Risk Assessment for

Offshore Refuelling

Veritas Viking II
April 2004

Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

April 2004
Page 2 of 9

Contents
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 3
OBJECTIVES................................................................................................................... 3
SCOPE............................................................................................................................. 3
METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................. 3
RESULTS......................................................................................................................... 4
RISK RANKING................................................................................................................ 5
RISK REDUCTION MEASURES......................................................................................5
UPDATE OF PROCEDURES:.......................................................................................... 6
DISCUSSION................................................................................................................... 7
INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICE.......................................................................................... 7
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 7

Appendices
1

Hazid Worksheets Including Risk Calculations And Definitions

ChevronTexaco Requirements

REVIEW AND APPROVAL

Rev

DESCRIPTION

AUTHOR

REVIEW

Issued to Client for

Review

M. Dean

S Kildare

Issued for Use

M. Dean

S Kildare / W
Spencer

Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd

APPROVAL

DATE

15 April 2004
J DeLaughter

16 April 2004

Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

April 2004
Page 3 of 9

1 INTRODUCTION
A hazard identification and risk analysis was undertaken to study the risks associated with
offshore refuelling (ship to ship) compared with port refuelling for the Veritas Viking II seismic
vessel offshore Western Australia. The hazid workshop was conducted at Veritas Centre, 38
Ord Street, West Perth on 14th April 2004.
The Veritas Viking II is operating in the Io/Jansz permit areas WA-18-R, WA-267-P, in a
survey area centrally located approximately 250kms WNW (Dampier) / 420kms West (Port
Headland). There are no known obstructions or fishing activities which could interfere with
refuelling operations.
The discussion contained in this report sets out the risks of offshore refuelling to provide
understanding and a level of comfort with respect to the overall risk exposure.

2 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the study are:

To identify hazards associated with refuelling Veritas Viking II at sea;

To ensure that risks are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP); and

To address each specific ChevronTexaco requirement.

3 SCOPE
The study comprises two parts:

A hazard identification containing a risk calculation for each identified hazard; and

A discussion of the risks and risk mitigation strategies to reduce risks to alarp.

A fault tree was developed to aid in understanding of the relative risks of offshore vs port
refuelling.
The risk analysis needs to address two issues:

Avoidance of loss of containment of fuel oil; and

Ensuring that procedures for the refuelling fully address each identified risk exposure
throughout the operation.

4 METHODOLOGY
Conventional Hazid methodology was used in the workshop, ie.

identify operations and activities;

brainstorm what ifs;

determine causes, consequences and safeguards which are already in place; and

to develop risk reduction measures to address any deficiencies and reduce the risks
to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
Hazards were identified and risk reduction measures developed. These are discussed in
relevant sections of this report and included in full as Appendices.
The following people attended the Hazid:
Name
Steve May
Simon Dewing
Wally Spencer
Dick Watson
Jackie DeLaughter
Sean Kildare

Title
Acquisition Advisor
Technical representative
HSE Manager
Marine Engineering Supervisor
Vessel Supervisor
Environmental Advisor to CVX

Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd

Organisation
ChevronTexaco
ExxonMobil
Veritas DGC
Veritas DGC
Veritas DGC
Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd

Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

Mike Dean

Facilitator

April 2004
Page 4 of 9

(Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd)

5 RESULTS
The refuelling operation was divided into the following activities:

Establishing communications

Preparation

Transferring personnel

Vessel approach

Mooring

Transfer of hoses

Transfer of fuel

Recover hoses

Release vessel

Recover personnel

Depart

The hazards identified and a breakdown of the number of issues identified by workshop
participants for each exposure are shown below. Whilst this does not indicate the severity of
any particular risk exposure, it illustrates where the participants focused attention on identified
risks during the Hazid workshop.

