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Case No.

1
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES EDGARDO M. CRISTOBAL and MA. TERESITA S. CRISTOBAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175768, December 11, 2013
Facts: Sps. Cristobal obtained a loan from Metrobank, secured buy 2 real estate mortgages. Loan became
due and despite demands, Sps Cristobal failed to settle their obligation. This prompted Metrobank to
extrajudicially foreclose the subject properties. Auction was held and Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Certificate of Sale was issued in its name and such certificate was duly registered in the RD of
Bulacan. However, Sps. Cristobal refused to vacate the properties, thus a petition for writ of possession was
filed by the petitioner.
RTC: Denied the Writ of Possession on the grounds that failure of Metrobank to post bond because the 12month redemption period has not yet expired. Petitioner did not offer any evidence from where the Court
could base the bond required under Section 7 of Act 3135. MR was filed, but was denied on the ground that
the 12-month redemption period has expired, thus, the court has no reason to reconsider the case.
CA: filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but was denied on the ground that though the 12-Month
redemption period has been expired, it is required to consolidate the property foreclosed to the name of the
buyer before the issuance of writ of possession. Instead of filling before CA, the petitioner should re-file the
writ of possession before the RTC.
Issue: WON petitioner has consolidated ownership in its name is a question of fact or law?
Held: Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there
is doubt as to what the law is. On a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of
whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising
the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Here, no question of law is involved, for it is clear that petitioner has the right to possession once it has
established that ownership has been consolidated in its name. Consolidation is essentially factual in nature,
as it requires the presentation of evidence

Case No. 2
FELIX VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
OF APPEALS and ALMARIO GO MANUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 127997, August 7, 1998
Facts: Private respondent, Manuel, filed an action collection of sum of money against Villanueva and his
wife. The action involved a check, in the amount of P167K issued by Villanueva in favor of private respondent
that supposedly represent the payment previously obtained by the Villanueva from Manuel. The check was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and Manuel demanded Villanueva but failed to fund the account.
Manuel filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 before Cebu Prosecutors Office. Petitioner, on the other hand,
avers that his principal obligation only amounts to P23,420.00.
RTC: ruled in favour of Manuel, thus requiring the Villanueva to pay the amount of P164K.
CA: Villaneva appealed to reverse RTC on the ground that the principal obligation is only P23,420.00, while
private respondent sought interest of 10% of the principal obligation; 25% as attorneys fees, as well as moral
and exemplary damages, which was denied.
Petitioners filed a petition before SC on the same grounds raised before CA, to wit: (a) CA erred in not ruling
that the 5% and 10% interest imposed is not enforceable due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) CA
erred in not finding that petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the CA erred in not
declaring that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power or authority to repeal the usury law.
Issue: WON the questions raised is of fact or law and cognizable before the SC for review?
Held: The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to the review and revision of
errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As
such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The petitioner failed to raise issues which would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the
findings of the trial and appellate courts.

Case No. 3
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 156284, February 6, 2007
Facts: Augusto Gomez instituted two cases involving different parcels of land and property belonging to
Consuelo Gomez. Consuelo, Ariston Sr. and Angel Gomez were sister and brothers, respectively. Maria-Rita
Gomez-Samson, Jesus Gomez and Ariston Gomez, Jr. are the children of Ariston, Sr. while Augusto Gomez
is the child of Angel. In the first of the two cases, Augusto alleged that certain parcels of land owned by
Consuelo were transferred fraudulently by donations intervivos in favor of Rita and Jesus and Augusto wanted
the subject Deed of Donation Intervivos declared false and null and void and be replaced by titles in the name
of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo. In the other case, Augusto alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was
also the sole and absolute owner of certain personal properties such as shares of stock in different
corporations, jewellery, collectors items, cars and P200,000 in cash and that a fraudulent Deed of Donation
Intervivos was executed by Consuelo in favor of the Aristons. Augusto also wanted to have such deed
cancelled. Both complaints were consolidated and were dismissed by the trial court and was also affirmed by
the CA
Issue: WON the payment of the Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo proves the alleged intercalation of
the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo?
Held: It is well to note that the factum probandum petitioner is trying to establish here is still the alleged
intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo. The
factum probans this time around is the alleged payment of the Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove
in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donors Tax after the death of
Consuelo does not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of
paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum. Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself
physically and personally delivered the check to the BIR. He instead testified that the check was prepared
and issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally delivered the
same to the BIR. On the query, however, as to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or after the death
of Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner merely formulated conjectures based on the
evidence he presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of
the RTRs or what he meant with the words "on even date" in his certification. Neither did petitioner present
any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated, thus, letting the
presumption that a public official had regularly performed his duties stand. This is in contrast to respondents
direct evidence attesting to the payment of said tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to
respondents evidence, petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by
evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.

