Case 2:15-cv-05799-ER Document 72 Filed 10/03/16 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANDREA CONSTAND,

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Plaintiff,
v.
BRUCE CASTOR,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 15-5799

M E M O R A N D U M
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

October 3, 2016

Before the Court are several nonparties motions to

intervene for the purposes of attending, participating in, or
asserting privileges during two different depositions in this
case. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part
and deny in part William H. Cosby, Jr.s motion for leave to
attend (through counsel) the deposition of Andrea Constand, deny
Cosbys motion for leave to participate in the deposition of
Judge Risa Vetri Ferman, and deny Judge Fermans motion for a
protective order concerning several privileges she may wish to
assert at her deposition.

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I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises from the same incident at the root of

Constand v. Cosby, No. 05-1099. According to the Complaint, in

January 2004, Cosby drugged and sexually assaulted Plaintiff
Andrea Constand in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Compl. 12,
ECF No. 1. A year later, Constand reported Cosbys actions to
police in Durham, Ontario, who then forwarded the complaint to
Pennsylvania authorities. Id. 13-14. The office of Defendant
Bruce Castor then, the Montgomery County District Attorney
was tasked with investigating the complaint. Id. 15.
On February 10, 2005, Castor stated that he viewed the
case against Cosby to be weak. Id. 17. Following that
statement, several other women leveled similar accusations
against Cosby. Id. Shortly thereafter, Castor issued a press
release announcing his decision not to prosecute Cosby. Castor
did not inform Constand of his decision prior to releasing it to
the media. Id. 18-20.
Nearly ten years later, the underlying events became
national news again, as many more women publicly accused Cosby
of conduct similar to that alleged in Constands original
complaint. Id. 23. Meanwhile, Castor whose tenure as
District Attorney ended in 2008 decided to seek the office of
District Attorney again. Id. 24. During the course of his

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electoral campaign, he publicly discussed Andrea Constand and

Bill Cosby a number of times, including the following:

He said both Constand and Cosby could be portrayed in

a less than flattering light, and that Constands
statements to the police contained less detail than
her civil complaint. Id. 27.

He gave a statement to the Philadelphia Inquirer about

Constands statements to the police differing from
those in her civil suit, then in reference to an
Inquirer article including his statement tweeted:
Inky: Cosby victim told police much different than
she told court in her lawsuit. First I saw that in a
story. Troublesome for the good guys. Not good. Id.
29-31.

He said that he had signed a declaration that he would

not prosecute Cosby on any information coming out of
the Constand civil suit. Constand alleges that he made
this statement in order to bolster his claim that
Constand was not a credible witness. Id. 32-35.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on October 26,

2015. ECF No. 1. It contains two claims: defamation/defamation

per se, and false light/invasion of privacy. Castor filed an
Answer on December 28, 2015. ECF No. 5.
On February 10, 2016, Cosby filed a Motion to
Intervene and for a Protective Order. ECF No. 9. In that motion,
he requested a protective order precluding Constand from
producing in response to Castors discovery requests (1) the
confidential settlement agreement (CSA) from Constand v.
Cosby, and (2) all statements Constand gave to police in
2004-05.

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Shortly thereafter, two other nonparties filed motions

to quash subpoenas. Kevin Steele, the current Montgomery County
District Attorney, moved to quash a subpoena in which Castor
demanded all of Constands 2004-05 statements in the DA Offices
possession, on the grounds that the statements were protected by
both Pennsylvanias Criminal History Record Information Act
(CHRIA) and by common law investigative privilege. And Brian
McMonagle Cosbys criminal lawyer moved to quash a subpoena
that demanded, in effect, all of his prior communications with
and concerning Bruce Castor.
On April 15, 2016, the Court held a hearing on Cosbys
motion for a protective order and the motions to quash
subpoenas. At that hearing, the parties and movants indicated
that they had resolved some of the issues on their own.1
Accordingly, the Court denied without prejudice Cosbys motion
for a protective order and Steeles motion to quash. The
remaining issues concerning Castors pursuit of Constands
police statements were also later resolved.2

The issues raised by McMonagles motion to quash had

not been resolved. The Court granted his motion in part and
denied his motion in part, ordering McMonagle to produce his
communications with Castor and to produce a privilege log
containing any communications about Castor. ECF No. 31.
2

The Court will thus deny as moot Castors Motion for

More Definite Statement, ECF No. 52, which Castor withdrew
during a hearing on September 7, 2016.
4

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This case is now in the discovery stage and several

nonparties have filed motions to intervene. Cosby has filed a
motion to intervene so that he may participate in the deposition
of Judge Risa Vetri Ferman who, in her prior capacity,
succeeded Castor as Montgomery County District Attorney and a
motion to intervene so that he may attend the deposition of
Andrea Constand. Judge Ferman has also filed a motion to
intervene for the limited purpose of asserting several
privileges with respect to her deposition. These motions are now
ripe for disposition.
II.

