This document summarizes Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin's response to John Mearsheimer's criticisms of institutionalism theory. Keohane and Martin argue that states willingly invest in international institutions because institutions (1) provide information, (2) reduce transaction costs, and (3) make commitments more credible. They also establish focal points to help coordinate cooperation. While institutions are not the sole factor influencing states, they do interact with state interests and power politics. Keohane and Martin maintain that institutions can matter independently of underlying political conditions.
This document summarizes Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin's response to John Mearsheimer's criticisms of institutionalism theory. Keohane and Martin argue that states willingly invest in international institutions because institutions (1) provide information, (2) reduce transaction costs, and (3) make commitments more credible. They also establish focal points to help coordinate cooperation. While institutions are not the sole factor influencing states, they do interact with state interests and power politics. Keohane and Martin maintain that institutions can matter independently of underlying political conditions.
This document summarizes Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin's response to John Mearsheimer's criticisms of institutionalism theory. Keohane and Martin argue that states willingly invest in international institutions because institutions (1) provide information, (2) reduce transaction costs, and (3) make commitments more credible. They also establish focal points to help coordinate cooperation. While institutions are not the sole factor influencing states, they do interact with state interests and power politics. Keohane and Martin maintain that institutions can matter independently of underlying political conditions.
International Security 20(1), Summer 1995, pp.39-51 General argument: Keohane and Martin respond to Mearsheimer. Major states have willingly invested resources in international institutions instead of asking why they are mistaken, which assumes institutions have no value, ask why they matter. Institutions are not the only independent variable, they exist along with power and interests and interact with them. Institutions: 1. Provide information (thus applies to security, not just economic issues) 2. Reduce transaction costs 3. Make commitments more credible 4. Establish focal points for coordination (to help solve multiple equilibrium games) Contra-Mearsheimer, states do not always seek relative gain. Their importance is conditional on factors such as the number of major actors in the system and whether military advantage favors offense or defense. o Snidal: If potential absolute gains are substantial, or if there are more than two states, relative gains wont be important to cooperation Even when relative gains are what states seek, information can alleviate fears of unequal gains by revealing things like military expenditures of alliance members Distribution conflicts make institutions even more important, as games with multiple equilibria need focal points to enable cooperation Institutions do respond to changing state interests, but also act independently and interactively on outcomes. To test whether or not institutions matter, search for instances in which underlying conditions have changed rapidly while institutions have remained constant, or where similar structural changes confront regions that have different institutional endowments, or consider institutional variation itself. Assumptions: States are rational actors constrained by the structural environment. Institutions constrain actors (part of the structural world). Empirics: Theoretical article. Cites others work on institutions to back up claims. Ex. John Duffields examination of NATO it made an independent contribution to peace in Europe by drawing boundaries, demonstrating U.S. commitments and making them credible, and facilitating the augmentations of NATO allies military capabilities. The stable norms and rules of NATO led to stability in levels of conventional forces within the regime that cant be explained by structural theories. Critiques: Suggested by the authors themselves, institutional theory needs to outline the conditions under which institutions can provide the information necessary to solve distributional problems. (When will institutions induce states to disclose information that will result in greater trust and mitigation of relative gains concerns?)
(Palgrave Macmillan Socio-Legal Studies) David Schneiderman (Auth.) - Resisting Economic Globalization - Critical Theory and International Investment Law-Macmillan Education UK (2013) PDF