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Case No.

G.R. No. 175768, December 11, 2013
Facts: Sps. Cristobal obtained a loan from Metrobank, secured buy 2 real estate mortgages. Loan became
due and despite demands, Sps Cristobal failed to settle their obligation. This prompted Metrobank to
extrajudicially foreclose the subject properties. Auction was held and Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Certificate of Sale was issued in its name and such certificate was duly registered in the RD of
Bulacan. However, Sps. Cristobal refused to vacate the properties, thus a petition for writ of possession was
filed by the petitioner.
RTC: Denied the Writ of Possession on the grounds that failure of Metrobank to post bond because the 12month redemption period has not yet expired. Petitioner did not offer any evidence from where the Court
could base the bond required under Section 7 of Act 3135. MR was filed, but was denied on the ground that
the 12-month redemption period has expired, thus, the court has no reason to reconsider the case.
CA: filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but was denied on the ground that though the 12-Month
redemption period has been expired, it is required to consolidate the property foreclosed to the name of the
buyer before the issuance of writ of possession. Instead of filling before CA, the petitioner should re-file the
writ of possession before the RTC.
Issue: WON petitioner has consolidated ownership in its name is a question of fact or law?
Held: Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there
is doubt as to what the law is. On a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of
whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising
the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Here, no question of law is involved, for it is clear that petitioner has the right to possession once it has
established that ownership has been consolidated in its name. Consolidation is essentially factual in nature,
as it requires the presentation of evidence

Case No. 2
G.R. No. 127997, August 7, 1998
Facts: Private respondent, Manuel, filed an action collection of sum of money against Villanueva and his
wife. The action involved a check, in the amount of P167K issued by Villanueva in favor of private respondent
that supposedly represent the payment previously obtained by the Villanueva from Manuel. The check was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and Manuel demanded Villanueva but failed to fund the account.
Manuel filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 before Cebu Prosecutors Office. Petitioner, on the other hand,
avers that his principal obligation only amounts to P23,420.00.
RTC: ruled in favour of Manuel, thus requiring the Villanueva to pay the amount of P164K.
CA: Villaneva appealed to reverse RTC on the ground that the principal obligation is only P23,420.00, while
private respondent sought interest of 10% of the principal obligation; 25% as attorney’s fees, as well as moral
and exemplary damages, which was denied.
Petitioners filed a petition before SC on the same grounds raised before CA, to wit: (a) CA erred in not ruling
that the 5% and 10% interest imposed is not enforceable due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) CA
erred in not finding that petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the CA erred in not
declaring that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power or authority to repeal the usury law.
Issue: WON the questions raised is of fact or law and cognizable before the SC for review?
Held: The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to the review and revision of
errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As
such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The petitioner failed to raise issues which would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the
findings of the trial and appellate courts.

Case No. 3
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Petitioner,
OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 156284, February 6, 2007
Facts: Augusto Gomez instituted two cases involving different parcels of land and property belonging to
Consuelo Gomez. Consuelo, Ariston Sr. and Angel Gomez were sister and brothers, respectively. Maria-Rita
Gomez-Samson, Jesus Gomez and Ariston Gomez, Jr. are the children of Ariston, Sr. while Augusto Gomez
is the child of Angel. In the first of the two cases, Augusto alleged that certain parcels of land owned by
Consuelo were transferred fraudulently by donations intervivos in favor of Rita and Jesus and Augusto wanted
the subject Deed of Donation Intervivos declared false and null and void and be replaced by titles in the name
of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo. In the other case, Augusto alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was
also the sole and absolute owner of certain personal properties such as shares of stock in different
corporations, jewellery, collector’s items, cars and P200,000 in cash and that a fraudulent Deed of Donation
Intervivos was executed by Consuelo in favor of the Aristons. Augusto also wanted to have such deed
cancelled. Both complaints were consolidated and were dismissed by the trial court and was also affirmed by
the CA
Issue: WON the payment of the Donor’s Tax after the death of Consuelo proves the alleged intercalation of
the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo?
Held: It is well to note that the factum probandum petitioner is trying to establish here is still the alleged
intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo. The
factum probans this time around is the alleged payment of the Donor’s Tax after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove
in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donor’s Tax after the death of
Consuelo does not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of
paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum. Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself
physically and personally delivered the check to the BIR. He instead testified that the check was prepared
and issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally delivered the
same to the BIR. On the query, however, as to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or after the death
of Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner merely formulated conjectures based on the
evidence he presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of
the RTRs or what he meant with the words "on even date" in his certification. Neither did petitioner present
any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated, thus, letting the
presumption that a public official had regularly performed his duties stand. This is in contrast to respondents’
direct evidence attesting to the payment of said tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to
respondents’ evidence, petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by
evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.