Case #4
FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS.), INC., LUIS R. TABUENA, JR. and RAMON A. TABUENA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
G.R. No. 94093, August 10, 1993
Facts: Petitioner Far East Marble received from private respondent (the former Commercial Trust Bank
Company which was absorbed by BPI) the following, viz: a) several loans evidenced by promissory notes;
and b)the former was extended by the latter credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts. Petitioner Tabuenas
(Ramon and Luis) executed in favor of BPI a continuing guaranty whereby they bound themselves, jointly
and severally, to answer for the loan obligations of Far East to the bank. Far East failed to pay its obligations
(both the promissory note and the trust receipts) and Ramon and Luis Tabuenas also did not comply with
their solidary liability under the continuing guaranty. As a result, in 1987, private respondent BPI filed a
complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against petitioners. Far East filed a compulsory
counterclaim where it admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes but alleged further
that it has already prescribed, so it raised the defense of prescription and lack of cause of action; it also
denied that BPI made prior demands for payment. BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative
defenses, alleging that its cause of action against Far East have not prescribed, since within 10 year from
the time its cause of action accued, various written extrajudicial demands were made by BPI to Far East.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint based on prescription and lack of cause of action. Apart from the fact that the
complaint failed to allege that the period of prescription was interrupted, the phrase repeated requests and
demands for payment is vague and incomplete so as to establish in the minds of defendant, or to enable the
court to draw a conclusion, that demands or acknowledgments of debt were made that could have interrupted
the period of prescription.
CA: Reversed the RTC and remanded the case for further proceedings
Issue: WON BPI has no sufficient cause of action because the phrase repeated requests and demands for
payment is not sufficient to state a cause of action?
Held: Sec 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of Rule 8 declares that every
pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise
and direct statement of the ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts"
are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant (Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., et
al., 204 SCRA 428 [1991]), while "evidentiary facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate
facts.
Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 732 [1991]); Rebollido vs. Court of Appeals et al., 170
SCRA 800 [1989]). These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint, particularly when it was therein alleged
that: (1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and extended
credit facilities in the form of trust receipts to Far East (photocopies of said notes and receipts were duly
attached to the Complaint); (2) said promissory notes and trust receipts had matured; and (3) despite repeated
requests and demands for payment thereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay.
Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for payment, Far
East has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. Besides, prescription is not a cause of
action; it is a defense which, having been raised, should, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals (DBP vs.
Ozarraga, 15 SCRA 48 [1965]), be supported by competent evidence. But even as Far East raised the
defense of prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive period was interrupted and renewed
by written extrajudicial demands for payment and acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.

Case # 5
Salita v. Magtolis
FACTS: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently,
Erwin filed a petition for annulment on the ground of Joselitas psychological incapacity. Dissatisfied with the
allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in
his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand
and accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine
upon petitioners time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of
Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not an averment of ultimate
facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ."
The RTC upheld the sufficiency of the BOP. Hence, Joselita filed a petition for certiorari against the order of
RTC Judge Magtolis.
ISSUE: W/N the allegations in the BOP are the ultimate facts needed to adequately and intelligently allow
Joselita to prepare her answer to the petition.
RULING: Yes. Ultimate facts have been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will support."
As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are to be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence
on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts." And
a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already
states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form
part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means.

Case # 6
Balitaan v. CFI Batangas
FACTS: Balitaan filed an information for estafa against her employee alleging that the latter did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the sum of P127.58 to her
(accused) own use and benefit.
During the presentation of Balitaan as the first witness for the prosecution, a cash voucher allegedly received
by the accused, where 3 checks are indicated, was presented, identified and marked as exhibit. The 3 checks
have the ff amounts: P500, P500 and P632.97. During Balitaans testimony, counsel for the accused objected
averring that the presented evidence is immaterial. The defense counsel argued that the information only
states that the sum of P127.58 was received by the accused, so that the presented evidence, the checks
having received in so much amount are immaterial and irrelevant.
The prosecution maintained that there was already a testimony of their witness that there is certain amount
received and that portion (P127.58) thereof was not delivered to the offended party; that what they are proving
are preliminary evidence going directly to the present issue of P127.58; and that the exhibit and evidence is
germane as they want to show that there is misappropriation of the amount from the total amount of
P1,632.97.
The defense further argued that the information alleges that the accused received the sum of P127.58; that
the information does not cite that this amount was only a part of the cash received, thus, the presented
evidence will be immaterial. However, the court overruled the objection. At the close of the direct examination
of Balitaan, counsel for the accused moved to strike out the foregoing testimonies but respondent court also
denied the motion.
Petition for certiorari was filed by the defense before the CFI of Batangas seeking to annul the orders of lower
court overruling the objections and denying the motion to strike out the testimony. CFI granted the petition
ordering the testimonies to be stricken out from the record. Hence, this petition against the CFI.
ISSUE: W/N matters of evidence must be included in the information.
RULING: As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of
the offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on the face of an information for
forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.
Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. All that is required is that the charge
be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged
to have committed and will enable him intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found guilty to plead her
conviction, in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Applying these principles, the Court ruled that the existence of the three checks need not be alleged in the
Information. This is an evidentiary matter which is not required to be alleged therein.

