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G.R. No.

70736 March 16, 1987


BONIFACIO L. HILARIO and EDUARDA M. BUENCAMINO HILARIO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SALVADOR BALTAZAR, respondents.
Bonifacio L. Hilario for petitioners. Alberto Mala, Jr. for private respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision declaring Salvador Baltazar a
leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on a parcel of land consisting of 1,740 square meters.
On January 13, 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Branch VI at Baliuag, Bulacan alleging that since January, 1955 he had been in continuous possession
as a share tenant of a parcel of land with an area of about 2 hectares situated in San Miguel, Bulacan,
which was previously owned by one Socorro Vda. de Balagtas; that on or about December 27, 1980,
and thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist from entering and cultivating a
portion of the aforesaid land with an area of 4,000 square meters and otherwise committed acts in
violation of his security of tenure; that the Hilarios were contemplating the putting up of a fence around
the said portion of 4,000 square meters and that unless restrained by the court, they would continue to
do so to his great irreparable injury.
Baltazar claims that he became a tenant of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas on the latter's two-hectare
landholding located at San Juan, San Miguel, Bulacan by virtue of a "Kasunduan" executed between
them on January 8, 1979, He states that he erected his house and planted "halaman," the produce of
which was divided at 70-30 and 50-50 (sic) in his favor. After the death of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas,
he allegedly gave the share pertaining to the landowner to her daughter Corazon Pengzon. It was only
in December, 1980 that he came to know that a portion of the 2 hectares or 4,000 square meters is
already owned by the Hilarios.
On the other hand, the petitioners aver that they acquired the landholding of 4,000 square meters from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) after it had been foreclosed by virtue of a deed of sale executed
between Bonifacio Hilario and the PNB. The former owner Corazon Pengzon testified that she owned
only two lots-Lot 427-B with an area of 841 square meters and Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square
meters with a total area of 1,740 square meters. The other 2 lots were owned by Ruben Ocampo and
Juan Mendoza. She further testified that in 1964 at the time of the partition of the property, she
declared the property for classification purposes as "bakuran" located in the Poblacion and had no
knowledge that there were other things planted in it except bananas and pomelos.
On November 27, 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in determining whether or not
respondent Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the land in question is not an agricultural
landholding but plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is not a tenant on the land.
On January 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals, however, remanded the case to the lower court for further
proceedings on the ground that the findings of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) were not
supported by substantial evidence.
In compliance with the order of the Court of Appeals, the CAR admitted additional evidence.
On December 19, 1983, the CAR admitted the petitioners' third party complaint filed with leave against
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) which states that in the event that judgment would be rendered
against them under the original complaint, the PNB must contribute, indemnify, and reimburse the
spouses the full amount of the judgment.
On the basis of the parties' and their witnesses' affidavits containing detailed narrations of facts and
documentary exhibits which served as their direct testimonies pursuant to PD 946, the CAR found that
there was no tenancy relationship existing between Baltazar and the former owner, Corazon Pengzon.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff not to be a tenant on the landholding
described in the complaint and ordering his ejectment therefrom.

The third-party complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 25- 26, Rollo)
Again, respondent Salvador Baltazar appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).
The IAC, however, reversed the decision of the CAR and held that:
... [T]he decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and another one entered declaring plaintiffappellant ii leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on the land in question consisting of 1,740
square meters. Costs against defendants-appellees. (p. 31, Rollo)
Consequently, the spouses Hilarios filed this petition for review making the following assignments of
errors:
I. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND DECISION
OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS (CAR) WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTION (SIC) THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF
CAR, OF ITS OWN FINDINGS.
III. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF CAR, FINDING
THE LOTS IN QUESTION WITH AN AREA OF 1,740 SQUARE METERS AS RESIDENTIAL LOT AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT NOT TO BE A TENANT.
We agree with the respondent court when it stated that it can affirm on appeal the findings of the CAR
only if there is substantial evidence to support them. However, after a careful consideration of the
records of the case, we find no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the CAR. The evidence
presented by the petitioners is more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that private respondent
Salvador Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding in question.
Salvador Baltazar claims: that he is working on the land in question pursuant to a "kasunduan"
executed between him and Socorro Balagtas. The contract covers a two-hectare parcel of land. The
disputed landholding is only 4,000 square meters more or less, although Baltazar claims that this area
is a portion of the two hectares in the contract. He testified that sometime in 1965, he relinquished 1.5
hectares of the two hectares subject of the "kasunduan" to Nemesio Ocampo, Juan Mendoza, Miguel
Ocampo and Miguel Viola and what remained under his cultivation was 1/2 hectare owned by Corazon
Pengson. He stated that when Socorro Balagtas died, no new contract was executed. However, he
insists that the old contract was continued between Corazon Pengson and himself. (Rollo, p. 23).
This claim is controverted by the testimony of Corazon Pengson herself which we quote as follows:
Q After the death of your mother in 1965, what step, if any, have you taken, regarding this subject
landholding or after the death of your mother how did you
Corazon Pengson further explained that she did not receive any share from the produce of the land
from 1964 up to the filing of the case and she would not have accepted any share from the produce of
the land because she knew pretty well that she was no longer the owner of the lot since 1974 when it
was foreclosed by the bank and later on purchased by the spouses Hilarios.
We note the CAR's finding:
Tenancy relationship is indivisible. The two-hectare land subject of plaintiff's alleged contract with
Socorro Balagtas having been parcelled into seven (7) and possession thereof relinquished/surrendered
in 1965 results in the termination of plaintiff's tenancy relationship with the previous owner/landholder.
Such being the case, he cannot now claim that the landholding in question consisting of 4,000 square
meters, more or less, is being cultivated by him under the old contract. The owner thereof Corazon
Pengson has no tenancy relationship with him (plaintiff). (p. 25, Rollo)
From the foregoing, it is clear that Corazn Pengson did not give her consent to Baltazar to work on her
land consisting of only 1,740 square meters. We agree with the CAR when it said:

