Prof. V. A.
Avena
Late Digests (Round 1)
PEOPLE V FRANCISCO
78 SCRA 696
HILADO; July 16, 1947
(yella)
FACTS:
- Defendant, who had been previously arrested on
charges of robbery requested permission from the
chief of police of Mansalay to go home to see his wife
about the procurement of bail for his provisional
release. Permission was granted. He was allowed to
go with sergeant Pimentel.
- Upon reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the
prisoner to see his wife. After a few moments,
Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Still
moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down
with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half,
on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have
a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in
the back. Pimentel found the child dead.
- The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of
the capital penalty upon the accused relies mainly on
the affidavit of the accused, the arraignment of the
defendant upon which he made a plea of guilty, and
the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of
appellant.
ISSUE: (relevant to the topic in the outline)
WON the testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of
appellant, is admissible
HELD:
- YES.
The rule contained in section 26(d) of Rule 123 is an old
one. Courts have assigned as reasons therefor the
following: first, identity of interest; second, the
consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the
law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the risk of and
occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such
evidence because its admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because where
a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of
the other. However, this rule has its exceptions as well.
Evidence
In the instant case, the wife did not testify in the direct
evidence for the prosecution. It will be noted that the
wife only testified against her husband after the latter,
testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the
killing of their little son. By all rules of justice and
reason this gave the prosecution, which had
theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a
witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it
did in rebuttal; and to the wife herself the right to so
testify, at least, in self-defense, not, of course, against
being subjected to punishment in that case in which
she was not a defendant but against any or all of
various possible consequences which might flow from
her silence.
Furthermore, by his said act (imputing the crime to his
wife), the husband himself exercising the very right
which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of
their marital relations must be taken to have waived all
objection to the latter’s testimony upon rebuttal, even
considering that such objection would have been
available at the outset. As well settled as this rule of
marital incompetency itself is the other that it may be
waived.
LICHAUCO V ATLANTIC
GR NO.L-27434
OZAETA; August 23, 1949
(monch)
FACTS
- Appelant Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila
is a foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to
do business in the Philippines, with its office and
principal place of business in the City of Manila. Richard
T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the
largest stockholders of said company when the Pacific
war broke out on December 8, 1941. He held 1,00
shares of stock, 545 of which was not fully paid. He
executed promissory notes in favor of the company
worth P245,250 (540 per share) for those shares. In
1941 he already paid P64.5k.
- Fitzsimmons had an agreement with the company
that should he die without having paid in full, the
company, at its option, may either reacquire the said
545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the
amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate
the corresponding number of the company's shares of
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stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a
share.
- On Jan 1942, the Japanese occupied Manila and seized
all assets of the company. Fitzsimmons died on 1944
and special proceeding was instituted. Atlantic
resumed business in 1945.
- Atlantic filed a claim on the estate worth P63,868.67
Fitzsimmons owed them. It also wanted to exercise its
option to acquire the 545 shares by returning the
P64.5k Fitzsimmons paid. They requested a set-off.
Lichauco, the administrator, denied any indebtedness.
He expressed conformity however to the refund of
P64.5k. He also interposed a counterclaim worth P90k
for salaries allegedly due.
- Santiago Inacay, chief of the accounting department
of the Atlantic testified that the officers had maintained
personal accounts with the company. Fitzsimmons
maintained one. He testified that at the end of 1941,
the account shows that Fitzsimmons owed 63k to the
company. He said that he specifically knew the balance
of the said account because it would be very
“shameful” on his part if the officers asked him for their
balance and he didn’t know.
- Modesto Flores, the assistant accountant, also
testified that Fitzsimmons had a balance of 63k. He
knew this because as accountant, he made the entries
in the books of the company. He also signed receipts
whenever Fitzsimmons would withdraw funds.
- Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vice-
president-treasurer and president were also called to
testify but the TC refused to admit them because they
were not only large stockholders and members of the
board of directors but also vice-president-treasurer and
president, respectively, of the claimant company.
However, if allowed to testify, they said that they would
also say that they had personal knowledge that
Fitzsimmons owed the company 63k.
