20. ARNOLD ALVA, Petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent. (G.R. No.

157331, April 12, 2006)

Facts:
The present petition stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with having committed the crime of estafa.
It was alleged therein that Arnold Alva, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he
made to Yumi Veranga y Hervera to the effect that he could process the latters application for U.S. Visa provided
she would give the amount of P120,000.00. He succeeded in inducing her to give and deliver the amount of
P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and representation, well knowing that the same were false and
untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain the amount of P120,000.00.
On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order of the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner in view of the
approval of his bail bond. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the trial on
the merits, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision. On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed an Urgent
Motion to Cancel Promulgation praying for the resetting of the 5 May 1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTCs
decision to 17 June 1999 in view of the fact that said counsel already had a prior commitment on subject date. The
RTC granted the motion. The promulgation, however, was deferred only until 19 May 1999. On 18 May 1999,
petitioners counsel again moved for the deferment of the promulgation, due to prior "undertakings of similar
importance." On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice. In his
stead, claiming to be petitioners representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the RTC a hand written
medical certificate expressing petitioners inability to attend the days hearing due to hypertension. In response to
the aforestated acts of petitioner and counsel, the RTC issued an Order directing the promulgation of its decision in
absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite
due notice. In its decision dated 25 March 1999, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.
Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, a document entitled Personal Bail Bond dated 21 May 1999
issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been filed before and approved by the RTC as
evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro on the face of said bail bond. For such reason, petitioner appeared to
have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction. Incompatible to the above inference, however, in an Order
dated 25 May 1999, judgment was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the bonding
company that issued petitioners original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person
of petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not
be forfeited. Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, manifested to
the RTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 for the reason that the address of
the accused is not within their area of responsibility. Nevertheless, De Jesus reassured the RTC that the name of the
accused will be included in their list of wanted persons for our future reference. Examination of the records of the
case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without informing the RTC.
On 26 July 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, which was denied for lack of merit. On
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not
be dismissed it appearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted. Petitioner
filed a Compliance essentially stating therein that he immediately posted a new bond for his provisional liberty and
that the presiding judge of the lower court, which issued the questioned decision, duly approved the new bond. A
certified true copy of the bond was submitted together with the Compliance. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless
dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for "appellants failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on
appeal despite our directive, and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had
already expired." Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereto seeking its reversal. On 19
February 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the MR stating that the appellant has failed to submit himself under the
jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law since his conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail
bond in place when appellant took his appeal. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.
2.

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioners alleged
failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal
Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the
law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.

Held:
1. NO. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the meaning of
the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail
and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory. Petitioners alleged failure to post a bail bond on
appeal is unimportant because under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal.
At the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal even until now he remains
at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Section 5 of Rule 114 provides that the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter
has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than 6 years but less than 20 years.
However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond

application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years
but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
presence of any of the five circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration; (b) That the accused is
found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of
reclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of petitioners application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC.
Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, to file a petition for bail for
someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the RTC on
19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals,
demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the very least placed
himself under the custody of the law. All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond
dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth
noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for bail through a
motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court
process acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even granting for the sake of argument that it was
indeed approved by Judge Muro, such approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been
established that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal. That the prosecution appears not to have been given
the chance to object, as evidently required, to the application or approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to
the accused), fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original records of the RTC does it even
show that the prosecution was informed of petitioners application for bail, much less the approval of such
application. As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated circumstances and the range of penalty imposed,
the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to object and present evidence, if necessary, with notice to
the accused. Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of
such application or, at the very least, failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial
discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention violative of respondent Peoples right of
procedural due process.
This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar reveals that
petitioner violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification his failure to appear before the
RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of the latters judgment, absent any justifiable reason. His
absence was a clear contravention of the conditions of his bail bond to say the least. While, indeed, a medical
certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez, allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating
therein the reason for the latters absence, the RTC found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it
ordered the promulgation of its judgment in absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner.
Upon examination, the subject medical certificate merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from
hypertension. It failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioners physical
incapability to present himself before the court even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of
petitioner unjustified. Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999, petitioner and counsel had
already been notified of the 19 May 1999 schedule of promulgation. The first having been postponed in view of the
Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by petitioners counsel. Another telling evidence of the
violation of petitioners original bail bond is when he failed to inform the RTC of his change of address. By failing to
inform the RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of
the RTC. It was an unmistakable complete breach of the conditions of his bail bond.
Following from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less
than twenty (20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his bail without
valid justification should have effectively precluded him from being admitted to bail on appeal. The issue of
the validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the
1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioners alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is,
therefore, unimportant as, under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on
appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at the time
petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal even until now he
remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or not petitioner has lost
his right to appeal his conviction now ensues. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing
petitioners appeal. Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory. By
putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner revealed his
contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. By
jumping bail, petitioner has waived his right to appeal.