should. (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant. 1993 Facts: Petitioner Far East Marble received from private respondent (the former Commercial Trust Bank Company which was absorbed by BPI) the following. evidenced by promissory notes.). JR. BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses. Basically. CA: Reversed the RTC and remanded the case for further proceedings Issue: WON BPI has no sufficient cause of action because the phrase “repeated requests and demands for payment” is not sufficient to state a cause of action? Held: Sec 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. the phrase “repeated requests and demands for payment” is vague and incomplete so as to establish in the minds of defendant. and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right (Nabus vs. 94093. vs. a complaint. petitioners. respondents. namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff. 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). while "evidentiary facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts." "Ultimate facts" are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant (Tantuico. Far East had failed and refused to pay. 15 SCRA 48 [1965]). Far East failed to pay its obligations (both the promissory note and the trust receipts) and Ramon and Luis Tabuenas also did not comply with their solidary liability under the “continuing guaranty”. August 10. et al. and extended credit facilities in the form of trust receipts to Far East (photocopies of said notes and receipts were duly attached to the Complaint). HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. TABUENA. Jr. Ozarraga. 204 SCRA 428 [1991]). so it raised the defense of prescription and lack of cause of action. Far East has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. a plain. Petitioner Tabuenas (Ramon and Luis) executed in favor of BPI a “continuing guaranty” whereby they bound themselves.." Further elaborating thereon. to answer for the loan obligations of Far East to the bank. alleging that its cause of action against Far East have not prescribed. and RAMON A. viz: a) several loans evidenced by promissory notes.Case #4 FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS. various written extrajudicial demands were made by BPI to Far East. (2) said promissory notes and trust receipts had matured. G. LUIS R. and (3) despite repeated requests and demands for payment thereof.. Besides. private respondent BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against petitioners. that demands or acknowledgments of debt were made that could have interrupted the period of prescription. as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals (DBP vs. or to enable the court to draw a conclusion. No. Republic of the Phil. concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts . BPI granted several loans. having been raised. "shall contain in a methodical and logical form. be supported by competent evidence. the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for payment. vs. Apart from the fact that the complaint failed to allege that the period of prescription was interrupted. Rebollido vs. Section 1 of Rule 8 declares that every pleading. et al. in 1987. TABUENA. particularly when it was therein alleged that: (1) for valuable consideration. including. Clearly then.. it is a defense which. a cause of action consists of three elements. As a result.R. jointly and severally. BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive period was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial demands for payment and acknowledgment by Far East of the debt. and b)the former was extended by the latter credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts. . . omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. 170 SCRA 800 [1989]). Far East filed a compulsory counterclaim where it admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes but alleged further that it has already prescribed.. But even as Far East raised the defense of prescription. of course. These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint. RTC: Dismissed the complaint based on prescription and lack of cause of action. prescription is not a cause of action. INC. Court of Appeals. it also denied that BPI made prior demands for payment. Court of Appeals et al. . since within 10 year from the time its cause of action accued..

respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother. Such information may be obtained by other means." The RTC upheld the sufficiency of the BOP. Magtolis FACTS: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married. Subsequently." As stated by private respondent. while not very definite. . . . and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts. "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. Erwin filed a petition for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity. ISSUE: W/N the allegations in the BOP are the ultimate facts needed to adequately and intelligently allow Joselita to prepare her answer to the petition. from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . Edwin specified that — . Ultimate facts have been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will support. in his Bill of Particulars. They separated in fact in 1988." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Joselita filed a petition for certiorari against the order of RTC Judge Magtolis. Subsequently. Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. RULING: Yes. ." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint.Case # 5 Salita v. . Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. . whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.’ as required by the Rules of Court. at the time of their marriage. nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition. Hence.

counsel for the accused objected averring that the presented evidence is immaterial. CFI granted the petition ordering the testimonies to be stricken out from the record.58 to her (accused) own use and benefit. counsel for the accused moved to strike out the foregoing testimonies but respondent court also denied the motion. RULING: As a general rule. Moreover. P500 and P632. The defense further argued that the information alleges that the accused received the sum of P127. The 3 checks have the ff amounts: P500. This is an evidentiary matter which is not required to be alleged therein. and that the exhibit and evidence is germane as they want to show that there is misappropriation of the amount from the total amount of P1.58 was received by the accused. where 3 checks are indicated. For instance. Petition for certiorari was filed by the defense before the CFI of Batangas seeking to annul the orders of lower court overruling the objections and denying the motion to strike out the testimony. misapply and convert the sum of P127.97. identified and marked as exhibit. ISSUE: W/N matters of evidence must be included in the information. All that is required is that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed and will enable him intelligently to prepare his defense. the presented evidence will be immaterial. the court overruled the objection. The prosecution maintained that there was already a testimony of their witness that there is certain amount received and that portion (P127. The defense counsel argued that the information only states that the sum of P127. Hence.Case # 6 Balitaan v.58) thereof was not delivered to the offended party. However. . in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. and if found guilty to plead her conviction.58. thus. unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate. matters of evidence. as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense.97. as that is a matter of evidence at the trial. reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. Applying these principles.632. During Balitaan’s testimony. it is not necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded. need not be averred. CFI Batangas FACTS: Balitaan filed an information for estafa against her employee alleging that the latter “did then and there. so that the presented evidence.” During the presentation of Balitaan as the first witness for the prosecution. that the information does not cite that this amount was only a part of the cash received. wilfully. was presented. the checks having received in so much amount are immaterial and irrelevant. that what they are proving are preliminary evidence going directly to the present issue of P127. the Court ruled that the existence of the three checks need not be alleged in the Information.58. a cash voucher allegedly received by the accused. this petition against the CFI. At the close of the direct examination of Balitaan.

