Professional Documents
Culture Documents
35
Fundamental Analysis 11
o The Financials Reviewed
o Q1 2010 Snapshot & Salient Indices
Technical Analysis 25
Going by the Bank’s analyst presentation for the 2008/09 financial year released in
August 2009 (http://www.proshareng.com/reports/view.php?id=2617 - the bank stated
categorically that the loan loss provision of N24billion made in the books of the bank
following the CBN/NDIC joint audit exercise would be a one-off provision, a feature it
does not expect to occur again. However, in its 8-months results to December 31,
2009 – it posted a new loan loss provision in its common year end financials of
N24.745billion – a total of N48.745billion provision in its 20-months financials.
Besides the loan loss provisions’ impact on the profitability of the bank in the reporting
period under review, the trend of some income components when compared with the
expenses components contributed to the profitability decline experienced by the bank.
While some of the income components were on the decline, expenses continued to rise
– leading to deterioration in the financial efficiency of the bank.
Worthy of note in the analysis of the cost efficiency matrix of the bank is the fact that
despite a staff rationalisation exercise (revealed by reduction in the number of staff by
461 from 3,414 as at April 30th, 2009 to 2,913 by December 31st, 2009) - the cost per
staff ratio of the bank still remains relatively high closing at N21.567million as at
December 31st 2009 from N21.053million of December 31st 2008.
As at 31st March, 2010 (Q1 2010 financials), the cost had grown higher to N22.356
million – suggesting that the staff reduction exercise had little or no positive impact on
the cost structure of the company.
Diamond Bank Plc may need to carry out a review of some of the subsidiary
relationships it has to allow it prune out those that offer no medium term contribution
to group performance. The sustained unprofitable trend in some of the subsidiaries
may continue to be a burden on the profitability of others – which perhaps the CBN
ordered changes on the re-calibration of the universal banking system, affords it. The
continued negative contribution of Diamond Capital Ltd would suggest inkling as to
the level of exposure of the bank to the capital market. The bank’s management
suggested in its April 2009 presentation the closure of unprofitable subsidiaries, such is
yet to be executed as some of the subsidiaries represent a key component depleting
the profitability potential of the group.
Diamond Bank Plc posted a net loss of N8.142bn as against N5.144bn profit after tax
reported in its 2008/2009 year end audited results to April 30th, 2009. The bank in its
2010 first quarter to March 31st, 2010 has however moved into a profitability position
with N1.527bn Profit after tax reported (though below the preceding year comparable
period by 78.71%). Close observations of the bank’s account figures showed the
following factors as responsible for the current loss position recorded:
Heavy loan loss provisions to the tune of N24.745bn made in the eight months
accounting period compared with N24.623bn made in the preceding twelve months
accounting period.
Mismatch in the income and expenses components of the bank in the period.
Income and expenses were on the inverse relationship to the detriment of the
bank’s profitability. This was glaring in the efficiency ratio of the bank.
Though the bank made a swing to profitability in its Q1 2010 results, percentage
variances of all the figures in the income statement regiment were not particularly
encouraging, though understandable - as all the figures closed below the figures
recorded in the preceding year comparable period. The only two positive
variances recorded were in the operating expenses and loan loss provisions items - a
burden to profitability. This consequently led to a decline in some of the key
performance ratios in the first quarter - a repeat of some of the common year end
results key ratios. For instance EPS closed lower at 10k from 50k of the
preceding year comparable period.
Like most banks that experienced an upswing to profitability at the end of Q1 2010
after declaring losses at the end of the common year-end; Diamond Bank Plc - for all
practical intent should be expected to continue making progress in its recovery. The
resilience of the bank according to the bank’s management will henceforth be proved
in the subsequent figures posted since all the banks now have the same timeframe for
their financial reporting.
Going through the bank management’s 2009 December audited report presentation to
analysts-http://www.proshareng.com/reports/view.php?id=2613 - a fundamental
analysis was conducted in section 3 of this report to provide a better appreciation of
the banks realities and prospects. The analysis revealed a worsening non-performing
loan trend with a consequent decline in coverage ratio. The Capital Adequacy Ratio
(CAR) is on the southward trend - a situation that should concern the bank’s risk
management function.
The technical analysis conducted in the 4th section of this report showed that for
fifteen months to May 7th, 2010, Diamond Bank Plc share price recorded +24.40%
appreciations to close at N8.82 from N7.09 it closed at the end of January 2nd, 2009
trading session. This trend placed Diamond Bank Plc as one of the seven banks in
the sector which have recorded price appreciations above their January 2nd,
2009 price levels.
