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Texts in History:
The Determinations of Readings
and Their Texts
Tony Bennett
I
While the issues I want to address fit into the general set of concerns of "post-
structuralism and history," it is clear that one ought to be speaking about poststructuralisms, since more than one variety of the beast has been in evidence over
the past few years. For the greater part, "poststructuralism" has been equated
with the work of Derrida or, more generally, with the ever mobile and flexible
strategy of deconstruction. While not entirely shifting this center of gravity, my
antimetaphysical and de-essentializing orientation of poststructuralist deconstruction has been paralleled by-in turn fuelling and being fuelled by-related
tendencies within Marxism. Admittedly, this has often resulted in forms of
Marxism that have been so thoroughly revised theoretically that they bear
scarcely any recognizable relationship to their classical antecedents. This need not
in itself, however, occasion any embarrassment. It is only by being ongoingly revised that a body of theory retains any validity or purchase as a historical force.
To construe the relations between the formulations of classical Marxism and
those which have been developed in the wake of structuralism as if the latter
could be assessed in terms of the degree of their fidelity to or compatibility with
the former would be unduly restricting. That way, a body of theory could never
be allowed to develop other than by means of the germination of the seeds of de-
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changing theoretical and political circumstances. Rather than testing the value
of theoretical innnovations by means of such backward-looking glances, the acid
test should always be: What do they enable one to do? What possibilities do they
open up that were not there beforehand? What new fields and types of action do
they generate?
It is in view of considerations of this kind that the construction of relations of
necessary opposition between poststructuralism and Marxism is not only misleading but also counterproductive. This is not to suggest that Marxism could,
or even should, want to ingest deconstruction wholesale. Yet it is to suggest that
poststructuralism confronts Marxism not just with a series of negative problems
(although it does that), but also with a field of positive possibilities. Secondly,
therefore,I want to suggest that, through a critical sifting of the diverse elements
of poststructuralism, Marxism may be able to reformulate its problems and objectives, not becauase it has to in order, so to speak, to keep its theoretical creden-
tials in good condition, but because, by doing so, it may open itself into a differently constituted field of political possibilities. Such "revisionism," that is to say,
may contribute to the urgent task of rethinking Marxism's conception of its rela-
tionship to the spheres of political action that it constitutes for itself and of the
that widely have been regarded as posing a series of negative problems for Marxism. What are these problems? "The work of Derrida and others," Terry Eagle-
ton has argued, has ". . . cast grave doubt upon the classical notions of truth,
reality, meaning and knowledge, all of which could be exposed as resting on a
naively representational theory of language."' Why is this a problem? (The question is rarely put, but it is well worth asking.) The reason that it has beenfelt to
be a problem-indeed, has sometimes been conceived and, very often, has been
perceived as an explicit challenge to Marxism -is that it calls into doubt all those
mechanisms (theories of knowledge; metaphysical conceptions of meaning; eschatological or historicist versions of History) that purport to provide a warrant,
a certainty of rightness (epistemological, ethical or historical), in the light of
which our orientation to and practice within the present might be validated, secured in-and by means of-some set of criteria that transcends our local, limited, and irremediably muddied calculations.
Obviously, acceptance of such criticisms entails that Marxists should critically
review all those economistic, scientistic, and historicist conceptions by means of
which Marxism has traditionally sought to supply itself with such warrants. Yet
need this be a problem? Again, the question is worth asking, if only because the
major theoretical developments within Marxism over the past two decades have
2 Texts in History
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been pushing in precisely this direction. It is singularly odd to expect that Marxists should feel placed on the defensive by the "discovery" that there neither are,
nor can be, any transcendental guarantees, any absolute certainties, or any essen-
tial truths since, in recent years, they have devoted some considerable effort to
expunging from Marxist thought precisely such residues of nineteenth-century
theologies, philosophies of history, or ideologies of science. Nor has this been a
process of theoretical self-criticism undertaken purely for its own sake. Such essentializing tendencies have been opposed, above all, because of their political
effects - the quietism produced by the scientism of the Second International, for
example, or the class essentialism that informed the political strategies of the
Third International.