MOTIONS TO INTERVENE
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs nonparties

attempts to intervene in cases for various reasons. There are

two primary types of Rule 24 intervention: intervention of right
and permissive intervention.
Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right provides that,
[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
who claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the movants ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2). A non-party may intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)

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only if: (1) the application for intervention is timely; (2)

the applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3)
the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter
by the disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not
adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation.
Mountain Top Condominium Assn v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder,
Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Harris v.
Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Rule 24(b) Permissive Intervention applies where
a movant is not entitled to intervention of right under Rule
24(a), but still has a valid reason to intervene in the case. It
provides that, [o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone
to intervene who has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(1)(B). In exercising its discretion to allow or reject
permissive intervention, the court must consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the original parties rights. R. 24(b)(3).
Where Rule 24(a) contains mandatory language the
court must permit intervention, so long as certain conditions
are satisfied Rule 24(b) is permissive, stating only that the
court may permit intervention. A ruling on a Rule 24(b) motion
is a highly discretionary decision. Brody By and Through
Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992).
6

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Cosby brings one motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)

and one motion to intervene under Rule 24(b). Judge Ferman also
brings a motion to intervene under Rule 24(b).
A.

Cosby Rule 24(a) Motion

First, Cosby seeks leave to intervene, under Rule

24(a), to attend the deposition of Andrea Constand. He contends

that he has a right to intervene in order to protect his rights
to confidentiality under the CSA, as he anticipates that
Constand will be asked questions during her deposition that she
cannot answer without violating the CSA. Therefore, he argues
that his counsel should be present during the deposition in
order to object to questions that intrude upon protected areas,
and to seek immediate resolution from the Court if necessary.
The critical question here is whether Cosbys desire
to protect information that he alleges is protected by a
confidential settlement agreement suffices to create an
interest under Rule 24(a).3 At least two courts outside this
district have held that a movants interest in safeguarding the
confidentiality of particular information constitutes a
cognizable Rule 24(a) interest. See In re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d
657, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In re Chocolate Confectionary
3

As the Third Circuit has recognized, the precise

nature of the interest required to intervene as of right has
eluded precise and authoritative definition. Mountain Top, 72
F.3d at 366.
7

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Antitrust Litig., No. 08-MDL-1935, 2008 WL 4960194, at *1 (M.D.

Pa. Nov. 18, 2008). But at least two courts within this district
have held otherwise. See Burlington v. News Corp., No. 09-1908,
2015 WL 2070063, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2015) (finding that an
interest in enforcing a confidential settlement agreement from a
previous case is merely collateral and not an interest in [the]
litigation); Liberty Res., Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 395 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 208 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that confidentiality
concerns about certain discovery are peripheral to the
litigation and thus not a sufficient interest under Rule
24(a)). Neither the parties nor Cosby have identified any
controlling cases on this issue.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds
that Cosbys interest in confidentiality is sufficient to
support limited intervention under Rule 24(a).4 Importantly,
unlike the would-be intervenors in Burlington and Liberty
Resources, Cosbys interests are not already represented by an
existing party. Though it is true that Constand was also a party
to the confidentiality agreement Cosby now seeks to enforce,
Cosby and Constand have demonstrated that they have different

The Court is satisfied that Cosby has also established

the other three Mountain Top factors: his motion was timely, his
interest might be impaired through this litigation and, for the
reasons discussed in this memorandum, his interest is not
adequately represented by an existing party.
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interpretations of the scope of the CSAs confidentiality

provision. Specifically, Cosby believes the provision to be more
expansive than Constand does, with the practical result being
that Constand may make statements that she believes to be proper
under the CSA, while Cosby believes that those statements
violate the CSA.
However, Cosbys interest is a limited one,
conditioned upon his own interpretation of the CSA being
correct, and Constands interpretation being incorrect. If
Constand is right, then she adequately represents Cosbys
interest in confidentiality, and Cosby is not entitled to
intervene. And Cosbys proposed form of intervention his
counsel being present at the deposition and calling the Court if
necessary to resolve important disputes would, as a practical
matter, serve little to no purpose. There is no reason for Cosby
to be present at the deposition to object as to matters on which
he and Constand agree; Constand already represents his interests
to that extent. As to matters on which Cosby and Constand
disagree, Constand would not be obligated to honor Cosbys
objections to any given question, and the Court would not be in
a position to resolve any disputes over the scope of the
confidentiality provision during a contemporaneous phone call,
given that the Court has never been presented with the full CSA
and has never ruled on the meanings of any of its provisions.
9