Case # 7
Paranaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v CA
FACTS: Lee Ching Bing assigned all his rights and interest in a leased property to Paraaque Kings
Enterprises, Inc. (PKEI) by virtue of a deed of assignment and with the conformity of the Lessor-ownerdefendant Santos. The Contract of Lease gives the lessee the right of first refusal.
The property being leased was sold to a third party, not the PKEI, for 5M. PKEI sent a letter to Santos
requesting her to rectify the error and consequently realizing her error, Santos had it reconveyed to her and
offered it to PKEI for 15M. PKEI refused to buy it for 15M and counter-offered to buy the property for 5M.
Santos did not reply to the counter-offer and eventually sold it to her first buyer for 9M.
These facts were alleged in the complaint of PKEI. Santos moved to dismiss the complaint stating that it
states no cause of action since it is clear that Santos already made the offer to PKEI but the latter rejected.
RTC and CA granted the motion and dismissed the complaint stating that the complaint created a cause of
action but neutralized itself by its subsequent averments which erased or extinguished its earlier allegations
of an impending wrong. It was further state that there was an absent of any actionable wrong in the very face
of the Complaint itself. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N a complaint has to establish facts proving the existence (factum probandum) of a cause of action.
2. W/N the factual allegations (factum probans) in the complaint, which were hypothetically admitted by the
adverse party, constitute bases for deciding a case on the merits.
RULING:
1. No. A cause of action already exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
In determining whether allegations (factum probans, as hypothetically admitted by the defendant) of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not
have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action (factum probandum) at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.
2. No. Although a careful examination of the complaint reveals that it sufficiently alleges an actionable
contractual breach (factum probans) on the part of private respondents, whether there was actual breach
(factum probandum) which entitled petitioner to damages and/or other just or equitable relief, is a question
which can better be resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses.
Having come to the conclusion that the complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of the right of first
refusal and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, private respondents, however, cannot be
denied their day in court.
While, in the resolution of a motion to dismiss, the truth of the facts alleged (factum probans) in the complaint
are theoretically admitted, such admission is merely hypothetical and only for the purpose of resolving the
motion. In case of denial, the movant is not to be deprived of the right to submit its own case and to submit
evidence to rebut the allegations in the complaint.
NOTE: Emphases here are supplied by me including the words factum probans and factum probandum
words in the parentheses. There were no clear mentions of such words in the case. I just sought to relate the
case with the topic under which it was assigned; hence, I came up with this content of the digest. IT IS
ADVISABLE THAT YOU READ THE WHOLE CASE (its just short anyway) AS I MIGHT HAVE
INTERPRETED IT INCORRECTLY. Please share to us if you have a different interpretation should you
decide to read it in its entirety.

Case # 8
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: A complaint was filed by the PCGG, represented by the Republic, against Tantoco Jr. and Santiago
before the Sandiganbayan. In response, the defendants filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for Bill of
Particulars but it was denied. The case was set for Pre-Trial.
Before the scheduled Pre-trial, a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff as well as a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents were filed by the defendants.
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents. In opposition thereto, PCGG filed an MR alleging, among others, that (1) the interrogatories "are
frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact which defendants sought to (extract) through their aborted
Motion for Bill of Particulars;" and that (2) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is
prematurely filed and irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its
evidence."
The MR was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N evidentiary matters maybe inquired into by the parties prior to trial.
RULING: Yes. It is settled that the office of a bill of particulars is limited to making more particular or definite
the ultimate facts in a pleading. It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception
is that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof
is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings. However, the truth is that "evidentiary matters"
may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. The Rules of Court make this possible through
the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the
interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are
relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The
objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial
as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.
The deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the timehonored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponent's case.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and
without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules, limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown
that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the person subject to the inquiry. And . . . further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege."
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.
In this case, some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of
several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the
plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end
that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be
produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their
disclosure may not be opposed.

Case # 9
FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San
Pablo City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the
Board Directors of private respondent. An action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against
the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served them with written interrogatories
pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination notifying the latter that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with
Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement
Opposition to Plaintiffs Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a) petitioner has
previously availed of one mode of discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification
advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and
oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent has no intention of leaving the country, e)the
intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits.
Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A.
Teope appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written
interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court. The petitioner filed an
original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication on the merits.
CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a
deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in Sections 16 and
18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is
not absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories;
b)deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the deposition would deprive the trial
court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory question.
With the denial of the petitioners MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal and not
certiorari is the proper remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts
which are not obtaining in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had already obtained a deposition, which it
had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as evidence, which was not done because there was nothing
yet to offer, and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen because there was nothing to reject
as nothing was offered.
2. Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be not taken in
the absence of good cause therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot be
considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law, which reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the
proposed deponent had earlier responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the proposed deponent had
signified his availability to testify in court; and (c) that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of
the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital witness.