- The administrator as evidence showed Exhibit 1,
which contains the gross value of assets of the conjugal
partnership of Fitzsimmons and Miguela Malayto. He
testified that he was the attorney in the divorce case
(1943) between them and that Fitzsimmons prepared
Exhibit 1 for the division of assets of the partnership. In
said exhibit, there is no indication of any debt to the
company
ISSUE/S
1. WON the officers of a corporation which is a party to
an action against an executor or administrator of a
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 130.23)
2. WON Exhibit 1 is admissible because it is self-serving
2. WON the deceased Richard T. Fitzsimmons was
entitled to his salary as president of the Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Company of Manila from January, 1942, to June
27, 1944, when he died in the Santo Tomas internment
camp
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of
parties. The officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or
against the corporation which is a party to an action
upon a claim or demand against the estate of a
deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person
Reasoning
- This provision was taken from section 383, paragraph
7, of our former Code of Civil Procedure, which in turn
was derived from section 1880 of the Code of Civil
Procedure of California.
- City Savings Bank vs. Enos: To hold that the statute
disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers
or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to
materially amending the statute by judicial
interpretation. Plainly the law disqualifies only "parties
or assignors of parties," and does not apply to persons
who are merely employed by such parties or assignors
of parties
- Merriman vs. Wickersman: An examination of the
authorities from other states will disclose that their
decisions rest upon the wordings of their statutes, but
that generally, where interest in the litigation or its
outcome has ceased to disqualify, officers and directors
of corporations are not considered to be parties within
the meaning of the law.
- The trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of
Messrs. Belden and Garmezy. It is not necessary,
however, to remand the case because it would be
merely corroborative, if at all, and in any event what
said witnesses would have testified, if permitted,
already appears in the record as hereinabove set forth,
and we can consider it together with the testimony of
the chief accountant and the assistant accountant who,
according to the appellant itself, were "the only ones in
Evidence
the best of position to testify on the status of the
personal account" of the deceased Fitzsimmons
2. NO
Reasoning A self-serving declaration is a statement
favorable to the interest of the declarant. It is not
admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted.
On the other hand, a declaration against the interest of
the person making it is admissible in evidence,
notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration
is relevant and the declarant has died, become insane,
or for some other reason is not available as a witness.
- Insofar, at least, as the appellant was concerned,
there was no probable motive on the part of
Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1 by not
including therein appellant's present claim of P63,000
among his obligations or liabilities to be deducted from
the assets of the conjugal partnership between him and
his divorced wife. He did not know then that he would
die within one year and that the corporation of which
he was the president and one of the largest
stockholders would present the claim in question
against his estate. Neither did he know that the books
and records of that corporation would be destroyed or
lost. Yet, although he listed in said inventory his
obligations in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust
Company and the Philippine Bank of Commerce
aggregating more than P30,000, he did not mention at
all any obligation in favor of the corporation of which he
was the president and one of the largest stockholders.
- A possible explanation such conflict between the
company and Fitzsimmons can be seen in Inacay’s
testimony. The latter said that at the end of the year,
the personal accounts would be on the credit side since
the dividend, bonuses and fees would be credited. On
the year 1941, such did not happen because of the war.
Fitzsimmons could have believed that such amount was
credited, therefore, he did not include any obligations
he had to the company in Exhibit 1. However, since the
counsels did not pursue this point, the court cannot rule
on this point. Leaving this foregoing reflection, the
court held that since the testimonies are based only on
memory, and given that human memory, especially
with regard to figures after more than 5 years, is
unreliable, they cannot overturn the TC decision.
3. No
ReasoningThere was no resolution either of the
stockholders of the board of directors of the company
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authorizing the payment of the salaries of the president
or any other officer or employee of the corporation for
the period of the war when the corporation was forced
completely to suspend its business operations and
when its officers were interned or virtually held
prisoners by the enemy
BABAO VS PEREZ
G.R. No. L-8334
Bautista; December 28, 1957
(mel)
NATURE
This is an action to recover one-half of a parcel of land
containing an area of 156 hectares situated in San Juan,
Batangas, plus the value of the produce gathered
thereon from August, 1947 until actual recovery and in
the alternative, to recover the Sum of P47,000
representing reimbursement of the amount of useful
and necessary expenses incurred to the clear and
improve the aforesaid land.
FACTS
Plaintiff is the judicial administrator of the estate of the
late Santiago Babao while defendant Florencio Perez is
the judicial administrator of the estate of the late
Celestina Perez. The other defendants are purchasers
and actual owners of portions of the land which is
sought to be recovered in the present litigation.
Celestina Perez was the owner of the parcel of land.
