heisalsodemandedtopaymonthlyallowancetothewidow.Adaponon
theotherhandallegedthat he owned theproperties in dispute and shouldnt be
includedintheinventory.TheprobatecourtdecidedinfavorofAdapon.
HELD:
Under section 599 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the probate jurisdiction of the
CourtofFirstInstancerelatesonlytomattershavingtodowiththesettlementof
estatesandprobateofwillsofdeceasedpersons,theappointmentandremovalof
guardiansandtrustees,andthepowers,duties,andrightsofguardiansandwards,
trustees, and cestuis que trust." As may be seen, the law does not extend the
jurisdictionofaprobatecourttothedeterminationofquestionsofownershipthat
ariseduringtheproceeding.
InthecaseofBauermannvs.Casas(10Phil.,392393)thiscourt,inpassingupon
thesamequestionnowraisedobservedthat"themerefactthatoneoftheparties
is an executor or administrator of a certain estate does not give exclusive
jurisdiction to the probate court wherein the estate is being settled, of questions
arisingbetweensuchtheexecutorsoradministratorsandthirdpersons,astothe
ownershipofspecificproperty.Ofcoursewhenitisoncedeterminedthatcertain
property is the property of the estate is being settled, but until this question is
decided the mere allegation that certain property is the property of an estate in
courseofjurisdictionoverquestionstouchingtheownershipofsuchpropertyand
rights based on the right of ownership." In Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil., 281), the
same doctrine was reiterated with greater force and emphasis, the court there
holdingthatacontestedclaimofanadministratorthatcertainrightsofpossession
ATENEOLAW2010
and ownership are the property, of the estate which he represent must be
determinedinaseparateaction,andnotintheadministrationproceedings."Again,
this Court in Guzman vs. Anog and Anog (37 Phil., 6263),decided that "when
questionsariseastotheownershipofproperty,allegedtobeapartoftheestate
ofadeceasedperson,butclaimedbysomeotherpersontobehisproperty,notby
virtueofanyrightofinheritancefromthedeceased,butbytitleadversetothatof
thedeceasedandhisestate,suchquestionscannotbedeterminedinthatcourseof
administrationproceedings.TheCourtofFirstInstance,actingasaprobatecourt,
hasnojurisdictionto,adjudicatesuchcontentions,whichmustbesubmittedtothe
courtintheexerciseofitsgeneraljurisdictionasaCourtofFirstInstancetotryand
determinetheordinaryactionsmentionedintheCodeofCivilProcedure."Finally,
in the case of Lunsod vs. Ortega (46 Phil., 676) where the same question like as
presented, the Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in the foregoing cases
statingthat"itisanestablisheddoctrineofthiscourtthatthemerefactthatoneof
thepartiesistheexecutororadministratoroftheestateofadeceasedpersondoes
notconferupontheprobatecourt,inwhichtheproceedingforthedistributionand
settlementofsaidestatearepending,exclusivejurisdictiontodecideallquestion
thatmayarisebetweenthesaidexecutororadministratorandthirdpersonsasto
thetitleofaspecificproperty."
99
MOOREANDSONSMERCANTILECO.V.WAGNER
50PHIL128
FACTS:
InthesettlementoftheintestateestateofSamuelAllen,hiswidowprayedthatthe
court orders the administrator to give her and her childrenallowance. Thecourt
orderedforthesame,despiteoppositiononthegroundthattheestateisinsolvent.
HELD:
Thatthesupportdoesnotencumberthepropertyofthedeceasedspouse,butthe
general estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant
the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the
residueoftheestate,thewifecanalwaysbeallowedsupportaspartpaymentof
the income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior to the
termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does not seem logical to
denythesamebeforeknowingexactlytheresultoftheliquidation,justbecauseof
the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates
moreorlessuncertain,andwithoutanysufficientproofofitsreality.Thejudgeor
theadministrator,asthecasemaybe,mustgrantthesupportreferredtoinarticle
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
66
1430, when the same is requested, and if the creditors believe that they are
prejudiced by such an action, by separating from the estate a part of its income,
they can appeal to the court therefrom, by satisfactorily proving that there is no
property or asset that may, in any case, be allotted to the interested parties. It
havingproventhatnoproperty,eitherprivateorconjugal,pertainstothesurviving
spouseortheheirsofthedeceased,thesupportcannotbegranted,becausethis,
ineffect,accordingtoarticle1430,isonlyanadvancepaymentonaccoountofthe
respectiveshareofeachpartner.
Such is the case now before us. It appears from the record that the liabilities
exceedtheassetsoftheestateofSamuelWilliamAllenandthathiswidow,byher
ownadmission,hadnotcontributedanypropertytothemarriage.Wherefore,itis
unlawful, in the present case, to grant the support, having the character of an
advancepaymenttobedeductedfromtherespectiveshareofeachpartner,when
thereisnopropertytobepartitioned,lacksthelegalbasisprovidedbyarticle1430.
100
SANTEROV.CFI
153SCRA728
FACTS:
PabloSanterodied,begottingchildrenfromtwowomen.Onthesettlementofhis
estate, on behalf of her children, Diaz filed for the grant of allowance. She
providedinhermotion,theneedtosustaindailyschoolingandotherexpensesof
the children. Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any
allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully
employedandoneismarriedasprovidedforunderSec.3Rule83,oftheRulesof
Court.Petitionersalsoallegethattherewasmisrepresentationonthepartofthe
guardianinaskingforallowancefortuitionfees,booksandotherschoolmaterials
and other miscellaneous expenses for school term 198283 because these wards
havealreadyattainedmajorityagesothattheyarenolongerunderguardianship.
TheyfurtherallegethattheadministratoroftheestateofPabloSanterodoesnot
have sufficient funds to cover said allowance because whatever funds are in the
handsoftheadministratorconstitutefundsheldintrustforthebenefitofwhoever
will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now
heldbytheadministratorarederived.
HELD:
Thefactthatprivaterespondentsareofage,gainfullyemployed,ormarriedisof
nomomentandshouldnotberegardedasthedeterminingfactoroftheirrightto
ATENEOLAW2010
allowanceunderArt.188.WhiletheRulesofCourtlimitallowancestothewidow
andminororincapacitatedchildrenofthedeceased,theNewCivilCodegivesthe
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are
entitledtoallowancesasadvancesfromtheirsharesintheinheritancefromtheir
fatherPabloSantero.SincetheprovisionoftheCivilCode,asubstantivelaw,gives
the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the
liquidationoftheestateofthedeceased,suchrightcannotbeimpairedbyRule83
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that
withrespectto"spouse,"thesamemustbethe"legitimatespouse"(notcommon
lawspouseswhoarethemothersofthechildrenhere).
RULE84
GENERALPOWERSANDDUTIESOFEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS
Section 1. Executor or administrator to have access to partnership books and

property. How right enforced. The executor or administrator of the estate of a
deceased partner shall at all times have access to, and may examine and take
copies of, books and papers relating to the partnership business, and make
examine and make invoices of the property belonging to such partnership; and
thesurvivingpartnerorpartners,onrequest,shallexhibittohimallsuchbooks,
papers,andpropertyintheirhandsorcontrol.Onthewrittenapplicationofsuch
executor or administrator, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may order
anysuchsurvivingpartnerorpartnerstofreelypermittheexerciseoftherights,
and to exhibit the books, papers, and property, as in this section provided, and
maypunishanypartnerfailingtodosoforcontempt.
Section 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings in repair. An executor or

administrator shall maintain in tenable repair the houses and other structures
and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the
heirsordeviseeswhendirectedsotodobythecourt.
Section3.Executororadministratortoretainwholeestatetopaydebts,andto
administerestatenotwilled.Anexecutororadministratorshallhavetherightto
thepossessionandmanagementoftherealaswellasthepersonalestateofthe
deceasedsolongasitisnecessaryforthepaymentofthedebtsandtheexpenses
ofadministration.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
67
WHATARETHEGENERALPOWERSOFANEXECUTORORADMINISTRATOR?
1. Have access to partnership books and accounts, in the case of
partnership
2. Tokeepbuildingsandotherpropertiesinrepair
3. Toretainwholeestatetopaydebts
4. Toadministerpropertiesnotmentionedinthewill
5. To bring and defend suits which survived upon death of the decedent
(Rule87)
101
CONCEPCIONJOCSONDEHILADOV.NAVA
69PHIL1
FACTS:
Theadministratrixenteredintoacontractofleaseofoneofthepropertiesofthe
estate. This was entered into without the intervention of the court. Opposition
wasthenentered,fortheannulmentofsuchcontract.
HELD:
Thecontracthereinquestionbeingamereactofadministration,couldvalidybe
entered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even
without the court's previous authority. And the court had no power to annul or
invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction
overthepersonofthelessee.
102
SANDIEGOV.NOMBRE
11SCRA165
FACTS:
Nombrewasinitiallytheappointedadministratoroftheestate.Heenteredintoa
lease contract with Escaler for a period of 3 years. This was done without
authorization of the court. Nombre was removed as an administrator and was
replaced. The court then sought the annulment of the contract, for lack of
authorization.
HELD:
TheCourtofAppealswascorrectinsustainingthevalidityofthecontractoflease
infavorofEscanlar,notwithstandingthelackofpriorauthorityandapproval.The
lawandprevailingjurisprudenceonthemattermilitatesinfavorofthisview.While
it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent
ATENEOLAW2010
(petitionerallegesthatbothactinrepresentativecapacity),areinsomerespects,
identical,theprovisionsonagency(Art.1878,C.C.),shouldnotapplytoajudicial
administrator.AjudicialadministratorisappointedbytheCourt.Heisnotonlythe
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua
Tan v. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his
duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case of
agency.Theagentisonlyanswerabletohisprincipal.Theprotectionwhichthelaw
gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the
factthatcontrolbytheprincipalcanonlybethruagreements,whereastheactsof
a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions oflawandordersofthe
appointingcourt.
103
JARODAV.CUSI
28SCRA1008
FACTS:
Tan filed a petition for the estate proceedings of Villa Abrille. He was duly
appointed as regular administrator. During the proceedings, he first sought
permissiontowithdrawmoneyfromthebankaccountofthedeceased.Thecourt
foundthemotionmeritorious.Next,allegingthatthedeceasedwasthemanager
and coowner of a subdivision, he sought authorization to sell the same. He was
likewiseauthorized.Jarodathenenteredhisoppositionbutthecourtoverruledhis
opposition.
HELD:
The order allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank deposits
standinginthenameofthedecedentisinabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackof
jurisdiction.Inthefirstplace,saidwithdrawalisforeigntothepowersanddutiesof
a special administrator, which, are to take possession and charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits and estate of the decease and preserve the same for the
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable
and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be
liabletopayanydebtsofthedeceasedunlesssoorderedbythecourt.
In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the
heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a
takingofpossessionandchargeofthecreditsoftheestate,andapparentlywithin
thepowersanddutiesofaspecialadministrator;butactually,saidwithdrawalisa
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
68
waiverbythespecialadministratorofaprimafacieexclusiverightoftheintestate
estatetothebankdepositsinfavorofthecoownersoftheJunaSubdivision,who
were allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in his motion.
Thebankdepositswereinthenameofthedeceased;they,therefore,belongprima
facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by proper
evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may be filed in the intestate
proceedings,thespecialadministratoriswithoutpowertomakethewaiverorto
handoverpartoftheestate,orwhatappearstobeaprimafaciepartoftheestate,
tootherpersonsonthegroundthattheestateisnottheownerthereof.Ifevento
sellforvaluableconsiderationpropertyoftheestaterequirespriorwrittennotice
oftheapplicationtotheheirs,legatees,ordeviseesunderRule89oftheRulesof
Court,suchnoticeisequally,ifnotmore,indispensablefordisposinggratuitously
of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice was
given,andwithoutitthecourt'sauthorityisinvalidandimproper.
Secondly, the order approving the power of attorney executed by administrator

Tanandappointinghimselfasattorneyinfacttosellthesubdivisionlotsforaprice
athisdiscretionis,likewise,voidforwantofnoticeandforapprovinganimproper
contractortransaction.
The rule requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are
interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not
furnishsuchnotice.Withoutsuchnotice,theorderofthecourtauthorizingthesale
isvoid.
RULE85
ACCOUNTABILITYANDCOMPENSATIONOFEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS
Section 1. Executor or administrator chargeable with all estate and income.

Exceptasotherwiseexpresslyprovidedinthefollowingsections,everyexecutor
oradministratorischargeableinhisaccountwiththewholeoftheestateofthe
deceasedwhichhascomeintohispossession,atthevalueoftheappraisement
contained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and income of such
estate;andwiththeproceedsofsomuchoftheestateasissoldbyhim,atthe
priceatwhichitwassold.
TOWHATISTHEADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTORACCOUNTABLEFOR?
ATENEOLAW2010
With the whole of the estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession,atthevalueoftheappraisementcontainedintheinventory;
with all the interest, profit, and income of such estate; and with the
proceedsofsomuchoftheestateasissoldbyhim,atthepriceatwhich
itwassold.
Section2.Nottoprofitbyincreaseorlosebydecreaseinvalue.Noexecutoror
administrator shall profit by the increase, or suffer loss by the decrease or
destruction,withouthisfault,ofanypartoftheestate.Hemustaccountforthe
excesswhenhesellsanypartoftheestateformorethantheappraisement,and
ifanyissoldforthelessthantheappraisement,heisnotresponsiblefortheloss,
ifthesalehasjustlymade.Ifhesettlesanyclaimagainsttheestateforlessthan
its nominal value, he is entitled to charge in his account only the amount he
actuallypaidonthesettlement.
Section 3. When not accountable for debts due estate. No executor or

administrator shall be accountable for debts due the deceased which remain
uncollectedwithouthisfault.
Section 4. Accountable for income from realty used by him. If the executor or
administrator uses or occupies any part of the real estate himself, he shall
accountforitasmaybeagreeduponbetweenhimandthepartiesinterested,or
adjustedbythecourtwiththeirassent;andifthepartiesdonotagreeuponthe
sum to be allowed, the same may be ascertained by the court, whose
determinationinthisrespectshallbefinal.
Section 5. Accountable if he neglects or delays to raise or pay money. When an

executor or administrator neglects or unreasonably delays to raise money, by
collecting the debts or selling the real or personal estate of the deceased, or
neglectstopayoverthemoneyhehasinhishands,andthevalueoftheestateis
thereby lessened or unnecessary cost or interest accrues, or the persons
interestedsufferloss,thesameshallbedeemedwasteandthedamagesustained
may be charged and allowed against him in his account, and he shall be liable
thereforonhisbond.
WHEN MAY UNCOLLECTED DEBTS BE CHARGEABLE TO THE

EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATORSACCOUNT?
If there is negligence, fault or unreasonable delay on the part of the

executororadministrator
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
69
Section6.Whenallowedmoneypaidascost.Theamountpaidbyanexecutoror
administrator for costs awarded against him shall be allowed in his
administrationaccount,unlessitappearsthattheactionorproceedinginwhich
the costs are taxed was prosecuted or resisted without just cause, and not in
goodfaith.
MAY COSTS AWARDED AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATOR OR EXECUTOR BE

ALLOWEDINHISADMINISTRATIONACCOUNT?
Generallyyes,hemaychargeitinhisadministrationaccount
Exceptionstotherule
o The action or proceeding involved was prosecuted or resisted
withoutjustcause,andnotingoodfaith
Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to

charge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless
renounced.Anexecutororadministratorshallbeallowedthenecessaryexpenses
the care, management, and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four
pesos per day for the time actually and necessarily employed, or a commission
upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession and is
finally disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or
distributiveshares,orbydeliverytoheirsordevisees,oftwopercentumofthe
firstfivethousandpesosofsuchvalue,onepercentumofsomuchofsuchvalue
asexceedsfivethousandpesosanddoesnotexceedthirtythousandpesos,one
halfpercentumofsomuchofsuchvalueasexceedonehundredthousandpesos.
But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been
attendedwithgreatdifficulty,andhasrequiredahighdegreeofcapacityonthe
partoftheexecutororadministrator,agreatersummaybeallowed.Ifobjection
tothefeesallowedbetaken,theallowancemaybereexaminedonappeal.
Iftherearetwoormoreexecutorsoradministrators,thecompensationshallbe
apportionedamongthembythecourtaccordingtotheservicesactuallyrendered
bythemrespectively.
Whentheexecutorsoradministratorisanattorney,heshallnotchargeagainst
theestateanyprofessionalfeesforlegalservicesrenderedbyhim.
Whenthedeceasedbywillmakessomeotherprovisionforthecompensationof
hisexecutor,thatprovisionshallbeafullsatisfactionforhisservicesunlessbya
ATENEOLAW2010
writteninstrumentfiledinthecourtherenouncesallclaimtothecompensation
providedbythewill.
HOWCANTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTORBECOMPENSATED?
Fornecessaryexpensesforthecare,managementandsettlementofthe
estate
Forhisservices
HOW CAN AN ADMINISTRATOR OR EXECUTOR BE COMPENSATED FOR HIS

SERVICES?
Itdependsifitistimebasedorcommissionbased
Iftimebased,P4/dayactuallyandnecessarilyemployed
Ifcommissionbased
o 2%forfirstP5000
o 1%forP500030000
o 0.5%forexceedingP100,000
WHATARETHEEXCEPTIONSTOTHERULEONCOMPENSATION?
1. Whenthedecedentmakesprovisioninhiswillforcompensation
2. In any special case, upon discretion of the court, the settlement of the
estateisattendedwithgreatdifficulty,andhasrequiredahighdegreeof
capacityonthepartoftheadministratororexecutor
WHOISPRIMARYLIABLEFORATTORNEYSFEES?
Theadministratororexecutor,subjecttoreimbursement
Section8.Whenexecutororadministratortorenderaccount.Everyexecutoror
administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year
from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the
court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims
against,orpayingthedebtsof,theestate,orfordisposingoftheestate;andhe
shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is
whollysettled.
WHENSHALLANEXECUTORORADMINISTRATORRENDERANACCOUNT?
Generalrule:within1yearsinceissuanceoflettersofadministrationor
testamentary
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
70
Exception: when the court directs otherwise because of extensions of

timeforpresentationofclaimsagainsttheestate,payingdebtsofestate,
orfordisposingtheestate
Section9.Examinationsonoathwithrespecttoaccount.Thecourtmayexamine
theexecutororadministratoruponoathwithrespecttoeverymatterrelatingto
anyaccountrenderedbyhim,andshallsoexaminehimastothecorrectnessof
hisaccountbeforethesameisallowed,exceptwhennoobjectionismadetothe
allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established by
competent proof. The heirs, legatees, distributees, and creditors of the estate
shallhavethesameprivilegeastheexecutororadministratorofbeingexamined
onoathonanymatterrelatingtoanadministrationaccount.
MAY THE RENDITION OF ACCOUNT BE FORGONE IF THERE IS A PARTITION

AGREEMENT?
No(Josonv.Joson)
Fortheheirstoknowthestateoftheestateandthishasbeenmandated
bytherules
Section10.Accounttobesettledonnotice.Beforetheaccountofanexecutoror
administratorisallowed,noticeshallbegiventopersonsinterestedofthetime
and place of examining and allowing the same; and such notice may be given
personally to such persons interested or by advertisement in a newspaper or
newspapers,orboth,asthecourtdirects.
MAYACOURTAUTOMATICALLYAPPROVEANACCOUNT?
No
Theremustbethefollowing
o Notice to all interested parties of the estateheirs, legatees,
devisees,creditors,distributees
o Noticemaybemadepersonallyorbypublication,orbyboth
Section11.Suretyonbondmaybepartytoaccounting.Uponthesettlementof
theaccountofanexecutororadministrator,apersonliableassuretyinrespect
tosuchaccountmay,uponapplication,beadmittedaspartytosuchaccounting.
DOESASURETYAUTOMATICALLYBECOMEAPARTYTOACCOUNTING?
No
Hemustfileanapplicationtothateffect
ATENEOLAW2010
104
GARCIAV.ESCUDERO
43PHIL437
FACTS:
Plaintiffs as the testators sisters were the testamentary heirs. Escudero and
another were appointed as administrators of the estate. Plaintiffs subsequently
prayed for the delivery of properties to them as well as the accounting for the
same.Escuderoassailedsuchmotionbyallegingthattheplaintiffsdonthaveany
standing in court, the properties in dispute not having been administered in
accordancewiththerules.
HELD:
The administrator isnt responsible for the loss, by a fortuitous event, of the
personalpropertiesunderadministrationintheabsenceofproofthatsaidlosswas
duetohisnegligence.Nordoesthefactthatnowrittenevidencewasintroduced
toprovethattheanimalsunderadministrationdiedofrinderpestrenderhimliable
forthevalueoftheanimals.
105
NICOLASV.NICOLAS
63PHIL332
FACTS:
Domingo Nicolas is the exadministrator of the estate. He appealed the order of
thecourt,allowingthe2accountshesubmittedbutlesserthanwhatheprayedfor.
Among others, he alleged not being given the opportunity to be heard on the
accounts he submitted. He likewise contested the fact of disapproving certain
paymentshemadeandtheexclusionofsomepleadingsandordershesubmitted
tosupporthisclaim.
HELD:
Whatsection779oftheCodeofCivilProcedurerequirestobetransmittedtothis
court in case of an appeal from a decree or order approving or disapproving the
accountsofanadministrator,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsection778,isa
certifiedtranscriptoftheappeal,order,decreeorjudgmentappealedfromandof
the accounts embraced in the order, the inclusion of any other order, decree or
judgment from which no appeal has been taken being unnecessary and
superfluous. The appealed order is the one dated June 20, 1934, and accounts
partially disapproved therein are those submitted by the exadministrator
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
71
appellant, dated August 14, 1933, and March 15, 1934, respectively, which
accountsappearintherecordonappeal,asamendedbyorderofthecourt.
The court a quo, therefore, committed no error in ordering the elimination from
the record on appeal of the other pleadings, decrees, orders and judgments not
appealed from, which, according to the appellant himself, are nothing more than
evidenceoftheservicesrenderedbyhimandhisattorney.
Withrespecttotheotherexpensesandfeeswhichtheexadministratorappellant
seeks to collect and which the lower court, rejected, the law only authorizes the
administratortocollectforhisservicesassuchthesumofP4foreverydayactually
and necessarily spent by him in the administration and care of the estate of a
deceasedperson,notforeveryactortaskhemightperform,evenifitweretotake
onlyafewminutestodoso,asindicatedbythenatureofthegreatmajorityofthe
task performed by him, for each and every one of which he seeks to collect P4.
Thereforethiscourtisoftheopinionthatthe18daysgrantedbythelowercourtto
the exadministratorappellant as actually and necessarily spent by him in the
performanceofhisduties,atP4aday,arereasonable.
106
UYTIOCOV.IMPERIAL
53PHIL802
FACTS:
Panis was formerly the counsel for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Uy Tioco was the administrator. Upon cessation of services, Panis submitted an
accountforthepaymentofhisattorneysfees.Despiteoppositionbytheguardian
ad litem of the minor children of deceased, the court granted the request of the
lawyer and ordered consequently the administrator to pay the former out of the
estatesfunds.
HELD:
Theargumentssubmittedindicateamisconceptionofthecharacteroftheliability
for the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the
executororadministratortoassisthimintheexecutionofhistrust.Theattorney
canthereforenotholdtheestatedirectlyliableforhisfees;suchfeesareallowed
to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the
paymentrestsontheexecutororadministrator,butifthefeespaidarebeneficial
totheestateandreasonable,heisentitledtothereimbursementfromtheestate.
ATENEOLAW2010
Suchpaymentshouldbeincludedinhisaccountsandthereimbursementtherefore
settleduponthenoticeprescribedinsection682oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.
107
DACANAYV.GERNANDEZ
53PHIL824
FACTS:
JustinianoDacanaydiedandwasoriginallysurvivedbyhislegitimatedaughterand
naturalchildren.Thelegitimatedaughtereventuallydiedandwassurvivedbyher
spouse Hernandez and children. The deceased Dacanay in this case was able to
leaveawill.Thelegitimatedaughterwasdeprivedofherrightfulshareduetoher
alleged disobedience. And despite opposition from Hernandez, the will was
admitted to probate. On the accounting of expenses, Tirso indicated therein as
accountthepaymentofattorneysfees.Thiswasoneofthethingscontested,on
thegroundthatthefeesshouldbeshoulderedbytheadministratorhimself.
HELD:
As will be seen, all of the fees relate to services rendered for the benefit of the
administrator himself and for that of the other natural children of Justiniano
Dacanayandnotforthebenefitoftheestate.
"The estate cannot be held liable for the costs of counsel fees arising out of
litigationbetweenthebeneficiariesthereofamongthemselves,orintheprotection
of the interest of a particular persons" (Woerner on Administration, 2d ed., sec.
516, and authorities there cited). It is true that an administrator may employ
competent counsel on questions which affects his duties as administrator and on
which he is in reasonable doubt and that reasonable expenses for such services
maybechargedagainsttheestatesubjecttotheapprovalofthecourt.Butsuchis
not the case here. In this case the administrator deliberately and knowingly
resortedtofalsifieddocumentsforthepurposeofdefraudingthelegitimateheirs
ofthedeceasedandthroughhisownbreachoftrust,broughtonthelitigationfor
which he now demands reimbursement for counsel fees. We know of no legal
authority for such reimbursement in these circumstances. The claim for P6,175 is
thereforedisallowed.
108
LACSONV.REYES
182SCRA729
FACTS:
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
72
Serquina submitted for probate the will of deceased Farlin. There being no
opposition, the will was duly admitted to probate. Thereafter, the counsel
Serquinasubmittedamotionforpaymentofattorneysfees.Thiswasopposedby
the heirs of Farlin, nonetheless, the court favored the payment and ordered that
thesamewouldconstitutealienoverthedistributionoftheestate.
HELD:
An administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he
hasincurredassuch,buthemaynotrecoverattorney'sfeesfromtheestate.His
compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of
executor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees. In one
case,"agreatersum[other than thatestablished by the rule] maybe allowed 'in
anyspecialcase,wheretheestateislarge,andthesettlementhasbeenattended
withgreatdifficulty,andhasrequiredahighdegreeofcapacityonthepartofthe
executororadministrator.'"Itisalsolefttothesounddiscretionofthecourt.With
respecttoattorney'sfees,therule,disallowsthem.Accordingly,totheextentthat
thetrialcourtsetasidethesumofP65,000.00asandforMr.Serquina'sattorney's
fees,tooperateasa"lienonthesubjectproperties,"thetrialjudgemustbesaidto
have gravely abused its discretion (apart from the fact that it never acquired
jurisdiction,inthefirstplace,toactonsaidMr.Serquina's"motionforattorney's
fees").
Thenextquestionisquiteobvious:Whoshouldersattorney'sfees?Wehaveheld
that a lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his
fees, but rather, his client. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself
thecounselfortheheirs,itisthelatterwhomustpaytherefor.
Inthatconnection,attorney'sfeesareinthenatureofactualdamages,whichmust
bedulyproved.Theyarealsosubjecttocertainstandards,towit:(1)theymustbe
reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the
subjectmatterincontroversy;(2)theextentoftheservicesrendered;and(3)the
professionalstandingofthelawyer. Inallcases,theymustbeaddressedinafull
blowntrialandnotonthebarewordoftheparties.Andalways,theyaresubjectto
themoderatinghandofthecourts.
109
ROSENSTOCKV.ELSER
48PHIL708
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
RosenstockpetitionedthewillofdeceasedElsertobeadmittedtoprobate.Itwas
dulyadmittedandconsequently,Rosenstockwasappointedastheexecutor.Ona
later date, he filed a motion for payment of additional compensation and
allowance.Thiswasapprovedbythecourt.Thewidowofthedeceasedmovedfor
reconsiderationbutwasdenied.
HELD:
During that period all of the assets and liabilities of the estate should have been
legallyascertainedanddetermined.Inotherwordsthecharacterandclassofthe
workwhichdevolvesupontheexecutorisofaverydifferenttypeandnaturenow
thanatthetimeofhisappointment.Althoughbymutualconsenthiscompensation
wasfixedatP1,0000permonthatthetimeofhisappointmentthatwasnotvalid
orbindingcontractcontinuousthroughoutthewholeadministrationoftheestate.
It was always subject to change and the approval of the court and to either an
increaseordecreaseasconditionsmightwarrant.Atalltimesthecompensationof
theprobatecourt.
110
JOSONV.JOSON
2SCRA83
FACTS:
Joson(father)diedandleftawill.Hewassurvivedbymanychildren,ashemarried
thriceduringhislifetime.Thewillwasadmittedforprobateandoneofthesons
wasappointedasanadministrator.Hefiledaccountingreportsindifferentdates
andthiswasopposedbysomeoftheheirs,onthegroundthattheshareofeach
heir in the yearly produce was allegedly being diminished. Thereafter, an
extrajudicialpartitionancompromiseagreementwasenteredintobyallheirs.This
wasapproved.Despitelackofhearingfortheaccounts,theadministratormoved
fortheclosureofproceedings,whichthecourtdulysustained.Thus,thisappeal.
HELD:
Section1ofRule86categoricallychargesanadministrator"withthewholeofthe
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession at the value of
appraisementcontainedintheinventory;withalltheinterest,profit,andincome
ofsuchanestate;andwiththeproceedsofsomuchoftheestateasisholdbyhim,
atthepriceatwhichsold."Section8ofthesameruleimposesuponhimtheduty
torenderanaccountofhisadministrationwithinoneyearfromhisappointment,
unlessthecourtotherwisedirects,aswellastorendersuchfurtheraccountsasthe
courtmayrequireuntiltheestateisfullysettled.Section10likewiseprovidesthat
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
73
before an account of the administrator is allowed notice shall be given to all

personsinterestedofthetimeandplaceofexaminingandallowingthesame.And
finally Section 9 expressly directs that the court shall examine the administrator
upon oath with respect to every matter relating to his account except when no
objection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is
satisfactorilyestablishedbycompetenttestimony.
Itthusappearsthatthedutyofanadministratortorenderanaccountisnotamere
incidentofanadministrationproceedingwhichranbewaivedordisregardedwhen
the same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to be performed and duly
acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and
terminated. Here the administrator has submitted his accounts for several years
not only motu proprio but upon requirement of the court, to which accounts the
heirs have seasonably submitted their opposition. And when the administrator
movedthecourttoclosetheproceedingsandrelievehimofhisadministrationand
ofhisaccounts,theheirswhoobjectedtheretoobjectedlikewisetotheclosingof
the proceedings invoking their right to be heard but the court ignored their
opposition and granted the motion setting forth as reasons therefor what we
quotedintheearlypartofthisdecision.Verily,thetrialcourterredinaccedingto
themotionforindoingsoitdisregardedtheexpressprovisionsofourrulesrelative
tothesettlementofaccountsofajudicialadministrator.
The fact that all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicial
settlementandpartitioninordertoputanendtotheirdifferencescannotinany
way be interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts
submittedbytheadministratornotonlybecausetosoholdwouldbeaderogation
ofthepertinentprovisionsofourrulesbutalsobecausethereisnothingprovided
insaidpartitionthattheaforesaidaccountsshallbedeemedwaivedorcondoned.
While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said extrajudicial settlement is
plausible and has contributed to the early settlement of the estate, the same
cannothoweverbeconsideredasreleaseoftheobligationoftheadministratorto
prove his accounts. This is more so when, according to the oppositors, the
administrator has committed in his accounts a shortage in the amount of
P132,600.00whichcertainlycannotjustbebrushedasidebyameretechnicality.
111
PHIL.TRUSTCOMPANYV.LUZONSURETY
2SCRA122
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
Picardwasontheonsetappointedastheadministratoroftheintestateesatateof
Burt.Heaccordinglyfiledabond,withLuzonSuretyashissurety.Thereafter,due
tofailuretodohisdutiesasadministratorproperly,hewasreplacedbyPTC.PTC
reported that it only had in its possession a small amount of money but if the
accountspreviouslysubmittedbyPicardisreferredto,itwouldshowthatPicardis
accountable for a bigger amount of money. As such, the court ordered him to
deliverthesame.Failingtoreallyaccountforhisdutiesandaccounting,thebond
wasmadeliableandconsequentlyrevokedbythecourt.
HELD:
Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio motu, cannot order the
confiscation or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is clearly without merit.
Whatevermaybetheruleprevailinginotherjurisdictions,inoursprobatecourtis
possessedwithanallembracingpowernotonlyinrequiringbutalsoinfixingthe
amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or
forfeitureofanadministrator'sbond,isdeemedbeanecessarypartandincident
oftheadministrationproceedingsasmuchasitsfilingandthefixingofitsamount.
Therule,therefore,isthattheprobatecourtmayhavesaidbondexecutedinthe
sameprobateproceeding.
Moreover, the condition of the administrator's bond in question is that Francis L.