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Therefore, the Court will fashion the following

procedure, which will allow Cosby to at least in large part5
protect the interests he claims without unnecessarily
interfering with the parties right to conduct an unobstructed
deposition: Cosby and his counsel will not attend Constands
deposition. The parties and their counsel are directed not to
discuss, except with each other, the contents of the deposition.6
Following the deposition, an expedited transcript shall be
generated. The transcript will be sealed for thirty days, during
which time Cosby may file any objections to particular questions
asked and/or answers provided during the deposition. The Court
will then consider any objections and responses thereto and
determine whether to strike the questions and/or answers at
issue, to keep the deposition under seal for good cause shown,
5

While it is true that Constand could, hypothetically,

violate the CSA simply by revealing confidential information to
Castor and/or his counsel during her deposition, the procedure
set forth by the Court should, at least, prevent further and
greater violations of any confidentiality rights Cosby properly
holds under the CSA. And, as discussed above, the Court is
unconvinced that Cosbys counsels physical presence at the
deposition would actually prevent Constand from revealing any
confidential information to Castor, at any rate. Moreover, it is
unclear whether Constand and Cosby could have bargained away
Castors ability to receive relevant information in discovery in
the instant case. See Green v. Cosby, 314 F.R.D. 164, 170 (E.D.
Pa. 2016) (An agreement between two parties to keep materials
confidential cannot block the disclosure of those materials to
third parties in discovery.).
6

This order, if violated, may subject the parties and

counsel to appropriate sanctions.
10

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to lift the seal, or to resolve the matter in some other way.

In this way, the Court will grant in part Cosbys
Motion to Intervene, but deny his requested form of
intervention.
B.

Cosby Rule 24(b) Motion

Cosby filed a separate motion to intervene under Rule

24(b), seeking leave to participate in the deposition of Judge

Risa Vetri Ferman, who succeeded Castor as Montgomery County
District Attorney.7
In this motion, Cosby argues that the Court should
permit him to intervene because this action shares numerous
common factual issues with his criminal case. Mot. Clarify at
11, ECF No. 43. Specifically, he says, [t]he contents of Ms.
Constands initial statements to police, and the interpretation
of those statements, and related investigation by the Montgomery
County District Attorneys Office, are all key factual issues in
both cases. Id. Moreover, he claims, [t]he contents of Ms.
Constands statements about her allegations against Mr. Cosby
and the extent to which those statements are internally
inconsistent go to the heart of this defamation lawsuit and
are simultaneously critical in the pending criminal case. Id.
7

In support of this motion, Cosby also filed a Motion

for Leave to File a Supplemental Memorandum, ECF No. 70, which
the Court will grant.
11

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at 11-12. In effect, Cosby seeks to use Judge Fermans

deposition in this civil matter to obtain discovery for use in
his criminal case. See Hrg Tr. 37:14-18, Sept. 7, 2016 (THE
COURT: Well, isnt that effectively taking discovery for a
criminal case? [COUNSEL FOR COSBY]: It may be taking it may
be availing yourself of the opportunity to learn information
that will benefit you in a criminal case.).
It may be true that consistencies and/or
inconsistencies between Constands statements to the police and
her claims in her 2005 civil lawsuit will be relevant in both
this civil case and Cosbys criminal case. It may also be true
that the circumstances surrounding the decision not to prosecute
Cosby in 2005 will be relevant in both cases. In that sense, it
is likely true that Cosbys defense in his criminal case shares
common question[s] of . . . fact with this case. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(b)(1)(B).8
However, Cosby is incorrect that [t]here is nothing
under the law to prevent him from using this civil case to

Notably, however, some courts have denied permissive

intervention even though the petition presents a common
question of law or fact where the movant raised claims
collateral or extrinsic to the questions presented in the
original proceedings, as is the case here. See Johnson v.
Cohen, No. 84-6277, 1986 WL 785, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1986)
(quoting Subaqueous Exploration of Archaeology, Ltd. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597, 60203 (D. Md. 1983)).
12

