Natural Resources and Environmental Law With Land, Titles and Deeds (Part 1)

Cases in Natural Resources and Environmental Law with
Land, Title and Deeds

Atty. Ilagan
Katherine Mae Anonuevo-Ongkeko

Natural Resources and Environmental Law with Land, Title and Deeds

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

#
TITLE
CTN
FACTS
ISSUE
DOCTRINE
RATIO
I. NATURE OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION OF COURTS
Concept Of The Regalian Doctrine
CRUZ VS. G.R. No. Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Do
the Regalian Doctrine; Natural Resources; Public Lands; No, the provisions of IPRA do
1
The Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia is a Western
SECRETAR
Y OF DENR
135385.
December
6, 2000.
PER
CURIAM
Europa filed a suit for prohibition and

mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners
assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.
provisions of
IPRA
contravene the
Constitution?
legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards

into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas. The capacity of the State to own or
acquire property is the states power of dominium. This
was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees
embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The
Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia is a Western legal
concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into
the country through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas.
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) grants the
indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) the ownership and possession of their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the
extent of these lands and domains, and the ownership
given is the indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled An Act to
Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples,
Creating a National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
It is simply known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 or the IPRA. The IPRA recognizes the
existence of the indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in
Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership
and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law which
traces its origin to native title.
The abrogation of the Filipinos ancestral rights in land
and the introduction of the concept of public domain
were the most immediate fundamental results of
Spanish colonial theory and law.All lands lost by the
old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as
well as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos,
were now declared to be crown lands or realengas,
belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the
realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.
The abrogation of the Filipinos ancestral rights in land
and the introduction of the concept of public domain
Anouevo-Ongkeko
not contravene the Constitution.

Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership
over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs
over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which
the resources are found, the right
to the small scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large
scale
development
and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not part of
the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native
title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the
right
of
ownership
and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and
does not include the right to
alienate the same.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
were the most immediate fundamental results of

Spanish colonial theory and law. The concept that the
Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in
the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and
the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to
land.
The State, by recognizing the right of tribal Filipinos to
their ancestral lands and domains, has effectively
upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their
own.The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6)
provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life. This Constitution goes
further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing
their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State
has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture
distinctly their own.
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples
economic and social systemthe concept of individual
land ownership under the civil law is alien to them.
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples'
economic and social system. The concept of individual
land ownership under the civil law is alien to them.
Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to
ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as
inferior, if not inexistent.
Ancestral Domains, Explained.Ancestral domains
are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim
of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously until
the present, except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private
individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains
comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies
of water, mineral and other natural resources. They
also include lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally
had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who
are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
the same conditions as ancestral domains except that

these are limited to lands and that these lands are not
merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by
the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional
group ownership. These lands include but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and
domains held by native title as never to have been
public landdomains and lands held under native title
are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands and are private.Native title refers
to ICCs/IPs preconquest rights to lands and domains
held under a claim of private ownership as far back as
memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have
been public lands and are indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue
of native title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned,
shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated. Like a Torrens title, a CADT is evidence of
private ownership of land by native title. Native title,
however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly
granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and
domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral
lands and domains held by native title as never to have
been public land. Domains and lands held under native
title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands andare private.
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is
not part of the public domain. But its private character
ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common
by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The
IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral
domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be
communally held. These communal rights, however, are
not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the
Civil Code. Co- ownership gives any co-owner the right
to demand partition of the property held in common.
The Civil Code expressly provides that [n]o co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. To
allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
destructive not only of customary law of the community
but of the very community itself.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
The IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept

of ownership, a concept that has long existed under
customary law.Following the constitutional mandate
that customary law govern property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains, the IPRA, by legislative flat, introduces a
new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has
long existed under customary law.
SECRETAR
Y OF DENR
VS. YAP
G.R. No.
173775.
October 8,
2008
REYES,
R.T., J.
On November 10, 1978, then President

Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
The
main
issue
is
whether
private
claimants have
a right to
secure
titles
over
their
occupied
portions
in
Boracay.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap,
Jr., and others filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants
alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on
their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that
they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared
their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. Respondentsclaimants posited that Proclamation
Anouevo-Ongkeko
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all

lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such
patrimony, a doctrine consistently adopted
under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions; Prior to Proclamation No.
1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had
never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of the grand divisions of
land. Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain The 1935 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the
1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions:
agricultural,
industrial
or
commercial,
residential,
resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided
by law, giving the government great leeway
for
classification.
Then
the
1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
petitions DENIED.
decision is reversed.
The
CA
Burden of Proof; In keeping with the

presumption of State ownership, there must
be a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land
The 1935 Constitution classified

lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber,
such classification modified by
the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Except for lands already covered

by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified
lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President
Marcos
categorized
all
unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a
public forest as a mass of lands
of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the
present system of classification
for the determination of which
lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not.
Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests.
PD No. 705, however, respects
titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond
the commerce of man. Since the Island
was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership.
Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles.
The Republic, through the OSG,
opposed the petition for declaratory
relief.
The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as
public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended. The OSG
maintained that respondents-claimants
reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced.
Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by Public Land Act
and Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of respondentsclaimants, declaring that, PD 1810
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration
but its motion was denied. The
Republic then appealed to the CA. On
In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in
toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG
sought reconsideration but it was
Anouevo-Ongkeko
for agricultural or other purposes; The

burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.A positive act declaring land
as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act
of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which
have been officially delimited and
classified. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive act
declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with
one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands
may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had
never been expressly and
administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions.
Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as
alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government,
such
as
a
presidential
proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a
certification
from
the
government that the land
claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable. The
burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the
person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such
proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was
similarly denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
That the occupants of Boracay have built

multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island, or that the island has already been
stripped of its forest cover, or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064
will destroy the islands tourism industry, do
not negate its character as public forest.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency

the petition in the trial court, President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island partly reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).
There is a big diffence between forest as

defined in a dictionary and forest or timber
land as a classification of lands of the
public domain as appearing in our
statutesone is descriptive of what appears
on the land while the other is a legal status,
a classification for legal purposesthe
classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.
On August 10, 2006, petitionersclaimants Sacay,and other landowners

in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They allege
that the Proclamation infringed on their
prior vested rights over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in
Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court
ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions
Anouevo-Ongkeko

disposable.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of
a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be
deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable
and disposable or forest, or both,
he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as
President
Arroyo
did
in
Proclamation No. 1064. This
was not done in Proclamation
No. 1801.
There is nothing in Proclamation No. 1801

or Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
Circular No. 3-82 which made Boracay
Island an agricultural landthe reference in
Circular No. 3-82 to private lands and
areas declared as alienable and
disposable does not by itself classify the
entire island as agricultural.Proclamation
No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not
convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law
or the Circular which made Boracay Island
an agricultural land. The reference in
Circular No. 3-82 to private lands and
areas declared as alienable and disposable
does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82
makes reference not only to private lands
and areas but also to public forested lands.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
Rule VIII, Section 3 provides: No trees in

forested private lands may be cut without
prior authority from the PTA. All forested
areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves.
Classification of public
exclusive prerogative of
Department, through the
Presidentcourts have no
so.
lands is the
the Executive
Office of the
authority to do
Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Where the

land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory
rights
Distinction Between Courts General And Limited Jurisdiction

JUNIO VS, No.
Wenceslao Junio is the registered Whether
3
DE
LOS
SANTOS
L-35744.
Septembe
r
28,
1984.
MELENC
IO-HERR
ERA, J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
owner of a parcel of land situated at

Bayambang, Pangasinan with an area
of 7.65 hectares covered by TCT No.
1004. An Affidavit of Adverse Claim
was executed by respondent Feliciano
de los Santos, claiming one third
undivided portion of Junios property
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
allegedly executed by Junio. Junio then
denies having sold any portion of his
property to De Los Santos, hence his
petition for the cancellation of said
adverse claim. Junio disputes the
appropriateness of the annotation
alleging that under section 110 of the
land registration act such inscription
may be resorted only when there is no
other means of registering an interest
or right, and that section 57 of the same
statute provides for the registration of a
documented sale involving a titled
property and that the register of deeds
acted negligently in registering the
document without the formal legal
or
not
respondents
acts
were
appropriate
Whether
or
not there was
a
perfected
contract
of
sale between
the parties
Sec. 111 of the Land Registration Act,

available only if controversial issues are not
involved.We find that contention again
bereft of merit as said Section 111 can be
availed of only if controversial issues are not
involved. In this case, the genuineness and
due execution of the sale between the parties
is in controversy.
Authority of Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) as a land registration
court to hear cases otherwise litigable only
in ordinary civil actions; Reason; Adverse
claim, cancellation of, allowed only after the
court acting either as a land registration
court or a court of general jurisdiction
adjudged it invalid.In fact, the lower
Court, instead of confining itself to the
propriety of the registration of the adverse
claim should already have decided the
controversy between the parties on the
merits thereof. Doctrinal jurisprudence holds
that the Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), as a Land
Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise
The Court, in this case, failed to

conduct a speedy hearing due to
the presence of a controversy.
The Supreme Court ruled that
the lower court, instead of
confining itself to the propriety
of the registration of the adverse
claim should already have
decided the controversy between
the parties on the merits thereof.
Doctrinal jurisprudence holds
that the CFI/RTC, as a land
registration court, can entertain
and dispose of the validity or
invalidity
of
respondents
adverse
claim;
whether
petitioner is entitled or not to a
declaratory relief. SC remanded
the case to the RTC to pass
controversy on merits.
ARCEO VS.
CA
G.R. No.
81401.
May 18,
1990
SARMIE
NTO, J
litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since

the Courts of First Instance are at the same
time, Courts of general jurisdiction and
could entertain and dispose of the validity or
invalidity of respondents adverse claim,
with a view to determining whether
petitioner is entitled or not to the relief that
he seeks. That doctrine is based on
expediency. In fact, petitioner has also
prayed in his Brief that the case be returned
to the lower Court for further proceedings.
Note should also be taken of the fact that an
adverse claim may be cancelled only after it
is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the
Court acting either as a land registration
Court or a Court of general jurisdiction. The
two other co-vendees, however, should be
impleaded as parties so that the entire
controversy as to ownership may be
threshed out in a single action to prevent
multiplicity of suits.
Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica

Geronimo were the owners of four
parcels of unregistered land (six were
involved but only four were disputed)
located in Pulilan, Bulacan. Escolastica
died on September 16, 1942 while
Abdon passed away in 1953. They had
one son, Esteban, who died on
September 2, 1941. Esteban had five
children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo,
Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married
Virginia Franco, with whom he
fathered six children, Carmelita,
Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and
Romeo. Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and
Sotera are the private respondents
herein while Joses widow, Virginia
(Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their
children are the petitioners.
Property Registration Decree; The Decree

has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional
trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court.We
have held that under Section 2 of the
Property
Registration
Decree,
the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
sitting as a land registration court, is no
longer as circumscribed as it was under Act
No. 496, the former land registration law.
We said that the Decree has eliminated the
distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court. The amendment was
[a]imed at avoiding multiplicity of suits,
the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the required
trial courts the authority to act not only on
It also appears that on October 1941,

the Arceos executed a deed of donation
Anouevo-Ongkeko
requisites. Respondent de los Santos

countered that he had tried to avail
himself of Section 57 by requesting
Junio to surrender his owners
dusplicate certificate of title but since
the latter refused to do so he was
compelled to present an adverse claim
pursuant to section 110 of the LRA.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
inter vivos, marked in which the
spouses bestowed the properties in
favor of Jose. Since 1942, Jose had
been paying taxes thereon. In 1949, he
took personal possession thereof,
worked thereon, and claimed them as
owner thereof.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
applications for original egistration but

also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such
applications or petitions.
The limited-jurisdiction-rule governing land
registration courts is subject to recognized
exceptions.At any rate, we have also stated
that the limited-jurisdiction-rule governing
land registration courts is subject to
recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the
parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced
in submitting controversial issues for
determination; (2) where they have been
given full opportunity to present their
evidence; and (3) where the court has
considered the evidence already of record
and is convinced that the same is sufficient
for rendering a decision upon such
controversial issues.
It furthermore appears that on August

2, 1950, the spouses executed another
deed of donation inter vivos, disposing
of the properties further in favor of
Jose.
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos
supposedly signed a deed of donation
mortis causa, revoking and giving
away the properties in question in favor
of all his grandchildren including Jose.
It seems however that it was notarized
only on November 3, 1944, after
Escolastica had died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia,
together with her children, filed with
the cadastral court an application for
registration in their names of lots on
the strength of exhihits. Pedro,
Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed
the application on the basis Pedro and
Lorenzo specifically contested the
application on certain lots on claims
that each of them were entitled to
one-third thereof.
II. THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND REGISTRIES OF DEEDS

Ministerial Duties Of The Register Of Deeds
BARANDA
No.
This is originally a petition for
Land Registration; Notice of Lis Pendens;
5
VS.
GUSTILO
L-81163.
Septembe
r 26, 1988
GUTIER
Anouevo-Ongkeko
reconstitution of Title filed with CFI of

Iloilo involving a parcel of land known
as lot no. 4517 covered by OCT No.
6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.
The said OCT no. 6406 was cancelled
Purpose of; A notice of lis pendens serves as

a warning to a prospective purchaser or
encumbrancer that a particular property is
the subject of litigation.The purpose of a
notice of lis pendens is defined in the
Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo

abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds' stand that, the
notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the
10
REZ, JR.,
J.
and transferred to TCT no. 106098 in

the names of Alfonso Hitalia and
Eduardo Baranda.
following manner: Lis pendens has been

conceived to protect the real rights of the
party causing the registration thereof. With
the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest
secure that he would not lose the property or
any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens
serves as a warning to a prospective
purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular
property is in litigation; and that he should
keep his hands off the same, unless of course
he intends to gamble on the results of the
litigation
Though ordinarily, a notice of lis pendens
cannot be cancelled while the action is still
pending and undetermined, the proper court
has discretionary power to cancel it under
peculiar circumstances.The private
respondents are not entitled to this
protection. The facts obtaining in this case
necessitate the application of the rule
enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v.
Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council
of Paraaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz
(10 SCRA 158), to the effect that: We have
once held that while ordinarily a notice of
pendency which has been filed in a proper
case, cannot be cancelled while the action is
pending and undetermined, the proper court
has the discretionary power to cancel it
under peculiar circumstances, as for
instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out
the main allegations of his complaint, and
where the continuances of the trial, for
which the plaintiff is responsible, are
unnecessarily delaying the determination of
the case to the prejudice of the defendant.
(Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal
Council of Paraaque v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, supra) The facts of this
case in relation to the earlier cases brought
all the way to the Supreme Court illustrate
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

petitioners over Lot No. 4571,
Barbara Cadastre cannot be
cancelled on the ground of
pendency of Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of
Appeals.
The function of the RD with
reference to the registration of
deeds, encumbrances,
instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. The acting
RD did not have any legal
standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the
respondents order directing him
to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated.
11
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
how the private respondents tried to block

but unsuccessfully the already final
decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.
The function of the Register of Deeds with
reference to the registration of deeds,
encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature.Section 10,
Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that It
shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented
for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. x x x. If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree. x x x The
elementary rule in statutory construction is
that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri
v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular
Bank of Asia and America Employees
Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA
663) The statute concerning the function of
the Register of Deeds to register instruments
in a torrens certificate of title is clear and
leaves no room for construction. According
to Websters Third International Dictionary
of the English Language the word shall
means ought to, must, x x x obligation
used to express a command or exhortation,
used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory. Hence, the
function of a Register of Deeds with
reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is
Anouevo-Ongkeko
12
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting

Register of Deeds did not have any legal
standing to file a motion for reconsideration
of the respondent Judges Order directing
him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In
case of doubt as to the proper step to be
taken in pursuance of any deed x x x or
other instrument presented to him, he should
have asked the opinion of the Commissioner
of Land Registration now, the Administrator
of the National Land Title and Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance
with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
ALMIROL
VS.
REGISTER
OF DEEDS
No.
L-22486.
March 20,
1968.
CASTRO,
J
Teodoro Almirol purchased a parcel of

land in Agusan from Arcenio Abalo.
The land was originally registered to
Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa
Abalo. Almirol went to the RD to
secure his name in the TCT, however
the RD refused to register the land
because:
Register of Deeds; No power to determine

validity of document.The Register of
Deeds may not validly ref use to register a
deed of sale presented to him for
registration. Whether a document is valid or
not, is not for the Register of Deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to
a court of competent jurisdiction. Indeed, a
Register of Deeds is entirely precluded by
section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and
discretion when confronted with the problem
of whether to register a deed or instrument
on the ground that it is invalid. For under the
said section, when he is in doubt as to the
proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him
for registration, all that he is supposed to do
is to submit and certify the question to the
Commissioner of Land Registration who
shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken on the
doubtful question.
The OCT was registered under Arcenio

and Nicolasa Abalo;
That in a sale of conjugal property,
acquired after the effectivity of the
NCC, both spouses should sign the
document;
Since the wife has already died, the
surviving husband cannot dispose of
the property without violating the
existing law
Because of the refusal of RD, Almirol
filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the RD to register the Deed of
Sale and issue to him the
Anouevo-Ongkeko
When the RD is in doubt as to

any instrument presented to him
for registration, all that is
supposed to do is to submit and
certify the question to the
Administrator of LRA, who
shall, after notice and hearing,
enter an order prescribing the
steps to be taken on the doubtful
question.
Refusal to register; Exhaustion of

administrative remedies.Mandamus does
not lie to compel the Register of Deeds to
13
corresponding TCT.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
register the deed of sale in question, because

pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of
Republic Act 1151, where any party in
interest does not agree with the Register of
Deeds, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, whose
decision on the matter shall be binding upon
all Registers of Deeds. Hence, this
administrative remedy must be resorted to,
before there can be recourse to the courts.
III. MODES OF REGISTERING TITLES

1. Citizenship Requirement
Krivenko Doctrine
KRIVENKO No.
7
VS.
REGISTRY
OF DEEDS
L630. Nove
mber 15,
1947
MORAN,
C. J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
This is a landmark case decided by the

Philippine Supreme Court, which
further solidified the PROHIBITION
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION THAT ALIENS
MAY NOT ACQUIRE PRIVATE
OR PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS,
INCLUDING
RESIDENTIAL LANDS. This was
the outcome of the petition by
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, who
bought a residential land in Manila,
Philippines on December 1941.
However, he failed to register the same
due to Japans declaration of war.
Later on in May 1945, he again
sought the registration of the same
land but the herein respondent,
Register of Deeds, denied the
application because as an alien,
Krivenko was disqualified to own
land pursuant to the laws of the
Philippine jurisdiction. Krivenko
brought the case to the Court of First
Instance of Manila which sustained the
refusal of the Register of Deeds of
Manila. He then appealed to the
Supreme Court. During the pendency
of the appeal, a new circular by the
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS or THE PUBLIC

DOMAIN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.When
section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution, with
reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention
of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it
undoubtedly means that all lands of the public domain
are classified into said three groups, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification
finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic
classification existing in the public laws and judicial
decision in the Philippines, and the term "public
agricultural lands" under said classification has always
been construed as referring to those lands that were
neither timber nor mineral, and as including residential
lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what
the members of the Constitutional Convention had in
mind when they drafted the Constitution was this
well-known classification and its technical meaning
then prevailing, There seems to be no question among
members of this Court that the phrase "public
agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII
of the Constitution includes residential lands. And this
is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given
after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is
the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute
after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is
to be regarded as a legislative construction that the
statute so revised conf forms to the Constitution." Soon
after the Constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and
60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino
citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by
such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn
declaration that residential lots are considered as
agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only
The
1935
COMMONWEALTH
CONSTITUTION served as the
main point of reference in this
case; the following facts
however, should be noted:
The 1943 Constitution was
already in place at the time this
case was penned in 1947
Krivenko bought the property in
December 1941
The
dispute
about
the
registration and the denial of
such by the register of deeds
occurred in May 1945.
Section 1, Article XIII of the
1935
Constitution
was
reproduced verbatim in Section
1, Article VIII of the 1943
Constitution
1935 Constitution: Article
XIII, Section 5. Save in cases of
hereditary
succession,
no
private agricultural land shall be
14
Department of Justice was released,
instructing all registers of deeds to
accept for registration all transfers of
residential lots to aliens. With the
effect of the circular swaying in his
favor, Krivenko thereafter filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal.
However, the Supreme Court deemed it
best to exercise its discretionary
powers and denied Krivenkos appeal,
in order to tackle the more pressing
constitutional issue; and in the process,
established itself as a landmark case
with regard to foreign ownership of
lands in the Philippines
agricultural lands may be alienated. Furthermore, prior

to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act
No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands
used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of
lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in
pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again,
prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public
Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable
for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or
leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land
may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease
granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new
Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation, and this again is another legislative
construction that the term "public agricultural land"
includes land for residence purposes.
The legislative interpretation is also in harmony with
the interpretation given by the Executive Department of
the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of
Justice Jose Abad Santos rendered an opinion holding
that under the Constitution, the phrase "public
agricultural lands" includes residential lands.
PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LANDS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.Under section 1 of Article XIII of
the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and
with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be def eated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may transfer their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article
XIII, which reads: "Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines." This
constitutional provision closes the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak
into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit
the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if,
after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of
Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated,
section 5 is intended to insure the policy of
nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections
must, therefore, be read together for they have the same
purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines. 1935
Constitution: Article XIII,
Section 1. It should be clear that
lands of the public domain are
by the State first and foremost,
but its utilization is limited to
Filipino citizens only, or to
corporations whose 60% capital
stock are owned by Filipinos. It
is clear from these phrases that
the bent towards excluding
foreigners is already evident.
...Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease
for
the
exploitation,
development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twentyfive years... When Sections 1
and 5 are read together, it is
therefore clear that aliens are
prohibited from acquiring
lands in the Philippines,
subject to exceptions provided
by law. The penned decision
referred to the Constitutional
Convention, specifically the
report of the Committee on
Nationalization and Preservation
of Lands and other Natural
Resources, for the purpose
behind the principle: "that
lands, minerals, forests, and
other
natural
resources
constitute the exclusive heritage
of the Filipino nation. They
15
that the persons against whom the prohibition is

directed in section 5 are the very same persons who
under section 1 are dis qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain in the Philippines. And the subject
matter of both sections is the same, namely, the
non-transferability of agricultural land to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential
lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to
"agricultural land" under section 5. It is a rule of
statutory construction that a word or phrase repeated in
a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. The only
difference between "agricultural land" under section 1
and "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the
former is public and the latter, private. But such
difference refers to ownership and not to the class of
land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for
the conservation of the national patrimony, what is
important is the nature or class of the property
regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its
citizens.
If, as conceded by all the members of this Court,
residential lands of the public domain should be
considered as agricultural lands to be protected as part
of the national patrimony, there can be no reason why
residential lands of private ownership should not
deserve the same consideration and protection. There is
absolutely no difference in nature, character, value or
importance. to the nation between a residential land of
the public domain and a residential land of private
ownership, and, therefore, both should equally be
considered as agricultural lands to be protected as part
of the national patrimony. Specially is this so where, as
indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienation of
public residential lots may become superfluous if the
same prohibition is not equally applied to private
residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private
residential lands will eventually become more
important, for time will come when, in view of the
constant disposition of public lands in favor of private
individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of
the public domain shall have become private residential
lands.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

should, therefore, be preserved
for those under the sovereign
authority of that nation and for
their posterity." The CA 141,
which blocked out the right of
aliens from acquiring property
by
reciprocity;
previously
granted them by the Public Land
Act No. 2874 sections 120 and
121 further supports this. The
Supreme Court affirmed the act
of the Register of Deeds in
denying the registration of
Krivenkos land, and established
itself as a landmark case when
addressing the issue of foreign
ownership of lands within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
The constitutional intent is made more patent and is

strongly implemented by an Act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was
approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth
Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there Were in the
Public Land Act No. 2874 provisions contained in
sections 120 and 121 thereof which granted to aliens the
right to acquire private agricultural lands only by way
of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution, and
Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed containing
Anouevo-Ongkeko
16
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
sections 122 and 123 which strike out completely the

right of reciprocity granted to aliens. This, undoubtedly,
is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section
5 of Article XIII of the Constitution, which, in
prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to
aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity.
EFFECT
UPON
THE
SPIRIT
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION
OF
NOT
CONSIDERING
RESIDENTIAL LANDS AS AGRICULTURAL
LANDS.If the term "private agricultural lands" is to
be construed as not including residential lots or lands
not strictly agricultural, the result would be that aliens
may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots
and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy
and hold in their names lands of any area for building
homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries,
schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf
courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in apellant's words, strictly
agricultural. That this is obnoxious to the conservative
spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
HALILI VS.
CA
G.R. No.
113539.
March 12,
1998.
PANGAN
IBAN, J
Petitioners appealed from the decision

of the MTC and RTC ruling that Helen
Guzmans (American citizen) waiver
of her inheritance in favor of her son
was not contrary to the constitutional
prohibition against the sale of land to
an alien.
Simeon de Guzman, an American
citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving
real properties in the Philippines. His
forced heirs were his widow, defendant
appellee Helen Meyers Guzman, and
his son, defendant appellee David Rey
Guzman, both of whom are also
American citizens. Helen executed a
deed
of
quitclaim
assigning,
transferring and conveying to David
Rey all her rights, titles and interests in
and over six parcels of land which the
two of them inherited from Simeon.
Subsequently, David Rey Guzman sold
said parcel of land to defendantappellee Emiliano Cataniag.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Were
the
petitioners
entitled to a
right
of
redemption?
Was the sale
of the lot to
defendantappellee
Cataniag
valid?
Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is

invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers
it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title
of the transferee is rendered valid.In
fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold
title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal
succession. But what is the effect of a
subsequent sale by the disqualified alien
vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen? This
is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is
consistent that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.
NO. The petitioners were not

entitled to a right of redemption.
The subject land is urban. Thus,
petitioners have no right to
invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil
Code, which presupposes that
the land sought to be redeemed
is rural.
YES. The sale to Cataniag is
valid. Non-Filipinos cannot
acquire or hold title to private
lands or to lands of the public
domain. But what is the effect of
a subsequent sale by the
disqualified alien vendee to a
qualified
Filipino
citizen?
Jurisprudence is consistent that if
land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes
a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid. Since the
17
Aliens May Lease Private Land

LLANTINO G.R. No. Chinese National, Co Liong Chong,
9
29663.
August
20, 1990
PARAS,
J.
entered into a contract with Filipino

spouses Gregorio and Belinda Llantino,
for a lease of a land in the Philippines
for 60 years. Co Liong Chong built a
commercial establishment in the leased
lot. During the term of the lease
contract, Co Liong Chong eventually
acquired Filipino citizenship, and went
by the name Juan Molina.
The defendant was placed in
possession of the property but knowing
that the period of the least would end
with the year 1967, petitioners
requested private respondent for a
conference but the latter did not honor
the request and instead he informed the
petitioners that he had already
constructed a commercial building on
the land worth P50,000.00; that the
lease contract was for a period of sixty
(60) years, counted from 1954; and that
he is already a Filipino citizen. The
claim of Chong came as a surprise to
the Llantinos because they did not
remember having agreed to a sixty-year
lease agreement as that would virtually
make Chong the owner of the realty
which, as a Chinese national, he had no
right to own and neither could he have
acquired
such
ownership
after
naturalization subsequent to 1954.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

disputed land is now owned by
Private Respondent Cataniag, a
Filipino citizen, the prior invalid
transfer can no longer be
assailed. The objective of the
constitutional provision -- to
keep our land in Filipino hands - has been served.
Petitioners, who are owners of the

adjoining lot, filed a complaint
questioning the constitutionality and
validity of the two conveyances and
claiming ownership thereto based on
their right of legal redemption under
Art. 1621[5] of the Civil Code.
VS.
CO
LIONG
CHONG
Lease; General rule that aliens are not

completely excluded from use of lands for
residential
purposes.Under
the
circumstances, a lease to an alien for a
reasonable period is valid. So is an option
giving an alien the right to buy real property
on condition that he is granted Philippine
citizenship. Aliens are not completely
excluded by the Constitution from use of
lands for residential purposes. Since their
residence in the Philippines is temporary,
they may be granted temporary rights such
as a lease contract which is not forbidden by
the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortune
and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire (Philippine Banking
Corporation vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52
(1967); citing Krivenko vs. Register of
Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
Under the circumstances, a lease

to an alien for a reasonable
period is valid. So is an option
giving an alien the right to buy
real property on condition that
he
is
granted
Philippine
citizenship. Aliens are not
completely excluded by the
Constitution from use of lands
for residential purposes. Since
their residence in the Philippines
is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as
a lease contract, which is not
forbidden by the Constitution.
Should they desire to remain
here forever and share our
fortune and misfortune, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to
acquire.
Exception to the rule.The only instance

where a contract of lease may be considered
invalid, is, if there are circumstances
attendant to its execution, which are used as
a scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition. If an alien is given not only a
lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of
land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner
cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a
virtual transfer of ownership whereby the
owner divests himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi,
In the case at bar, even

assuming, arguendo, that the
subject contract is prohibited,
the same can no longer be
questioned presently upon the
acquisition by the private
respondent
of
Filipino
citizenship. It was held that
sale of a residential land to an
alien which is now in the hands
of a naturalized Filipino citizen
is valid.
18
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi)

rights, the sum of which make up ownership.
It is just as if today the possession is
transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day
the disposition, and so on, until ultimately
all the rights of which ownership is made up
are consolidated in an alien
A Corporation Sole May Acquire And Register Private Agricultural Land

CORPORATION SOLE; COMPONENTS AND A corporation sole, which
No.
Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and
10 ROMAN
PURPOSE OF; POWER TO HOLD AND TRANSMIT
CATHOLIC
APOSTOLI
C
ADMINIST
RATOR OF
DAVAO,
INC.
VS.
LAND
REGISTRA
TION
COMMISSI
ON
L-8451.
December
20, 1957
FLIX, J.
resident of the City of Davao, executed

a deed of sale of a parcel of land in
favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a
corporation sole organized and existing
in accordance with Philippine Laws,
with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian
citizen, as actual incumbent. The
Register of Deeds of Davao for
registration, having in mind a previous
resolution of the CFI in Carmelite
Nuns of Davao were made to prepare
an affidavit to the effect that 60% of
the members of their corp. were
Filipino citizens when they sought to
register in favor of their congregation
of deed of donation of a parcel of land,
required it to submit a similar affidavit
declaring the same. June 28, 1954:
Roman in the letter expressed
willingness to submit an affidavit but
not in the same tenor as the Carmelite
Nuns because it had five incorporators
while as a corporation sole it has only
one and it was ownership through
donation and this was purchased.
CHURCH PROPERTIES TO His SUCCESSOR IN

OFFICE.A corporation sole is a special form of
corporation usually associated with the clergy * * *
designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of
ownership of the church which was regarded as the
property owner (I Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p.
682-683). It consists of one person only, and his
successors (who will always be one at a time), in some
particular station, who are incorporated by law in order
to give them some legal capacities and advantages
particularly that of perpetuity which in their natural
persons they could not have. * * * (Reid vs. Barry, 93
Fla. 849 112 So. 846). Through this legal fiction,
church properties acquired by the incumbent of a
corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his
death not to his personal heirs but to his successor in
office. A corporation sole, therefore, is created not only
to administer the temporalities of the church or religious
society where he belongs, but also to hold and transmit
the same to his successor in said office.
PERSONALITY OF, SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
FROM THAT OF ROMAN PONTIFF.Although a
branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different
countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country
where it is located, is considered an entity or person
with all the rights and privileges granted to such
artificial being under the laws of that country, separate
and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff
or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious
relations with the latter which are governed by the
Cannon Law or their rules and regulations.
consists of one person only, is

vested with the right to
purchase and hold real estate
and to register the same in
trust for the faithful or
members of the religious
society or church for which the
corporation was organized. A
corporation sole is not the
owner of the properties that he
may acquire but merely the
administrator thereof. The
properties pass, upon the
death, not to his personal heirs
but to his successors in office.
In this sense, the king is a sole
corporation; so is a bishop, or
dens, distinct from their several
chapters
POWER AND QUALIFICATION TO PURCHASE IN