To the degree that such tendencies within Marxism have proved politically un-
helpful, the only fitting Marxist response to the discovery that there can be no
it must accept its own discursivity and acknowledge that it is submitted to the
effects of language and writing: so be it! How could it be otherwise? Still, such
that Marxism "is shot through with metaphors disguised as concepts," or that it
is dependent on a whole battery of rhetorical and figurative devices, is all very
well but, in itself, hardly matters a jot.2 What would matter, what would count
as helpful, would be to show that the existing stock of metaphorical, rhetorical,
and figurative devices used in Marxism had disabling theoretical and political
consequences that could be remedied by the use of another set of similar devices.
If this is not the point at issue, then deconstruction seems likely to do no more
than to lock itself into a historical cul-de-sac in which it keeps alive the demand for
transcendence simply by never-endingly denying its possibility - a criticism of es-
sentialism that can rapidly become a lament for its loss, a consolation for the lim-
itations of the human condition that is simultaneously a recipe for political quietism.
To put this another way, it has been argued that one of the major critical
effects of deconstruction consists in the claim: "There is no metalanguage."3
That is not true of course. If by "metalanguage" is meant a language that constitutes other languages or discourses as objects of analysis within itself, then the
world is full of them. What, then, does this claim amount to? Simply that there
is no metametalanguage, no language which can claim an absolute or transcendental validity for its ways of "fixing" other languages, discourses, or texts as objects within itself, or which can efface the traces of writing or language within it-
self. Fine. God is dead, and there is no such thing as an Absolute Science that escapes the constraints of its own discursivity. Meanwhile, the struggle between
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sense of making them count above contending ones in terms of their ability to
organize the consciousness and practice of historical agents.
If it is objected-"But what can the justification for such a practice be?"-the
answer must be, "None," if it is a case of looking for absolute justifications, be
they epistemological, ethical, or historical. In Language, Semantics and Ideology,
Michel Pacheux tells the story of Baron von Munchausen, who rode into a bog
only to extricate himself from this predicament by dragging himself-and his
horse-out "by pulling with all the strength of one arm on a lock of my own
hair."4 PNcheux likens this to the way in which an individual, in being hitched
into a subject position within ideology, is also subjected to a "phantasy effect"
whereby, once in place, such a subject represents himself to himself as "cause of
himself."s While I intend the argument only analogically, it seems to me that
socialism can extricate itself from the mire of an epistemological and ethical relativism only by yanking itself out by means of a political desire that functions as
cause and justification of itself (although, of course, produced by and within the
complex play of social forces and relationships) and that supplies the criteria-always contested-for the determination of the ends to which political
and theoretical practice are directed. If that is not felt to be enough, I would ask:
what other foundation could there be that is not a demand for transcendence and
that - in order to preserve things as they are - simultaneously denies the possibil-
II
The issues I want now to consider, in the context of these more general problems, concern the ways in which, if at all, texts either can or should be constituted as objects of analysis within a Marxist framework. I shall do so by consider-
ing the work of Ernesto Laclau who, perhaps more probingly than anyone else,
4 Texts in History
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analysis of textual phenomena. The issues I want to explore concern the means
by which Marxism should represent to itself its relationship to the texts with
which it engages and the political issues which hinge on such considerations.