RULING:
The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute immensely to the
attainment of the judiciarys primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. The deposition-discovery

procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue formulation and face revelation theretofore performes primarily by the
pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a device, along with the
pre trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is to enable the parties
consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end , the field of inquiry that
may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as
witness to testify orally at trial.
I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon
motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause
shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition shall
not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this
grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that
the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or
oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its
purpose may be attained.
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made
prior to trial. 11 This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are
interlocutory and not appealable, 12 considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any
independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be
reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an
interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material
injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where
there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. It is our considered opinion that on the bases of
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, and which will hereinafter be discussed, certiorari may be
availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. SC ruled that certiorari may be availed of to
review the questioned order of the trial court.

II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious,
Rule 29 imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of
discovery, such as dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default
against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the
amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters
inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the
disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings or parts
thereof; or staying further proceedings. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and
for good cause shown that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good
cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. The requirement, however, that
good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some
plainly adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished
from conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. What
constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is sought.
The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the
taking of the deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine,"
nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the examination, nor that all
the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing. In the present case, private respondent

failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the
deposition shall not be taken.
1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories, the courts
took a relatively liberal view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which this question was
raised, Judge Hilbert said that:
"Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate, the court unquestionably has,
and in a proper case should exercise, discretion to permit an oral examination. But it should be made to
clearly appear that the relevant subject matter will not involve the interrogation of the witness with respect to
those particulars upon which he was examined by interrogatories." It is quite clear, therefore, and we so
hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will
not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a
ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable
to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence.
2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the
court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of
the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason
cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost
freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. Regardless of the
development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation, our legal system is now thoroughly committed to the
notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses whose demeanor
and manner are subject to the observation of the judge is superior to the use of written statements of the
same witnesses. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use of depositions
as evidence. And since their use as evidence was originally conceived as the sole function of depositions
proper, the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the limitations on their use. But under the concept
adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery with use
on trial not necessarily contemplated and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations
other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is
subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.
3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court
could not observe the behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the
interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition
could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. Finally, in the
absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed
deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the
following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to
be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d)
that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.
4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress
the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the
following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to
be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d)
that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. Inconvenience to the party whose deposition
is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. No doubt, private respondent and its
representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced as are all parties when required to submit
to examination but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process.

On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse
of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court
erred in affirming the same.

Case # 10
People vs Abelardo Parungao
FACTS: Parungao was a prisoner at the Pampanga Provincial Jail in San Fernando, Pampanga. He was
being held as a conspirator and a mastermind in the escape of his inmates in a jailbreak. The jailbreak
happened at night when the guards were all asleep and suddenly 15 prisoners escaped and even killed two
(2) guards and injured one (1). The escapees took away guns and ammunition; and so they were charged
with robbery with homicide. The other inmates who were able to escape the prison but were eventually caught
all testified that Parungao was the mastermind of the plan. During the escape, Parungao did not actually exit
his jail cell nor participate in the homicide. The other inmates also testified that they heard Parungao inciting
the killings while he was in his cell. He was convicted in the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the other inmates were admissible or may be given weight in
convicting Parungao.
RULING: No. Plainly the foregoing testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana that accused-appellant was the
mastermind of the jail break is not sufficient to prove such fact, such evidence being merely hearsay because
said witnesses testified and conveyed to the court matters not of their own personal knowledge but matters
only narrated to them by other detainees. There is nothing in their testimony pointing to accused-appellant as
the very source of their information that he planned the jailbreak. However, it must be noted that neither
accused-appellant nor his counsel objected to the admission of the testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana.
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lock of objection to hearsay
testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such
declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not can not be given credence for it has no
probative value.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the
same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value
To give weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana, and to make the same the basis for
finding accused-appellant a co-conspirator and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment, gravely violates
the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to meet the witnesses face-to-face and
to subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test
their truthfulness, memory, and intelligence. In case of conflict between a provision of the Constitution giving
the accused a substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to
the Constitution
The trial court gravely erred in accepting, and worse still, in giving weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito,
Pilapil, and Aldana, that accused appellant masterminded the jailbreak, and was a co-conspirator. Too, it
defies logic to say that accused-appellant is the mastermind of the jailbreak, giving written instructions even,
but in the same breath say that he did not in fact join the jailbreak and sat meekly inside his detention cell.
Furthermore, we cannot agree with the trial court that accused-appellant is guilty as principal by inducement
simply because as testified by Jail Guard Pacheco, he shouted out words of encouragement to Briones. The
jailbreakers had already killed the guards and needed no prodding or instigation from anybody to kill. It
appears, therefore, that the alleged proddings and urgings were no longer necessary to induce the assailants
to commit the crime.
The record is bereft of any evidence indicating a prior plan or agreement between accused-appellant and
the other inmates in the implementation of a common design to bolt jail, kill the guards, and rob the prison
armory. There is no evidence that accused-appellant participated in the killing of the two guards, Basa and
Valencia, nor in inflicting injuries on Aldana. In fact, accused-appellant before, during, and after the incident
never left his cell.
In the light of the established circumstances, the Court is not convinced that there is enough evidence to
prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of a doubt. The paucity of such evidence only

strengthens the suspicion that the prosecution witnesses fabricated their testimony against accusedappellant because of his having reported their drug trafficking activities in the provincial jail.