Picardshallfaithfullyexecutetheordersanddecreesofthecourt;thatifhedidso,
theobligationshallbecomevoid,otherwiseitshallremaininfullforceandeffect.
In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate without
authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound upon
thetermsoftheirbond.
RULE86
CLAIMSAGAINSTESTATE
Section 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court. Immediately after granting

letterstestamentaryorofadministration,thecourtshallissueanoticerequiring
allpersonshavingmoneyclaimsagainstthedecedenttofilethemintheofficeof
theclerkofsaidcourt.
Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in the
precedingsection,thecourtshallstatethetimeforthefilingofclaimsagainstthe
estate,whichshallnotbemorethantwelve(12)notlessthansix(6)monthsafter
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
74
the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an
orderofdistributionisentered,onapplicationofacreditorwhohasfailedtofile
his claim within the previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on
such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not
exceedingone(1)month.
WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM PERIOD WHEN A COURT CAN ALLOW THE FILING OF
CLAIMS?
12months
Timeperiod:6monthsto12months
The court can set a period less than 12 months but not less than 6
months
WHENDOESTHE1MONTHPERIODCOMMENCE?
Fromapprovalofthecourt
CANTHECOURTSETALESSERTIMEPERIOD?
Yes,the1monthisthemaximumperiod
Section3.Publicationofnoticetocreditors.Everyexecutororadministratorshall,
immediately after the notice to creditors is issued, cause the same to be
published three (3) weeks successively in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, and to be posted for the same period in four public places in the
province and in two public places in the municipality where the decedent last
resided.
WHATARETHEPOSTINGANDPUBLICATIONREQUIREMENTS?
1. Publication in newspapers of general circulation once a week for three
consecutiveweeks
2. Postingofnoticeforsameperiodinfourpublicplacesintheprovince
3. Postingofnoticeforsameperiodintwopublicplacesinthemunicipality
wheredecedentlastresided
Section 4. Filing of copy of printed notice. Within ten (10) days after the notice
has been published and posted in accordance with the preceding section, the
executororadministratorshallfileorcausetobefiledinthecourtaprintedcopy
ofthenoticeaccompaniedwithanaffidavitsettingforththedatesofthefirstand
last publication thereof and the name of the newspaper in which the same is
printed.
ATENEOLAW2010
WHATSHOULDTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTORDOWITHIN10DAYSFROM
POSTINGANDPUBLICATION?
1. Executeanaffidavit
a. Alldetailsofpostingandpublication
b. Datesoffirstandlastpublication
c. Nameofnewspaperinwhichitwaspublished
2. Printedcopyofthenotice
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
expressorimplied,whetherthesamebedue,notdue,orcontingent,allclaims
for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgmentformoneyagainstthedecedent,mustbefiledwithinthetimelimited
in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set
forthascounterclaimsinanyactionthattheexecutororadministratormaybring
againsttheclaimants.Whereanexecutororadministratorcommencesanaction,
orprosecutesanactionalreadycommencedbythedeceasedinhislifetime,the
debtormaysetforthbyanswertheclaimshehasagainstthedecedent,instead
of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claimsmaybesetoffagainsteachotherinsuchaction;andiffinaljudgmentis
rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been
presenteddirectlybeforethecourtintheadministrationproceedings.Claimsnot
yetdue,orcontingent,maybeapprovedattheirpresentvalue.
WHAT CLAIMS ARE BARRED IF NOT CLAIMED WITHIN THE PERIOD SET BY THE
RULES?
1. Claimsformoneyarisingfromcontract
2. Contingentclaimsformoneyarisingfromcontract
3. Funeralexpenses
4. Expensesforlastsicknessofdecedent
5. Judgmentofmoneyagainstdecedent
Section6.Solidaryobligationofdecedent.Wheretheobligationofthedecedent
issolidarywithanotherdebtor,theclaimshallbefiledagainstthedecedentasif
heweretheonlydebtor,withoutprejudicetotherightoftheestatetorecover
contributionfromthedebtor.Inajointobligationofthedecedent,theclaimshall
beconfinedtotheportionbelongingtohim.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
75
WHEREMUSTACLAIMBASEDONASOLIDARYOBLIGATIONOFTHEDECEDENTBE
FILED?
Itmustbeclaimedfromtheestateasifthedecedentisthesoledebtor
Withoutprejudicetoreimbursementfromtheothersolidarydebtor
Caveatthe creditor however is not precluded from filing claim against

theothersolidarydebtor
Section7.Mortgagedebtduefromestate.Acreditorholdingaclaimagainstthe
deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the
securityandprosecutehisclaiminthemannerprovidedinthisrule,andsharein
the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his
mortgageorrealizeuponhissecurity,byactionincourt,makingtheexecutoror
administratorapartydefendant,andifthereisajudgmentforadeficiency,after
thesaleofthemortgagedpremises,orthepropertypledged,intheforeclosure
or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency
judgmentinthemannerprovidedintheprecedingsectionorhemayrelyupon
hismortgageorothersecurityalone,andforeclosurethesameatanytimewithin
theperiodofthestatuteoflimitations,andinthateventheshallnotbeadmitted
asacreditor,andshallreceivenoshareinthedistributionoftheotherassetsof
estate;butnothinghereincontainedshallprohibittheexecutororadministrator
from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for
which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall
adjudgeittobeforthebestinterestoftheestatethatsuchredemptionshallbe
made.
Section8.Claimofexecutororadministratoragainstanestate.Iftheexecutoror
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice
thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
administrator,whoshall,intheadjustmentofsuchclaim,havethesamepower
and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in
the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or
administratortopaytothespecialadministratornecessaryfundstodefendsuch
claim.
ATWHATINSTANCESMAYASPECIALADMINISTRATORBEAPPOINTED?
1. Whenthereisdelayintheappointmentofadministratororexecutor
2. Whenthereisclaimsbytheadministratororexecutorhimself
3. When the proceedings have ended and there are claims against the
estatefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod
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Section 9. How to file a claim. Contents thereof. Notice to executor or

administrator. A claim may be filed by delivering the same with the necessary
voucherstotheclerkofcourtandbyservingacopythereofontheexecutoror
administrator. If the claim be founded on a bond, bill, note, or any other
instrument, the original need not be filed, but a copy thereof with all
indorsements shall be attached to the claim and filed therewith. On demand,
however,oftheexecutororadministrator,orbyorderofthecourtorjudge,the
original shall be exhibited, unless it be list or destroyed, in which case the
claimantmustaccompanyhisclaimwithaffidavitoraffidavitscontainingacopy
or particular description of the instrument and stating its loss or destruction.
Whentheclaimisdue,itmustbesupportedbyaffidavitstatingtheamountjustly
due,thatnopaymentshavebeenmadethereonwhicharenotcredited,andthat
therearenooffsetstothesame,totheknowledgeoftheaffiant.Iftheclaimis
not due, or is contingent, when filed, it must also be supported by affidavits
statingtheparticularsthereof.Whentheaffidavitismadebyapersonotherthan
the claimant, he must set forth therein the reason why it is not made by the
claimant.Theclaimoncefiledshallbeattachedtotherecordofthecaseinwhich
theletterstestamentaryorofadministrationwereissued,althoughthecourt,in
its discretion, and as a matter of convenience, may order all the claims to be
collectedinaseparatefolder.
Section10.Answerofexecutororadministrator.Offsets.Withinfifteen(15)days
afterserviceofacopyoftheclaimontheexecutororadministrator,heshallfile
his answer admitting or denying the claim specifically, and setting forth the
admissionordenial.Ifhehasnoknowledgesufficienttoenablehimtoadmitor
deny specifically, he shall state such want of knowledge. The executor or
administrator in his answer shall allege in offset any claim which the decedent
beforedeathhadagainsttheclaimant,andhisfailuretodososhallbartheclaim
forever.Acopyoftheanswershallbeservedbytheexecutororadministratoron
the claimant. The court in its discretion may extend the time for filing such
answer.
Section 11. Disposition of admitted claim. Any claim admitted entirely by the
executor or administrator shall immediately be submitted by the clerk to the
courtwhomayapprovethesamewithouthearing;butthecourt,initsdiscretion,
beforeapprovingtheclaim,mayorderthatknownheirs,legatees,ordeviseesbe
notified and heard. If upon hearing, an heir, legatees, or devisee opposes the
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claim, the court may, in its discretion, allow him fifteen (15) days to file an
answertotheclaiminthemannerprescribedintheprecedingsection.
Section 12. Trial of contested claim. Upon the filing of an answer to a claim, or
upon the expiration of the time for such filing, the clerk of court shall set the
claim for trial with notice to both parties. The court may refer the claim to a
commissioner.
Section 13. Judgment appealable. The judgment of the court approving or

disapproving a claim, shall be filed with the record of the administration
proceedingswithnoticetobothparties,andisappealableasinordinarycases.A
judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due
course of administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not
createanylienuponthepropertyoftheestate,orgivetothejudgmentcreditor
anypriorityofpayment.
Section14.Costs.Whentheexecutororadministrator,inhisanswer,admitsand
offers to pay part of a claim, and the claimant refuses to accept the amount
offered in satisfaction of his claim, if he fails to obtain a more favorable
judgment,hecannotrecovercosts,butmustpaytotheexecutororadministrator
costs from the time of the offer. Where an action commenced against the
deceased for money has been discontinued and the claim embraced therein
presentedasinthisruleprovided,theprevailingpartyshallbeallowedthecosts
ofhisactionuptothetimeofitsdiscontinuance.
RULE87
ACTIONSBYANDAGAINSTEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS
Section1.Actionswhichmayandwhichmaynotbebroughtagainstexecutoror
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interestthereonshallbecommencedagainsttheexecutororadministrator;but
torecoverrealorpersonalproperty,oraninteresttherein,fromtheestate,orto
enforcealienthereon,andactionstorecoverdamagesforaninjurytopersonor
property,realorpersonal,maybecommencedagainsthim.
WHATACTIONSMAYBEFILEDAGAINSTANADMINISTRATOROREXECUTOR?
1. Recoveryofrealorpersonalproperty,oraninteresttherein
2. Toenforcelienagainstanyrealorpersonalproperty
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3. Actionstorecoverdamagesforaninjurytopersonorproperty
WHATACTIONSMAYNOTBEFILED?
Claimfortherecoveryofmoneyordebtorinterestthereon
Section 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive.

For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an
executororadministratormaybringordefend,intherightofdeceased,actions
forcauseswhichsurvive.
Section 3. Heir may not sue until shall assigned. When an executor or
administratorisappointedandassumesthetrust,noactiontorecoverthetitleor
possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be maintained
against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court assigning
suchlandstosuchheirordeviseeoruntilthetimeallowedforpayingdebtshas
expired.
Section 4. Executor or administrator may compound with debtor. Within the

approval of the court, an executor or administrator may compound with the
debtorofthedeceasedforadebtdue,andmaygiveadischargeofsuchdebton
receivingajustdividendoftheestateofthedebtor.
WHATDOESITMEANFORTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTORTOCOMPOUND
WITHTHEDEBTOR?
It means to enter into a compromise agreement with the deceaseds

debtor
Hemaydoso,withtheapprovalofthecourt
Heshallaccountfortheamountrecoveredonthedebtdue
Section5.Mortgagedueestatemaybeforeclosed.Amortgagebelongingtothe
estateofadeceasedperson,asmortgageeorassigneeoftherightoramortgage,
maybeforeclosedbytheexecutororadministrator.
Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently

conveyed. If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor or other
individualinterestedintheestateofthedeceased,complainstothecourthaving
jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having concealed,
embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the
deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any
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deed,conveyance,bond,contract,orotherwritingwhichcontainsevidenceofor
tendsordisclosestheright,title,interest,orclaimofthedeceased,thecourtmay
citesuchsuspectedpersontoappearbeforeitanymayexaminehimonoathon
thematterofsuchcomplaint;andifthepersonsocitedrefusestoappear,orto
answeronsuchexaminationorsuchinterrogatoriesasareputtohim,thecourt
maypunishhimforcontempt,andmaycommithimtoprisonuntilhesubmitsto
theorderofthecourt.Theinterrogatoriesputanysuchperson,andhisanswers
thereto,shallbeinwritingandshallbefiledintheclerk'soffice.
Section7.Personentrustedwithestatecompelledtorenderaccount.Thecourt,
oncomplaintofanexecutororadministrator,mayciteapersonentrustedbyan
executororadministratorwithanypartoftheestateofthedeceasedtoappear
beforeit,andmayrequiresuchpersontorenderafullaccount,onoath,ofthe
money,goods,chattels,bonds,account,orotherpapersbelongingtosuchestate
ascametohispossessionintrustforsuchexecutororadministrator,andofhis
proceedingsthereon;andifthepersonsocitedrefusestoappeartorendersuch
account, the court may punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful
orderofthecourt.
WHOMAYBECOMPELLEDOTHERTHANTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTOR,TO
RENDERANACCOUNT?
Apersonentrustedbyanexecutororadministratorwithanypartofthe
estateofthedeceased
Section8.Embezzlementbeforelettersissued.Ifaperson,beforethegrantingof
letters testamentary or of administration on the estate of the deceased,
embezzles or alienates any of the money, goods, chattels, or effects of such
deceased, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the executor or
administratoroftheestatefordoublethevalueofthepropertysold,embezzled,
oralienated,toberecoveredforthebenefitofsuchestate.
Section9.Propertyfraudulentlyconveyedbydeceasedmayberecovered.When
executororadministratormustbringaction.Whenthereisadeficiencyofassets
in the hands of an executor or administrator for the payment of debts and
expensesofadministration,andthedeceasedinhislifetimehadconveyedrealor
personalproperty,orarightorinteresttherein,orandebtorcredit,withintent
todefraudhiscreditorsortoavoidanyright,debt,orduty;orhadsoconveyed
suchproperty,right,interest,debtorcreditthatbylawtheconveyancewouldbe
voidasagainsthiscreditors,andthesubjectoftheattemptedconveyancewould
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be liable to attachment by any of them in his lifetime, the executor or

administratormaycommenceandprosecutetofinaljudgmentanactionforthe
recovery of such property, right, interest, debt, or credit for the benefit of the
creditors; but he shall not be bound to commence the action unless on
applicationofthecreditorsofthedeceased,notunlessthecreditorsmakingthe
applicationpaysuchpartofthecostsandexpenses,orgivesecuritythereforto
theexecutororadministrator,asthecourtdeemsequitable.
Section10.Whencreditormaybringaction.Lienforcosts.Whenthereissucha
deficiencyofassets,andthedeceasedinhislifetimehadmadeorattemptedsuch
a conveyance, as is stated in the last preceding section, and the executor or
administratorhasnotcommencedtheactionthereinprovidedfor,anycreditorof
the estate may, with the permission of the court, commence and prosecute to
finaljudgment,inthenameoftheexecutororadministrator,alikeactionforthe
recovery of the subject of the conveyance or attempted conveyance for the
benefitofthecreditors.Buttheactionshallnotbecommenceduntilthecreditor
has filed in a court a bond executed to the executor or administrator, in an
amount approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or
administratoragainstthecostsandexpensesincurredbyreasonofsuchaction.
Suchcreditorshallhavealienuponanyjudgmentrecoveredbyhimintheaction
forsuchcostsandotherexpensesincurredthereinasthecourtdeemsequitable.
Where the conveyance or attempted conveyance had been made by the
deceased in his lifetime in favor of the executor or administrator, the action
whichacreditmaybringshallbeinthenameofallthecreditors,andpermission
ofthecourtandfilingofbondasaboveprescribed,arenotnecessary.
112
DELACRUZV.CAMON
16SCRA886
FACTS:
TheestateofFallonandMurphyowneda2/4prodivisoshareinHaciendaRosario.
Camon was the lessee of the said land long before intestate proceedings have
commenced. Dela Cruz as administrator of the estate, filed a motion in the
probatecourttoorderCamontopaytheestateitsshareintherentalsforacertain
span of years over the rice and agricultural lands. Camon alleged on the other
handthattheprobatecourtdoesnthavejurisdictionoverhisperson.
HELD:
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Here,thecourtsitsasaprobatecourt.Saidcourtisprimarilyconcernedwiththe
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. For these purposes,
propertyinthehandsoftheestate'sadministratorcomeswithinthepowerofthe
probatecourt.
With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the administrator's claim for
rentals allegedly due. The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated.
Conceivably,thelesseemayinterposedefenses.Compromise,payment,statuteof
limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to defeat the
administrator's case. Here, appellee's opposition to the motion served a warning
that at the proper time he will set up the defense that the administrator, as
attorneyinfactofthedeclaredheirs,hadtheretoforesoldtheestate'stwofourths
shareinHaciendaRosariotogetherwith"alltherights,titleandinterest(including
allaccruedrents)thatsaidheirshadinheritedfromthesaiddeceased."Appellant
administratorinhisreplytotheoppositionadmitsthefactofsaleoftheland,but
notoftherentalsdue.Accordingly,therighttocollecttherentalsisstillinafluid
state. That right remains to be threshed out upon a fulldress trial on the merits.
Because of all of these, the money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the
handsoftheadministrator;itisnotthuswithintheeffectivecontroloftheprobate
court. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the deceased
"concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the court
incidentalprerogativetoreachoutitsarmstogetitbackand,ifnecessary,tocite
thepossessorthereofincontempt.
113
QUIRINOV.GOROSPE
169SCRA702
FACTS:
Thisinvolvesthesettlementofissuesclaimedbydifferentpartiestotheintestate
proceedings of Don Alfonso. Mostly are claims for attorneys fees as well as
different expenses incurred with respect to acts of administration of the estate.
Thecourtdecidedtheissuesbypiecemeal.
HELD:
Ontheissueofclaimsagainsttheestateforattorneysfeesandfortransportation
andrepresentationexpensestheterm"claims"requiredtobepresentedagainsta
decedent'sestateisgenerallyconstruedtomeandebtsordemandsofapecuniary
nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime or
liability contracted by the deceased before his death. It is important to note that
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movants claims for attorney's fees and transportation as wen as representation

expenses are for services rendered to the alleged substituted heirs of Don Juan
CastellviandsuchservicesdidnotinuretothebenefitofDonAlfonsoCastellvior
his estate. The court charged with the settlement of the estate of Don Alfonso
Castellvi is bound to protect the estate from any disbursements based on claims
notchargeabletotheestate.
WithrespecttotheissueofexpensesrelatedtoactsofadministrationWithregard
to Floro's claim for payment for services rendered to the estate of Don Alfonso
Castellvi,theruleisthatwherethemonetaryclaimagainsttheadministratorhasa
relationtohisactsofadministrationintheordinarycoursethereof,suchclaimscan
be presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for the
settlementoftheestateispending,althoughsaidclaimswerenotincurredbythe
deceasedduringhislifetimeandcollectibleafterhisdeath.Thisisso,becausethe
administrationisunderthedirectsupervisionofthecourtandtheadministratoris
subjecttoitsauthority.
114
AGUASV.LILEMOS
5SCRA959
FACTS:
Hermogenes Llemos on the relevant date, mailed a copy of a petition for the
issuanceofawritofpossessiontoAguasandothers.Helikewiseindicatedthathe
willfilethesame.ThispromptedAguasandotherstotravelallthewaytoSamar
with their lawyers, only to find out that no petition has been filed. This
consequently led to a case filed against Llemos but the latter died eventually.
Aguas and others then modified their complaint, including therein the heirs of
Llemos.Theyallegedamongothersthatthedeathofthedefendantdoesntabate
thecauseofactionfortort.
HELD:
Under Rule87, section 5, the actions that are abatedby deathare: (1) claimsfor
funeralexpensesandthoseforthelastsicknessofthedecedent;(2)judgmentsfor
money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract
expressorimplied".Noneoftheseincludesthatoftheplaintiffsappellants;foritis
not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must
arisefrom"contractexpressorimplied".
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Upontheotherhand,Rule88,section1,enumeratesactionsthatsurviveagainsta
decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real
and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
(3)actionstorecoverdamagesforaninjurytopersonorproperty.Thepresentsuit
is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to
property"isnotlimitedtoinjuriestospecificproperty,butextendstootherwrongs
bywhichpersonalestateisinjuredordiminished.Tomaliciouslycauseapartyto
incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that
party'sproperty.
115
MELGARV.BUENVIAJE
179SCRA196
FACTS:
Avehicularcollisionhappenedamong2passengerbusesandaFordFiera.Thebus
owned by Bella suddenly swerved to the left lane and collided headon with the
Fiera.Itfurtherswervedtotheleftlaneandcollidedagainwiththeotherbus.This
causedtheinjuriesanddeathsofmany.Thevictimsinthiscasethenconsequently
filedacaseagainsttheheirsofBellathelatterhavingbeenkilledintheaccident.
HELD:
UnderSection5Rule86oftheRulesofCourt,actionsthatareabatedbydeathare:
(1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied,whetherthesamebedue,notdueorcontingent;(2)Allclaimsforfuneral
expensesandexpensesforthelastsicknessofthedecedent;and(3)Judgmentsfor
moneyagainstthedecedent.Itisevidentthatthecaseatbarisnotamongthose
enumerated.Otherwisestated,actionsfordamagescausedbythetortiousconduct
ofthedefendantsurvivethedeathofthelatter.
TheactioncanthereforebeproperlybroughtunderSection1,Rule87oftheRules
ofCourt,againstanexecutororadministrator.
Thepointofcontroversyishoweveronthefactthatnoestateproceedingsexistfor
thereasonthatherchildrenhadnotfiledanyproceedingsforthesettlementofher
estate,claimingthatBallaleftnoproperties.
Thus,whilepetitionersmayhavecorrectlymovedforthedismissalofthecaseand
privaterespondentshaveforthwithcorrectedthedeficiencybyfilinganamended
complaint, even before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion for
reconsiderationofthedenialoftheirmotiontodismiss,theactionunderSection
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17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which allows the suit against the legal
representativeofthedeceased,thatis,theexecutororadministratorofhisestate,
wouldstillbefutile,forthesamereasonthatthereappearstobenostepstaken
towardsthesettlementoftheestateofthelateFelicidadBalla,norhasanexecutor
or administrator of the estate been appointed. From the statement made by the
petitioners that "many persons die without leaving any asset at all" which
insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to believe that the
petitioners will not take any step to expedite the early settlement of the estate,
judiciallyorextrajudiciallyifonlytodefeatthedamagesuitagainsttheestate.
116
PAJARILLOV.IAC
176SCRA340
FACTS:
1. The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who had a brother named
FelipeBalaneandasisternamedPerfectaBalanedeCordero.
2. Perfectadiedin1945leavingatractofland.JuanaandFelipeexecuteda
publicinstrumententitled"ExtrajudicialSettlementoftheEstateofthe
Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero." These instruments were never
registerednorwastitletransferredinSalud'snamealthoughshesaysshe
immediatelytookpossessionoftheland.
3. Meantime, intestate proceedings were instituted on the estate of
Perfectaandthesaidlandwasamongthoseincludedintheinventoryof
thepropertiesbelongingtothedecedent.
4. Salud interposed no objection to its inclusion nor did she oppose its
subsequentadjudicationtohermotherJuanaintheprojectofpartition.
5. ItisnotclearifthelandwaseverregisteredinJuana'sname.However,
thereisevidencethatJuanaconfirmedtheearlierdonationofthelandto
Saludbutrequestedthatshebeallowedtopossessthesameandenjoy
itsfruits,untilherdeath.
6. Salud says that sometime in 1951, acceding to this request, she
transferred the possession of the land to her mother, who was then
staying with Claudio and his family. During the period they were
occupyingtheland,Claudiopaidtherealtytaxesthereon.
7. A deed of sale was executed by Juana in favor of Claudio for a
consideration of P12,000. Years later, Claudio registered the land in his
name.
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8.
80
JuanaandClaudiosubsequentlydied.Saludnowcameforthandfiledfor
reconveyance of the land, on the ground that the deed of sale was null
andvoidandwasprocuredthroughfraud.
HELD:
Thepetitionerswouldalsofaulttheprivaterespondentsforlachesandarguethat
Salud's inaction in protection of her rights should bar her from asserting them at
thislatehour.Specifically,itispointedoutthatshefailedtoregisterthedeedof
donationanditsacceptance;didnotopposetheinclusionofthesubjectlandinthe
inventory of Perfecta's properties submitted in the intestate proceedings; did not
objecttotheadjudicationofthelandtoJuanaintheprojectofpartition;didnot
protestthesaleofthelandtoClaudioSuterio;anddidnotquestionitsregistration
in his name. It is contended that all these acts constitute laches, which has been
describedbythisCourtthus:
An estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right

within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assertiteitherhasabandoneditordeclinedtoassertit.
Theproblemwiththepetitioners'theoryisthatitwouldregardJuanaandSaludas
strangerswhentheyareinfactmotheranddaughter.Onemayexpectapersonto
be vigilant of his rights when dealing with an acquaintance or associate, or even
with a friend, but not when the other person is a close relative, as in the case at
bar.Tobeginwith,thelandcamefromJuanaherself.Secondly,sherequestedher
daughternottoregisterthelandaslongasshewasstillalivesoshecouldenjoyits
fruits until her death. To Salud, it was not difficult to comply with this request,
comingasitdidfromherownmother.Therewasnoreasontodisobeyher.Shedid
nothavetoprotectherselfagainstherownmother.Indeed,whatwouldhavebeen
unseemlywasherregisteringthelandagainsthermother'srequestasifshehadno
confidence in her. Salud did no less than what any dutiful daughter would have
doneunderthecircumstances.
If Salud did not protest the inclusion of the land in the inventory of Perfecta's
propertiesanditssubsequentadjudicationtoJuanaintheintestateproceedings,it
was because she did not feel threatened by these acts. She did not distrust her
mother. Moreover, Juana had herself acknowledged the donation when she was
asked in whose name the property would be registered following the intestate
proceedings.Saludfeltsafebecauseshehadtheextrajudicialsettlementtorelyon
toprovethathermotherandherunclehaddonatedthesubjectlandtoher.
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117
BERNARDOV.CA
7SCRA367
FACTS:
Capili and Reyes were husband and wife. When Capili died, testate proceedings
wereinstituted.Hiswillwasdulyprobatedandtheheirsweredeterminedtobe
his widow and cousins. Thereafter, Reyes died and was substituted by her own
collateralrelatives.Aprojectofpartitionwassubmittedbytheadministratorand
thiswasopposedbythewifescollateralrelatives.Theyaverredthatsomeofthe
propertiesofthehusbandwerenthisexclusivelybutoftheconjugalpartnership.
Ontheonehand,theotherpartiesaverredthatitisexclusivepropertybyvirtueof
thedeedofdonationexecutedbythewifeduringherlifetime,donatinghershare
in the conjugal property to her husband. The court found the deed of donation
voidandthatthepropertiesindisputewereconjugalinnature.
HELD:
Inalineofdecisions,thisCourtconsistentlyheldthatasageneralrule,questionas
to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,
except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from
the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass
provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a
separateaction.However,wehavealsoheldthatwhenthepartiesinterestedare
all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a
question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may
definitelypassjudgmentthereon;andthatwiththeconsentoftheparties,matters
affectingpropertyunderjudicialadministrationmaybetakencognizanceofbythe
courtinthecourseofintestateproceeding,providedinterestsofthirdpersonsare
notprejudiced.
Inthecasenowbeforeus,thematterincontroversyisthequestionofownership
of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of
course,thewidow,nowrepresentedbecauseofherdeath,byherheirswhohave
been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared
voluntarily.Therearenothirdpartieswhoserightsmaybeaffected.Itistruethat
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the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testatorhusband, but the
widowis,inadditiontoherownrighttotheconjugalproperty.Anditisthisright
thatisbeingsoughttobeenforcedbyhersubstitutes.Therefore,theclaimthatis
being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it
complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the
petitionersandthewidow,representedbydents)areallheirsclaimingtitleunder
thetestator.
118
GUANCOV.NATIONALBANK
54PHIL244
FACTS:
The now deceased Guanco during his lifetime obtained a loan from PNB. He
furnishedthebankwithhissharesindifferentcorporationsassecurityfortheloan.
Whenhedied,oneofthecorporations,forwhichhehassharesofstock,issuedto
the bank a promissory note with an amount covering the debt of Guanco. It
likewisefurnishedthebankwithadditionalsecuritytocoveranyadditionalloanit
wouldliketotakefromthebank.Inthemeantime,theadministratorintheestate
proceedingsmovedthatthebankmanagerpresenthimselfincourtwithrespectto
the shares of stock being held by him. The bank manager didnt appear but
instead,thecounselofthebankfiledamotion,allegingthereinthatthesharesin
questionwerestillinitspossessionassecurityfortheoutstandingdebtofGuanco.
Thereafter, the administrator prayed that the shares be brought in court. The
court ordered for the same and the bank sought reconsideration on the ground
thatthecourtexceededitsjurisdiction.
HELD:
Upon appeal to this court, counsel for the bank maintains that the court below
exceededitsjurisdictioninorderingthedeliveryofthesharestotheadministrator
inaproceedingundersection709oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Thiscontentionis
entirelycorrect.
As will be seen, the section quoted only provides a proceeding for examining
personssuspectedofhavingconcealed,embezzled,orconveyedawaypropertyof
the deceased or withholds information of documentary evidence tending to
disclose rights or claims of the deceased to such property or to disclose the
possessionofhislastwillandtestament.Thepurposeoftheproceedingistoelicit
evidence, and the section does not, in terms, authorize the court to enforce
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delivery of possession of the things involved. To obtain the possession, recourse

mustthereforegenerallybehadtoanordinaryaction.
Inissuingtheorderfromwhichtheappealhasbeentaken,thecourtbelowrelied
largelyonadictumintheAlafrizcasethat"theremaybecases,wherepapersand
documentary evidence of ownership of property are held by a third person
belongingtotheestateofadeceasedperson,inwhichitwouldbeperfectlyproper
to the court to order the same turned over to the court." That may be true; it
might, for instance, apply to the possession of a will. But in the same case, the
court also said that "the court had no right to deprive her (the appellant) of her
evidence relating to the property, until the question of ownership had been
settled."
Thatispracticallythiscase.Thebankmaintainsthatthepledgeofthe250sharesis
stillinforce.Itmayhavedocumentaryevidencetothateffect,anditwasnotunder
obligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a third party, on the
strength of a citation under section 709. The possession of the certificates of the
shares in question is a part of that evidence and it is obvious that if they are
surrenderedtotheadministratoroftheestateandpossiblydisposedofbyhim,the
bank will lose its day in court, and its rights can only be determined in a
correspondingaction.
119
ALAFRIZV.MINA
28PHIL137
FACTS:
Alafriz was the administrator of the estate of Navarro. He filed a motion for the
courttoorderMinatoproduceadocumentevincingthedepositmadebyNavarro
tosecurealoanheearlierobtained.Minacompliedwiththesubsequentorderof
thecourtbysurrenderingthepawntickettotheclerkandatthesametime,prayed
tobeexemptedfromthesamebyaverringthatsheandhermotherwerethereal
ownersofthejewelry.Thejewelryinquestionwaslaterincludedintheinventory
ofpropertiesoftheestate,towhichMinaprayedthatitberatherexcluded.She
also prayed to be further heard so that she could prove her ownership over the
properties. However, she was overruled and the property in question was still
included in the inventory. She appealed this on several groundsamong others,
thatthereisnolegalbasistoorderhertoproducethepawnticket;thatthecourt
was wrong to order Alafriz to institute adequate actions against Mina as may be
necessaryinfurtheranceofhisdutiesasadministrator.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
82
HELD:
Insupportofthefirstassignmentoferror,theappellantcontendsthatthereisno
law justifying the order made by the lower court, citing her to appear and to
declareconcerningthequestionwhethershehadpropertybelongingtotheestate.
She also contends that the administrator should have proceeded by an ordinary
action,ifhebelievedthatshehadinherpossessionpropertyoftheestate.Section
709oftheCodeofProcedureinCivilActions(ActNo.190)expresslyauthorizesthe
orderofwhichcomplaintismade.
Onthesecondandthirdassignmentsoferror,itistobenotedthatthepawnticket
showed that it had been issued to the deceased Navarro. That fact, perhaps,
constitutedprimafacieproofofownership,butitcertainlywasnotabsoluteproof
of ownership. The lower court not only ordered the appellant to turn the pawn
ticketovertotheclerk,butalsoorderedtheadministratortopaytotheclerkwith
whichtoredeemsaidjewels.Inaccordancewiththeorderofthecourt,theclerk
did actually redeem said jewels and now has them in his possession. All this was
done without permitting the appellant to be jewels did, in fact, belong to the
appellantthen,ofcourse,thecourthadnorighttodepriveherofthepawnticket,
nortousethefundsoftheestateinredeemingthem.Thereisnothinginsection
709whichjustifiestheorderscomplainedofinthesecondandthirdassignmentsof
error. Said section (709) simply provides that "the court may cite such suspected
person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such
complaint." There is nothing in the section which authorizes the court to take
possession of the property, if any should be found in the possession of the
defendantorofthepersoncited.If,uponthehearing,therewasgoodreasonfor
believingthatthepersoncitedhadpropertyinhisorherpossessionbelongingto
the estate, then it was the duty of the administrator to proceed by an ordinary
actiontorecoverpossessionofthesame.Theremaybecases,wherepapersand
documentary evidence of ownership of property are held by a third person
belongingtotheestateofadeceasedperson,inwhichitwouldbeperfectlyproper
forthecourttoorderthesameturnedovertothecourt.Wedonotnow,however,
attemptinanywaytoindicatewhatwouldbesuchaconditionnoreventofinally
decide that such a condition might exist. In the present case the defendant was
entitledtoretainpossessionofthepawnticket,untilthequestionoftheownership
of the jewels should be determined in the proper way. The court had no right to
deprive her of her evidence relating to the property, until the question of
ownershiphadbeensettled.
ATENEOLAW2010
Regarding the court ordering Alafriz to institute actions against Mina as may be
necessary in furtherance of his claims, this order, it would seem, was not
authorized in the proceedings then pending, neither was the order directing the
administrator to pay, out of the funds of the estate, the amount necessary to
redeem the jewels, until the question of ownership had been settled. No
complaint,however,isheremadebyanyone,relatingtothatorder.Thatpartof
theordermayproperlybeconsideredwhentheadministratorrendershisaccount.
If,however,theestateorPiaMinahasbeendamagedbysaidorder,suchdamages
may,perhaps,besettledinanactionbroughtforthepurposeofdeterminingthe
ownershipofthejewels.Forthepresentwearenotinclinedtorevokesaidorder.It
may finally appear that the jewels actually belonged to the estate and not to Pia
Mina. In that case the jewels will then be where they can be turned over to the
administratorwithoutfurtherdelay.
120
HEIRSOFGREGORIEV.BAKER
51PHIL75
FACTS:
Baker was the appointed administrator of the estate of Ankrom. When he
preparedtheinventoryoftheestate,hemistakenlyincludedatractofland.The
heirsofGregorieduringtheproceedingfiledtheirclaimagainsttheestate,based
on a foreign judgment, which was duly accepted by the court. The assets of the
estateseemedsufficienttocoveralldebts.However,onasubsequentdate,Baker
discoveredthatduringAnkromslifetime,heobtainedaloanfromPTCsecuredby
thelandindispute.Andthatafewdaysaftertheloanandmortgage,heconveyed
the land to a certain person in Ohio for a consideration of P1 and other valuable
consideration. As such, Baker filed an amended inventory and was approved by
thecourt.
HELD:
Whenthereisadeficiencyofassetsinthehandsofanexecutororadministratorto
paydebtsandexpenses,andwhenthedeceasedpersonmadeinhislifetimesuch
fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interest
therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by
license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such
action,commenceandprosecutetofinaljudgment,inthenameoftheexecutoror
administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the
benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so
conveyed.Butsuchactionshallnotbecommenceduntilthecreditorfilesincourta
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
83
bondwithsufficientsurety,tobeapprovedbythejudge,conditionedtoindemnify
theexecutororadministratoragainstthecostsofsuchaction.Suchcreditorshall
havealienuponthejudgmentbyhimsorecoveredforthecostsincurredandsuch
otherexpensesasthecourtdeemsequitable.
Theremedyoftheappellantsis,therefore,toindemnifytheadministratoragainst
costsand,byleaveofcourt,toinstituteanactioninthenameoftheadministrator
to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in
fraudofcreditors.
121
VELASQUEZV.GEORGE
125SCRA456
FACTS:
Defendantsmortgagors are officers of the Island Associates Inc. Andres Muoz,
asidefrombeingthetreasurerdirectorofsaidcorporation,wasalsoappointedand
qualified as administrator of the estate of Benjamin George in the above special
proceedings. In life, the latter owned 64.8 percent or 636 shares out of the
outstanding 980 shares of stock in the corporation. Without the proper approval
from the probate court and without notice to the heirs and their counsel, the
defendantsmortgagorsexecutedaDeedofFirstRealEstateMortgageinfavorof
thedefendantmortgageeErlindaVillanueva,coveringthreeparcelsoflandowned
by Island Associates. In said Deed, the defendantsmortgagors also expressly
waived their right to redeem the said parcels. Subsequently, a power of attorney
was executed by the defendantsmortgagors in favor of Villanueva whereby the
latter was given the full power and authority to cede, transfer, and convey the
parcelsoflandwithinthereglementaryperiodprovidedbylawforredemption.A
certificateofsalewasconsequentlyissuedtoVillanueva.Theplaintiffsthenfileda
complaint for the annulment of the same but was overruled by the court. The
courtheldthattheSECistheproperforumfortheircomplaint.
HELD:
Whether or not the mortgage contract, with an unusual provision whereby the
mortgagors waived their right to redeem the mortgaged property, could be
executedwithoutproperapprovaloftheprobatecourtandwithoutnoticetothe
widow and legitimate children of the deceased is a matter clearly within the
authorityofatrialcourttodecide.Ifinthecourseoftrial,thecourtbelievesthat
thevalidityofthecompositionoftheboardofdirectorsisabsolutelynecessaryfor
resolutionoftheissuesbeforeit,theremedyis,atmost,torequirethatoneissue
ATENEOLAW2010
tobethreshedoutbeforetheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionandtoholdin
abeyance,thetrialonthemeritsoftheprincipalissuesinthemeantime.Certainly,
the solution is not for the lower court to surrender its judicial questions to an
administrativeagencyforresolution.
Theadministratorisnottheproperpartytoinstitutetheaction.Theadministrator,
Andres Muoz, is the same person charged by the plaintiffsappellants to have
voted in the board of directors without securing the proper authority from the
probate court to which he is accountable as administrator. In Ramirez v. Baltazar
(24SCRA918),weruledthat"sincethegroundforthepresentactiontoannulthe
aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious
machinationsandcollusioninwhichtheadministratorhasallegedlyparticipated,it
wouldbefarfetchedtoexpectthesaidadministratorhimselftofiletheactionin
behalfoftheestate.Andwhoelsebuttheheirs,whohaveaninteresttoassertand
to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the
exception, rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the
settlementoftheestate,theheirshavenorighttocommenceanactionarisingout
of the rights belonging to the deceased." The case at bar falls under such an
exception.
RULE88
PAYMENTOFTHEDEBTSOFTHEESTATE
Section 1. Debts paid in full if estate sufficient. If, after hearing all the money
claims against the estate, and after ascertaining the amount of such claims, it
appears that there are sufficient assets to pay the debts, the executor or
administratorpaythesamewithinthetimelimitedforthatpurpose.
Section 11. Order for payment of debts. Before the expiration of the time
limitedforthepaymentofthedebts,thecourtshallorderthepaymentthereof,
and the distribution of the assets received by the executor or administrator for
thatpurposeamongthecreditors,asthecircumstancesoftheestaterequireand
inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisrule.
Section 12. Orders relating to payment of debts where appeal is taken. If an

appealhasbeentakenfromadecisionofthecourtconcerningaclaim,thecourt
may suspend the order for the payment of the debts or may order the
distributionsamongthecreditorswhoseclaimsaredefinitelyallowed,leavingin
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
84
the hands of the executor or administrator sufficient assets to pay the claim
disputedandappealed.Whenadisputedclaimisfinallysettledthecourthaving
jurisdiction of the estate shall order the same to be paid out of the assets
retainedtothesameextentandinthesameproportionwiththeclaimsofother
creditors.
Section13.Whensubsequentdistributionofassetsordered. Ifthewholeofthe
debts are not paid on the first distribution, and if the whole assets are not
distributed, or other assets afterwards come to the hands of the executor or
administrator, the court may from time to time make further orders for the
distributionsofassets.
Section 14. Creditors to be paid in accordance with terms of order. When an

orderismadeforthedistributionofassetsamongthecreditors,theexecutoror
administrationshall,assoonasthetimeofpaymentarrives,paythecreditorsthe
amountsoftheirclaims,orthedividendthereon,inaccordancewiththetermsof
suchorder.
Section 15. Time for paying debts and legacies fixed, or extended after notice,
within what periods. On granting letters testamentary or administration the
court shall allow to the executor or administrator a time for disposing of the
estateandpayingthedebtsandlegaciesofthedeceased,whichshallnot,inthe
first instance, exceed one (1) year; but the court may, on application of the
executororadministratorandafterhearingonsuchnoticeofthetimeandplace
thereforgiventoallpersonsinterestedasitshalldirect,extendthetimeasthe
circumstances of the estate require not exceeding six (6) months for a single
extension not so that the whole period allowed to the original executor or
administratorshallexceedtwo(2)years.
Section 2. Part of estate from which debt paid when provision made by will. If
the testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to be
appropriatedforthepaymentofhisdebts,theexpensesofadministration,orthe
familyexpenses,theyshallbepaidaccordingtotheprovisionsofthewill;butif
the provision made by the will or the estate appropriated, is not sufficient for
that purpose, such part of the estate of the testator, real or personal, as is not
disposedofbywill,ifanyshallbeappropriatedforthatpurpose.
Section3.Personaltyfirstchargeablefordebts,thenrealty.Thepersonalestate
ofthedeceasednotdisposedofbywillshallbefirstchargeablewiththepayment
ATENEOLAW2010
of debts and expenses; and if said personal estate is not sufficient for that
purpose, or its sale would redound to the detriment of the participants for the
estate,thewholeoftherealestatenotdisposeofbywill,orsomuchthereofas
isnecessary,maybesold,mortgaged,orotherwiseencumberedforthatpurpose
by the executor or administrator, after obtaining the authority of the court
therefor. Any deficiency shall be met by contributions in accordance with the
provisionsofsection6ofthisrule.
Section6.Courttofixcontributiveshareswheredevisees,legalitees,orheirshave
been possession. Where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have entered into
possession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have been
settledandpaid,andhavebecomeliabletocontributeforthepaymentofsuch
debtsandexpenses,thecourthavingjurisdictionoftheestatemay,byorderfor
that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and
orderhowmuchandinwhatmannereachpersonshallcontribute,andmayissue
executionascircumstancesrequire.
PAYMENTOFDEBTSMUSTBETAKENFROMTHEFOLLOWING,INTHISORDER
1. Fromtheportionorpropertydesignatedinthewill
2. Fromthepersonalpropertyand
3. Fromtherealproperty
MAYTHECOURTISSUEAWRITOFEXECUTIONFORTHEPAYMENTOFLEGACY?
Nosincethelegacyisnotadebtoftheestate
Section4.Estatetoberetainedtomeetcontingentclaims.Ifthecourtissatisfied
that a contingent claim duly filed is valid, it may order the executor or
administratortoretaininhishandssufficientestatetopaysuchcontingentclaim
whenthesamebecomesabsolute,oriftheestateisinsolvent,sufficienttopaya
portionequaltothedividendoftheothercreditors.
Section 5. How contingent claim becoming absolute in two years allowed and
paid.Actionagainstdistributeeslater.Ifsuchcontingentclaimbecomesabsolute
andispresentedtothecourt,ortotheexecutororadministrator,withintwo(2)
yearsfromthetimelimitedforothercreditorstopresenttheirclaims,itmaybe
allowed by the court if not disputed by the executor or administrator and, if
disputed, it may be proved and allowed or disallowed by the court as the facts
may warrant. If the contingent claim is allowed, the creditor shall receive
paymenttothesameextentastheothercreditorsiftheestateretainedbythe
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
85
executororadministratorissufficient.Butiftheclaimisnotsopresented,after
having become absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed, the assets
retained in the hands of the executor or administrator, not exhausted in the
payment of claims, shall be disturbed by the order of the court to the persons
entitled to the same; but the assets so distributed may still be applied to the
paymentoftheclaimwhenestablished,andthecreditormaymaintainanaction
against the distributees to recover the debt, and such distributees and their
estates shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate they have
respectivelyreceivedfromthepropertyofthedeceased.
PAYMENTOFCONTINGENTCLAIMS
Ifthecontingentclaimbecomesabsoluteandispresentedtothecourtas
an absolute claim within 2 years from the time allowed for the
presentation of claims, it will be paid in the same manner as the other
absoluteclaims
After said period, the creditor may proceed against the distributees,
providedsaidcontingentclaimshadbeenseasonablyfiledinandallowed
bytheprobatecourt
The property reserved for payment of such contingent claims may

thereforeberetainedonlywithinthetwoyearperiodasthereafter,the
sameshallbeincludedamongassetsfordistributiontotheheirs
Section 7. Order of payment if estate insolvent If the assets which can be

appropriated for the payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose, the
executor or administrator shall pay the debts against the estate, observing the
provisionsofArticles1059and2239to2251oftheCivilCode.
Section 8.Dividends to be paid in proportion to claims. If there are no assets

sufficienttopaythecreditsofanyonceclassofcreditorsafterpayingthecredits
entitled to preference over it, each creditor within such class shall be paid a
dividendinproportiontohisclaim.Nocreditorofanyoneclassshallreceiveany
paymentuntilthoseoftheprecedingclassarepaid.
Section 9. Estate of insolvent nonresident, how disposed of. In case

administrationistakeninthePhilippineoftheestateofapersonwhowasatthe
time of his death an inhabitant of another country, and who died insolvent, his
estatefoundinthePhilippinesshall,asfaraspracticable,besodisposedofthat
hiscreditorshereandelsewheremayreceiveeachanequalshare,inproportion
totheirrespectivecredits.
ATENEOLAW2010
Section10.WhenandhowclaimprovedoutsidethePhilippinesagainstinsolvent
resident'sestatepaid. Ifitappearstothecourthavingjurisdictionthatclaims
havebeendulyproveninanothercountryagainsttheestateofaninsolventwho
was at the time of his death an inhabitant of the Philippines, and that the
executor or administrator in the Philippines had knowledge of the presentation
ofsuchclaimsinsuchcountryandanopportunitytocontesttheirallowance,the
courtshallreceiveacertifiedlistofsuchclaims,whenperfectedinsuchcountry,
andaddthesametothelistofclaimsprovedagainstthedeceasedpersoninthe
Philippines so that a just distribution of the whole estate may be made equally
amongallitscreditorsaccordingtotheirrespectiveclaims;butthebenefitofthis
and the preceding sections shall not be extended to the creditors in another
country if the property of such deceased person there found is not equally
apportioned to the creditors residing in the Philippines and the other creditor,
accordingtotheirrespectiveclaims.
Section16.Successorofdeadexecutororadministratormayhavetimeextended
onnoticewithincertainperiod. Whenanexecutororadministratordies,anda
new administrator of the same estate is appointed, the court may extend the
timeallowedforthepaymentofthedebtsorlegaciesbeyondthetimeallowed
totheoriginalexecutororadministrator,notexceedingsix(6)monthsatatime
and not exceeding six (6) months beyond the time which the court might have
allowed to such original executor or administrator; and notice shall be given of
thetimeandplaceforhearingsuchapplication,asrequiredinthelastpreceding
section.
122
TIMBOLV.CANO
1SCRA1271
FACTS:
IntestateCanodiedleavinghisonlysonTimbolassoleheir.Timbolatthetimeof
deathofhisfatherwasstillaminor.HisuncleJosewasappointedinthemeantime
astheadministratoroftheestate.Josepetitionedthathebeallowedtoleasethe
landownedbyCanoandhewouldaccordinglypayforitsrental.Thiswasallowed
by the court together with the approval to convert a portion of the land into a
subdivision.Plansofpartitionwereaswellapprvoved.Lateron,whenTimbolwas
appointed as the administrator in Joses stead, he petitioned that the land area
allotted for subdivision development be increased. This was opposed by Jose on
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
86
the ground of prejudice on its part with respect to the portion of land he was
leasing,amongotherobjections.Themotionhoweverwasstillgranted.
HELD:
Inthesecondandthirdassignmentsoferrorappellantarguesthatthecourtbelow,
asaprobatecourt,hasnojurisdictiontodeprivetheappellantofhisrightsunder
the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only by a court of
general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In probate
proceedingsthecourtorderstheprobateofthewillofthedecedent(Rule80,See.
5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any
qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of administration;
hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13);
orderspaymentoflawfuldebts(Rule89,Sec.14);authorizessale,mortgageorany
encumbranceof realestate(Rule90,Sec. 2); directs thedeliveryofthe estate to
those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a
trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that it is
wiselyandeconomicallyadministered,notdissipated.
Eventhecontractofleaseunderwhichtheappellantholdstheagriculturallandsof
the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's
approval.Iftheprobatecourthastherighttoapprovethelease,somayitorderits
revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the
propertytoalesseeisanactofadministration,alsosubjecttotheapprovalofthe
court.Ofcourse,ifthecourtabusesitsdiscretionintheapprovalofthecontracts
or acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may be
reversedonappeal;butnotbecausethecourtmaymakeanerrormayitbesaid
thatitlacksjurisdictiontocontrolactsofadministrationoftheadministrator.
123
JAUCIANV.QEUROL
38PHIL
FACTS:
RogeroandDayandantesignedadocumentacknowledgingtheirdebttoJaucian.It
seemedthatRogerosignedthedocumentinthecapacityofsuretybutnowherein
thedocumentisthisapparent.Areadingofthedocumentwouldshowthatthey
werebindingthemselvesjointlyandseverally.Onarelevantdate,Rogerosought
the annulment of the document on the ground that his signature was procured
fromfraud.Asamatterofcrossclaim,Jaucianinterposedthepaymentofdebtto
him. During the pendency of this case however, Rogero died and his estate was
ATENEOLAW2010
substituted as party. Later on, Jaucian won the case. In the meanwhile, estate
proceedingswereinstitutedforRogero.Onthebasisofjudgment,Jaucianclaims
paymentbutwasdeniedbythecourtformanyreasons.Amongothers,isthenon
submissionwiththecommissiononclaimswithintherequiredperiod.
HELD:
Anexaminationoftheorderinquestion,however,leadsustoconcludethatitwas
not a final order, and therefore it was not appealable. In effect, it held that
whatever rights Jaucian might have against the estate of Rogero were subject to
theperformanceofaconditionprecedent,namely,thatheshouldfirstexhaustthis
remedy against Dayandante. The court regarded Dayandante. The court regarded
Dayandante as the principal debtor, and the deceased as a surety only liable for
such deficiency as might result after the exhaustion of the assets of the principal
coobligor. The pivotal fact upon which the order was based was the failure of
appellanttoshowthathehadexhaustedhisremedyagainstDayandante,andthis
failurethecourtregardedasacompletebartothegrantingofthepetitionatthat
time. The court made no order requiring the appellee to make any payment
whatever, and that part of the opinion, upon which the order was based, which
containedstatementsofwhatthecourtintendedtodowhenthepetitionshould
berenewed,wasnotbindinguponhimoranyotherjudgebywhomhemightbe
succeeded.Regardlessofwhatmaybeourviewswithrespecttothejurisdictionof
thecourttohavegrantedthereliefdemandedbyappellantinanyevent,itisquite
clearfromwhatwehavestatedthattheorderofApril13,1914,requirednoaction
bytheadministratoratthattime,wasnotfinal,andthereforewasnotappealable.
WethereforeconcludethatnorightswereconferredbythesaidorderofApril13,
1914,andthatitdidnotprecludetheadministratorfrommakingoppositiontothe
petitionoftheappellantwhenitwasrenewed.
124
CUUNJIENGV.TIAOQUI
64PHIL
FACTS:
TiaoquifiledacaseforcollectionofmoneyfromtheCuUnjiengs.Inthesaidcase
initiallyinstituted,propertiesoftheCuUnjiengswerepreliminarilyattachedupon
filing of bond by Tiaoqui during his lifetime. During the pendency of the
proceedings,Tiaoquidiedandwassubstitutedlateronbytheadministratorsofhis
estate. When he died, estate proceedings were commenced and when asked to
file accounts and project of partition, the administrators found difficulty in the
sameduetothependinglitigationwiththeCuUnjiengs.Whentheaccountingwas
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
87
submittedanddulyapproved,thefinalprojectofpartitiontookalatertimetodo.
Inthemeanwhile,CuUnjiengshadacounterclaimagainsttheplaintiff.Theissuein
thiscaserevolvesaroundthenatureofthecounterclaimasacontingentclaimand
whetherthesameshouldhavebeenrelayedtotheprobatecourt.
HELD:
From the definitions just quoted, it is evident that the counterclaim of the
defendantsappellants is not a contingent claim because the obligation sought to
beenforcedagainstthedeceasedorhislegalrepresentatives,theadministrators,
doesnotdependonanuncertainorfutureevent.Accordingtotheallegationsof
thecounterclaimcontainedintheamendedanswer,theobligationcontradictedby
the deceased arose from the time the conspiracy was carried out and from the
timethepreliminaryattachmentwasobtainedillegallyandwithoutanyjustcause.
However,theadministratorscontendintheirbriefthatthecounterclaimisofthe
natureofacontingentclaimbecauseitcannotberealizeduntilfinaljudgmenthas
beenrenderedbythecourt.Thiscontentionissufficientlyrefutedbyreproducing
whathasbeenstatedinthecaseofE.Gaskell&Co.vs.TanSit,supra,totheeffect
that"thetermcontigenthasreferencetotheuncertaintyoftheliabilityandnotto
theuncertaintyinwhichtherealizationorcollectionoftheclaimmaybeinvolved."
Referringnowtothecontentionofthedefendantsappellantsthattheywerenotin
dutyboundtoinformtheprobatecourtthattheyhadfiledacounterclaimagainst
the deceased, it is true that the Code of Civil Procedure contains nor provision
directly imposing such duty on them. However, if under section 602 of the same
Code the probate court alone had acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the
settlement,paymentofdebtsanddistributionoftheestateofthedeceased,tothe
exclusionofallothercourts,itcannotbedeniedthatifthedefendantsappellants
wantedsomeremedyfromsaidcourtfortheprotectionoftheirrights,theyshould
timely apply to it and ask for the retention of properties sufficient to pay for the
counterclaimincaseitshouldprosper.Thiscourtisnotunmindfulofthefactthat
inthiscasetheadministratorswerealsoindutyboundtoinformtheprobatecourt
oftheexistenceofthecounterclaim,whichdutywaspartlycompliedwithbythem
when they reiteratedly informed the court that it was not possible to present a
final account or project of partition on the ground that there were pending
litigations, among them that brought against the defendants Cu Unjiengs, and
whentheyappliedforthereopeningoftheintestateproceedingsandforauthority
tocontinuethesuitagainstsaiddefendants.Suchduty,however,wascoextensive
withthatofthedefendantsappellantsandthatlatterwerenotrelievedthereofby
theconductthatmighthavebeenobservedbytheadministrators,whichconduct,
ATENEOLAW2010
ontheotherhand,cannotbeconsideredimpropertakingintoconsiderationallthe
circumstanceshereinbeforestated.
125
INTESTATEOFJANUARIAGONZALES
72PHIL245
FACTS:
In the summary settlement of the estate of Gonzales, the court ordered the
paymenttocreditorAbarro.Nopaymentbeingmade,theonlypropertyleftbythe
deceased was sold in public auction and proceeds were used to pay the debt.
However,thecourtorderedthesametobesubjecttolegalredemption.Oneyear
has passed and since then, no redemption was made. Thereafter, Abarro sought
the finality of the sale. Tomasa as one of the heirs opposed the same on the
groundshehastenderedthemoneyalreadytothesherifftoredeemtheproperty.
HELD:
Tomasa de Guia has no right to redeem and that the sale made in favor of
Sisenando Abarro is final. In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a
deceasedperson,salesorderedbytheprobatecourtforpaymentofdebtsarefinal
andarenotsubjecttolegalredemption.Unlikeinordinaryexecutionsales,thereis
nolegalprovisionallowingredemptioninthesaleofpropertyforpaymentofdebts
ofadeceasedperson
126
ECHAUSV.BLANCO
179SCRA704
FACTS:
Eschaus filed a claim in her capacity as administratrix of her late fathers estate
against Hodges for allegedly profits from a business endeavor. During the
pendency of the case, Hodges died. However, the case proceeded and PCIB was
even substituted as a party to the case with no objection. When judgment was
renderedinfavorofEschaus,insteadofawritofexecution,amotionforpayment
pursuanttojudgmentwasfiledinthespecialproceedings.Thewidowopposedthe
same.
HELD:
It must be noted that Civil Case No. 6628 which is a money claim, was Instituted
during the lifetime of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before a decision
couldberenderedbytheRegionalTrialCourthearingthecase,C.N.Hodgesdied.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
88
Uponhisdeath,hewassubstitutedbyPCIBasadministratorofhisestate.Beinga
moneyclaim,saidcivilcaseshouldhavebeendismissedandinstitutedasamoney
claimintheintestateestateofC.N.Hodges.
However,thisisnottosuggestthatbecausetheclaimofpetitionerwaspursuedto
itsconclusioninCivilCaseNo.6682insteadofbeingdismissedandfiledasamoney
claim in Special Proceedings No. 1672, the judgment rendered therein is null and
void.
Moreover,whenPCIBasadministratoroftheestateofC.N.Hodgeswasorderedto
besubstitutedasdefendant,itregisterednoobjectiontotheorder.Thus,evenif
We admit for the sake of argument that the trial court, after the death of C. N.
Hodges has no jurisdiction to render a judgment therein, the argument must fail.
PCIB,participatedactivelyinthesaidcase.Itdidnotappealthedecisionrendered
therein, neither did it raise the issue of jurisdiction ion at any stage. It has been
consistentlyheldbythiscourtthatwhilelackofjurisdictionmaybeassailedatany
stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before the court without
jurisdictionwillestopsuchpartyfromassailingsuchlackofjurisdiction.
The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the
court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules are
present. The period prescribed for creditors isnt exclusive and may be made
before the order of distribution, subject to the discretion of the court and under
equitableterms.
RULE89
SALES,MORTGAGES,ANDOTHERENCUMBRANCESOFPROPERTYOFDECEDENT
Section 1. Order of sale of personalty. Upon the application of the executor or

administrator, and on written notice to the heirs and other persons interested,
the court may order the whole or a part of the personal estate to be sold, if it
appears necessary for the purpose of paying debts, expenses of administration,
orlegacies,orforthepreservationoftheproperty.
Section 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of

realty to pay debts and legacies though personalty not exhausted. When the
personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of
administration,andlegacies,orwherethesaleofsuchpersonalestatemayinjure
ATENEOLAW2010
the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a
testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of such
debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or
administratorandonwrittennoticeoftheheirs,devisees,andlegateesresiding
inthePhilippines,mayauthorizetheexecutororadministratortosell,mortgage,
orotherwiseencumbersomuchasmaybenecessaryoftherealestate,inlieuof
personalestate,forthepurposeofpayingsuchdebts,expenses,andlegacies,ifit
clearlyappearsthatsuchsale,mortgage,orencumbrancewouldbebeneficialto
the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority
maybeforthesale,mortgage,orotherencumbranceofthewholeofsuchreal
estate,orsomuchthereofasisnecessaryorbeneficialunderthecircumstances.
Section3.Personsinterestedmaypreventsuchsale,etc.,bygivingbond.Nosuch
authoritytosell,mortgage,orotherwiseencumberrealorpersonalestateshall
be granted if any person interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be
fixedbythecourt,conditionedtopaythedebts,expensesofadministration,and
legacies within such time as the court directs; and such bond shall be for the
securityofthecreditors,aswellasoftheexecutororadministrator,andmaybe
prosecutedforthebenefitofeither.
Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested

persons. Disposal of proceeds. When it appears that the sale of the whole or a
part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees,
legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the
executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and
legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the executor or
administratortosellthewholeorapartofsaidestate,althoughnotnecessaryto
paydebts,legacies,orexpensesofadministration;butsuchauthorityshallnotbe
granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the
proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper
proportions.

estate to pay debts and legacies in other countries. When the sale of personal
estate, or the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of real estate is not
necessary to pay the debts, expenses of administration, or legacies in the
Philippines, but it appears from records and proceedings of a probate court in
another country that the estate of the deceased in such other country is not
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
89
sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies there, the
court here may authorize the executor or administrator to sell the personal
estate or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the real estate for the
payment of debts or legacies in the other country, in same manner as for the
paymentofdebtsorlegaciesinthePhilippines.

realtyacquiredonexecutionorforeclosure.Thecourtmayauthorizeanexecutor
oradministratortosellmortgage,orotherwiseencumberrealestateacquiredby
him on execution or foreclosure sale, under the same circumstances and under
the same regulations as prescribed in this rule for the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbranceofotherrealestate.
WHEN PERSONAL PROPERTY MAY BE SOLD, OR THE REAL PROPERTY BE SOLD,

MORTGAGED,OROTHERWISEBEENCUMBERED
1. Forthepaymentofdebts,expensesofadministration,andlegaciesinthe
Philippines
2. When such sale would be beneficial to the persons interested in the
estate
3. For the payment of debts, expenses of administration and legacies
involved in the settlement of the estate of a decedent in a foreign
country
Section 7. Regulation for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise

encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased
may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules
andwhenitappearsnecessaryorbeneficialunderthefollowingregulations.
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the
debts due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the
valueofthepersonalestate,thesituationoftheestatetobesold,mortgaged,or
otherwiseencumbered,andsuchotherfactsasshowthatthesale,mortgage,or
otherencumbranceisnecessaryorbeneficial.
(b)Thecourtshallthereuponfixatimeandplaceforhearingsuchpetition,and
causenoticestatingthenatureofthepetition,thereasonsforthesame,andthe
time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons
ATENEOLAW2010
interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by publication or

otherwise,asitshalldeemproper;
(c)Ifthecourtrequiresit,theexecutororadministratorshallgiveanadditional
bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that such executor or
administrator will account for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance;
(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been
complied with, the court, by order stating such compliance, may authorize the
executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in proper
cases, such part of the estate as is deemed necessary, and in case of sale the
courtmayauthorizeittobepublicorprivate,aswouldbemostbeneficialtoall
parties concerned. The executor or administrator shall be furnished with a
certifiedcopyofsuchorder;
(e)Iftheestateistobesoldatauction,themodeofgivingnoticeofthetimeand
place of the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning notice of
executionsale;
(f)Thereshallberecordedintheregistryofdeedsoftheprovinceinwhichthe
realestatethussold,mortgage,orotherwiseencumberedissituated,acertified
copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or
administratorforsuchrealestate,whichshallbeasvalidasifthedeedhadbeen
executedbythedeceasedinhislifetime.
PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY FROM COURT TO SELL, ENCUMBER, OR

MORTGAGEPROPERTY
1. Theexecutororadministratorshallfileawrittenpetitionsettingforththe
debts due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the
legacies,thevalueofthepersonalestate,thesituationoftheestatetobe
sold,mortgaged,orotherwiseencumbered,andsuchotherfactsasshow
thatthesale,mortgage,orotherencumbranceisnecessaryorbeneficial.
2. Thecourtshallthereuponfixatimeandplaceforhearingsuchpetition,
and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reasons for the
same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by
mailtothepersonsinterested,andmaycausesuchfurthernoticetobe
given,bypublicationorotherwise,asitshalldeemproper;
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
3.
4.
5.
6.
90
If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an

additionalbond,insuchsumasthecourtdirects,conditionedthatsuch
executor or administrator will account for the proceeds of the sale,
mortgage,orotherencumbrance;
If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have
been complied with, the court, by order stating such compliance, may
authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber, in proper cases, such part of the estate as is deemed
necessary,andincaseofsalethecourtmayauthorizeittobepublicor
private, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned. The
executororadministratorshallbefurnishedwithacertifiedcopyofsuch
order;
Iftheestateistobesoldatauction,themodeofgivingnoticeofthetime
and place of the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning
noticeofexecutionsale;
Thereshallberecordedintheregistryofdeedsoftheprovinceinwhich
therealestatethussold,mortgage,orotherwiseencumberedissituated,
acertifiedcopyoftheorderofthecourt,togetherwiththedeedofthe
executororadministratorforsuchrealestate,whichshallbeasvalidasif
thedeedhadbeenexecutedbythedeceasedinhislifetime.
TWOGROUNDSTOGRANTTHESALE,ENCUMBERANCE,MORTGAGE
1. Tosettleexistingdebts
2. Forthebenefitoftheheirsandlegatees
Section 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased

contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. Where the deceased was in his
lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest
therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that
purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property
accordingtosuchcontract,orwithsuchmodificationsasareagreeduponbythe
partiesandapprovedbythecourt;andifthecontractistoconveyrealproperty
to the executor or administrator, the clerk of court shall execute the deed. The
deed executed by such executor, administrator, or clerk of court shall be as
affectual to convey the property as if executed by the deceased in his lifetime;
butnosuchconveyanceshallbeauthorizeduntilnoticeoftheapplicationforthat
purposehasbeengivenpersonallyorbymailtoallpersonsinterested,andsuch
further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems
proper; nor if the assets in the hands of the executor or administrator will
ATENEOLAW2010
thereby be reduced so as to prevent a creditor from receiving his full debt or

diminishhisdividend.
Section9.Whencourtmayauthorizeconveyanceoflandswhichdeceasedheldin
trust. Wherethedeceasedinhislifetimeheldrealpropertyintrustforanother
person,thecourtmayafternoticegivenasrequiredinthelastprecedingsection,
authorizetheexecutororadministratortodeedsuchpropertytotheperson,or
hisexecutororadministrator,forwhoseuseandbenefititwassoheld;andthe
courtmayordertheexecutionofsuchtrust,whethercreatedbydeedorbylaw.
127
ESTATEOFGAMBOAV.FLORENZA
12PHIL.191
FACTS:
The administrator filed in the special proceedings a motion praying for a hearing
for preference of credits as some credits were secured by mortgages while some
werenot.Inthewholecourseoftheproceedings,thecourtallowedthesaleofa
property for the payment of a specific debt. The rules however provide that the
salecanbeallowedtosatisfythedebts.
HELD:
Thereisnothinginanyoneofthesesectionsnorinanyothersectionsofthecode
which indicates that the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its probate
jurisdiction,hasanypowertoorderthesaleofaspecificpieceofrealestateforthe
purposeofpayingamortgagedebtwhichisalienthereon.Itmaybethatthecourt
would have authority to sell the property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the
purposeofpayingotherdebts oftheestate,butthereisnothinggivingthecourt
authoritytosellitforthepurposeofpayingthatspecificdebt.
Anotherfatalobjectiontotheorderofthe12thofNovember,directingthesale,is
that the court entirely failed to comply with the provisions of section 722 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. That section requires the administrator to present a
petitionaskingforthesaleoftherealestate.Italsodistinctlyprovidesthat,when
such petition is made, the court shall appoint a time and place for hearing it and
shallrequirenoticeofthepetitionandofthetimeandplaceofsuchhearingtobe
given in a newspaper of general circulation, and that the court may order such
furthernoticegivenasitdeemsproper.
128
BOAGAV.SOLER
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
91
2SCRA755
FACTS:
InthesettlementofestateofspousesRos,theadministratorthenwasallowedto
sellparcelsoflandtoSoler,toraisemoneytosettledebts.Onarelevantdate,the
records of the special proceedings were burned. Records were reinstituted and
Bonagawasissuedlettersofadministration.Hethenfiledanactiontoannulthe
deedsofsaletoSoler.Thelattersoughtthedismissalofthesameduetolackof
capacity to sue and the finality attained by the orders. Without any hearing, the
courtdismissedtheaction.
HELD:
ThesaleonAugust30,1944appearstobeof21parcelsofabaca,coconut,forest
andpasturelands,coveringanaggregateareaofmorethan1,001hectaresforthe
lump sum of P142,800, Japanese currency. Plaintiffappellant alleges (and the
record nowhere indicates the contrary), that these lands comprised almost the
entireestate.Nothingintherecordwouldshowwhether,asrequiredbyRule90,
sections4and7,theapplicationforauthoritytosellwassetforhearing,orthatthe
court ever caused notice thereof to be issued to the heirs of Alejandro Ros
Incidentally, these heirs seem not to have gotten any part of the purchase price
sincetheywerethenallegedlyinSpain.Yet,intheorderofdeclarationofheirsof
thewifeandapprovingthesaletoSoler(Annex"B"),thedeclarationoftheheirsof
thehusbandAlejandroRoswasexpresslyheldinabeyance,indicatingarecognition
of their existence. Appellees maintain that the sale was made for the purpose of
paying debts, but this, at lease, is controversial. Appellant asserts that the total
outstandingdebtsoftheestateatthetimeofthesaleamountedtoonlyP4,641.48,
arelativelymeagersumcomparedtothelargetractsoflandsold.
Thelowercourterredindismissingtheactionwithoutahearingonthemerits.A
sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties, under
Sections4and7,Rule90,mustcomplywiththerequisitesthereinprovided,which
aremandatory.Amongtheserequisites,thefixingofthetimeandplaceofhearing
for an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs, are essential; and
without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it,
wouldbenullandvoidabinitio.Rule90,Section4,doesnotdistinguishbetween
heirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines. Therefore, its
requirementsshouldapplyregardlessoftheplaceofresidenceofthoserequiredto
benotifiedundersaidrule.
ATENEOLAW2010
ThecontentionthatthesalewasmadeunderSection2,Rule90(whereinnoticeis
requiredonlytothoseheirs,etc.,residinginthePhilippines),isnotsubstantiated
bytherecord.Neitherthedeedofsale,northeordersissuedbytheprobatecourt
inconnectiontherewith,showwhether,asrequiredbysaidSection2,thepersonal
propertieswereinsufficienttopaythedebtsandexpensesofadministration.There
is not even a showing, to start with, that the sale was made for the purpose of
paying debts or expenses of administration (or legacies), a condition which
circumscribes the applicability of that section. On the face of the reamended
complaint at any rate, it does not appear that the contested sale was one under
section 2 of Rule 90; and the same can not be invoked to sustain the motion to
dismiss. Without reception of further evidence to determine whether the
requisitesoftheapplicableprovisionsoftheRuleshadbeenfollowed,thedismissal
of the action was erroneous and improvident. Plaintiff should at least have been
givenachancetoprovehiscase.
129
VDA.DECELISVVDA.DELASANTA
93PHIL909
FACTS:
HELD:
130
DEJESUSV.DEJESUS
3SCRA548
FACTS:
InesAlejandrino,asadministratrixofherlatehusbandsestate,filedaninventory
which included a parcel of land. The decedents sister opposed this inclusion on
thegroundthatitwascoownedwithherandanotherbrother.Insteadoflitigating
the same, the parties entered into an agreement dubbed as Statement of Facts.
Inesacknowledgedthatthelandwascoownedandthatherlatehusbandwasjust
holding the same in trust. Later on, when Ines son substituted his mother as
administrator,heinstitutedanactiontoannulsaidagreement.
HELD:
Onthequestionofjurisdiction,wethinktheprobatecourthadjurisdictiontoact
onandapproveofthestipulationsinquestion,notonlyasanincidenttoitspower
to exclude any property from the inventory of the estate of the deceased, but
under section 9, Rule 90, Rules of Court, which permits the probate court,
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
92
whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another
person, to authorize the executor or administrator to deed such property to the
person or persons for whose use and benefit it was so held. There being no
controversybetweentheformeradministratrixandthedefendantsthatthelatter
andthedeceasedMeleciodeJesusownthelotinquestionincommonandthatit
wasregisteredinthedeceased'snameonlyintrustforallthecoowners,therewas
no need to file a separate action to an ordinary court to establish the common
ownershipofthepartiesoversaidproperty;andtheprobatecourtcouldapprove,
as it did approve, the agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized their
common ownership of the property in question and the trust character of the
exclusive title held by the deceased over the same, especially since the parties
themselvesstatethatsuchagreementwasenteredintoinordertoforestallfuture
litigation between them and to foster family relations, and in addition, the
defendantEusebiadeJesushadagreed,inconsiderationofthecourt'sapprovalof
saidagreement,towaiveamoneyclaimagainsttheestate,sothatcourtapproval
ofsaidagreementwouldreallyredoundtothebenefitoftheestateandtheheirs.
Section 9, Rule 90, however, provides that authority can be given by the probate
courttotheadministratortoconveypropertyheldintrustbythedeceasedtothe
beneficiariesofthetrustonly"afternoticegivenasrequiredinthelastpreceding
section"; i.e., that. "no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the
application for that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons
interested,andsuchfurthernoticehasbeengiven,bypublicationorotherwise,as
thecourtdeemsproper"(sec.8,Rule90).Thisrulemakesitmandatorythatnotice
beservedontheheirsandotherinterestedpersonsoftheapplicationforapproval
of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased, and where no such
notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance
itself, is completely void. Here, plaintiffs claim that no such notice was given the
heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus of the petition for the approval of the
stipulationsinquestion,anditisquiteprobablethattheclaimistrue,becausesaid
heirswereallminorswhentheproceedingsinquestiontookplace.Itwouldhave
been necessary, therefore, to appoint a guardian ad litem for them before they
could be validly served said notice, yet the records here do not show that such
appointment of guardian was obtained. In fact, any such appointment appears
improbable, considering that the stipulations in question were approved the very
next day following their execution and submission for approval. It must be
observedthatin1948,beforethepromulgationoftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,
parents as such were not the legal representatives of their children before the
courtsandcouldnotdisposeoftheirpropertywithoutjudicialauthorization.
ATENEOLAW2010
RULE90
DISTRIBUTIONANDPARTITIONOFTHEESTATE
Section1.Whenorderfordistributionofresiduemade.Whenthedebts,funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have
beenpaid,thecourt,ontheapplicationoftheexecutororadministrator,orofa
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residueoftheestatetothepersonsentitledtothesame,namingthemandthe
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand
and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
otherpersonhavingthesameinhispossession.Ifthereisacontroversybefore
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversyshallbeheardanddecidedasinordinarycases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above

mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them,giveabond,inasumtobefixedbythecourt,conditionedforthepayment
ofsaidobligationswithinsuchtimeasthecourtdirects.
Section 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to

advancementmade,orallegedtohavebeenmade,bythedeceasedtoanyheir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
personraisingthequestionsandontheheir.
Section3.Bywhomexpensesofpartitionpaid.Ifatthetimeofdistributionthe
executororadministratorhasretainedsufficienteffectsinhishandswhichmay
lawfully be applied for the expenses of partition of the properties distributed,
suchexpensesofpartitionmaybepaidbysuchexecutororadministratorwhenit
appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the intention of the
testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their
respective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be
settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person interested in the partition
does not pay his proportion or share, the court may issue an execution in the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
93
name of the executor or administrator against the party not paying the sum
assessed.
Section 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. Certified copies of final

orders and judgments of the court relating to the real estate or the partition
thereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province where the
propertyissituated.
131
LOPEZV.LOPEZ
68PHIL227
FACTS:
ConcepcionfiledapetitionintheintestateproceedingsofEmeterioLopezforthe
summary entitlement to his estate, alleging therein that she is the acknowledged
natural child of the latter. Opposition was made by alleged nephews and nieces
denying her allegations. The petition was later amended by averring that the
estatevalueisbiggerthanwhatwaspreviouslyallegedandisbeyondthescopeof
asummarysettlement.
HELD:
Appellantsclaimthattheyhadnonoticeeitherofthepetitionforthedeclaration
of heirs or of the date set for the hearing thereof. We find in the record no
evidence affirmatively showing that they had no such notice; therefore, the
presumption of regularity of proceedings should stand. In the motion for
reconsideration filed by them, the lack of notice is alleged; but the motion is not
evenverified.Besides,accordingtotherecordAttorneySimplicioB.Pe awasthe
counselforboththeadministratorandtheoppositorsappellants.Thepetitionfor
declarationofheirs,althoughsignedbyAttorneySimplicioB.Pe aas"abogadodel
administrador",was,infact,apetitionfiledinbehalfoftheoppositorsappellants
as their right to succession is therein asserted and prayed for. Under this
circumstances, there exists sufficient ground for holding, as we do hold, that the
oppositorsappellantshadnoticeofthepetitionaswellasofthehearingwherethe
saidattorneywaspresent.
132
HEIRSOFPERFECTOSANTIESBANV.SANTIESBAN
68PHIL367
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
Ambrosiowasappointedastheadministratorofhislatewifesestate.Sincethere
werent any accounts payable, the heirs extrajudicially partitioned the properties.
The properties having been distributed and accounted for, the court ordered the
proceedingsclosure.Morethantwoyearsafter,thefatherconveyedhisinterest
to the eight parcels of land he got to his daughter. This was opposed by
Macondrayandlikewise,itprayedfortheappointmentofanewadministrator.The
heirsopposedthis.
HELD:
The appellants contend in their assigned error that the court exceeded its
jurisdictioninissuingthen orderofDecember11,1935whichsetasidetheother
orderofNovember12,1934,reopeningtheintestateandrequiringthatthename
of the a new administrator be proposed. They argue that this last order, having
becomefinal,wasnotsubjecttomodificationorreversal.Wefindnomeritinthe
assignment of error because the order of November 12, 1934, did not finally
determine the action and was interlocutory in nature (section 123, Code of Civil
Procedure). By said order the court did not determine or adjudicate any right or
controversyandithadnootherobjectthantoopenthewayforthehearingand
resolution of the rights to alleged damages which one of the parties claimed to
have suffered. The orders irregularly issued by the court were those which
reopened the intestate and appointed a new administrator, because the order
closing the intestate, dated November 29, 1932, put an end thereto and relieved
theadministratorfromhisduties.Undersection753oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,
whatbringsanintestateproceedingtoacloseistheorderofdistributiondirecting
the delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the
indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. This order was issued in the intestate
since October 18, 1932 when the court approved the partition executed and
submittedbyalltheheirs.
133
SOLIVIOV.CA
Supra
HELD:
However,inasmuchasConcordiahadagreedtodelivertheestateofthedeceased
to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from
whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her
"MotiontoReopenand/orReconsiderOrderdatedApril3,1978"whichshefiledin
Spl.ProceedingNo.2540:
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
94
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation,besidestheyhavecloselyknowneachotherduetotheirfiliationtothe
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for(sic)eachother.(p.234,Record;Emphasissupplied)
She is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
financetheeducationofindigentbutdeservingstudentsaswell.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the
agreement.
134
SALVADORV.STA.MARIA
20SCRA604
FACTS:
CelestinoSalvadorsoldpreviouslyalandtospousesHalili.Allegingthereafterthe
absenceofconsideration,hesoughtreconveyanceoftheland.Hediedduringthe
pendency of proceedings and his heirs were substituted to his part. In the
meanwhile,intestateproceedingswereinstituted.Intheinventoryoftheestate,
the parcel of land was included. The land in question was later reconveyed.
However, the land was reconveyed to the heirs and not to the estate. This was
questioned.
HELD:
Itisasettledpointoflawthattherightofheirstospecific,distributivesharesof
inheritancedoesnotbecomefinallydeterminableuntilallthedebtsoftheestate
arepaid.Untilthen,inthefaceofsaidclaims,theirrightscannotbeenforced,are
inchoate,andsubjecttotheexistenceofaresidueafterpaymentofthedebts.
Petitionersdonotquestiontheexistenceofthedebtsabovementioned.Theyonly
contend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment
reconveyed to them, not to the estate the same are not properties of the estate
buttheirown,andthus,notliablefordebtsoftheestate.
ATENEOLAW2010
Said contention is selfrefuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged
characterasheirsofCelestino;assuch,theyweresubstitutedinthereconveyance
case; the reconveyance to them was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino
Salvador.Itfollowsthatthepropertiestheyclaimare,evenbytheirownreasoning,
partofCelestino'sestate.Therighttheretoasallegedlyhisheirswouldariseonlyif
saidparcelsoflandarepartoftheestateofCelestino,nototherwise.Theirhaving
receivedthesame,therefore,inthereconveyanceaction,wasperforceintrustfor
theestate,subjecttoitsobligations.Theycannotdistributesaidpropertiesamong
themselvesassubstitutedheirswithoutthedebtsoftheestatebeingfirstsatisfied.
135
TIMBOLV.CANO
Supra
136
URIARTEV.CFIOFNEGROSOCCIDENTAL
Supra
FACTS:
HELD:
Whentheestatetobesettledisthatofanonresidentalien(likethedeceased)the
Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have
concurrentjurisdictiontotakecognizanceoftheproperspecialproceedingforthe
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are
the Negros and the Manila Courts province and city where the deceased left
considerableproperties.
Aspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionoftheestateofadeceased
person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in
accordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingforthesettlement
of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
samepurpose.Thusithasbeenheldrepeatedlythat,ifinthecourseofintestate
proceedingspendingbeforeaCFIitisfounditthatthedecedenthadleftalastwill,
proceedingsfortheprobateofthelattershouldreplacetheintestateproceedings
evenifatthatstageanadministratorhadalreadybeenappointed,thelatterbeing
requiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnovertheestateinhispossessiontothe
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
95
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear

indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally
determined,orinterveneinSpecialProceedingNo.51396oftheManilaCourt,ifit
isstillopen,ortoaskforitsreopeningifithasalreadybeenclosed,soastobeable
tosubmitfordeterminationthequestionofhisacknowledgmentasnaturalchildof
the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdictiontodeclarewhoaretheheirsofthedeceasedtestatorandwhetheror
notaparticularpartyisorshouldbedeclaredhisacknowledgednaturalchild.
RULE91
ESCHEATS
Section1.Whenandbywhompetitionfiled.Whenapersondiesintestate,seized
ofrealpropertyinthePhilippines,leavingnoheirorpersonbylawentitledtothe
same,theSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentativeinbehalfoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines,mayfileapetitionintheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewhere
the deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the
Philippines,settingforththefacts,andprayingthattheestateofthedeceasedbe
declaredescheated.
WHERESHOULDAPETITIONFORESCHEATBEFILED?
Intheprovincewherethedeceasedlastresidedorwhichhehadestate
WHATSHOULDTHEPETITIONCONTAINASMINIMUMREQUIREMENTS?
Setforththefacts
Prayerthattheestatebedeclaredescheated
INWHATINSTANCESCANESCHEATBEFILED?
Decedentdiedintestatewithnoheirsandpersonentitledtothesame
Actionsofreversion
PropertiesalienatedinviolationofConstitutionorstatute
Dormantbankaccounts
Decedentdyingintestate
Resident
Wherelastresided
ATENEOLAW2010
Nonresident
Wherepropertiesarelocated
Escheat of properties alienated in Wherepropertiesarelocated
violationofConstitutionorstatute
Escheatofdormantbankaccounts
Wherethemoneyisdeposited
Actionsforreversion
Wherepropertiesarelocated
Section 2. Order for hearing. If the petition is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and
placeforthehearingthereof,whichdateshallbenotmorethansix(6)months
aftertheentryoftheorder,andshalldirectthatacopyoftheorderbepublished
before the hearing at least once a week for six (6) successive weeks in some
newspaperofgeneralcirculationpublishedintheprovince,asthecourtshallbe
deembest.
Section 3. Hearing and judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the
datefixedintheorderthatsuchorderhasbeenpublishedasdirectedandthat
thepersondiedintestate,seizedofrealorpersonalpropertyinthePhilippines,
leaving no heir or person entitled to the same, and no sufficient cause being
showntothecontrary,thecourtshalladjudgethattheestateoftheestateofthe
deceased in the Philippines, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall
escheat;andshall,pursuanttolaw,assignthepersonalestatetothemunicipality
or city where he last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to the
municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated. If the
deceasedneverresidedinthePhilippines,thewholeestatemaybeassignedto
therespectivemunicipalitiesorcitieswherethesameislocated.Shallestateshall
beforthebenefitofpublicschools,andpubliccharitableinstitutionsandcenters
insaidmunicipalitiesorcities.
Thecourt,attheinstanceofaninterestedparty,oronitsownmotion,mayorder
the establishment of a permanent trust, so that the only income from the
propertyshallbeused.
Section 4. When and by whom claim to estate filed. If a devisee, legatee, heir,
widow,widower,orotherpersonentitledtosuchestateappearsandfilesaclaim
theretowiththecourtwithinfive(5)yearsfromthedateofsuchjudgment,such
personshallhavepossessionofandtitletothesame,orifsold,themunicipality
or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds after deducting reasonable
chargesforthecareoftheestate;butaclaimnotmadewithinthesaidtimeshall
beforeverbarred.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
96
Section5.Otheractionsforescheat.Untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw,actionsfor
reversionorescheatofpropertiesalienatedinviolationoftheConstitutionorof
any statute shall be governed by this rule, except that the action shall be
institutedintheprovincewherethelandliesinwholeorinpart.
137
MUNICIPALCOUNCILOFLAGUNAV.COLEGIODESANJOSE
65PHIL
FACTS:
Thiscasewascommencedinthesaidbyapetitionfiledbythepetitionersinbehalf
of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat. The Colegio de San Jose,
Inc.,appearedspeciallyandassailedthepetitionuponthegroundsthatthecourt
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the case and that the petition
doesnotallegesufficientfactstoentitletheapplicantstotheremedyprayedfor;
andaskedthatthepetitionbefinallydismissed.CarlosYoungintervenedandfiled
amotionaskingforthedismissalorthepetitionuponthegroundthattheCodeof
Civil Procedure, under which the same was filed, is not applicable because it was
notyetinforcewhentheoriginalownerofthehaciendadied,whichwasinApril,
1596,andthatthepetitionwasirregularlydocketedastheapplicantshadpaidat
thedocketfeeswhichtheclerkofcourtshouldcollect.Subsequentlytheattorneys
for both parties filed another motions of minor importance, almost all of which
containstheargumentsadvancedinsupportoftheircontentions.OnOctober29,
1936,thecourtoverruledtheobjectiontotheappearanceandinterventioninthe
casebytheColegiodeSanJoseandCarlosYoung,enteringtheorderwhichisone
ofthoseappealedfrom.Andonthe30thofthesamemoththecourtenteredthe
resolution,alsoappealedfrom,dismissingthepetitionforescheat,withthecosts
tothepetitioners.
HELD:
Accordingly to the first of the said sections, the essential facts which should be
allegedinthepetition,whicharejurisdictionbecausetheyconferjurisdictionupon
theCourtofFirstInstance,are:Thatapersonhasdiedintestateorwithoutleaving
anywill;thathehasleftrealorpersonalproperty;thathewastheownerthereof;
thathehasnotleftanyheirorpersonwhoisbylawentitledtotheproperty;and
thattheonewhoappliesfortheescheatisthemunicipalitywheredeceasedhad
his last residence, or in case should have no residence in the country, the
municipalitywherethepropertyissituated.
ATENEOLAW2010
The following section provides that after the publications and trial, if the court
findsthatthedeceasedisinfacttheownerofrealandpersonalpropertysituated
in the country and has not left any heirs or other person entitled thereto, it may
order, after the payments of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat, and in
such case it shall adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the
deceasedhadhislastplaceofresidenceandtherealpropertytothemunicipality
ormunicipalitieswheretheyaresituated.
Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and
personalpropertyofadeceasedpersonbecomethepropertyoftheStateuponhis
death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action
contemplatedbysection1oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,butaspecialproceeding
inaccordancewiththesaidsectionandChapterXXXIX,PartII,ofthesameCode.
Theproceeding,asprovidedbysection750,shouldbecommencedbypetitionand
notbycomplaint.
Inaspecialproceedingforescheatundersection750and751thepetitionerisnot
thesoleandexclusiveinterestedparty.Anypersonallegingtohaveadirectrightor
interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest and
necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the
presentcasetheColegiodeSanJose,Inc.,andCarlosYoungappearedallegingto
have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the former
becauseitclaimstobetheexclusiveownerofthehacienda,andthelatterbecause
heclaimtobethelesseethereofunderacontractlegalityenteredwiththeformer.
Inviewoftheseallegationsitiserroneoustoholdthatthesaidpartiesarewithout
righteithertoappearincaseortosubstantiatetheirrespectiveallegedright.This
unfavorablyresolvesthepetitioners'firstassignmentoferror.
A motion to dismiss is an allowed pleading in escheat proceedings when on its

face,theescheatproceedingsshouldbedismissed.
Anescheatproceedingisimproperwhenthepropertyissubjecttotheownership
ofthestatealready.
138
REPUBLICV.IAC
148SCRA271
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
97
FACTS:
The property in dispute was among the lands taken over by the United States
Government under the Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the American
Congress.Itwasregisteredin1930underTransferCertificateofTitleNo.9509of
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga in the name of Kantiro Koyama, a Japanese
national,whohasnotbeenheardfromsincetheendofWorldWarII.Underthe
said Act, the land was supposed to be transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines.
RepublicofthePhilippineshadfiledescheatproceedingsagainstthesaidproperty,
claiming that the registered owner of the land "had been absent for the past ten
years or more and he, therefore, may be presumed dead for the purpose of
appointing his successor." It also alleged that since he left no heirs or persons
entitled to the aforementioned property, the State should inherit the same in
accordancewithRule91oftheRulesofCourt.Thecourtsubsequentlyallowedthe
escheat.
HELD:
Itisclear,andtherespondentCityofZamboangadoesnotdenyit,thattherewas
mereinadvertenceonthepartoftheAmericangovernmentinomittingtotransfer
thedisputedlandtotheRepublicofthePhilippines.TheobviouspurposeoftheAct
wastoturnovertothePhilippinegovernmentallenemypropertiessituatedinits
territorythathadbeenseizedandwerebeingheldforthetimebeingbytheUnited
States,whichwasthenexercisingsovereigntyoverthePhilippines.Thetransferof
suchenemypropertiestothePhilippineRepublicwasoneoftheactsbywhichthe
United States acknowledged the elevation of this country to the status of a
sovereignstateonJuly4,1946.
While it is true that there are no records of such transfer, we may presume that
such transfer was made. The lack of such records does not mean that it was not
madeasthiswouldruncountertothemandateofthePhilippinePropertyActof
1946, which, to repeat, intended to vest title in the Philippines enemy properties
foundinitsterritory.ItwouldbemorereasonabletosupposethatthePresidentof
theUnitedStates,orthepersonactingunderhisauthority,compliedwith,rather
than neglected (and so violated) this requirement of Section 3 of the said Act, if
only on the basis of the presumption of the regularity of official functions. In the
extreme, we can even say that this section legally effected the transfer, to be
evidenced later by the formality of the corresponding deed, and that the lack of
suchdeeddoesnotmeanthatnotransferwasmade.Otherwise,wewouldhaveto
ATENEOLAW2010
facethedubiousconclusionthatthesaidpropertyisstillownedandsostillsubject
todispositionbytheUnitedStates.
Weholdthatwhereitcomestoordinaryrealpropertiestheownersofwhichmay
bepresumeddeadandleftnoheirs,thesamemaybeescheated,conformablyto
Rule91oftheRulesofCourt,infavorofthepoliticalsubdivisionsinwhichtheyare
located. The said Rule, however, does not cover properties taken from enemy
nationalsasaresultofWorldWarIIandrequiredtobetransferredtotheRepublic
of the Philippines by the United States in accordance with its own enactment
commonlyknownasthePhilippinePropertyActof1946.Suchproperties,including
the land in dispute, belong to the Philippine government not by virtue of the
escheatproceedingsbutonthestrengthofthetransferauthorizedandrequiredby
thesaidAct.
139
VICENTETANV.CITYOFDAVAO
166SCRA73
FACTS:
The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, during their lifetime, were
residentsofDavaoCity.Astheywerechildless,theyadoptedathreeyearoldgirl
whom they named Dominga Garcia and brought up as their own. At the age of
nineteenyears,DomingaGarciamarriedaChinaman,TanSengaliasSengYap,with
whom she had three children, named Vicente, who was born in 1916. Dominga
GarciaandherthreechildrenemigratedtoCanton,China.Inlessthanayear,Tan
Sengfollowedhisfamilytohiscountryoforigin.TheyleftaparceloflandinDavao
whichwassubjectofescheatproceedings.
HELD:
With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines,
representedbytheSolicitorGeneral,mayfiletheescheatpetitionunderSection1,
Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the Appellate Court correctly ruled
that the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on
September12,1962,whentheapplicablerulewasstillRule92ofthe1940Rulesof
Courtwhichprovided:
Sec.1.Whenandbywhom,petitionfiled. Whenapersondiesintestate,seizedof
real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law
entitledtothesame,themunicipalityorcitywherethedeceasedlastresided,ifhe
resided in the Philippines, or the municipality or city in which he had estate if he
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
98
residedoutofthePhilippines,mayfileapetitioninthecourtoffirstinstanceofthe
province setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be
declaredescheated.
Rule91oftheRevisedrulesofCourt,whichprovidesthatonlytheRepublicofthe
Philippines,throughtheSolicitorGeneral,maycommenceescheatproceedings,did
nottakeeffectuntilJanuary1,1964.Althoughtheescheatproceedingswerestill
pending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition
becausetodosowouldworkinjusticetotheCityofDavao.
TheCourtofAppealsshouldhavedismissedtheappealofVicentaTanandRamon
Pizarro earlier because the records show that Vicenta was never a party in the
escheat proceedings. The trial court's order dated February 4, 1972 ordering that
she be substituted for Ramon Pizarro as oppositor (p. 16, Record on Appeal) was
set aside by the same court in its Order of March 23, 1972 (p. 178, Record on
Appeal)whichwasnotappealed.
Vicenta Tan, if she still exists, was never served with summons extraterritorially
under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. She never appeared in the trial
court by herself, or counsel and never filed a pleading therein, hence, she never
submittedtothecourt'sjurisdiction.
140
BERMUDOV.CA
55SCRA8
FACTS:
CaseregardingaparceloflandbeingdisputedamongthreepartiesChinesemen
andtheChineseCommunistParty.
HELD:
Sincethereisdisputeonwhoownstrulytheparcelofland,thestateshouldhave
institutedescheatproceedings.
141
REPUBLICV.CFIOFMANILA
165SCRA11
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Unclaimed Balance Law, some 31 banks including herein private
respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines
separate statements under oath by their respective managing officers of all
ATENEOLAW2010
depositsandcreditsheldbytheminfavor,orinthenamesofsuchdepositorsor
creditors known to be dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have not
made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more. In
the sworn statement submitted by private respondent Bank, only two (2) names
appeared:JesusYdirinandLeonoraTrumpeta.
The aforementioned statements were published in two newspapers, one was in

English while the other was in Spanish. Both are of general circulation in the
Philippines. This consequently led to a complaint for escheat lodged by the
government against the 31 banks. The private respondent bank sought the
dismissalofthesameonthegroundofimpropervenue.Inopposingthedismissal
of the case, petitioner maintained that private respondent bank is just a nominal
party and the proper parties to lodge the motion to dismiss are the depositors
themselves.
HELD:
Issueofrealpartyininterest
A"realpartyininterest"hasbeendefinedasthepartywhowouldbebenefittedor
injuredbythejudgmentofthesuitorthepartyentitledtoavailofthesuit.There
can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this definition for the
escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily
deprivesaidbankoftheuseofsuchdeposits.Itisinthissensethatitstandstobe
"injuredbythejudgmentofthesuit;"anditisforthisreasonthatSection3ofAct
No.3936specificallyprovidesthatthebankshallbejoinedasapartyintheaction
forescheat.
Questionofimpropervenue
ThefirstsentenceofSection3ofActNo.3936directstheAttorneyGeneral,now
SolicitorGeneral,tocommenceanactionoractionsinthenameofthePeopleof
the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where the bank is
located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant. It manifests
awareness on the part of the legislators that a single action to cover all banks
wherever located in the Philippines would not be legally feasible in view of the
venueprescribedforsuchactionunderthesamesection,i.e.,theprovincewhere
thebankislocated.Thus,theadditionofthelastsentence,whichthelowercourt
hadcorrectlyinterpretedtomean"thatforescheatofunclaimedbankbalancesall
banks located in one and the same province where the Court of First Instance
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
99
concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in one action" was clearly
intended to save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as
authorityforthelumpingtogetherofallbankswhereverfoundinthePhilippinesin
onesingleescheatproceedings.
GENERALGUARDIANSANDGUARDIANSHIP
RULE92
VENUE
Section1.Wheretoinstituteproceedings.Guardianshipofapersonorestateofa
minor or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the
province, or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the
municipalcourtcharteredcitywheretheminororincompetentpersonsresides,
andifheresidesinaforeigncountry,intheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovince
wherein his property or the party thereof is situated; provided, however, that
where the value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds that
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace or municipal court, the proceedings shall
beinstitutedintheCourtofFirstInstance.
In the City of Manila the proceedings shall be instituted in the Juvenile and
DomesticRelationsCourt.
THREEKINDSOFGUARDIAN
1. Legal guardianwho is such by provision of law without the need of
judicial appointment, as in the case of the parents over the person of
theirminorchildren,etc.
2. Judicial guardianwho is a competent person appointed by the court
overthepersonand/orpropertyofthewardtorepresentthelatterinall
his civil acts and transactions, and is the one contemplated in the
aforementionedrules
3. Guardian ad litemwho may be a competent person appointed by the
courtforpurposesofaparticularactionorproceedinginvolvingaminor
TOWHICHJUDICIALGUARDIANSHIPPERTAINS
Withrespecttothepersonoftheward,hispropertyorboth
ATENEOLAW2010
Where the person has no property, guardianship may only with his
person
Withrespecttoanonresidentward,withrespecttohisproperty
Section 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word