ISSUE: 1. the movant is not to be deprived of the right to submit its own case and to submit evidence to rebut the allegations in the complaint. PKEI sent a letter to Santos requesting her to rectify the error and consequently realizing her error. NOTE: Emphases here are supplied by me including the words “factum probans” and “factum probandum” words in the parentheses. Hence. Inc. No. this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. While. A cause of action already exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right. this petition. Having come to the conclusion that the complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of the right of first refusal and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Santos did not reply to the counter-offer and eventually sold it to her first buyer for 9M. Inc. is a question which can better be resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. however. (PKEI) by virtue of a deed of assignment and with the conformity of the Lessor-ownerdefendant Santos. cannot be denied their day in court. The property being leased was sold to a third party. Although a careful examination of the complaint reveals that it sufficiently alleges an actionable contractual breach (factum probans) on the part of private respondents. 2. and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. such admission is merely hypothetical and only for the purpose of resolving the motion. whether there was actual breach (factum probandum) which entitled petitioner to damages and/or other just or equitable relief. IT IS ADVISABLE THAT YOU READ THE WHOLE CASE (it’s just short anyway) AS I MIGHT HAVE INTERPRETED IT INCORRECTLY. These facts were alleged in the complaint of PKEI. No. not the PKEI. There were no clear mentions of such words in the case. private respondents. PKEI refused to buy it for 15M and counter-offered to buy the property for 5M. It was further state that there was an absent of any actionable wrong in the very face of the Complaint itself. RTC and CA granted the motion and dismissed the complaint stating that the complaint created a cause of action but neutralized itself by its subsequent averments which erased or extinguished its earlier allegations of an impending wrong. 2. for 5M. the truth of the facts alleged (factum probans) in the complaint are theoretically admitted. In case of denial. which were hypothetically admitted by the adverse party. The Contract of Lease gives the lessee the right of first refusal. Please share to us if you have a different interpretation should you decide to read it in its entirety. In determining whether allegations (factum probans. I just sought to relate the case with the topic under which it was assigned.Case # 7 Paranaque Kings Enterprises. hence.  . I came up with this content of the digest. W/N the factual allegations (factum probans) in the complaint. it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action (factum probandum) at the outset. Santos had it reconveyed to her and offered it to PKEI for 15M. as hypothetically admitted by the defendant) of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action. in the resolution of a motion to dismiss. v CA FACTS: Lee Ching Bing assigned all his rights and interest in a leased property to Parañaque Kings Enterprises. constitute bases for deciding a case on the merits. RULING: 1. W/N a complaint has to establish facts proving the existence (factum probandum) of a cause of action. Santos moved to dismiss the complaint stating that it states no cause of action since it is clear that Santos already made the offer to PKEI but the latter rejected.


Nevertheless. limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy. ISSUE: W/N evidentiary matters maybe inquired into by the parties prior to trial. against Tantoco Jr. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial. However. Before the scheduled Pre-trial. It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. and Santiago before the Sandiganbayan. In response. there are limitations to discovery. . according to the verification of the amended complaint. The deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. Sandiganbayan FACTS: A complaint was filed by the PCGG. the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. the truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. their disclosure may not be opposed. the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. Others. among others. whether they be ultimate or evidentiary. It is settled that the office of a bill of particulars is limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading. when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings. to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence." In fine. The Sandiganbayan admitted the Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents. represented by the Republic. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. ." The MR was denied. which is prematurely filed and irregularly utilized . It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery. "As indicated by (the) Rules. embarrass. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant. a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff” as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents were filed by the defendants. are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff.Case # 8 Republic v. the defendants filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for Bill of Particulars but it was denied. that (1) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact which defendants sought to (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars." and that (2) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition. or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law. even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention. admittedly. hence. In this case. In opposition thereto. RULING: Yes. . To this end. some of the documents are. The Rules of Court make this possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. this petition. PCGG filed an MR alleging. And . The case was set for Pre-Trial. excepting only those matters which are privileged. . Their relevance is indisputable. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged. No longer can the timehonored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.

This is provided for in Sections 16 and 18. c)to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory question. which was not done because there was nothing yet to offer. Teope who was the chairman of the Board Directors of private respondent. (b) that said deposition was offered as evidence.Whether or not the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case. to repeat. which it had not. RULING: The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment of the judiciary’s primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. 2. 1992. An action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served them with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be not taken in the absence of good cause therefor. embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent. which did not happen because there was nothing to reject as nothing was offered. and (c) that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital witness. d) deponent has no intention of leaving the country. 1992. CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct. which reasons. and (c) that said offer was rejected. Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a) petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery. Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. ISSUES: 1. viz. Teope appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court. b)deponent had signified his availability to testify in court. The deposition-discovery . is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts which are not obtaining in the case at bar. petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section 15. On March 26. if there are valid reasons for the ruling. The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication on the merits. February 12 and April 22.Case # 9 FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot be considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories. With the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC. are: (a) that the proposed deponent had earlier responded to written interrogatories. that a deposition shall not be taken. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. (b) that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court. Rule 24. c) such taking would cause annoyance. e)the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits.: (a) that petitioner had already obtained a deposition. b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition. in its discretion.

taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery. Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable. and which will hereinafter be discussed. However. The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of the deposition. to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. Pursuant to this rule. however. This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. orders made under Section 16. that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must be exercised. or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. the court in which the action is pending may. 12 considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. It is our considered opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. contempt of court. upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown. refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious. issue formulation and face revelation theretofore performes primarily by the pleadings. A particular and specific demonstration of facts." nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the examination. or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party. is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. or arrest of the party or agent of the party. but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. Rule 29 imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. private respondent . The requirement. nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing. as distinguished from conclusory statements. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. among others. the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a device. II. make an order that the deposition shall not be taken. that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. not arbitrarily.procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving. where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate. it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery. to the end that its purpose may be attained. certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. or staying further proceedings. nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine. however. What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is sought. like other discovery orders. The evident purpose is to enable the parties consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end . It is well settled. such as dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof. along with the pre trial hearing under Rule 20. or oppressively. capriciously. I. SC ruled that certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination. striking out his pleadings or parts thereof. In the present case. 11 This is because.

Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance. the courts took a relatively liberal view. the first case in which this question was raised. while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable. Judge Hilbert said that: "Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate. in the absence of proof. As a matter of practice. Accordingly. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. otherwise. or to harass or oppress the other party. no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions. private respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties when required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process. the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules.. Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. 3. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition. the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy. And since their use as evidence was originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper. in the absence of proof. (c) that there is good cause shown. embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined. as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court. 2. the court could not observe the behavior of the deponents. (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed. and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices. embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined. the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the limitations on their use.failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken. (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed. therefore. harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition. Finally. the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories." It is quite clear. our legal system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses — whose demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge — is superior to the use of written statements of the same witnesses. (c) that there is good cause shown. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that. and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. Finally. 4. the court unquestionably has. restrictions are imposed upon their use. Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance. Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation. 1. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence. In Howard v. harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition. discretion to permit an oral examination. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions. No doubt. if the deposition were taken. no deposition could ever be taken. and in a proper case should exercise. said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use of depositions as evidence. States Marine Corp. But it should be made to clearly appear that the relevant subject matter will not involve the interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars upon which he was examined by interrogatories. . and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.

On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions. . and that respondent court erred in affirming the same. we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case.

memory. The jailbreak happened at night when the guards were all asleep and suddenly 15 prisoners escaped and even killed two (2) guards and injured one (1). The jailbreakers had already killed the guards and needed no prodding or instigation from anybody to kill. Too. Furthermore. The other inmates also testified that they heard Parungao inciting the killings while he was in his cell. In fact. However. In the light of the established circumstances. Pilapil. the lock of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value To give weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito. in giving weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito. and Aldana. and Aldana. that the alleged proddings and urgings were no longer necessary to induce the assailants to commit the crime. However. Basa and Valencia. and Aldana. It appears. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not can not be given credence for it has no probative value. He was being held as a conspirator and a mastermind in the escape of his inmates in a jailbreak. RULING: No. Parungao did not actually exit his jail cell nor participate in the homicide. Pilapil. or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. nor in inflicting injuries on Aldana. The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. and after the incident never left his cell. Plainly the foregoing testimony of Quito. There is no evidence that accused-appellant participated in the killing of the two guards. In case of conflict between a provision of the Constitution giving the accused a substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence. during. accused-appellant before. kill the guards. The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence. therefore.Case # 10 People vs Abelardo Parungao FACTS: Parungao was a prisoner at the Pampanga Provincial Jail in San Fernando. and rob the prison armory. the Court is not convinced that there is enough evidence to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of a doubt. and Aldana that accused-appellant was the mastermind of the jail break is not sufficient to prove such fact. we have no choice but to give effect to the Constitution The trial court gravely erred in accepting. and to make the same the basis for finding accused-appellant a co-conspirator and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment. like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta. Pilapil. but in the same breath say that he did not in fact join the jailbreak and sat meekly inside his detention cell. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the other inmates were admissible or may be given weight in convicting Parungao. The record is bereft of any evidence indicating a prior plan or agreement between accused-appellant and the other inmates in the implementation of a common design to bolt jail. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. He was convicted in the RTC. that accused appellant masterminded the jailbreak. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. such evidence being merely hearsay because said witnesses testified and conveyed to the court matters not of their own personal knowledge but matters only narrated to them by other detainees. There is nothing in their testimony pointing to accused-appellant as the very source of their information that he planned the jailbreak. it must be noted that neither accused-appellant nor his counsel objected to the admission of the testimony of Quito. During the escape. and was a co-conspirator. Pilapil. it defies logic to say that accused-appellant is the mastermind of the jailbreak. The paucity of such evidence only . gravely violates the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to meet the witnesses face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-examination. we cannot agree with the trial court that accused-appellant is guilty as principal by inducement simply because as testified by Jail Guard Pacheco. and so they were charged with robbery with homicide. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. giving written instructions even. The escapees took away guns and ammunition. and worse still. and intelligence. the only effective means to test their truthfulness. The other inmates who were able to escape the prison but were eventually caught all testified that Parungao was the mastermind of the plan. Pampanga. he shouted out words of encouragement to Briones.

.strengthens the suspicion that the prosecution witnesses fabricated their testimony against accusedappellant because of his having reported their drug trafficking activities in the provincial jail.

It appears that cases of old stock were shipped to Manila before the fire but instead of being taken directly to the bodega they were housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor where the petitioner had office. that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of the goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. 731.800. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega before the fire.800 when the true value of the said jewelry was about P 600. but also that it submitted fraudulent proof .Case # 11 & 23 PRATS AND COMPANY VS. when in fact the fire chief noticed that it was never touched and he himself turned on the alarm. First. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or connived therein and submitted fraudulent proof as the trial judge found. the sum of P117. conducted by the defendant. As a conclusion. a mercantile partnership instituted an action in the RTC of the City of Manila for recovery from the Phoenix Insurance Co. the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P 12. or with its connivance. the manipulation of one of their people to attend to the alarm box not to allow others to touch it and reasoned out that he already have done it. and the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss in contravention of the express terms of the policy. RULING: YES. upon account of moneys received from salvage sales. Phoenix Insurance admitted the insurance of the insurance but by way of special defense.60 with interest. and secondly. alleged that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff. by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff from a fire for said loss was covered by insurance issued by the defendant company. The finding of the trial court in the effect that plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of his claim is also well founded. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY FACTS: Prats & Co. or connive therein.. The trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by the policy but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11. of remnants of the insured stock.93 with interest from the filing of the complaint. not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set. Also.