The law accords the landholder the right to initially choose his tenant to work on his land. For this
reason, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder
through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the land by
usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of
security of tenure of the law (Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482) (Ibid)
And in the case of Tuazon v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 484), this Court had the occasion to explain:
... Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important."
The respondent court ruled that the fact that the land in question is located in the poblacion does not
necessarily make it residential.
The conclusion is purely speculative and conjectural, We note that the evidence presented by the
petitioners sufficiently establishes that the land in question is residential and not agricultural.
As we stated in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals (supra) "the key factor in ascertaining whether or not
there is a landowner-tenant relationship in this case is the nature of the disputed property."
The records show that the disputed property, only 1,740 square meters in area, is actually located in
the poblacion of San Miguel, Bulacan not far from the municipal building and the church. It is divided
into two lots-Lot 427-B with an area of 841 square meters and Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square
meters. Two other lots which the respondent claims to cultivate as "tenant" were originally owned by
Ruben Ocampo and Juan Mendoza, not Corazon Pengson, through whom the respondent traces his
alleged tenancy rights.
Respondent Baltazar is a full-time government employee working in the Bureau of Plant Industry.
The disputed lots were acquired at a foreclosure sale from the Philippine National Bank. They were
purchased as residential lots and the deed of sale describes them as "residential." The inspection and
appraisal report of the PNB classified the land as residential. The declaration of real property on the
basis of which taxes are paid and approved by the Acting Provincial Assessor of Bulacan classifies the
land as residential. The tax declarations show that the 841 square meter lot is assessed for tax
purposes at P25,236.00 while the 899 square meter lot is assessed at P26,920.00. The owner states
that the land has only bananas and pomelos on it. But even if the claim of the private respondent that
some corn was planted on the lots is true, this does not convert residential land into agricultural land.
The presumption assumed by the appellate court, that a parcel of land which is located in a poblacion is
not necessary devoted to residential purposes, is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside
the poblacion should be presumed residential or commercial or non-agricultural unless there is clearly
preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.
The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged tenant pays no rental or share to the
landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared 70-30 and 50-50 of the produce in his
favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever received anything from him,
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) The parties are the
landholder and tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The purpose is agricultural production;
and (4) There is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
We held in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, cited above that:
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a
dejure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws ... (emphasis supplied).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 176942

August 28, 2008

NICORP MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LEONIDA DE LEON,


respondent.
G.R. No. 177125
respondent.

August 28, 2008

SALVADOR R. LIM, petitioner, vs. LEONIDA DE LEON,

These consolidated petitions assail the November 8, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 92316, finding respondent Leonida de Leon as a bonafide tenant of the subject property, thereby
reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 135022 which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Adjudicator in DARAB
Case No. 0402-031-03. Also assailed is the March 1, 2007 Resolution4 denying the motions for
reconsideration.
On August 26, 2004, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Region IV- Province of Cavite, praying that petitioners Salvador R. Lim and/or
NICORP Management and Development Corporation (NICORP) be ordered to respect her tenancy rights
over a parcel of land located in Barangay Mambog III, Bacoor, Cavite, registered under TCT No. T-72669
in the name of Leoncia De Leon and Susana De Leon Loppacher (De Leon sisters), who were likewise
impleaded as parties-defendants in the suit.
Respondent alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the land since time immemorial with
full knowledge and consent of the owners, who were her sisters-in-law; that sometime in 2004,
petitioners circulated rumors that they have purchased the property from the De Leon sisters; that
petitioners ignored respondents requests to show proof of their alleged ownership; that on August 12,
2004, petitioners entered the land and uprooted and destroyed the rice planted on the land and graded
portions of the land with the use of heavy equipment; that the incident was reported to the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) which issued a Cease and Desist Order5 but to no avail.
Respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over the land; restore
the land to its original condition and not to convert the same to non-agricultural use; that any act of
disposition of the land to any other person be declared null and void because as a tenant, she allegedly
had a right of pre-emption or redemption over the land; and for actual damages and attorneys fees.6
Petitioner Lim denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). He alleged that respondent is a septuagenarian who is no longer
physically capable of tilling the land; that the MARO issued a certification7 that the land had no
registered tenant; that respondent could not be regarded as a landless tiller under the CARP because
she owns and resides in the property adjacent to the subject land which she acquired through
inheritance; that an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy8 was executed by the De Leon sisters when they sold the
property to him.
Moreover, Lim claimed that respondent and her family surreptitiously entered the subject land and
planted a few crops to pass themselves off as cultivators thereof; that respondent tried to negotiate
with petitioner Lim for the sale of the land to her, as the latter was interested in entering into a joint
venture with another residential developer, which shows that respondent has sufficient resources and
cannot be a beneficiary under the CARP; that the land is no longer classified as agricultural and could

not thus be covered by the CARP. Per certification issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, the land is classified as residential pursuant to a
Comprehensive Land Use Plan approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.9
For its part, petitioner NICORP asserted that it was not a proper party to the suit because it has not
actually acquired ownership of the property as it is still negotiating with the owners. However, it joined
in petitioner Lims assertion that respondent is not a qualified tenant; and that the subject land could
not be covered by the CARP since it is below the minimum retention area of five hectares allowed under
the program.10 Eventually, NICORP purchased the subject property from Lim on October 19, 2004.11
The De Leon sisters did not file a separate answer to respondent's complaint.
Meanwhile, Provincial Adjudicator Teodoro A. Cidro, to whom the case was assigned, died. Thus, the
case was referred to the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for resolution.
In compliance with the directive of the RARAD, respondent submitted as evidence an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate12 dated February 20, 1989 to prove that, as a result of her relationship with her
sisters-in-law, she was made a tenant of the land; a tax declaration13 showing that the land was
classified as irrigated riceland; several affidavits14 executed by farmers of adjacent lands stating that
respondent and her family were tenants-farmers on the subject land; and several documents and
receipts15 to prove the agricultural activities of respondent and her family.
Respondent likewise submitted a handwritten letter16 of Susana De Leon addressed to respondents
daughter Dolores, showing that the former purportedly acknowledged respondent's son, Rolando, as
the legitimate tenant-lessee on the land. However, Rolando died on September 1, 2003 as evidenced
by his death certificate.17
On December 6, 2004, the RARAD rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for failure of
respondent to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship.18
There was no evidence to show that the De Leon sisters constituted respondent as tenant-lessee on the
land; neither was it proved that there was sharing of harvests with the landowner.
The DARAB affirmed the decision of the RARAD.19
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the findings of the RARAD/DARAB stating that
there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship; that the
letter of Susana De Leon to Dolores clearly acknowledged respondents son, Rolando, as a tenant, as
well as respondents share in the proceeds of the sale of the land; and that the sharing of produce was
established by the affidavits of neighboring farmers that were not controverted by petitioners.
The appellate court further held that the reclassification of the land by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
as residential cannot be given weight because it is only the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that
can reclassify or convert an agricultural land to other uses or classifications; and that the sale of the
land by the De Leon sisters to petitioner Lim is void because it violated Section 70 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 665720 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Hence, petitioners Lim and NICORP
separately filed petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which were consolidated per resolution of
the Court dated June 4, 2007.22
Petitioners allege that respondent failed to prove by substantial evidence all the elements of a tenancy
relationship; hence the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent has tenancy rights over the
subject land.
The petitions are meritorious. There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential elements concur:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee.23 All the foregoing requisites must be proved by substantial evidence and

the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.24 Unless a person has established
his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.25
In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to support the appellate courts conclusion that
respondent is a bona fide tenant on the subject property. Respondent failed to prove the third and sixth
elements cited above. It was not shown that the De Leon sisters consented to a tenancy relationship
with respondent who was their sister-in-law; or that the De Leon sisters received any share in the
harvests of the land from respondent or that the latter delivered a proportionate share of the harvest to
the landowners pursuant to a tenancy relationship.
The letter of Susana De Leon to Dolores, which allegedly proved consent of the De Leon sisters to the tenancy
arrangement, partially reads:
Nuong ako ay nandiyan, hindi nagkaayos ang bukid kasi ang iyong Kuya Roly ay ayaw na si Noli ang ahente. Pero
bago ako umalis ay nagkasundo kami ni Buddy Lim (Salvador) na aayusin niya at itutuloy ang bilihan at siya ang
bahala sa Kuya Roly mo.
Kaya nagkatapos kami at ang kasama ng Kuya mo ngayon ay si Buddy Lim. Ang pera na para sa kasama ay na kay
Buddy Lim. Ang kaparte ng Nanay Onching (Leoncia) mo ay nasa akin ang karamihan at ako na ang mag-aasikaso.
The Court cannot agree with the appellate courts conclusion that from the tenor of the letter, it is clear that
Susana acknowledged respondent's deceased son as "kasama" or tenant, and recognized as well respondents
share in the proceeds of the sale, thus proving the existence of an implied leasehold relations between the De Leon
sisters and respondent.26 The word "kasama" could be taken in varying contexts and not necessarily in relation to
an agricultural leasehold agreement. It is also unclear whether the term "kasama" referred to respondent's
deceased son, Rolando, or some other person. In the first sentence of the second paragraph, the word "kasama"
referred to petitioner Lim while the second sentence of the same paragraph, did not refer by name to Rolando as
"kasama."
Likewise, "Nanay Onching," as mentioned in the letter, referred to Leoncia, one of the De Leon sisters, on whose
behalf Susana kept part of the proceeds of the sale, and not herein respondent as understood by the Court of
Appeals, who had no right to such share. It is Leoncia who co-owned the property with Susana and who is therefore
entitled to a part of the sale proceeds.
Significantly, respondent was not mentioned at all in Susanas letter, but only her son, Rolando. However, even if
we construe the term "kasama" as pertaining to Rolando as a tenant of the De Leon sisters, respondent will not
necessarily be conferred the same status as tenant upon her sons death. A direct ascendant or parent is not
among those listed in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844 which specifically enumerates the order of succession to
the leasehold rights of a deceased or incapacitated agricultural tenant, to wit:

In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the
leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent
incapacity, from among the following: a) the surviving spouse; b) the eldest direct descendant by
consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age. x x x
Provided, further that in the event that the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the
period herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
There is no evidence that the De Leon sisters consented to constitute respondent as their tenant on the
subject land. As correctly found by the RARAD/DARAB, even the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate that
respondent offered in evidence to prove the alleged consent does not contain any statement from
which such consent can be inferred.27 Absent any other evidence to prove that the De Leon sisters
consented to the tenurial arrangement, respondents cultivation of the land was by mere tolerance of
her sisters-in-law.
The appellate court found that the element of sharing in the produce of the land was established by the
affidavits of neighboring farmers attesting to the fact that respondent cultivated the land since time
immemorial.28 However, perusal of the said affidavits reveals that there is nothing therein that would
indicate a sharing of produce between the De Leon sisters and respondent. The affidavits did not
mention at all that the De Leon sisters received a portion of the harvests or that respondent delivered
the same to her sisters-in-law. The affidavits failed to disclose the circumstances or details of the

alleged harvest sharing; it merely stated that the affiants have known respondent to be the cultivator of
the land since time immemorial. It cannot therefore be deemed as evidence of harvest sharing.
The other pieces of evidence submitted by respondent likewise do not prove the alleged tenancy
relationship. The summary report of the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation, the official receipts
issued by the National Food Authority and the certificate of membership in Bacoor Agricultural MultiPurpose Cooperative,29 only prove that respondent and her family engaged in agricultural activities but
not necessarily her alleged status as tenant of the De Leon sisters. Besides, these documents are not
even in the name of respondent but were issued in favor of her daughter Dolores.
That respondent was allowed to cultivate the property without opposition, does not mean that the De
Leon sisters impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with respondent. Occupancy and
continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant.30 The principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land but is, moreso, a legal relationship.31 Thus,
the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements,
provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are more important.32
Finally, the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not violate Sections 6533 and 7334 (c) of R.A. No.
6657. There was no illegal conversion of the land because Sec. 65 applies only to lands which were
covered by the CARP, i.e. those lands beyond the five-hectare retention limit allowed to landowners
under the law, which were distributed to farmers-beneficiaries. In the instant case, it was not shown
that the subject land was covered by the CARP. Neither was it shown that the sale was made to
circumvent the application of R.A. 6657 or aimed at dispossessing tenants of the land that they till.
The sale of the land to petitioners likewise did not violate R.A. No. 3844 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
Considering that respondent has failed to establish her status as de jure tenant, she has no right of preemption or redemption under Sections 1135 and 1236 of the said law. Even assuming that respondents
son Rolando was a tenant of the De Leon sisters, his death extinguished any leasehold on the subject
land. Section 837 of R.A. 3844 specifically provides for the extinction of an agricultural leasehold
relation, in the absence of persons enumerated under Section 9 of the law who are qualified to succeed
the deceased tenant.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92316 and the Resolution
denying the motions for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 13502, which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Adjudicator in DARAB Case No.
0402-031-03, dismissing the complaint of respondent Leonida De Leon for lack of merit, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 108941

July 6, 2000

REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJASA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special
Sixteenth Division, ISABEL CANDELARIA and JAMIE DINGLASAN, respondents.
This is a petition1 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals2 reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro3 and ordering petitioners Reynaldo and Erlinda Bejasa
(hereinafter referred to as "the Bejasas") to surrender the possession of the disputed landholdings to
respondent Isabel Candelaria ("hereinafter referred to as Candelaria") and to pay her annual rental from
1986, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.4
Inescapably, the appeal involves the determination of a factual issue. Whether a person is a tenant is a
factual question.5 The factual conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are contradictory
and we are constrained to review the same.6
We state the undisputed incidents.
This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-581917 and TCT No. T-59172,8
measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares more or less, situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro. The parcels of land are indisputably owned by Isabel Candelaria.

On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land with Pio
Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract, Malabanan agreed among other
things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan
seeds or seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary
harvest of fruits, etc."9
Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas claim
that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the land and shouldered all
expenses of production.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their first
agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with
Candelaria.10
Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan (hereinafter referred to as
"Jaime) as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land.11
On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria
Dinglasan, Jaime's wife (hereinafter referred to as "Victoria"). The contract had a term of one year.12
On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga"13 agreement, with a term of one year. The agreement is below
quoted:14
"Ako si Victoria Dinglasan bilang tagapamahala ni Isabel Candelaria ay ipinaaryendo kay Reynaldo
Bejasa ang lupang dating aryendo ni Pio Malabanan sa nasabing Ginang Buhat sa ika-30 ng Disyembre
1984 hanggang Ika-30 ng Disyembre 1985. Ako ay tumanggap sa kanya ng pitong libong piso at ito ay
daragdagan pa niya ng walong libong piso (P8,000) dito sa katapusan ng buwan ng Disyembre 1984.
During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed. The balance of
P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00 was paid on January 11, 1985.15
After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to
stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared
harvest.16
On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease agreement over
the land.17 The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also renewed by Candelaria on the
same date.18
On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the Bejasas.
On May 26, 1987, COSLAP dismissed the complaint.
Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan Oriental,
Mindoro19 against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages." The case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR").
On December 28, 1987, the DAR certified that the case was not proper for trial before the civil
courts.20
The trial court dismissed Jaime's complaint, including the Bejasas' counterclaim for leasehold, home lot
and damages.1awphi1
On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a
complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages."21 against Isabel
Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan.22

On February 20, 1991, after trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas.23First, they reasoned that
a tenancy relationship was established.24 This relationship can be created by and between a "person
who furnishes the landholding as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor and the
person who personally cultivates the same."25 Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have
security of tenure.26 The lower court ruled:27
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
"(1) Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiffs in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the lands in question and to
respect plaintiff's security of tenure on the landholdings of Isabel Candelaria and the home lot presently occupied by them;
"(2) Confirming the leasehold tenancy system between the plaintiffs as the lawful tenant-tillers and the landholder, Isabel
Candelaria, with the same lease rental of P20,000.00 per calendar year for the use of the lands in question and thereafter, same
landholdings be placed under the operation land transfer pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657;
"(3) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the amount of P115,500.00 representing the sale of
calamansi which were unlawfully gathered by Jaime Dinglasan and his men for the period July to December, 1987 and which were
supported by receipts and duly proven, with formal written accounting, plus the sum of P346,500.00 representing the would-be
harvests on citrus, calamansi, rambutan and bananas for the years 1988, 1989 and 1990, with legal rate of interest thereon from
the date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
"(4) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney's fee and expenses of
litigation; and
"(5) Authorizing the plaintiffs as tenant-farmers to litigate as pauper not only in this Court but up to the appellate courts in
accordance with Section 16 of P. D. No. 946.

"SO ORDERED."
On February 20, 1991, respondents filed their notice of appeal.28
On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's ruling.29
Reasoning: First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship were met.30 There
was no consent given by the landowner. The consent of former civil law lessee, Malabanan, was not
enough to create a tenancy relationship.31 Second, when Malabanan engaged the services of the
Bejasas, he only constituted them as mere overseers and did not make them "permanent tenants".
Verily, even Malabanan knew that his contract with Candelaria prohibited sublease.32 Third, the
contract ("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its very terms, expired after one year.
The contract did not provide for sharing of harvests, means of production, personal cultivation and the
like.33 Fourth, sharing of harvest was not proven. The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is
self-serving. Fifth, the element of personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa himself
admitted that he hired laborers to clear and cultivate the land.34 The Court of Appeals disposed of the
case, thus:35
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The interlocutory order issued on September 5, 1988 is DISSOLVED and the appellees are hereby
ordered to surrender possession of the disputed landholdings to appellant Isabel Candelaria and pay
her the amount of P15,000.00 in annual rents commencing from 1986 plus attorney's fees and litigation
expenses of P35,000.00 and costs.
"SO ORDERED."

Hence, this appeal filed on March 3, 1993.36


The issue raised is whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:37
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;


(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay
on and cultivate the land.1avvphi1
However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy
relation, still, no such relation existed.
There was no proof that they shared the harvests.
Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as consideration for the possession of the land, he agreed to deliver the
landowner's share (1/5 of the harvest) to Malabanan.38 Only Reynaldo Bejasa's word was presented to
prove this. Even this is cast into suspicion. At one time Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the
harvest went to him, that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% went to the landowner, Candelaria.39 Later
on he stated that the landowner's share was merely one fifth.40
In Chico v. Court of Appeals,41 we faulted private respondents for failing to prove sharing of harvests
since "no receipt, or any other evidence was presented."42 We added that "Self serving statements ...
are inadequate; proof must be adduced."43
Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner
never gave her consent.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria.44 They acknowledge that
Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement with them.45 True enough
Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the land.46
However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the
Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983.47 We do not agree. In a tenancy
agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria
agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year,48 such agreement did not create a tenancy
relationship, but a mere civil law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of
the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the
"aryenduhan",49 which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the
term of the contract.
Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals of February 9, 1993, in toto.

G.R. No. L-62626 July 18, 1984


SPOUSES CAYETANO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO S. MACAYA, respondents.

In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of, Appeal declaring the existence of
a landholder-tenant relationship and ordering the private respondent's reinstatement, the petitioners
contend that the appellate court committed an error of law in:
1. Disregarding the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations which are supported by
substantial evidence; and
2. Substituting the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations with its own findings.
Briefly, the facts of the case as found by the Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District,
Branch 1 at Pasig, Metro Manila are as follows: Sometime in 1946, the late Severino Manotok donated
and transferred to his eight (8) children and two (2) grandchildren namely: Purificacion Manotok, Eliza
Manotok, Perpetua manotok, Filomena Manotok, Severino Manotok, Jr., Jesus Manotok, Rahula Ignacio
Manotok, Severino Manotok III, Fausto Manotok and Rosa Manotok, a thirty-four-hectare lot located in
Payong, Old Balara, Quezon City covered by a certificate of title. Severino Manotok who was appointed
judicial guardian of his minor children 'accepted on their behalf the aforesaid donation. At that time,
there were no tenants or other persons occupying the said property.
In that same year, Teodoro Macaya accompanied by Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went
to the house of Manotok in Manila and pleaded that he be allowed to live on the Balara property so that
he could at the same time guard the property and prevent the entry of squatters and the theft of the
fruits and produce of the fruit trees planted by the owner. Manotok allowed Macaya to stay in the
property as a guard (bantay) but imposed the conditions that at any time that the owners of the
property needed or wanted to take over the property, Macaya and his family should vacate the property
immediately; that while he could raise animals and plant on the property, he could do so only for his
personal needs; that he alone could plant and raise animals on the property; and that the owners would
have no responsibility or liability for said activities of Macaya. Macaya was allowed to use only three (3)
hectares. These conditions, however, were not put in writing.
On December 5, 1950, the property-owners organized themselves into a corporation engaged primarily
in the real estate business known as the Manotok Realty, Inc. The owners transferred the 34-hectare lot
to the corporation as part of their capital contribution or subscription to the capital stock of the
corporation.
From 1946 to 1956, Macaya did not pay, as he was not required to pay anything to the owners or
corporation whether in cash or in kind for his occupancy or use of the property. However, the
corporation noted that the realty taxes on the property had increased considerably and found it very
burdensome to pay the said taxes while on the other hand, Macaya had contributed nothing nor even
helped in the payment of the taxes. Thus, Macaya upon the request of the owners agreed to help by
remitting ten (10) cavans of palay every year as his contribution for the payment of the realty taxes
beginning 1957.
On June 5, 1964, the corporation requested Macaya to increase his contribution from ten (10) cavans to
twenty (20) cavans of palay effective 1963 because the assessed value of the property had increased
considerably. Macaya] agreed.
In 1967, Macaya informed the corporation that he could not afford anymore to deliver any palay
because the palay dried up. He further requested that in the ensuring years, he be allowed to
contribute only ten (10) cavans of palay. The corporation said that if that was the case, he might as well
not deliver anymore. Thus, from 1967 up to 1976, Macaya did not deliver any palay.
On January 31, 1974, Manotok Realty, Inc. executed a "Unilateral Deed of Conveyance" of the property
in favor of Patricia Tiongson, Pacita Go, Roberto Laperal III, Elisa Manotok, Rosa Manotok, Perpetua M.
Bocanegra, Filomena M. Sison, Severino Manotok, Jr., Jesus Manotok, Ignacio S. Manotok, Severino
Manotok III and Fausto Manotok.
Sometime in 1974, Macaya was informed by the Manotoks that they needed the property to construct
their houses thereon. Macaya agreed but pleaded that he be allowed to harvest first the planted rice
before vacating the property.

However, he did not vacate the property as verbally promised and instead expanded the area he was
working on.
In 1976, the Manotoks once more told Macaya to vacate the entire property including those portions
tilled by him. At this point, Macaya had increased his area from three (3) hectares to six (6) hectares
without the knowledge and consent of the owners. As he was being compelled to vacate the property,
Macaya brought the matter to the Department (now Ministry) of Agrarian Reforms. The Manotoks,
during the conference before the officials of the Department insisted that Macaya and his family vacate
the property. They threatened to bulldoze Macaya's landholding including his house, thus prompting
Macaya to file an action for peaceful possession, injunction, and damages with preliminary injunction
before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
The sole issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists
between the parties. The Court of Agrarian Relations found that Macaya is not and has never been a
share or leasehold tenant of Severino Manotok nor of his successors-in-interest over the property or any
portion or portions thereof but has only been hired as a watchman or guard (bantay) over the same. On
Macaya's appeal from the said decision, the respondent appellate court declared the existence of an
agricultural tenancy relationship and ordered Macaya's reinstatement to his landholding.
Since what is involved ed is agricultural tenancy, we refer to Republic Act No. 1199 as amended by
Republic Act No. 2263. Section 3 thereof defines agricultural tenancy as:
... the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed
by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the
latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both.
Thus, the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the landholder and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production;
and 5) there is consideration (Agustin, Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, 1981, p. 19). As
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant, as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant, This is so because unless a person has established his status as a
de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws. ...
The key factor in ascertaining whether or not there is a landowner-tenant relationship in this case is the
nature of the disputed property.
Is the thirty-four (34) hectare lot, of which the six (6) hectares occupied by the private respondent form
a part, against agricultural land? If not, the rules on agrarian reform do not apply.
From the year 1948 up to the present, the tax declarations of real property and the annual receipts for
real estate taxes paid have always classified the land as "residential". The property is in Balara, Quezon
City, Metro Manila, not far from the correctly held by the trial court:
University of the Philippines and near some fast growing residential subdivisions. The Manotok family is
engaged in the business of developing subdivisions in Metro Manila, not in farming.
The trial court observed that a panoramic view of the property shows that the entire 34 hectares is
rolling forestal land without any flat portions except the small area which could be planted to palay. The
photographs of the disputed area show that flush to the plantings of the private respondent are adobe
walls separating expensive looking houses and residential lots from the palay and newly plowed soil.
Alongside the plowed or narrowed soil are concrete culverts for the drainage of residential subdivisions.
The much bigger portions of the property are not suitable for palay or even vegetable crops.
The trial court noted that in a letter dated April 12, 1977, the City Engineer of Quezon City certified on
the basis of records in his office that the property in question falls within the category of "Residential I
Zone."

The respondent court ignored all the above considerations and noted instead that the appellees never
presented the tax declarations for the previous year, particularly for 1946, the year when Macaya
began cultivating the property. It held that while the petitioners at that time might have envisioned a
panoramic residential area of the disputed property, then cogonal with some forest, that vision could
not materialize due to the snail pace of urban development to the peripheral areas of Quezon City
where the disputed property is also located and pending the consequent rise of land values. As a
matter of fact, it found that the houses found thereon were constructed only in the 70's.
Whatever "visions" the owners may have had in 1946, the fact remains that the land has always been
officially classified as "residential" since 1948. The areas surrounding the disputed six hectares are now
dotted with residences and, apparently, only this case has kept the property in question from being
developed together with the rest of the lot to which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants rice or
corn on a residential lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the heart of a metropolitan area
cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it into agricultural land and subject it to the
agrarian reform program.
On this score alone, the decision of the respondent court deserves to be reversed.
Another requisite is that the parties must be landholder and tenant. Rep. Act No. 11 99 as amended
defines a landholder
Sec. 5(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a
consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain under the leasehold
tenancy system.
On the other hand, a tenant is defined as
Sec. 5(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's
consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.
Under these definitions, may Macaya be considered as a tenant and Manotok as a landholder?
Significant, as the trial court noted, is that the parties have not agreed as to their contributions of the
several items of productions such as expenses for transplanting, fertilizers, weeding and application of
insecticides, etc. In the absence of an agreement as to the respective contributions of the parties or
other terms and conditions of their tenancy agreement, the lower court concluded that no tenancy
relationship was entered into between them as tenant and landholder.
On this matter, the respondent Appellate Court disagreed. It held that:
... Whether the appellant was instituted as tenant therein or as bantay, as the appellees preferred to
call him, the inevitable fact is that appellant cleared, cultivated and developed the once unproductive
and Idle property for agricultural production. Appellant and Don Severino have agreed and followed a
system of sharing the produce of the land whereby, the former takes care of all expenses for cultivation
and production, and the latter is only entitled to 10 cavans of rice per harvest. This is the essense of
leasehold tenancy.
It should be noted, however, that from 1967 to the present, Macaya did not deliver any cavans of palay
to the petitioners as the latter felt that if Macaya could no longer deliver the twenty (20) cavans of
palay, he might as well not deliver any. The decision of the petitioners not to ask for anymore
contributions from Macaya reveals that there was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the
parties. Neither can such relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system of
sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at which time, Macaya was also
planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and during the limited period when it was
in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed price leases the property while
the lessor has no responsibility whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no
agreement as to the sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items. The private

respondent, however, has long stopped in paying the annual rents and violated the agreement when he
expanded the area he was allowed to use. Moreover, the duration of the temporary arrangement had
expired by its very terms.
Going over the third requisite which is consent, the trial court observed that the property in question
previous to 1946 had never been tenanted. During that year, Vicente Herrera was the overseer. Under
these circumstances, coupled by the fact that the land is forested and rolling, the lower court could not
see its way clear to sustain Macaya's contention that Manotok had given his consent to enter into a
verbal tenancy contract with him. The lower court further considered the fact that the amount of ten
(10) cavans of palay given by Macaya to the owners from 1957 to 1964 which was later increased to
twenty (20) cavans of palay from 1964 to 1966 was grossly disproportionate to the amount of taxes
paid by the owners. The lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no
intention on the part of the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only for
residential purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the fourth requisite which is the purpose
was also not present.
The last requisite is consideration. This is the produce to be divided between the landholder and tenant
in proportion to their respective contributions. We agree with the trial court that this was also absent.
As earlier stated, the main thrust of petitioners' argument is that the law makes it mandatory upon the
respondent Court of Appeals to affirm the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations if the findings of
fact in said decision are supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusions stated therein are not
clearly against the law and jurisprudence. On the other hand, private respondent contends that the
findings of the Court of Agrarian Relations are based not on substantial evidence alone but also on a
misconstrued or misinterpreted evidence, which as a result thereof, make the conclusions of the Court
of Agrarian Relations clearly contrary to law and jurisprudence.
After painstakingly going over the records of the case, we find no valid and cogent reason which
justifies the appellate court's deviation from the findings and conclusions of the lower court. It is quite
clear from the 44-page decision of the trial court, that the latter has taken extra care and effort in
weighing the evidence of both parties of the case. We find the conclusions of the respondent appellate
court to be speculative and conjectural.
It bears re-emphasizing that from 1946 to 1956, there was no agreement as to any system of sharing
the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything from the harvest and private respondent
Macaya was using and cultivating the land free from any charge or expense. The situation was rather
strange had there been a tenancy agreement between Don Severino and Macaya.
From 1957 to 1964, Macaya was requested to contribute ten (10) cavans a year for the payment of the
realty taxes. The receipts of these contributions are evidenced by the following exhibits quoted below:
(a) Exhibit "4" adopted and marked as Exhibit "K" for plaintiff (Macaya):
Ukol sa taon 1961
Tinanggap naniin kay G. Teodoro Macaya ang sampung (10) cavan na palay bilang tulong niya sa
pagbabayad ng amillaramiento sa lupa ng corporation na nasa Payong, Q.C. na kaniyang binabantayan.
(b) Exhibit "9" adopted and marked as Exhibit "L" for plaintiff (Macaya): Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya ang
TATLONG (3) kabang palay bilang kapupunan sa DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang palay na kanyang tulong sa pagbabayad ng
amillaramiento para sa taong 1963 ng lupang ari ng Manotok Realty, Inc. na nasa Payong, Quezon City, na kanyang binabantayan
samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION PANGTIRAHAN.
c) Exhibit "10" adopted and marked as Exhibit "N" for plaintiff (Macaya): Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya ang
DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang palay na kanyang tulong sa pagbabayad ng amillaramiento para sa taong 1964 ng lupang ari ng
Manotok Realty Inc., na nasa Payong, Quezon City, na kanyang binabantayan samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION
PANG TAHANAN.
d) Exhibit "11" adopted and marked as Exhibit "M" for plaintiff (Macaya): Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya ang
DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang ng palay na kanyang tulong sa pagbabayad ng amillaramiento para sa taong 1965 ng lupang ari ng
Manotok Realty, Inc., na nasa Payong, Quezon City, na kanyang binabantayan samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION
PANG TAHANAN.

From the above-quoted exhibits, it clearly appears that the payment of the cavans of palay was
Macaya's contribution for the payment of the real estate taxes; that the nature of the work of Macaya is

that of a watchman or guard (bantay); and, that the services of Macaya as such watchman or guard
(bantay) shall continue until the property shall be converted into a subdivision for residential purposes.
The respondent appellate court disregarded the receipts as self-serving. While it is true that the
receipts were prepared by petitioner Perpetua M. Bocanegra, Macaya nevertheless signed them
voluntarily. Besides, the receipts were written in the vernacular and do not require knowledge of the law
to fully grasp their implications.
Furthermore, the conclusion of the respondent appellate court to the effect that the receipts having
been prepared by one of the petitioners who happens to be a lawyer must have been so worded so as
to conceal the real import of the transaction is highly speculative. There was nothing to conceal in the
first place since the primary objective of the petitioners in allowing Macaya to live on the property was
for security purposes. The presence of Macaya would serve to protect the property from squatters. In
return, the request of Macaya to raise food on the property and cultivate a three-hectare portion while
it was not being developed for housing purposes was granted.
We can understand the sympathy and compassion which courts of justice must feel for people in the
same plight as Mr. Macaya and his family. However, the petitioners have been overly generous and
understanding of Macaya's problems. For ten years from 1946 to 1956, he lived on the property, raising
animals and planting crops for personal use, with only his services as "bantay" compensating for the
use of another's property. From 1967 to the present, he did not contribute to the real estate taxes even
as he dealt with the land as if it were his own. He abused the generosity of the petitioners when he
expanded the permitted area for cultivation from three hectares to six or eight hectares. Mr. Macaya
has refused to vacate extremely valuable residential land contrary to the clear agreement when he was
allowed to enter it. The facts of the case show that even Mr. Macaya did not consider himself as a true
and lawful tenant and did not hold himself out as one until he was asked to vacate the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is AFFIRMED.

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