Professional Documents
Culture Documents
not complied with, the trial court should suspend the proceedings and order the
However it would be in the interest of justice if the trial court hears the complaint
against all herein respondents and adjudicates petitioners rights as against theirs in a
singles and complete proceeding.
FACTS: Petitioner Salas Jr. and Respondent Laperal Realty Corporation entered into
an agreement for the latter to develop and provide complete construction services on
formers land. Petitioner executed a special power of attorney in favor of Respondent
Corporation to exercise general control, supervision and management of the sale of
his land. On June 10, 1989 Petitioner left his home for a business trip in Nueva Ecija
but never returned again. Petitioners wife filed a petition for presumptive death of her
husband after seven years of absence. The trial court granted her petition.
On the otherhand, Respondent Corporation already subdivided the property owned
by Salas Jr. to different lot buyers. The heirs of Salas Jr. filed in the RTC of Lipa City a
Complaint for nullity of sale, reconveyance, cancellation of contract and damages
against Laperal Realty Corporation and lot buyers. Laperal Realty Corporation filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the heirs of Salas Jr. failed to submit their
grievance to arbitration as stated in the agreement executed by Salas Jr. and Laperal
Realty Corporation. The lot buyers also filed a motion to dismiss based on the same
ground.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the arbitration clause in the agreement between Salas Jr.
and Laperal Realty binds the heirs of the former.
(2) Whether or not the trial court must dismiss the case or must hear the case
simultaneously.
HELD: (1) A submission to arbitration is a contract. As such, the Agreement,
containing the stipulation on arbitration, binds the parties thereto, as well as their
assigns and heirs. But only they. Petitioners, as heirs of Salas Jr., and respondent
Laperal Realty Corporation are certainly bound by the agreement.
(2) The arbitration agreement is valid, binding and enforceable and not contrary to
public policy so much so when there obtains a written provision for arbitration which is
The petition is granted the trial court must proceed with the hearing of the case.
Instead of appealing, SPI brought the issue to the Court of Appeals through Certiorari,
and the Court of Appeals found out that the arbitration clause in the agreement which
was duly executed by the parties in accordance with law must be followed.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not an arbitration clause exist between the parties.
whereby the latter engaged the services of the former to build the EDSA Plaza
Project. While the project is on-going, SPI decided to expand the project by engaging
the services of BF Corporation again. The parties entered into an agreement for main
HELD: (1) Even if the remedy of appeal is available, the action of SPI to bring the
contract works which includes the phase I, II and car park of the EDSA Plaza.
issue to the Court of Appeals through a certiorari was not a violation of the law on
procedure on the ground that the issue in the case at bar is a matter of finding out
which of the arbitration or the trial court has jurisdiction over the dispute.
Serious and substantial. BF Corporation alleged that the delay was cause by a fire
in the location of the project.
The Court of Appeals is correct in ordering that the arbitration clause in the
Agreement must be followed on the ground that all the formal requisites of an
agreement to arbitrate are present (a) it must be in writing; (b) it must be subscribed
as Agreement for the Execution of Builders Work for the EDSA Plaza Project. The
said agreement would cover the construction work until its eventual completion.
all the other contracts and agreements between the parties, was signed by the
representative of both parties and duly notarized. The failure of the SPI to initial the
Conditions of Contract would therefore not affect compliance with the formal
the project according to SPI which resulted disagreements between the parties. BF
Corporation then filed a complaint for collection of the balance due the construction
agreement. SPI on the other hand filed a motion to suspend proceeding instead of
Agreement.
filing of an answer. According to SPI the formal trade contract for the construction of
the project provided for a clause requiring prior resort to arbitration before judicial
(2) The Supreme Court finds that under the circumstances obtaining in this case a
one month period from the time the parties held a conference on July 12, 1993 until
private respondent SPI notified petitioner if a reasonable time, hence the action to file
BF Corporation alleged that there was no formal contract between the parties
although they entered into an agreement defining their rights and obligations in
undertaking the project.
The trial courts dismiss the contention of the SPI on the ground that even if the
arbitration clause exists in the said agreement, the same provides that the Articles of
Agreement shall be signed by the parties to the contract and even if it was signed into
a contract it has already prescribed.
only a question of fact. The Supreme Court in a long line of cases is not a trier of
(3) HI-PRECISION STEEL CENTER, INC vs. LIM KIM STEEL BUILDERS, INC.
G.R. No. 110434
December 13, 1993
(228 SCRA 397)
FACTS: Petitioner Hi-Precision Steel Center Inc. entered into a contract with
Respondent Lim Kim Steel Builders for the latter to complete a P21 Million
construction project owned by the former for a period of 153 days. On the last day of
the construction of the project, respondent only accomplished 75.8674% of the
project. The respondent alleged that it was the fault of the petitioner because of
issuance of change orders. On the other hand petitioner alleged that it was due to the
fault of the respondent because it incurred delays.
Respondent filed a Request for Adjudication with public respondent Construction
Industry Adjudication Commission (CIAC). Respondent sought for the payment of the
unpaid progress buildings, unearned profits and other receivables. Petitioner on the
other hand claimed actual and liquidated damages including attorneys fees. CIAC
formed Arbitral Tribunal composed of three members. And they come up with a
decision in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner filed a petition to the Supreme Court that sought to reverse the decision of
the CIAC for it committed grave abused of discretion in not properly implementing
paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 1191 of the Civil Code, in not applying the doctrine of
estoppels and failure of the arbitral tribunal to uphold the supremacy of the law
between the parties and enforce it against private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Arbitral Tribunal Committed grave abused of discretion.
HELD: Section 19 of Executive Order 1008 as amended provides that The Arbitral
award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and inappealable except on
QUESTION OF LAW which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court. The
allegations raised by the Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. are all question of facts. The
Petitioner make it appear that the issues involve are questions of law but in truth it is
HELD: Section 14 of Republic Act 876, otherwise known as the Arbitration Law,
allows any party to the arbitration proceeding to petition the court to take measures to
(4) HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
safeguard and/or conserve any matter which is the subject of the dispute in
arbitration. It simply grants an arbitrator the power to issue subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum at any time before rendering the award. The exercise of such power is
without prejudice to the right of a party to file a petition in court to safeguard any
matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration. In the case at bar, private
FACTS: A certain Victor Tancuan issued Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company
respondent filed an action for a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary
(HBSTC) check for P25, 250,000.00 while a certain Eugene Arriesgado issued Far
attachment. Undoubtedly, such action involved the same subject matter as that in
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) three checks amounting to P25, 200,000.00.
arbitration, i.e., the sum of P25, 200,000.00 which was allegedly deprived from private
respondent in what is known in banking as a "kiting scheme." However, the civil
Tancuan and Arriesgado exchanged each other's checks and deposited them with
action was not a simple case of a money claim since private respondent has included
their respective banks for collection. When FEBTC presented Tancuan's HBSTC
check for clearing, HBSTC dishonored it for being "Drawn against Insufficient Funds."
Arbitration Law.
HBSTC sent Arriesgado's three FEBTC checks through the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC) to FEBTC but was returned as "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds." HBSTC received the notice of dishonor but refused to accept the checks and
Corporation cannot bypass the arbitration process laid out by the body and seek relief
returned them to FEBTC through the PCHC for the reason "Beyond Reglementary
directly from the courts. In the case at bar, undeniably, private respondent has
Period," implying that HBSTC already treated the three (3) FEBTC checks as cleared
initiated arbitration proceedings as required by the PCHC rules and regulations, and
pending arbitration has sought relief from the trial court for measures to safeguard
for the returned checks and inquired from HBSTC whether it had permitted any
and/or conserve the subject of the dispute under arbitration, as sanctioned by section
withdrawal of funds against the unfunded checks and if so, on what date. HBSTC,
14 (which allows the party to file a petition in the proper court in order to take
however, refused to make any reimbursement and to provide FEBTC with the needed
measures to safeguard and/or conserve any matter which is the subject of the dispute
information.
in arbitration) of the Arbitration Law, and otherwise not shown to be contrary to the
PCHC rules and regulations.
FEBTC submitted the dispute for arbitration as provided by the rules of PCHC where
HSBTC also participated. Pending such arbitration proceeding, FEBTC filed with the
RTC of Makati an action for sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment
against HSBTC. HSBTC sought for the dismissal of such action on the ground that
there is a pending arbitration proceeding involving the same issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent may subsequently file a separate case in
court over the same subject matter of arbitration, simply to obtain the provisional
remedy of attachment against the petitioner.
having to resort to prior arbitration, it is entitled to collect the value of the services it
GROUPS
rendered through an ordinary action for the collection of a sum of money from
respondent. On the other hand, the latter contends that there is a need for prior
arbitration as provided in the Agreement. This is because there are some disparities
between the parties positions regarding the extent of the work done, the amount of
advances and billable accomplishments, and the set off of expenses incurred by
electrical work at the Third Port of Zamboanga. Respondent took over some of the
work contracted to petitioner due to the alleged failure of the latter to finish the job.