Appellant also assails as inherently incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be corroborative in nature. Also. Labine. TIBURCIO ABALOS FACTS: In the evening of March 20. a woman shouted “Police officer. All these. the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility. through the clear and positive testimony of Basal. RULING: In the main. There was thus no need. hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. is sufficient to convict an accused. particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility. Police Major Cecilio Abalos. were having a heated argument. accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood. The record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in testifying against appellant. The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind. Besides. if credible and positive. The record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Basal came and intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband's slaying. the prosecution has convincingly proved. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine. Labine. P/Pfc. the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had called for help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the events. sir?” The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. as .” The victim. it is up to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such testimony. the prosecution has convincingly proved. about two inches thick. a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness. particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility. the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had called for help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the events. from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle.Case # 12 & 24 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. unfortunately. From the evidence in the case at bar. There was thus no need. 1983. while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father. Moreover. three inches wide and three feet long. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap. From the evidence in the case at bar. Moreover. help us! Somebody’s making trouble here. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with murder. as appellant would want the prosecution to do. is sufficient to convict an accused. are flawed arguments. the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. if credible and positive. through the clear and positive testimony of Basal. “What is it. then appeared at the scene and asked Major Abalos. a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial erred in finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.

must have been given not only by a credible witness. Curiously enough. For. he himself. no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's identification of him supposedly because of inadequate lighting. and that it was an innocent case of error in personae. After all. it is up to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such testimony. Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. was just seventeen meters away from them. under the same conditions. contrary to appellant's pretense. but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in itself. Labine. was then armed with a carbine. Basal came and intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband's slaying Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm is rather preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would assault a police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically. Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew. if it were true that he had merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA. aside from his position. Appellant's explanation is. Also. Besides. The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. there was no necessity at all for him to flee from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was in the company of his own father who. therefore. Samar.appellant would want the prosecution to do. Appellant's testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence. by appellant's own reckoning. appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight. . he being also a longtime resident of that municipality. Further. the condition of visibility at the time of the incident was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent death. the illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the combatants. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and which. to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be corroborative in nature. What these facts establish is that the lights in the area at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident. absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in law. Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post. he could have readily surrendered to his father right then and there. to be believed. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright. could clearly see his father's assailant wearing a fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen.

allowing her to see his face. No. and he then raped Leah in the presence of Rafael and others. she scratched his face. the accused questions the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Accused Monforte raped Teresita at the garage. as synthesized in appellee's brief and set forth earlier. On appeal. victim Leah recognized accused Rolando Precioso. The absence of evidence of any improper motive impelling the principal witness sustains the conclusion that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. as between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused.R. then. Despite this. . Furthermore. if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. While sleeping at the Galvadores' store. Trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimony is accorded great respect on appeal. Agusan del Sur. could not have been conjured and fabricated by these hapless and innocent victims. considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to airing in public things that affect her honor. Rafael Galvadores called out to Teresita Pescador. allowing Leah and Rafael to recognize him. and the records do not show that the court below disregarded any consideration which would warrant a departure from this jurisprudential dictum. as a result of which his mask fell off. would like to convince the trial court that he was working at the time. a neighbor. it is hard to conceive that the complainant would assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not true. They escorted Leah to the Spouses Galvadores' house on the pretext that her niece is suffering from stomach ache. to open the door. Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court in the raison d'etre that the latter is in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies. on the other hand. a househelp. would not have publicly admitted that they had been criminally ravished if that was not true. Their testimony given at a public trial wherein they narrated their ordeal with all the sordid details thereof. 2. We have consistently ruled that denials. through his physical appearance. Leah was raped by Monforte too twice and she was able to see his face since the handkerchief over his face was removed. both young barrio girls. Teresita recognized accused Precioso. for their natural instinct is to protect their honor. WON the witnesses and their testimonies are credible 2. Monforte. Ergo. 95890 May 12. The accused were convicted through the positive identification of Teresita and Leah. but said house is admittedly only around 150 meters away from the house of the Galvadores spouses. ISSUE: 1. The defense of alibi interposed by appellants is evidentially sterile and jurisprudentially weak as they were not able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.ROLANDO PRECIOSO. having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The men ransacked the house looking for valuables. G. the former deserve more credence. the victims were awakened by four armed men who were covered with handkerchiefs and stockings and only their eyes and mouths were visible. Rafael and Leah were brought to the store by Precioso. one of their neighbors who frequented the store. Complainants. are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses. through his voice and general physical appearance. he was sleeping in the house of his grandmother. his clothes and his voice. He removed the cover of his face to kiss Leah. WON the defense of alibi can be appreciated HELD: 1. 1993 FACTS: The accused's were charged of robbery in band with multiple rape before the RTC Bayugan. Precioso claimed that when the crime was committed.Case # 13 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. subject to exceptions which do not obtain in the present case.

. The offense in the case at bar is the special complex crime of robbery with rape. in this instance. is merely a generic aggravating circumstance. Cuadrilla.*The crime charged in the case at bar cannot be correctly categorized or denominated as robbery in band with multiple rape as there is no such composite crime.

1995. In particular. who was sometimes left with Cyra May at home. where relevant. then only 3 1/2 years old. March 5. without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3. 1995 or three days earlier. "Mama. On November 20. is usually regarded as relevant. Accused denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia. The victim and her mother. and. 2003 FACTS: Accused was charged with Rape before RTC of Quezon City. the object of which is to do away with the presentation of evidence. cannot take judicial notice of the victims age. if so. Gloria asked Cyra May how many times he did those things to her. A persons appearance. Pruna case laid down guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: . theoutward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age. Cyra May. as evidence of age (for example. The court held that the process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. The MedicoLegal Officer's examination shows that the victim is still a virgin but there are abrasions on the labia minora which could have been caused by friction with an object. and Gloria but only once. the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Consequently. particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. the evidence being the appearance of the person. The issue now is the second element. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things to Col. at 4:00 p. On the other hand. told Gloria. This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.Cyra's father. inconvenient. a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious. si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko". G. is admissible as object evidence. It is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. he is not taking judicial notice of such fact. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice. of infancy.] The formal offer of the person as evidence is not necessary. and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Buanafe. HELD: Courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in determining her age. No. in the ordinary way. Kuya Ronnie is the Buenafes house boy. the tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it.Case # 14 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman. or of being under the age of consent to intercourse). The spouses brought accused to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him. When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age. A persons appearance. of facts which are already known to courts. to which she answered many times. it does. had been established beyond reasonable doubt.m. The first element. ISSUE: WON the court can take judicial notice of victim's age. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused. 131516. testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.R. and claimed that he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating and that she was coached. In every case such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by observation of such persons. Cyra May indicated the room where accused slept and pointed at his pillow. rather. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous. however. on the contrary. The prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence. he is conducting an examination of the evidence. carnal knowledge. of November 17. Experience teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer. a handful of cases holds that courts. perhaps an erect penis. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO.

that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old. of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40. the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. c.. therefore. 6. authentic document. or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age.e. Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years). . In the absence of a certificate of live birth. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. Under the above guideline. b. i.1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old. 5. (b) and (c) above. The appearance corroborates the relatives testimony. the testimony. 2. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. exists that the second element of statutory rape. In such cases. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. if clear and credible. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. is present. the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a). No reasonable doubt. 4. similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with the respondents Board of Directors. G. 1999.printed communication through keyboard terminals. (2) computer conferencing . CA and KOREAN AIRLINES (KAL). 2001. 15. Inc. In this age of modern technology. 152392. the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. was duly authorized to sue in its behalf. Even given the possibility that Atty.Case # 15 EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. ETI filed a MR of the Order. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1. No. and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying. the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping. however.R. a resident foreign corporation. that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution. and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. Aguinaldo. In the Philippines. The respondent. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting. (ETI) vs. teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations is a reality. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferencesThus. failed to establish its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. KAL submitted on an Affidavit. (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain. ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. for a collection of sum of money. Aguinaldo attended. however.Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. on its contention that Atty. the Court is not convinced that one was conducted. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. assailing the orders of the RTC. Even the identification card of Atty. its resident agent and legal counsel. teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. ISSUE: WON the court can take judicial notice of teleconference HELD: Generally speaking. which he and Atty. This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways. filed a Complaint against ETI with the RTC Manila. The trial court denied the MR. May 26. 8792. It was also averred that in that same teleconference. executed by its general manager. matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge. its resident agent. 2005 FACTS: Korean Airlines. the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. through Atty. Atty. ETI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the respondents Manila Regional Office. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo. on November 30. alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference. In general terms. The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent failed to comply with Section 5. even if there had been one. The KAL manager also alleged. and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing television-like communication augmented with sound. . in light of Republic Act No. Trial court denied the motion to dismsis of ETI and gave credence to the claims of KAL and Atty.

The court granted the motion per its Order dated February 11. 1999 and approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible. the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint. The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25. given the additional fact that no such allegation was made in the complaint. The respondent again prayed for an extension within which to submit the said resolution. that he and Atty. failed to comply. 2000. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25. it even represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea. or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent. Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25. Aguinaldo. inter alia. announced the holding of the teleconference only during the hearing of January 28. long before the complaint was filed. 2000. or until February 8. however. through Atty. Atty. It was only on March 6. 1999. until March 6. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days. within which to submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping. . The court granted the motion. 1999. where the Board of Directors supposedly approved the resolution. 2000 that the respondent alleged. 2000. 2000 that the respondent claimed. The respondent failed to do so. It was on the said date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim. for the first time. stating.The respondent. only to allege later that no written copy existed. for the first time. 2000. and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said resolution. It was only on January 28. contending that it was with its main office in Korea. 1999. that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference. that there was such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25.

. VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. JR. and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs. From the beginning of Erap’s term. that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. They can be reversed but they . It can be written. the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports. Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. In the cases at bar. WON the court can take judicial notice that the petitioner resigned as President. At 1:20 p.. went on air and accused the Estrada.e. March 2. Consequently. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO FACTS: Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.Case # 16 JOSEPH E. The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. during and after January 20. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Singson. had defected. he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as president. 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes. In truth. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. it must be given legal effect. our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On January 22. LEONARD DE VERA. INC. Nos. in his capacity as Ombudsman. contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. It is a factual question and its elementsare beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. On January 19. 2000. 2001 or by the totality of prior. G. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled.R. the Monday after taking her oath. Using this totality test. GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner. of said day. FRANCISCO. the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20. RAMON GONZALES. It can be oral. ISSUE: 1. give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. It can be express. 2. we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. we hold that petitioner resigned as President. Estrada fell from power. Again. 2001 JOSEPH E. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender. WON the court can take judicial notice of news reports HELD: None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. DENNIS FUNA. ESTRADA vs. whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before. his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior. 146710-15. Hence. i. To quote petitioners submission. It can be implied. ANIANO DESIERTO. ESTRADA vs.m. Indeed. a longtime friend of Estrada. he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4. As long as the resignation is clear.

investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. In other words. he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias. . Moreover.

although part of Estrada’s Complaint. especially since the bone of contention relates to Estrada’s entitlement to commissions for the sale of health plans she claims to have brokered. Chief Operating Officer Virgilio del Valle.” That is the reason for the modifier “such. was renewed on February 11. Maxicare alleged that it followed a “franchising system” in dealing with its agents whereby an agent had to first secure permission from Maxicare to list a prospective company as client. The statement in Annex “F” amounted to an admission.” In this case. ipso facto. . This may be interpreted as to mean “not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear. Maxicare directly negotiated with MERALCO regarding the terms and conditions of the agreement and left plaintiff-appellee Estrada out of the discussions on the terms and conditions. As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.” then the one making the admission may show that he made no “such” admission. Maxicare formally appointed Estrada as its “General Agent. and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. Maxicare allegedly engaged the services of Carmela Estrada who was doing business under the name of CARA HEALTH SERVICES to promote and sell the prepaid group practice health care delivery program called MAXICARE Plan with the position of Independent Account Executive. It is more than obvious from the entirety of the records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently declared that her involvement as broker is the proximate cause which consummated the sale between Meralco and Maxicare. but cites the admission “out of context. MERALCO account included. 1991. to demonstrate Maxicare’s bad faith and ill will towards Estrada. the letter was attached to the Complaint. The letter agreement provided for plaintiff-appellee’s Estrada’s compensation in the form of commission.” evidenced by a letter-agreement dated February 16. provides a contrary answer to Maxicare’s ridiculous contention. Plaintiffappellee Estrada submitted proposals and made representations to the officers of MERALCO regarding the MAXICARE Plan but when MERALCO decided to subscribe to the MAXICARE Plan.Case # 18 Phil. RULING: Yes. an admission of the statements contained therein. Roberto K. and in fact. if a party invokes an “admission” by an adverse party. and Sales/Marketing Manager Josephine Cabrera were impleaded as defendants-appellants. For instance. Section 34. ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada is entitled to the commission despite her admission that the negotiation between her and MERALCO failed. the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. or that his admission was taken out of context. Macasaet. On September 15. Estrada alleged that it did apply with Maxicare for the MERALCO account and other accounts. 1990. Health Care Providers (Maxicare) vs Carmela Estrada/Cara Health Care Providers FACTS: Maxicare is a domestic corporation engaged in selling health insurance plans whose Chairman Dr. Undeniably. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires the purpose for which the evidence is offered to be specified. 1991. is not. the letter. and offered in evidence. its franchise to solicit corporate accounts. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. Moreover. We intoned therein that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading. the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake.

Magdalo was there appointed as chief chemist who prepared the sauces secretly inside his lab." when employed in connection with a license under a patent. Secondly. not with the formula for Mafran sauce." The last part of paragraph 3 of the complaint and paragraph 3 of the answer are reproduced below for ready reference: 3. the plaintiff in return assigned to said corporation his interest and rights over the said trademark and formula so that the defendant corporation could use the formula in the preparation and manufacture of the mafran sauce.. "the property rights and interests over said trademark and formula shall automatically revert to the respondent patentee." and that in case of his "death or other disabilities. There had been many requests from Tirso for Magdalo to share his secret recipe but the latter denies his request every time. should dissolution of the Petitioner corporation eventually take place.. — . on the corporation becoming insolvent. This incontrovertible fact is admitted without equivocation in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's answer. permanent in character.. Sr. the respondent patentee assigned. Fifthly. Fourthly. FACTS: This case is about the right to use the secret formula of Magdalo Francisco. it is provided in paragraph 5-(a) of the Bill that the respondent patentee was to be appointed "chief chemist . Magdalo wishes to have the Bill of Assignment rescinded. The RTC ruled in favor of UFC and Tirso. UFC filed a petition for certiorari with SC. Thirdly. — Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint. hence. means the compensation paid for the use of a patented invention." then his "heirs or assigns who may have necessary qualifications shall be preferred to succeed" him as such chief chemist. etc. in order to preserve the secrecy of the Mafran formula and to prevent its unauthorized proliferation. because there could be no reversion of the trademark and formula in this case. Sr. in making his Mafran sauce (Banana-based sauce). but only its use. ceded and transferred the trademark and formula — and not merely the right to use it — for then such assignment passes the property in such patent right to the petitioner corporation to which it is ceded. the case. pursuant to the last paragraph of the Bill. All these provisions of the Bill of Assignment clearly show that the intention of the respondent patentee at the time of its execution was to part.Case # 19 Francisco Universal Food Corporation vs CA. Magdalo invented the sauce in 1938 but had no capital to mass produce it so he sought help from the rich Tirso Reyes. it does "not require proof and cannot be contradicted. Tirso soon fired Magdalo and contended that the Bill of Assignment transferred/ceded to the Corporation the secret formula. a perceptive analysis of the entire instrument and the language employed therein would lead one to the conclusion that what was actually ceded and transferred was only the use of the Mafran sauce formula. Francisco. This must be so. will become part of the property in the hands of the receiver thereof. It is further provided in paragraph 5-(d) that the same respondent shall have and shall exercise absolute control and supervision over the laboratory assistants and personnel and over the purchase and safekeeping of the chemicals and other mixtures used in the preparation of the said product. Firstly.. and the trade name for the marketing of said project. ISSUE: W/N the formula was deemed transferred based on the Bill of Assignment. Together they formed Universal Food Corp in an agreement embodied under a Bill of Assignment. The word "royalty. which.. the facts of the case compellingly demonstrate continued possession of the Mafran sauce formula by the respondent patentee. as contended by the petitioner. one of the principal considerations of the Bill of Assignment is the payment of "royalty of TWO (2%) PER CENTUM of the net annual profit" which the petitioner corporation may realize by and/or out of its production of Mafran sauce and other food products. 4 as we shall presently show. if. Magdalo V. and due to these privileges. as appearing in said contract 3. . This was the precise intention of the parties. Hence. it is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint that what was ceded and transferred by virtue of the Bill of Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the formula itself). to preserve the monopoly and to effectively prohibit anyone from availing of the invention. and Victoriano N. CA reversed the same for Magdalo. RULING: No.