Also, the bank’s share price in the year 2010 to date appreciated by +22.67%, still
placing the bank among the top performing bank in the period, trading above its 200
days moving average of N7.89. This indicates a bullish trend in the bank shares. But
this trend will be more real and sustained if the subsequent results from the bank
could support the technical indices.
We are of the view that with the stable board and management since the Central Bank
of Nigeria policy on banks’ Managing Director/CEO would not affect the bank now, the
bank may reap the dividends such continuity could afford, ceteris paribus.
Prominent among the changes that have come into the banking industry is need for
strict adherence to sound risk management beyond a cliché, the adoption of world
class standards in disclosures, and the enthronement of a regulator-sensitive industry.
To achieve the shift in mindset it sought to create, the CBN took a series of steps
which is well documented in our treatise - The BULL IN THE CHINA SHOP report –
http://www.proshareng.com/admin/upload/reports/The%20Bull%20in%20the%20China%20Shop%20220809.pdf
(August 22, 2010). In this report, we presented the CBN’s outlook for the financial
market, its interventions and the consequential impact of the steps taken and
proposed – seeking to highlight the implementation variables that could impact the
economy, businesses and the fortunes of the banks.
The conclusion drawn was that the CBN’s actions were long overdue but fraught with
many unintended consequences which ought to be managed with a clear sense of
action timing lest we risked creating a state of inertia in the sector that could impact
affairs. The effect on the industry, post the report, revealed that the execution
challenges envisaged were not exaggerated and that the policies and pronouncements
of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had created a ‘avalanche effect’ on the sector -
the confluence of which undermined the most important ingredient in the financial
market place – trust and clarity of objectives, motives and engagements.
For the avoidance of doubt, we retain the conviction that some sort of intervention was
required at the time it came; and do believe that the scale and size of the intervention
were at a base level required to ‘rein in’ the shift in practice that has all but eroded the
Professional responsibility of banks and bankers.
This eventuality (and its herd management) however meant that banks had to operate
under excruciating but not existential circumstances and changes that impacted on
how they managed their poor risk-based decisions, provisions, focus on new
businesses and management changes; further accentuated by the increased
political/sovereign risk that pervaded the economy between November 2009 and
February 2010 – all generally creating an atmosphere, it would appear, un-conducive
to commercial vibrancy.
Banks, in the country, were therefore subjected to the most rigorous stress test ever
conducted in banking history and under such a clime, it was not unexpected that a
general lull would pervade the market. Indeed, not a few banks had to contend with a
fast-moving news cycle that was fed regularly with scoops from the apex regulators
that ensured a more than 100days news cycle was maintained on the banking sector
and not on the economy itself.
The consequential move against ‘habitual’ debtors through the publication of names of
debtors – most of which were disputed/contested/clarified on the pages of newspapers
These set of initial actions by the CBN helped to create a rumour mill that just kept on
giving and in no time, facts were interlaced with fiction and the very lofty motive(s) of
the CBN were juxtaposed with conspiracy theorists and allegations of selective
intervention from all quarters.
What could not be disputed were the revelations of misdemeanours and malpractices
presented by the CBN against identified persons post their audit engagements that
were countered by shock, resistance and confrontation. The CBN, to its credit stood
strong despite subsequent mis-steps to steer the ‘reform’ forward.
Following the conclusion of the first CBN/NDIC joint audit of the banks in the country,
the regulatory authority axed the CEO’s of five banks and in its subsequent and final
audit axed the CEO’s of three additional banks and placed two banks on notice to build
up its capital base by June 2010.
The consequential effect of the audit which went on for about a period of three months
took its toll on individual banks, customers and the relationships that existed. More
importantly, the management and treatment of specialised assets and bank share-
backed collaterals led to subjective but prudence based provisioning that impacted on
the performance results of the cleared and un-cleared banks. This went on till
December 2009 when the CBN audit undertook its year end review and recognised the
need to take a more pragmatic and best practice view of the provisioning required
including the suspension of the general provisioning rule and the introduction of a
prudential guideline to take care of specialised assets.