Laclau enormously expands the significance of these problems in arguing, in fact,
that Marxism is concerned with little else other than textual phenomena in the
sense that even its primary object - the prevailing system of economic and social
relationships - is constituted entirely within discourses whose conditions of existence are largely textual.6
At the same time, however, Laclau disputes the more usual way in which
Marxism has represented its relationship to the textual phenomena it analyzes. In
its more scientistic formulations, Marxism typically has represented its own rela-
tion to reality as one of pure transparency, thereby denying its own discursivity
and textuality. Furthermore, in doing so, it has represented its relationship to the
appearance of the real which it knows (the economy, society, history), Marxism
has represented itself as having produced a valid knowledge-or, more accurately, a knowledge that is tendentially valid-of such texts "in themselves." In
opposition to this view, Laclau argues that Marxism, rather than seeking to
efface its own discursivity, should conceive of itself as a set of discursive interven-
tions, interventions which must prove their validity through their effects rather
this is tantamount to saying that Marxism should regard itself as, again in good
part, if not entirely, a set of textual practices that seeks to rearticulate the rela-
While I am not sure that I should like to go as far as Laclau in, in fact, collapsing the social into the discursive, I go along with his view sufficiently to think
that the way in which Marxism represents its relationship to the textual phenomena it engages is not merely a recondite theoretical question but one with farreaching political implications. I want, therefore, to dispute the view that Marxism should represent texts as possible objects of knowledge (as opposed to defending such a view against the criticisms of deconstruction), to review a range of
the devices through which Marxism has sought to do this, and to comment on
their, in my view, largely negative consequences.
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So regarded, texts cannot figure within Marxism, I shall argue, in the sense
that there is no space other than a transcendent, ahistorical one within which
they can be constituted as possible objects of knowledge. They should not so figure in the sense that such a representation of textual phenomena, and of Marxism's relationship to them, is both theoretically and politically disabling. It is
theoretically disabling in the respect that it inhibits the adequate formulation and
development of what I regard as the proper concerns of Marxist literary theory:
namely, the development of a historical and materialist theory of the interactions
among texts classified as literary, other ideological phenomena, and broader
social and political processes and relationships, recognizing that the systems of
classification within which the "literary" is produced are always culturally specific and that, therefore, their functioning and effects are a part of what needs to
be studied. While that is, perhaps, a fairly uncontentious view, I want to add a
rider that calls into question an essentializing orientation that has lain behind
much of the work that has been developed within the Marxist tradition: that is,
that such a theory cannot be adequately developed if predicated on the assumption- an assumption which usually has obtained implicitly-that the relations
among literary texts, other ideological phenomena, and broader social and political processes can be determined or specified for all time by referring such texts to
the appearance of the real which Marxism "knows." The characteristic discursive
move of such approaches has consisted in the claim that Marxism, through "the
appliance of science," rescues literary texts from the history of their misunder-
standing in revealing, for the first time and by means of the application of the
principles of historical materialism, their objective historical meaning. Such
claims are not to be taken at their face-value. Their primary effect has been to
disguise the active and interventionist nature of Marxist criticism, to shield from
itself, and from others, a recognition of its own inescapably ideological nature.
The stress.placed within Marxism on returning the text to the originating condi-
6 Texts in History
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had two consequences. First, at the theoretical level, it has entailed that analysis
of the functioning of texts within history has been conceived as a once and once
only affair. For once a text is coupled to the conditions of its origin by means of
textual determinations that organize and animate the practice of reading, connecting texts and readers in specific relations to one another by constituting
readers as reading subjects of particular types and texts as objects-to-be read in
particular ways. This entails arguing that texts have, and can have, no existence
independently of such reading formations, that there is no place independent of,
anterior to, or above the varying reading formations, through which their historical life variantly is modulated, within which texts can be constituted as ob-
determinate ways in which they are gridded onto one another within different
reading formations. The consequence of this so far as Marxist criticism is concerned- and the distinction between theory and criticism I have in mind here is
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that, whereas the concern of theory is to analyze the determinations that are
operative in the processes whereby meanings are produced in relation to textual
them-is that it should seek to detach texts from socially dominant reading formations and to install them in new ones. The accent here should be placed on the
use of the plural mood. Its business is not to subject textual phenomena to a singular move by means of a scientistically represented reevaluation of their objective historical meaning, but to move them about in different ways, to locate
them within different reading formations and to produce them as different texts
III
I can think of two major forms of objection that might be advanced in relation
to this line of reasoning. The first is that it is merely another version of neo-Kant-