3.

For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been sufficient to state that for reasons
stated in the foregoing discussion, the question posed has now become academic. However, to
diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term "jurisdiction of the court (over the
person of the accused)" with that of "custody of the law", it is fundamental to differentiate the two.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender; while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a
person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Moreover,
jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused escapes from the
custody of the law, but continues until the case is terminated. Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there
is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner when he
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged notwithstanding the fact that
he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive. As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under
the custody of the CA, we cannot say the same for "being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on
the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will
of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention." In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to
the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted
any relief by the CA.

21. Spouses Trinidad vs Victor Ang

The Case:
An Information for violation of BP 22 was filed against the spouses Alexander and Cecilia
Trinidad (petitioners) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Masbate City. The
MTCC ordered the spouses to submit their counter-affidavits, as the case was covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the order.
The spouses then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings
and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest, in view of the pendency of a
petition for review they filed before the Department of Justice, which the MTCC granted on
May 28, 2009, subject x x x to paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The MTCC, however, set aside its order and set the spouses
arraignment on September 10, 2009. The spouses thus filed a petition for certiorari with the
RTC, holding that the MTCC judge did not err in setting their arraignment after the lapse of
one year and 10 months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. After the
amendment of the rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit
on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review with the DOJ, the
RTC added.
The spouses elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the 60-day limit on
suspension of arraignment is only a general rule, and cited several cases where it was
shown that arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the petition for review
with the DOJ. The Court initially dismissed the petition but reinstated the petition.
The Issue:
Whether or not the 60-day limit for suspension of arraignment during the pendency of a
petition for review with the DOJ should be strictly applied.
The Ruling:
We grant the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review oncertiorari.
A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when the petitioners
received a copy of the RTCs assailed order. In addition, the petitioners failure to state the
material date of filing the motion for reconsideration is only a formal requirement that
warrants the relaxation of the rules in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules
of Court and in the interest of justice.
Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any reversible
error in the challenged RTC order.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by
the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination
and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway,1 the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is
a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment
of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to
defer arraignment. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with
the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August
10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day
limit provided for by the Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
How,2 Roberts, Jr. v. CA,3 and Dimatulac v. Villon4 were all decided prior to the
amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took
effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day
limit on the suspension of arraignment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and REINSTATE the petition for review
on certiorari; and
(2) DENY the said petition for petitioners failure to show any reversible error in the
challenged RTC order.
SO ORDERED.

22. PEOPLE vs MARTN

23 People vs Peralta

PEOPLE VS. PERALTA387 SCRA 45

Facts: Wilfredo Peralta, Severino Espinosa, Jr., and several John Does
were chargedf o r t h e m u r d e r o f C h i e f I n s o . A r t h u r R i v e r a q u a l i fi e
d b y t r e a c h e r y , e v i d e n t premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity, conspiracy, confederating and mutually helping one
another. The accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented several witnesses including
the live-in partner of Peralta, the son
and wife of Rivera, Conrado Capitulo and two state witnesses, namely, Danilo
Castaneda and Noel Reyes. Later Severino Espinosa filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was
subsequently granted and the criminal charge against him was dismissed. Trial court then
rendered its decision finding Peralta guilty. Peralta appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning
several errors. Among them questioning the presentation of the state witnesses,
Danilo Castaneda and Noel Reyes, under the Witness Protection Program, arguing
that the aforementioned witnesses shouldve been indicted together with him since
Section 9, Rule 119 is the applicable law and not the Witness Protection Program.
I s s u e : W h e t h e r o r n o t S e c t i o n 9 , Ru l e 1 1 9 s h o u l d a p p l y i n s t e a d o f t
h e W i t n e s s Protection Program.
Held: The assertion of accused-appellant that the two (2) state witnesses
should have been indicted with him applying Section 9, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court instead of the Witness Protection Program Act which was used by the
Department of Justice, we find the same to be without merit. In the case of Webb vs.

De Leon, where, as in this case, the petitioners questioned the non-inclusion o Alfaro in the
Information considering her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime, this Court explained:
x x x t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f c r i m e s a p p e r t a i n s t o t h e e xe c u t i v e d e p a r
t m e n t o f government whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed.
A necessary component of this is to see that our law is the right to prosecute their violators.
The discretion of whether what and who to charge, the exercise of which depends on
a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No 6981 (Witness Protection
Security and Benefi t Act) vesting in the Department of Justice the power to
determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted
immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 199 does not support the proposition that the
power to choose who shall be state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this
provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already
acquired jurisdiction over
thec r i m e a n d t h e a c c u s e d . T h e d i s c h a r g e o f a n a c c u s e d i s p a r t o f t
h e e xe r c i s e o f jurisdiction but is not recognition of an inherent judicial function.