The adoption of a common year accounting date in the sector will further reveal where
each bank stands in their fundamental and operational strengths. The results released
so far showed that some banks might not have much loan losses to make provisions
for (indeed, some had to plough back over-provisioning either as a function of
recoveries or the subjective application of judgements by inspectors) while others will
have to make additional provisions to reflect the deteriorating conditions of their loan
portfolios, diminution in value of assets, investments, and share backed collaterals or
adjustments necessitated by post audit evidence. Yet, it is evident from the results of
all the ten banks released so far, that some banks’ financial positions have improved
from what was reported by the CBN/NDIC special joint audit reports.
The rescued banks however face a different challenge. On the one hand, they may not be
able to present the same level of recovery posted by the cleared banks due to the
alleged precarious situations of their financial positions. On the other hand, they may
not be able to declare results at all as to do so would require them to hold an AGM
which as things stand, may be a difficult thing to achieve given the way events had
evolved.
The International Financial Reporting Standard being adopted in the sector is expected to
bring to bear on the system a level of transparency which will give the investing public
more confidence in the financial reports of banks - strengths or weaknesses. Most
importantly, when viewed within the context of a common accounting year end date; it
Following from this must be the expectation from the investment community on the
Asset Management Company being floated by the Central Bank of Nigeria in conjunction
with the Federal Ministry of Finance and backed by the Nigerian Stock
Exchange/Securities & Exchange Commission. The bill has passed through the
legislature and is now awaiting a synchronisation of the bills from the both the lower
and upper house. It must be noted that though the bill is not touted as representing a
cure all for the sector ills; its successful establishment should however go a long way
to providing the much needed respite to the sector, and indirectly to the economy – by
easing liquidity into the system (ceteris paribus). The bill is not without its critics who
question the operational structure, pricing of debts model and disposal issues; partly
as a result of the non-availability of the proposed bill to a wider audience.
Of interest must be the Central Bank of Nigeria’s policy on reviewing the practice of
Universal Banking. This has thus become a factor in the re-shaping of the banking
industry/Sectoral outlook in the coming days – 2010 to be precise – as the group
structure of banks are adjusted to reflect these new realities. Subsidiaries, affiliates
and associated companies will have to be reined in or extricated from pure banking
operations under different models to meet the demands of the new regulatory regime.
It should be noted that a combination of regulatory/supervisory inertia coupled with
misapplication of the concept by banks created the condition under which deposit-
based banks got entangled in linked and synergetic businesses which, left unregulated
or effectively supervised created conditions that impacted on the outcomes we have. It
is hoped that not a few institutions will have to revisit their business strategy and
models to meet this development.
In the closing month of 2009, banks, faced with the challenge of remaining in business
Profitably resorted to laying-off staff, partly to help reduce their operating expenses;
but in the main, to streamline operations relative to the business available now and
foreseeable. This caused some tension in the industry as it soon became widespread
and with such severity that it became a matter for national discourse. Some banks
refrained from this approach, perhaps on the strength of their belief in their business
model; and this went on till late January 2010 when it abated for a while and
continued in April/May 2010 with one of the banks seeking recapitalisation.
The staff issues soon paved way for the CBN policy on terms and tenures for MD/CEO’s of
banks which led to the forward dated exits of three pioneer chief executives of UBA,
Zenith and Skye Banks. This development was professionally well managed by these
institutions that complied with the directive and stabilised their institutions with the
announcement of successors in days and weeks; and ultimately sign-posted a positive
shift in the change management initiative embarked upon by the CBN. The newly
appointed MD/CEO’s have since been approved by the CBN and we can expect a
seamless transition.
The swing of operator focus is now of flight to quality as against flight to safety slogan.
Much emphasis will now be placed on quality on all fronts in the sector and no bank
will want to be seeing defaulting in delivering on quality platform. The imperative for
quality cuts across all the strata of banking businesses and quality of items on their
financials will be of paramount focus to the investing public.
Nigerian banks since then have taken steps to introduce and/or strengthen the
processes and practice of sound corporate governance and leadership succession in
their institutions.
Price movements of stocks in the banking sector in 2010 have been positive as all the
stocks in the sector with the exception of Union Bank Nigeria Plc and Ecobank Nigeria
Plc. (which recorded a decline of -10.24% and -42.97% respectively).
Diamond Bank Plc – the subject of this report, placed eight position in the year to
date appreciation ranking with a +22.67% price growth.
Improve Internal Efficiencies Operations cost and cost per staff remain high – a
Establishment of Loan factory concern for an aspect of the banks’ critical
Operations automation and optimization priorities.