ITS NAME PRIVATE LANDS; 60 PER CENTUM
FILIPINO
CAPITAL
REQUIREMENT
NOT
INTENDED TO CORPORATION SOLE.Under the
circumstances of the present case, it is safe to state that
even before the establishment of the Philippine
Anouevo-Ongkeko
19
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines

every corporation sole then organized and registered
had by express provision of law (Corporation Law,
Public Act No. 1459) the necessary power and
qualification to purchase in its name private lands
located in the territory in which it exercised its
functions or ministry and for which it was created,
independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique
and single member and head, the bishop of the diocese.
It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid
that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the
Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of
the Constitution did not have in mind the religious
corporation sole when they provided that 60 per centum
of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.
Thus, if this constitutional provision were not intended
for corporation sole, it is obvious that this could not be
regulated or restricted by said provision.
CONSTITUTION REQUIREMENT LIMITED TO
OWNERSHIP NOT TO CONTROL.Both the
Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in
their provisions that a corporation sole or "ordinary" is
not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but
merely the administrator thereof and holds the same in
trust for the church to which the corporation is an
organized and constituent part. Being mere
administrator of the temporalities or properties titled in
his name, the constitutional provision requiring 60 per
centum Filipino ownership is not applicable. The said
constitutional provision is limited by its terms to
ownership alone and does not extend to control unless
the control over the property affected has been devised
to circumvent the real purpose of the constitution.
CORPORATION SOLE WITHOUT NATIONALITY;
NATIONALITY
OF
CONSTITUENTS
DETERMINES WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT is APPLICABLE.The corporation
sole by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of
operation have no designed owner of its temporalities,
although by the terms of the law it can be safely implied
that they ordinarily hold them in trust for the benefit of
the Roman Catholic faithful of their respective locality
or diocese. They can not be considered as aliens
because they have no nationality at all. In determining,
therefore, whether the constitutional provision requiring
60 per centum Filipino capital is applicable to
corporations sole, the nationality of the constituents of
the diocese, and not the nationality of the actual
incumbent of the parish, must be taken into
consideration. In the present case, even if the question
of nationality be considered, the aforesaid constitutional
requirement is fully met and satisfied, considering that
Anouevo-Ongkeko
20
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
the corporation sole in question is composed of an

overwhelming majority of Filipinos.
Donation In Favor Of A Religious Corporation Controlled By Non-Filipinos

11 REGISTER No.

RlGHT TO ACQUIRE
OF DEEDS
LANDS LlMITED TO
OF RIZAL L-67
FlLIPINO CITIZENS;
VS. UNG
76.
SUI SI
ACT 271 REPEALED BY
May
TEMPLE
SECTION 5, ARTICLE
21,
1955
XIII, OF THE
CONSTITUTION.The
provisions of Act No. 271
of the old Philippine
Commission which allow
all religious associations,
of whatever sort or
denomination, whether
incorporated in the
Philippines or in the
name of other country, to
hold land in the
Philippines for religious
purposes, must be
deemed repealed by the
absolute terms of section
5, Article XIII, of the
Constitution, which limit
the acquisition of land in
the Philippines to its
REY
ES J.
B. L.,
J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
21
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
citizens, or to
corporations or
associations at least sixty
per centum of the capital
stock of which is owned
by such citizens, adopted
after the enactment of
said Act No. 271.
DEED OF DONATION
EXECUTED BY A
FILIPINO CITIZEN IN
FAVOR OF A FOREIGN
RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATION CAN
NOT BE
REGISTERED.In view
of the provisions of
sections 1 and 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution
and the decision of the
Supreme Court in the
case of Krivenko vs. The
Register of Deeds of
Manila, 44 Off. Gaz.,
1211, a deed of donation
of a parcel of land
executed by a Filipino
Anouevo-Ongkeko
22
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
citizen in favor of a
religious organization
whose founder, trustees
and administrator are
non-Filipinos, can not be
admitted for registration.
REFUSAL OF
REGISTER OF DEEDS
TO REGISTER DEED
OF DONATION IS NOT
VlOLATIVE OF
FREEDOM OF
RELIGION CLAUSE.
The refusal of the
Register of Deeds to
register said deed of
donation is not violative
of the freedom of religion
clause of the Constitution
(section 1 [7], Article III),
since land tenure is by no
means indispensable to
the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious
profession or worship; or
that one may not worship
the Deity according to the
Anouevo-Ongkeko
23
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
dictates of his own

conscience unless upon
land held in fee simple.
Land Sold To An Alien Which Is Now In The Hands Of A Filipino May No Longer Be Annuled
No.
A residential lot was sold by petitioner Whether
or Aliens; Sale of residential land to an alien No,
12 DE
CASTRO
VS. TAN
L-31956.
April 30,
1984
PLANA,
J.
Filomena De Castro to Tan Tai, a

Chinese, who died leaving herein
respondents-heirs, his widow and
children. In an extra-judicial settlement
of estate with sale executed by the
respondents after Tan Tais death, the
parcel of land in question was allotted
in its entirety to Joaquin, one of Tan
Tais sons who became a naturalized
Filipino before the latters death.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the
respondents, contending that the sale
be annulled for violation of the 1935
Constitution, to which respondents
moved to dismiss.
not a contract
of sale can be
annulled
on
the basis that
it
is
in
violation
of
the
1935
Constitution
prohibiting the
sale of land to
aliens
but now already in the hands of a

naturalized
Filipino
citizen
valid.
Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto,
the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled
and recover the lot she herself has
sold.While the vendee was an alien at the
time of the sale, the land has since become
the property of respondent Joaquin Teng, a
naturalized Philippine citizen, who is
constitutionally qualified to own land.
independently of the
doctrine of pari delicto, the
petitioner cannot have the sale
annulled. While the vendee was
an alien at the time of sale, the
land has since become the
property, of respondent Joaquin
Teng, a naturalized Philippine
citizen, who is constitutionally
qualified to own a land.
Laches; Annulment of sale; Filing of an

action on July 15, 1968 to annul sale of land
made in 1938, barred by laches.Laches
also militates against petitioners cause. She
sold the disputed lot in 1938. She instituted
the action to annul the sale only on July 15,
1968. What the Court said in the cited
Sarsosa case applies with equal force to the
petitioner.
Concept of laches.Laches has been
defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
13
REPUBLIC
VS.
IAC
AND
GONZALES
G.R No.
74170.
July 18,
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Chua Kim (aka Uy Teng Be) was the

adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un.
Lot 1 and 2 were sold to Gregorio by
the Manosca spouses, and Lot 549 by
Aliens; The conveyances were made before

the 1935 Constitution went into effect i.e. at
a time where there was no prohibition
against acquisition of private agricultural
The conveyances were made

before the 1935 Constitution
went into effect: at a time when
there was no prohibition against
24
1989.
NARVAS
A, J
Marquez spouses. When Gregorio died,

Uy Teng Be took possession of the
property. The 3 subject lands later
became subject of a compromise
agreement in litigation in Quezon City,
and the court finds that Chua Kim has
established his registrable title over the
property. The Solicitor General
challenged the correctness of the order.
The CA affirmed the CFIs decision,
hence this appeal.
lands by aliens.It is a fact that the lands in

dispute were properly and formally
adjudicated by a competent Court to the
Spouses Gaspar and to the Spouses Marquez
in fee simple, and that the latter had
afterwards conveyed said lands to Gregorio
Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kims adopting parent,
by deeds executed in due form on December
27, 1934 and December 30, 1934,
respectively. Plainly, the conveyances were
made before the 1935 Constitution went into
effect, i.e., at a time when there was no
prohibition against acquisition of private
agricultural lands by aliens. Gregorio Reyes
Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the
lands thus purchased by him, and his
ownership was not at all affected either (1)
by the principle subsequently enunciated in
the 1935 Constitution that aliens were
incapacitated to acquire lands in the country,
since that constitutional principle has no
retrospective application, or (2) by his and
his successors omission to procure the
registration of the property prior to the
coming into effect of the Constitution.
The Republic's theory is that the

conveyances to Chua Kim were made
while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to
his taking oath as a naturalized
Philippine citizen on January 7, 1977,
at a time when he was disqualified to
acquire ownership of land in the
Philippines hence, his asserted titles are
null and void.
The compromise agreement approved by

judgment rendered on July 29, 1970
implicitly recognized Chua Kims title to the
lands in question.It is a fact, furthermore,
that since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy
Un in San Narciso, Quezon, in 1946, Chua
Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in continuous
possession of the lands in concept of owner,
as the putative heir of his adoptive father,
said Gregorio Reyes; this, without protest
whatever from any person. It was indeed
Chua Kims being in possession of the
property in concept of owner, and his status
as adopted son of Gregorio Reyes, that were
the factors that caused his involvement in
Civil Case No. C-385 of the CFI at Calauag,
Quezon, at the instance of the original
parties thereto, and his participation in the
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

acquisition
of
private
agricultural lands by aliens.
Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore
acquired good title to the lands
thus purchased by him, and his
ownership was not at all affected
either:
-By the principle subsequently
enunciated
in
the
1935
Constitution that aliens were
incapacitated to acquire lands in
the
country,
since
that
constitutional principle has no
retrospective application, or
-By his and his successor's
omission
to
procure
the
registration of the property prior
to the coming into effect of the
Constitution.
The litigated property is now
in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino. A disqualified vendee
no longer owns it. Respondent,
as a naturalized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to
own the subject property.
25
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
Compromise Agreement later executed by

all the parties. As already mentioned, that
compromise agreement, approved by
judgment rendered on July 29, 1970,
implicitly recognized Chua Kims title to the
lands in question.
Acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine
citizenship foreclosed any further debate
regarding the title to the property in
controversy.Be this as it may, the
acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine
citizenship should foreclose any further
debate regarding the title to the property
in controversy, in line with this Courts
rulings relative to persons similarly
situated.
Recovery Of Land Sold To An Alien

[No.
On 1944, Dionisio Rellosa, a Filipino, WON Rellosa SALE OF LAND DURING JAPANESE The sale in question is null and
14 RELLOSA
VS.
GAW
CHEE HUN
L-1411.
Septembe
r
29,
1953]
BAUTIST
A
ANGELO
, J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
sold to Gaw Chee Hun, a Chinese, a

parcel of land with a house erected on
it, located in Manila. Both parties
entered into a lease contract, whereby
Rellosa, the vendor, occupied the land
under the condition that Gaw Chee
obtain the approval of the sale by the
Japanese Administration. Gaw Chee
did not obtain such approval. Rellosa
now seeks to annul the sale and the
lease. Gaw Chee, meanwhile, contends
that such sale was absolute and
conditional, the same not being
contrary to law, morals and public
order. He further states that Rellosa is
estopped from asserting his ownership
over the land, after having leased the
same from Gaw Chee, and thus,
recognizing Gaw Chees title over the
property.
can have the

sale declared
null and void
and
recover
the property
considering
the effect of
the
law
governing
rescission of
contracts.
MILITARY OCCUPATION, NULL AND

VOID; VENDOR CANNOT RECOVER
PROPERTY,
CONTRACT
HAVING
BEEN
ENTITLED
IN
"PARI
DELICTO".The
phrase
"private
agricultural land" employed in the
Constitution of September 4, 1943 of the
then Republic of the Philippines includes
residential lands (Krivenko vs. Register of
Deeds, 42 Off. Gaz., 471). But the vendor in
a sale of residential land executed in
February 1944 cannot have the sale declared
null and void nor rescind the contract and
recover the property, because both vendor
and vendee are in pari delicto
EXCEPTION TO "PARI DELICTO

DOCTRINE, EXPLAINED.The doctrine
of Tani delicto is subject to one important
limitation, namely, "whenever public policy
is considered as advanced by allowing either
party to sue for relief against the transaction"
(3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed.,
p. 733). But not all contracts which are
void, but plaintiff is barred from

taking the present action under
the principle of pari delicto.
A party to an illegal contract
cannot come into court to have
his illegal objects carried out.
This is the doctrine of In Pari
Delicto. Rellosas sale of the
land to Gaw Chee, an alien is
against the Constitution and is
thus illegal. The Commonwealth
Act provided that such sale is not
only unlawful but also null and
void ab initio, that such will
effect
the
annulling
and
cancelling of the title originally
issued, and reverting the
property and its improvements to
the State.
26
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
illegal for being opposed to public policy

come under this limitation. The cases in
which this limitation may apply, only
"include the class of contracts which are
intrinsically contrary to public policy,
contracts in which the illegality itself
consists in their opposition to public policy,
and any other species of illegal contracts in
which, from their particular circumstances,
incidental and collateral motives of public
policy require relief." Examples of this class
of contracts are usurious contracts, marriagebrokerage contracts and gambling contracts.
(Mem, pp. 735-737.) A sale of residential
land executed during the Japanese military
occupation wherein both parties were in pari
delicto does not come under this exception
because it is not intrinsically contrary to
public policy, nor one where the illegality
itself consists in its opposition to public
policy. It is illegal not because it is against
public policy but because it is against the
Constitution.
15
PHILIPPIN
E
BANKING
CORPORA
TION
VS.
LUI SHE
No.
L-17587.
Septembe
r 12, 1967
CASTRO,
J
Anouevo-Ongkeko
This is the second motion that the

defendant-appellant has filed relative to
this Court's decision of September 12,
1967. Accepting the nullity of the other
contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7), the
defendant-appellant
nevertheless
contended that the lease contract (Plff
Exh. 3) is so separable from the rest of
the contracts that it should be saved
from invalidation. In denying the
motion,
we
pointed
to
the
circumstances that on November 15,
1957, the parties entered into the lease
contract (in favor of Wong Heng) for
50 years: that ten days after, they
amended the contract so as to make it
cover the entire property of Justina
Santos; less than a month after, they
entered into another contract giving
Wong Heng the option to buy the
WON
the
lease contract
executed by
Santos is valid
Validity of lease or option to buy real estate

to an alien.
A lease to an alien for a reasonable period
is valid. So is an option giving an alien the
right to buy real property on condition that
he is granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens
are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from the use of lands for
residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease
contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain
here forever and share our fortune and
misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire.
When invalid.If an alien is given not only
a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece
This is a misrepresentation of the

grossest sort. The documents
were known to the defendantappellant and her counsel even
before the death of Justina
Santos. Nor is there anything in
the documents that is likely to
alter the result we have already
reached in this case. With
respect to the 1957 codicil, it is
claimed that Justina Santos could
not have intended by the 99-year
lease to give Wong the
ownership
of
the
land
considering that she had earlier
devised the property to Tita
Yaptinchay
LaO.
Without
passing on the validity of her
testamentary disposition since
27
leased premises should his pending
petition for naturalization be granted;
that on November 18, 1958, after
failing to secure naturalization and
after finding that adoption does not
confer the citizenship of the adopting
parent on the adopted, the parties
entered into two other contracts
extending the lease to 99 years and
fixing the period of the option to buy at
50
years
which
indubitably
demonstrate that each of the contracts
in question was designed to carry out
Justina Santos' expressed wish to give
the land to Wong and thereby in effect
place its ownership in alien hands, that
"as the lease contract was part of a
scheme to violate the Constitution it
suffers from the same infirmity that
renders the other contracts void and
can no more be saved from illegality
than the rest of the contracts." The
present motion is for a new trial and is
based on three documents (1 Codicil
and 2 wills) executed by Justina Santos
which, so it is claimed, constitute
newlydiscovered material evidence:
Codicil- Justina Santos not only named
Tita Yaptinchay LaO the administratrix
of her estate with the right to buy the
properties of the estate, but also
provided that if the said LaO was
legally disqualified from buying she
was to be her sole heir. Wills- Justina
Santos enjoined her heirs to respect the
lease contract made, and the
conditional option given, in favor of
Wong.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
of land, by virtue of which the Filipino

owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of
his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a
virtual transfer of ownership whereby the
owner divests himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi,
jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi), but
also of the right to dispose of it (jus
disponendi) rights the sum total of which
make up ownership It is just as if today the
possession is transferred, tomorrow the use,
the next day the disposition, and so on, until
ultimately all the rights of which ownership
is made up are consolidated in an alien. If
this can be done, then the constitutional ban
against alien landholding in the Philippines,
as announced in Krivenko vs. Register of
Deeds (79 Phil. 461) is indeed in grave peril.
Remedy of parties; Exception to pari delicto
doctrine.It does not follow that because
the parties are in pari delicto they will be
left where they are without relief. Article
1416 of the Civil Code provides as an
exception to the rule of in pari delicto that
when the agreement is not illegal per se but
is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by
law is designed for the protection of the
plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby
enhanced, recover what he had paid or
delivered.
Sec. 5, Art. XIII of the Constitution is an
expression
of
public
policy.The
constitutional provision that save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the
Philippines is an expression of public
policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

the issue is one pending before
the probate court, it suffices to
state here that even granting that
Justina Santos had devised the
land in dispute to LaO, Justina
Santos was not thereby barred or
precluded from subsequently
giving the land to Wong. The
execution of the lease contract
which, together with the other
contracts, amount to a transfer of
ownership to Wong, constitutes
an implied revocation of her
codicil, at least insofar as the
disposition of the land is
concerned. As for the 1959 wills,
it is said that they manifest a
desire to abide by the law, as is
evident from the statement
therein that Wong's right to buy
the land be allowed "anytime he
or his children should be entitled
to buy lands in the Philippines
(i.e., upon becoming Filipino
citizens)". It seems obvious,
however, that this is nothing but
a reiteration of the substance of
the
lease
contract
and
conditional option to buy which
in compensation, as our decision
demonstrates, amount to a
conveyance, the protestation of
compliance with the law
notwithstanding. In cases like
the one at bar, motives are
seldom avowed and avowals are
not always candid. The problem
is not, however, insuperable,
especially as in this case the very
witnesses for the defendantappellant testified that
Considering her age, ninety (90)
years old at the time and her
condition, she is a wealthy
28
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

woman, it is just natural when
she said. "This is what I want
and this will be done." In
particular reference to this
contract of lease, when I said
"This is not proper, she said
'you just go ahead, you prepare
that, I am the owner, and if there
is illegality, I am the only one
that can question the illegality.'"
The ambition of the old woman
before her death, according to
her revelation to me, was to see
to it that these properties be
enjoyed, even to own them, by
Wong Heng because Doa
Justina told me that she did not
have any relatives, near or far,
and she considered Wong Heng
as a son and his children her
grandchildren; especially her
consolation in life was when she
would hear the children reciting
prayers in Tagalog. She was very
emphatic in the care of the
seventeen (17) dogs and of the
maids who helped her much, and
she told me to see to it that no
one could disturb Wong Heng
from those properties. That is
why we thought of adoption,
believing that thru adoption
Wong Heng might acquired
Filipino citizenship, being the
adopted child of a Filipino
citizen. The other points raised
in the motion for new trial either
have already been disposed of in
our decision or are so
insubstantial to merit any
attention. ACCORDINGLY, the
motion for new trial is denied.
(lease contract not valid)
Rights Of A Former Natural-Born Filipino Citizens To Acquire Lands

Anouevo-Ongkeko

29

Atty. Rowel Ilagan
2. Classification of Public Land
Only Alienable Lands Of The Public Domain May Be The Subject Of Disposition
G.R. No. From the time of Marcos until Estrada, Whether
or Reclamation Projects; Government-Owned Under the Public Land Act (CA
16 CHAVEZ
VS. PUBLIC
ESTATE
AUTHORIT
Y
133250.
May
6,
2003
CARPIO,
J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
portions of Manila Bay were being

reclaimed. A law was passed creating
the Public Estate Authority which was
granted with the power to transfer
reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
with AMARI, a private corporation.
Under the Joint Venture Agreement
between AMARI and PEA, several
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising
the Freedom Islands and several
portions of submerged areas of Manila
Bay were going to be transferred to
AMARI .
not
the
stipulations in
the Amended
JVA for the
transfer
to
AMARI
of
lands,
reclaimed or
to
be
reclaimed,
violate
the
Constitution
and Controlled Corporations; Public

Estates Authority (PEA); Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA); PEA and
BCDA, Distinguished; While PEA is the
central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide.
BCDA is an entirely different government
entity which is authorized by law to sell
specific government lands that have long
been declared by presidential proclamations
as military reservations for use by the
different service of the armed forces under
the Department of National Defense.PEA
is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide.
PEA took the place of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR for brevity) as the government
agency charged with leasing or selling all
reclaimed lands of the public domain. In the
hands of PEA, which took over the leasing
and selling functions of DENR, reclaimed
foreshore lands are public lands in the same
manner that these same lands would have
been public lands in the hands of DENR.
BCDA is an entirely different government
entity. BCDA is authorized by law to sell
specific government lands that have long
been declared by presidential proclamations
as military reservations for use by the
different services of the armed forces under
the Department of National Defense.
BCDAs mandate is specific and limited in
area, while PEAs mandate is general and
national. BCDA holds government lands
that have been granted to end-user
government entitiesthe military services
of the armed forces. In contrast, under
Executive Order No. 525, PEA holds the
reclaimed public lands, not as an end-user
141, as amended), reclaimed

lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the
public domain Section 3 of the
Constitution: Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands.
Private
corporations
or
associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease The
157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease
these
lands
to
private
corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands
to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to
Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations
in
the
1987
Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA
violates glaringly Sections 2 and
3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409
of the Civil Code, contracts
whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose
object is outside the commerce
of men, are inexistent and void
from the beginning. The Court
must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended
JVA null and void ab initio.
30
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
entity, but as the government agency

primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National
Government.
Well-settled is the doctrine that public land
granted to an end-user government agency
for a specific public use may subsequently
be withdrawn by Congress from public use
and declared patrimonial property to be
sold to private parties.In Laurel v.
Garcia, cited in the Decision, the Court
ruled that land devoted to public use by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, when no
longer needed for public use, may be
declared patrimonial property for sale to
private parties provided there is a law
authorizing such act. Well-settled is the
doctrine that public land granted to an
end-user government agency for a specific
public use may subsequently be withdrawn
by Congress from public use and declared
patrimonial property to be sold to private
parties. R.A. No. 7227 creating the BCDA is
a law that declares specific military
reservations no longer needed for defense or
military purposes and reclassifies such lands
as patrimonial property for sale to private
parties.
Government owned lands, as long as they
are patrimonial property, can be sold to
private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations; Once
converted to patrimonial property, the land
may be sold by the public or municipal
corporation to private parties, whether
Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.Government owned lands, as
long they are patrimonial property, can be
sold to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations.
Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by
Anouevo-Ongkeko
31
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
the government under Act No. 1120 are

patrimonial property which even private
corporations can acquire by purchase.
Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain if sold or transferred to a
public or municipal corporation for a
monetary consideration become patrimonial
property in the hands of the public or
municipal corporation. Once converted to
patrimonial property, the land may be sold
by the public or municipal corporation to
private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations.
AMARI is not precluded from recovering
from PEA in the proper proceedings, on a
quantum meruit basis, whatever it may have
incurred in implementing the Amended JVA
prior to its declaration of nullity.Despite
the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is
not precluded from recovering from PEA in
the proper proceedings, on a quantum meruit
basis, whatever Amari may have incurred in
implementing the Amended JVA prior to its
declaration of nullity.
17
BUREAU
OF
FORESTRY
VS. CA AND
GALLO
No.
L-37995.
August
31, 1987
PARAS,
J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for

the registration of 4 parcels of land
situated
in
Buenavista,
Iloilo
containing an approximate area of 30.5
hectares.
She alleged she occupied said parcels
of land having bought them from the
estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who,
in his lifetime, had bought the lands in
turn from Canuto Gustilo in 1934.
The Director of Lands opposed the
WON
the
classification
of lands of
public domain
by
the
Executive
Branch of
the
Government
into
agricultural,
Public Lands; Lands of the public domain

cannot be the subject of registration
proceedings; Where the land is public land,
there is no need for the Director of Forestry
to submit convincing proofs that the land is
not more valuable for agriculture than for
forest purposes.Such contentions of
private respondents do not hold water.
Admittedly the controversial area is within a
timberland block or classification of the
municipality and certified to by the Director
Admittedly, the controversial

area is within a timberland block
classified and
certified as such by the Director
of Forestry in 1956. The lands
are needed
for forest purposes and hence
they are portions of the public
domain which
cannot be the subject of
registration proceedings.
32
application on the ground that neither
the
applicant nor her predecessors-ininterest have sufficient title over the
lands
applied for, which could be registered
under the Torrens systems, and that
they have never been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of
the said
lands for at least 30 years.
The Director of Forestry also opposed
on the ground that certain portions of
the lands, with an area of
approximately 19.4 hectares are
mangrove swamps
and are within a Timberland Block.
In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the
subject parcels of land from Mercedes
Diago, and moved to be substituted in
place of the latter, attaching to his
motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title.
Philippine Fisheries Commission also
moved to substitute petitioner Bureau
of Forestry as oppositor, since
supervision and control of said portion
have
been transferred from the Bureau of
Forestry to the PFC.
In April 1966, the trial court rendered
its decision ordering the registration of
the 4 parcels of land in the name of
Filomeno Gallo. It ruled that although
the
controverted portion of 19.4 hectares
are mangrove and nipa swamps within
a
Timberland Block, petitioners failed to
submit convincing proof that these
lands are more valuable for forestry
than for agricultural purposes, and the
presumption is that these are
agricultural lands.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
forest
or
mineral can be
changed
or
varied
by the court.
NO
of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands

needed for forest purposes and hence they
are portions of the public domain which
cannot be the subject of registration
proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is
public land and there is no need for the
Director of Forestry to submit to the court
convincing proofs that the land in dispute is
not more valuable for agriculture than for
forest purposes, as there was no question of
whether the land is forest land or not. Be it
remembered that said forest land had been
declared and certified as such by the
Director of the Bureau of Forestry on
February 18, 1956, several years before the
original applicant of the lands for
registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July
11,1961.
The Executive Branch of the government
through the Office of the President, not the
court, determines the classification of lands
of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or mineral lands.As provided for under
Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government
and not of the courts. With these rules, there
should be no more room for doubt that it is
not the court which determines the
classification of lands of the public domain
into agricultural, forest or mineral but the
Executive Branch of the Government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it
was grave error and/or abuse of discretion
for the respondent court to ignore the
uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block and (2) as
certified to by the then Director of Forestry,
the area is needed for forest purposes.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Clearly therefore the land is
public land and there is no need
for the Director
of Forestry to submit convincing
proofs that the land is more
valuable for
forest
purposes
than
for
agriculture.
As provided for under Sec.
6 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, the
classification or reclassification
of public lands into alienable or
disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a
prerogative of the Executive
Department
and not of the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more
room for
doubt that it is not the court
which
determines
the
classification of lands of the
public domain but the Executive
Branch, through the Office of the
President.
Furthermore,
respondents
cannot
claim
to
have
obtained their title by
prescription
since
the
application filed by them
necessarily implied an
admission
that the portions
applied for are part of the public
domain and
cannot
be
acquired
by
prescription, unless the law
expressly permits it. It is a
rule of law that possession of
forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into
private ownership
33
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
Forest lands of the public domain cannot be

acquired by prescription; Rule that
possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.
Furthermore, private respondents cannot
claim to have obtained their title by
prescription inasmuch as the application
filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are
part of the public domain which cannot be
acquired by prescription, unless the law
expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that
cannot ripen into private ownership
18
DIRECTOR
OF LANDS
VS. CA AND
BISNAR
G.R. No.
83609.
October
26, 1989
GRIO-A
QUINO,
J.
* Petitioner Director of Lands, through

the Solicitor General, seeks a review of
the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al.
vs. Director of Lands," affirming in
toto the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, granting the private
respondents'
application
for
confirmation and registration of their
title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC
Cad. Rec. 1256.
The principal
issue in this
appeal
is
whether the
lots
in
question may
be registered
under Section
48 (b) of CA
141,
as
amended.
NO!
* In their joint application for

registration of title to two (2) parcels of
land filed on July 20,1976, the
applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar
claimed to be the owners in fee simple
of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar
Cadastre
Plan
AP-06-000869,
respectively containing an area of 28
hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34
hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in
barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of
President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p.
14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that
they inherited those parcels of land (p.
41, Rollo) and they had been paying
the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
Anouevo-Ongkeko
It is not the Court which determines the

classification of lands of the public domain
into agricultural, forest or mineral but the
Executive Branch of the government.In
the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of
Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled: As
provided for under Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted
from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now
a prerogative of the Executive Department of
the government and not the courts. With
these rules, there should be no more room
for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or
mineral but the Executive Branch of the
government, through the Office of the
President. Hence, it was grave error and/or
abuse of discretion for respondent court to
ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the
disputed area is within a timberland block,
and (2) as certified to by the then Director of
Forestry, the area is needed for forest
purposes.
Positive act of the government needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest
* In the case of Bureau of

Forestry vs. Court of Appeals,
153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6
of Commonwealth Act 141,
which was lifted from Act 2874,
the
classification
or
reclassification of public lands
into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a
prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government
and not the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more
room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the
classification of lands of the
public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the
Executive Branch
of
the
government, through the Office
of the President. Hence, it was
grave error and/or abuse of
discretion for respondent court to
ignore the uncontroverted facts
that (1) the disputed area is
within a timberland block, and
(2) as certified to by the then
34
* On December 16,1976, the Director
of Lands and the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development,
opposed the application on the grounds
that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest
possess
sufficient title to acquire ownership in
fee simple of the land or lots applied
for, the same not having been acquired
by any of the various types of title
issued by the Spanish Government,
such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant,
(2) the 'concession especial' or special
grant, (3) the 'composicion con el
estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the
'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase,
and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or
possessory information under the
Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or
any other recognized mode of
acquisition of title over realty under
pertinent applicable laws.
Possession of forest land, however long,

cannot ripen into private ownership.Thus,
cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano
vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil.
401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the Torrens System.
2. Neither the applicants nor their

predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question for at least thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the
filing of the application.
3. The properties in question are a
portion of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines, not
subject to private appropriation, (pp.
17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15,
Rollo.)
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Director of Forestry, the area is
needed for forest purposes. (pp.
21-22,
Rollo.)It
bears
emphasizing that a positive act
of the government is needed to
declassify
land
which
is
classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes (Republic vs.
Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless
and until the land classified as
forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply
Thus, possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership (Vano
vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161
[1920]; Adorable vs. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]).
A parcel of forest land is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under
the Torrens System (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA
648; Republic vs. Vera, 120
SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section
48
(b)
of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, applies exclusively to
public agricultural land. Forest
lands or areas covered with
forests are excluded (p. 26,
* On February 24,1977, the applicants

filed an amended application, which
was approved on March 14, 1977, and
Anouevo-Ongkeko
and to convert it into alienable or disposable

land for agricultural or other purpose.It
bears emphasizing that a positive act of the
government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs.
Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the
land classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
35
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in
Amunategui that:
included the following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act
invoked be not applicable to the case,
they hereby apply for the benefits of
Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended,
as
they
and
their
predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for
more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16,
Rollo.)
In confirmation of imperfect title

cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets
the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act 1942.
He
must
overcome
the
presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public
domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title
such as those derived from old
Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open and notorious
possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for
at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his
application.
(Heirs
of
Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
RTC: IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT

CA: AFFIRM RTC
WHEREFORE, the appealed

decision is reversed and set
aside. The application for
registration in LRC Cad. Rec.
1256 of the former Court of First
Instance, is hereby dismissed
without costs.
SO ORDERED
Anouevo-Ongkeko
36
Public Lands And Government Lands Distinguished
19 MONTANO No. 3714. Isabelo Montano presented a petition to Whether
VS. CA
January
26, 1909
TRACEY
,J
Anouevo-Ongkeko
the Court of Land Registration for the

inscription of a piece of land in the
barrio of Libis, municipality of
Caloocan, used as a fishery having a
superficial area of 10,805 square
meters, and bounded as set out in the
petition; its value according to the last
assessment being $505.05, United
States currency. This petition was
opposed by the Solicitor-General in
behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
the entity known asObras Pias de la
Sagrada Mitra, the former on the
ground that the land in question
belonged to the Government of the
United States, and the latter, that it was
the absolute owner of all the dry land
along the eastern boundary of the said
fishery. The Court of Land Registration
in its decision of December 1, 1906,
dismissed the said oppositions without
costs and decreed, after a general entry
by default, the adjudication and
registration of the property described in
the petition, in favor of Isabelo
Montano y Marcial. From this decision
only counsel for the Director of Public
Lands appealed to this court. and
precisely Isabelo Montano sought title
thereon on the strength of 10 years'
occupation pursuant to paragraph 6,
section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine
Commission
or
not the land in
question can
be acquired by
Montano
PUBLIC LANDS.In Acts of the Congress

of the United States the term "public lands"
is uniformly used to describe so much of the
national domain under the legislative power
of the Congress as has not been .subjected to
private right or devoted to public use.
TIDEWATER LANDS.Lands under the
ebb and flow -of the tide being reserved for
public uses of navigation and fishery and
subject to
Congressional regulation,
pursuant to its power over commerce, are
not understood as included in the term
"public lands" when used in general laws
authorizing private appropriation thereof as
homesteads or otherwise.
SWAMPS AND MARSHES.Swamps and
marshes not available for the purpose of
navigation or public uses may be subjected
to private appropriation although covered by
the tides.
"MANGLARES."Of this character are the
manglar or mangrove swamps of the
Philippine Islands in which grow aquatic
trees cultivated and in common use for
domestic or commercial purposes. Such
manglares when 'converted by man into
fisheries and used as such for the statutory
period are the subject of private ownership
under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
and Act No. 926 of the Philippine
Commission.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Accordingly, "government land"
and "public domain" are not
synonymous items. The first
includes not only the second, but
also other lands of the
Government already reserved or
devoted to public use or subject
to private right. In other words,
the Government owns real estate
which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate
which is not part thereof.
Government property was of two
kinds first, that of public use
or service, said to be of public
ownership, and second, that of
having a private character or use.
(Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.)
Lands of the first class, while
they retain their public character
are inalienable. Those of the
second are not. Therefore, there
is much real property belonging
to the Government which is not
affected by statutes for the
settlement, prescription or sale
of public lands. Examples in
point are properties occupied by
public buildings or devoted to
municipal or other governmental
uses.
It is settled that the general
legislation of Congress in respect
to public lands does not extend
to tide lands. It provided that the
scrip might be located on the
unoccupied and unappropriated
public lands. As said inNewhall
vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A
marshland which is inundated by
the rise of tides belong to the
37
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

State and is not susceptible to
appropriation by occupation, has
no application in the present case
inasmuch as in said case the land
subject matter of the litigation
was not yet titled
3. Non-Registrable Properties
Property Of Public Domain
L- The
20 MARTINEZ No.
VS. CA
31271. Ap
ril
29,
1974
ESGUER
RA, J.
Court may not adjudge title over nonregisterable land.The Land Registration
Court
has
no
jurisdiction
over
non-registerable properties, such as public
navigable rivers which are parts of the
public domain, and cannot validly adjudge
the registration of title in favor of a private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the
Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856
in the name of petitioners may be attacked at
any time, either directly or collaterally, by
the State which is not bound by any
prescriptive period provided for by the
Statute of Limitations.
spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor

Suarez, now petitioners-appellees, are the
registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
located in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by
transfer certificate of title No. 15856 of the
Register of Deeds of the said province.
Both parcels of land are fishponds. The
property involved in the instant case is the
second
parcel
mentioned
in
the
above-named transfer certificate of title.
The disputed property was originally
owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who
secured a titulo real over it way back in
1883. After the death of Paulino
Montemayor the said property passed to his
successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor
and Donata Montemayor, who in turn, sold
it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain
Potenciano Garcia.
Right of State to recover non-registerable

land does not prescribe.The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the State of the
public properties fraudulently registered and
which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe.
The Secretary of Public Works and
Communications has jurisdiction to order
removal of obstructions to navigable
waters.When it comes to registered
properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications under
Republic Act 2056 to order the removal of
obstruction to navigation along a public and
navigable creek or river included therein,
has been definitely settled and is no longer
open to question.
Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented

by the then municipal president of Lubao,
Pedro Beltran, from restoring the dikes
constructed on the contested property, the
former, on June 22, 1914, filed Civil Case
No. 1407 with the Court of First Instance
against the said Pedro Beltran to restrain the
latter in his official capacity from molesting
him in the possession of said second parcel,
and on even date, applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was issued
against said municipal president. The Court,
by decision promulgated June 12, 1916,
declared permanent the preliminary
injunction, which, decision, on appeal, was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on August
21, 1918. From June 22, 1914, the dikes
around the property in question remained
Anouevo-Ongkeko
38
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
closed until a portion thereof was again

opened just before the outbreak of the
Pacific War.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia
applied for the registration of both parcels
of land in his name, and the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land
registration court, granted the registration
over and against the opposition of the
Attorney-General and the Director of
Forestry. Pursuant to the Courts decision,
original certificate of title No. 14318,
covering said parcels 1 and 2 was issued to
the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza
Sioson.
These parcels of land were subsequently
bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose
name transfer certificate of title No. 1421
was first issued on November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these
properties changed hands until eventually
they were acquired by the herein appellee
spouses who hold them by virtue of transfer
certificate of title No. 15856.
Some four (4) years later, and while Civil
Case No. 751 was still pending, the
Honorable
Florencio
Moreno,
then
Secretary
of
Public
Works
and
Communications,
ordered
another
investigation of the said parcel of land,
directing the appellees herein to remove the
dikes they had constructed, on the strength
of the authority vested in him by Republic
Act No. 2056, approved on June 13, 1958,
entitled An Act To Prohibit, Remove
and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams,
Dikes, Or Any Other Walls In Public
Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In
Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate
Works in Such Waters or Waterways And
In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To
Provide Penalties For Its Violation, And
For Other Purposes.1 The said order which
gave rise to the instant proceedings,
Anouevo-Ongkeko
39
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
embodied a threat that the dikes would be

demolished should the herein appellees fail
to comply therewith within thirty (30) days.
The spouses Martinez replied to the order
by commencing on January 2, 1959 the
present case, which was decided in their
favor by the lower Court
21
LAUREL
VS.
GARCIA
G.R. No.
92013.
July 25,
1990
GUTIER
REZ, JR.,
J.
These two (2) petitions for prohibition

seek to enjoin respondents from
proceeding with the bidding for the
sale of the 3,179 square meters of land
at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku
Tokyo, Japan. The latter case also,
prays for a writ of mandamus to fully
disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale
of the Roppongi property.
The Roppongi case is one of the four
properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the
Reparation Agreement entered into
with Japan. The other three (3)
properties
include
Nampeidai
Property (present site of the Philippine
Embassy
Chancery),
Kobe
Commercial Property (commercial
lot being used as a warehouse and
parking lot for consulate staff) and
Kobe Residential Property (resident
lot which is now vacant).
Can
the
Roppongi
property and
others of its
kind
be
alienated by
the Philippine
Government?
Does the Chief
Executive, her
officers
and
agents, have
the authority
and
jurisdiction, to
sell
the
Roppongi
property?
There can be no doubt that it is of public

dominion unless it is convincingly shown
that the property has become patrimonial.
This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the
Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man and can not be alienated.As property
of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction
of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State
as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare
and cannot be the object of appropriation.
oppongi property correctly classified under
paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code
as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public service.The
Roppongi property is correctly classified
under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public service.
The Reparations Agreement provides

that reparations valued at $550M
would be payable in twenty (20) years
in accordance with annual schedules of
procurements to be fixed by the
Philippine and Japanese governments.
The procurements are to be divided
into government sector and those for
private parties in projects, the latter
shall be made available only to Filipino
citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Roppongi property is of public dominion.
A property continues to be part of the public

domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being
1.Can the Roppongi property

and others of its kind be
alienated by the Philippine
Government?
NO. There can be no doubt
that the property is of public
dominion and the respondents
have failed to show that it has
become patrimonial.
The property is correctly
classified under Art 420 of the
Civil Code as property belonging
to the State and intended for
some public service. The fact
that it has not been used for
actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to
patrimonial
property.
Such
conversion happens only if
property is withdrawn from
public
use,
through
an
abandonment of the intention to
use the Roppongi property for
public service and to make it
patrimonial
property.
Abandonment must be a certain
and positive act based on correct
legal premises.
The EO does not declare that the
properties lost their public
40
entities in
projects.
national
development
The Roppongi property was acquired

under the heading Government
Sector for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeida due to the
need for major repairs. However, the
Roppongi property has remained
underdeveloped since that time.
Although there was a proposal to lease
the property with the provision to have
buildings built at the expense of the
lessee, the same was not acted
favorably upon by the government.
Instead, President Aquino issued EO
No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens
or entities to avail of separations
capital goods and services in the event
of sale, lease or dispositions.
Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by
various sectors, the Executive branch
of the government pushed for the sale
of reparation properties, starting with
the Roppongi lot. The property has
twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price of $225M. The
first was a failure, while the second has
been postponed and later restrained by
the SC.
An abandonment of the intention to use the

Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article
422 of the Civil Code must be definite.The
respondents
enumerate
various
pronouncements by concerned public
officials insinuating a change of intention.
We
emphasize,
however,
that
an
abandonment of the intention to use the
Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article
422 of the Civil Code must be definite.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the
non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the governments own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack
of financial support to repair and improve
the property of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro,
166 SCRA 368 [1988]. Abandonment must
be a certain and positive act based on correct
legal premises.
Amongst the arguments of the

respondents is that the subject property
is not governed by our Civil Code, but
rather by the laws of Japan where the
property is located. They relied upon
the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law
regarding the acquisition, transfer and
devolution of the title to a property.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
such.The fact that the Roppongi site has

not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen
and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA
481 [1975]). A property continues to be part
of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until
there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being
such.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to

Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of
the Roppongi propertys original purpose.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy
to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment
of the Roppongi propertys original purpose.
Even the failure by the government to repair
the building in Roppongi is not
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

character, merely intending the
properties to be made available
to foreigners and not to Filipinos
alone, in case of sale, lease or
other disposition. Furthermore, it
is based on the wrong premise
that the Japan properties can be
sold to end-users, when in fact it
cannot.
Neither does the CARP Law reclassify the properties into
patrimonial properties, merely
stating that sources of funds for
its implementation be sourced
from proceeds of the disposition
of the Government in foreign
countries, but not that the
Roppongi property be withdrawn
from being classified as a
property of public dominion.
CONFLICT OF LAW
Furthermore, the respondents
argument that the Japanese law
and not our Civil Code shall
apply is incorrect. There is no
conflict of law in this situation.
A conflict of law arises only
when:
A.There is a dispute over the
title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of
conveyance,
the
essential
validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and
effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined.
B.A foreign law on land
ownership and its conveyance
is asserted to conflict with a
41
abandonment since as earlier stated, there

simply was a shortage of government funds.
The
recent
Administrative
Orders
authorizing a study of the status and
conditions of government properties in
Japan
were
merely
directives
for
investigation but did not in any way signify
a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Republic Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) does
not authorize the Executive Department to
sell the Roppongi property.Section 63 (c)
of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law)
which provides as one of the sources of
funds for its implementation, the proceeds of
the disposition of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries, did not
withdraw the Roppongi property from being
classified as one of public dominion when it
mentions Philippine properties abroad.
Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are
alienable and not to those reserved for public
use or service. Rep. Act No. 6657, therefore,
does not authorize the Executive Department
to sell the Roppongi property. It merely
enumerates possible sources of future
funding to augment (as and when needed)
the Agrarian Reform Fund created under
Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any
property outside of the commerce of man
cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
President can not convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her
own sole will; Conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted
by Congress.It is not for the President to
convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any
such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress.
It requires executive and legislative
concurrence.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

domestic law on the same
matters.
Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply. Both
elements does not exist in the
case. The issues are not
concerned with the validity of
ownership or title. There is no
question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The
issue is the authority of the
government officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to
the state and the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect the
sale, which should be governed
by Philippine law The rule of lex
situs does not apply.
2.Does the Chief Executive, her
officers and agents, have the
authority and jurisdiction, to sell
the Roppongi property?
NO. A law or a formal
declaration to withdraw the
Roppongi property from public
domain to make it alienable and
a need for legislative authority
to allow the sale of the property
is needed. None has been
enacted for this purpose.
42
22
REPUBLIC
VS.
ALAGAD
G.R. No.
66807.
January
26, 1989
SARMIE
NTO, J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
On 11 October 1951, Melitona,

Carmen (with spouse Espiridion
Kolimlim), Justo, Carlos, Librada (with
spouse Emerson Abano), Demetrio,
and Antonio Alagad filed an
application for registration of their title
over a parcel of land situated at Linga,
Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263
hectares (survey plan Psu- 116971),
which was amended after the land was
divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1
with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot
2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares
(survey plan Psu-226971, amendment
2). The Republic opposed the
application on the stereo-typed ground
that applicants and their predecessors
have not been in possession of the land
openly, continuously, publicly and
adversely under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 26 July 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the
public domain. It appears that barrio
folk also opposed the application. On
16 January 1956, by virtue of a final
judgment in said case, supplemented
by orders issued on 21 March 1956 and
13 August 1956, the Alagads were
declared owners of Lot 1 and the
remaining portion, or Lot 2, was
declared public land. Decree N-51479
was entered and OCT 0- 401, dated 18
October 1956, was issued in the names
of the Alagads. In August 1966, the
Alagads filed before the Municipal
Court of Pila, Laguna (Civil Case 52)
an action to evict the barrio folk
The State cannot be bound by, or estopped

from the mistakes or negligent acts of its
officials or agents, much more, non-suited
as a result thereof.With respect to the first
question, we hold that the Court of Appeals
has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
It is well-established that the State cannot be
bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its officials or agents, much
more, non-suited as a result thereof. This is
so because: x x x [T]he state as a persona in
law is the judicial entity, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land
under the basic doctrine embodied in the
1935 Constitution as well as the present
charter. It is charged moreover with the
conservation of such patrimony. There is
need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny
before private claims to portions thereof are
judicially accorded recognition, especially
so where the matter is sought to be raked up
anew after almost fifty years. Such
primordial consideration, not the apparent
carelessness, much less the acquiescence of
public officials, is the controlling norm.
Res Judicata; Land Registration; Res
Judicata will not apply if the court which
rendered the prior judgment had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.There
is no merit either, in claims that res judicata
is an impediment to reversion of property. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals, this court
stated: x x x [a] certiorari of title may be
ordered cancelled (Republic v. Animas, et
al,, supra), and the cancellation may be
pursued through an ordinary action therefor.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
Laguna de Bay is a lake (Colegio

de San Jose case); Highest
Ordinary Depth Laguna de Bay
has long been recognized as a
lake. Laguna de Bay is a body of
water formed in depressions of
the earth; it contains fresh water
coming from rivers and brooks
or springs, and is connected with
Manila Bay by the Pasig River.
Inasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a
lake, the Court must resort to the
legal provisions governing the
ownership and use of lakes and
their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and
ownership of the parcels of land
in question. The recourse to legal
provisions is necessary, for
under Article 74 of the Law of
Waters, the natural bed or basin
of lakes is the ground covered by
their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth and in which
case, it forms part of the national
dominion. When Laguna de
Bays waters are at their highest
ordinary depth has been defined
as the highest depth of the waters
of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season, such depth being the
regular,
common,
natural,
which occurs always or most of
the time during the year.
Otherwise, where the rise in
water level is due to the
extraordinary action of nature,
43
occupying portions of Lot 1. On 8
August 1968, judgment was rendered
in the eviction case ordering the barrio
folk therein to return possession of the
premises to the Alagads. The barrio
folk did not appeal. The Republic filed
a petition for annulment of title and
reversion, insofar as the 1.42 hectare
northwestern portion on end of Lot 1 is
concerned, contending that such is
foreshore land, and that the Alagads
could not have had an imperfect title to
it as it was the barrio folk who filled up
the land to elevate the land to its
present condition. The Court, on 6
October 1970, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the
Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his
deputies from enforcing the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case 52, and
the Alagads from selling, mortgaging,
disposing or otherwise entering into
any transaction affecting the area. The
case was set for pre-trial on 6 July
1971,
to
which
the
attorney
representing the Republic did not
appear. On 16 July 1971, the court
dismissed the complaint. The Republic
filed a motion for reconsideration, was
set for hearing, and finally denied by
the court. Appeal was made to the
Court of Appeals, which sustained the
trial court for failure to show in the
record on appeal that the appeal was
perfected on time. Hence, the appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower courts, and
reinstated the Republics complaint and
thus remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
This action cannot be barred by the prior

judgment of the land registration court, since
the said court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res
judicata does not apply the parcel registered
in the names of the private respondents were
foreshore land, the land registration court
could not have validly awarded title thereto.
It would have been without the authority to
do so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands had
failed to appeal from the decree of
registration could not have validated the
courts
decision,
rendered
without
jurisdiction.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

rainfall for instance, the portions
inundated thereby are not
considered part of the bed or
basin of the body of water in
question. It cannot therefore be
said to be foreshore land but land
outside of the public dominion,
and land capable of registration
as private property.
Forest Lands
Anouevo-Ongkeko
44