approach I am advocating is one that aims to suspend the neo-Kantian problematic, to displace its essentialism by following Laclau toward an absolute historicalization of textual phenomena that is, at the same time, uncompromisingly
materialist and that thereby affords no space in which "the text itself" might be
constituted as an object, knowable or otherwise. I shall come back to this point
later. The second line of objection would be that I merely am reducing texts to
contexts, and I must admit that there is much truth in this. However, I am also
proposing a way of rethinking context such that, ultimately, neither text nor
context are conceivable as entities separable from one another. According to
most formulations, context is conceived as social; that is, as a set of extradiscursive and extratextual determinations to which the text is related as an external
backdrop or set of reading conditions. The concept of reading formation, by contrast, is an attempt to think of context as a set of discursive and intertextual determinations, operating on material and institutional supports, that bear in upon
a text, not just externally, from the outside in, but internally, shaping it, in the
8 Texts in History
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to analyze the formal mechanisms by which a text produces a position or positions for reading, organizing its own consumption in the implied, model, or preferred reader (the terms vary, but the approach is essentially the same) that it con-
of readers, is problematic. "No text," Umberto Eco has argued, "is read independently of the reader's experience of other texts."8 If that is so, its implication,
although Eco does not draw it, is that reading cannot be accounted for first by
analyzing the fixed properties of the text and only then by considering the inter-
textual determinations that may explain how those fixed properties come to be
received and interpreted differently. Rather, analysis should deal with the ways
in which such intertextual determinations organize the text internally through
the specific constitution of the text as a text-to-be-read. It is clear, for example,
that reading practices are, in part, organized by the systems of genre expectations
brought to bear on specific texts. It is equally clear that such expectations are
largely culturally determined and, hence, variable. Given that such genre expectations may predispose the readers to relate themselves to a text in a specific way,
relations between them. In the case of texts operating within the constructed
space of "the literary," they produce such texts "both as an enclosure of the inter-
nal fictional space and as an exclusion of the space of reality against which the
work is set."10 Since the functioning of such frames is culturally dependent,
Frow argues, "changes in the context of reception of a work alter the kinds of expectation governed by the frame and are thus translated into structural changes in
the work."'1 In short, there is no fixed boundary between the extratextual and
the intratextual that prevents the former from pressing in upon the latter and
reorganizing it. The intratextual, in fact, is always the product of a definite set of
intertextual relations.
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the ideological level of a social formation. If social position determines the ways
in which individuals are exposed to and inserted within ideological discourses, it is
the properties of those discourses that actually mold and organize the activities of
those individuals as reading subjects. Except for some suggestive comments by
Stephen Heath, however, such discursive determinations have been conceived as
be regarded as conditioned by the way they are processed through the operation
of those interdiscursive and intertextual relations that bear most specifically and
most closely on the process of reading.
The concept of reading formation, then, is an attempt to weave a way between
these two approaches to the study of reading by conceiving the intratextual determinations of reading as being overdetermined by the operation of determinations which, while they cannot be derived from the text concerned, are not reducible to an extratextual social context either. It is an attempt to identify the de-
terminations that, in operating on both texts and readers, mediate the relations
between text and context, connecting the two and providing the mechanisms
through which they productively interact in representing context, not as a set of
extradiscursive relations, but as a set of intertextual and discursive relations that
produce readers for texts and texts for readers. This is to question conventional
conceptions of texts, readers, and contexts as separable elements, fixed in their re-
lations to one another, by suggesting that they are variable functions within a
discursively ordered set of relations. Different reading formations, that is to say,
produce their own texts, their own readers, and their own contexts.
In an interview he gave, Pierre Macherey asked what the study of literature
would look like once the supposition that it consisted of fixed works - of texts,
given and completed-was abandoned." Well, I think it would look very different. The implication of the perspectives I have been developing is that it would
consist, not in the study of texts as self-contained givens, but in the study of texts
produced within different reading formations and of the different social and
ideological relations of reading of which they form a part need not be allowed to
10 Texts in History
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complicate the analytical exchange between analyst and text. To the contrary, it
would be a question of studying texts in the light of their readings, readings in
their texts. The relations between textual phenomena and social and political
processes can be theorized adequately only by placing in suspension the text as it
appears to be given to us in our own reading formation so as to be able to analyze
the differential constitution and functioning of that apparently same but different
text within different reading formations. The aim of such an analysis would not
be to reveal the meaning or effects of textual phenomena but, rather, to make
them hum and reverberate with (ideally) the full range of meanings and effects
for which they have furnished a site.
None of this in any way queries the objective, material existence of textual
cording to which there is conjured up the notion that there is somehow and
somewhere, at the back of the materiality of textual phenomena, an ideal text the "text itself" - that it is the purpose of analysis to reach and to reveal, always
(if the rhetoric is to be believed) for the first time, or, in an eschatology of meaning, to anticipate. It is for this reason that I do not think my arguments lead in
(wherever that might be) but unknowable, but that there is no "there" in which
its existence might be posited, other than in the varying reading formations
through which the actual history of its functioning is modulated and that,
therefore, to seek to produce a knowledge of it is to engage in a Sisyphean labor.
IV
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formations can somehow be peeled away to yield an unfettered access to its irreducible kernel, thereby establishing analysis in a relationship of pure and unmediated transparency to its object. Either that, or it is merely myopic, overlook-
ing the history that, in determining the form in which a text is currently avail-
qualified in its favor. Rather, readings can only be assessed politically in terms of
meaning of textual phenomena, that the concept of the "text itself" is produced
and has effects as an essentially rhetorical device used to enhance the claims of a
plicitly recognize the "mobility" of texts in the very process of their attempts to
shift them or to make them mean differently, that movement is represented
always as a final movement, as, at last, a pinning down of texts so that their intrinsic nature can be recognized. There are, of course, a variety of means by
which such a concept of the "text itself" may be produced discursively. Barthes
argues that the category of the author typically functions in this way. "To give a
text an Author," he writes, "is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a
final signified, to close the writing."14 Whatever the details of the devices used,
however, a necessary condition for, and complement to, the discursive production of the "text itself" consists in the discursive production of a unified subject
12 Texts in History
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This is as true of Marxist criticism as it is of any other. I argued earlier that the
distinguishing hermeneutic gambit of Marxist criticism has consisted in the contention that the objective historical meaning of a text can only be understood by
placing it in the context of the originating conditions of its production. The precise way in which this move operates, as well as its consequences, however, are
considerably more complicated than this bald description suggests. In fact, detailed analyses of texts in the light of the originating conditions of their production are somewhat rare in the Marxist tradition, and they rarely stop at that. Indeed, there is a sense in which such considerations are the last things to be taken
into account. To take LukAcs-and I would argue that, on these matters, Lukics
is the paradigm case - the way in which he construes the relations between a text
and the social and ideological conditions of its period is always informed by a
prior conception of the relations of that text to earlier and subsequent texts, and
to the social and ideological conditions of their respective periods, as specified by
the degree to which it does or does not continue the realist tendencies of earlier
texts, or anticipates and paves the way for those of subsequent texts. In short, the
a History which Marxism claims to know but yet whose final judgmentswhich can only be delivered once the process of History has been completed- it
can only anticipate. Hence Lukics's constant insistence that the meaning of a
period and its texts will become clear to us the more distant we are from it, not
just because, with time, perspectives settle, but because, with the unfolding of
each stage of historical development, we move a little closer to the post-historical
unified subject, "Man," to whom the meaning of the text of History and, therefore, of each text within it, will finally be rendered luminously transparent. In
Lukacs's work, the means by which the text itself is fixed and its objective
historical meaning is deciphered is thus accomplished by means of the determina-
tion which the future is allowed to exert on that text and its history.
The idealism of such an approach is apparent. The "text itself," which such a
criticism posits, turns out to be that text which achieves a full and adequate relationship to itself only when the text of History has been completed. It is an ideal
text which assumes a social and material form that is fully adequate to itself only
at the end of History and that, pending this consummation, exists only as a
shadowy presence, an ideal form lodged behind the diverse social, material, and
ideological relations that regulate the real history of its reading, until it is given
Not only idealist but ideological: the critical project that is produced and supported by such a view ends up constituting literary texts as a privileged region for
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itself, without any development because without any object in the scientific sense
of the term, and only ever finding in the real its own mirror reflection."16 This
perfectly describes Lukics's criticism and, indeed, the entire tradition of Marxist
makes himself, as will eventually be made clear once they are slotted into the
foreordained hermeneutic sprocket-holes that await them at the end of that
process.
It is not that I object to the fact that there can be no surprises within such an
approach, nor even to its manifestly ideological nature, since it seems to me that
any critical practice that hopes to be a historical force must be deeply ideological,
in the sense that its concern will be to engage in the struggle for the terms in
ject it produces. I argued earlier, following Laclau, that Marxism should be conceived as a set of discursive interventions that seeks to interrupt, to uncouple, and
mulations, with the result that it has permitted itself one move and one move
only in relation to literary texts: that of bringing them into line with the knowl-
ond, that this project depended on the idealist principles I have just outlined
whereby Lukics sought to fix texts into history. The system of articulations that
Lukics sought to weave through his studies of literary texts can be roughly summarized as follows: literary texts are reflections of the process, yet to be com-
pleted, of Man's historical self-creation; the texts which most adequately reflect
this process are those which embody the maximum form available in a particular
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epoch of Man's historical self-consciousness; the supports for such forms of his-
ulating bourgeois humanist values to those of socialism, but only at the price of
representing the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as merely
the given, contingent form of the more essential struggle between the humanizing and dehumanizing forces in history. Clearly, once texts have been shifted by
being moved into such an interpretive system, there is no other way that they can
be moved which is not, at the same time, a breach with that system and with the
fixing of texts that it proposes. All criticism can do, so long as it remains within
the confines of such a system, is to perfect its anticipations of the judgments of
the posthistorical unified subject that it posits as a condition of its own practice.
What can be done with such a criticism today? Not very much, it seems to me.
Apart from the fact that the way of fixing texts in history which it proposes rests
grouped around an essential contradiction that is expressed in terms of the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat. To the contrary, the successful articulation of such
struggles into a provisional unity depends on a recognition of their relative autonomy, of the separate interests of women and blacks, for example, wihch can-
is called into question. If such texts are to be-and I think they should beregarded as strategic sites for the contestation of dominant ideological subject
identities, it needs to be recognized that, as such, they are implicated in different
struggles (and not just one) and that, therefore, they may need to be moved
around differently - and then only provisionally - within different social and ideological relations or reading, rather than being moved just once by an attempted
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scientistic fixing of their meaning. As to whether the text itself" might encounter, at the end of history, the unified subject of judgment that can sustain
and recognize it, it seems to me that such an issue, together with a good many
others of the same nature, is one that we safely can leave to the future, precisely
143.
2. See Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
1982), 74-75.
3. Ibid., 84.
4. Michel Pecheux, Language, Semantics and Ideology (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), 17.
5. Ibid., 108-09.
6. See Ernesto Laclau, "Politics as the Construction of the Unthinkable" (unpublished paper).
7. Laclau deals with the problem of the discursive construction of relations of contradiction in
"Populist Rupture and Discourse," Screen Education 34 (Spring 1980).
8. Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts (London: Alan
Hutchinson Publishing Co., Ltd., 1981), 21.
9. John Frow, "The Literary Frame,"Journal of Aesthetic Education 16, 2 (1982):25.
14. Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," Image-Music-Text (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1977), 147.
15. In this respect I believe that the discursive conditions for the production of the "text itself" are
similar to those required by theories of value. I have discussed the latter in "Marxism and Popular
Fiction," Literature and History 7, 2 (Autumn 1981).
16. Louis Althusser, "The Conditions of Marx's Scientific Discovery," Theoretical Practice, nos.
7-8. (1973):7.
16 Texts in History
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