"incompetent"includespersonssufferingthepenaltyofcivilinterdictionorwho
are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselvesandmanagetheirproperty,becomingtherebyaneasypreyfordeceit
andexploitation.
WHOISANINCOMPETENT?
Includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are

hospitalizedlepers,prodigals,deafanddumbwhoareunabletoreadand
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals,andpersonsnotbeingofunsoundmind,butbyreasonofage,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming
therebyaneasypreyfordeceitandexploitation.
Section 3. Transfer of venue. The court taking cognizance of a guardianship

proceeding, may transfer the same to the court of another province or
municipality wherein the ward has acquired real property, if he has transferred
theretohisbonafideresidence,andthelattercourtshallhavefulljurisdictionto
continuetheproceedings,withoutrequiringpaymentofadditionalcourtfees.
142
FRANCISCOV.CA
127SCRA371
FACTS:
PetitioneristheguardianoftheincompetentSanPedro.Partiesallegingtobethe
incompetentsrelativessoughthisremovalforallegedlyfailingtofileaninventory.
He actually did render an accounting and later on, an inventory but his accounts
were questioned on the ground it didnt coincide on what he truly received as
guardian.Thejudgeorderedhimremoveandforhimtopayforhispayables.On
reconsideration,thejudgereverseditsorderofpaymentbutstill,removedhimon
thegroundofoldageevenifhewas72andstillabletofulfillhisduties.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
100
HELD:
PetitioneristhedulyappointedguardianoftheincompetentEstefaniaSanPedroin
SpecialProceedingsNo.532oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofBulacanpresidedover
by respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming
to be a first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to be
niecesoftheincompetent,petitionedthecourtfortheremovalofpetitionerand
for the appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among other
grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an
inventoryoftheestateofhiswardandtorenderanaccounting.
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting but failed to

submitaninventory,forwhichreasonthecourtonMarch20,1975gavepetitioner
ten (10) days within which to do so, otherwise he would be removed from
guardianship Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to which respondent
PelagioFranciscofiledanobjectiononthegroundthatpetitioneractuallyreceived
P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not P12,000.00 only as stated in
thedeedofsaleandreportedbyhiminhisinventory.TherespondentJudgefound
theclaimtobetrue,and,inhisorderofApril17,1980relievedthepetitioneras
guardian.
Onmotionofpetitioner,however,therespondentJudgereconsideredhisfinding,
relyingonthedeedofsaleasthebestevidenceofthepricepaidforthesaleofthe
land.inhisorderdatedSeptember12,1980,respondentjudgeacknowledgedthat
his finding was "rather harsh and somewhat unfair to the said guardian."
Nevertheless, respondent Judge ordered the retirement of petitioner on the
groundofoldage.
143
LAVIDESV.CITYCOURTOFLUCENA
114SCRA187
FACTS:
Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides instituted a guardianship
proceeding with respect to the person and property of their seven (7) minor
children. Said petition alleged that the estate left by the deceased wife of herein
petitioner, mother of the above named minors, has a total value of thirtyfive
thousandpesos(P35,000.00)oranamountofP5,000.00pertainingtoeachminor.
Although there had been no previous settlement of the estate of the deceased,
petitionerwasappointedandqualifiedasjudicialguardian.
ATENEOLAW2010
The City Court, upon motion, authorized petitioner to settle the estate
extrajudiciallyandtosellaportionthereofconsistingofsharesofstocks.Pursuant
to said authority, petitioner extrajudicially settled the estate, and on August 28,
1971,soldthesaidsharesofstocksforthesumofP64,512.00
Petitioner filed a motion for confirmation and approval of a Deed of Exchange

Agreement. While this latter motion was still pending consideration, the
respondentcourt,reviewedtherecordsofthecaseandfindingthattheundivided
estateleftbythedeceasedwasworthatleastP35,000.00,dismissedthecasefor
lack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as guardian and
annulledallproceedingstakenpriortotheissuanceofthesaidorderofDecember
5,1978.
HELD:
Theabovesection,inclearterms,grantsconcurrentjurisdictionbetweenmunicipal
andcitycourtandCourtsofFirstInstanceintheappointmentofguardianseither
with respect to the person or property of the minor or incompetent, except that
where the value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds the
jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts, the guardianship proceedings shall be
institutedintheCourtofFirstInstance.Itisclear,therefore,thatthevalueofthe
property of the minor or incompetent sought to be placed in guardianship
determines which court has jurisdiction. And that property referred to is the
individual estate of the minor so much so that when there are more than one
minororincompetentsoughttobeplacedunderguardianship,whatdetermines
whichcourthasjurisdictionisthevalueoftheindividualpropertyofeachminoror
incompetent.
Inthecaseatbar,itappearsthatrespondentcitycourtdismissedthepetitionfor
guardianship on ground of lack of jurisdiction because a perusal of the record of
the case shows that the undivided estate left by the deceased mother is worth
P35,000.00whichamountisclearlyoutsideitsjurisdiction.Thisreasoningmustbe
rejectedforitoverlooksthefactthatthepetitionforguardianshipfiledbyherein
petitioner before the respondent city court clearly alleged that the individual
estate or share of each of the seven minor children sought to be placed under
guardianship is P5,000.00, which amount is well within the jurisdiction of the
respondent city court (Section 88, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No.
3828). That the respondent city court has jurisdiction over the case cannot be
denied, for the rule is wellsettled that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matterisdeterminedbytheallegationsofthecomplaintand/orpetition.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
144
101
PARCOV.CA
111SCRA262
FACTS:
Francisco Rodriguez is the guardian of the Soledad Rodriguez (ward). With the
authorityandapprovalofCFIJudge(whotookcognizanceoftheproceedingsupon
authorizationfromtheSecretaryofJustice),Rodriguezsold3parcelsoflandtoLuis
Parco and Virginia Bautista (Petitioners). The sale was made for the support,
maintenanceandmedicaltreatmentoftheward.Titlesoversaidparcelsoflands
wereissuedinfavorofthePETITIONERS.
More than a year after the sale, RODRIGUEZ sought an order requiring
PETITIONERS to appear before the court for examination on the basis that the 3
parcelsoflandwereallegedlyindangerofbeinglost,squandered,concealedand
embezzled.
HELD:
As held in the case of Cui v. Piccio, where title to any property said to be
embezzled,concealedorconveyedisindispute,thedeterminationofsaidtitleor
right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or
conveyedthepropertymustbedeterminedinaseparateordinaryactionandnot
inguardianshipproceedings.
Inthiscase,thereisdefinitelyacloudofdoubtastowhohasabetterrightortitle
tothedisputedproperties.Thus,thissituationrequiresthedeterminationoftitle
or ownership of the 3 parcels of land which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
guardianshipcourtandshouldbethreshedoutinaseparateordinaryaction.
Inthiscase,twobranchesoftheCFIofQuezonconcurrentlyassumedjurisdiction
over the proceedings. Branch I assumed original jurisdiction which was later on
assigned to Branch IV (by virtue of the order of the Sec. of Justice to unclog the
dockets). When Branch I issued an order reassuming jurisdiction over the case,
Branch IV actually ordered that the records be forwarded and returned to the
former. However, it subsequently threshed out the issue of ownership of the
parcels of land, which decision is the subject of the present appeal. This only
bolstersthatthecourtnolongerhadjurisdictionovertheproceedingsofthecase.
ATENEOLAW2010
145
OFFICEOFCOURTADMINISTRATORV.GINES
224SCRA261
FACTS:
Gineswasaccostedforgraveignoranceoflawandprocedure
HELD:
1.
Branch 26 was originally typewritten as part of the caption. Further,
Floresname(CourtInterpreter)wasalreadyindicatedinthepetition.
2.
ReginaVALDEZ(claimingtobethenieceofLAGMAY)filedthepetitionfor
guardianship,allegingthatsheisaresidentofSanFernando,LaUnion.Shealleged
however, that LAGMAY (ward) was presently residing in Mabalacat, Pampanga. It
wasalsoallegedthatLAGMAYisanAmericancitizen,single,childlessandaretired
seamanreceivingpensionfromtheUS.
Despitethisfact(undertheRules,jurisdictionliesinthecourtwheretheminoror
incompetent person resides, see Sec 1, Rule 92), GINES immediately gave due
course tothe petition and directed that notices be served,andgrantedlettersof
guardianshipinfavorofVALDEZ.(*Note:VALDEZisalsotheauntofGINES)
3.
Further, there was no order setting the case for hearing, at a particular
date time and place. No notices were sent to any of the kin or even to Juan
Lagmayhimself.
4.
The bond supposedly required from Valdez was not yet filed, but still,
Floresadministeredoathtotheformer.
5.
JudgeGinesalsodirectedthatthepersonhavingcustodyofJuanLagmay
be ordered to release the latter and turn him over to the special sheriffs, under
painofcontempt.WhenthispersonrefusedtoturnovercustodyoverLagmay,the
judgeorderedhisarrest(Theremedyinthiscaseshouldhavebeenapetitionfor
habeas corpus, and not to have the person having custody cited for contempt,
muchlessarrested).
146
VANCILV.BELMES
358SCRA707
FACTS:
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
102
BonifaciaVancil,isthemotherofReederC.Vancil,aNavyservicemanoftheUnited
StatesofAmericawhodiedinthesaidcountry.Duringhislifetime,hehad2minor
children.Petitionerfiledapetitiontobeappointedasguardianofthetwominor
children. She alleged that the minor children were residents of Cebu City. After
being appointed, opposition was entered by the mother of the children, alleging
thatshehaspreviouslyfiledapetitionwiththeRTCofPagadianCity.
HELD:
Petitioner,asthesurvivinggrandparent,canexercisesubstituteparentalauthority
only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that
respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority
over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor s
guardian, respondent s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of
Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of
Valerie considering that her (respondent s) livein partner raped Valerie several
times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
guardianshipproceeding.
EvenassumingthatrespondentisunfitasguardianofminorVincent,stillpetitioner
cannotqualifyasasubstituteguardian.ItbearsstressingthatsheisanAmerican
citizenandaresidentofColorado.Obviously,shewillnotbeabletoperformthe
responsibilitiesandobligationsrequiredofaguardian.Infact,inherpetition,she
admittedthedifficultyofdischargingthedutiesofaguardianbyanexpatriate,like
her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may
notalsoqualifyasaguardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondent s allegation that petitioner has not set
foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,
petitioner soldageandherconvictionoflibelbytheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch
6
6,CebuCityinCriminalCaseNo.CBU16884 filedbyoneDaniloR.Deen,willgive
herasecondthoughtofstayinghere.Indeed,hercomingbacktothiscountryjust
tofulfillthedutiesofaguardiantoVincentforonlytwoyearsisnotcertain.
147
KATIPUNANV.KATIPUNAN
375SCRA200
FACTS:
ATENEOLAW2010
BraulioKatipunan,assistedbyhisbrotherMiguel,soldalot/apartmentbuildingto
theBalgumabrothers.Braulio'stitlewascancelledandanewonewasissuedtothe
Balgumas.Inalaterdate,BrauliofiledacomplaintforannulmentoftheDeedof
AbsoluteSale.
HeaverredthathisbrotherMiguel,Atty.BalgumaandInocencioValdezconvinced
him to work abroad. They made him sign a document purportedly a contract of
employment,whichdocumentturnedouttobeaDeedofAbsoluteSale.Hefurther
alleged that he did not receive the consideration stated in the contract. He was
shockedwhenhissisterAguedatoldhimthattheBalgumabrotherssentaletterto
the lessees of the apartment informing them that they are the new owners. He
claimedthatthethree,withevidentbadfaith,conspiredwithoneanotherintaking
advantageofhisignorance,hebeingonlyathirdgrader.
TwiceBrauliomovedtodismisshiscomplaint,whichweregranted.Ingrantinghis
motions for reconsideration (to pursue the case again), the trial court was
convincedthatrespondentdidnotsignthemotionstodismissvoluntarilybecause
ofhispoorcomprehension,asshownbythemedicalreportofDr.AnnetteRevilla,
aResidentPsychiatristatthePGH.Besides,thetrialcourtnotedthatBrauliowas
not assisted by counsel in signing the said motions, thus it is possible that he did
notunderstandtheconsequencesofhisaction.
Thetrialcourtsetthecaseforpretrial.ThecourtlikewisegrantedBraulio'smotion
toappointAguedaashisguardianadlitem.
Thetrialcourtdismissedthecomplaint,holdingthatrespondentfailedtoprovehis
causesofactionsinceheadmittedthat:(1)heobtainedloansfromtheBalgumas;
(2) he signed the Deed of Absolute Sale; and (3) he acknowledged selling the
propertyandthathestoppedcollectingtherentals.
HELD:
The title of the Balgumas should be annulled. It is apparent that the contract
entered into by Braulio and Atty. Balguma is voidable because Braulio is an
incompetent.
SinceBrauliohasamentalstateofasixyearoldchild,hecannotbeconsideredas
fully capacitated. He falls under the category of incompetent as defined in
Section2,Rule92oftheRulesofCourt:
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
103
The word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil

interdictionorwhoarehospitalizedlepers,prodigals,deafanddumbwhoare
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
havelucidintervals,andpersonsnotbeingofunsoundmind,butbyreasonof
age,disease,weakmind,andothersimilarcauses,cannot,withoutoutsideaid,
takecareofthemselvesandmanagetheirproperty,becomingtherebyaneasy
preyfordeceitandexploitation.
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract manifest a vitiated

consent on the part of Braulio. Undue influence was exerted upon him by his
brother Miguel and Inocencio Valdez and Atty. Balguma. They did not explain to
him the nature and contents of the document. Worse, they deprived him of a
reasonablefreedomofchoice.Itbearsstressingthathereachedonlygradethree.
Thus,itwasimpossibleforhimtounderstandthecontentsofthecontractwritten
in English and embellished in legal jargon. The trial court took cognizance of the
medicalfindingofDr.Revilla(asanexpertwitness)whotestifiedthat,basedonthe
testssheconducted,shefoundthatBrauliohasaverylowIQandamindofasix
yearoldchild.Infact,thetrialcourthadtoclarifycertainmattersbecauseBraulio
was either confused, forgetful or could not comprehend. Thus, his lack of
education,coupled withhis mentalaffliction,placed himnot onlyatahopelessly
disadvantageouspositionvisvispetitionerstoenterintoacontract,butvirtually
rendered him incapable of giving rational consent. To be sure, his ignorance and
weakness made him most vulnerable to the deceitful cajoling and intimidation of
petitioners.
My case digests unfortunately end here. Though assignments were given up to

TRUSTEES, I unfortunately was not able to make them. For crossreference
however,pleaserefertothecasedigestscompendiummadebymyblockforthe
restoftherulesconcerned.=)
RULE93
APPOINTMENTOFGUARDIANS
Section 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. Any
relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent
whohasnoparentorlawfulguardian,ortheminorhimselfiffourteenyearsof
ageorover,maypetitionthecourthavingjurisdictionfortheappointmentofa
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generalguardianforthepersonorestate,orboth,ofsuchminororincompetent.
An officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines
mayalsofileapetitioninfavorofawardthereof,andtheDirectorofHealth,in
favorofaninsanepersonwhoshouldbehospitalized,orinfavorofanisolated
leper.
Section 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general

guardianmustshow,sofarasknowntothepetitioner:
(a)Thejurisdictionfacts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or
convenient;
(c)Thenames,ages,andresidenceoftherelativesoftheminororincompetent,
andofthepersonhavinghimintheircare;
(d)Theprobablevalueandcharacterofhisestate;
(e)Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersofguardianship.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall
rendervoidtheissuanceoflettersofguardianship.
Section3.Courttosettimeforhearing.Noticethereof.Whenapetitionforthe
appointmentofageneralguardianisfiled,thecourtshallfixatimeandplacefor
hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
personsmentionedinthepetitionresidingintheprovince,includingtheminorif
above14yearsofageortheincompetenthimself,andmaydirectothergeneral
orspecialnoticethereoftobegiven.
Section4.Oppositiontopetition.Anyinterestedpersonmay,byfilingawritten
opposition,contestthepetitiononthegroundofmajorityoftheallegedminor,
competency of the alleged incompetent, or the insuitability of the person for
whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that
letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the
opposition.
Section5.Hearingandorderforletterstoissue.Atthehearingofthepetitionthe
alleged in competent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown
that the required notice has been given. Thereupon the courts shall hear the
evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the
person in question is a minor, or incompetent it shall be appoint a suitable
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
104
guardianofhispersonorestate,orboth,withthepowersanddutieshereinafter
specified.
Section 6. When and how guardian for nonresident appointed. Notice. When a
person liable to be put under guardianship resides without the Philippines but
theestatetherein,anyrelativeorfriendofsuchperson,oranyoneinterestedin
hisestate,inexpectancyorotherwise,maypetitionacourthavingjurisdictionfor
the appointment of a guardian for the estate, and if, after notice given to such
person and in such manner as the court deems proper, by publication or
otherwise,andhearing,thecourtissatisfiedthatsuchnonresidentisaminoror
incompetent rendering a guardian necessary or convenient, it may appoint a
guardianforsuchestate.
Section 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under parental
authorityisworthtwothousandpesosorless,thefatherofthemother,without
the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the
propertyofthechildisworthmorethantwothousandpesos,thefatherorthe
mothershallbeconsideredguardianofthechild'sproperty,withthedutiesand
obligations of guardians under this rules, and shall file the petition required by
section 2 hereof. For good reasons the court may, however, appoint another
suitableperson.
Section8.Serviceofjudgment.Finalordersorjudgmentsunderthisruleshallbe
served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or
incompetentpersonresidesorwherehispropertyorpartthereofissituated.
RULE94
BONDSOFGUARDIANS
Section 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters. Amount. Condition.

Beforeaguardianappointedentersupontheexecutionofhistrust,orlettersof
guardianship issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs,
conditionedasfollows:
(a)Tomakeandreturntothecourt,withinthree(3)months,atrueandcomplete
inventoryofalltheestate,realandpersonal,ofhiswardwhichshallcometohis
possessionorknowledgeofanyotherpersonforhim;
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(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the
estateaccordingtotheserulesforthebestinterestsoftheward,andtoprovide
forthepropercare,custody,andeducationoftheward;
(c) To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward in his hands,
and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and
disposition of the same, at the time designated by these rules and such other
timesasthecourtsdirects,andattheexpirationofhistrusttosettlehisaccounts
with the court and deliver and pay over all the estate, effects, and moneys
remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person
lawfullyentitledthereto;
(d)Toperformallordersofthecourtbyhimtobeperformed.
Section 2. When new bond may be required and old sureties discharged.
Wheneveritisdeemednecessary,thecourtmayrequireanewbondtobegiven
by the guardian, and may discharge the sureties on the old bond from further
liability, after due notice to interested persons, when no injury can result
therefromtothoseinterestedintheestate.
Section3.Bondstobefiled.Actionsthereon. Everybondgivenbyaguardian
shallbefiledintheofficeoftheclerkofthecourt,and,incaseofthebreachofa
condition thereof, may be prosecuted in the same proceeding or in a separate
action for the use and benefit of the ward or of any other person legally
interestedintheestate.
RULE95
SELLINGANDENCUMBERINGPROPERTYOFWARD
Section1.Petitionofguardianforleavetosellorencumberestate. Whenthe
incomeoftheestateunderguardianshipisinsufficienttomaintainthewardand
his family, or to maintain and educate the ward when a minor, or when it
appears that it is for the benefit of the ward that his real estate or some part
thereof be sold, or mortgaged or otherwise encumbered, and the proceeds
thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security, or in the
improvement or security or other real estate of the ward, the guardian may
presentaverifiedpetitiontothecourtbywhichhewasappointedsettingforth
suchfacts,andprayingthatanorderissueauthorizingthesaleorencumbrance.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
105
DOES THE GUARDIAN NEED TO SECURE COURT APPROVAL FOR SALE OF

PERISHABLEGOODSOWNEDBYTHEWARD?
Therulesdoesntdistinguishonthetypeofgoods
The guardian needs to always secure court approval before sale or

encumbranceofthepropertiesoftheward
Section2.Ordertoshowcausethereupon. Ifitseemsprobablethatsuchsale
orencumbranceisnecessary,orwouldbebeneficialtotheward,thecourtshall
makeanorderdirectingthenextofkinoftheward,andallpersonsinterestedin
the estate, to appear at a reasonable time and place therein specified to show
causewhytheprayerofthepetitionshouldnotbegranted.
Section3.Hearingonreturnoforder.Costs. Atthetimeandplacedesignated
intheordertoshowcause,thecourtshallheartheproofsandallegationsofthe
petitioner and next of kin, and other persons interested, together with their
witnesses,andgrantandrefusetheprayerofthepetitionasthebestinterestof
the ward require. The court shall make such order as to cost of the hearing as
maybejust.
Section 4. Contents of order for sale or encumbrance, and how long effective.
Bond. If, after full examination, it appears that it is necessary, or would be
beneficialtotheward,tosellorencumbertheestate,orsomeportionofit,the
court shall order such sale or encumbrance and that the proceeds thereof be
expendedforthemaintenanceofthewardandhisfamily,ortheeducationofthe
ward,ifaminor,orfortheputtingofthesameinterest,ortheinvestmentofthe
same as the circumstances may require. The order shall specify the causes why
the sale or encumbrance is necessary or beneficial, and may direct that estate
ordered sold be disposed of at either public or private sale, subject to such
conditionsastothetimeandmannerofpayment,andsecuritywhereapartof
the payment is deferred as in the discretion of the court are deemed most
beneficialtotheward.Theoriginalbondoftheguardianshallstandassecurity
for the proper appropriation of the proceeds of the sale, but the judge may, if
deemedexpedient,requireanadditionalbondasaconditionforthegrantingof
the order of sale. No order of sale granted in pursuance of this section shall
continueinforcemorethanone(1)yearaftergrantingthesame,withoutasale
beinghad.
WHATSHALLTHEORDERSTATE?
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1.
2.
Specifythecauseswhythesaleorencumbranceisnecessaryorbeneficial
Itmaydirectthatestateorderedsoldbedisposedofateitherpublicor
private sale, subject to such conditions as to the time and manner of
payment,andsecuritywhereapartofthepaymentisdeferredasinthe
discretionofthecourtaredeemedmostbeneficialtothe
Section 5. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct management of

estate. The court may authorize and require the guardian to invest the
proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other of his ward's money in his
hands, in real estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of all
concerned, and may make such other orders for the management, investment,
anddispositionoftheestateandeffects,ascircumstancesmayrequire.
RULE96
GENERALPOWERSANDDUTIESOFGUARDIANS
Section1.Towhatguardianshipshallextend. Aguardianappointedshallhave
the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his
estate,orthemanagementoftheestateonly,asthecasemaybe.Theguardian
oftheestateofanonresidentshallhavethemanagementofalltheestateofthe
wardwithinthePhilippines,andnocourtotherthanthatinwhichsuchguardian
wasappointedshallhavejurisdictionovertheguardianship.
WHYISGUARDIANSHIPFORMANAGEMENTOFESTATEONLYALLOWED?
Managementofestatedoesntnecessarilyneedthecareandcustodyof
theperson
Section2.Guardiantopaydebtsofward. Everyguardianmustpaytheward's
just debts out of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if
sufficient;ifnot,thenoutofhisrealestateuponobtaininganorderforthesale
orencumbrancethereof.
Section 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions for
ward. A guardian must settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for,
andreceivealldebtsduehim,ormay,withtheapprovalofthecourt,compound
for the same and give discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and just
dividendoftheestateandeffects;andheshallappearforandrepresenthisward
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
106
in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person be appointed for
thatpurpose.
Section4.Estatetobemanagedfrugally,andproceedsappliedtomaintenanceof
ward. Aguardianmustmanagetheestateofhiswardfrugallyandwithoutthe
waste,andapplytheincomeandprofitsthereof,sofarasmaybenecessary,to
thecomfortableandsuitablemaintenanceofthewardandhisfamily,iftherebe
any;andifsuchincomeandprofitsbeinsufficientforthatpurpose,theguardian
maysellorencumberthe realestate,upon beingauthorizedbyorderso to do,
andapplytosuchoftheproceedsasmaybenecessarytosuchmaintenance.
Section 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition proceedings after

hearing. The court may authorized the guardian to join in an assent to a
partition of real or personal estate held by the ward jointly or in common with
others,butsuchauthorityshallonlybegrantedafterhearing,uponsuchnoticeto
relativesofthewardasthecourtmaydirect,andacarefulinvestigationastothe
necessityandproprietyoftheproposedaction.
Section 6. Proceedings when the person suspected of embezzling or concealing

property of ward. Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person
havingactualorprospectiveinterestintheestateofthewardascreditor,heir,or
otherwise,thatanyoneissuspectedofhavingembezzled,concealed,orconveyed
away any money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the
ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for
examinationtouchingsuchmoney,goods,interest,orinstrument,andmakesuch
orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or
conveyance.
Section7.Inventoriesandaccountsofguardians,andappraisementofestates.
Aguardianmustrendertothecourtaninventoryoftheestateofhiswardwithin
three(3)monthsafterhisappointment,andannuallyaftersuchappointmentan
inventoryandaccount,therenditionofanyofwhichmaybecompelleduponthe
applicationofaninterestedperson.Suchinventoriesandaccountsshallbesworn
tobytheguardian.Alltheestateofthewarddescribedinthefirstinventoryshall
beappraised.Intheappraisementthecourtmayrequesttheassistanceofoneor
moreoftheinheritancetaxappraisers.Andwheneveranypropertyoftheward
not included in an inventory already rendered is discovered, or suceeded to, or
acquiredbytheward,likeproceedingsshallbehadforsecuringaninventoryand
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appraisementthereofwithinthree(3)monthsaftersuchdiscovery,succession,or
acquisition.
Section 8. When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. Expenses and

compensation allowed. Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his
appointment, and as often thereafter as may be required, a guardian must
presenthisaccounttothecourtforsettlementandallowance.Inthesettlement
oftheaccount,theguardian,otherthanaparent,shallbeallowedtheamountof
his reasonable expenses incurred in the execution of his trust and also such
compensationforhisservicesasthecourtdeemsjust,notexceedingfifteenper
centumofthenetincomeoftheward.
WHATARETHEGENERALPOWERSOFAGUARDIAN?
1. Careandcustodyoftheward,and/ormanagementofhisestate
2. Paythedebtsofhisward
3. Tosettleaccounts,collectdebts,andappearinactionsforward
4. Managetheestatefrugally
5. Maybeauthorizedtojoininpartitionproceedingsafterhearing
6. To institute proceedings where the person is suspected of embezzling,
concealingpropertyofward
7. Inventoriesandaccountsofguardians,andappraisementofestate
RULE97
TERMINATIONOFGUARDIANSHIP
Section 1. Petition that competency of ward be adjudged, and proceedings

thereupon. Apersonwhohasbeendeclaredincompetentforanyreason,orhis
guardian, relative, or friend, may petition the court to have his present
competency judicially determined. The petition shall be verified by oath, and
shallstatethatsuchpersonisthencompetent.Uponreceivingthepetition,the
court shall fix a time for hearing the questions raised thereby, and cause
reasonablenoticethereoftobegiventotheguardianofthepersonsodeclared
incompetent,andtotheward.Onthetrial,theguardianorrelativesoftheward,
and,inthediscretionofthecourt,anyotherperson,maycontesttherighttothe
reliefdemanded,andwitnessesmaybecalledandexaminedbythepartiesorby
the court on its own motion. If it be found that the person is no longer
incompetent,hiscompetencyshallbeadjudgedandtheguardianshipshallcease.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
107
GROUNDSFORTERMINATIONOFGUARDIANSHIP
1. Competencyofward
2. Insanityandincompetencyoftheguardianhimself
3. Deathofthewardorguardianhimself
4. Resignationoftheguardian
5. Guardianincapableofdischarginghistrust
6. Guardianmismanagedorwastedtheestate
7. Conflictofinterest
8. Guardian failed to render accounting and inventory for 30 days after
courtorder
Section2.Whentheguardianremovedorallowedtoresign.Newappointment.
Whenaguardianbecomesinsaneorotherwiseincapableofdischarginghistrust
or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for
thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a return, the court
may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to
surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled
thereto. A guardian may resign when it appears proper to allow the same; and
uponhisresignationorremovalthecourtmayappointanotherinhisplace.
Section 3. Other termination of guardianship. The marriage or voluntary

emancipation of a minor ward terminates the guardianship of the peson of the
ward,andshallenabletheminortoadministerhispropertyasthoughhewereof
age, but he cannot borrow the money or alienate or encumber real property
withouttheconsentofhisfatherormother,orguardian.Hecansueandbesued
incourtonlywiththeassistanceofhisfather,motherorguardian.Theguardian
of any person may be discharged by the court when it appears, upon the
application of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer
necessary.
Section 4. Record to be kept by the justice of the peace or municipal judge.