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obtain discovery for his state criminal case. Hrg Tr. 37:19.
Though Rule 24(b) does not explicitly include jurisdictional
language, courts have read into the rule a requirement that,
before granting permissive intervention, a court must have an
independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim the movant asserts as the basis for intervention. E.E.O.C.
v. Natl Childrens Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Permissive intervention . . . has always required an
independent basis for jurisdiction.); see also, e.g., Beckman
Indus., Inc. v. Intl Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir.
1992); Barrett v. McDonald, No. 14-742, 2015 WL 237165, at *2
(D. Del. Jan. 16, 2015); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, Nos. 12-193, 13-1631, 13-1634, 13-1635, 13-1668,
13-1669, 13-1670, 13-1671, 13-1672, 2014 WL 4445953, at *2 (D.
Del. Sept. 8, 2014); Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins.
Co., No. 04-3509, 2012 WL 262647, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30,
2012); Westra Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 546 F.
Supp. 2d 194, 197 (M.D. Pa. 2008); In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 333, 338-39 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Wodecki v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 107 F.R.D. 118, 119 (W.D. Pa. 1985);
Butcher & Singer, Inc. v. Kellam, 623 F. Supp. 418, 422 (D. Del.
1985).
Here, Cosby asserts that he should be permitted to
intervene due to commonalities between this case and his
13

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defenses in his state court criminal case. Hrg Tr. 12:5-23. But
this Court has no independent basis for subject matter
jurisdiction over any claim or defense in Cosbys state court
criminal case, in which he is charged with violations of
Pennsylvania criminal law. Accordingly, Cosby is not entitled to
permissive intervention and the Court will deny Cosbys motion
to participate in Judge Fermans deposition.
C.

Judge Ferman Rule 24(b) Motion

Finally, Judge Ferman also moves to intervene under

Rule 24(b).
On June 8, 2016, Plaintiff served Judge Ferman with a
subpoena to testify at a deposition in this action. Judge Ferman
intends to appear for her deposition, but seeks to intervene
under Rule 24(b) for the purpose of obtaining a protective order
prohibiting any inquiry into areas protected by the law
enforcement privilege,9 the deliberative process privilege,10 or
9

The law enforcement privilege sometimes called the

investigative privilege allows the government to protect
information from being discovered during ongoing government
investigations. Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 605 A.2d 1243, 1246
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). When asserted, the privilege requires
the court to balance the governments interest in ensuring the
secrecy of the documents whose discovery is sought against the
need of the private litigant to obtain discovery of relevant
materials in possession of the government. Id. at 1247.
10

The deliberative process privilege applies to

confidential deliberations of law or policymaking, reflecting
opinions, recommendations or advice. In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d
946, 959 (3d Cir. 1987). [A] partys assertion of the
14

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CHRIA.11 Judge Ferman contends that any questions involving the

investigation of Cosby, and the decisionmaking process
concerning the decision whether to charge Cosby, would implicate
these privileges.
The Court will deny this motion without prejudice
as premature. Judge Fermans deposition has not yet occurred; no
questions have been asked and no privileges invoked. Indeed, in
order to rule on at least two of the privileges Judge Ferman
anticipates invoking, the Court would be required to balance
various interests which, in the abstract, would be challenging
at best. Before the Court knows what questions will be asked of
Judge Ferman, and what objections will be asserted in response,
the Court cannot accurately determine which interests are
actually at stake, and whose rights would or would not be

deliberative process privilege requires a two-step review in the

district court. First, it must decide whether the communications
are in fact privileged. Second, the court must balance the
parties interests. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dept of Army
of U.S., 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir. 1995).
11

CHRIA creates a mechanism by which citizens may gain

access to certain law enforcement records, including their own
criminal history information. Curtis v. McHenry, 172 F.R.D. 162,
163 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Accordingly, it clarifies some of the
circumstances under which certain information may or may not be
provided to the public. CHRIA states that [i]nvestigative and
treatment information shall not be disseminated to any
department, agency or individual unless the department, agency
or individual requesting the information is a criminal justice
agency which requests the information in connection with its
duties. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9106(c)(4).
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threatened by the disclosure of any given piece of information.12

If the Courts assistance is later required, the parties may
bring any concrete disputes to the Courts attention.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will (1) grant in
part Cosbys motion to intervene to attend the deposition of
Andrea Constand; (2) deny Cosbys motion to intervene to
participate in the deposition of Judge Risa Ferman; and (3) deny
without prejudice Judge Fermans motion to intervene. An
appropriate order follows.

12

The Court offers no views as to whether Judge Ferman

is entitled to assert these privileges in the first place.
16