The foregoing reasons support the conclusion of the CA that what was actually ceded and transferred by the respondent patentee Magdalo V." and is there a better example of least transmission of rights than allowing or permitting only the use. was only the use of the formula. our conclusion is fortified by the admonition of the Civil Code that a conveyance should be interpreted to effect "the least transmission of right. Sr. .Finally. The Bill of Assignment vested in the petitioner corporation no title to the formula. of the formula for Mafran sauce. Francisco. without transfer of ownership.

The southern boundary of the lot in question is a barrio road with approximate area of 10 meters wide. or in the course of the trial or proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake. 1971. an elementary school. the land adjoining that which is sought to be redeemed is a piece of residential land on which the respondents live. 1975. this is deemed an admission by the respondents of the residential character of their own land thus disqualifying them from rightfully redeeming the property in question. et al FACTS: Hugo Mararac sold the land in question to Leonardo Mararac and Monica Resuello on March 27. The description was merely copied from the deed of sale between the property’s original owners and the petitioners when the self-same document was presented by the respondents as their own evidence. the circumstances under which legal redemption may be exercised not having been found present in the case at bar. who was the husband of plaintiff Carlina Rafanan who died in 1976. As correctly held by the lower court: “… the ordinary Philippine residence is traditionally profuse . a chapel. 1975. the same do not. and payments of attorney's fees and are able and willing to make the payment. marked as Exhibit B. At the time of sale of the land in question to the defendants in 1975 there was no offer to exercise right of legal redemption. by brook. trail. Evidence consisting of photographs of the petitioners’ land show a one-storey nipa and bamboo house. the neighboring and surrounding properties give a clear picture of a residential area. by their mere presence make the lot agricultural. the lot now owned by plaintiffs was owned by plaintiff Angel Mararac and Juanito Mararac. House of plaintiffs is along the said road. The character of the locality.Case # 20 Spouses Fabia vs IAC. 1971. Evidence militates against the respondents’ contention that the above description does not bind them. Angel Mararac. Again. the streets. Juanito Mararac. As provided under Section 2. Plaintiffs reside on a lot east of the land in question and adjacent to it. the lot in eastern side of the land in question was owned by Angel Mararac and his brother. ISSUE: Whether or not the land in question maybe considered rural for purposes of legal redemption. Defendants own rural lands other than the land in question. On April 8. of the petitioner’s Declaration of Property for Tax Purposes which contains the assessor’s official finding and classification that the land covered by the declaration is residential. No such palpable mistake has been shown. the respondents have no right to enforce against the petitioners. road or other servitude for the bene-fit of others. yet. Trees and plants abound on the petitioner’s property. with residential houses line the streets. Leonardo Mararac and Monica Resuello sold to the defendants the land in question on February 25. The land in question is fenced and was fenced even before the first sale in March 27. The stipulation of facts of the parties recites: "1. The land in question in relation to plaintiffs' lot is not separated by ravine. Thus. and a public artesian well. Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings. there was no offer of legal redemption. At that time. At that time. Plaintiffs offered to redeem the land in the amount paid by the defendants as well as an amount for the return of investment of the property and interest. defendants declared the land for tax purposes. RULING: Undeniably. to Basing along the road touching the southern boundary of the land in question are lines of houses on both sides. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. including the disputed property. From Barangay Balogo. Lots. A portion of the land in question on the side farther from the road. is used as a fishwell. There are concrete and semi-concrete houses. At the time of the sale of the land in question to Leonardo Mararac and Monica Resuello in 1971. There was no legal redemption offered during the period between the first and second sale.

.” In fact. 50 O.G. Lara. The stipulation of facts is deemed an admission by the respondents of the residential character of their own land thus disqualifying them from rightfully redeeming the property in question. 5778). Truly a residential home lot is not converted into agricultural land by the simple reservation of a plot for the cultivation of garden crops or the planting of bananas and some fruit trees. cannot be considered as rural for purposes of legal redemption under the law. subject matter of the petition. The land. being primarily residential. and ecological balance. the lots neighboring the land in question are likewise planted with trees and plants and some even have fishwells. esthetic appreciation.with trees and plants for home sufficiency. We have to apply the rule of reason based on the specific facts of each case. Nor can an orchard or agricultural land be considered residential simply because a portion thereof has been criss-crossed with asphalt and cement roads with buildings here and there (Republic of the Philippines v.