When a justice of the peace or municipal court takes cognizance of the
proceedings in pursuance of the provisions of these rules, the record of the
proceedingsshallbekeptasintheCourtofFirstInstance.
Section5.Serviceofjudgment. Finalordersofjudgmentsunderthisruleshall
beserveduponthecivilregistrarofthemunicipalityorcitywheretheminoror
incompetentpersonresidesorwherehispropertyorpartthereofissituated.
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A.M.No.030205SC20030501
RULEONGUARDIANSHIPOFMINORS
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule shall apply to petitions for
guardianshipoverthepersonorproperty,orboth,ofaminor.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
personandpropertyoftheirunemancipatedcommonchildwithoutthenecessity
of a court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to the
provisionsoftheFamilyCodeonguardianship.
Sec.2.Whomaypetitionforappointmentofguardian.Ongroundsauthorized
bylaw,anyrelativeorotherpersononbehalfofaminor,ortheminorhimselfif
fourteenyearsofageorover,maypetitiontheFamilyCourtfortheappointment
of a general guardian over the person or property, or both, of such minor. The
petition may also be filed by the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development
and by the Secretary of Health in the case of an insane minor who needs to be
hospitalized.
Sec. 3. Where to file petition. A petition for guardianship over the person or
property,orboth,ofaminormaybefiledintheFamilyCourtoftheprovinceor
city where the minor actually resides. If he resides in a foreign country, the
petition shall be flied with the Family Court of the province or city where his
propertyoranypartthereofissituated.
Sec.4.Groundsofpetition.Thegroundsfortheappointmentofaguardianover
thepersonorproperty,orboth,ofaminorarethefollowing:
(a)death,continuedabsence,orincapacityofhisparents;
(b)suspension,deprivationorterminationofparentalauthority;
(c)remarriageofhissurvivingparent,ifthelatterIsfoundunsuitabletoexercise
parentalauthority;or
(d)whenthebestinterestsoftheminorsorequire.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
108
Sec. 5. Qualifications of guardians. In appointing a guardian, the court shall

considertheguardians:
(a)moralcharacter;
(b)physical,mentalandpsychologicalcondition;
(c)financialstatus;
(d)relationshipoftrustwiththeminor;
(e)availabilitytoexercisethepowersanddutiesofaguardianforthefullperiod
oftheguardianship;
(f)lackofconflictofinterestwiththeminor;and
(g)abilitytomanagethepropertyoftheminor.
Sec.6.Whomaybeappointedguardianofthepersonorproperty,orboth,ofa
minor. In default of parents or a courtappointed guardian, the court may
appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, of a minor, observing as
faraspracticable,thefollowingorderofpreference:
(a)thesurvivinggrandparentandIncaseseveralgrandparentssurvive,thecourt
shallselectanyofthemtakingIntoaccountallrelevantconsiderations;
(b)theoldestbrotherorsisteroftheminorovertwentyoneyearsofage,unless
unfitordisqualified;
(c)theactualcustodianoftheminorovertwentyoneyearsofage,unlessunfitor
disqualified;and
(d)anyotherperson,whointhesounddiscretionofthecourt,wouldservethe
bestinterestsoftheminor.
Sec. 7. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general

guardianmustallegethefollowing:
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(b)Thename,ageandresidenceoftheprospectiveward;
(c)Thegroundrenderingtheappointmentnecessaryorconvenient;
(d) The death of the parents of the minor or the termination, deprivation or
suspensionoftheirparentalauthority;
(e)Theremarriageoftheminorssurvivingparent;
(f)Thenames,ages,andresidencesofrelativeswithinthe4thcivildegreeofthe
minor,andofpersonshavinghimintheircareandcustody;
(g)Theprobablevalue,characterandlocationofthepropertyoftheminor;and
(h)Thename,ageandresidenceofthepersonforwhomlettersofguardianship
areprayed.
The petition shall be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum

shopping.However,nodefectinthepetitionorverificationshallrendervoidthe
issuanceoflettersofguardianship.
Sec. 8. Time and notice of hearing. When a petition for the appointment of a
generalguardianisfiled,thecourtshallfixatimeandplaceforitshearing,and
shall cause reasonable notice to be given to the persons mentioned in the
petition,includingtheminorifheisfourteenyearsofageorover,andmaydirect
othergeneralorspecialnoticetobegiven.
Sec.9.Casestudyreport.Thecourtshallorderasocialworkertoconductacase
study of the minor and all the prospective guardians and submit his report and
recommendationtothecourtforitsguidancebeforethescheduledhearing.The
socialworkermayinterveneonbehalfoftheminorifhefindsthatthepetition
forguardianshipshouldbedenied.
Sec.10.Oppositiontopetition.Anyinterestedpersonmaycontestthepetition
byfilingawrittenoppositionbasedonsuchgroundsasthemajorityoftheminor
ortheunsuitabilityofthepersonforwhomlettersareprayed,andpraythatthe
petition be denied, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any
suitablepersonnamedintheopposition.
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Sec.11.Hearingandorderforletterstoissue.Atthehearingofthepetition,it
must be shown that the requirement of notice has been complied with. The
prospective ward shall be presented to the court. The court shall hear the
evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. If warranted,
thecourtshallappointasuitableguardianofthepersonorproperty,orboth,of
theminor.
Atthediscretionofthecourt,thehearingonguardianshipmaybeclosedtothe
publicandtherecordsofthecaseshallnotbereleasedwithoutitsapproval.
Sec. 12. When and how a guardian of the property for nonresident minor is
appointed; notice. When the minor resides outside the Philippines but has
property in the Philippines, any relative or friend of such minor, or any one
interested in his property, in expectancy or otherwise, may petition the Family
Courtfortheappointmentofaguardianovertheproperty.
Noticeofhearingofthepetitionshallbegiventotheminorbypublicationorany
other means as the court may deem proper. The court may dispense with the
presenceofthenonresidentminor.
If after hearing the court is satisfied that such nonresident is a minor and a
guardianisnecessaryorconvenient,itmayappointaguardianoverhisproperty.
Sec. 13. Service of final and executory judgment or order. The final and
executoryjudgmentorordershallbeservedupontheLocalCivilRegistrarofthe
municipality or city where the minor resides and the Register of Deeds of the
place where his property or part thereof is situated shall annotate the same in
thecorrespondingtitle,andreporttothecourthiscompliancewithinfifteendays
fromreceiptoftheorder.
Sec. 14. Bond of guardian; amount; conditions.Before he enters upon the

execution of his trust, or letters of guardianship issue, an appointed guardian
may be required to post a bond in such sum as the court shall determine and
conditionedasfollows:
(a)Tomakeandreturntothecourt,withinthreemonthsaftertheissuanceofhis
letters of guardianship, a true and complete Inventory of all the property, real
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andpersonal,ofhiswardwhichshallcometohispossessionorknowledgeorto
thepossessionorknowledgeofanyotherpersoninhisbehalf;
(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the
propertyaccordingtothisruleforthebestinterestsoftheward,andtoprovide
forhispropercare,custodyandeducation;
(c)TorenderatrueandJustaccountofallthepropertyofthewardinhishands,
and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and
dispositionofthesame,atthetimedesignatedbythisruleandsuchothertimes
asthecourtdirects;andattheexpirationofhistrust,tosettlehisaccountswith
the court and deliver and pay over all the property, effects, and monies
remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person
lawfullyentitledthereto;and
(d)Toperformallordersofthecourtandsuchotherdutiesasmayberequiredby
law.
Sec.15.Wheretofilethebond;actionthereon.Thebondpostedbyaguardian
shallbefiledintheFamilyCourtand,Incaseofbreachofanyofitsconditions,
the guardian may be prosecuted in the same proceeding for the benefit of the
wardorofanyotherpersonlegallyinterestedintheproperty.
Whenevernecessary,thecourtmayrequiretheguardiantopostanewbondand
maydischargefromfurtherliabilitythesuretiesontheoldbondafterduenotice
tointerestedpersons,ifnoinjurymayresulttherefromtothoseinterestedinthe
property.
Sec.16.Bondofparentsasguardiansofpropertyofminor.lfthemarketvalue
ofthepropertyortheannualIncomeofthechildexceedsP50,000.00,theparent
concernedshallfurnishabondInsuchamountasthecourtmaydetermine,but
in no case less than ten per centurn of the value of such property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
AverifiedpetitionforapprovalofthebondshallbefliedintheFamilyCourtof
the place where the child resides or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in
theFamilyCourtoftheplacewherethepropertyoranypartthereofissituated.
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The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding In which all

incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations of a general
guardianshallbeheardandresolved.
Sec.17.Generaldutiesofguardian.Aguardianshallhavethecareandcustody
of the person of his ward and the management of his property, or only the
management of his property. The guardian of the property of a nonresident
minorshallhavethemanagementofallhispropertywithinthePhilippines.
Aguardianshallperformthefollowingduties:
(a)Topaythejustdebtsofthewardoutofthepersonalpropertyandtheincome
oftherealpropertyoftheward,If thesameis sufficient;otherwise,out of the
realpropertyofthewarduponobtaininganorderforitssaleorencumbrance;
(b)Tosettleallaccountsofhisward,anddemand,suefor,receivealldebtsdue
him, or may, with the approval of the court, compound for the same and give
dischargestothedebtoronreceivingafairandjustdividendofthepropertyand
effects; and to appear for and represent the ward in all actions and special
proceedings,unlessanotherpersonisappointedforthatpurpose;
(c)Tomanagethepropertyofthewardfrugallyandwithoutwaste,andapplythe
incomeandprofitsthereon,insofarasmaybenecessary,tothecomfortableand
suitablemaintenanceoftheward;andifsuchincomeandprofitsbeinsufficient
for that purpose, to sell or encumber the real or personal property, upon being
authorizedbythecourttodoso;
(d) To consent to a partition of real or personal property owned by the ward

jointly or in common with others upon authority granted by the court after
hearing, notice to relatives of the ward, and a careful investigation as to the
necessityandproprietyoftheproposedaction;
(e)Tosubmittothecourtaverifiedinventoryofthepropertyofhiswardwithin
three months after his appointment, and annually thereafter, the rendition of
whichmayberequiredupontheapplicationofaninterestedperson;
(f)Toreporttothecourtanypropertyofthewardnotincludedintheinventory
which is discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward within three
monthsaftersuchdiscovery,succession,oracquisition;and
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(g)Torendertothecourtforitsapprovalanaccountingofthepropertyoneyear
fromhisappointment,andeveryyearthereafterorasoftenasmayberequired.
Sec.18.PoweranddutyofthecourtThecourtmay:
(a)Requesttheassistanceofoneormorecommissionersintheappraisalofthe
propertyofthewardreportedintheinitialandsubsequentinventories;
(b)Authorizereimbursementtotheguardian,otherthanaparent,ofreasonable
expenses incurred in the execution of his trust, and allow payment of
compensationforhisservicesasthecourtmaydeemjust,notexceedingtenper
centum of the net income of the ward, if any; otherwise, in such amount the
courtdeterminestobeareasonablecompensationforhisservices;and
(c) Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or
prospectiveinterestinthepropertyattheward,requireanypersonsuspectedof
havingembezzled,concealed,ordisposedofanymoney,goodsorinterest,ora
written instrument belonging to the ward or his property to appear for
examination concerning any thereof and issue such orders as would secure the
propertyagainstsuchembezzlement,concealmentorconveyance.
Sec. 19. Petition to sell or encumber property.When the income of a property

underguardianshipisinsufficienttomaintainandeducatetheward,orwhenitis
for his benefit that his personal or real property or any part thereof be sold,
mortgaged or otherwise encumbered, and the proceeds invested in safe and
productivesecurity,orintheimprovementorsecurityofotherrealproperty,the
guardianmayfileaverifiedpetitionsettingforthsuchfacts,andprayingthatan
orderissueauthorizingthesaleorencumbranceoftheproperty.
Sec.20.Ordertoshowcause.Ifthesaleorencumbranceisnecessaryorwould
be beneficial to the ward, the court shall order his next of kin and all person/s
interested in the property to appear at a reasonable time and place therein
specifiedandshowcausewhythepetitionshouldnotbegranted.
Sec.21.Hearingonreturnoforder;costs.Atthetimeandplacedesignatedin
theordertoshowcause,thecourtshallheartheallegationsandevidenceofthe
petitioner and next of kin, and other persons interested, together with their
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
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witnesses,andgrantordenythepetitionasthebestinterestsofthewardmay
require.
Sec. 22. Contents of order for sale or encumbrance and its duration; bond. If,
afterfullexamination,itisnecessary,orwouldbebeneficialtotheward,tosell
orencumbertheproperty,orsomeportionofit,thecourtshallordersuchsaleor
encumbrance the proceeds of which shall be expended for the maintenance or
the education of the ward, or invested as the circumstances may require. The
ordershallspecifythegroundsforthesaleorencumbranceandmaydirectthat
thepropertyorderedsoldbedisposedofatpublicsale,subjecttosuchconditions
astothetimeandmannerofpayment,andsecuritywhereapartofthepayment
is deferred. The original bond of the guardian shall stand as security for the
properappropriationoftheproceedsofthesaleorencumbrance,butthecourt
may,ifdeemedexpedient,requireanadditionalbondasaconditionforthesale
orencumbrance.Theauthoritytosellorencumbershallnotextendbeyondone
year,unlessrenewedbythecourt.
Sec. 23. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct management of
property. The court may authorize and require the guardian to invest the
proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other money of his ward in his
hands,inrealorpersonalproperty,forthebestinterestsoftheward,andmay
makesuchotherordersforthemanagement,investment,anddispositionofthe
propertyandeffects,ascircumstancesmaywarrant.
Sec. 24. Grounds for removal or resignation of guardian. When a guardian

becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or is found
thereafter to be unsuitable, or has wasted or mismanaged the property of the
ward,orhasfailedtorenderanaccountormakeareturnforthirtydaysafteritis
due,thecourtmay,uponreasonablenoticetotheguardian,removehimassuch
andrequirehimtosurrenderthepropertyofthewardtothepersonfoundtobe
lawfullyentitledthereto.
Thecourtmayallowtheguardiantoresignforjustifiablecauses.
Upontheremovalorresignationoftheguardian,thecourtshallappointanew
one.
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No motion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless the guardian has
submittedtheproperaccountingofthepropertyofthewardandthecourthas
approvedthesame.
Sec. 25. Ground for termination of guardianship. The court motu proprio or
upon verified motion of any person allowed to file a petition for guardianship
mayterminatetheguardianshiponthegroundthatthewardhascomeofageor
has died. The guardian shall notify the court of such fact within ten days of its
occurrence.
Sec. 26. Service of final and executory judgment or order. The final and
executoryjudgmentorordershallbeservedupontheLocalCivilRegistrarofthe
municipality or city where the minor resides and the Register of Deeds of the
provinceorcitywherehispropertyoranypartthereofissituated.BoththeLocal
Civil Registrar and the Register of Deeds shall enter the final and executory
judgmentororderintheappropriatebooksintheiroffices.
Sec.27.Effectoftherule.ThisRuleamendsRules92to97inclusiveoftheRules
of Court on guardianship of minors. Guardianship of incompetents who are not
minors shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and
governedbytheRulesofCourt.
Sec. 28. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on May 1, 2003 following its
publicationinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationnotlaterthanApril15,2003.
RULE98
TRUSTEES
Section1.Wheretrusteeappointed. Atrusteenecessarytocarryintoeffectthe
provisionsofawillonwritteninstrumentshallbeappointedbytheCourtofFirst
Instanceinwhichthewillwasallowed,ifitbeawillallowedinthePhilippines,
otherwisebytheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceinwhichtheproperty,or
someportionthereof,affectedbythetrustissituated.
APPLICABILITYOFRULES
This rule applies only to express trusts as these are understood in the
CivilCodeprovisionsanddoesntapplytoimpliedtrustswhicharisefrom
operationoflaw
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112
PARTIESINVOLVEDINANEXPRESSTRUST
1. Trustor
2. Trustee
3. Beneficiary
FILINGOFPETITIONMAYBEDONEINTESTATEESTATEPROCEEDINGS
Wheretheappointmentofatrusteeisnecessarytocarryintoeffectthe
provisionsofthewill,aswherethetestatorprovidedthereinthatcertain
portionsofhispropertybeplacedintrust
Section 2. Appointment and powers of trustees under will. Executor of former

trusteeneednotadministertrust. Ifatestatorhasomittedinhiswilltoappoint
a trustee in the Philippines, and if such appointment is necessary to carry into
effect the provisions of the will, the proper Court of First Instance may, after
noticetoallpersonsinterested,appointatrusteewhoshallhavethesamerights,
powers, and duties, and in whom the estate shall vest, as if he had been
appointed by the testator. No person succeeding to a trust as executor or
administratorofaformertrusteeshallberequiredtoacceptsuchtrust.
Section3.Appointmentandpowersofnewtrusteeunderwritteninstrument.
When a trustee under a written instrument declines, resigns, dies or removed
before the objects of the trust are accomplished, and no adequate provision is
made in such instrument for supplying the vacancy, the proper Court of First
Instancemay,afterduenoticetoallpersonsinterested,appointanewtrusteeto
act alone or jointly with the others, as the case may be. Such new trustee shall
haveandexercisethesamepowers,right,anddutiesasifhehadbeenoriginally
appointed,andthetrustestateshallvestinhiminlikemannerasithadvestedor
wouldhavevested,inthetrusteeinwhoseplaceheissubstitutedandthecourt
may order such conveyance to be made by the former trustee or his
representatives, or by the other remaining trustees, as may be necessary or
proper to vest the trust estate in the new trustee, either or jointly with the
others.
Section 4. Proceedings where trustee appointed abroad. When land in the

Philippinesisheldintrustforpersonsresidentherebyatrusteewhoderiveshis
authorityfromwithoutthePhilippines,suchtrusteeshall,onpetitionfiledinthe
CourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewherethelandissituated,andafterdue
noticetoallpersonsinterested,beorderedtoapplytothecourtforappointment
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astrustee;anduponhisneglectorrefusaltocomplywithsuchorder,thecourt
shalldeclaresuchtrustvacant,andshallappointanewtrusteeinwhomthetrust
estate shall vest in like manner as if he had been originally appointed by such
court.
Section5.Trusteemustfilebond. Beforeenteringonthedutiesofhistrust,a
trusteeshallfilewiththeclerkofthecourthavingjurisdictionofthetrustabond
intheamountfixedbythejudgeofsaidcourt,payabletotheGovernmentofthe
Philippinesandsufficientandavailablefortheprotectionofanypartyininterest,
andatrusteewhoneglectstofilesuchbondshallbeconsideredtohavedeclined
or resigned the trust; but the court may until further order exempt a trustee
underawillfromgivingabondwhenthetestatorhasdirectedorrequestedsuch
exemption and may so exempt any trustee when all persons beneficially
interestedinthetrust,beingoffullage,requesttheexemption.Suchexemption
maybecancelledbythecourtatanytimeandthetrusteerequiredtoforthwith
fileabond.
Section 6. Conditions included in bond. The following conditions shall be

deemedtobepartofthebondwhetherwrittenthereinornot;
(a) That the trustee will make and return to the court, at such time as it may
order, a true inventory of all the real and personal estate belonging to him as
trustee,whichatthetimeofthemakingofsuchinventoryshallhavecometohis
possessionorknowledge;
(b)Thathewillmanageanddisposeofallsuchestate,andfaithfullydischargehis
trust in relation thereto, according to law and the will of the testator or the
provisionsoftheinstrumentororderunderwhichheisappointed;
(c) That he will render upon oath at least once a year until his trust is fulfilled,
unless he is excused therefrom in any year by the court, a true account of the
property in his hands and the management and disposition thereof, and will
rendersuchotheraccountsasthecourtmayorder;
(d)Thatattheexpirationofhistrusthewillsettlehisaccountincourtandpay
overanddeliveralltheestateremaininginhishands,orduefromhimonsuch
settlement,tothepersonorpersonsentitledtothereto.
Butwhenthetrusteeisappointedasasuccessortoapriortrustee,thecourtmay
dispense with the making and return of an inventory, if one has already been
filed, and in such case the condition of the bond shall be deemed to be altered
accordingly.
Section7.Appraisal.Compensationoftrustee. Whenaninventoryisrequired
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
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tobereturnedbyatrustee,theestateandeffectsbelongingtothetrustshallbe
appraised and the court may order one or more inheritance tax appraisers to
assistintheappraisement.Thecompensationofthetrusteeshallbefixedbythe
court,ifitbenotdeterminedintheinstrumentcreatingthetrust.
Section8.Removalorresignationoftrustee. TheproperCourtofFirstInstance
may,uponpetitionofthepartiesbeneficiallyinterestedandafterduenoticeto
thetrusteeandhearing,removeatrusteeifsuchremovalappearsessentialinthe
interest of the petitioner. The court may also, after due notice to all persons
interested,removeatrusteewhoisinsaneorotherwiseincapableofdischarging
his trust or evidently unsuitable therefor. A trustee, whether appointed by the
courtorunderawritteninstrument,mayresignhistrustifitappearstothecourt
propertoallowsuchresignation.
Section9.Proceedingsforsaleorencumbranceoftrustestate. Whenthesale
or encumbrance of any real or personal estate held in trust is necessary or
expedient, the court having jurisdiction of the trust may, on petition and after
duenoticeandhearing,ordersuchsaleorencumbrancetobemade,andthere
investment and application of the proceeds thereof in such manner as will best
effect the objects of the trust. The petition, notice, hearing, order of sale or
encumbrance, and record of proceedings, shall conform as nearly as may be to
theprovisionsconcerningthesaleorimcumbrancebyguardiansoftheproperty
ofminorsorotherwards.
EXEMPTIONOFTRUSTEEFROMPOSTINGBOND
Unlike an executor who must still post a bond notwithstanding

exemptionstatedinwill,thetrusteeisnotmandatedtopostabondifhe
wasexemptedunderthewill
RULE102
HABEASCORPUS
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly

provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.
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WRITOFHABEASCORPUS
Writ directed to the person detaining another and commanding him to

produce the body of the prisoner at a certain time and place, with the
day and the cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and
receivewhatsoeverthecourtorjudgeawardingthewritshallconsiderin
thatbehalf
HABEASCORPUSASAREMEDYUNDERTHERULES
Remedy in all cases of illegal confinement or detention or where the

rightfulcustodyofapersoniswithheldfromoneentitledtosuchcustody
Actualoreffective,notmerelynominalormoral,restraintisrequired
However,actualphysicalrestrainedisnotalwaysrequired,anyrestraint
thatwillprejudicefreedomofactionissufficient
INSTANCESWHENTHEWRITMAYLIKEWISEBEAVAILEDOF
1. There has been deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in a
restraintofaperson
2. Thecourthadnojurisdictiontoimposethesentence
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed, such sentence being void as to
suchexcess
WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR WRIT TO BE ISSUED IN CASE OF COURT JUDGMENT

RESULTINGTOILLEGALDEPRIVATIONOFLIBERTY?
Judgmentnolongerappealable,inwhichcasethewritisinthenatureof
acollateralattackagainstafinalandvoidjudgment
If the judgment is still appealable then the remedy of the person is to

dulyappealtherefrom
Section2.Whomaygrantthewrit. Thewritofhabeascorpusmaybegranted
bytheSupremeCourt,oranymemberthereofintheinstancesauthorizedbylaw,
andifsogranteditshallbeenforceableanywhereinthePhilippines,andmaybe
made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of
FirstInstance,oranyjudgethereofforthehearinganddecisiononthemerits.It
mayalsobegrantedbyaCourtofFirstInstance,orajudgethereof,onanyday
and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his
judicialdistrict.
Section3.Requisitesofapplicationtherefor. Applicationforthewritshallbeby
petitionsignedandverifiedeitherbythepartyforwhosereliefitisintended,or
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bysomepersononhisbehalf,andshallsetforth:
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or
restrainedonhisliberty;
(b)Theofficerornameofthepersonbywhomheissoimprisonedorrestrained;
or,ifbothareunknownoruncertain,suchofficerorpersonmaybedescribedby
an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be
deemedthepersonintended;
(c)Theplacewhereheissoimprisonedorrestrained,ifknown;
(d)Acopyofthecommitmentorcauseofdetentionofsuchperson,ifitcanbe
procuredwithoutimpairingtheefficiencyoftheremedy;or,iftheimprisonment
orrestraintiswithoutanylegalauthority,suchfactshallappear.
Section4.Whenwritnotallowedordischargeauthorized. Ifitappearsthatthe
personallegedtoberestrainedofhislibertyisinthecustodyofanofficerunder
processissuedbyacourtorjudgeorbyvirtueofajudgmentororderofacourt
ofrecord,andthatthecourtorjudgehadjurisdictiontoissuetheprocess,render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdictionappearsafterthewritisallowed,thepersonshallnotbedischarged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Not
shallanythinginthisrulebeheldtoauthorizethedischargeofapersoncharged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonmentunderlawfuljudgment.
Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. A court or judge
authorized to grant the writ must, when a petition therefor is presented and it
appearsthatthewritoughttoissue,grantthesameforthwith,andimmediately
thereupontheclerkofthecourtshallissuethewritunderthesealofthecourt;
orincaseofemergency,thejudgemayissuethewritunderhisownhand,and
maydeputeanyofficerorpersontoserveit.
Section6.Towhomwritdirected,andwhattorequire. Incaseofimprisonment
or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to him, and shall command
himtohavethebodyofthepersonrestrainedofhislibertybeforethecourtor
judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of
imprisonmentorrestraintbyapersonnotanofficer,thewritshallbedirectedto
an officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the person
restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the
time and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he is
restrainedthenandtheretoappearbeforesaidcourtorjudgetoshowthecause
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oftheimprisonmentorrestraint.
Section 7. How prisoner designated and writ served. The person to be

producedshouldbedesignatedinthewritbyhisname,ifknown,butifhisname
is not known he may be otherwise described or identified. The writ may be
served in any province by the sheriff or other proper officer, or by a person
deputed by the court or judge. Service of the writ shall be made by leaving the
originalwiththepersontowhomitisdirectedandpreservingacopyonwhichto
makereturnorservice.Ifthatpersoncannotbefound,orhasnottheprisonerin
his custody, then the service shall be made on any other person having or
exercisingsuchcustody.
Section 8. How writ executed and returned. The officer to whom the writ is
directedshallconveythepersonsoimprisonedorrestrained,andnamedinthe
writ, before the judge allowing the writ, or in case of his absence or disability,
before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified in the writ,
unless, from sickness or infirmity of the person directed to be produced, such
person cannot, without danger, be bought before the court or judge; and the
officershallmakeduereturnofthewrit,togetherwiththedayandthecauseof
thecaptionandrestraintofsuchpersonaccordingtothecommandthereof.
Section9.Defectofform. Nowritofhabeascorpuscanbedisobeyedfordefect
of form, if it sufficiently appears therefrom in whose custody or under whose
restraintthepartyimprisonedorrestrainedisheldandthecourtorjudgebefore
whomheistobebought.
Section10.Contentsofreturn. Whenthepersontobeproducedisimprisoned
orrestrainedbyanofficer,thepersonwhomakesthereturnshallstatetherein,
andinothercasesthepersoninwhosecustodytheprisonerisfoundshallstate,
inwritingtothecourtor judgebeforewhomthewritisreturnable,plainlyand
unequivocably:
(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under
restraint;
(b)Ifhehasthepartyinhiscustodyorpower,orunderrestraint,theauthority
andthetrueandwholecausethereof,setforthatlarge,withacopyofthewrit,
orderexecution,orotherprocess,ifany,uponwhichthepartyisheld;
(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not
produced,particularlythenatureandgravityofthesicknessorinfirmityofsuch
partybyreasonofwhichhecannot,withoutdanger,beboughtbeforethecourt
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
115
orjudge;
(d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has
transferred such custody or restraint to another, particularly to whom, at what
time,forwhatcause,andbywhatauthoritysuchtransferwasmade.
Section11.Returntobesignedandswornto. Thereturnorstatementshallbe
signedbythepersonwhomakesit;andshallalsobeswornbyhimiftheprisoner
isnotproduced,andinallothercasesunlessthereturnismadeandsignedbya
swornpublicofficerinhisofficialcapacity.
Section12.Hearingonreturn.Adjournments. Whenthewritisreturnedbefore
onejudge,atatimewhenthecourtisinsession,hemayforthwithadjournthe
caseintothecourt,theretobeheardanddetermined.Thecourtorjudgebefore
whomthewritisreturnedoradjournedmustimmediatelyproceedtohearand
examine the return, and such other matters as are properly submitted for
consideration, unless for good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, in which
eventthecourtorjudgeshallmakesuchorderforthesafekeepingoftheperson
imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. If the person
imprisoned or restrained is not produced because of his alleged sickness or
infirmity,thecourtorjudgemustbesatisfiedthatitissogravethatsuchperson
cannot be produced without danger, before proceeding to hear and dispose of
thematter.Onthehearingthecourtorjudgeshalldisregardmattersofformand
technicalities in respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a court or
officerauthorizedtocommitbylaw.
Section13.Whenthereturnevidence,andwhenonlyaplea. Ifitappearsthat
the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law,
thereturnshallbeconsideredprimafacieevidenceofthecauseofrestraint,but
ifheisrestrainedofhislibertybyanyallegedprivateauthority,thereturnshall
beconsideredonlyasapleaofthefactsthereinsetforth,andthepartyclaiming
thecustodymustprovesuchfacts.
Section14.Whenpersonlawfullyimprisonedrecommitted,andwhenlettobail.
If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and
specificallychargedinthewarrantofcommitmentwithanoffensepunishableby
death,heshallnotbereleased,discharged,orbailed.Ifheislawfullyimprisoned
orrestrainedonachargeofhavingcommittedanoffensenotsopunishable,he
mayberecommittedtoimprisonmentoradmittedtobailinthediscretionofthe
courtorjudge.Ifhebeadmittedtobail,heshallforthwithfileabondinsuchsum
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as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the

prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance
before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order of
judgment;andthecourtorjudgeshallcertifytheproceedings,togetherwiththe
bond,forthwithtothepropercourt.Ifsuchbondisnotsofiled,theprisonershall
berecommittedtoconfinement.
Section 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. When the court or judge
has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is
satisfiedthatheisunlawfullyimprisonedorrestrained,heshallforthwithorder
hisdischargefromconfinement,butsuchdischargeshallnotbeeffectiveuntila
copyoftheorderhasbeenservedontheofficerorpersondetainingtheprisoner.
If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the
prisonershallbeforthwithreleased.
Section 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. A
clerkofacourtwhorefusestoissuethewritafterallowancethereofanddemand
therefor,orapersontowhomawritisdirected,whoneglectsorrefusestoobey
or make return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes false
return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner,
refusestodelivertothepersondemanding,withinsix(6)hoursafterthedemand
therefor,atruecopyofthewarrantororderofcommitment,shallforfeittothe
party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recorded in a proper
action,andmayalsobepunishedbythecourtorjudgeasforcontempt.
Section17.Persondischargednottobeagainimprisoned. Apersonwhoisset
at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the
sameoffenseunlessbythelawfulorderorprocessofacourthavingjurisdiction
ofthecauseoroffense;andapersonwhoknowingly,contrarytotheprovisions
of this rule, recommits or imprisons, or causes to be committed or imprisoned,
for the same offense, or pretended offense, any person so set at liberty, or
knowinglyaidsorassiststherein,shallforfeittothepartyaggrievedthesumof
one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, notwithstanding any
colorablepretenseorvariationinthewarrantofcommitment,andmayalsobe
punishedbythecourtorjudgegrantingthewritasforcontempt.
Section 18. When prisoner may be removed from one custody to another. A
personcommittedtoprison,orincustodyofanofficer,foranycriminalmatter,
shall not be removed therefrom into the custody of another unless by legal
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process,ortheprisonerbedeliveredtoaninferiorofficertocarrytojail,or,by
orderofthepropercourtorjudge,beremovedfromoneplacetoanotherwithin
the Philippines for trial, or in case of fire epidemic, insurrection, or other
necessity or public calamity; and a person who, after such commitment, makes
signs,orcountersignsanyorderforsuchremovalcontrarytothissection,shall
forfeittothepartyaggrievedthesumofonethousandpesos,toberecoveredin
aproperaction.
Section 19. Record of writ, fees and costs. The proceedings upon a writ of
habeas corpus shall be recorded by the clerk of the court, and upon the final
disposition of such proceedings the court or judge shall make such order as to
costsasthecaserequires.Thefeesofofficersandwitnessesshallbeincludedin
thecoststaxed,butnoofficerorpersonshallhavetherighttodemandpayment
inadvanceofanyfeestowhichheisentitledbyvirtueoftheproceedings.When
apersonconfinedundercolorofproceedingsinacriminalcaseisdischarged,the
costs shall be taxed against the Republic of the Philippines, and paid out of its
Treasury;whenapersonincustodybyvirtueorundercolorofproceedingsina
civilcaseisdischarged,thecostsshallbetaxedagainsthim,oragainsttheperson
whosignedtheapplicationforthewrit,orboth,asthecourtshalldirect.
A.M.No.07912SC
WRITOFAMPARO
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to

anypersonwhoserighttolife,libertyandsecurityisviolatedorthreatenedwith
violationbyanunlawfulactoromissionofapublicofficialoremployee,orofa
privateindividualorentity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
SEC.2.WhoMayFile.Thepetitionmaybefiledbytheaggrievedpartyorbyany
qualifiedpersonorentityinthefollowingorder:
1. Anymemberoftheimmediatefamily,namely:thespouse,childrenand
parentsoftheaggrievedparty;
2. Anyascendant,descendantorcollateralrelativeoftheaggrievedparty
withinthefourthcivildegreeofconsanguinityoraffinity,indefaultof
thosementionedintheprecedingparagraph;or
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3.
Anyconcernedcitizen,organization,associationorinstitution,ifthereis
noknownmemberoftheimmediatefamilyorrelativeoftheaggrieved
party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other
authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by
an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all
others,observingtheorderestablishedherein.
SEC.3.WheretoFile.Thepetitionmaybefiledonanydayandatanytimewith
the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committedoranyofitselementsoccurred,orwiththeSandiganbayan,theCourt
of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be
enforceableanywhereinthePhilippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be
returnablebeforesuchcourtorjudge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their

justices,itmaybereturnablebeforesuchcourtoranyjusticethereof,ortoany
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committedoranyofitselementsoccurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the
Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the
place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred.
SEC.4.NoDocketFees.Thepetitionershallbeexemptedfromthepaymentof
the docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or
judgeshalldocketthepetitionandactuponitimmediately.
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall
allegethefollowing:
1.
Thepersonalcircumstancesofthepetitioner;
2.
The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible
forthethreat,actoromission,or,ifthenameisunknownoruncertain,
therespondentmaybedescribedbyanassumedappellation;
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3.
4.
5.
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Therighttolife,libertyandsecurityoftheaggrievedpartyviolatedor
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendantcircumstancesdetailedinsupportingaffidavits;
The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances,andaddressesoftheinvestigatingauthorityorindividuals,
aswellasthemannerandconductoftheinvestigation,togetherwithany
report;
Theactionsandrecoursestakenbythepetitionertodeterminethefate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsibleforthethreat,actoromission;and
Thereliefprayedfor.
6.
Thepetitionmayincludeageneralprayerforotherjustandequitablereliefs.
SEC.6.IssuanceoftheWrit.Uponthefilingofthepetition,thecourt,justiceor
judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to
issue.Theclerkofcourtshallissuethewritunderthesealofthecourt;orincase
ofurgentnecessity,thejusticeorthejudgemayissuethewritunderhisorher
ownhand,andmaydeputizeanyofficerorpersontoserveit.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition
whichshallnotbelaterthanseven(7)daysfromthedateofitsissuance.
SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who
refusestoissuethewritafteritsallowance,oradeputizedpersonwhorefusesto
serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt
withoutprejudicetootherdisciplinaryactions.
SEC.8.HowtheWritisServed.Thewritshallbeservedupontherespondentbya
judicialofficerorbyapersondeputizedbythecourt,justiceorjudgewhoshall
retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be
servedpersonallyontherespondent,therulesonsubstitutedserviceshallapply.
SEC.9.Return;Contents.Withinseventytwo(72)hoursafterserviceofthewrit,
the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting
affidavitswhichshall,amongotherthings,containthefollowing:
1.
The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the
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2.
3.
4.
aggrievedparty,throughanyactoromission;
Thestepsoractionstakenbytherespondenttodeterminethefateor
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsibleforthethreat,actoromission;
Allrelevantinformationinthepossessionoftherespondentpertaining
tothethreat,actoromissionagainsttheaggrievedparty;and
If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall
furtherstatetheactionsthathavebeenorwillstillbetaken:
a. Toverifytheidentityoftheaggrievedparty;
b. To recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which
may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;
c. To identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerningthedeathordisappearance;
d. Todeterminethecause,manner,locationandtimeofdeathor
disappearanceaswellasanypatternorpracticethatmayhave
broughtaboutthedeathordisappearance;
e. Toidentifyandapprehendthepersonorpersonsinvolvedinthe
deathordisappearance;and
f. Tobringthesuspectedoffendersbeforeacompetentcourt.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its
resolutionandtheprosecutionofthecase.
Ageneraldenialoftheallegationsinthepetitionshallnotbeallowed.
SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised in
thereturn,otherwise,theyshallbedeemedwaived.
SEC.11.ProhibitedPleadingsandMotions.Thefollowingpleadingsandmotions
areprohibited:
1.
Motiontodismiss;
2.
Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,
positionpaperandotherpleadings;
3.
Dilatorymotionforpostponement;
4.
Motionforabillofparticulars;
5.
Counterclaimorcrossclaim;
6.
Thirdpartycomplaint;
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118
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Reply;
Motiontodeclarerespondentindefault;
Intervention;
Memorandum;
Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief
orders;and
12.
Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutoryorder.
SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a
return,thecourt,justiceorjudgeshallproceedtohearthepetitionexparte.
SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to
simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissionsfromtheparties.
Thehearingshallbefromdaytodayuntilcompletedandgiventhesamepriority
aspetitionsforhabeascorpus.
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment,thecourt,justiceorjudgemaygrantanyofthefollowingreliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
memberoftheimmediatefamilybeprotectedinagovernmentagencyorbyan
accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their
safety.Ifthepetitionerisanorganization,associationorinstitutionreferredtoin
Section3(c)ofthisRule,theprotectionmaybeextendedtotheofficersinvolved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall
extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditionsthatmaybeimposedbythecourt,justiceorjudge.
(b)InspectionOrder.Thecourt,justiceorjudge,uponverifiedmotionandafter
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duehearing,mayorderanypersoninpossessionorcontrolofadesignatedland
or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be
supportedbyaffidavitsortestimoniesofwitnesseshavingpersonalknowledgeof
theenforceddisappearanceorwhereaboutsoftheaggrievedparty.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged

nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chamberstodeterminethemeritoftheopposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the
rightoftheaggrievedpartyallegedtobethreatenedorviolated.
Theinspectionordershallspecifythepersonorpersonsauthorizedtomakethe
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and
mayprescribeotherconditionstoprotecttheconstitutionalrightsofallparties.
Theordershallexpirefive(5)daysafterthedateofitsissuance,unlessextended
forjustifiablereasons.
(c)ProductionOrder.Thecourt,justiceorjudge,uponverifiedmotionandafter
due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any
designateddocuments,papers,books,accounts,letters,photographs,objectsor
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or
contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit
theirinspection,copyingorphotographingbyoronbehalfofthemovant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the

privilegednatureoftheinformation,inwhichcasethecourt,justiceorjudgemay
conductahearinginchamberstodeterminethemeritoftheopposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutionalrightsofalltheparties.
(d)WitnessProtectionOrder.Thecourt,justiceorjudge,uponmotionormotu
proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to
the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act
No.6981.
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119
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government
agencies,ortoaccreditedpersonsorprivateinstitutionscapableofkeepingand
securingtheirsafety.
SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion of

the respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an
inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the
precedingsection.
Amotionforinspectionorderunderthissectionshallbesupportedbyaffidavits
or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of the
respondent.
SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who
refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be
punishedforcontempt.Thecontemnormaybeimprisonedorimposedafine.
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall
establishtheirclaimsbysubstantialevidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
theperformanceofduty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinarydiligenceasrequiredbyapplicablelaws,rulesandregulationswas
observedintheperformanceofduty.
Therespondentpublicofficial or employeecannotinvokethe presumptionthat

officialdutyhasbeenregularlyperformedtoevaderesponsibilityorliability.
SEC.18.Judgment.Thecourtshallrenderjudgmentwithinten(10)daysfromthe
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are
provenbysubstantialevidence,thecourtshallgranttheprivilegeofthewritand
suchreliefsasmaybeproperand appropriate; otherwise,the privilege shall be
denied.
SEC.19.Appeal.Anypartymayappealfromthefinaljudgmentorordertothe
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Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or
both.
Theperiodofappealshallbefive(5)workingdaysfromthedateofnoticeofthe
adversejudgment.
Theappealshallbegiventhesamepriorityasinhabeascorpuscases.
SEC.20.ArchivingandRevivalofCases.Thecourtshallnotdismissthepetition,
butshallarchiveit,ifuponitsdeterminationitcannotproceedforavalidcause
such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their
lives.
Aperiodicreviewofthearchivedcasesshallbemadebytheamparocourtthat
shall,motupropriooruponmotionbyanyparty,ordertheirrevivalwhenready
for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon
failuretoprosecutethecaseafterthelapseoftwo(2)yearsfromnoticetothe
petitioneroftheorderarchivingthecase.
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a
consolidatedlistofarchivedcasesunderthisRulenotlaterthanthefirstweekof
Januaryofeveryyear.
SEC.21.InstitutionofSeparateActions.ThisRuleshallnotprecludethefilingof
separatecriminal,civiloradministrativeactions.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been
commenced,noseparatepetitionforthewritshallbefiled.Thereliefsunderthe
writshallbeavailablebymotioninthecriminalcase.
TheprocedureunderthisRuleshallgovernthedispositionofthereliefsavailable
underthewritofamparo.
SEC.23.Consolidation.Whenacriminalactionisfiledsubsequenttothefilingof
apetitionforthewrit,thelattershallbeconsolidatedwiththecriminalaction.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a
petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal
action.
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120
Afterconsolidation,theprocedureunderthisRuleshallcontinuetoapplytothe
dispositionofthereliefsinthepetition.
SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantiverightsrecognizedandprotectedbytheConstitution.
SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall
applysuppletorilyinsofarasitisnotinconsistentwiththisRule.
SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving
extralegalkillingsandenforceddisappearancesorthreatsthereofpendinginthe
trialandappellatecourts.
CERTIORARI,
HABEAS
AMPARO
HABEASDATA
PROHIBITION,
CORPUS
MANDAMUS
WEIGHT OF Preponderanc Preponderanc Substantial
Preponderanc
EVIDENCE
eofevidence
eofevidence
evidence
eofevidence
BURDEN OF Petitioner
Petitioner
Petitioner
Petitioner and
PROOF
and
respondent
respondent
DISMISSAL OF If
failed If
failed Not
If
failed
PETITION
burden
of burden
of dismissed,
burden
of
proof
proof
archived
proof
DILIGENCE
Ordinary
Ordinary
If
public Ordinary
REQUIRED
respondent,
extraordinar
y
GENERAL
OK
OK
Notallowed Notallowed
DENIAL
PRESUMPTIO
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
N
OF
REGULARITY
RIGHTS
Constitutional Right
to Right to life, Right
to
PROTECTED
and statutory liberty
liberty, and privacy in life,
rights
security
liberty, and
security
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DOCKETFEES
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
A.M.No.08116SC
THERULEONTHEWRITOFHABEASDATA
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
personwhoserighttoprivacyinlife,libertyorsecurityisviolatedorthreatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrievedparty.
WHATISTHEWRITFORHABEASDATA?
Remedyavailabletoanypersonwhoserighttoprivacyinlife,libertyor
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
publicofficialoremployee,orofaprivateindividualorentityengagedin
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person,family,homeandcorrespondenceoftheaggrievedparty
WHATRIGHTSAREPROTECTEDBYTHISWRIT?
Righttoprivacyinlife,liberty,orsecurity
ILLUSTRATION:MAYAPETITIONFORWRITOFHABEASDATABEFILEDAGAINST
SWS?
With respect to being a respondent, SWS as an entity may be a

respondentitisengagedinthegathering,collectingandstoringofdata
orinformationregardingtheperson,family,homeandcorrespondence
With respect to the acts conducted of SWS, if the same are unlawful in
nature, then it may be made a respondent to the petition for the
issuanceofwritofhabeasdata
SEC. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances,thepetitionmaybefiledby:
1. Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely:
thespouse,childrenandparents;or
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2.
121
Anyascendant,descendantorcollateralrelativeoftheaggrievedparty
withinthefourthcivildegreeofconsanguinityoraffinity,indefaultof
thosementionedintheprecedingparagraph.
SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court
where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the
optionofthepetitioner.
ThepetitionmayalsobefiledwiththeSupremeCourtortheCourtofAppealsor
the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government
offices.
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. When the writ is issued by a Regional

TrialCourtoranyjudgethereof,itshallbereturnablebeforesuchcourtorjudge.
WhenissuedbytheCourtofAppealsortheSandiganbayanoranyofitsjustices,
itmaybereturnablebeforesuchcourtoranyjusticethereof,ortoanyRegional
TrialCourtoftheplacewherethepetitionerorrespondentresides,orthatwhich
has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
collectedorstored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place
where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
theplacewherethedataorinformationisgathered,collectedorstored.
ThewritofhabeasdatashallbeenforceableanywhereinthePhilippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an
indigentpetitioner.Thepetitionoftheindigentshallbedockedandactedupon
immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency
notlaterthanfifteen(15)daysfromthefilingofthepetition.
SEC. 6. Petition. A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should
contain:
(a) Thepersonalcircumstancesofthepetitionerandtherespondent;
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(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affectstherighttolife,libertyorsecurityoftheaggrievedparty;
(c) Theactionsandrecoursestakenbythepetitionertosecurethedataor
information;
(d) Thelocationofthefiles,registersordatabases,thegovernmentoffice,
and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information,ifknown;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppressionordestructionofthedatabaseorinformationorfileskept
bytherespondent.
Incaseofthreats,thereliefmayincludeaprayerforanorderenjoining
theactcomplainedof;and
(f) Suchotherrelevantreliefsasarejustandequitable.
SEC.7.IssuanceoftheWrit.Uponthefilingofthepetition,thecourt,justiceor
judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to
issue.Theclerkofcourtshallissuethewritunderthesealofthecourtandcause
it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent
necessity,thejusticeorjudgemayissuethewritunderhisorherownhand,and
maydeputizeanyofficerorpersonserveit.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition
whichshallnotbelaterthanten(10)workdaysfromthedateofitsissuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who
refusestoissuethewritafteritsallowance,oradeputizedpersonwhorefusesto
serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt
withoutprejudicetootherdisciplinaryactions.
SEC.9.HowtheWritisServed.Thewritshallbeservedupontherespondentbya
judicialofficerorbyapersondeputizedbythecourt,justiceorjudgewhoshall
retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be
servedpersonallyontherespondent,therulesonsubstitutedserviceshallapply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. The respondent shall file a verified written return
together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of
the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable
reasons.Thereturnshall,amongotherthings,containthefollowing:
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(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged
communications, confidentialityof the sourceof information ofmedia
andothers;
(b) Incaseofrespondentincharge,inpossessionorincontrolofthedata
orinformationsubjectofthepetition;
(i) A disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner,
thenatureofsuchdataorinformation,andthepurpose
foritscollection;
(ii) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the
security and confidentiality of the data or information;
and,
(iii) The currency and accuracy of the data or information held;
and,
(c) Otherallegationsrelevanttotheresolutionoftheproceeding.
Ageneraldenialoftheallegationsinthepetitionshallnotbeallowed.
SEC.11.Contempt.Thecourt,justiceorjudgemaypunishwithimprisonmentor
finearespondentwhocommitscontemptbymakingafalsereturn,orrefusingto
makeareturn;oranypersonwhootherwisedisobeysorresistalawfulprocess
ororderofthecourt.
SEC.12.WhenDefensesMaybeHeardinChambers.Ahearinginchambersmay
beconductedwheretherespondentinvokesthedefensethatthereleaseofthe
data or information in question shall compromise national security or state
secrets,orwhenthedataorinformationcannotbedivulgedtothepublicdueto
itsnatureorprivilegedcharacter.
Sec.13.ProhibitedPleadingsandMotions.Thefollowingpleadingsandmotions
areprohibited:
1. Motiontodismiss;
2. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,
positionpaperandotherpleadings;
3. Dilatorymotionforpostponement;
4. Motionforabillofparticulars;
5. Counterclaimorcrossclaim;
6. Thirdpartycomplaint;
7. Reply;
8. Motiontodeclarerespondentindefault;
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9. Intervention;
10. Memorandum;
11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief
orders;and
12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutoryorder.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court,
justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the
petitionersuchreliefasthepetitionmaywarrantunlessthecourtinitsdiscretion
requiresthepetitionertosubmitevidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to
simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissionsfromtheparties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition
areprovenbysubstantialevidence,thecourtshallenjointheactcomplainedof,
or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or
information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;
otherwise,theprivilegeofthewritshallbedenied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful
officersasmaybedesignatedbythecourt,justiceorjudgewithinfive(5)working
days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. The officer who executed the final judgment shall,
withinthree(3)daysfromitsenforcement,makeaverifiedreturntothecourt.
Thereturnshallcontainafullstatementoftheproceedingsunderthewritanda
complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles
inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner
andtherespondent.
Theofficershallstateinthereturnhowthejudgmentwasenforcedandcomplied
with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the
mannerandregularityoftheserviceofthewrit.
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SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer?s Return. The court shall set the return for hearing
withduenoticetothepartiesandactaccordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or
both.
Theperiodofappealshallbefive(5)workingdaysfromthedateofnoticeofthe
judgmentorfinalorder.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo
cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. The filing of a petition for the writ of
habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or
administrativeactions.
SEC.21.Consolidation.Whenacriminalactionisfiledsubsequenttothefilingof
apetitionforthewrit,thelattershallbeconsolidatedwiththecriminalaction.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a
petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the
criminalaction.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the
dispositionofthereliefsinthepetition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been
commenced,noseparatepetitionforthewritshallbefiled.Thereliefunderthe
writshallbeavailabletoanaggrievedpartybymotioninthecriminalcase.
TheprocedureunderthisRuleshallgovernthedispositionofthereliefsavailable
underthewritofhabeasdata.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantiverights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall
applysuppletorilyinsofarasitisnotinconsistentwiththisRule.
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SEC. 25. Effectivity.This Rule shalltake effect on February2,2008,followingits

publicationinthree(3)newspapersofgeneralcirculation.
RULE103
CHANGEOFNAME
Section1.Venue.Apersondesiringtochangehisnameshallpresentthepetition
totheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceinwhichheresides,or,intheCityof
Manila,totheJuvenileandDomesticRelationsCourt.
RULE103AND108DIFFERENTFROMONEANOTHER
Rule 103 and 108 differ from one anotherthey involve different
allegations,issuestobethreshedout,andthereliefsbeingaskedof
If the reliefs of both the rules are prayed for, then the requirements of
bothshouldbesatisfiedbeforesuchshallbegranted
CHANGEOFNAMECANNOTBESUMMARILYDECIDEDON
The change of name of a person as recorded in the registry cannot be

effected through summary proceedings as provided for in Article 412,
whichrefersonlytothecorrectionofclericalerrorsandnotthosewhich
willinvolvesubstantialchange
ALIENMAYPETITIONFORCHANGEOFNAME
HemayifheisdomiciledinthePhilippines
NAMETHATAPPEARSINTHEBIRTHCERTIFICATE
Thenamethatcanbechangedunderthisrule
Notthenamereflectedinthebaptismalcertificateorthatbywhichthe
personisknowninthecommunity
Section2.Contentsofpetition.Apetitionforchangeofnameshallbesignedand
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf,andshallsetforth:
1. Thatthepetitionerhasbeenabonafideresidentoftheprovincewhere
thepetitionisfiledforatleastthree(3)yearspriortothedateofsuch
filing;
2. Thecauseforwhichthechangeofthepetitioner'snameissought;
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3. Thenameaskedfor.
POSSIBLECAUSESFORCHANGEOFNAME
1. Whenthenameisridiculous,dishonorable,orextremelydifficulttowrite
orpronounce
2. Whenthechangeresultsasalegalconsequence,asinlegitimation
3. Whenthechangewillavoidconfusion
4. Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name,unawareofalienparentage
5. AsinceredesiretoadoptaFilipinotoerasesignsofforeignalienage,all
ingoodfaithandwithoutprejudicinganybody
CHANGEOFNAMESHOULDNOTBEPERMITTED
Would not be permitted if it would give a false impression of family

relationshiptoanother
It will be allowed however if it wouldnt cause prejudice to the family

whosesurnameitis
Section 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance,thecourt,byanorderrecitingthepurposeofthepetition,shallfixa
dateandplaceforthehearingthereof,andshalldirectthatacopyoftheorder
be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive
weeksinsomenewspaperofgeneralcirculationpublishedintheprovince,asthe
courtshalldeembest.Thedatesetforthehearingshallnotbewithinthirty(30)
days prior to an election nor within four (4) month after the last publication of
thenotice.
PETITIONFORCHANGEOFNAMEISAPROCEEDINGINREM
Thepublicationrequirementisajurisdictionalrequirement
To be valid and to confer jurisdiction upon the court, such publication

mustgivetheproperinformation
Section4.Hearing.Anyinterestedpersonmayappearatthehearingandoppose
the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appearonbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheRepublic.
Section5.Judgment.Uponsatisfactoryproofinopencourtonthedatefixedin
theorderthatsuchorderhasbeenpublishedasdirectedandthattheallegations
ofthepetitionaretrue,thecourtshall,ifproperandreasonablecauseappears
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forchangingthenameofthepetitioner,adjudgethatsuchnamebechangedin
accordancewiththeprayerofthepetition.
Section6.Serviceofjudgment.Judgmentsorordersrenderedinconnectionwith
thisruleshallbefurnishedthecivilregistrarofthemunicipalityorcitywherethe
courtissuingthesameissituated,whoshallforthwithenterthesameinthecivil
register.
RULE108
CANCELLATIONORCORRECTIONOFENTRIESINTHECIVILREGISTRY
Section1.Whomayfilepetition. Anypersoninterestedinanyact,event,order
ordecreeconcerningthecivilstatusofpersonswhichhasbeenrecordedinthe
civilregister,mayfileaverifiedpetitionforthecancellationorcorrectionofany
entryrelatingthereto,withtheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewherethe
correspondingcivilregistryislocated.
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid

grounds,thefollowingentriesinthecivilregistermaybecancelledorcorrected:
(a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction;(m)judicialdeterminationoffiliation;(n)voluntaryemancipationof
aminor;and(o)changesofname.
CHANGESINDETAILSOFCITIZENSHIPANDNATIONALITYNOTALLOWED
Whilebirthismentionedasoneoftheentriesthatmaybecorrected,this
referred only to such particulars as are attendant to birth excluding
citizenshipandnationality
Citizenshipdetailsthatmaybechangedelection,lossorrecovery
ILLEGITIMATECHILDRENMAYUSETHEIRFATHERSSURNAME
RA9255allowsillegitimatechildrentousethesurnameoftheirfathersif
theirfiliationhasbeenexpresslyrecognizedbyhimthroughtherecordof
birth in the civil register, or by an admission in the public instrument
madebythefather,providedthathehadtherighttoinstituteanaction
incourttoprovenonfiliationduringhislifetime
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SUMMARYORADVERSARIALPROCEEDING
Evensubstantialerrorsinacivilregistermaybecorrectedprovidedthat
the aggrieved parties avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding; and that the proceeding under Rule 108 ceases to be
summaryinnatureandtakesthecharacterofanappropriateadversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements therein are complied
with
If the petition filed under Rule 108 is merely to correct obvious clerical
errorsthecourtmayconductasummaryproceedingandissueanorder
forthecorrectionofthatmistake
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
Section4.Noticeandpublication. Uponthefilingofthepetition,thecourtshall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonablenoticethereoftobegiventothepersonsnamedinthepetition.The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutiveweeksinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince.
Section5.Opposition. Thecivilregistrarandanypersonhavingorclaimingany
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen(15)daysfromnoticeofthepetition,orfromthelastdateofpublication
ofsuchnotice,filehisoppositionthereto.
Section6.Expeditingproceedings. Thecourtinwhichtheproceedingisbrought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
Section 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issueanordergrantingthecancellationorcorrectionprayedfor.Ineithercase,a
certifiedcopyofthejudgmentshallbeserveduponthecivilregistrarconcerned
whoshallannotatedthesameinhisrecord.
REPUBLICACTNo.6085
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ANACTAMENDINGCOMMONWEALTHACTNUMBEREDONEHUNDREDFORTY
TWOREGULATINGTHEUSEOFALIASES
Section1.SectiononeofCommonwealthActNumberedOnehundredfortytwo
isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or
other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
differentfromtheonewithwhichhewasregisteredatbirthintheofficeofthe
localcivilregistry,orwithwhichhewasbaptizedforthefirsttime,or,incaseof
analien,withwhichhewasregisteredinthebureauofimmigrationuponentry;
or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil
registryandwhohavenotbeenbaptized,haveoneyearfromtheapprovalofthis
actwithinwhichtoregistertheirnamesinthecivilregistryoftheirresidence.The
nameshallcomprisethepatronymicnameandoneortwosurnames."
Section2.SectionTwoofCommonwealthActNumberedOnehundredfortytwo
isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
"Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedingslikethoselegallyprovidedtoobtainjudicialauthorityforachangeof
name,andnopersonshallbeallowedtosecuresuchjudicialauthorityformore
thanonealias.Thepetitionforanaliasshallsetforththeperson'sbaptismaland
family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other
thanhisoriginalorrealname,specifyingthereasonorreasonsfortheuseofthe
desiredalias.ThejudicialauthorityfortheuseofaliastheChristiannameandthe
alienimmigrant'snameshallberecordedintheproperlocalcivilregistry,andno
personshalluseanynameornamesother,thanhisoriginalorrealnameunless
thesameisoraredulyrecordedintheproperlocalcivilregistry."
Section 3. Section three of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty

two,isherebyamendedtoreadasFollows:
"Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that with
whichhewasregisteredatbirthinthelocalcivilregistry,orincaseofanalien,
registeredinthebureauofimmigrationuponentry,oranypersonwhoobtained
judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall represent
himselfinanypublicorprivatetransactionorshallsignorexecuteanypublicor
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
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private document without stating or affixing his real or original name and all
namesoraliasesorpseudonymheisormayhavebeenauthorizedtouse."
Section 4. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred fortytwo is hereby

amendedbytheinsertionofthefollowingnewsectiontobedesignatedSection
fourtoreadasfollows:
"Sec.4.Sixmonthsfromtheapprovalofthisactandsubjecttotheprovisionsof
section1hereof,allpersonswhohaveusedanynameand/ornamesandaliasor
aliases different from those authorized in section one of this act and duly
recordedinthelocalcivilregistry,shallbeprohibitedtousesuchothernameor
namesand/oraliasoraliases."
Section5.SectionfourofCommonwealthActNumberedOnehundredfortytwo
isherebyamendedtoreadasSectionfive,asfollows:
"Sec. 5. Any violation of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of from
oneyeartofiveyearsandafineofP5,000toP10,000."
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and all Acts, rules or
regulationsoflawsinconsistentherewithareherebyrepealed.
DIFFERENCEBETWEENRA9048ANDRULE108
RA9048
RULE108
Administrativeproceeding
Summaryproceeding
Affidavitisfiled
Petitionisfiled
Penaltyclause
Nopenaltyclause
Publication requirement: once a week Publication requirement: once a week

for2consecutiveweeks
forthreeconsecutiveweeks
Postinginconspicuousplace
Noposting
Change of name is based on 3 Change of name is to correct clerical

enumeratedground
and/orinnocuouserrors
RULE101
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PROCEEDINGSFORHOSPITALIZATIONOFINSANEPERSONS
Section1.Venue,Petitionforcommitment. Apetitionforthecommitmentofa
persontoahospitalorotherplacefortheinsanemaybefiledwiththeCourtof
FirstInstanceoftheprovincewherethepersonallegedtobeinsaneisfound.The
petitionshallbefiledbytheDirectorofHealthinallcaseswhere,inhisopinion,
suchcommitmentisforthepublicwelfare,orforthewelfareofsaidpersonwho,
in his judgment, is insane and such person or the one having charge of him is
opposedtohisbeingtakentoahospitalorotherplacefortheinsane.
WHOMAYFILEPETITION?
May be filed by the person who has custody or having charge of said
insaneperson
If he refuses to do so and where it is required for the welfare of the

insanepersonorthepublic,thepetitionshallbefiledbytheDirectorof
Healthorthepresentauthorizedofficer
Section 2. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance,thecourt,byanorderrecitingthepurposeofthepetition,shallfixa
dateforthehearingthereof,andcopyofsuchordershallbeservedontheperson
allegedtobeinsane,andtotheonehavingchargehim,oronsuchofhisrelatives
residing in the province or city as the judge may deem proper. The court shall
furthermore order the sheriff to produce the alleged insane person, if possible,
onthedateofthehearing.
Section3.Hearingandjudgment.Uponsatisfactoryproof,inopencourtonthe
datefixedintheorder,thatthecommitmentappliedforisforthepublicwelfare
orforthewelfareoftheinsaneperson,andthathisrelativesareunableforany
reason to take proper custody and care of him, the court shall order his
commitment to such hospital or other place for the insane as may be
recommendedbytheDirectorofHealth.Thecourtshallmakeproperprovisions
forthecustodyofpropertyormoneybelongingtotheinsaneuntilaguardianbe
properlyappointed.
Section4.Dischargeofinsane.When,intheopinionoftheDirectorofHealth,the
person ordered to be committed to a hospital or other place for the insane is
temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may
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file the proper petition with the Court of First Instance which ordered the
commitment.
Section 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding. It shall be the duty of the

provincial fiscal or in the City of Manila the fiscal of the city, to prepare the
petitionfortheDirectorofHealthandrepresenthimincourtinallproceedings
arisingundertheprovisionsofthisrule.
NOTES:
1. Where the insane person was judicially commited to the hospital or
asylum, the Director of Health may not order his release without prior
courtapproval
2. Likewise, the court may not order his release without the
recommendationoftheDirector
RULEONADOPTION
A.DOMESTICADOPTION
Section1.ApplicabilityoftheRule. ThisRulecoversthedomesticadoptionof
Filipinochildren.
Section2.Objectives. (a)Thebestinterestsofthechildshallbetheparamount
consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, in
accordance with Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the
RightsoftheChild,UNDeclarationonSocialandLegalPrinciplesRelatingtothe
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement
andAdoption,NationallyandInternationally,andtheHagueConventiononthe
ProtectionofChildrenandCooperationinRespectofIntercountryAdoption.
(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster
care or adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, or
abandoned.Tothisend,theStateshall:
1. Ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his
parentsandisprovidedwithlove,care,understandingandsecurityfor
the full and harmonious development of his personality. Only when
such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
adoptionwithinthechild sextendedfamilyisavailableshalladoption
byanunrelatedpersonbeconsidered.
Safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions in
relinquishingtheirparentalauthorityovertheirchild;
Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological
parents;
Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a
positiveenvironmentforadoption;
Ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity
to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications
andofferadoptionrelatedservicesincluding,butnotlimitedto,parent
preparationandpostadoptioneducationandcounseling;
Encouragedomesticadoptionsoastopreservethechildsidentityand
cultureinhisnativeland,andonlywhenthisisnotavailableshallinter
countryadoptionbeconsideredasalastresort;and
Protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental
authorityandcustodyovertheiradoptedchild.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be

administrativelyorjudiciallydeclaredsoastoestablishthestatusofthechildas
legallyavailableforadoption andhiscustodytransferredtotheDepartmentof
Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child
placingorchildcaringagency,whichentityshallbeauthorizedtotakestepsfor
thepermanentplacementofthechild.
Section4.Whomayadopt. Thefollowingmayadopt:
(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any
crimeinvolvingmoralturpitude;whoisemotionallyandpsychologically
capableofcaringforchildren,atleastsixteen(16)yearsolderthanthe
adoptee,andwhoisinapositiontosupportandcareforhischildrenin
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of a 16year
differencebetweentheageoftheadopterandadopteemaybewaived
when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the
spouseoftheadoptee sparent;
(2) AnyalienpossessingthesamequalificationsasabovestatedforFilipino
nationals:Provided,Thathiscountryhasdiplomaticrelationswiththe
RepublicofthePhilippines,thathehasbeenlivinginthePhilippinesfor
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atleastthree(3)continuousyearspriortothefilingofthepetitionfor
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered,thathehasbeencertifiedbyhisdiplomaticorconsularoffice
or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to
adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to
enter his country as his adopted child. Provided, further, That the
requirementsonresidencyandcertificationofthealien squalification
toadoptinhiscountrymaybewaivedforthefollowing:
(i)
aformerFilipinocitizenwhoseekstoadoptarelativewithin
thefourth(4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino
spouse;or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degreeofconsanguinityoraffinityoftheFilipinospouse.
(3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianshipandclearanceofhisfinancialaccountabilities.
Husbandandwifeshalljointlyadopt,exceptinthefollowingcases:
1. ifonespouseseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofonespousebythe
otherspouse;or
2. if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided,
however,Thattheotherspousehassignifiedhisconsentthereto;or
3. ifthespousesarelegallyseparatedfromeachother.
Incasehusbandandwifejointlyadoptoronespouseadoptstheillegitimatechild
oftheother,jointparentalauthorityshallbeexercisedbythespouses.
Section5.Whomaybeadopted. Thefollowingmaybeadopted:
1. Anypersonbeloweighteen(18)yearsofagewhohasbeenvoluntarily
committed to the Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D.
No.603orjudiciallydeclaredavailableforadoption;
2. Thelegitimatechildofonespouse,bytheotherspouse;
3. An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the
formertothatoflegitimacy;
4. Apersonoflegalageregardlessofcivilstatus,if,priortotheadoption,
said person has been consistently considered and treated by the
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5.
6.
adoptersastheirownchildsinceminority;
Achildwhoseadoptionhasbeenpreviouslyrescinded;or
Achildwhosebiologicaloradoptiveparentshavedied:Provided,That
noproceedingsshallbeinitiatedwithinsix(6)monthsfromthetimeof
deathofsaidparents.
Achildnototherwisedisqualifiedbylawortheserules.
7.
Section6.Venue. ThepetitionforadoptionshallbefiledwiththeFamilyCourt
oftheprovinceorcitywheretheprospectiveadoptiveparentsreside.
Section 7. Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be verified and

specifically state at the heading of the initiatory pleading whether the petition
contains an application for change of name, rectification of simulated birth,
voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, or declaration of child as
abandoned,dependentorneglected.
1)IftheadopterisaFilipinocitizen,thepetitionshallallegethefollowing:
(b)Thatthepetitionerisoflegalage,inpossessionoffullcivilcapacityandlegal
rights;isofgoodmoralcharacter;hasnotbeenconvictedofanycrimeinvolving
moralturpitude;isemotionallyandpsychologicallycapableofcaringforchildren;
is at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is the
biologicalparentoftheadopteeoristhespouseoftheadoptee sparent;andis
inapositiontosupportandcareforhischildreninkeepingwiththemeansofthe
family and has undergone preadoption services as required by Section 4 of
RepublicActNo.8552.
2)Iftheadopterisanalien,thepetitionshallallegethefollowing:
(b)Subparagraph1(b)above;
(c)ThathiscountryhasdiplomaticrelationswiththeRepublicofthePhilippines;
(d) That he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriategovernmentagencytohavethelegalcapacitytoadoptinhiscountry
andhisgovernmentallowstheadopteetoenterhiscountryashisadoptedchild
andresidetherepermanentlyasanadoptedchild;and
(e) That he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
yearspriortothefilingofthepetitionandhemaintainssuchresidenceuntilthe
adoptiondecreeisentered.
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The requirements of certification of the alien s qualification to adopt in his

countryandofresidencymaybewaivedifthealien:
(i) is a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or
(ii)seekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofhisFilipinospouse;or
(iii) is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouse.
3)Iftheadopteristhelegalguardianoftheadoptee,thepetitionshallallegethat
guardianship had been terminated and the guardian had cleared his financial
accountabilities.
4)Iftheadopterismarried,thespouseshallbeacopetitionerforjointadoption
exceptif:
(a)onespouseseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildoftheother,or
(b)ifonespouseseekstoadopthisownillegitimatechildandtheotherspouse
signifiedwrittenconsentthereto,or
(c)ifthespousesarelegallyseparatedfromeachother.
5)Iftheadopteeisafoundling,thepetitionshallallegetheentrieswhichshould
appearinhisbirthcertificate,suchasnameofchild,dateofbirth,placeofbirth,
ifknown;sex,nameandcitizenshipofadoptivemotherandfather,andthedate
andplaceoftheirmarriage.
6) If the petition prays for a change of name, it shall also state the cause or
reasonforthechangeofname.
Inallpetitions,itshallbealleged:
(a) The first name, surname or names, age and residence of the adoptee as
shown by his record of birth, baptismal or foundling certificate and school
records.
(b)Thattheadopteeisnotdisqualifiedbylawtobeadopted.
(c)Theprobablevalueandcharacteroftheestateoftheadoptee.
(d)Thefirstname,surnameornamesbywhichtheadopteeistobeknownand
registeredintheCivilRegistry.
A certification of nonforum shopping shall be included pursuant to Section 5,