Case # 11 & 23
PRATS AND COMPANY VS. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY
FACTS:
Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership instituted an action in the RTC of the City of Manila for recovery from
the Phoenix Insurance Co. the sum of P117,800.60 with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been
sustained by the plaintiff from a fire for said loss was covered by insurance issued by the defendant
company. Phoenix Insurance admitted the insurance of the insurance but by way of special defense,
alleged that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and the plaintiff had
submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss in contravention of the express terms of the
policy. The trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by
the policy but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11, 731.93 with interest from the
filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant,
of remnants of the insured stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or connived therein and submitted fraudulent
proof as the trial judge found.
RULING: YES. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were used
by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents
of the bodega before the fire. It appears that cases of old stock were shipped to Manila before the fire but
instead of being taken directly to the bodega they were housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor
where the petitioner had office. Also, the manipulation of one of their people to attend to the alarm box not
to allow others to touch it and reasoned out that he already have done it, when in fact the fire chief noticed
that it was never touched and he himself turned on the alarm. The finding of the trial court in the effect that
plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of his claim is also well founded. First, the plaintiff had
submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P 12,800 when the true value of the said jewelry
was about P 600; and secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the
value of the goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. As a
conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connive therein, but also that it submitted
fraudulent proof

Case # 12 & 24
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TIBURCIO ABALOS
FACTS:
In the evening of March 20, 1983, while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police Major Cecilio
Abalos, were having a heated argument, a woman shouted Police officer, help us! Somebodys making
trouble here. The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then appeared at the scene and asked Major Abalos, What is it,
sir? The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his
carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches
wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously
swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of
his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he
sustained from that blow. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of direct assault with murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial erred in finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of direct assault
with murder.
RULING:
In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces
of incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor
visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had called for help at the height of
the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the events. Appellant also assails as inherently
incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he
knew to the authorities. All these, unfortunately, are flawed arguments.
From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and
positive testimony of Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is
bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in
testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of
a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. There was thus no need, as
appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since
her testimony would only be corroborative in nature.
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling
reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. Besides, it
is up to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own
assessment of the necessity for such testimony. Also, no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to
Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow of the
victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband's slaying.
He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility, particularly the
fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution should
have presented as well the woman who had called for help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate
Basal's narration of the events.
From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and
positive testimony of Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is
bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in
testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of
a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. There was thus no need, as

appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since
her testimony would only be corroborative in nature.
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling
reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. Besides, it
is up to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own
assessment of the necessity for such testimony. Also, no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to
Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow of the
victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband's slaying
Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm is
rather preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would
assault a police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident
was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim's assailant but
likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent death.
Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a longtime resident of that municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road
and which, by appellant's own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from them. Notwithstanding the
fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp and the
nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the combatants.
Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his
testimony which is detailed on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight.
While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's identification of him supposedly because of inadequate
lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father's assailant wearing a fatigue
uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching
the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. What
these facts establish is that the lights in the area at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an
excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's pretense. Appellant's testimony is thus negated by the
rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a credible witness, but that the same
must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.
Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true
that he had merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the
NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father
right then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was the Station Commander of the
Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee from
the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was in the company of his own father who, aside
from his position, was then armed with a carbine. Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and should
be considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in law.

Case # 13
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ROLANDO PRECIOSO, G.R. No. 95890 May 12, 1993
FACTS:
The accused's were charged of robbery in band with multiple rape before the RTC Bayugan, Agusan del Sur.
While sleeping at the Galvadores' store, the victims were awakened by four armed men who were covered
with handkerchiefs and stockings and only their eyes and mouths were visible. Despite this, victim Leah
recognized accused Rolando Precioso, a neighbor, through his voice and general physical appearance. They
escorted Leah to the Spouses Galvadores' house on the pretext that her niece is suffering from stomach
ache. Rafael Galvadores called out to Teresita Pescador, a househelp, to open the door. Teresita recognized
accused Precioso, one of their neighbors who frequented the store, through his physical appearance, his
clothes and his voice. The men ransacked the house looking for valuables, then, Rafael and Leah were
brought to the store by Precioso, and he then raped Leah in the presence of Rafael and others. He removed
the cover of his face to kiss Leah, allowing Leah and Rafael to recognize him. Accused Monforte raped
Teresita at the garage, she scratched his face, as a result of which his mask fell off, allowing her to see his
face. Leah was raped by Monforte too twice and she was able to see his face since the handkerchief over his
face was removed. The accused were convicted through the positive identification of Teresita and Leah. On
appeal, the accused questions the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies.
ISSUE:
1. WON the witnesses and their testimonies are credible
2. WON the defense of alibi can be appreciated
HELD:
1. Trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimony is accorded great respect on
appeal, and the records do not show that the court below disregarded any consideration which would
warrant a departure from this jurisprudential dictum. Appellate courts will generally not disturb the
factual findings of the trial court in the raison d'etre that the latter is in a better position to weigh
conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying, subject to exceptions which do not obtain in the present case.
The absence of evidence of any improper motive impelling the principal witness sustains the
conclusion that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. Furthermore, considering the inbred
modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to airing in public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive
that the complainant would assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not
true. Complainants, both young barrio girls, would not have publicly admitted that they had been
criminally ravished if that was not true, for their natural instinct is to protect their honor. Their testimony
given at a public trial wherein they narrated their ordeal with all the sordid details thereof, as
synthesized in appellee's brief and set forth earlier, could not have been conjured and fabricated by
these hapless and innocent victims.