Atty. Rowel Ilagan
REPUBLIC
No.
Private
respondent,
Isabel
Lastimado,
Whether
or
Republic
Act
931;
Land
inside
military
No,
the petitioner is not
23
VS. CA AND
LASTIMAD
O
L-39473.
April 30,
1979
MELENC
IO-HERR
ERA, J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
in the Court of First Instance a Petition

for the reopening of cadastral
proceedings over a portion of Lot No.
626 of the Mariveles Cadastre,
consisting of 971.0569 hectares,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 931, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2061.
In the absence of any opposition,
whether from the Government or from
private individuals, private respondent
was
allowed
to
present
her
evidence ex-parte. The said land was
awarded to the private respondent.
Within one year from the entry of the
decree of registration, petitioner filed a
Petition for Review pursuant to Sec.
38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud
alleging that during the period of
alleged adverse possession by private
respondent, said parcel of land was part
of the U.S. Military Reservation in
Bataan, which was formally turned
over to the Republic of the Philippines
only on December 22, 1965, and that
the same is inside the public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not
subject to disposition or acquisition
under the Public Land Law.
The trial Court ruled, and was upheld
by the Court of Appeals, that no fraud
was committed by private respondent,
which deprived petitioner of its day in
Court as there was no showing that she
was aware of the facts alleged by the
Government, so that she could not have
suppressed them with intent to deceive.
The trial Court also noted that
petitioner had failed to file an
opposition to the reopening of the
cadastral proceedings despite notices
sent not only to the Solicitor General as
required by Republic Act No. 931. but
to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau
not
the
petitioner was
estopped from
filing a suit
due to the
inaction
and/or neglect
of its officials.
reservation cannot be the object of cadastral

proceedings or reopening under Republic
Act 931.If the allegation of petitioner that
the land in question was inside the military
reserva tion at the time it was claimed is
true, then, it cannot be the object of any
cadastral proceeding nor can it be the object
of reopening under Republic Act No. 931.
No conversion of land into private property
despite longer possession of land; Reasons;
Agency having jurisdiction to register under
the Torrens System land forming part of
public forest.Similarly, if the land in
question, indeed, forms part of the public
forest, then, possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert it into private property
as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court
to register under the Torrens Systems.
naction of Office of Solicitor General to
oppose cadastral proceedings not a bar to
States recovery of public land; Reasons.
Even assuming that the government agencies
can be faulted for inaction and neglect
(although the Solicitor General claims that it
received no notice), yet, the same cannot
operate to bar action by the State as it cannot
be estopped by the mistake or error of its
officials or agents. Further, we cannot lose
sight of the cardinal consideration that
State as a persona in law is the juridical
entity, which is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land under basic
Constitutional precepts, and that it is
moreover charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.
estopped.
The Supreme Court
held that If the allegation of
petitioner that the land in
question was inside the military
reservation at the time it was
claimed is true, then, it cannot be
the object of any cadastral p nor
can it be the object of reopening
under
Republic
Act
No.
931. Similarly, if the land in
question, indeed forms part of
the
public
forest,
then,
possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert it into
private property as it is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the
Cadastral Court to register under
the Torrens System.
Even
assuming
that
the
government agencies can be
faulted for inaction and neglect
(although the Solicitor General
claims that it received no notice),
yet, the same cannot operate to
bar action by the State as it
cannot be estopped by the
mistake or error of its officials or
agents. Further, one cannot lose
sight
of
the
cardinal
consideration that "the State as
persona in law is the juridical
entity, which is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in
land" under basic Constitutional
Precepts, and that it is moreover
charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.
The case was remanded to the
trial court to allow petitioner to
present evidence in support of its
45
of Forestry as well. It then concluded

that "the remedy granted by section 38
of the Land Registration Act is
designed to give relief to victims of
fraud, not to those who are victims of
their own neglect, inaction or
carelessness, especially when no
attempt is ever made to excuse or
justify the neglect." With the foregoing
as the essential basis, the trial Court
dismissed the Petition for Review.
Hence, the present petition.
Watersheds
VS. No.
24 TAN
DIRECTOR
OF
FORESTRY
L-24548.
October
27, 1983
MAKASI
AR, J.
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of

Forestry issued notice advertising for
public bidding a certain tract of public
forest land situated in Olongapo,
Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares,
within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares
of timberland, which was turned over
by the US Government to the
Philippine Government. Wenceslao
Tan with nine others submitted their
application in due form.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Petition for Review.
I. Whether or
not
petitioners
timber license
is valid (No)
II. Whether
or
not
petitioner had
exhausted
administrative
remedies
available (No)
The area was granted to the

petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary
Gozon of Agriculture and Natural
Resources
issued
a
general
memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of
Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber
Licenses (OTL) subject to some
conditions
stated
therein
(not
exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL
and not exceeding 5000 hectares for
extension)
What is important for validity of a timber

license is the date of release thereof not the
alleged date of signing stated thereat.The
release of the license on January 6, 1964,
gives rise to the impression that it was
ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which
date the authority of the Director of Forestry
was revoked. But, what is of greatest
importance is the date of the release or
issuance, and not the date of the signing of
the license. While petitioner-appellants
timber license might have been signed on
December 19, 1963 it was released only on
January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right
is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out
by the trial court, the Director of Forestry
had no longer any authority to release the
license on January 6, 1964. Therefore,
petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license. This is
evident on the face of his petition as
supplemented by its annexes which includes
Ordinary Timber License No. 20-64
Acts of Secretary of Natural Resources
should be appealed and the President first
before court action.To this We cannot
agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the
order of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources
Feliciano
(replacing
Gozon)
promulgated on December 19, 1963 a
memorandum revoking the authority
Anouevo-Ongkeko
I
Petitioners timber license was
signed and released without
authority and is therefore void
ab initio. In the first place, in the
general memorandum dated May
30, 1963, the Director of
Forestry was authorized to grant
a new ordinary timber license
only where the area covered
thereby was not more than 3,000
hectares; the tract of public
forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares In the
second place, at the time it was
released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had
no more authority to grant any
license. (The license was
released to the petitioner
onJanuary 6, 1964 while on the
other hand, the authority of the
Director of Forestry to issue
license
was
revoked
on December 19, 1963). In view
thereof, the Director of Forestry
had no longer any authority to
release the license on January 6,
1964, and said license is
therefore void ab initio. What is
46
delegated to the Director of Forestry to
grant ordinary timber licenses. On the
same date, OTL in the name of Tan,
was signed by then Acting Director of
Forestry, without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. On January 6, 1964, the
license was released by the Director of
Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company
wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR
praying that the OTL of Tan be
revoked. On March 9, 1964, The
Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL
null and void (but the same was not
granted to Ravago). Petitionerappellant moved for a reconsideration
of the order, but the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
denied the motion.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
President of the Philippines, who issued

Executive
Proclamation
No.
238
withdrawing the area from private
exploitation, and establishing it as the
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve.
Considering that the President has the power
to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
respondents-appellees, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is
failure on his part to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
Forestry; Administrative Law; Actions;
Constitutional Law; State is immune from
suit for actions of officers acting within
scope of their authority, as in revocation of
timber license. Petitioner-appellant not
only failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, but also failed to note that his
action is a suit against the State which, under
the doctrine of State immunity from suit,
cannot prosper unless the State gives its
consent to be sued (Kawananakoa vs.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7
Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973
Constitution). The respondents- appellees, in
revoking the petitioner-appellants timber
license, were acting within the scope of their
authority. Petitioner- appellant contends that
this case is not a suit against the State but
an application of a sound principle of law
whereby administrative decisions or
actuations may be reviewed by the courts as
a protection afforded the citizens against
oppression (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing
the shard of his contention, We find that
petitioner-appellants action is just an
attempt to circumvent the rule establishing
State exemption from suits. He cannot use
that principle of law to profit at the expense
and prejudice of the State and its citizens.
The promotion of public welfare and the
protection of the inhabitants near the public
forest are property, rights and interest of the
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

of greatest importance is the date
of the release or issuance. Before
its release, no right is acquired
by the licensee.
Granting
arguendo,
that
petitioner-appellant's
timber
license is valid, still respondentsappellees can validly revoke his
timber license. "A license is
merely a permit or privilege to
do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or
a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it
taxation
The welfare of the people is the
supreme law. Thus, no franchise
or right can be availed of to
defeat the proper exercise of
police power.
II
Petitioner did not exhaust
administrative remedy in this
case. He did not appeal the order
of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture
and
Natural
Resources to the President of the
Philippines. Considering that the
President has the power to
review on appeal the orders or
acts of the respondents, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant
to take that appeal is failure on
his part to exhaust his
47
State.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

administrative remedies.
Forestry
Law;
Administrative
Law;
Contracts; A timber license may he revoked
any time pursuant to its express terms.
Granting
arguendo,
that
petitioner-appellants timber license is valid,
still respondents-appellees can validly
revoke his timber license. As pointed out
earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and
regulations included in the ordinary timber
license states: The terms and conditions of
this license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry, and
that this license may be made to expire at an
earlier date, when public interests so
require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber
license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.
Director
of
Forestry
under
the
administrative control of Department
Secretary.As provided in the aforecited
provision, timber licenses are subject to the
authority of the Director of Forestry. The
utilization and disposition of forest resources
is directly under the control and supervision
of the Director of Forestry. However, while
Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that forest products shall be
cut, gathered and removed from any forest
only upon license from the Director of
Forestry, it is no less true that as a
subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry
is subject to the control of the Department
Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (Sec. 79[c], Rev. Adm.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
48
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
Code), who, therefore, may impose

reasonable regulations in the exercise of the
powers of the subordinate officer (Director
of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309,
May 5, 1981).
Mangrove Swamps
25 DIRECTOR G.R. No. The said land consists of 178,113 The
OF
FORESTRY
VS.
VILLAREA
L
32266.
February
27, 1989
CRUZ, J.
square meters of mangrove swamps

located in the municipality of Sapian,
Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging
that
he
and
his
predecessors-ininterest had been in
possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several
persons, including the petitioner on
behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application
was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The
Director of Forestry then came to this
Court in a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. He
asks that the registration be reversed.
basic
question
before
the
Court is the
legal
classification
of mangrove
swamps,
or
manglares, as
they
are
commonly
known. If they
are part of our
public forest
lands, they are
not alienable
under
the
Constitution.
If they are
considered
public
agricultural
lands,
they
may
be
acquired under
private
ownership.
The
private
respondents
claim to the
land
in
question must
be judged by
these criteria.
Public Lands; Public Forests; Mangrove

Swamps, Classification Of; Mangrove
swamps are classified as forest lands but
said classification is descriptive only of its
legal nature and status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually
looks
like.Mangrove
swamps
or
manglares should be understood as
comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the aforecited
Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of
1917. The legislature having so determined,
we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise
of our own discretion. The statutory
definition remains unchanged to date and, no
less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly,
the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional,
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify
our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The
law is thus presumed valid and so must be
respected. We repeat our statement in the
Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. That determination
having been made and no cogent argument
having been raised to annul it, we have no
duty as judges but to apply it. And so we
shall.
The Supreme Court held that

mangrove swamps as forest
lands is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not
have to 'e descriptive of what the
land actually loo0s li0e$
Furthermore
the
legislativedefinition em'odied in
section 18 of the "evised
.dministrative Code of 1217
which declares thatmangrove
swamps or manglares form part
of the pu'lic forests of the
3hilippines hence they are
notaliena'le$
The
evidence
presented 'y the respondent in its
claim were not sufficient to
prove
itspossession
and
ownership of the land, he only
presented
ta4
declaration$
/herefore the decision of
theCourt of .ppeals was set aside
and
the
application
for
registration of title 'y the
respondent is dismissed'y the
Supreme Court
The previous description of mangrove

swamps as agricultural lands covers only
those lands over which ownership had
Anouevo-Ongkeko
49
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
already vested before the Administrative

Code of 1917 became effective.Our
previous description of the term in question
as pertaining to our agricultural lands should
be understood as covering only those lands
over which ownership had already vested
before the Administrative Code of 1917
became effective. Such lands could not be
retroactively legislated as forest lands
because this would be violative of a duly
acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two
months ago in Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, where the possession
of the land in dispute commenced as early as
1909, before it was much later classified as
timberland.
Alienable Public Lands; Mangrove Swamps;
Mangrove swamps form part of the public
forests and are not alienable under the
Constitution.It is reiterated for emphasis
that, conformably to the legislative
definition embodied in Section 1820 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part
of the public forests of the Philippines. As
such, they are not alienable under the
Constitution and may not be the subject of
private ownership until and unless they are
first released as forest land and classified as
alienable agricultural land.
Mineral Lands
26 ATOK-BIG
WEDGE
MINING
CO. VS. CA
G.R. No.
88883.
January
18, 1991
PARAS,
J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9)

hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet, was located sometime
between December 25, 1930 and
December 31, 1930, a period of six (6)
days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, better known
as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-
Whether
or
not
an
individual's
long
term
occupation of
land of the
public domain
vests him with
such
rights
The perfection of a mining claim BEFORE

THE 1935 CONSTITUTION had the
effect of removing the land from public
domain. The perfection of a mining claim
CONVERTED THE PROPERTY TO A
MINERAL LAND and under the laws then
in force REMOVED IT FROM THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the
It is of no importance whether
Benguet and Atok had secured a
patent for as held in the Gold
Creek Mining Corporation case,
for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not
required to secure a patent as
long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws;
50
called Declaration of Location.
The said Declaration of Location of
mineral claim was duly recorded in the
Office of the Mining Recorder
sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia
mineral claim, together with other
mineral claims, was sold by A.I.
Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining
Company, the earlier corporate name
of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company,
Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner)
in a Deed of Sale executed on
November 2, 1931. Since then
petitioner Atok has been in continuous
and
exclusive
ownership
and
possession of said claim up to the
present .
over the same

as to defeat
the rights of
the owner of
that claim.
Atok has paid the realty taxes and

occupation fees for the Fredia mineral
claim. The Fredia mineral claim
together with other mineral claims
owned by Atok has been declared
under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and
that in view of Presidential Decree No.
1214 an application for lease was filed
by Atok covering the Fredia mineral
claim.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership,
is as good as though secured by
patent (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 160 SCRA 228
[1988]).
Mineral Lands; Property; Ownership; For

all physical purposes of ownership, the
owner is not required to secure a patent, as
long as he complies with the provisions of
mining laws.It is of no importance
whether Benguet and Atok had secured a
patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
Corporation case, for all physical purposes
of ownership, the owner is not required to
secure a patent as long as he complies with
the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160
SCRA 228 [1988]). In the case at bar, the
evidence on record pointed that the
petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with
all the requirements of the law regarding the
maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral
Claim.
In the case at bar, the evidence

on record pointed that the
petitioner Atok has faithfully
complied
with
all
the
requirements
of
the
law
regarding the maintenance of the
said Fredia Mineral Claim.
Prescription; Since the subject lot is mineral

land, private respondents possession
thereof no matter how long did not confer
upon him possessory rights over the same.
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and
Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before
the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by
virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could
its use be shared simultaneously by them
On the other hand, private respondent

