ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFFICERS CASE NO 6

G.R. No. 193459

February 15, 2011
GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
FACTS:

On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment

complaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.

On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes,

et al. against the same respondent also based on betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.

On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by

the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same
time.

On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the

First and Second Complaints sufficient in form. On 7
September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First
and Second Complaints were sufficient in form.

On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for

certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking
to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with
the impeachment proceedings. The petition prayed for a
temporary restraining order.
Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari
jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not
yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her
disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of the proceedings before public respondent.
Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the
present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not
gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of
form and substance of the two complaints. Hence,
certiorari is unavailing.

The following day, during the en banc morning session of

14 September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue
a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment
proceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a
matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should
have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the
petition before voting on the issuance of the status quo
ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)

Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides

that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of
one year."
ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine
whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution
in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?
HELD: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to

defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated

system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the
Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of
the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
ISSUE #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication?
HELD: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions
on the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and
on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate
interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation
that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.
ISSUE #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?
HELD: There are two components of the act of initiating the
complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint AND the referral
by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated (meaning, filed and
initiated), another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.
ISSUE #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance?
HELD: YES. Contrary to petitioner contention, the Impeachment
Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and
that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the committee.
In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is
made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2],
Article XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House
deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an
impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the
impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the
Impeachment Rules.
ISSUE #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts
constitutive of the offenses vis--vis petitioners submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints?
HELD: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House
of Representatives.)
ISSUE #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the
delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between
publication and promulgation.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on
August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on

September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially

identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general
circulation.
Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of
due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on
September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her
contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which
directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to
"the publication of rules in any medium of information, not
necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation."
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication,"
there is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably
uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances
involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances
emanating from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms
"promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these
rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understoodthat is, to make known. Since the Constitutional
Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the
former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It
is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the
Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision
means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch
of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has
not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no
position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution.
Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is
a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does
not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant selfexecuting provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where
impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution
would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the
15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the
Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints
pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like
what happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even
before the 15th Congress open its first session)
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the
rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the
purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper

to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th

Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in
keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the
impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of
the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the
House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects
of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present
case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment
is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not
for the punishment of the offender.
ISSUE #7: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?
Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
HELD: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to
file the complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is
reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it
is referred to the House Committee on Justice.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of
initiation because "something prior to that had already been done.
This is wrong. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the
verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the
House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the
impeachment proceedings.
ISSUE #8: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one
impeachable offense?
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion
when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that
"the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as
far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the
House." Petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint rule.
To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in
form and substance since each charges her with both culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
HELD: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint
need not allege only one impeachable offense.