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. Essentially, the dispute arose from
Upon completing its task under the Contract, petitioner billed respondent in the
amount of P6, 711, 813.90. Contesting the accuracy of the amount of advances and
could be applied to the facts. The instant case involves technical discrepancies that
billable accomplishments listed by the former, the latter refused to pay. Respondent
are better left to an arbitral body that has expertise in those areas.
also took refuge in the termination clause of the Agreement. That clause allowed it to
set off the cost of the work that petitioner had failed to undertake -- due to termination
The Subcontract Agreement contained an arbitral clause which clearly indicates that
the resolution of the dispute between the parties requires a referral to the provisions
of their Agreement. Within the scope of the arbitration clause are discrepancies as to
Petitioner filed a Complaint for the collection of the amount representing the alleged
filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Complaint was premature, because there
was no prior recourse to arbitration.
The arbitral clause in the Agreement is a commitment on the part of the parties to
submit to arbitration the disputes covered therein. Because that clause is binding,
RTC denied the Motion on the ground that the dispute did not involve the
they are expected to abide by it in good faith. And because it covers the dispute
interpretation or the implementation of the Agreement and was, therefore, not covered
between the parties in the present case, either of them may compel the other to
by the arbitral clause. After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled that the take-over of
arbitrate.
some work items by respondent was not equivalent to a termination, but a mere
modification, of the Subcontract. The latter was ordered to give full payment for the
work completed by petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and ordered the
referral of the case to arbitration.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exist a controversy/dispute between petitioner and
respondent regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Sub-Contract
Agreement that requires prior recourse to voluntary arbitration.
pre-trial. The trial court denied the notice of appeal and the CA affirmed it.
CORPORATION
encouraged under our jurisdiction. However, the failure to consummate one does not
warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to
FACTS: Petitioner RCBC filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer
This Court's ruling is pursuant to the case of Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of
attachment. However, the writ was returned partially satisfied since only a parcel of
Appeals, where it was held that the trial court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure of
summons was served on each of the defendants, respondents herein, who filed their
respective answers, except for defendant Gabriel Cheng who was dropped without
prejudice as party-defendant as his whereabouts could not be located. Subsequently,
petitioner moved for an alias writ of attachment which the court a quo denied.
Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial. Discussions between
petitioner and respondents were undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of
respondent. Petitioner approved a debt payment scheme for the corporation which
was communicated to the latter by means of a letter for the conformity of its officers
and respondent. Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to
signify his agreement to the terms and conditions of the restructuring.
The trial court on its own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without prejudice the
case for failure to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial court of respondents'
unremitting desire to settle the case amicably through a loan restructuring program.
The court a quo approved the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference
alleging that only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the letter which
informed the defendants that petitioner already approved defendant Magwin
Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its loan obligations. Respondent
final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which are appealable to the
Supreme Court.
(7) METRO CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. CHATHAM PROPERTIES, INC.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
untenable because first, private respondents removed the obstacle to the continuation
of the arbitration, precisely by withdrawing their objection to the exclusion of the
(8)
PHILROCK,
INC.
vs.
CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
ARBITRATION
COMMISSION
after the CIAC Order had been issued. It even concluded and signed the Terms of
Reference in which the parties stipulated the circumstances leading to the dispute;
summarized their respective positions, issues, and claims; and identified the
composition of the tribunal of arbitrators. The document clearly confirms both parties
FACTS: Private respondent Cid spouses filed a complaint for damages against
intention and agreement to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. In view of this
Philrock and its officers. At the initial trial date, both parties agreed to refer the matter
fact, we fail to see how the CIAC could have been divested of its jurisdiction.
The Court will not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat the
disagreements arose as to whether moral and exemplary damages and tort should be
objective of voluntary arbitration for its own private motives. After submitting itself to
included as an issue along with breach of contract, and whether the seven officers
and engineers of Philrock who are not parties to the Agreement to Arbitrate should be
assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter rendered an adverse
decision.
parties; hence, both the Cid spouses and Philrock requested that the case be
remanded to the trial court. The Court ordered that it no longer had jurisdiction over
the case and remanded the same to CIAC for arbitral proceeding. The parties
proceeded to finalize, approve and sign the Terms of Reference which stated that the
parties agree that their differences be settled by an Arbitral Tribunal. Thereafter, the
petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss alleging that the CIAC has lost jurisdiction over the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) has
jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction contracts
entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary
arbitration.
It is undisputed that the parties submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Commission by virtue of their Agreement to Arbitrate Petitioners contention is
to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner also prayed either for
LINE
dismissal or suspension of the Third Party Complaint on the ground that there exists
an arbitration agreement between it and respondent AMML. The lower court issued
March 2, 2000
an
Order
denying
petitioner's
Motion
to
Dismiss.
Petitioner's
Motion
for
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner also filed its Answer to the Third Party Complaint in the trial
sharing agreement whereby they mutually agreed to purchase, share and exchange
court. Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for
needed space for cargo in their respective containerships. Under the Agreement, they
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner's prayer for
arbitration.
During the lifetime of the said Agreement, Florex International, Inc. (Florex) delivered
to AMML cargo of various foodstuffs, with Oakland, California as port of discharge
and San Francisco as place of delivery. The corresponding Bill of Lading No. MAEU
MNL110263 was issued to Florex by respondent AMML. Pursuant to the Agreement,
For respondent Court of Appeals to say that the terms of the contract do not require
respondent AMML loaded the subject cargo on MS Sealand Pacer, a vessel owned by
petitioner. Under this arrangement, therefore, respondent AMML was the principal
respondent AMML as Principal Carrier can seek damages and/or indemnity from
petitioner, as Containership Operator.
Consignee refused to pay for the cargo, alleging that delivery thereof was delayed.
Thus, Florex filed a complaint against respondent Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping
As the Principal Carrier with which Florex directly dealt with, AMML can and should be
Agency (Filipinas), Inc. for reimbursement of the value of the cargo and other
held accountable by Florex in the event that it has a valid claim against the former.
charges. According to Florex, the cargo was received by the consignee only on June
Pursuant to the Agreement, AMML, when faced with such a suit "shall use all
28, 1991, since it was discharged in Long Beach, California, instead of in Oakland,
reasonable endeavours to defend" itself or "settle such suits for as low a figure as
reasonably possible". In turn, respondent AMML can seek damages and/or indemnity
from petitioner as Containership Operator for whatever final judgment may be
AMML in its Answer alleges that even on the assumption that Florex was entitled to
adjudged against it under the Complaint of Florex. The crucial point is that collection
filed a Third Party Complaint against petitioner, averring that whatever damages
Thus, when the text of a contract is explicit and leaves no doubt as to its intention, the
designated his brother, Atty. Francis Zosa, as his representative in the arbitration
court may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.
panel while MCHC designated Atty. Inigo S. Fojas and MCMC nominated Atty.
Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the parties expressly provided for
by their Agreement, the Third Party Complaint should have been dismissed.
ZOSA
G.R. No. 129916
HELD: The Arbitration clause is invalid only in so far as the composition of panel of
arbitrators is concern.