Liwan Consi has a lot below the land
of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide,
Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a
house thereon sometime in 1964. The
lot is covered by Tax Declaration No.
9462. When he first constructed his
house below the lot of Mr. Acay he
was told that it was not necessary for
him to obtain a building permit as it
was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land
so he was constructing a house thereon.
It was only in January 1984 when
Anouevo-Ongkeko
land, against even the government, without

need of any further act as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. As
the land had become the private property of
the locators, they had the right to transfer the
same.
The perfection of the mining

claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the
public domain. By such act, the
locators
acquired
exclusive
rights over the land, against even
the government, without need of
any further act such as the
purchase of the land or obtaining
of a patent over it. As the land
had become the private property
of the locators, they had the right
to transfer the same, as they did,
to Benguet and Atok .
As in the instant petition, the
record shows that the lot in
question was acquired through a
Deed of Sale executed between
Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
It is, therefore, evident that
Benguet
and
Atok
have
exclusive rights to the property
in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the
51
private respondent Consi repaired the
said house that people came to take
pictures and told him that the lot
belongs to Atok. Private respondent
Consi has been paying taxes on said
land which his father before him had
occupied .
On January 1984, the security guards
of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes,
Security Officer of Atok, that a
construction was being undertaken at
the area of the Fredia mineral claim by
private respondent Liwan Consi.
Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier
to go and take pictures of the
construction. Feliciano Reyes himself
and other security guards went to the
place of the construction to verify and
then to the police to report the matter.
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a
complaint for forcible entry and
detainer against Liwan Consi , which
was dismissed after due hearing by the
MTC of Itogon in favor of Liwan
Consi. Petitioner ATOK appealed to
the RTC of Baguio, which reversed the
decision of the MTC, ordering
defendant Liwan Consi to vacate the
premises of the Fredia Mineral claim,
restoring possession thereof to the
plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company. Defendant Liwan Cosi was
further ordered to remove and demolish
the house he constructed in the
premises of the land of Fredia Mineral
claim.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the
public
domain
except
agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time
of its adoption. The land was not
and could not have been
transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of
acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the
mining
companies
for
agricultural
and
mineral
purposes (Ibid).
On the matter of possession,
private respondent contends that
his predecessor-in-interest has
been in possession of said lot
even before the war and has in
fact cultivated the same. Since
the subject lot is mineral land,
private respondent's possession
of the subject lot no matter how
long did not confer upon him
possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the
New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538.Possession as a fact
cannot be recognized at the same
time
in
two
different
personalities except in the cases
of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact
of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if
there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession; if the dates
of the possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and
if all these conditions are equal,
In a petition for review filed by Liwan

Consi with the CA, the CA rendered its
decision dismissing the subject forcible
entry action, and further rule in part
that: Liwan Consi had a possessory
Anouevo-Ongkeko
and the mining companies for agricultural

and mineral purposes (Ibid.). On the matter
of possession, private respondent contends
that his predecessor-ininterest has been in
possession of said lot even before the war
and has in fact cultivated the same. In the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160
SCRA 288 1988, this Court held: x x x
even if it be assumed that the
predecessor-in-interest of the de la Rosas
had already been in possession of the subject
property, their possession was not in the
concept of owner of the mining claim but of
the property as agricultural land, which it
was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land.
They were not disputing the rights of the
mining locators nor where they seeking to
oust them as such and to replace them in the
mining of the land. x x x. Since the subject
lot is mineral land, private respondents
possession of the subject lot no matter how
long did not confer upon him possessory
rights over the same.
52
right over the property which may

mature into ownership on the basis of
long-term possession under the Public
Land Law. Thus, it held that both
Consi and ATOK are of equal footing
with regards to the subject lot, holding
possessory titles to the land. The
petitioner through its long term
occupancy while respondent mining
firm being the claim locator and
applicant for lease on the mineral
claim.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

the thing shall be placed in
judicial
deposit
pending
determination of its possession
or ownership through proper
proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present,
petitioner ATOK has been in
continuous
and
exclusive
possession of the Fredia mineral
claim while private respondent's
possession
started
only
sometime in 1964 when he
constructed a house thereon.
Clearly, ATOK has superior
possessory rights than private
respondent, Liwan Consi, the
former being "the one longer in
possession."
ATOK
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, which was denied by
the CA. Hence, this petition.
It is therefore clear that from the

legal viewpoint it was really
petitioner who was in actual
physical possession of the
property. Having been deprived
of this possession by the private
respondent, petitioner has every
right to sue for ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by
the Court, it can further be
declared and held that petitioner
Atok has the exclusive right to
the property in question.
National Parks
27 PALOMO
VS. CA
G.R. No.
95608.
January
21, 1997
ROMER
O, J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15

parcels of land covered by Executive
Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the
registration of these lands and donated
the same to his heirs, Ignacio and
Carmen Palomo two months before his
death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid
Whether
or
not forest land
may be owned
by
private
persons.
Laches; It is a trifle late at this point to

argue that the government had no right to
include certain properties in a reservation
for provincial park purposes when the
question should have been raised 83 years
ago.Moreover, despite claims by the
petitioners that their predecessors in interest
were in open, adverse and continuous
The adverse possession which

may be the basis of a grant of
title in confirmation of imperfect
title cases applies only to
domain. It is in the law
governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by
53
original certificates of title were lost
during the Japanese occupation,
Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 1970. The
Register of Deeds of Albay issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime
in October 1953. Sometime in July
1954 President Ramon Magsaysay
issued Proclamation No. 47 converting
the area embraced by Executive Order
No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control,
management,
protection
and
administration
of
the
defunct
Commission of Parks and Wildlife,
now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never
released as alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and,
therefore, is neither susceptible to
disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Law nor registerable under
the Land Registration Act. The
Palomos, however, continued in
possession of the property, paid real
estate taxes thereon and introduced
improvements by planting rice,
bananas, pandan and coconuts. On
April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo
and
Trinidad
Pascual
mortgaged the parcels of land to
guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the
Bank of the Philippine Islands.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years

prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the
lands were surveyed only in December
1913, the very same year they were acquired
by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February
1913 or 10 months before the lands were
surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government
had already surveyed the area in preparation
for its reservation for provincial park
purposes. If the petitioners predecessors in
interest were indeed in possession of the
lands for a number of years prior to their
registration in 1916-1917, they would have
undoubtedly known about the inclusion of
these properties in the reservation in 1913. It
certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue
that the government had no right to include
these properties in the reservation when the
question should have been raised 83 years
ago.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

private persons. It is not
registerable
and
possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are
reclassified
and
considered
disposable and alienable. There
is no question that the lots here
forming part of the forest zone
were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As to the
forfeiture
of
improvements
introduced by petitioners, the
fact that the government failed to
oppose the registration of the
lots in question is no justification
for petitioners to plead good
faith
in
introducing
improvements on the lots.
The principle of estoppel does not operate

against the Government for the acts of its
agents.As regards the petitioners
contention that inasmuch as they obtained
the titles without government opposition, the
government is now estopped from
questioning the validity of the certificates of
title which were granted. As correctly
pointed out by the respondent Court of
Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not
operate against the Government for the act
of its agents.
The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain.
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of
First Instance were readily issued, the lands
are still not capable of appropriation. The
adverse possession which may be the basis
of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable
54
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
lands of the public domain.

It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned
by private persons.It is elementary in the
law governing natural resources that forest
land cannot be owned by private persons. It
is not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into
private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.
Military Or Naval Reservations

A military reservation known as the
28 REPLUBLI No.
C
VS.
MARCOS
L-29675.
Septembe
r
30,
1969.
FERNAN
DO, J.
Republic Act 931; Reopening of proceedings

of registration does not apply to land not the
object of cadastral proceeding.Under
Republic Act 931, only persons "claiming
title to parcels of land that have been the
object of cadastral proceedings" are granted
the right to petition for a reopening thereof if
the other conditions named therein are
successfully met. Therefore, if the parcels of
land were not the object of cadastral
proceedings, then this statute finds no
application.
U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center

consisting of Lots in Baguio' Cadastre
with an aggregate area of 29 hectares,
more or less, was set aside pursuant to
Executive Order No. 1254, issued by
the then President William Howard
Taft of the United States, as attested by
Proclamation No. 114 of the then
Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes,
and Executive Order No. 5139 issued
by the then President Herbert Hoover,
as attested by Proclamation No, 260 of
the then Governor- General Dwight F.
Davis.
Does not apply to parcels of land already

alienated, reserved, leased or disposed of by
Government.The power of the court to
order the reopening of proceedings under
Republic Act 931 is limited "to such of said
parcels of land as have not been alienated,
reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by
the Government.
After independence, the United States

relinquished to the Republic of the
Philippines all claims to title over the
military bases including the aforesaid
lots, their relinquishment being
formalized by an agreement of
December 6, 1956. Then came this
categorical assertion in the petition that
the land involved in this proceeding "is
limited to what is admittedly, and by
unquestionable proof, within the
so-called
U.S.
Fleet
Naval
Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Contrary to the allegation of the

City Attorney, we humbly state
categorically that the land
involved In this case is no longer
a reservation in its strict sense. It
ceased to be a Naval Reservation
of the United States of America
upon the termination of its
sovereignty over the islands. It
was f ormerly reserved and
placed under the control of the
U.S. Naval Department for the
use of Naval Hospital and for
other purposes of the Navy
during the American Regime
(U.S. Government) pursuant to
Executive Order No. 5139
(Annex 'B" of the petition), and
was subsequently released " or
turned over to the Republic of
the Philippines in accordance
with the provisions of the
U.S.-Philippine Military Bases
Agreement on December 6,
1956, The said parcel of land
(Lot 140 of the Baguio City
Cadastre) until this time was not
reserved for military purposes by
the Republic of the Philippines.
55
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
141, Baguio Cadastre."

On May 21, 1965 the Pirasos,
respondents herein, relying on the
controlling, sought the reopening of
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC
Rec. No. 211 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City, praying for
the issuance in their favor of title to a
parcel of land consisting of 290,283
square meters, more or less, situated in
Baguio City. On September 11, 1965,
respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an
opposition. She sought in a pleading
dated March 14, 1966 to be allowed to
introduce evidence to prove her alleged
right to registration of a portion of the
land. This motion was granted in an
order of the respondent Judge dated
May 16, 1966.
Foreshore And Reclaimed Areas

29 REPUBLIC G.R. No. On 11 October 1951, Melitona,
VS.
ALAGAD
66807.
January
26, 1989.
SARMIE
NTO, J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Property of public dominion: Property for

public use or public service. Property,
according to the Civil Code, is either of
public dominion or of private ownership.
Property is of public dominion if it is (1)
intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character;or
if it (2) belongs to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Carmen (with spouse Espiridion

Kolimlim), Justo, Carlos, Librada (with
spouse Emerson Abano), Demetrio,
and Antonio Alagad filed an
application for registration of their title
over a parcel of land situated at Linga,
Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263
hectares (survey plan Psu- 116971),
which was amended after the land was
divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1
with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot
2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares
(survey plan Psu-226971, amendment
2). The Republic opposed the
application on the stereo-typed ground
that applicants and their predecessors
have not been in possession of the land
openly, continuously, publicly and
adversely under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 26 July 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the
Patrimonial property and property of public

dominion. All other property of the State
which is not of the character mentioned in
article [420], is patrimonial property,
meaning to say, property open to
disposition by the Government, or
otherwise, property pertaining to the
national domain, or public lands. Property of
Laguna de Bay is a lake (Colegio

de San Jose case); Highest
Ordinary Depth Laguna de Bay
has long been recognized as a
lake. Laguna de Bay is a body of
water formed in depressions of
the earth; it contains fresh water
coming from rivers and brooks
or springs, and is connected with
Manila Bay by the Pasig River.
Inasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a
lake, the Court must resort to the
legal provisions governing the
ownership and use of lakes and
their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and
ownership of the parcels of land
in question. The recourse to legal
provisions is necessary, for
under Article 74 of the Law of
Waters, the natural bed or basin
of lakes is the ground covered by
56
public domain. It appears that barrio
folk also opposed the application. On
16 January 1956, by virtue of a final
judgment in said case, supplemented
by orders issued on 21 March 1956 and
13 August 1956, the Alagads were
declared owners of Lot 1 and the
remaining portion, or Lot 2, was
declared public land. Decree N-51479
was entered and OCT 0- 401, dated 18
October 1956, was issued in the names
of the Alagads. In August 1966, the
Alagads filed before the Municipal
Court of Pila, Laguna (Civil Case 52)
an action to evict the barrio folk
occupying portions of Lot 1. On 8
August 1968, judgment was rendered
in the eviction case ordering the barrio
folk therein to return possession of the
premises to the Alagads. The barrio
folk did not appeal. The Republic filed
a petition for annulment of title and
reversion, insofar as the 1.42 hectare
northwestern portion on end of Lot 1 is
concerned, contending that such is
foreshore land, and that the Alagads
could not have had an imperfect title to
it as it was the barrio folk who filled up
the land to elevate the land to its
present condition. The Court, on 6
October 1970, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the
Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his
deputies from enforcing the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case 52, and
the Alagads from selling, mortgaging,
disposing or otherwise entering into
any transaction affecting the area. The
case was set for pre-trial on 6 July
1971,
to
which
the
attorney
representing the Republic did not
appear. On 16 July 1971, the court
dismissed the complaint. The Republic
filed a motion for reconsideration, was
Anouevo-Ongkeko
the public dominion, on the other hand,

refers to things held by the State by regalian
right. They are things res publicae in nature
and
hence,
incapable
of
private
appropriation. Thus, under the present
Constitution, [w]ith the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated.
Public Dominion, as to waters Article 502
provides that (1) Rivers and their natural
beds; (2) Continuous or intermittent waters
of springs and brooks running in their
natural beds and the beds themselves; (3)
Waters rising continuously or intermittently
on lands of public dominion; (4) Lakes and
lagoons formed by Nature on public lands,
and their beds; (5) Rain waters running
through ravines or sand beds, which are also
of public dominion; (6) Subterranean waters
on public lands; (7) Waters found within the
zone of operation of public works, even if
constructed by a contractor; (8) Waters
rising continuously or intermittently on
lands belonging to private persons, to the
State, to a province, or to a city or
municipality from the moment they leave
such lands; and (9) The waste waters of
fountains, sewers and public establishments
are of public dominion. It is also ordained in
Article 44 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 3
August 1866 that natural ponds and lakes
existing upon public lands and fed by public
waters, belong to the public domain. Lakes,
ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of
private individuals, or the State or provinces,
belong to the respective owners of such
lands, and those situated upon lands of
communal use belong to their respective
pueblos.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth and in which
case, it forms part of the national
dominion. When Laguna de
Bays waters are at their highest
ordinary depth has been defined
as the highest depth of the waters
of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season, such depth being the
regular,
common,
natural,
which occurs always or most of
the time during the year.
Otherwise, where the rise in
water level is due to the
extraordinary action of nature,
rainfall for instance, the portions
inundated thereby are not
considered part of the bed or
basin of the body of water in
question. It cannot therefore be
said to be foreshore land but land
outside of the public dominion,
and land capable of registration
as private property.
Foreshore land A foreshore land has been

defined as that part of (the land) which is
between high and low water and left dry by
57
set for hearing, and finally denied by
the court. Appeal was made to the
Court of Appeals, which sustained the
trial court for failure to show in the
record on appeal that the appeal was
perfected on time. Hence, the appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower courts, and
reinstated the Republics complaint and
thus remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
the flux and reflux of the tides, or The

strip of land that lies between the high and
low water marks and that is alternatively wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide. If
the submergence, however, of the land is
due to precipitation, it does not become
foreshore, despite its proximity to the
waters.
IV. JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES

Requisites for Availment of Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act
the Requisites for Confirmation of Imperfect In any case, respondents bare
30 REPUBLIC G.R. No. Respondents filed an application for Should
VS.
ALCONAB
A
155012.
April 14,
2004
DAVIDE,
JR., C.J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
registration of title over 5 parcels of

land located in Laguna. They stated
that they are the sole heirs of Melendez
spouses and that their parents had been
in possession of the property since
1949. After the death of their parents,
they respectively partitioned the lot and
subdivided it into5 lots. Since then they
have been in actual possession of the
property in the concept of owners and
in a public and peaceful manner. The
republic opposed on the grounds that
they are not in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the property,
tax declaration and tax receipts do not
constitute bona fide right over the land,
ownership based on Spanish title can
no longer be availed and that the said
land is part of the public domain.
Trial court ruled in favour of the
respondents. It ruled that the land is
alienable and not deemed as reserve or
forest land.
application of
the
respondents be
granted? NO
Title.Applicants for confirmation of

imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of
the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that
they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
Actual possession of a land consists in the

manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.The law
speaks of possession and occupation. Since
these words are separated by the conjunction
and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
assertions of possession and

occupation
by
their
since
1940 (as testified to by
Carmencita) or since 1949 (as
testified to by Mauricio and
declared
in
respon-dents
application for registration) are
hardly
the
well-nigh
incontrovertible
evidence
required in cases of this nature.
Proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to
substantiate their claim. They
cannot just offer general
statements which are mere
conclusions of law than factual
evidence of possession. Even
granting that the possession by
the
respondents
parents
commenced in 1940, still they
failed to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land
under a bona fide claim of
58
possession must not be a mere fiction.

Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.
While belated declaration of a property for
taxation purposes does not necessarily
negate the fact of possession, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of
property are, nevertheless, good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for
no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or at least constructive possession.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

acquisition of ownership.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141,
as amended by Republic Act No.
1942,[13] reads as follows:
Section 48. The following
described
citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where
the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: and
occupation by the applicant
himself
or
through
his
predecessor-in-interest, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Indeed the lot is deemed as
alienable
and
disposable.
However there was no sufficient
proof that the respondents are in
actual, continuous, open and
exclusive possession of the land.
No evidence on record shows
that Spouses Mauricio and Luz
Melendez cultivated, had control
over, or used the whole or even a
greater portion of the tract of
land for agricultural purpose
Compliance with the All Requirements for a Government Grant Ipso Jure Converts Land to Private Ownership
CHO No.
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased Whether
or PUBLIC
LANDS;
WHAT
LANDS The earliest possession of the lot
31 OH
VS.
DIRECTOR
OF LANDS
48321.
August
31, 1946
PADILL
Anouevo-Ongkeko
from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in

Tayabas,
which
they
openly,
continuously and adversely possessed
since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh
Cho applied for registration of this
land. The Solicitor General reiterates
not Oh Cho
had
title
Whether
or
not Oh Cho is
entitled to a
decree
of
BELONG
TO
PUBLIC
DOMAIN;
EXCEPTION. All lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the
by the first predecessor in

interest of the applicant for
registration began in 1880. Held:
He does not come under the
59
A, J
Anouevo-Ongkeko
the second objection of the opponent

and adds that the lower court
committed an error in not declaring
null and void the sale of the lot to the
applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496), or
should it not be applicable to the case,
then he would apply for the benefits of
the Public Land Act (C. A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he
has title to the lot that may be
confirmed under the Land Registration
Act. He failed to show that he or any of
his predecessors in interest had
acquired the lot from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, under
the laws, orders and decrees
promulgated
by
the
Spanish
Government in the Philippines, or by
possessory information under the
Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496).
All lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain.
An exception to the rule would be any
land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish
conquest.
(Cario vs. Insular
Government, 212 U. S., 449; 53 Law.
ed., 594.) The applicant does not come
under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title
to the lot, the next question is whether
he is entitled to a decree of registration
thereof under the provisions of the
registration
possession of an occupant and of his

predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before
the Spanish conquest.
PUBLIC LAND ACT, REGISTRATION
UNDER; ALIEN DISQUALIFIED.An
alien is not entitled to a decree of
registration under the provisions of the
Public Land Act, because he is disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The benefits provided in the Public Land
Act for applicant's immediate predecessors
in interest are or constitute a grant or
concession by the State; and before they
could acquire any right under such benefits,
the applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits. The
condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had
been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They
did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to title which was transmissible
to the applicant. The only right, if it may
thus be called, is their possession of the lot
which, tacked to that of their predecessors in
interest, may be availed of by a qualified
person to apply for its registration but not by
a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

exception.
Oh Cho failed to show that he
has title to the lot, which may be
confirmed under the Land
Registration
Act.
All lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain. An exception
to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors in interest since
time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the
presumption that the land had
never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a
private property even before the
Spanish
conquest.
The applicant does not come
under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by
his first predecessor in interest
began
in
1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh
Cho is not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he
is an alien disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public
domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest
would have been entitled toa
decree of registration had they
applied for the same. The
application for the registration of
the land was a condition
precedent, which was not
complied with by the Lagmeos.
60
Public Land Act (C. A. No, 141),

Under the provisions of the Act
invoked by the applicant, he is not
entitled to a decree of registration of
the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain (sections 48, 49, C. A.
No. 141).
As the applicant failed to prove title to
the lot and has invoked the provisions
of the Public Land Act, it seems
unnecessary to make pronouncement in
this case on the nature, character or
classification of the lot sought to be
registered.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Hence, the most they had was
mere possessory right, not title.
This possessory right was what
was transferred to Oh Cho, but
since the latter is an alien, the
possessory right could never
ripen
to
ownership
by
prescription. As an alien, Oh
Cho is disqualified from
acquiring title over public land
by prescription.
Land Acquisition by Private Corporations

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a W/N the land A juridical confirmation proceeding should The fact, therefore, that the
32 DIRECTOR No.
OF LANDS
VS.
IAC
AND ACME
PLYWOOD
& VENEER
CO.
L-73002.
December
29, 1986
NARVAS
A, J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo

Nazario, acquired from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the
Infiels over the landdates back before
the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan land sought to be registered
is a private land pursuant to RA 3872
granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or
within the public domain. Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has
introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when
the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite
of Maconacon Isabela
is already a
private land YES
W/N
the
constitutional
prohibition
against their
acquisition by
private
corporations
or associations
applies- NO
at most be limited to ascertaining whether

the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time as it is not so
much one to confer title as it is to recognize
a title already vested.Nothing can more
clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability
of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum
of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x
x shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title x x x." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the
required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not
confirmation proceedings were

instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as
simply
another
accidental
circumstance, productive of a
defect
hardly
more
than
procedural and in nowise
affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no
doubt of Acme's entitlement to
the land. As it is unquestionable
that in the light of the undisputed
facts, the Infiels, under either the
1935 or the 1973 Constitution,
could have had title in
themselves
confirmed
and
registered,
only
a
rigid
subservience to the letter of the
law would deny the same benefit
to
their
lawful
successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no
61
originally convert the land from public to

private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well
put in Cario, "x x x (T)here are indications
that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

constitutional mandate.
Acme, though a private
corporation, was qualified to
apply
for
the
judicial
confirmation of its title under
Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act since the property at
the time it was purchased by it
from the Infiels on October 29,
1962 was already a PRIVATE
LAND to which they had a
legally
sufficient
and
transferrable title.
The 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested

rights. Thus where land was acquired in
1962 when corporations were allowed to
acquire lands not beyond 1,024 hectares, the
same may be registered in 1982 although
under 1973 Constitution corporations
cannot acquire lands of the public
domain.Even on the proposition that the
land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
and their ancestors, until title in their favor
was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acme's
right to acquire the land at the time it did,
there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or
acquiring interests in public land to which
the vendor had already acquired that type of
so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares. The purely accidental circumstance
that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution
which forbids corporations from owning
lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came
Anouevo-Ongkeko
62
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
into effect, or invalidate transactions then

perfectly valid and proper. This Court has
already held, in analogous circumstances,
that the Constitution cannot impair vested
rights.
33
NATIVIDA
D
VS.
COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No.
88233.
October 4,
1991
GRIO-A
QUINO,
J.
On January 18,1982, Tomas Claudio

Memorial College, Inc. (TCMC) filed
in the Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to
six (6) parcels of land. These lots are
situated in Barrio San Juan, Morong,
Rizal
Alienable lands of the public domain; The

prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against
corporations acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain except through lease, did
not apply to petitioners for they were no
longer alienable lands of the public domain
but private property.
On August 16,1982, the Director of

Lands opposed the application on the
grounds among others that:
-Neither the applicant (TCMC) nor its
predecessors- in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48[b], P.D.
1073);
-The monuments of title and/or the tax
declarations and tax payments receipts.
if any alleged in the application, do not
constitute sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the lands applied for.
The Director's contention that a

corporation may not apply for
confirmation of title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act 141, the Public Land Act,
was disposed of in the Acme
case where this Court ruled that
the defect in filing the
-The parcels applied for are portions of

the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject
to private appropriation; and
The applicant is a private corporation
Anouevo-Ongkeko
Under the facts of this case and

pursuant to the above rulings, the
parcels of land in question had
already been converted to private
ownership through acquisitive
prescription by the predecessorsin-interest of TCMC when the
latter purchased them in 1979.
All that was needed was the
confirmation of the titles of the
previous
owners
or
of
TCMC. Being already private
land when TCMC bought them
in 1979, the prohibition in the
1973
Constitution
against
corporations acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain
except through lease (Article
XIV,
Section
11,
1973
Constitution) did not apply to
them for they were no longer
domain but private property.
63
disqualified under the New Philippine

Constitution to hold alienable land of
the public domain (Sec. 11, Art. XVI,
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

confirmation proceedings in the
name of a corporation was
simply
an
"accidental
circumstance, x x x in nowise
affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings." (Director of Lands
vs. IAC and Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., 146 SCRA
509, 522.) Since the petitioners
could have had their respective
titles confirmed prior to the sale
to TCMC, it was not necessary
for the corporation to take the
circuitous route of assigning to
natural persons its rights to the
lots for the purpose of
complying, on paper, with the
technicality of having natural
persons file the applications for
confirmation of title to the
private lands.
TCMC, the petitioners thereafter

adduced evidence in support of the
application, showing that the original
owners had possessed and cultivated
the land as owners for more than 30
years before they were sold to TCMC.
On March 16, 1983, the lower court
rendered a decision
ordering the
registration of Lots 3010, 2855, 2853,
2851 and 5650 in the names of Oscar
H. Natividad, Eugenio P. Pascual and
Bartolome R. Ramos. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:
V. REGISTRATION UNDER THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE

Acquisition of Ownership in Any Other Manner Provided by Law
34 INTERNAT G.R. No. IHVCP is a company engaged in the Whether or Transfer of ownership; Effect on existing Yes.
IONAL
HARDWOO
D
AND
VENEER
CO. VS. UP
52518.
August
13, 1991
DAVIDE,
JR., J.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
manufacture,
processing
and
exportation of plywood. It renewed its
timber license, which was granted by
the government and shall be valid for
25 years, in early 1960. Said license
authorizes the company to cut, collect
and remove timber from the portion of
timber land located in certain
municipalities of Laguna, including
not UP is
owner of
portion
timberland
Paete.
the
the
of
in
timber license agreements.When it ceded

and transferred the property to UP, the
Republic of the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and,
more specifically, in respect to the areas
covered by the timber license of petitioner,
removed and segregated it from a public
forest; it divested itself of its rights and title
thereto and relinquished and conveyed the
The Court ruled that R.A. 3990

ceded and transferred in full
ownership to UP the area, which
means that the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed
it from the public domain. In
respect to the areas covered by
the timber license of IHVCP, the
64
Paete.
same to the UP; and made the latter the

absolute owner thereof, subject only to the
existing concession. x x x. The proviso
regarding existing concessions refers to the
timber license of petitioner. All that it
means, however, is that the right of
petitioner as a timber licensee must not be
affected, impaired or diminished; it must be
respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the
Philippines is concerned, all its rights as
grantor of the license were effectively
assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full
ownership. This is further borne out by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides,
inter alia, that any incidental receipts or
income therefrom shall pertain to the general
fund of the University of the Philippines.
In 1964, the Congress enacted

R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an
experiment station for UP. The said
experiment station covers a portion of
the timberland in Paete, occupied by
IHVCP so UP, who claims ownership
of said portion of timberland,
demanded the latter to pay the forest
charges to it, instead of the BIR.
IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed
a suit against UP, claiming that R.A.
3990 does not empower UP to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut by it
within the tract of land referred to in
said Act, and collect the corresponding
forest charges prescribed by the BIR.
Atty. Rowel Ilagan

said Act removed and segregated
it from being a public forest.
The Court further cited Sec. 3 of
R.A. 3990, which provides that,
"any incidental receipts or
income therefrom shall pertain to
the general fund of the
University of the Philippines.
The provision of the Act is clear
that UP, being the owner of the
land, has the right to collect
forest charges and to supervise
the operations of IHVCP insofar
as the property of the UP within
it is concerned.
Jurisdiction of Bureau of Forestry.

Having been effectively segregated and
removed from the public domain or from a
public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority
and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. This is
obvious from the fact that the condition in
Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the
disposition of timber shall be subject to
forestry laws and regulations is not
reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter
does not likewise provide that it is subject to
the conditions set forth in the proclamation.
An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing without other limitations than
those established by law.
Authority to collect forest charges.As
provided for in Article 441 of the Civil
Code, to the owner belongs the natural
fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits.
There are, however, exceptions to this rules,
as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets
Anouevo-Ongkeko
65
Atty. Rowel Ilagan
the fruits. In the instant case, that exception

is made for the petitioner as licensee or
grantee of the concession, which has been
given the license to cut, collect, and remove
timber from the area ceded and transferred
to UP until 1 February 1985. However, it
has the correlative duty and obligation to
pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the
new owner, the UP, at the same rate as
provided for in the Agreement. The charges
should not be paid anymore to the Republic
of the Philippines through the Bureau of
Internal Revenue because of the very nature
of the transfer as aforestated.
Anouevo-Ongkeko
66

Natural Resources and Environmental Law With Land, Titles and Deeds (Part 1)

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Natural Resources and Environmental Law With Land, Titles and Deeds (Part 1)

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Cases in Natural Resources and Environmental Law with

Land, Title and Deeds

Europa filed a suit for prohibition and

legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards

not contravene the Constitution.

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

were the most immediate fundamental results of

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

the same conditions as ancestral domains except that

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

The IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept

On November 10, 1978, then President

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all

Burden of Proof; In keeping with the

The 1935 Constitution classified

Except for lands already covered

for agricultural or other purposes; The

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

That the occupants of Boracay have built

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency

There is a big diffence between forest as

On August 10, 2006, petitionersclaimants Sacay,and other landowners

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

There is nothing in Proclamation No. 1801

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Rule VIII, Section 3 provides: No trees in

Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Where the

Distinction Between Courts General And Limited Jurisdiction

owner of a parcel of land situated at

Sec. 111 of the Land Registration Act,

The Court, in this case, failed to

litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since

Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica

Property Registration Decree; The Decree

It also appears that on October 1941,

requisites. Respondent de los Santos

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

applications for original egistration but

It furthermore appears that on August

II. THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND REGISTRIES OF DEEDS

reconstitution of Title filed with CFI of

Purpose of; A notice of lis pendens serves as

Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo

and transferred to TCT no. 106098 in

following manner: Lis pendens has been

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

how the private respondents tried to block

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting

Teodoro Almirol purchased a parcel of

Register of Deeds; No power to determine

The OCT was registered under Arcenio

When the RD is in doubt as to

Refusal to register; Exhaustion of

Atty. Rowel Ilagan

register the deed of sale in question, because

III. MODES OF REGISTERING TITLES

This is a landmark case decided by the

CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS or THE PUBLIC

agricultural lands may be alienated. Furthermore, prior