Rule7ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
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Section 8. Rectification of Simulated Birth. In case the petition also seeks

rectificationofasimulatedofbirth,itshallallegethat:
(a)Petitionerisapplyingforrectificationofasimulatedbirth;
(b)ThesimulationofbirthwasmadepriortothedateofeffectivityofRepublic
ActNo.8552andtheapplicationforrectificationofthebirthregistrationandthe
petitionforadoptionwerefiledwithinfiveyearsfromsaiddate;
(c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best interests of the
adoptee;and
(d)Theadopteehasbeenconsistentlyconsideredandtreatedbypetitionerashis
ownchild.
Section9.Adoptionofafoundling,anabandoned,dependentorneglectedchild.
In case the adoptee is a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected
child,thepetitionshallallege:
(a) The facts showing that the child is a foundling, abandoned, dependent or
neglected;
(b) The names of the parents, if known, and their residence. If the child has no
knownorlivingparents,thenthenameandresidenceoftheguardian,ifany;
(c) The name of the duly licensed childplacement agency or individual under
whosecarethechildisincustody;and
(d)ThattheDepartment,childplacementorchildcaringagencyisauthorizedto
giveitsconsent.
Section10.Changeofname. Incasethepetitionalsopraysforchangeofname,
thetitleorcaptionmustcontain:
(a)Theregisterednameofthechild;
(b)Aliasesorothernamesbywhichthechildhasbeenknown;and
(c)Thefullnamebywhichthechildistobeknown.
Section11.AnnexestothePetition. Thefollowingdocumentsshallbeattached
tothepetition:
A. Birth, baptismal or foundling certificate, as the case may be, and school
recordsshowingthename,ageandresidenceoftheadoptee;
B.Affidavitofconsentofthefollowing:
1.Theadoptee,iften(10)yearsofageorover;
2.Thebiologicalparentsofthechild,ifknown,orthelegalguardian,orthechild
placementagency,childcaringagency,orthepropergovernmentinstrumentality
whichhaslegalcustodyofthechild;
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3.Thelegitimateandadoptedchildrenoftheadopterandoftheadoptee,ifany,
whoareten(10)yearsofageorover;
4.Theillegitimatechildrenoftheadopterlivingwithhimwhoareten(10)years
ofageorover;and
5.Thespouse,ifany,oftheadopteroradoptee.
C.Childstudyreportontheadopteeandhisbiologicalparents;
D.Ifthepetitionerisanalien,certificationbyhisdiplomaticorconsularofficeor
anyappropriategovernmentagencythathehasthelegalcapacitytoadoptinhis
countryandthathisgovernmentallowstheadopteetoenterhiscountryashis
ownadoptedchildunlessexemptedunderSection4(2);
E. Home study report on the adopters. If the adopter is an alien or residing

abroad but qualified to adopt, the home study report by a foreign adoption
agencydulyaccreditedbytheInterCountryAdoptionBoard;and
F.Decreeofannulment,nullityorlegalseparationoftheadopteraswellasthat
ofthebiologicalparentsoftheadoptee,ifany.
Section12.OrderofHearing. Ifthepetitionandattachmentsaresufficientin
form and substance, the court shall issue an order which shall contain the
following:
1. The registered name of the adoptee in the birth certificate and the
namesbywhichtheadopteehasbeenknownwhichshallbestatedin
thecaption;
2. Thepurposeofthepetition;
3. The complete name which the adoptee will use if the petition is
granted;
4. Thedateandplaceofhearingwhichshallbesetwithinsix(6)months
fromthedateoftheissuanceoftheorderandshalldirectthatacopy
thereofbepublishedbeforethedateofhearingatleastonceaweekfor
three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province or city where the court is situated; provided, that in case of
application for change of name, the date set for hearing shall not be
withinfour(4)monthsafterthelastpublicationofthenoticenorwithin
thirty(30)dayspriortoanelection.
ThenewspapershallbeselectedbyraffleunderthesupervisionoftheExecutive
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Judge.
5.
6.
Adirectivetothesocialworkerofthecourt,thesocialserviceofficeof
thelocalgovernmentunitoranychildplacingorchildcaringagency,or
the Department to prepare and submit child and home study reports
beforethehearingifsuchreportshadnotbeenattachedtothepetition
duetounavailabilityatthetimeofthefilingofthelatter;and
A directive to the social worker of the court to conduct counseling
sessions with the biological parents on the matter of adoption of the
adopteeandsubmitherreportbeforethedateofhearing.
At the discretion of the court, copies of the order of hearing shall also be
furnished the Office of the Solicitor General through the provincial or city
prosecutor,theDepartmentandthebiologicalparentsoftheadoptee,ifknown.
Ifachangeinthenameoftheadopteeisprayedforinthepetition,noticetothe
SolicitorGeneralshallbemandatory.
Section13.ChildandHomeStudyReports. Inpreparingthechildstudyreport
on the adoptee, the concerned social worker shall verify with the Civil Registry
therealidentityandregisterednameoftheadoptee.Ifthebirthoftheadoptee
was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the
socialworkertoregistertheadopteeandsecureacertificateoffoundlingorlate
registration,asthecasemaybe.
The social worker shall establish that the child is legally available for adoption
andthedocumentsinsupportthereofarevalidandauthentic,thattheadopter
has sincere intentions and that the adoption shall inure to the best interests of
thechild.
In case the adopter is an alien, the home study report must show the legal
capacity to adopt and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his
country as his adopted child in the absence of the certification required under
Section7(b)ofRepublicActNo.8552.
If after the conduct of the case studies, the social worker finds that there are
groundstodenythepetition,heshallmaketheproperrecommendationtothe
court,furnishingacopythereoftothepetitioner.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
131
Section14.Hearing. Uponsatisfactoryproofthattheorderofhearinghasbeen
published and jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, the court
shall proceed to hear the petition. The petitioner and the adoptee must
personallyappearandtheformermusttestifybeforethepresidingjudgeofthe
courtonthedatesetforhearing.
The court shall verify from the social worker and determine whether the
biological parent has been properly counseled against making hasty decisions
caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child; ensure that all measures to
strengthenthefamilyhavebeenexhausted;andascertainifanyprolongedstay
ofthechildinhisownhomewillbeinimicaltohiswelfareandinterest.
Section15.SupervisedTrialCustody. Beforeissuanceofthedecreeofadoption,
the court shall give the adopter trial custody of the adoptee for a period of at
least six (6) months within which the parties are expected to adjust
psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding
relationship. The trial custody shall be monitored by the social worker of the
court,theDepartment,orthesocialserviceofthelocalgovernmentunit,orthe
childplacement or childcaring agency which submitted and prepared the case
studies. During said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in the
adopter.
Thecourtmay,motupropriooruponmotionofanyparty,reducetheperiodor
exemptthepartiesifitfindsthatthesameshallbeforthebestinterestsofthe
adoptee,statingthereasonstherefor.
An alien adopter however must complete the 6month trial custody except the
following:
1. AformerFilipinocitizenwhoseekstoadoptarelativewithinthefourth
(4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or
2. OnewhoseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofhisFilipinospouse;or
3. OnewhoismarriedtoaFilipinocitizenandseekstoadoptjointlywith
hisorherspousethelatter srelativewithinthefourth(4th)degreeof
consanguinityoraffinity.
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective
adopterthroughapreadoptionplacementauthorityissuedbytheDepartment,
thecourtshallorderthattheprospectiveadoptershallenjoyallthebenefitsto
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whichthebiologicalparentisentitledfromthedatetheadopteeisplacedwith
him.
The social worker shall submit to the court a report on the result of the trial
custodywithintwoweeksafteritstermination.
Section16.DecreeofAdoption. Ifthesupervisedtrialcustodyissatisfactoryto
the parties and the court is convinced from the trial custody report and the
evidence adduced that the adoption shall redound to the best interests of the
adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be issued which shall take effect as of the
datetheoriginalpetitionwasfiledevenifthepetitionersdiebeforeitsissuance.
Thedecreeshall:
A.Statethenamebywhichthechildistobeknownandregistered;
B.Order:
1. TheClerkofCourttoissuetotheadopteracertificateoffinalityupon
expirationofthe15dayreglementaryperiodwithinwhichtoappeal;
2. The adopter to submit a certified true copy of the decree of adoption
andthecertificateoffinalitytotheCivilRegistrarwherethechildwas
originally registered within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
certificate of finality. In case of change of name, the decree shall be
submitted to the Civil Registrar where the court issuing the same is
situated.
3. TheCivilRegistraroftheplacewheretheadopteewasregistered:
a. Toannotateontheadoptee soriginalcertificateofbirththe
decreeofadoptionwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptofthe
certificateoffinality;
b. Toissueacertificateofbirthwhichshallnotbearanynotation
thatitisaneworamendedcertificateandwhichshallshow,
among others, the following: registry number, date of
registration, name of child, sex, date of birth, place of birth,
nameandcitizenshipofadoptivemotherandfather,andthe
dateandplaceoftheirmarriage,whenapplicable;
c. To seal the original certificate of birth in the civil registry
records which can be opened only upon order of the court
whichissuedthedecreeofadoption;and
d. Tosubmittothecourtissuingthedecreeofadoptionproofof
compliance with all the foregoing within thirty days from
receiptofthedecree.
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132
If the adoptee is a foundling, the court shall order the Civil Registrar where the
foundling was registered, to annotate the decree of adoption on the foundling
certificate and a new birth certificate shall be ordered prepared by the Civil
Registrarinaccordancewiththedecree.
Section 17. Book of Adoptions. The Clerk of Court shall keep a book of
adoptionsshowingthedateofissuanceofthedecreeineachcase,complianceby
theCivilRegistrarwithSection16(B)(3)andallincidentsarisingaftertheissuance
ofthedecree.
Section 18. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. All hearings in

adoption cases, after compliance with the jurisdictional requirements shall be
confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books and papers
relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any
otheragencyorinstitutionparticipatingintheadoptionproceedingsshallbekept
strictlyconfidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is
necessary for security reasons or for purposes connected with or arising out of
the adoption and will be for the best interests of the adoptee, the court may,
uponpropermotion,orderthenecessaryinformationtobereleased,restricting
thepurposesforwhichitmaybeused.
Section19.RescissionofAdoptionoftheAdoptee. Thepetitionshallbeverified
and filed by the adoptee who is over eighteen (18) years of age, or with the
assistanceoftheDepartment,ifheisaminor,orifheisovereighteen(18)years
ofagebutisincapacitated,byhisguardianorcounsel.
Theadoptionmayberescindedbasedonanyofthefollowinggroundscommitted
bytheadopter:
1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite
havingundergonecounseling;
2. Attemptonthelifeoftheadoptee;
3. Sexualassaultorviolence;or
4. Abandonmentorfailuretocomplywithparentalobligations.
Adoption,beinginthebestinterestsofthechild,shallnotbesubjecttorescission
by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes
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providedinArticle919oftheCivilCode.
MAYTHEADOPTERRESCINDTHEADOPTION?
No
But he may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided for by the Civil
Code
Section20.Venue.ThepetitionshallbefiledwiththeFamilyCourtofthecityor
provincewheretheadopteeresides.
Section21.Timewithinwhichtofilepetition.Theadoptee,ifincapacitated,must
filethepetitionforrescissionorrevocationofadoptionwithinfive(5)yearsafter
he reaches the age of majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the
adoption,withinfive(5)yearsafterrecoveryfromsuchincompetency.
Section22.OrdertoAnswer.Thecourtshallissueanorderrequiringtheadverse
party to answer the petition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof.Theorderandcopyofthepetitionshallbeservedontheadverseparty
insuchmannerasthecourtmaydirect.
Section23.Judgment. Ifthecourtfindsthattheallegationsofthepetitionare
true,itshallrenderjudgmentorderingtherescissionofadoption,withorwithout
costs,asjusticerequires.
The court shall order that the parental authority of the biological parent of the
adoptee,ifknown,orthelegalcustodyoftheDepartmentshallberestoredifthe
adopteeisstillaminororincapacitatedanddeclarethatthereciprocalrightsand
obligationsoftheadopterandtheadopteetoeachothershallbeextinguished.
The court shall further declare that successional rights shall revert to its status
priortoadoption,asofthedateofjudgmentofjudicialrescission.Vestedrights
acquiredpriortojudicialrescissionshallberespected.
It shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in his original birth or
foundlingcertificate.
The court shall further order the Civil Registrar where the adoption decree was
registered to cancel the new birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate his
originalbirthorfoundlingcertificate.
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
133
Section24.ServiceofJudgment. Acertifiedtruecopyofthejudgmenttogether
with a certificate of finality issued by the Branch Clerk of the Court which
rendered the decision in accordance with the preceding Section shall be served
bythepetitionerupontheCivilRegistrarconcernedwithinthirty(30)daysfrom
receipt of the certificate of finality. The Civil Registrar shall forthwith enter the
rescission decree in the register and submit proof of compliance to the court
issuingthedecreeandtheClerkofCourtwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptof
thedecree.
The Clerk of Court shall enter the compliance in accordance with Section 17
hereof.
Section 25. Repeal. This supersedes Rule 99 on Adoption and Rule 100 of the
RulesofCourt.
EFFECTSOFADOPTION
1. Theadoptershallhaveparentalauthorityovertheadoptedchild
2. Adoptedshallbeconsideredaslegitimatechildoftheadopterandshall
beonlyconsidereddirectlyrelatedtotheadopted
B.INTERCOUNTRYADOPTION
Section 26. Applicability. The following sections apply to intercountry

adoption of Filipino children by foreign nationals and Filipino citizens
permanentlyresidingabroad.
Section27.Objectives. TheStateshall:
a. Considerintercountryadoptionasanalternativemeansofchildcare,if
thechildcannotbeplacedinafosteroranadoptivefamilyorcannot,in
anysuitablemanner,becaredforinthePhilippines;
b. Ensurethatthechildsubjectofintercountryadoptionenjoysthesame
protectionaccordedtochildrenindomesticadoption;and
c. Takeallmeasurestoensurethattheplacementarisingtherefromdoes
notresultinimproperfinancialgainforthoseinvolved.
Section28.WheretoFilePetition. AverifiedpetitiontoadoptaFilipinochild
maybefiledbyaforeignnationalorFilipinocitizenpermanentlyresidingabroad
withtheFamilyCourthavingjurisdictionovertheplacewherethechildresidesor
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maybefound.
ItmaybefileddirectlywiththeInterCountryAdoptionBoard.
Section 29. Who may be adopted. Only a child legally available for domestic
adoptionmaybethesubjectofintercountryadoption.
Section30.ContentsofPetition. Thepetitionermustallege:
a. His age and the age of the child to be adopted, showing that he is at
leasttwentyseven(27)yearsofageandatleastsixteen(16)yearsolder
than the child to be adopted at the time of application, unless the
petitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the
spouseofsuchparent,inwhichcasetheagedifferencedoesnotapply;
b. Ifmarried,thenameofthespousewhomustbejoinedascopetitioner
exceptwhentheadopteeisalegitimatechildofhisspouse;
c. Thathehasthecapacitytoactandassumeallrightsandresponsibilities
of parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone the
appropriatecounselingfromanaccreditedcounselorinhiscountry;
d. Thathehasnotbeenconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude;
e. Thatheiseligibletoadoptunderhisnationallaw;
f. That he can provide the proper care and support and instill the
necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the
childtobeadopted;
g. That he agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child, as embodied
under Philippine laws and the U. N. Convention on the rights of the
child,andtoabidebytherulesandregulationsissuedtoimplementthe
provisionsofRepublicActno.8043;
h. ThathecomesfromacountrywithwhichthePhilippineshasdiplomatic
relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and
accreditedagencyandthatadoptionofafilipinochildisallowedunder
hisnationallaws;and
i.
Thathepossessesallthequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualifications
providedinthisrule,inRepublicActno.8043andinallotherapplicable
Philippinelaws.
DEFINITION
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
134
Section 31. Annexes. The petition for adoption shall contain the following
annexeswrittenandofficiallytranslatedinEnglish:
1. Birthcertificateofpetitioner;
2. Marriagecontract,ifmarried,and,ifapplicable,thedivorcedecree,or
judgmentdissolvingthemarriage;
3. Sworn statement of consent of petitioner s biological or adopted
childrenaboveten(10)yearsofage;
4. Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the petitioner
certifiedbyadulylicensedphysicianandpsychologist;
5. Income tax returns or any authentic document showing the current
financialcapabilityofthepetitioner;
6. Police clearance of petitioner issued within six (6) months before the
filingofthepetitioner;
7. Character reference from the local church/minister, the petitioner s
employerandamemberoftheimmediatecommunitywhohaveknown
thepetitionerforatleastfive(5)years;
8. Full body postcardsize pictures of the petitioner and his immediate
familytakenatleastsix(6)monthsbeforethefilingofthepetition.
Section32.DutyofCourt. Thecourt,afterfindingthatthepetitionissufficient
in form and substance and a proper case for intercountry adoption, shall
immediately transmit the petition to the InterCountry Adoption Board for
appropriateaction.
Section33.Effectivity.ThisRuleshalltakeeffectonAugust22,2002following
itspublicationinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation.
WHATIFTHECHILDISALLOWEDTOENTERCOUNTRYOFADOPTERBUTHEISNOT
GRANTEDCITIZENSHIP?
Law only provides that entry and residence should be allowed but it
didntprovidethattheforeigncountryshouldgrantcitizenship
DOMESTICADOPTION
RA8552
INTERCOUNTRYADOPTION
RA8043
Definedasasociolegalprocessofprovidingapermanentfamily Intercountry adoption refers to the sociolegal process of
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PROCEDURE
135
to a child whose parents have voluntarily or involuntarily adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen
relinquishedparentalauthorityoverthechild
permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of
adoptionisissuedoutsidethePhilippines.
Sec. 7.InterCountry Adoption as the Last Resort. The Board

shallensurethatallpossibilitiesforadoptionofthechildunder
the Family Code have been exhausted and that intercountry
adoptionisinthebestinterestofthechild.Towardsthisend,the
Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be
taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child is

placed for intercountry adoption: Provided, however, That the
maximumnumberthatmaybeallowedforforeignadoptionshall
notexceedsixhundred(600)ayearforthefirstfive(5)years.
A verified petition to adopt a Filipino child may be filed by a

foreign national or Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad
with the Family Court having jurisdiction over the place where
thechildresidesormaybefound.
ItmaybefileddirectlywiththeInterCountryAdoptionBoard.
WHERETOFILE
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
Itshallbesupportedbythefollowing
1. Birthcertificateofpetitioner;
2. Marriage contract, if married, and, if applicable, the
divorcedecree,orjudgmentdissolvingthemarriage;
Theapplicationfortheadoptionofachildshallbefiledwiththe
3. Swornstatementofconsentofpetitioner sbiological
DSWD
oradoptedchildrenaboveten(10)yearsofage;
4. Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the
petitioner certified by a duly licensed physician and

psychologist;
5. Incometaxreturnsoranyauthenticdocumentshowing
thecurrentfinancialcapabilityofthepetitioner;
6. Police clearance of petitioner issued within six (6)
monthsbeforethefilingofthepetitioner;
7. Character reference from the local church/minister,
the petitioner s employer and a member of the
immediatecommunitywhohaveknownthepetitioner
foratleastfive(5)years;
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8.
WHOMAYADOPT
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
136
Full body postcardsize pictures of the petitioner and

his immediate family taken at least six (6) months
beforethefilingofthepetition.
(1)
Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full AnalienoraFilipinocitizenpermanentlyresidingabroadmayfile
civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not an application for intercountry adoption of a Filipino child if
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; who is he/she:
emotionallyandpsychologicallycapableofcaringforchildren,at
1. Is at least twentyseven (27) years of age and at least
leastsixteen(16)yearsolderthantheadoptee,andwhoisina
sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted,
positiontosupportandcareforhischildreninkeepingwiththe
at the time of application unless the adopter is the
means of the family. The requirement of a 16year difference
parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived
spouseofsuchparent:
whentheadopteristhebiologicalparentoftheadopteeoristhe
spouseoftheadoptee sparent;
2. If married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the
adoption;
(2)
Anyalienpossessingthesamequalificationsasabove
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his country has
3. Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and
diplomaticrelationswiththeRepublicofthePhilippines,thathe
responsibilitiesofparentalauthorityunderhisnational
hasbeenlivinginthePhilippinesforatleastthree(3)continuous
laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling
years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and
fromanaccreditedcounselorinhis/hercountry;
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered,
thathehasbeencertifiedbyhisdiplomaticorconsularofficeor
4. Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
anyappropriategovernmentagencytohavethelegalcapacityto
turpitude;
adoptinhiscountry,andthathisgovernmentallowstheadoptee
toenterhiscountryashisadoptedchild.Provided,further,That
the requirements on residency and certification of the alien s

5. Iseligibletoadoptunderhis/hernationallaw;
qualification to adopt in his country may be waived for the
following:
6. Isinapositiontoprovidethepropercareandsupport
andtogivethenecessarymoralvaluesandexampleto
(i)
aformerFilipinocitizenwhoseeksto adoptarelative
allhischildren,includingthechildtobeadopted;
withinthefourth(4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or
(ii)
one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his
7. Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as
Filipinospouse;or
embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N.
(iii)
one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, and to
adopt jointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
abidebytherulesandregulationsissuedtoimplement
degreeofconsanguinityoraffinityoftheFilipinospouse.
theprovisionsofthisact;
(3)Theguardianwithrespecttothewardafterthetermination
8. Comes from a country with whom the Philippines has
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WHOMAYBEADOPTED
STEPBYSTEPPROCEDURE
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
of the guardianship and clearance of his financial

accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following

cases:
1.
ifonespouseseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofone
spousebytheotherspouse;or
2.
ifonespouseseekstoadopthisownillegitimatechild:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his
consentthereto;or
3.
ifthespousesarelegallyseparatedfromeachother.
Incasehusbandandwifejointlyadoptoronespouseadoptsthe
illegitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercisedbythespouses.
1. Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has
been voluntarily committed to the Department under
Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or judicially
declaredavailableforadoption;
2. The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other
spouse;
3. Anillegitimatechild,byaqualifiedadoptertoraisethe
statusoftheformertothatoflegitimacy;
4. Apersonoflegalageregardlessofcivilstatus,if,prior
to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopters as their own
childsinceminority;
5. Achildwhoseadoptionhasbeenpreviouslyrescinded;
or
6. Achildwhosebiologicaloradoptiveparentshavedied:
Provided,Thatnoproceedingsshallbeinitiatedwithin
six(6)monthsfromthetimeofdeathofsaidparents.
7. Achildnototherwisedisqualifiedbylawortheserules.
1. HurriedDecisions.
Inallproceedingsforadoption,thecourtshallrequireproofthat
the biologicalparent(s)hasbeenproperlycounseledtoprevent
137
diplomaticrelationsandwhosegovernmentmaintains
a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that
adoptionisallowedunderhis/hernationallaws;and
9.
Possesses all the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications provided herein and in other
applicablePhilippinelaws.
Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless

sooneremancipatedbylaw.
1. FamilySelection/Matching.
Nochildshallbematchedtoaforeignadoptivefamilyunlessitis
satisfactorilyshownthatthechildcannotbeadoptedlocally.The
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him/her from making hurried decisions caused by strain or

anxiety togiveup thechild,andtosustainthatallmeasuresto
strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any
prolongedstayofthechildinhis/herownhomewillbeinimical
tohis/herwelfareandinterest.
2. CaseStudy.
Nopetitionforadoptionshallbesetforhearingunlessalicensed
socialworkeroftheDepartment,thesocialserviceofficeofthe
localgovernmentunit,oranychildplacingorchildcaringagency
has made a case study of the adoptee, his/her biological
parent(s),aswellastheadopter(s),andhassubmittedthereport
and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such
petition.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is

legallyavailableforadoptionandthatthedocumentstosupport
this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the
adopter(s)shallascertainhis/hergenuineintentionsandthatthe
adoptionisinthebestinterestofthechild.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it

finds, after the conduct of the case studies, that the petition
should be denied. The case studies and other relevant
documents and records pertaining to the adoptee and the
adoptionshallbepreservedbytheDepartment.
3. SupervisedTrialCustody.
No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the

adopter(s)hasbeengivenbythecourtasupervisedtrialcustody
period for at least six (6) months within which the parties are
expectedtoadjustpsychologicallyandemotionallytoeachother
and establish a bonding relationship. During said period,
temporaryparentalauthorityshallbevestedintheadopter(s).
Thecourtmaymotupropriooruponmotionofanypartyreduce
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
138
clearance,asissuedbytheBoard,withthecopyoftheminutes
ofthemeetings,shallformpartoftherecordsofthechildtobe
adopted. When the Board is ready to transmit the Placement
Authority to the authorized and accredited intercountry
adoption agency and all the travel documents of the child are
ready,theadoptiveparents,oranyoneofthem,shallpersonally
fetchthechildinthePhilippines.
2. PreadoptivePlacementCosts.
The applicant(s) shall bear the following costs incidental to the

placementofthechild;
(a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the
residenceoftheapplicant(s)abroad,includingalltravelexpenses
withinthePhilippinesandabroad;
(b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination and
psychologicalevaluationrequired,andotherrelatedexpenses.
3. Fees,ChargesandAssessments.
Fees, charges, and assessments collected by the Board in the

exercise of its functions shall be used solely to process
applications for intercountry adoption and to support the
activitiesoftheBoard.
4. SupervisionofTrialCustody.
The governmental agency or the authorized and accredited

agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the
application for intercountry adoption shall be responsible for
the trial custody and the care of the child. It shall also provide
family counseling and other related services. The trial custody
shall be for a period of six (6) months from the time of
placement. Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody
shalladecreeofadoptionbeissuedinthesaidcountryacopyof
which shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of
thechild.
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the trial period if it finds the same to be in the best interest of

theadoptee,statingthereasonsforthereductionoftheperiod.
However,foralienadopter(s),he/shemustcompletethesix(6)
monthtrialcustodyexceptforthoseenumeratedinSec.7(b)(i)
(ii)(iii).
Ifthechildisbelowseven(7)yearsofageandisplacedwiththe
prospective adopter(s) through a preadoption placement
authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s)
shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is
entitledfromthedatetheadopteeisplacedwiththeprospective
adopter(s).
4. DecreeofAdoption.
If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been

complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the
petition, and after consideration of the case studies, the
qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the
evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners
arequalifiedtoadopt,andthattheadoptionwouldredoundto
the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be
entered which shall be effective as of the date the original
petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the
petitioner(s)diesbeforetheissuanceofthedecreeofadoption
toprotecttheinterestoftheadoptee.Thedecreeshallstatethe
namebywhichthechildistobeknown.
5. CivilRegistryRecord.
An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil

Registry,asrequiredbytheRulesofCourt,attestingtothefact
that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being
registeredwithhis/hersurname.Theoriginalcertificateofbirth
shallbestamped"cancelled"withtheannotationoftheissuance
ofanamendedbirthcertificateinitsplaceandshallbesealedin
thecivilregistryrecords.Thenewbirthcertificatetobeissuedto
the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
139
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to

the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited
agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a
progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress report
shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to
issuethedecreeofadoption.
TheDepartmentofForeignAffairsshallsetupasystembywhich
Filipinochildrensentabroadfortrialcustodyaremonitoredand
checked as reported by the authorized and accredited inter
country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to the
Philippines of a Filipino child whose adoption has not been
approved.
5. ExecutiveAgreements.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, upon representation of the

Board,shallcausethepreparationofExecutiveAgreementswith
countries of the foreign adoption agencies to ensure the
legitimate concurrence of said countries in upholding the
safeguardsprovidedbythisAct.
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140
issue.
ParentalAuthority.
Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adopteeshallbeseveredandthesameshallthenbevestedontheadopter(s).
Legitimacy.
Theadopteeshallbeconsideredthelegitimateson/daughteroftheadopter(s)forallintentsandpurposesandassuchisentitledto
alltherightsandobligationsprovidedbylawtolegitimatesons/daughtersborntothemwithoutdiscriminationofanykind.Tothis
EFFECTS
end,theadopteeisentitledtolove,guidance,andsupportinkeepingwiththemeansofthefamily.
Succession.
Inlegalandintestatesuccession,theadopter(s)andtheadopteeshallhavereciprocalrightsofsuccessionwithoutdistinctionfrom
legitimatefiliation.However,iftheadopteeandhis/herbiologicalparent(s)hadleftawill,thelawontestamentarysuccessionshall
govern.
f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantialrightsofthepersonappealingunlessitbeanordergranting
RULE109
ordenyingamotionforanewtrialorforreconsideration.
APPEALSINSPECIALPROCEEDINGS
Section2.Advancedistributioninspecialproceedings. Notwithstandingapending
Section1.Ordersorjudgmentsfromwhichappealsmaybetaken. Aninterested
controversyorappealinproceedingstosettletheestateofadecedent,thecourt
personmayappealinspecialproceedingsfromanorderorjudgmentrenderedbya
may,initsdiscretionanduponsuchtermsasitmaydeemproperandjust,permit
Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such
thatsuchpartoftheestatemaynotbeaffectedbythecontroversyorappealbe
distributedamongtheheirsorlegatees,uponcompliancewiththeconditionsset
orderorjudgment:
a) Allowsordisallowsawill;
forthinRule90ofthisrules.
b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributiveshareoftheestatetowhichsuchpersonisentitled;
APPEALINORDINARY
APPEALINSPECIAL
c) Allowsordisallows,inwholeorinpart,anyclaimagainsttheestateofa
CIVILACTION
PROCEEDINGS
deceasedperson,oranyclaimpresentedonbehalfoftheestateinoffset
NUMBEROFDAYS
15days
30days
toaclaimagainstit;
d) Settlestheaccountofanexecutor,administrator,trusteeorguardian;
NOTICE OR RECORD OF Notice of appeal and Record of appeal and
e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
APPEAL?
paymentofdocketfees
paymentofdocketfees
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,

GRANTOFEXTENSION
None
May
extend
on
exceptthatnoappealshallbeallowedfromtheappointmentofaspecial
meritoriousgrounds
administrator;and
MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO
ATENEOLAW2010

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SPECIALPROCEEDINGS(REGALADOTEXT;CHUA)

It is absolute rule that there is an

Usually constitute actions in personam,

It is a general rule that there is no

Constitute actions in remwherein

Generally, no default in special

Concurrent jurisdiction over guardianship and adoption cases is now

We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of

Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special

Distinction between final and interlocutory orders in civil actions for

Rule 33 on judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to special

On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate

WHAT IS DETERMINED BY THE QUESTION OF RESIDENCE IN SETTLEMENT OF

As venue may be waived, the submission of all affected parties to said

WHICH COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF

It acquires exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all questions concerning the

HOW SHOULD THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BE LIQUIDATED UPON DEATH OF

It shall be liquidated in the proceedings for the estate of the deceased

If separate proceedings have been instituted for each estate, both

WHEN MAY A PROBATE COURT PASS UPON QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP OF

AT WHAT INSTANCES MAY THE PROBATE COURT ONLY ISSUE WRITS OF

Section 4. Presumption of death. For purposes of settlement of his estate, a

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of

REMEMBER CIVIL PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO LOUIE (94 SA CIVPRO FINALS ):

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable

Evidence was introduced to prove that the widow, Benita Gatchalian, on

While it istruethat a special proceeding is an applicationtoestablish a statusor

GENERAL RULE: JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION; EXCEPTION: SUMMARY

When a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially

Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. Whenever the gross

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of

Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the

As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an

In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made by

Section1,Rule74oftheRevised Rules of Court, however,does not precludethe

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall pass

It seeks to prove that instrument submitted is the will of the testator,

Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or

In the absence of such competent witness and/or if the court deems it

Section 7. Proof when witnesses do not reside in province. If it appears at the

the court may, on motion, direct it to be taken, and may authorize a

Section 10. Contestant to file grounds of contest. Anyone appearing to contest

Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will

The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific

Crisostomo. A corresponding prayer for the appointment of an additional

court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed

The depositions in question appear to be in due form and would ordinarily be

While the appeal pending submission in this court, petitioner presented an

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No

WHO DETERMINES WHETHER A PERSON IS UNFIT TO BE AN

Person named in the will to administer the

Section 2. Executor of executor not to administer estate. The executor of an

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary

each other. Nonetheless, but mere disagreements without misconduct doesnt

Section 1. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition

Section 6. When letters of administration granted to any applicant. Letters of

Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary

Section 3. When powers of special administrator cease. Transfer of effects.