Push non-value activities to Alternative
Distribution channels (ADC)
For more detail of the Management presentation review, see pages 43-45 of the
presentation here: http://www.proshareng.com/reports/view.php?id=2613 t
This analysis is more effective in fulfilling long – term growth objectives of shares, rather than
their short – term price fluctuations.
In the Nigerian Stock Market, this has traditionally been the key focus of most players and it
remains a guiding beacon as to what could possible happen to a stock. Our approach to
fundamental analysis therefore takes into consideration only those variables that are
directly related to the company itself, rather than the overall state of the market or
technical analysis data, the former of which was reviewed in section 2 above and the
latter, a subject for review in section 4 below.
Gross Earnings and Interest Income: The gross earnings for the eight months
period closed lower to the preceding twelve months period by -37.84%. Comparing the
eight months period to December 2009 with the pro-rated eight months period to
April, 2009 still showed a decline by -6.77%.
The decline could be attributed to higher rate of decline recorded in Interest Income
and Operating income components for the reporting periods. While expenses variance
with the preceding period showed higher figures above the current figures, the reverse
is the case for the income components. Generally, the revenue earnings capacity of
the bank suffered a relative decline.
The evidence of revenue growth – represented by the bank has having been generated
through the growth in loan volume and commission/fees from bond trading could not
be reconciled as it indeed does contradict with the figures recorded by the bank – a
decline in gross earnings for both comparable periods.
Loans and advances, a key contributor to interest income recorded growth of +4.54%
and +56.80% for eight to twelve months and the prorated eight months comparable
periods respectively. Interest income conversely recorded a decline by -34.79% and -
2.19% for the two comparable periods.
Deposit Base and Net Interest Margin: The bank recorded an improvement in its
deposit base for the period under review with +3.25% deposit growth in eight month
as compared with the previous year twelve month figures. Eight months to the
prorated previous year eight months would show +54.87% deposit growth. The
cleared status of the bank according to the CBN bifurcation contributed to the
improvement.
Other factors according to the Management of the bank include the bank’s strong retail
network and deliberate focus on attracting a larger percentage of demand deposits,
rather than the more expensive term deposits aided the deposit growth in the period
under review.
However, the bank experienced a decline in its net interest margin to +50.94% in the
eight months period to December 31st, 2009 from +53.96% of the previous year
twelve months.
80.00% 76.16%
20.00%
10.00%
53.94% 73.43% 61.59% 67.22% 57.00% 59.46%
0.00%
Diamond Access Zenith Guaranty UBA IBTC
Loan Loss Expense (Provisions): The N24.745bn loan loss provisions that appeared
in the book of the bank contributed to the loss position reported. But for the loan loss
provision, the bank would still have had 24.46% of the gross earnings for its
profitability at the close of the eight months period.
This raises concerns for the bank’s risk management function; as for all banks under a
risk-biased regulatory environment.
The N24.623bn loan loss provisions made in the 2009 April account of the bank
following the conclusion of the CBN/NDIC joint audit exercise points to a deteriorating
asset condition which is hoped would be halted in the current year.
This may be a pointer to the fact that much of the bank’s non-performing loans are yet
to be recovered and this may be showing indications of likelihood of further provisions
in the days ahead.
The actual amount of non-performing loans recovered by the bank may prove a better
indicator of the asset status.
The bank must be concerned about its asset quality for the periods under review. The
non-performing loans ratio spiked up to 18.2% as at December 31st 2009 from as low
as 7.4% recorded at the close of April 30th, 2009 full year report. Loan coverage ratio
also was worse off from 102.1% as at December 31st, 2009 to close low at 64.6% by
December 31st 2009.
The non reversal of this trend will create a heavy burden on the bank’s earning
capacity which translates into a cost to investors, instead of returns. This trend may
also place the bank at a competitive disadvantage among its peers and other players
in the sector. The sectoral distribution is captured in the graph below:
TB
TC
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N
A
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on
FB
UB
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G
IB
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Ac
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Business Segment Contribution: Retail banking segment remains the most
profitable department with N4.9 billion profit after tax in the eight months period,
down from N9.8 billion reported by April 30th, 2009. Corporate banking and
Investment banking segments posted loss positions of N14.3 billion and N2.1 billion
respectively. The loss position of the two segments when compared with the previous
trend to April 30th, 2009 was worrisome as the negative figures rose very significantly.
Comparing the eight months result released for the period ended 31st December, 2009
with the preceding year twelve months results, Gross Earnings declined by 37.84% to
close at N67.736 billion compared with N108.978 billion reported in the twelve months
period to April 30th, 2009. The bank reported Loss before tax of (N13.374 billion) as
against N5.901 billion profit reported by April 30th, 2009.
There was a net loss position of (N8.174 billion) as against N5.172 billion net profit
recorded in the preceding twelve month period. Profit before tax and profit after tax
consequently showed -309.69% and -258.04% variances respectively.
Diamond Bank Plc recorded outstanding growths in both profit before tax margin and
after tax margin of 26.83% and 21.21% respectively in its 2008 financial year after
which the trend has been on the decline.
The decline culminated in -18.27% and -12.07% for Profit before tax and Profit after
tax respectively in the most recent audited financial results. The loss position reported
accounted for the negative figures.
The trend has definitely created a run on the earnings per share (EPS) of the bank as
depicted by the chart below.
EPS Trend
1.5
1.18
1
0.74
0.5 0.59
0.36 EPS
Trend
0 -0.02
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 Dec
-0.5 -0.56
-1
The net interest margin of Diamond Bank Plc closed lower of the preceding reporting
period figures, at a time when most banks in its league recorded an uptrend in their
figures. This, when compared with the growth trend in the company’s loans and
advances posted a mismatch.
Diamond Bank’s loans and advances figures as at 31st December, 2009 rose by 4.54%
to close at N322.820 billion compared with N308.815 billion for the preceding twelve
months period.
Loan to deposit ratio in the last six accounting periods apart from a decline to 46.37%
recorded in 2007 has been on the consistent growth till date. However, there was no
commensurate impact in its accruable earnings.
Total assets of the bank in 2006 and 2008 recorded 71.18% and 94.94% growths
respectively, followed by 43.50% growth recorded in 2007. Assets diminution
however set in with the bank’s April 30th, 2009 reporting period with 9.02% growth
recorded in the period.
Earnings Performance
The Bank’s earnings performance, as measured by the returns on average assets and
returns on average equity declined.
The banks return on equity and return on assets as at April 30th 2009 stood at 4.54%
and 0.76% respectively, decreased by 6.50% and 1.29% respectively as compared to
April 2008. However, as at December 31st, 2009 return on equity and assets declined
to -7.74% and -1.26% respectively. These negative figures were as a result of the net
loss position reported by the bank.
Diamond Bank shareholders’ fund assumed a decline since April 30th 2009 accounting
year with -1.82% and -7.33% declines for April 30th 2009 and December 31st 2009
respectively.
The impact of huge non-performing loans and consequent loan loss provisions
accounts for this decline in the shareholders’ fund.
The bank’s capital adequacy has been on the decline trend since April 30th, 2009
financial year. This is not unconnected with the high level of risk posed against the
capital and assets of the bank due to huge non-performing loans in its books. Diamond
Bank’ CAR as at 31st December, 2009 stood at 16.23%
:
Revenue and Profitability Gross earnings in the quarter recorded a negative
growth of -27.10% to close at N24.50 billion compared with N33.6 billion recorded in
the preceding year comparable period. Declines recorded in interest income and some
other income components contributed to the decline recorded.
Profit after tax also declined by -77% to close at N2.0 billion from N8.7 billion recorded
in the previous year’s comparable period.
The EPS consequently declined from 50k reported in the preceding year to 11k.
Deposits and Loans & Advances: The bank’s deposits in the first quarter of the year
recorded growth bank 22.82% to close at N462.40 billion compared with N376.50
billion recorded in the preceding year comparable period. The bank’s deposits still
remains largely concentrated on the ‘’ expensive term deposits’’ according to the
management.
Diamond Bank Plc in the last fifteen months to May 7th, 2010 recorded +24.40% to
close at N8.82 from N7.09 it closed at the end of January 2nd, 2009 trading session.
This trend placed Diamond Bank Plc as one of the seven banks in the sector which
have recorded price appreciations above their January 2nd, 2009 price levels.
In the year 2009 alone, the share price of the bank closed with +4.37% appreciations,
as against -33.80% depreciations recorded in the entire market in the period. This
positive performance though slightly showed a level of resilience in the bank’s stock in
the period under review notwithstanding the general bearish trend of the market
coupled with the shake up in the banking sector from August 14th, 2009.
