Q 1.

How extensive are China's ties across South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, Nepal,
Bhutan and Pakistan, and how does China's South Asia outreach fit with its broader foreign
policy?
De facto, Beijings South Asia policy has had two major simultaneous strains further reinforced in
recent times by the regions emergence as a stakeholder in Chinas One Belt One Road (OBOR) and
Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiatives. One, it aims to engage India economically to benefit from its
market and growth on the one hand and its diplomatic leverages in trade and climate talks among
others. Second, it aims to exploit New Delhis diplomatic and economic failures in its own backyard
(read SAARC) by developing ties that undermine Indias centrality in South Asia. South Asia
being one of the worlds most populous and fastest emerging regions that borders Chinas volatile
south, these two goals neatly combine with Chinas wider foreign policy objective of maintaining
stable external environment to attain security, integrity and sustainable socio-economic
development domestically.
To achieve both the objectives, China has largely adhered to a policy of non-interference in
domestic matters and used its manufacturing and infrastructure project implementation capabilities
to deepen trade relations with entire South Asia. Among South Asian countries, China clearly values
Pakistan as indispensable for historical and geographic reasons, and its bedrock anti-Indianism.
Chinas emergence as Pakistans biggest supplier of weapons and the multi-billion dollar ChinaPakistan Economic corridor despite all viability odds are testimony to this. Bangladesh also has
water disputes and political baggages with India concerns which make it look north. China has
been Bangladeshs biggest trade partner since 2005. That leaves Bhutan and Nepal. Because of their
land locked geography, historic cultural proximity to Tibet and special relationship with India since
beginning, these two hold key to legitimising Chinas Tibet policy an issue on which it has little to
expect from India. China has emerged as a key political and economic player in Nepal after 2005
when relations with India soured. Bhutan is the last to straighten its consistent tilt towards India.
China has been trying to establish full diplomatic ties with Bhutan for long before it could come
anyway closer to exploiting its strategic position.
Q2. What steps is China taking to expand its ties in the region, and what issues prevent China
from developing stronger ties with the countries of South Asia?
Chinas consistent policy beyond expanding trade and diplomatic relations with each of the South
Asian country has been to connect this region to its relatively underdeveloped southern regions.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on the west, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
(BCIM) corridor in the east and, expanding rail and road routes all across the Tibetan plateau along
Nepal and Bhutan upto Arunachal Pradesh seeks to end the political-economic Himalayan divide of
the region with its north. Sri Lanka and Maldives are in the MSR loop, not away from Chinese
trade, aid and military engagement.
The hope that Chinas multi-trillion dollar infrastructure initiatives - OBOR and MSR - could end
up resetting geo-economics has all these countries including India seek a stake in it. Alongside,
China steered financial institutions namely Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New
Development Bank and Silk Road Fund among others are not only to invest in these initiatives but
also in projects in South Asia. Add to these, the Chinese investment and aids, and China is
following a multi-pronged political-economic approach to engage South Asia.

China is constrained in South Asia by Indias reluctance towards all these initiatives and the
increasing interest of US and Japan among others in the region. The domestic political instability in
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives and even Sri Lanka is another problem.
Finally, Chinas aid and assistance model often leading to public unrest has alarmed some.
Q 3. How do India's ties across South Asia affect China's outreach to region, and to what
extent are China and India in competition in South Asia?
India sees South Asia and the Indian Ocean as its own backyard. It has been heavily involved
economically and politically in the entire region except Pakistan. According to World Bank
Bilateral Remittances Matrix 2014, all of South Asia has way more remittance coming from India
than China. Except Pakistan, South Asian countries particularly Bhutan and Afghanistan have
received huge amount of Indian aid. Come FDI stock, and again except Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Bangladesh, others have received manifold investment from India compared to China.1
India also clearly has a socio-cultural and geographic advantage in the region which provides it
unique benefits. India is more like any of these countries than China. In recent years, Indias
wariness of China has acted as clear and active constraint in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh
seeking a balanced relations with India and China. India effectively sees these countries neutrality
in India-China dynamics as falling in favour of China. Recently, Indias statement of all-possible
support to Myanmar during its Presidents visit to New Delhi was interpreted as helping Myanmar
counter Chinese domination. In Afghanistan, India has been active for long to thwart Pakistans
objective of installing a friendly government in Kabul. Altogether, China and India are in a real
competition in South Asia in the short and long term to protect their gains and consolidate further as
reflected in their growing financial and political commitment towards the region.

1http://www.cfr.org/economics/economics-influence-china-india-south-asia/p36862
2