2. The defense of alibi interposed by appellants is evidentially sterile and jurisprudentially weak as they
were not able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Precioso claimed that when the
crime was committed, he was sleeping in the house of his grandmother, but said house is admittedly
only around 150 meters away from the house of the Galvadores spouses. Monforte, on the other
hand, would like to convince the trial court that he was working at the time. We have consistently
ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.

*The crime charged in the case at bar cannot be correctly categorized or denominated as robbery in band
with multiple rape as there is no such composite crime. The offense in the case at bar is the special complex
crime of robbery with rape. Cuadrilla, in this instance, is merely a generic aggravating circumstance.

Case # 14
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO, G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003
FACTS:
Accused was charged with Rape before RTC of Quezon City. On November 20, 1995, Cyra May, then only
3 1/2 years old, told Gloria, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko".
Kuya Ronnie is the Buenafes house boy, who was sometimes left with Cyra May at home. Gloria asked Cyra
May how many times he did those things to her, to which she answered many times. Cyra May indicated the
room where accused slept and pointed at his pillow. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things to Col.
Buanafe,Cyra's father, and Gloria but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier.
The spouses brought accused to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him. The MedicoLegal Officer's examination shows that the victim is still a virgin but there are abrasions on the labia
minora which could have been caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis. Accused denied
having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia, and claimed that he used to be ordered
to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating and that she was coached. The two elements of
statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below
twelve years of age. The first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The issue now is the second element. The prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth
or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only
three years old at the time of the rape.
ISSUE:
WON the court can take judicial notice of victim's age.
HELD:
Courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in determining her age. On the other hand, a
handful of cases holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, cannot take judicial notice of the victims age.
The court held that the process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance
cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it
would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in
the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts. It is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. When the trier of facts observes
the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he
is conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a
process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the
presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A persons
appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of
the court.
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under the age of consent to
intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly observe the person brought
before it. Experience teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer,
particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted
and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular, theoutward physical appearance of an
alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be
pedantically over-cautious. Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge
the age of persons in court by observation of such persons.] The formal offer of the person as evidence is not
necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him
before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused.
Pruna case laid down guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between
the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the
victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives testimony.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved
(below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her
appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the
victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.

Case # 15
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, Inc. (ETI) vs. CA and KOREAN AIRLINES (KAL), G.R. No. 152392. May 26,
2005
FACTS:
Korean Airlines, a resident foreign corporation, through Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent and legal counsel,
filed a Complaint against ETI with the RTC Manila, for a collection of sum of money. ETI filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping. Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a
resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting. KAL submitted on an Affidavit,
executed by its general manager, alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference,
which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of
directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping
and to file the complaint. The KAL manager also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy
of the aforesaid resolution. Trial court denied the motion to dismsis of ETI and gave credence to the claims
of KAL and Atty. Aguinaldo. ETI filed a MR of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to
take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the MR. ETI
then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the court can take judicial notice of teleconference
HELD:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made
by individuals through teleconferencing.Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more
people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring
people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group
communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing television-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication
through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with
optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private
corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with
related to such conferencesThus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a
teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate
governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with
the respondents Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had
been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing
Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent
failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on
December 1, 1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its
behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in
the Philippines. Even the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to its pleading
merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the respondents Manila Regional Office.

The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during the
hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which
to submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion. The respondent, however, failed to
comply, and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its
main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its Order dated February 11, 2000. The respondent
again prayed for an extension within which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. It was on the
said date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter
alia, that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of
Directors supposedly approved the resolution.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999 and
approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that
no such allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999,
long before the complaint was filed, the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least
appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28, 2000 that the respondent
claimed, for the first time, that there was such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it
even represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege
later that no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged, for the first time,
that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.

Case # 16
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC.,
LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.
G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is
the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded
his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of
Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from
power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be
the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers and duties of the Presidency.
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits
that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news
reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs. News reports have
also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the
petitioner and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of
their superior.
ISSUE:
1. WON the court can take judicial notice that the petitioner resigned as President.
2. WON the court can take judicial notice of news reports
HELD: None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal
question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elementsare beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It
can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before
he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his
acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on
the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the
denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative
prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth,
our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they

can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which
they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking
slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and
the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy
of assailing it before the proper court.

