ERROR IN PERSONAE

People vs. Oanis

G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1997
Facts:
In the afternoon of December 24,1938, Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor:
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him
dead or alive."
When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he
knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police
tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts,
and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. When this group arrived at Irenes
house Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare and asked her where Irenes room was. Brigida indicate the
place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. The defendants Oanis
and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door
where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their 32 and 45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted; it turned
out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Issue:
Whether or not Oanis and Galanta may be held responsible for the death of Tecson.
Ruling:
Yes. The defendants must be held responsible for the death of Tecson.
The theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact or the maxim ignorantia facti
excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. Appellants found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action.
In this case, the person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity
to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed. "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." A peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal
liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.

PRATER INTENTIONEM
U.S. vs. Marasigan
G.R. No. L-9426
August 15,1914
Facts:
In this case it appears that about 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco
Mendoza, while engaged in examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now
called Calayan, in the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to
approach them.
On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: "Why is this line curved?" indicating the
division line between the lands of the two. "Let us make it straight." Francisco replied saying: "Why do you
want to make the line straight? If you make the line straight, it will put certain logs and trees on your land.?"
To this the accused replied: "This is false." Saying this he drew his knife and struck at Mendoza. Attempting
to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left hand.
As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand,
the latter being the most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about P45, but
the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless.
Issue:
Whether or not Mendoza is obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieved the accused from
the natural and ordinary results of the crime.
Ruling:
No, Mendoza is not obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural
and ordinary results of his crime.
It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefulness of which was
destroyed, was the middle finger, or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was
rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could be
restored by a surgical operationIt was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the
consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

PRATER INTENTIONEM
Vda. De Bataclan, et. al. Vs. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126
October 22, 1957
Facts:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated
by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo,
Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the
right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way
they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not
get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch
made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably
approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and
permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by
one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire. Hence, the petitioners sought for the recovery
of compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees against the respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not, the acts of the respondents are the proximate cause of the death of the deceased
Ruling:
Yes, the acts of the respondents are the proximate cause of the death of the deceased.
The proximate cause in the case at bar was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with
them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. The
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its
conductor because none of them have cautioned or taken steps, with the circumstances present, to warn
the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

PRATER INTENTIONEM
Brias vs. People
G.R. No. L-30309
November 25, 1983
Facts:
In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station
in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita
Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon.
They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching Barrio
Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brias, shouted
Lusacan, Lusacan!
The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and holding her
baggage with the other. When they were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman
and the child stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an oncoming
train, causing their instant death.
A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino, the
assistant conductor and Clemente Brias for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower
court acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of the petitioner-appellant is the proximate cause of the death of the
deceased
Ruling:
Yes, the act of the petitioner-appellant is the proximate cause of the death of the deceased.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement
of petitioner-appellant Brias. This announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the
nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been seated in their respective seats
when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous
announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any
intervening efficient causes.
The negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag
stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the
victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
Intod vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103119
October 21, 1992
Facts:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan
to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them.
Otherwise, he would also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm, all of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room because Palangpangan was in another City
and her home was occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one is in the room when the accused fired
the shots and no one was hit by the gun fire.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the
witness which was affirmed by the Court of appeals decision. Thus, Intod filed a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not, Intod is liable for impossible crime of murder.
Ruling:
Yes, Intod is liable for impossible crime of murder.
The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. Article 4(2) provides and
punishes an impossible crime an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out
with means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony against person or family. For this provision to
apply, there must be either: (1) Legal responsibility, or (2) Physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor or beyond control
prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed
them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on
the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment and under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the

offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment.
PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
Jacinto vs. People
G.R. No. 162540
July 13, 2009
Facts:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Jacinto with a postdated BDO Check in the amount of P10,000.00
as payment for Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc. (petitioner was then the collector of Mega
Foam). Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle, the sister of petitioner.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from
Land Bank looking for Generoso Capitle to inform him that the BDO check deposited in his account had
been dishonored. Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia asking her to inform Jacqueline Capitle
about the bounced check. Valencia told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and invited Ricablanca to join
the scheme. Ricablanca, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco. Verification
from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino had already paid Mega Foam in cash as replacement for the dishonored
check. Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the NBI and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents.
With the help of Ricablanca, petitioner and Valencia were arrested upon receiving the marked money. The
NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two. The RTC found the accused guilty of qualified
theft. The CA modified the judgment by reducing the sentence of Valencia and Capitle but Jacontos
sentence remained.
Issue:
Ruling:
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a
crime against property. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of
the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check
was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored
check.