In the year 2010, the bank as at 7th May , 2010 recorded year to date appreciation of
+23% which is above +19% sector average appreciations for the same period.
The trend so far in the price movement of the shares of the bank shows that the share
of the bank is one of the performing stocks in the sector, emerging in the class of the
top five performing in the sector.
The All-Share Index and Diamond Bank Plc share price are moving almost in the same
direction with Diamond Bank Plc share price moving above the All-Share Index . In the
year 2009 alone, the share price of the bank closed with +4.37% appreciations, as
against -33.80% depreciations recorded in the entire market in the period.
In the year 2010, while Diamond Bank Plc share price appreciated by +23%, All-Share
Index has recorded year to date appreciation of +32.06%. This shows ASI has
outperformed Diamond Bank Plc in the current year alone.
As illustrated from the graph below, the Diamond Bank Plc share price now trades
below its 20 days and 50 days moving averages but above its 200 days moving
average of N8.89, N9.12 and N7.89 respectively.
Technically, Diamond Bank Plc share trading above its 200 days moving average would
suggest that the bank has attained a bullish outlook, yet it has to be sustained given
the developments with its 20 and 50 day moving averages.
The price moving average trend showed that Diamond Bank Share price started
trading above its 200 days moving average at the end of September 7th, 2009 trading
day and has since sustained the trend to date.
The Objective: This is not an opinion on the stock (given that we still await specific
information required to form an objective opinion). To enable investors make sense of the
data released however, and considering the significance of the paradigm shift taking place
in the banking industry; we have thus provided an insight into the deductions we are able to
make from the information available for further review and professional advice.
Diamond Bank Plc’s performance compared with the results released so far in the
banking sector would be considered as providing a less than impressive outlook
relative to expectation - with reference to its common year end audited account to
December 31st, 2009.
We are reluctant to believe that there is no issue with regards to the trend of its loan
loss expense of N24.745bn after the credibility defining statement at the end of the
April 2009 statement on a one-off provisioning. Yet, we must bear in mind that the
additional provision was a CBN/NDIC directive which might suggest that there is much
more with regards to the risk management functions application of the prudential
guidelines. The consolation here is provided by the very many changes the CBN itself
has made with regards to the application of these guidelines which may or may not
therefore be a reflection on the bank’s true asset quality status. The returns from
hereon, after the reversal of the 2% general provision by the CBN, should reflect
recovery efforts and the plough back of provisions less any new provisions that may be
required; considering the rising trend in the bank’s non-performing loan profile,
skyrocketing to N68.211bn from N25.200bn recorded as at April 30th, 2009.
The bank, like so many others also faced a tumultuous year which may or may nit
impacted its ability to manage its cost profile. This, management has represented is
receiving the necessary attention.
The key indices revealed by the ‘beyond the line’ analysis conducted here suggest that
2010 will be a year of serious hard work for the bank to re-calibrate its books and
earning potentials.
Balance Sheet
Assets
Cash & Bank Balances 13.528 32.227 85.657 62.864 54.744 70.429
Short Term Investments 34.756 46.565 40.639 42.059 11.502 9.090
Loans and Advances to Customers 42.573 80.560 100.972 240.449 308.815 322.820
Advances under Finance Lease 2.058 4.090 8.051 11.501 6.150 6.963
Long Term Investments 1.557 3.599 11.798 30.834 66.458 68.777
Deffered Taxation 0.0687 0.301 0.451 1.102 4.416 7.858
Other Assets 13.723 19.651 21.543 51.821 54.705 22.114
Investment Properties 0.000 0.000 0.833 1.319 2.651 3.475
Fixed Assets 3.376 8.473 16.870 27.523 34.156 37.567
Total Assets 130.654 223.651 320.950 625.669 682.078 650.757
71.18% 43.50% 94.94% 9.02% -4.59%
Liabilities
Depositis 80.013 148.563 217.737 419.708 466.889 482.056
Due to Other Banks & Fin. Inst. 1.473 2.755 16.307 8.531 8.557 14.659
Taxation 0.897 1.306 1.703 2.813 3.826 3.827
Deffered Taxation 0.485 0.927 1.325 2.534 3.525 1.962
Dividend Payable 0 0 0 0 0.164 0.178
Other Liabilities 19.566 29.106 21.639 54.358 59.151 23.104
Long Term Borrowings 6.708 8.916 7.821 18.587 23.708 19.051
Total Liabilities 109.142 191.573 266.532 506.531 565.82 544.664
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