The Court is of the view that the petitioner MCMC and MCHC represent the same
interest. There is no quarrel that both defendants are entirely two different
corporations with personalities distinct and separate from each other. But as the
Zosa as President under the Employment Agreement which shall cease if the
petitioners represent the same interest, it could never be expected, in the arbitration
proceedings, that they would not protect and preserve their own interest, much less,
would both or either favor the interest of the plaintiff. The arbitration law, as all other
laws, is intended for the good and welfare of everybody. In fact, what is being
challenged by the plaintiff herein is not the law itself but the provision of the
President and Chief Executive Officer of MCHC on account of loss of trust and
Employment Agreement based on the said law, which is the arbitration clause but
confidence arising from alleged violation of the resolution issued by MCHC's board of
It appears that the two (2) petitioners have one (1) arbitrator each to compose the
panel of three (3) arbitrators. As the defendant MCMC is the Manager of defendant
resignation to the company on the ground that said position had less responsibility
MCHC, its decision or vote in the arbitration proceeding would naturally and certainly
and scope than President and Chief Executive Officer. He demanded that he be given
be in favor of its employer and the defendant MCHC would have to protect and
preserve its own interest; hence, the two (2) votes of both petitioners would certainly
be against the lone arbitrator for the respondent. Hence, apparently, respondent
MCHC did not accept respondent Zosa's resignation for good reason, but instead
would never get or receive justice and fairness in the arbitration proceedings from the
informed him that the Employment Agreement is terminated for cause, in accordance
panel of arbitrators. In fairness and justice to the both petitioners which represent the
with the said agreement. Respondent Zosa was further advised that he shall have no
same interest should be considered as one and should be entitled to only one
further rights under the said Agreement or any claims against the Manager or the
Corporation except the right to receive within thirty (30) days the amounts stated in
the Agreement. Disagreeing with the position taken by petitioners, respondent Zosa
arbitrators is concerned should be declared void and of no effect, because the law
says, "Any clause giving one of the parties power to choose more arbitrators than the
they had exhausted all possible avenues for an amicable resolution and settlement of
their grievances; that as a result of the fraud, bad faith, malice and wanton attitude of
petitioners, they should be held responsible for all the actual expenses incurred by
private respondents in the delayed shipment of orders which resulted in the extra
handling thereof, the actual expenses and cost of money for the unused Letters of
Credit and the substantial opportunity losses due to created out-of-stock situations
and unauthorized shipments of Del Monte-USA products to the Philippine Duty Free
Area and Economic zone; that the bad faith, fraudulent acts and willful negligence of
February 7, 2001
placed private respondent on tenterhooks since then; and, that the shrewd and subtle
(MMI) whereby the latter was appointed as the sole and exclusive distributor of Del
Monte products of the former in the Philippines. The agreement provides for an
thereof was a subterfuge. For the foregoing, private respondents claimed, among
other reliefs, the payment of actual damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees
Inc. (SFI), with the approval of petitioner DMC-USA, as MMI's marketing arm to
concentrate on its marketing and selling function as well as to manage its critical
relationship with the trade.
Respondents MMI and SFI filed a Complaint against petitioners DMC-USA. Private
ISSUE: Whether or not the dispute between the parties warrants an order compelling
products continued to be brought into the country by parallel importers despite the
appointment of private respondent MMI as the sole and exclusive distributor of Del
Monte products thereby causing them great embarrassment and substantial damage.
HELD: Petitioners contend that the subject matter of private respondents' causes of
They alleged that the products brought into the country by these importers were aged,
action arises out of the Agreement between petitioners and private respondents.
damaged, fake or counterfeit, so that they had to cause, after prior consultation the
Thus, considering that the arbitration clause of the Agreement provides that all
Petitioners apparently upset with the publication, instructed private respondent MMI to
stop coordinating with Antonio Ongpin and to communicate directly instead with
claim, on the other hand, that their causes of action are rooted in Arts. 20, 21 and 23
of the Civil Code, the determination of which demands a full blown trial, as correctly
held by the Court of Appeals.
Private respondents further averred that petitioners knowingly continued to deal with
the former in bad faith by involving disinterested third parties and by proposing
A careful examination of the instant case shows that the arbitration clause in the
solutions which were entirely out of their control. Private respondents claimed that
is valid and the dispute between the parties is arbitrable. However, this Court must
deny the petition.
Splitting of the proceedings to arbitration as to some of the parties on one hand and
trial for the others on the other hand, or the suspension of trial pending arbitration
between some of the parties, should not be allowed as it would, in effect, result in
FACTS: An Information for Libel was filed before the RTC of Manila against private
arbitration. Accordingly, the interest of justice would only be served if the trial court
complainant.
HELD: NO. The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus:
Petitioner does submit that there is no need to employ the clause "printed and first
published" in indicating where the crime of libel was committed, as the term "publish"
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
is "generic and within the general context of the term 'print' in so far as the latter term
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
is utilized to refer to the physical act of producing the publication." Where the law
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
general circulation.
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office
it should be reiterated that the flaws in the Information strike at the very heart of the
jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. It is settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense
The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not
must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within
that they were published in Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Article 360 states, in as unequivocal a manner
where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or
as possible, that the criminal and civil action for libel shall be filed with the court of the
first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not
province or city "where the libelous article is printed and first published, or where any
necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way
of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense."
that while leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the
If the Information for libel does not establish with particularity any of these two venue
Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these
requirements, the trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear the criminal case.