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LIGAYA SANTOS AND ROBERT BUNDA V. DOMINGO ORDA JR., G.R.

NO 189402 (MAY 6, 2010)


NATURE: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 ROC, seeking to
reverse and set aside the CA decision
FACTS: In G.R. no 158236, SC affirmed the CA decision on September 1,
2004. Unsatisfied, petitioner Santos filed a motion for reconsideration
1. Pending resolution of her motion, Santos filed an urgent petition for
bail. In opposition to the motion, the prosecutor presented two
witnesses, Frias and Agnote.
2. Frias testified that on the day of the incident, he heard gunshots and
saw 3 armed men run towards the parked van where Santos was. On
the other hand, Agnote alleged that Santos approached him to
contract a hired killer who would be willing to assassinate respondent
Orda. Based on the testimonies of the two, RTC denied the petition
for bail
3. RTC later dismissed the case for murder holding that there was no
probable cause in this case. As such, it lifted the arrest warrants and
ordered the immediate release of the accused
4. Thereafter, respondent Orda filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA, claiming that RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
finding that no probable cause existed against the accused
5. CA granted the petition citing that RTC failed to appreciate the
evidence presented by the prosecution. In particular, Frias positively
identified the accused and related in detail their supposed
participation in the killing Ordas son. Thus, CA found it necessary
that a full blown trial be conducted to unearth the truth behind their
testimonies
ISSUES:
1. WON a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC is the
correct remedy in assailing the RTC decision

2. WON CA erred in finding that there was probable cause against


petitioners
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No. The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC is
inappropriate.
Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it
was the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him under
the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to an ordinary
appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and
cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available,
as it was in this case. A special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure a
partys failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or resolution. Rule 65
is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the
lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.
The general rule is that a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the
wrong remedy, except:
1. When the public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate
2. When the broader interest of justice so requires
3. When the writs issued are null and void
4. When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority
5. When, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; or
6. In other meritorious cases
None of the above exceptions are present in the instant case; hence, the
general rule must apply. Respondent not having availed himself of the
proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the case against petitioners, the
dismissal has become final and executory.
SECOND ISSUE: No. When an information is filed, the task for the court is
to first determine whether a probable cause exists for the arrest of the
accused.

Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in
the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average
man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would
justify conviction.
Moreover, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the
ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the DOJ
Secretary, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent
assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over
the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution, but is required to
evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such
assessment in the order disposing the motion.
Records show that the RTC, on motion of the prosecution, allowed the
withdrawal of the Informations for murder, holding that the prosecution
witnesses testimonies were not credible. Pursuant to the SCs decision in
G.R. No. 158236, RTC reviewed again the records of the case and made
an independent evaluation of the evidence presented to ascertain the
existence or non-existence of probable cause to indict the petitioners. After
such evaluation, the court, on September 30, 2005, dismissed the case for
murder against the accused, including petitioners herein, ratiocinating that
no probable cause existed to indict them for their crime.
RTC allowed the withdrawal of the Information and consequently dismissed
the case against petitioners on the following grounds:
1. The incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina, Ernesto and Dennis
because of their subsequent recantation
2. The improbability of Ernesto and Dennis testimony in view of the
counter-evidence presented by Santos
3. Lack or insufficiency of evidence at the level of prosecution for
determining probable cause
4. The incredibility of the testimonies of Frias and Agnote because of the
absence of corroborating evidence

Based on these, RTC did not err in finding that no probable cause existed
to indict the petitioners for the crime of murder. Neither did it gravely abuse
its discretion in making said conclusion. There was no hint of whimsicality,
nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law on the part of the Presiding Judge. On the
contrary, he came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for
petitioners to commit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to
the facts, allegations and evidence on record.
PRINCIPLES
1. Certiorari under Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy and as such, can
only be availed if there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
2. A petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy,
except:
a. When the public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictate
b. When the broader interest of justice so requires
c. When the writs issued are null and void
d. When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise
of judicial authority
e. When, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or
f. In other meritorious cases
3. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.

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