Case # 18
Phil. Health Care Providers (Maxicare) vs Carmela Estrada/Cara Health Care Providers
FACTS:
Maxicare is a domestic corporation engaged in selling health insurance plans whose Chairman Dr. Roberto
K. Macasaet, Chief Operating Officer Virgilio del Valle, and Sales/Marketing Manager Josephine Cabrera
were impleaded as defendants-appellants. On September 15, 1990, Maxicare allegedly engaged the services
of Carmela Estrada who was doing business under the name of CARA HEALTH SERVICES to promote and
sell the prepaid group practice health care delivery program called MAXICARE Plan with the position of
Independent Account Executive.
Maxicare formally appointed Estrada as its General Agent, evidenced by a letter-agreement dated February
16, 1991. The letter agreement provided for plaintiff-appellees Estradas compensation in the form of
commission. Maxicare alleged that it followed a franchising system in dealing with its agents whereby an
agent had to first secure permission from Maxicare to list a prospective company as client. Estrada alleged
that it did apply with Maxicare for the MERALCO account and other accounts, and in fact, its franchise to
solicit corporate accounts, MERALCO account included, was renewed on February 11, 1991. Plaintiffappellee Estrada submitted proposals and made representations to the officers of MERALCO regarding the
MAXICARE Plan but when MERALCO decided to subscribe to the MAXICARE Plan, Maxicare directly
negotiated with MERALCO regarding the terms and conditions of the agreement and left plaintiff-appellee
Estrada out of the discussions on the terms and conditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada is entitled to the commission despite her admission that the negotiation
between her and MERALCO failed.

RULING: Yes. The statement in Annex F amounted to an admission, provides a contrary answer to
Maxicares ridiculous contention. We intoned therein that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a
partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was
in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission.
For instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites the admission out of context,
then the one making the admission may show that he made no such admission, or that his admission was
taken out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear. That is the
reason for the modifier such.
In this case, the letter, although part of Estradas Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an admission of the statements
contained therein, especially since the bone of contention relates to Estradas entitlement to commissions for
the sale of health plans she claims to have brokered. It is more than obvious from the entirety of the records
that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently declared that her involvement as broker is the proximate
cause which consummated the sale between Meralco and Maxicare.
Moreover, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires the purpose for which the evidence is offered
to be specified. Undeniably, the letter was attached to the Complaint, and offered in evidence, to demonstrate
Maxicares bad faith and ill will towards Estrada.

Case # 19
Francisco

Universal Food Corporation vs CA, Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. and Victoriano N.

FACTS: This case is about the right to use the secret formula of Magdalo Francisco, Sr., in making his Mafran
sauce (Banana-based sauce). Magdalo invented the sauce in 1938 but had no capital to mass produce it so
he sought help from the rich Tirso Reyes. Together they formed Universal Food Corp in an agreement
embodied under a Bill of Assignment. Magdalo was there appointed as chief chemist who prepared the
sauces secretly inside his lab. There had been many requests from Tirso for Magdalo to share his secret
recipe but the latter denies his request every time. Tirso soon fired Magdalo and contended that the Bill of
Assignment transferred/ceded to the Corporation the secret formula. Magdalo wishes to have the Bill of
Assignment rescinded.
The RTC ruled in favor of UFC and Tirso. CA reversed the same for Magdalo. UFC filed a petition for certiorari
with SC, hence, the case.
ISSUE: W/N the formula was deemed transferred based on the Bill of Assignment.
RULING: No. a perceptive analysis of the entire instrument and the language employed therein would lead
one to the conclusion that what was actually ceded and transferred was only the use of the Mafran sauce
formula. This was the precise intention of the parties, 4 as we shall presently show.
Firstly, one of the principal considerations of the Bill of Assignment is the payment of "royalty of
TWO (2%) PER CENTUM of the net annual profit" which the petitioner corporation may realize by and/or
out of its production of Mafran sauce and other food products, etc. The word "royalty," when employed in
connection with a license under a patent, means the compensation paid for the use of a patented invention.
Secondly, in order to preserve the secrecy of the Mafran formula and to prevent its unauthorized
proliferation, it is provided in paragraph 5-(a) of the Bill that the respondent patentee was to be appointed
"chief chemist ... permanent in character," and that in case of his "death or other disabilities," then his "heirs
or assigns who may have necessary qualifications shall be preferred to succeed" him as such chief
chemist. It is further provided in paragraph 5-(d) that the same respondent shall have and shall exercise
absolute control and supervision over the laboratory assistants and personnel and over the purchase
and safekeeping of the chemicals and other mixtures used in the preparation of the said product. All these
provisions of the Bill of Assignment clearly show that the intention of the respondent patentee at the
time of its execution was to part, not with the formula for Mafran sauce, but only its use, to preserve
the monopoly and to effectively prohibit anyone from availing of the invention.
Thirdly, pursuant to the last paragraph of the Bill, should dissolution of the Petitioner corporation eventually
take place, "the property rights and interests over said trademark and formula shall automatically revert to
the respondent patentee. This must be so, because there could be no reversion of the trademark and
formula in this case, if, as contended by the petitioner, the respondent patentee assigned, ceded and
transferred the trademark and formula and not merely the right to use it for then such assignment
passes the property in such patent right to the petitioner corporation to which it is ceded, which, on the
corporation becoming insolvent, will become part of the property in the hands of the receiver thereof.
Fourthly, it is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint that what was ceded and transferred by
virtue of the Bill of Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the formula itself). This incontrovertible
fact is admitted without equivocation in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's answer. Hence, it does "not
require proof and cannot be contradicted." The last part of paragraph 3 of the complaint and paragraph 3 of
the answer are reproduced below for ready reference:
3. ... and due to these privileges, the plaintiff in return assigned to said corporation his interest and
rights over the said trademark and formula so that the defendant corporation could use the formula in
the preparation and manufacture of the mafran sauce, and the trade name for the marketing of said
project, as appearing in said contract
3. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint.
Fifthly, the facts of the case compellingly demonstrate continued possession of the Mafran sauce
formula by the respondent patentee.