Risk Exposure
Collision
Damage to Reputation
Entanglement
Failure of communications
Falls / Trips
Fire
Inadequate control of fuel hoses
Inadequate hose length
Injury to personnel
Loss of propulsion / steerage
Man overboard
Mooring failure
Personnel injury
Punctured hoses
Spills
TOTAL
The main exposures are:

Damage to reputation

Entanglement

Failure of communications

Loss of propulsion / steerage

Punctured hoses

Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd

Issues identified
5
3
6
3
2
2
1
1
1
3
2
2
1
3
5
40

Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

Spill

Vessel collision

April 2004
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Collision

Spill

Damage to
Reputation

Punctured hoses

Personnel injury
Mooring failure
Entanglement
Man overboard

Loss of propulsion
/ steerage

Failure of
communications

Injury to personnel
Inadequate hose
length

Fire

Falls / Trips

Inadequate control
of fuel hoses

Figure 1

Breakdown of Risk Exposure Issues During Hazid Workshop

6 RISK RANKING
Risks were ranked using the Veritas DGC Risk Score Calculator. Risks for each of the
relevant hazard items was either low risk or medium risk. The highest risks are associated
with loss of propulsion and/or steerage of the bunkering vessel and entanglement of the
bunkering vessel in towed equipment.
No high risks were calculated.
Calculated risk scores are included in the worksheets in Appendix 1.

7 RISK REDUCTION MEASURES

Risk reduction measures were developed to reduce the identified risks to ALARP. Risk
reduction measures fall into two categories:

Physical containment (i.e. maintenance of the integrity of the entire fuel containment
system for all risk exposures); and

Supervision (human element)

Risk reduction measures relating to physical containment include:

Control over mooring to prevent vessels parting during refuelling operation;

Redundancy in bunkering vessel propulsion and steering systems to ensure vessel

safety during approach, mooring and departure;

Redundancy in mooring lines;

Adequate fendering to permit safe mooring;

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Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

Dry break couplings;

Hose testing and certification; and

Bunding and containment on both vessels.

April 2004
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In addition, a specification for the bunkering vessel was prepared during the workshop to
identify key items which must be met and checked during the audit of the bunkering vessel.
Risk reduction measures relating to Supervision include:

Establishment and maintenance of communications throughout the process;

Personnel posted to supervise the operation continuously from each vessel

(personnel from Veritas Viking II transferred to the bunkering vessel prior to mooring);

Entire operation to be conducted during daylight hours only; and

Operations to be conducted only in suitable sea and weather conditions, at the

discretion of the vessel Masters.

8 UPDATE OF PROCEDURES:
As a result of the Hazid workshop, procedures will be revised to incorporate the following:

Both captains to be in agreement as to a procedure for vessel separation;

Both steering pumps running on bunkering vessel;

Create a checklist to match Veritas procedures (checklist to be approved by Viking II

Master);

Doubling up of all mooring lines;

Emergency procedures to be understood (include in checklist and pre-briefing);

Engine room of bunkering vessel to be manned;

FRC (fast rescue craft) to be at the ready at all times during refuelling;

Handling hoses with mechanical means;

Hoses to be handled from the higher vessel;

Include communications on the preparation checklist; backup frequencies to be

agreed prior; engineers to use (and test) handheld VHF radios;

Master of bunkering vessel to be included in JHA;

Minimum stand-off distance during preparation to be covered in procedures;

Operation requires a third fender. To be confirmed. (Procedural recommendation);

Bunkering vessel to be running both engines on separate fuel systems during entire
refuelling operation (supply vessel under own propulsion);

Personnel transfers to include scramble nets, PPE, training, boarding on lee side of
vessel, MOPO;

Suitable sea state, weather conditions, wind, course/ heading for entire operation;

Timing, coordination, proper release of vessel, adequate propulsion, steering and

propulsion to be fully tested and operational, communications; and

Vane rope to be secured, taking into account weather conditions and experience of
crew. At discretion of Master

Bunkering Vessel Specifications:

Vessel to have minimum 2000hp twin screws and bow thruster
Vessel fuel cargo capacity to be minimum 300 m3 total
Both vessels must have facilities to deploy the Yokohama fenders
Dedicated manning levels on vessel to be adequate to ensure permanent
monitoring of bunkering operation (at Master's discretion)

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Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

April 2004
Page 7 of 9

Vessel to have appropriate radio communications

Crew to be experienced with fuel transfers (including mooring alongside
moving vessel) at sea
Height of bunkering vessel to be suitable to moor alongside (to avoid fouling
vane wire)

9 DISCUSSION
The hazard identification (Hazid) workshop resulted in a number of recommendations to
mitigate identified exposures to spillage of fuel. It would be expected that these issues will be
dealt with as a matter of course.
Establishment of communications, preparation and planning for the fuel transfer operation are
included in procedures and are seen as pre-conditions to the conduct of the operation.
Failure of any of these processes prior to mooring will result in aborting of the operation.
Entanglement, vessel collision, communications, loss of steerage are dealt with through
procedures and ensuring that redundant propulsion and steering systems are available for the
bunkering vessel.
The actual fuel transfer operation is to be closely controlled and scrutinised by a number of
Veritas and ChevronTexaco personnel on each vessel. Dry break couplings will be used to
limit fuel loss in the event of unexpected breakage of the hose due to mooring failure or hose
failure. Hoses will be inspected and certified to ensure that they are free of damage before
each fuel transfer operation. Connection points are bunded on each vessel.
It is arguable that the level of supervision and the importance given to tight control of the
process will lead to a reduced risk of fuel spillage compared with normal refuelling
operations.
Damage to reputation could result from a fuel spill or damage to vessels or equipment. These
issues are dealt with through maintaining close control over the whole operation, from vessel
approach and mooring through fuel transfer and vessel release.
It would be expected that this would result in incident free operation.

10 INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICE

The refuelling at sea procedure is a standard maritime operational procedure, and is
successfully completed globally without incident on a daily basis. The procedures that have
been developed prior to and following the HAZID Workshop indicate that Veritas will exceed
what is considered to be industry (maritime) best practice for this operation.

11 CONCLUSION
A hazard identification and risk assessment has been conducted to assess risks associated
with refuelling the Veritas Viking II at sea. As a result of the hazard identification, a range of
measures have been identified, including amendments to procedures and physical measures,
to reduce the identified risks to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
The hazard identification and resulting risk reduction measures address each of the
ChevronTexaco requirements for consideration of a proposal for refuelling the Veritas Viking II
at sea.

Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd

Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

APPENDIX 1

HAZID WORKSHEETS INCLUDING RISK CALCULATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd

April 2004
Page 8 of 9

Veritas DGC
Risk Assessment for Offshore Refuelling
Veritas Viking II

APPENDIX 2

April 2004
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CHEVRONTEXACO REQUIREMENTS

The following requirements have been set out by ChevronTexaco with respect to refuelling at
sea:

The operation is to comply with Veritass MOPO as contained in the Project Specific
HSE Plan, with the additional condition that no refuelling is allowed during the hours of
darkness;

The vessel used for the refuelling must be audited and approved by CVX;

Fender arrangement to be provided for both vessels and approved by CVX;

The use of dry break coupling(s) for the transfer hoses;

The transfer hoses must have been recently inspected and certified;

Refuelling is only to be conducted in a position to be approved by CVX;

AMSA to be advised as per Marine Orders 6/2002;

JHA is to be conducted prior to the refuelling and is to be approved by CVX;

CVX personnel to be present during the operation on the Veritas Viking II, and/or the
refuelling vessel with the authority to stop the operation if deemed unsafe;

Agreed procedures between CVX and Veritas DGC; and

No other activities such as transfer of equipment and stores to be conducted

simultaneously with the refuelling.

The Hazid specifically addressed each of these requirements.

Ecos Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd