G.R. No.

L-45667 June 20, 1977

MANUEL
BORJA,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and
HON. ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of the City Court of Cebu (Branch I), respondents.
Hermis I. Mopntecillo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N.
Ortega for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The jurisdictional infirmity imputer to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City of Cebu
which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
in this certionrari proceeding was the absence of an arrainment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was
accused of slight physical injuries. This notwithstanding respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the
trial in abssentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of
such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor. 1
Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent
Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to
submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976
petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due
process, 3 more specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4 Ther was thus, at the very least, a graveabuse
of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to comment, agreed that the procedural defect was
of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance.
The comment was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this Court, duly taken
note of in the comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed
for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds support in
the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that
he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted
only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the
evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a
valid law. 6 This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through Justice De Joya and following the
language of the American Supreme Court, Identified due process with the accused having "been heard
in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law, ..." 8 An arraignment thus becomes
indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is
required to meet ... " 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading
case of United States v. Binayoh. 10 He pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a
duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to
extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its

own motion, must perform, unless waived." 11 To emphasize its importance, he added: "No such duty,
however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to
exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he
himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, ..." 12
In the terse and apt language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in
any criminal prosecution." 13 Procedural due process demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is
at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is
granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus
made fully aware of Possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the
state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter he is no longer in the
dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in
a much worse position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With
his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the
consequences. He is not even required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus
evident is that an arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed
to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an Idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge Senining was that
notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown that
after one postponement due to his failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing. When that date
came, December 14, 1973, without petitioner being present, although his bondsmen were notified,
respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testified, the offended
party herself, and three documents were offered in evidence after which the prosecution rested its case.
Thereupon, respondent City Court set the promulgation of the decision on December 28, 1973." 14 It
could then conclude: :Verily the records clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned at all and was
not represented by counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is
indisputable then that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and
counsel. As categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the leading case of Abriol v.
Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is
pronounced on him." 17 He added further that such "constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no
doubt that it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices
to refer to another leading case, People v. Holgado, 19 where the then Chief Justice Moran
emphatically took note of the importance of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would
be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence." 20 With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and
counsel being thus manifest, it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. It cannot

justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is
mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." 21 As pointed
out then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come
"after arraignment." The express mention in the present Constitution of the need for such a step
emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an accused due process. Without the
accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the applicability of this exception to the
basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge Mendoza possess any
curative aspect. To quote anew from the comment of the Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First
Instance ... considered the appeal taken by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in
the respondent City Court. Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning those defects. In
fact, the Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of petitioner at
the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to bolster his position.
Specifically, the absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of
due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial." 22
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries,
is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated
November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The
case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries,
with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment
of petitioner.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ, concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

[G.R. No. 137348. June 21, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @
ROBERT TIU, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial
would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the
courts. [1]
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
The case at bar involves the clash of two classic values - - - the need for the State to stop crimes and
preserve the peace against the right of an individual to confront material witnesses to establish his
innocence. In balancing the two values, we shall scrutinize and set the parameters that ought to guide
prosecution when to disclose the identity of confidential informers.
On July 27, 1998 accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were charged with
violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 2, Article I, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The Information[2] reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other not having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
sell or offer for sale 980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a regulated
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who are Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records do not
show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the
course of the trial, the two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter.
The prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, sought to establish that on July
23, 1998 at around 5:00 P.M., a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD),
PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug
activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner. After an evaluation of the
confidential information, Chief Inspector Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. He constituted
a team of eight (8) with Police Inspector Medel N. Poe as team leader, SPO1 Gonzales as poseur-buyer
and the rest as back-up support.
According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher, placed an order for one (1) kilo of
shabu and agreed to a P600,000.00 consideration. The CI likewise agreed to meet with his contact on
July 24, 1998 at 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4:00 and 5:00
A.M. The boodle money was prepared consisting of six (6) bundles of cut bond paper with a marked
P1,000.00 peso bill on top of each bundle.
On July 24, 2004 at 3:00 A.M., the CI received a call from the drug dealer changing the meeting time
between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. on the same day. The team, together with the CI, proceeded to the meeting
place and arrived there at around 1:30 P.M. The CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked their car
along 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue. The rest of the team posted themselves at their back and their
right side.
A little while, accused Ong approached their car. The CI introduced him to SPO1 Gonzales who told
accused Ong in broken Tagalog to get in the car. When Ong inquired about the money in payment of
the shabu, SPO1 Gonzales showed him the slightly opened plastic bag containing the boodle money.
SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see the shabu. Accused Ong excused himself, went out of the car,
walked a few steps and then waved his right hand to somebody. While accused Ong was walking back
to the car, SPO1 Gonzales and the CI saw a green Toyota Corolla coming. The Corolla parked in front
of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as accused Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu
alighted, approached accused Ong and handed to him a gift-wrapped package. SPO1 Gonzales opened
it and inside was one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance. After its inspection,
accused Ong demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong the boodle money placed
in a W. Brown plastic bag. Thereafter, SPO1 Gonzales signaled his back-up team by turning on the
hazard lights of the car. SPO1 Gonzales himself arrested accused Ong while the CI and the back-up
agents arrested accused De Ming.
The officers brought the two (2) accused to their office where the corresponding booking sheets and
arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was referred to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The two (2) accused were subjected to a physical and
mental examination as required. They were found to be free from any external signs of trauma.
Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that the
specimen she examined had a net weight of 980.50 grams and manifested positive results for methyl

amphetamine hydrochloride[3] or what is commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. Her testimony
was supported by her Physical Sciences Report.[4]
Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the
Peoples Republic of China, claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Upon the
recommendation of a friend, he was able to work in a pancit canton factory in Quezon City. In June
1998, he stopped working at the factory and hunted for another job. Two (2) weeks prior to his arrest,
accused Ong was introduced by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a
bihon factory owned by Ong Sin.
On July 22, 1998, Ong Sin called up and set a meeting with accused Ong at the Tayuman branch of
Jollibee the next day. While waiting at Jollibee, accused Ong received a call from Ong Sin that he could
not personally meet him. Instead, his two (2) co-workers would meet accused Ong as instructed.
Subsequently, two (2) men answering to Ong Sins description approached accused Ong. He joined
them inside a yellow car. When they reached a certain place, the driver reached for his cellular phone
and called up someone. After a brief conversation, the driver handed the phone to him. Ong Sin was on
the line and informed him that the driver would accompany him to the bihon factory. The driver got out
of the car and accused Ong followed him. After walking two (2) blocks, the driver picked up something
from the place. They returned to the car. Suddenly, the companion of the driver poked a gun at him. He
was arrested, blindfolded and brought to an undisclosed place. Several hours later, he was taken to the
police station. There he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first time. He maintained
innocence to the crime charged.
On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW
business. He claimed that he gets his products from Baclaran and sells them to customers in the cities
of Naga and Daet in Bicol.
On July 23, 1998 at around 4:30 and 5:00 P.M., while waiting inside his car for his girlfriend and her
mother who just went in a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, he was approached by
persons unknown to him. They asked him what he was doing there. One of them went to the car parked
at his back, ordered somebody inside to get out and take a good look at him. The person pointed at him
saying maybe he is the one. He was then dragged out of his car and brought to the other car. They took
his clutch bag. They blindfolded and brought him to a place. After a few hours, at Camp Crame,
Quezon City, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing accused Ong and the charge of
conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City.
Avelina Cardoz, the mother of his girlfriend, and a divine healer, corroborated his story. She testified
that she requested accused De Ming to drive her to a townhouse at 8 th Street, New Manila, to cure a
patient. She declared that the officers of the Peoples Journal publication could attest to her profession.
She asked accused De Ming to wait for her and her daughter inside his car. When they returned to the
car, accused De Ming was nowhere to be found. They saw him next at the Quezon City Jail.
On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty
of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos.[5]
The case is with us on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree.
I
Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the
trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied.)
The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their
Certificate of Arraignment[6] states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does not,
however, indicate whether the Information was read in the language or dialect known to them. It
merely states:
This 4th day of Aug., 1998, the undersigns (sic) states:
That, in open court, and in the presence of Trial Prosecutor Ruben Catubay, the following accused
William Ong and Ching De Ming AKA Robert Tiu was/were called and, having been informed of the
nature of the accusation filed against him/her/them, furnishing him/her/them a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses, the said accused in answer to the question of the
Court, pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.
TO WHICH I CERTIFY.
Sgd. Mary Ruth Milo-Ferrer
Branch Clerk of Court
Sgd. William Ong
ACCUSED WILLIAM ONG
Sgd. Ching de Ming
ACCUSED CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU
Neither does the August 4, 1998 Order of Judge Diosdado M. Peralta of RTC-Br. 95, Quezon City,
disclose compliance with the rule on arraignment. It merely stated in part that [w]hen both accused
William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, both
accused entered a plea of not guilty.[7]
From the records, it is clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language. Thus, the services of a
Chinese interpreter were used in investigating appellants. SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales revealed in his
testimony, viz:[8]
Q: Now, is it not a fact that you had the difficulty of investigating the two accused because of
communication problem from your informant?
A: We did not encounter such problem when we investigated them sir. We also asked question and we
have another Chinese who was arrested who can speak Tagalog and we used that Chinese man to
translate for us and for them if the questions are difficult to understand, sir.
Q: Now that Chinese interpreter that is also an accused?
A: Yes sir.[9]
After arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower court had to secure the services of a certain
Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter. This appears in the Order of August 28, 1998 of Judge Peralta,
viz:
Considering that the counsel of the two (2) accused has still a lot of questions to ask on crossexamination x x x x From hereon, Mr. Richard Ng Lee, a businessman and a part time interpreter,

is hereby designated by the Court as interpreter in this case considering that there is no official
interpreter of the Court who is knowledgeable in the Chinese language or any Chinese dialect
whatsoever. The appointment of Mr. Richard Ng Lee is without the objection of counsel of the accused
and the public prosecutor and considering that the court is convinced that he indeed possesses the
qualifications of an interpreter of a Chinese language or any other Chinese dialect known and
spoken by the two (2) accused.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
What leaps from the records of the case is the inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend
any other language than Chinese and any of its dialect. Despite this inability, however, the appellants
were arraigned on an Information written in the English language.
We again emphasize that the requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect
known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the
arraignment.[11]
II
More important than the invalid arraignment of the appellants, we find that the prosecution evidence
failed to prove that appellants willfully and unlawfully sold or offered to sell shabu.
Appellants conviction is based on the lone testimony of SPO1 Gonzales. He was the designated poseurbuyer in the team formed for the buy-bust operation. But a careful reading of his testimony will reveal
that he was not privy to the sale transaction that transpired between the CI and appellant William
Ong, the alleged pusher. It is beyond contention that a contract of sale is perfected upon a meeting of
the minds of the parties on the object and its price.[12] Not all elements of the sale were established by
the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, viz:
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: After you have prepared the boodle money and you had made the proper marking which you
presented before this Honorable Court, what happen?
A: Out CI make a couple of call and he contacted William Ong thru a broken tagalog conversation.
Q: When your CI contacted with William Ong in broken tagalog?
A: I have a conversation with William Ong in broken tagalog the deal of one kilo gram of shabu was
initially closed.
Q: When you say closed, what do you mean by that?
A: They agreed to the sale of the shabu.
ATTY. TRINIDAD (counsel of accused) to the COURT
We object to the line of questioning, Your Honor that would be hearsay.
COURT:
I think what you were asking is what happened he said it was the CI who talked.
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: So after that, do you know what happen?
A: The CI informed us that the price of that shabu which were supposed to buy from them
amounts to 600,000.00 pesos, maam.

Q: Where did you come to know about this information that the amount is already 600,000.00 pesos?
ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT
Already answered, Your Honor.
COURT:
In other words what he say is that, there was a telephone conversation but he has no personal
knowledge. Your question then was what happened.
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: After the CI informed you that the price of the shabu is 600,000.00 pesos?
A: We prepared this boodle money and the 6,000 by our Chief SOD.
COURT to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: After the informant told you that there was an agreement to sell 600,000.00 pesos and that you have
already prepared the boodle money as you have stated, what happened after that?
A: The CI told us that the transaction is 600,000.00 pesos and venue is at 6 th Street, corner
Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4 oclock to 5 oclock in the morning of July
24, 1998, maam.
Q: So when the CI informed you that they will meet at 6 th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, what
transpired next?
A: On or about 3 oclock in the morning William Ong made a call to our CI informing him that the sale
of the delivery of shabu was reset to another time.[13]
xxxx
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: And when you were informed that there was a resetting of this deal?
COURT to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: How did you come to know that there was a resetting because he has no participation in the
conversation and it was the CI according to him and the alleged poseur-buyer.
A: The CI told our Chief Deputy.
ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT
That would be hearsay, Your Honor, and that would be a double hearsay.
COURT
Put on record that the counsel manifested that his answer is again hearsay and that a double
hearsay evidence.
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: And what did the CI do?
A: The CI informed us that the time will be at about 2 to 3 oclock in the afternoon of that same
day and the place.[14]
It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, albeit only through the
telephone, with the pusher. The CI was likewise the one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as to

the quantity of shabu to be purchased and its price. He also set the venue and time of the meeting
when the sale would take place. The Joint Affidavit of Arrest[15] executed by SPO1 Gonzales, PO2
Elmer N. Sarampote and PO1 Noli Jingo G. Rivel fortifies these facts, viz:
xxxx
That after couple of calls made by our CI, suspect WILLIAM ONG was finally contacted on or about
9:30 in the evening of July 23, 1998 and through a broken Tagalog conversation, a drug deal/sale was
initially closed in the agreed amount of six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00) and the agreed
venue is at the corner of 6th Street and Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City between 4:00 and
5:00 oclock in the morning of July 24, 1998 through Kaliwaan or Abutan (Cash upon Delivery);
That said information was relayed to our Deputy Chief, who upon learning said report, immediately
grouped and briefed the team for the said operation;
xxxx
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the morning of July 24, 1998, WILLIAM ONG made a call to our CI
informing him (CI) to reset the time of the drug deal/sale of one (1) kilogram of SHABU and it was
scheduled again between 2:00 to 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of same date and same place;
It is therefore understandable that in his account of his meeting with appellant William Ong, SPO1
Gonzales made no reference to any further discussion of the price and the quantity of the shabu.
When they met, they just proceeded with the exchange of money and shabu, viz:
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: And when you were there stationed at the venue at 6 th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, what
happened?
A: I and the CI parked our car at 6 th Street corner Gilmore Avenue and then we saw William Ong
emerged from Gilmore Avenue and approached me and our CI, maam.[16]
xxxx
Q: And when he approached you what did you do if any?
A: Our CI introduced me to William Ong as an interested buyer of one kilo gram of shabu and
afterwards I asked William Ong in broken tagalog to get inside the car.[17]
xxxx
Q: And while inside the car, what happened next?
A: While inside the car William Ong asked me about the payment of the stuff and I got the paper bag
and slightly opened. So that I get the plastic bag and show to William Ong the boodle money.
Q: When you showed the boodle money to William Ong what did he do if there was any?
A: He looked at it, maam.
Q: And when he looked at it what happened next?
A: I told him that I should look at the stuff before I give the money.
Q: What stuff are you referring to?
A: The shabu, maam.
Q: And what did you do after expecting the boodle money or the bag where the boodle money was
placed, if there was any?

A: He excused himself and alighted from our car and told me to wait for his companion.
Q: And where you able to wait for that male companion he is referring to?
A: He walked a distance and waved at his companion as if somebody will come to him.
Q: How did he do that?
A: (put on record that the witness when answering the question he stood up and then used his right
hand in waving as if he is calling for somebody)
Q: When William Ong waved his right hand to his companion what happened?
A: William Ong walked towards to me and suddenly a green Toyota appeared and parked in front of
our car.
Q: When a green Toyota corolla was parked in front of the car, what happened next?
A: Chinese looking male person alighted from the car and he went to William Ong and handed to
William Ong something that was gift wrapped.[18]
xxxx
Q: When that thing was handed to William Ong which identified in Court and which was marked, what
did William Ong do?
A: William Ong took it from Ching De Ming, maam.
Q: When this Exhibit was given to by William Ong what did you do in return?
A: I opened that something which was gift wrapped and I saw one sealed plastic bag containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be a shabu.[19]
xxxx
Q: When you saw this Exhibit C-2 crystalline substance which was opened according to you. What did
you do?
A: The companion of William Ong demanded to me the money and I gave to him the boodle money.
Q: When you gave the boodle money to him, what did he do if any these person who secured the
money?
A: He took the money inside the bag.[20]
Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer
and the consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the poseur-buyer but
merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay
and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.[21]
III
We further hold that the prosecution failed to establish its claim of entrapment.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means
of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.[22] It is commonly employed by police officers as an
effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. [23] In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or
prodding him to commit the offense.[24] Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or
its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him.[25] Instigation is
deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.[26]

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in
effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For,
the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption should not by itself
prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. [27]
It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal
law through lawless enforcement.[28] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of
abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.[29]
In People v. Doria,[30] we stressed the objective test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such
operations, the prosecution must present a complete picture detailing the transaction, which must start
from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug
subject of the sale.[31] We emphasized that the manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer
to purchase the drug, the payment of the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be
the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced
to commit an offense.[32]
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and
how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1
Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales testimony is
hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the
exception to the hearsay rule.[33] To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the
appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the
witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. [34] As the
prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a
valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.
IV
The Court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually
not presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable
service to the police.[35] Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of
revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. All these considerations, however,
have to be balanced with the right of an accused to a fair trial.
The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roviaro v. U.S.[36] on informers privilege is instructive. In
said case, the principal issue on certiorari is whether the United States District Court committed
reversible error when it allowed the Government not to disclose the identity of an undercover employee
who had played a material part in bringing about the possession of certain drugs by the accused, had
been present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged crime, and might be a material witness
to whether the accused knowingly transported the drugs as charged. [37] The Court, through Mr. Justice
Burton, granted certiorari in order to pass upon the propriety of disclosure of the informers identity.
Mr. Justice Burton explained that what is usually referred to as the informers privilege is in reality the
Governments privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.[38] The purpose of the privilege is
the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege
recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to

law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that
obligation.
It was held that the scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where the
disclosure of the contents of the communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the
contents are not privileged.[39] Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to
those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.[40]
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege, which arises from the fundamental
requirements of fairness was emphasized. Where the disclosure of an informers identity, or the contents
of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.[41] In these situations, the trial court may
require disclosure and dismiss the action if the Government withholds the information.[42]
In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem has
to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in protecting people
from crimes against the individuals right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted by
giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible
defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informers testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.[43]
In the case at bar, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the
imposition of the death penalty. They have foisted the defense of instigation which is in sharp contrast
to the claim of entrapment by the prosecution. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of
the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is
indispensable, it should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our
scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance.
V
Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no crime of illegal sale of
regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.
After the arrest of the appellants, the records show that the substance allegedly taken from them was
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination upon request of the Chief of the SOD
Narcotics Group, Quezon City.[44] Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime
Laboratory, testified that the qualitative examination she conducted manifested positive results for
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride with net weight of 980.50 grams. [45] This is not in dispute. The
issue is whether the substance examined was the same as that allegedly confiscated from appellants.
The Joint Affidavit of Arrest[46] merely states that the evidence confiscated was submitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Group for qualitative examination. SPO1 Gonzales testified on direct examination
that:
Q: When you arrested them according to you, what other steps did you take if any?
A: We brought them to our office and we requested the crime laboratory Camp Crame to test the
suspected shabu that we recovered from both of them.[47]
On cross-examination, the defense only got this statement from SPO1 Gonzales regarding the evidence
allegedly confiscated:
Q: And you immediately brought him to your office at Camp Aguinaldo?
A: After we gathered the evidences we turned them over to our office, sir.[48]

Clearly, there was no reference to the person who submitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. It is the Memorandum-Request for Laboratory Examination[49] which indicates that a
certain SPO4 Castro submitted the specimen for examination. However, the rest of the records of the
case failed to show the role of SPO4 Castro in the buy-bust operation, if any. In the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest, the only participants in the operation were enumerated as SPO1 Gonzales as the poseur-buyer,
Police Inspector Medel M. Poe as the team leader with PO2 Elmer N. Sarampote and PO1 Noli Jingo
G. Rivel as back-up support.[50] Other members of the team who acted as perimeter security were not
identified. In fact, when SPO1 Gonzales was asked during the trial as to their identities, he was only
able to name another member of the team:
Q: When you say team, who compose the team?
A: I and more or less eight (8) person, maam.
Q: Can you name the member of the team?
A: Our team led by Inspector Medel Poe, I myself, PO2 Elmer Sarampote, PO1 Noli Jingo G. Rivel,
SPO3 Ronaldo Sayson, and I can not remember the others, maam.[51]
These are questions which cannot be met with a lockjaw. Since SPO4 Castro appears not to be a
part of the buy-bust team, how and when did he[52] get hold of the specimen examined by Police
Inspector Eustaquio? Who entrusted the substance to him and requested him to submit it for
examination? For how long was he in possession of the evidence before he turned it over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory? Who else had access to the specimen from the time it was allegedly taken from
appellants when arrested? These questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the
integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot maintain that
it was able to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
VI
Finally, the denials and proffered explanations of appellants assume significance in light of the
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
Appellant Ong testified that he was arrested on July 23, 1998 when he was scheduled to meet with a
certain Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a bihon factory. On his part, appellant De Ming
claimed that when he was arrested on July 23, 1998, he was in the area waiting for his girlfriend and
her mother who just went inside a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. His girlfriends
mother, Avelina Cardoz, confirmed his explanation. The prosecution tells a different story, the
uncorroborated story of SPO1 Gonzales that their team entrapped the appellants in a buy-bust operation
on July 24, 1998. Our minds rest uneasy on the lone testimony of SPO1 Gonzales.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants
WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU, are ACQUITTED of the crime of
violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and are ordered immediately released from
custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this decision immediately and to inform this Court
within five (5) days from receipt of this decision of the date the appellants are actually released from
confinement. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Vitug, and Corona, JJ., on official leave.

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
G.R. No. L-68347 November 7, 1985
CYNTHIA NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR, and WILLIE TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ. GEN. FABIAN C. VER, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and
COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.
G.R. No.L-69482. November 7, 1985.
MILA AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 25, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla
for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
G. R. No. 68 347 entitled " Nolasco, et al. vs. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al." is a Petition for
mandamus to compel respondents to comply with the Order to release CYNTHIA NOLASCO,
Willie TOLENTINO and Mila AGUILAR issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
in Criminal Case No. 223466 for Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents, which
respondents have refuse to do on the ground that they are in custody under Presidential
Detention Action (PDA). In this Court's Resolution of December 19, 1984, we ordered
NOLASCO and TOLENTINO released, while in respect of AGUILAR, the case was set for
hearing and she continued to remain under custody. NOLASCO and TOLENTINO were
released from detention on January 12, 1985 pursuant to the Order of the President "on the
basis of findings that they no longer pose any appreciable danger to national security and
public order. 1 G.R. No. 68347, therefore, is now confined to AGUILAR's petition for release.
G.R. No. 69482, entitled "Mila Aguilar vs. Military Commission No. 25," is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus with Preliminary Injunction praying that said Commission be restrained from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 for Subversion, entitled "People vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." insofar as AGUILAR,
who is one of the ten (10) defendants therein, is concerned on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction over her, and
that the Commission be ordered to dismiss the subversion charge against her. On January 10, 1985, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining said Military Commission from further proceeding with the case
insofar as AGUILAR is concerned.
The two cases were ordered consolidated upon motion of petitioners' counsel.
The background facts for those two consolidated cases may stated as follows:
1. On March 18, 1977, before Special Military Commission No. 1, petitioner Mila Aguilar (hereinafter referred to
as AGUILAR), who is listed as No. 74 among the defendants, was charged with Rebellion 2 in Criminal Case No.
SMC 1-1 (hereinafter referred to as SMC 1) entitled "People vs. Jose Ma. Sison. et al. (thereinafter referred to as
the Rebellion Case). The charge alleged that the rebellion was committed "in or about the month of August, 1973
to February, 1974 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto." During the alleged period (August, 1973 to
March 18, 1977), Rebellion was not a capital offense, being punishable only with "prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding 20,000 pesos" under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Presidential Decree No. 942, effective on
June 10, 1976, increased the penalty to reclusion temporal in its medium period and a fine in the same amount It
was only January 16, 1981, and through Presidential Decree No. 1834, that Rebellion became a capital offense
with Article 135 of the Code being amended by raising the penalty for Rebellion to "reclusion perpetua to death."
2. On October 3, 1978, AGUILAR and nine others were charged before Military Commission No. 25 (hereinafter

referred to as MC- 25), with Subversion 3 in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Jose Ma. Sison, et al.," committed "on or about the year 1968 and for some-time prior and subsequent thereto"
(hereinafter referred to as the Subversion Case).
3. AGUILAR was at large until August 6, 1984 when she was arrested. In the meantime:
(a) In the Rebellion Case, arraignment was held on October 28, 1978, without the presence of AGUILAR. The
other defendants in custody refused to plead, and pleas of 'not guilty" were entered for them including one for
AGUILAR. In June, 1982, trial commenced and towards the latter part of that year the prosecution rested its
case. In July, 1984. Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus were filed against SMC in G.R. Nos.
67850 and 6M51 of this Court. entitled "Ruben Guevarra, et al. vs. Special Military Commission No. l." On July
31, 1984, we issued in those cases a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining SMC 1 from proceeding with the
Rebellion Case. 4
(b) In regards to the Subversin Case, a Petition for Habeas Corpus, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction was filed in G.R. No. 50155 entitled "Saturnino Ocampo, et al, vs. Military Commission No. 25" in
March, 1979 which, however, was dismissed on November 6, 1981. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied on
July 20, 1982. Trial in the Subversion Case resumed on January 16, 1984. It maybe mentioned that a plea of
"not guilty" had also been entered for AGUILAR notwithstanding that she had not yet been arrested up to then,
4. (a) As previously stated, AGUILAR was arrested on August 6, 1984 in Quezon City, together with one, Cynthia
Nolasco (hereinafter referred to as NOLASCO).
(b) On that same date, an apartment leased by NOLASCO at No. 239-B Mayon, Quezon City, was raided as a
suspected CPP-NPA under-ground house, which was found under the charge of Willie Tolentino (hereinafter
referred to as TOLENTINO). Several documents were seized from the apartment and TOLENTINO was
arrested.
(c) On August 7, 1984, a Presidential Detention Action(PDA) was issued against AGUILAR, NOLASCO and
TOLENTINO.
(d) On August 13, 1984, an Information was filed against AGUILAR, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO for illegal
possession of Subversive Documents in Criminal Case No. 223466 of the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court
(hereinafter referred to as the Subversive Documents Case). That Court ordered the release of the three
defendants on the same day, August 13, 1984, on a P600.00 bail for each, "subject to the existence of any other
order from any other court or competent authority o the effect that they continue to remain under your custody."
(e) On August 16, 1984, in the Rebellion Case, SMC-1 ordered AGUILAR held in custody. On August 17, 1984,
in the Subversion Case, MC 25 also directed AGUILAR's confinement during the pendency of the trail. 5
(f) As the custodial authorities had refuse to release them because of the PDA, the three defendants filed the
petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 68437. In our Resolution of December 19, 1984 in that case, we ordered the
released of NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, but served action in regards to AGUILAR. NOLASCO and
TOLENTINO were subsequently released such that, in G. R. No. 68347, AGUILAR has remained the sole
petitioner. Hence, the consolidation of these two cases.
In G.R. No. 68347, respondents oppose the release of AGUILAR on the ground of inter alia that she belongs to
the highest echelon of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) central committee; that in 1982 a reward of
P100,000.00 had been posted for his capture; and that the released her would undermined Government efforts
to repel the movement to overthrow our democratic institutions with the use of deception, force and violence.
While in G.R. No. 69482, respondent MC 25 upholds its jurisdiction over AGUILAR on the ground that her case
was already filed and pending trial before it as of January 12, 1981 when General Order No. 69 ( infra) was
issued.
5) (a) As previously stated, the prosecution in the Rebellion Case had rested its case in the latter part of 1982;
and that on July, 31, 1984, we had issued a Temporary Restraining Order in G.R. Nos. 67850 and 67851
enjoining SMC 1 from proceeding with the case.
(b) On September 14, 1984, in the Subversion Case, AGUILAR was brought before MC 25 to appear and be
involved in the ongoing trial of the case. AGUILAR's counsel questioned the jurisdiction of the Commission over
her, but the Commission upheld its jurisdiction. Challenging that ruling, on January 7, 1985, AGUILAR filed her
Petition in G.R. No. 69482 for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction. A Temporary
Restraining Order en-joining MC-25 from proceeding further with the Subversion Case, insofar as it involves

AGUILAR, was issued by this Court January 10, 1985.

The basic issue to be resolved is whether or not MC 25 can still exercise jurisdiction over AGUILAR in the
Subversion Case what has first to be determined is the validity of the plea of 'not guilty' entered by the
Commission on her behalf in that case.
We hold that AGUILAR had not been legally arraigned when a plea of "not guilty" had been entered for her
together with the other defendants who had refused to plead. There can be no arraignment or plea in absentia.
Under both the 1964 Rules of Court 6 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, 7 a defendant must be
present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Even under Section 62 of the Manual of Courts
Martial, it is provided that "during arraignment, the accused and personnel will stand
Respondent MC 25, in its Answer submitted in G.R. No. 69482, invoked Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No.
39 8 to justify a plea in absentia, stating that she was informed of the date set for trial and apprised of the
content of the charge sheet through the prescribed service. The cited provision, allowing trial in absentia, and
which presupposes arraignment in absentia (through publication), was promulgated in 1972. It should give way
to the 1973 Constitution, effective January 17, 1973, which provides that "after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified. 9 In the Constitutional provision, "arraignment" cannot be construed as inclusive of "arraignment in
absentia." As a matter of fact, in the codification made in Presidential Decree No. 1835, Section 5 provides:
SEC. 5. After the arraignment of an accused who is charged with subversion, the trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified. Judgment may be promulgated in absentia and the
penalty of confiscation of his properties in the Philippines may be immediately executed.
The codal section replaces Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 39, And it should be borne in mind that actual
arraignment is an element of due process. 10 Even military tribunals are bound to observe fundamental rules of
law 11 and arraignment in absentia would be violative of due process.
As AGUILAR was not arraigned before MC 25, the next question is to determine whether MC 25 can try her at
this late date in the Subversion Case, together with her other co-defendants, or whether a new Complaint or
Information should be filed against her before the civil Courts. General Order No. 69, effective January 12, 1981,
provides:
(b) Cases already investigated (ready for trial)All cases which, on the effective date of this
Order, have been referred to the military tribunals for trial pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
39, as amended, wherein the accused have not as yet entered their pleas, shall be referred to
the provincial or city fiscals or civil government prosecutors concerned, who, on the basis of the
charges thus preferred by the Judge Advocate General, AFP, consequent to a finding of a prima
facie case after preliminary investigation, shall file the corresponding informations before the civil
courts of competent jurisdiction without the need of conducting another preliminary investigation.
If all the accused in the Subversion Case had not been ar-.signed by January 12, 1981, there would be no
question but that the case should be referred to Fiscals for filing with the civil Courts. The provision does not
expressly provide for a case where some defendants had been arraigned prior to January 12, 1981, but other
defendants had not been arraigned before said date. We find, in the light of the attendant facts, particularly, that
AGUILAR was still not arraigned in the Subversion Case as of January 12, 1981, that MC 25 had lost jurisdiction
to try AGUILAR in the Subversion Case when she was brought before that tribunal on September 14, 1984 to
appear before the ongoing trial of the other defendants. Moreover, with the lifting of Martial Law on January 17,
1981, Military Commissions were dissolved and they could no longer try civilians. 12
It is true that the dissolution of Military Commissions was conditioned on the final determination of cases pending
with them.
General Order No. 8 is also hereby revoked and the military tribunals created pursuant thereto
are hereby dissolved upon final determination of cases pending therein which may not be
transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on
double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render further prosecution of the cases difficult, if
not impossible ... 13
That is so in respect of those who are already undergoing trial at the time of the lifting of Martial Law. That

yardstick does not apply to AGUILAR who was not within the Military Commission's jurisdiction when Martial Law
was lifted. Her case was not effectively pending before said Commission at that point of time.
The Subversion Case, therefore, should be transferred to the civil Court. for further proceedings. No "irreparable
prejudice" will be caused the State inasmuch as, due to the absence of ar-raignment, no double jeopardy can
attach. Nor has any evidence been presented against AGUILAR thus far, The in-convenience and "difficult(ies)"
attendant to the transfer, and the quantity of evidence that the State may have to re-introduce in a separate trial
must yield to the Constitutional rights of a defendant, and to the desired objective for normally and civilian
supremacy to prevail, with judicial power vested exclusively in civil Courts.
We have also noted that, in the Charge Sheet for Subversion, the ten defendants were accused of being
"officers and/or ranking members of the Communist Party of the Philippines(CPP) and/or the New People's
Army." There was no indication of who were officers and who were ranking members. Moreover, the guilt of a
ranking member (not a ranking leader)should not be equated with that of an officer. If AGUILAR should now be
charged before a civil Court with Subversion, the Complainant or Information against her can be made more
specific that she is an officer of the Communist Party, or a ranking member thereof. As a ranking member, the
charge against her will not be a capital offense. 14
In so far as the Rebellion Case is concerned, while it is not involved in these two cases, it does have an
important bearing. It should be recalled that, on August 16, 1984, SMC-1 had again ordered AGUILAR held in
custody. And since the Order of Release of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the-Subversive
Documents Case was "subject to the existence of any other order from any other court or competent authority to
the effect that they continue to remain under your custody' ,the release of AGUILAR cannot be ordered.
Significant also is the fact that on July 31, 1984, this Court, in G.R. Nos, 67850 and 67851 entitled "Ruben
Guevarra, et al. vs. Special Military Commission No. 1", had issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
SMC I from proceeding with the Rebellion Case. To all intends and purposes, therefore, it is still,-lending case.
WHEREFORE, judgment in these two consolidated cases is rendered as follows:
(1) Respondent Military Commission No. 25 shall not take jurisdiction over petitioner, Mila Aguilar, in its Case No.
MC-25-113, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." The Temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. Within 30 days after receipt of notice hereof, the said respondent
shall refer the case against petitioner Mila Aguilar to the proper provincial or city Fiscal, or civilian government
prosecutor, so that the corresponding Information may be filed against her before a civil Court of competent
jurisdiction. The date of the referral shall be immediately advised to this Court.
(2) If, within forty-five (45) days after the date of referral, no Information is filed against petitioner, Mila Aguilar,
before a civil Court, she shall be immediately released in relation to the MC-25-113 case, as well as in relation to
Criminal Case No. 223466 of the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court where she has already filed bail without
prejudice to her detention during the continued pendency of the Rebellion Case in her regard.
(3) If, within forty-five (45) days after the mentioned referral, an Information is filed before a civil court against
petitioner Mila Aguilar, charging her with a capital offense, her petitions in these consolidated G.R. No. 68347
and No. 69482 cases shall be deemed dismissed in view of the pendency of the Rebellion Case and of the
capital offense case.
(4) If the Information filed before a civil Court does not charge petitioner, Mila Aguilar, with a capital offense, and
the civil Court shall order her release cm ball, she shag ako be released in relation to Criminal Case No. 223466
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, on the strength of the bail she has already filed, but also without
prejudice to her detention during the continued pendency of the Rebellion Casein her regard.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, C.J., Plana, Escolin, relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo JJ., concur.
Concepcion, jr., J. took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

Petitioner Mila Aguilar, together with her co-petitioners in the main case, G.R. No. 68347
(referring to the criminal case for illegal possession of Subversive Documents filed against
them in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City), seeks to be set at liberty and prays of
this Court to order her release on P600. bail as fixed and granted by the said trial court and
duly posted by them. Cynthia Nolasco and herein petitioner Mila Aguilar, Directress and
Assistant Directress, respectively, of the Extension Services Center at St. Joseph's College in
Quezon City, were taken into custody by several armed plain clothes men of the Constabulary
Security Group in Quezon City on August 6, 1984 while on board a passenger jeepney at the
intersection of Mayon and P. Margal Streets in Quezon City. A red Ford Fiera blocked the
passenger jeepney. Then the men alighted from two cars and forcibly took the women from
the jeepney and blindfolded them. They did not Identify, themselves nor warn the woman
about the arrest The incident was first reported by the press as a criminal abduction. Willie
Tolentino, a grant-in-aid scholar at the same college's non-formal Education Program had
likewise been taken into custody on the same day by other armed plainclothes men of the
same Constabulary Security Group at Cynthia Nolasco's apartment at Mayon Street, of which
he was the caretaker. The apartment was ransacked without any search warrant shown to
him. 1 The Quezon City fiscal on August 10,1984 conducted an investigation of the subversion charges 2 filed
against all three and found that they could be charged only for illegal possession of subversive documents under
P.D. 33 and recommended their release on bail at P600.00 each, which they forthwith posted and the trial court
approved on August 13, 1981 But the respondent military authorities refused to honor the court's release order
on bail, When FLAG Atty. Cesar F, Maravilla went to Camp Crame in the morning of the next day, August 14th, to
serve the court's order of release, the duty officer refused to receive the same, despite counsel' separated
explanations that it was a ministerial duty on the officer's part to receive it. 3 At 5:00 p.m. of the same day. the
CSG legal officer furnished FLAG Atty. Rene V. Sarmiento a xerox copy of a Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
dated August 7, 1984 issued against the three detainees, after earlier representations that no PDA was issued
against them. The PDA was issued "on the basis of evidence and verified reports that [they] have violated P.D.
1835 [on subversion] and had committed acts inimical to public safety and public order." The FLAG lawyers went
to Camp Crame on August 7th. The custodian there denied having custody of the detainees. They were able to
see the detainees only in the afternoon of August 8th. 4 The military's motion of August 16, 1984 for
reconsideration to amend the information to subversion under P.D. No. 1835 (excluding Tolentino) was rejected
for lack of basis by the fiscal per resolution of November 16, 1984.
The Court per its Resolution dated December 19, 1984 but released only on January 7, 1985 granted the petition
insofar as Cynthia Nolasco and Willie Tolentino were concerned, not-withstanding the PDA (which ordered their
detention for at least one year). As stated in the majority decision, Nolasco and TOLENTINO were released from
detention on January 12, 1985, after the President lifted the PDA "on the basis of findings that they no longer
pose any appreciable danger to national security and public order. (Emphasis supplied).
But since the Quezon City trial court's order of release on bail carried the standard saving clause to effect
release subject the existence of any other order from any other court or competent authority to the effect that the
continue to remain under your custody" and respondents alleged that Mila Aguilar is a communist leader with
two pending related cases of subversion and rebellion before military commissions, the court held in abeyance
her release until the parties could be heard. So Mila Aguilar is now the sole remaining petitioner at bar.
Concurrence
I. The healing so had and the record established the following facts and legal findings and disposition, as stated
in the majority decision penned by Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera, with which I concur.,
1. The rebellion case filed against her on March 18, 1977 with Special Military Commission No. 1 against over 74
accused alleges the commission of rebellion during the period from August, 1973 to March 18, 1977. Rebellion
was during this period not a capital offense, being punishable only with "prision mayor [6 years and 1 day to 12
years] and a fine not exceeding 20,000 pesos" under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which was
increased on June 10, 1976 by P.D. 942 to reclusion temporal [12 years and 1 day to 20 years] in its medium
period with the same amount of fine; 5

2. The subversion case filed against her on October 3, 1978 with Military Commission No. 25 is in vague and
general terms, charging her and her nine co-defendants of being "officers and/or ranking members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and/or the New People's Army." The decision points out that "there
was no indication of who were officers and who were ranking members. If Aguilar should now be charged before
a civil court with Subversion, the complaint or information against her can be made more specific that she is an
officer of the Communist Party, or a ranking member thereof. As a ranking member, the charge against her will
not be a capital offense. 6
3. Since she had been taken in to custody only on August 6, 1984, she was not legally arraigned in both cases.
In the rebellion case, arraignment was held on October 28, 1978 without her presence. Pleas of "not guilty" were
entered for her by the military commission. Trial was held in absentia, insofar as she was concerned. It
commenced in June, 1.982 and the prosecution rested its case towards the latter part of that year. [It is
noteworthy that petitioner Mila Aguilar's Traverse of March 6, 1985 that "the prosecution which rested its case in
the later part of 1982 has not presented a single evidence against petitioner. Petitioner's name was not
mentioned in any of the prosecution's evidence," is unrebutted and not denied in respondents' Reply to Traverse
of July 16, 1985.] In G.R. No. 67850-51 of this Court entitled "Ruben Guevarra, et al. vs. Special Military
Commission No. 1, " this Court issued on July 31, 1984 a temporary restraining order enjoining the military
commission from proceeding with the rebellion case. 7
4. In the subversion case, she was brought on September 14, 1984 before Military Commission No. 25 to appear
and be involved in the ongoing trial of the case. She challenged the commission's jurisdiction and upon its
denial, she filed on January 7, 1985 the second case at bar, G.R. No. 69482, to assail its jurisdiction and the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent military commission from proceeding further
against her in the subversion case.
5. As formulated in the majority decision "(T)he basic issue to be resolved is whether or not MC 25 can still
exercise jurisdiction over Aguilar in the Subversion Case. What has first to be determined is the validity of the
plea of 'not guilty' entered by the Commission on her behalf in that case. 8
6. The majority decision holds correctly on the issue of arraignment in absentia that petitioner "AGUILAR had not
been legally arraigned when a plea of 'not guilty' had been entered for her together with the other defendants
who had refuse to plead. There can be no arraignment or plea in absentia. Under both the 1964 Rules of Court
(sections 1 and 2, Rule 116) and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (section 1[a] and [b], Rule 116), a
defendant must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Even under Section 62 of the
Manual of Courts Martial, it is provided that during arraignment, the accused and personnel will stand. 9
7. Since petitioner "AGUILAR was not arraigned in the subversion case before MC 25, " the majority decision
then further holds correctly that the military commission had lost jurisdiction to try her as of January 12, 1981
(date of effectivity of General Order No. 69 which phased out military commissions) and that accordingly "a new
complaint or information should be filed against her before the civil courts. 10 The majority decision expressly
rules that "in the light of the attendant facts, particularly, that AGUILAR was still not arraigned in the Subversion
Case as of January 12, 1981, that MC-25 had lost jurisdiction to try AGUILAR in the subversion case when she
was brought before that tribunal on September 14, 1984 to appear before the ongoing trial of the other
defendants. Moreover, with the lifting of Martial Law on January 17, 1981, Military Commissions were dissolved
and they could no longer try civilians. 11
8. The majority decision correctly orders in the judgment that "Respondent Military Commission No. 25 shall not
take jurisdiction over petitioner, Mila Aguilar, in (the subversion case). The Temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. 12 In other words, military commissions, which are admittedly not
courts and do not form part of the judicial system but are adjuncts of the executive department "by which military
discipline is preserved," have no authority or jurisdiction whatsoever to try civilians for civil offenses under
general law, With the lifting of martial law, there can be no dispute about the established principle that Civilians
like petitioner placed on trial for offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process. Judicial power is vested by the Constitutional exclusively in the Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law. 13 It is equally indisputable that " 'The presiding officer
at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminished
salary and nurtured by the Judicial tradition, but is a military law officer. Substantially different rules of evidence
and procedure apply in military trails. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence
on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both

sides, and who usually has direct command authority over its member is a pervasive one in military law despite
strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.' " The late Justice Hugo Black of the U.S. Supreme Court stressed
that'(A) Court Martial it not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a
specialized part of the over-all mechanism by which military discipline is pre-served' and 'Free countries of the
world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to
maintaining discipline among troops in active service. 14
Dissent
II. The judgement or dispositive portion of the majority decision then directs that the subversion case against
petitioner Mila Aguilar be referred, within thirty (30) days after receipt of notice of the decision, by respondents to
the proper provincial or city fiscal or civil government prosecutor for filing of the corresponding information before
the civil court of competent jurisdiction. The judgment further provides conditionally that if within forty-five (45)
days after date of referral, no information is filed against petitioner Mila Aguilar, then, she shall be immediately
released in relation to the subversion case as well as to the illegal possession of subversive documents pending
in the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court, where she has already posed the P600. bail without prejudice to
her detention during the continued pendency of the rebellion case in her regard." It is in connection with such
inadequate and incomplete disposition of the case and the denial of justice and due process that I dissent from
the majority decision and vote to grant Mila Aguilar's petition in the main case and set her free, like her released
co-petitioners Cynthia Nolasco and Willie Tolentino, for the following reasons and considerations:
1. The majority decision postulates that there continues a valid pending rebellion case against petitioner Mila
Aguilar for which she must continue to be detained. But the decision itself shows the contrary. Under the ratio
decidendi of the case and disposition of the subversion case, and given exactly the same background facts, the
Court must likewise hold that Special Military Commission No. 1 never acquired jurisdiction over her in the
rebellion case. The rulings at bar in the subversion case are fully applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the rebellion
case, i.e. her arraignment in absentia was null and void; 15 consequently, "the military commission had lost
jurisdiction to try her as of January 12, 1981 (date of effectivity of G.O. No. 69 which phased out military
commissions") and "a new complaint or information should be filed against her before the civil courts; 16 and
that "in the light of the attendant facts, particularly, that AGUILAR was still not arraigned in the[Rebellion] case as
of January 12, 1981, that [Special Military Commission No. 1] 17 had lost jurisdiction to try AGUILAR in the
[Rebellion] case when she was brought before the tribunal on [August 16, 1984] to appear before the ongoing
trial of the other defendants. Moreover, with the lifting of Martial Law on January 17, 1981, Military Commissions
were dissolved and they could no longer try civilians. 18
2. Petitioner's position in the rebellion case is even much stronger than in the subversion case, as shown by the
very facts stated in the majority decision, viz. the rebellion case filed against her covered the period from August,
1973 to March 18, 1977 when rebellion was bailable, not being a capital offense; 19 and the prosecution rested
Is case in 1982, and had not presented a single evidence against her" nor is her name mentioned in any of the
prosecution's evidence, 20 So there is no evidence whatever to support the charge of rebellion. The best proof of
this is the very finding of the Quezon City fiscal who conducted The preliminary investigation and twice rejected
charges for "Subversion/Rebellion And/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion or Sedition" filed against
her and her arrest on August 6, 1984 and found that she and her co-petitioners could be charged only for the
minor offense of illegal possession of subversive documents. 21 Indeed, as asserted by her counsel, "(S)urely if
the petitioners were either ranking leaders or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines or the National
Democratic Front, it is exceedingly bizarre that the sole crime imputed to them is only Violation of P.D. 33 [Illegal
Possession of Subversive Materials]. .... The truth is that at the time of their arrest, petitioners were engaged in
legal activities. 22
3. The two military commissions never acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Aguilar in the subversion and
rebellion cases. As stated in the majority decision itself, since she was still not arraigned as of January 12, 1981
when military commissions were phased out under G.O. 69, they lost jurisdiction to try her in both cases;
furthermore, with the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981 under Proclamation 2045, "military commissions
were dissolved and they could no longer try civilians. " The commitment orders issued by said military
commissions on August 16, 1984 and August 17, 1984 in the rebellion and subversion cases against petitioner
Aguilar over whom they never acquired jurisdiction before their dissolution on January 17, 1981 were void and
ineffectual. They no longer had the competence nor authority to issue the same against petitioner. At that date,
military commissions were legally in existence only to terminate the trial of those other accused who had been

properly arraigned before their dissolution and whose cases could not be transferred to the civil courts without
running afoul of double jeopardy or other similar circumstances. There exists, then, no "other order from any
other court or competent authority, " to hold petitioner Aguilar under custody. The metropolitan trial court's order
of August 13,1984 for her release on P600. bail after over fourteen months of detention should now be
ordered to be honored and implemented without further delay, in line with the basic principle that freedom should
be the general and normal state of the people.
4. The only apparent reason for the majority decision's adverse disposition is its peremptory ruling that the
rebellion case "is not involved in these two cases." But it recognizes that "it does have an important bearing" and
cites the "significant fact" that this Court on July 31, 1984 (even before the apprehension of petitioner Aguilar on
August 6, 1984) had issued a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 67850-51 involving another accused
Ruben Guevarra similarly situated as Aguilar who had not been arraigned as of January 12, 1981and therefore
no longer fell under the jurisdiction of the military commission) enjoining the military commission from proceeding
with the rebellion case The happenstance that petitioner Aguilar did not herein implead Special Military
Commission No. I in the rebellion case or did not join Guevarra as co-petitioner in the aforecited case G.R. No.
67850-51 instituted by Guevarra is immaterial. The special military commission had not insisted on bringing her
into the trial, where the prosecution had rested its case since 1982. (See Annex 1, Respondents' Reply to
Traverse dated July 15, 1985, wherein the commission's president announced at the August 16, 1984
proceeding that "So, prosecution cannot continue' as far as petitioner Aguilar was concerned.) The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court in Guevarra's case was not a general character enjoining all further
proceedings by the commission in the rebellion case and therefore likewise redounded in favor of Aguilar. The
fact remains that the rebellion case is of course both involved in these two cases and does have an important
bearing herein , because its pendency and the military commission commitment order of August 16, 1984 to hold
her in custody are cited as the reason for not complying with the Quezon City trial court's order of release on a
P600. bail posted by petitioner. As already stressed above, the rebellion case and the commitment order
against Aguilar are void and ineffectual for loss of jurisdiction since the dissolution of the military commissions on
January 17, 1981. There is therefore no impediment against the release of Aguilar on the P600. bail already
posted by her in the only remaining case against her for illegal possession of subversive documents.
5. Technically. this Court may not make the same disposition in the subversion case at bar of ordering that the
military commission not take jurisdiction over petitioner Mila Aguilar in the rebellion case and make permanent
the temporary restraining order therein issued at Guevarra's instance enjoining said commission from all
proceedings in the rebellion case against her, since that case is not being resolved here. But certainly, this Court
can filed that the pendency of the rebellion case and the commitment order against Aguilar do not constitute a
valid reason against her release on her approved P600. bail for the oft repeated reason that the dissolved
military commission never acquired jurisdiction over her.
6. The issue of the dissolved military commission's lost jurisdiction over accused like Ruben Guevarra in case
G.R. No, 6785451 and petitioner Aguilar herein, since, as already stated, they were never arraigned in the
rebellion case as of the military commission's dissolution on January 17, 1981, cannot but be resolved in the
same manner as in the subversion case at bar. It is proper to indicate herein that both the subversion and
rebellion charges against petitioner Aguilar be referred to the proper provincial or city fiscal or civil government
prosecutor for preliminary investigation and for the filing or otherwise of the corresponding information before a
civil court of competent jurisdiction. This is of course subject to any defense of a prior disposition that she may
properly raise as submitted in her Traverse 23 such as the fact, as herein abovestated, that the Quezon City
fiscal had already conducted such preliminary investigation of the same rebellion and subversion charges and
that on the basis of the same evidence submitted by the military, first in the 1978 subversion case, as well as
before the Quezon City fiscal in the preliminary investigation of the subversion and rebellion charges filed
against her and her co-petitioners in August, 1984. the said civil prosecutor had twice ruled that only a charge of
illegal possession of subversive documents could be filed against them. It will be up to respondents in such
preliminary investigation as may be properly held to prove their seemingly excessive charges against petitioner
Mila Aguilar of being a top communist leader. Suffice it to note that the majority decision in its dispositive portion
recognizes the possibility that no information may be filed against petitioner Aguilar after the referral of the
subversion case to the proper provincial or city fiscal or civil government prosecutor. Indeed, it would not be the
first time, as in the case of Aristedes Sarmiento 24 wherein he and his wife were charged with subversion as
ranking leaders of the NPA, that such charges be dismissed after the prosecution rested the case, for utter
"worthlessness of evidence." Thus, the Court has always stressed that all persons are entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence and that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 25
7. There is great need for an objective review of the charges against petitioner Aguilar in the same manner that

after this Court's Resolution of December 19, 1984 for the release of her co-petitioners Cynthia Nolasco and
Willie Tolentino, the President approved the Minister of National Defense recommendation and findings that they
"would no longer pose any appreciable danger to national security and public order. 26 As pleaded by petitioner
Aguilar in her motion for temporary release on recognizance of January 18, 1985, she continues to be afflicted
with asthma, of which physical infirmity the Honorable Court was informed in petitioner's Urgent Motion to
Transfer Detention (par. 2 thereof) dated August 30,1984. And because of her continued detention. petitioner-a
widow-has been unable to care for her 12-year old son, who is presently under the custody of petitioners 81
-year old mother, Ramona B, Aguilar-who herself is in need of petitioner's care. 27 She further invoked therein
"valid humanitarian grounds for ordering at least petitioner's release on recognizance to the custody of persons
of unquestioned good repute and probity, pending resolution of this petition as well; As G.R. No. 69482," stating
therein that Father Bienvenido Baesa of the Order of Friars Minor (OFM) and Sister Giovanni Faustino of the
Congregation of Franciscans of the Immaculate Concepcion (CFIC) are ready, able and willing to take custody
over petitioner during the pendency of these proceedings. The CFIC runs the St. Joseph's College, where
petitioner is employed as assistant directress of said college's Ex-tension Service Center. 28 Releasing her on
these humanitarian grounds, prescinding from the above legal and constitutional grounds, pending the proper
preliminary investigation and determination of whether the filing of charges of rebellion and subversion against
her in the civil courts maybe justified (notwithstanding the previous contrary determination of the Quezon City
fiscal last year), would be a meaningful step in the ongoing struggle for the hearts and minds of the people.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the ruling that Military Commission No. 25 has no jurisdiction to try Mila Aguilar for the subversion
case. But thirty days is too long a period for the military to refer the case to the civilian authorities. The referral is
a simple procedure so as more reasonable period would be ten days. If a referral is made within the period, the
civil authorities should conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not an information for
subversion should be filed against Mila Aguilar. The preliminary investigation should not be ex-parte. Whether or
not a referral is made, Mila Aguilar should not be detained the meantime because the civil courts are functioning
normally and in the light of the rules and regulations implementing P.D. Nos. 1877 and 1877-A, the authorities
should resort to said courts for her detention. If an information be filed, she can apply for bail and it is for the
prosecution to show that the evidence against her is strong.
The reasons for holding that Military Commission No. 25 has no jurisdiction over Mila Aguilar in the subversion
case are equally applicable to the rebellion case against her before Military Commission No. 1. This Court
should do complete justice and also rule that Military Commission No. I has no jurisdiction over Mila Aguilar. The
procedure indicated for the subversion case should then he followed in respect of the rebellion case with the
added circumstance that it was punishable only with prision mayor at the time it was allegedly committed.
Accordingly, pending proceedings on the rebellion case Mila Aguilar should be set free. And in the event she be
accused of rebellion, she can post bail.
Mila Aguilar should be set free on the bail which she had posted in the subversive documents case.
In Fine, Mila Aguilar should be set free immediately.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
Section 5(c) of PD No. 39 applies to the case.