Finally, our conclusion is fortified by the admonition of the Civil Code that a conveyance should be
interpreted to effect "the least transmission of right," and is there a better example of least transmission
of rights than allowing or permitting only the use, without transfer of ownership, of the formula for Mafran
sauce.
The foregoing reasons support the conclusion of the CA that what was actually ceded and transferred by
the respondent patentee Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. was only the use of the formula. The Bill of Assignment
vested in the petitioner corporation no title to the formula.

Case # 20
Spouses Fabia vs IAC, Angel Mararac, et al
FACTS:

Hugo Mararac sold the land in question to Leonardo Mararac and Monica Resuello on March 27, 1971. At
that time, the lot now owned by plaintiffs was owned by plaintiff Angel Mararac and Juanito Mararac, who
was the husband of plaintiff Carlina Rafanan who died in 1976. Leonardo Mararac and Monica Resuello
sold to the defendants the land in question on February 25, 1975. At that time, the lot in eastern side of the
land in question was owned by Angel Mararac and his brother, Juanito Mararac. On April 8, 1975,
defendants declared the land for tax purposes.
At the time of sale of the land in question to the defendants in 1975 there was no offer to exercise right of
legal redemption. At the time of the sale of the land in question to Leonardo Mararac and Monica Resuello
in 1971, there was no offer of legal redemption. There was no legal redemption offered during the period
between the first and second sale. The southern boundary of the lot in question is a barrio road with
approximate area of 10 meters wide. The land in question in relation to plaintiffs' lot is not separated by
ravine, by brook, trail, road or other servitude for the bene-fit of others. The land in question is fenced and
was fenced even before the first sale in March 27, 1971. Defendants own rural lands other than the land in
question. From Barangay Balogo, to Basing along the road touching the southern boundary of the land in
question are lines of houses on both sides.
House of plaintiffs is along the said road. A portion of the land in question on the side farther from the road,
is used as a fishwell. Plaintiffs offered to redeem the land in the amount paid by the defendants as well as
an amount for the return of investment of the property and interest, and payments of attorney's fees and are
able and willing to make the payment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question maybe considered rural for purposes of legal redemption.
RULING:
Undeniably, the land adjoining that which is sought to be redeemed is a piece of residential land on which
the respondents live. The stipulation of facts of the parties recites:
"1. Plaintiffs reside on a lot east of the land in question and adjacent to it;
Again, this is deemed an admission by the respondents of the residential character of their own land thus
disqualifying them from rightfully redeeming the property in question.
Thus, the circumstances under which legal redemption may be exercised not having been found present in
the case at bar, the respondents have no right to enforce against the petitioners.
As provided under Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, Admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted
unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.
No such palpable mistake has been shown. Evidence militates against the respondents contention that the
above description does not bind them. The description was merely copied from the deed of sale between
the propertys original owners and the petitioners when the self-same document was presented by the
respondents as their own evidence, marked as Exhibit B, of the petitioners Declaration of Property for Tax
Purposes which contains the assessors official finding and classification that the land covered by the
declaration is residential.
The character of the locality, the streets, the neighboring and surrounding properties give a clear picture of
a residential area. Lots, including the disputed property, with residential houses line the streets. There are
concrete and semi-concrete houses, a chapel, an elementary school, and a public artesian well. Evidence
consisting of photographs of the petitioners land show a one-storey nipa and bamboo house. Trees and
plants abound on the petitioners property, yet, the same do not, by their mere presence make the lot
agricultural. As correctly held by the lower court: the ordinary Philippine residence is traditionally profuse

with trees and plants for home sufficiency, esthetic appreciation, and ecological balance. In fact, the lots
neighboring the land in question are likewise planted with trees and plants and some even have fishwells.
Truly a residential home lot is not converted into agricultural land by the simple reservation of a plot for the
cultivation of garden crops or the planting of bananas and some fruit trees. Nor can an orchard or
agricultural land be considered residential simply because a portion thereof has been criss-crossed with
asphalt and cement roads with buildings here and there (Republic of the Philippines v. Lara, 50 O.G. 5778).
We have to apply the rule of reason based on the specific facts of each case. The land, subject matter of
the petition, being primarily residential, cannot be considered as rural for purposes of legal redemption
under the law.
The stipulation of facts is deemed an admission by the respondents of the residential character of their own
land thus disqualifying them from rightfully redeeming the property in question.