Sometime in 1924 when the deceased Santiago Babao
married Maria Cleofe Perez, niece of Celestina Perez,
the latter and the former entered into a verbal
agreement whereby Santiago Babao bound himself to
improve the land by leveling and clearing all the forest
trees standing thereon and planting in lieu there of
coconuts, rice, corn and other crops such as bananas
and bamboo trees, and to act at the same time as
administrator thereof during the lifetime of Celestina
Perez, all expenses for labor, and materials to be at his
cost, in consideration of which Celestina in turn bound
herself to convey to Santiago Babao or, his wife of land,
together with all the improvements thereon upon her
death;
-Due to said verbal agreement, Santiago Babao left his
job as administrator of the Llana Estate in San Juan,
Batangas for which he was receiving a salary of P150 a
month, and started leveling and clearing the land, all of
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which having been administered by him from 1924 to
1946; that for clearing and improving the portions of
land above-mentioned, he incurred expenses
amounting to P7,400 which added to his salary as
administrator from l924 to 1946 at rate P150 a month
mounting to P39,600, makes a total of P47,000;
-In the violation of the aforesaid verbal agreement,
Celestina Perez, acting through Leovigildo Perez, to
whom she extended a power of Attorney to sell, sold
few days before she died about 127 hectares of the
land in question in consequence of which Santiago
Babao was deprived of the possession and
administration thereof from 1945.
Celestina Perez died on August 24, 1947 as a result of
which intestate proceedings were instituted for the
settlement of her estate and one Florencio Perez was
named as judicial administrator; Santiago Babao died
on January 6, 1948 and as a consequence in estate
proceedings were instituted for the settlement of his
estate and Bienvenido Babao failed to recover the
portion of the lane herein litigated, said estate would
suffer an irreparable damage of not less than P366,700
representing fruits which it has failed to receive during
the last 20 years. Wherefore, plaintiff prayed for the
conveyance of portion of the land in question and for
annulment of the sales of the portion for having been
made fictitiously, and in the alternative, for judgment in
plaintiff's favor for the sum of P47,000 representing the
amount of useful and necessary expenses incurred by
Santiago Babao in improving the land in line with the
oral agreement.
Defendant’s claim:
Defendants denied plaintiff's claim that a verbal
agreement was entered into between Celestina Perez
Babao relative to the clearing, improving and
administering the land belonging to the former having
an area of 156 hectares, as well as the other claim that
Santiago Babao had actually cleared and improve a
great portion thereof at the cost at around P7,400.
They alleged in 1924 and for many years prior thereto,
the land in question had already been cleared and
cultivated for agricultural purposes with an exception of
a portion of 50 hectares; Said land was cleared and
cultivated due partly to the effort made by Celestinas
husband, Esteban de Villa, her overseers and tenants,
and partly to the "trusco" system employed by them
whereby persons were allowed to clear the land and
plat thereon and from the harvest were compensated
according to a graduated scale of division varying from
Evidence
year to year; that the coconut trees, banana plants and
bamboo trees now standing thereon were planted not
by Santiago Babao nor at his expenses but by the
tenants of the spouses Esteban de Villa and Celestina
Perez who were dully compensated according to the
"trusco" system; Although Santiago Babao and Maria
Cleofe Perez were married in 1924, the former did not
have anything to do with the land in question to
Esteban de Villa was then still living and actively
managed the same with help of his overseer and
tenants until he died in 1930. It was only in that year
when Santiago Babao began administering the land in
the capacity of a nephew of Celestina until 1935 when
Celestina disgusted with the conduct of Santiago, left
the company of Santiago and his wife and went to live
with her nephew Bernardo Perez until her death in
1947. Since then Celestina Perez prohibited Santiago
from interfering with the administration of the land and
designated another person in his place, and for the
work he did from 1930 to 1935, he was more than
compensated because the proceeds of the harvests
during said years were all given only to him and his
wife and Celestina was given only what was barely
sufficient for her maintenance.
Defendants also alleged that the sales made by
Celestina Perez through her attorney-in-fact Leovigildo
Perez of several portions of the land were not fictitious
but were made with full knowledge and authority of
Celestina who executed in favor of Leovigildo Perez a
power of Attorney under the authority notary public in
the presence of Santiago Babao himself who did not
interpose any objection to the execution of said power
of attorney and, therefore, said sales are real, valid and
genuine, having been executed in accordance with law.
Defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed
After hearing, the court rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants. Defendants in due time
took the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals where
the parties submitted their respective briefs within the
reglementary period, and thereafter the court rendered
judgment reversing in toto the decision appealed from
and dismissing the case without pronouncement as to
costs.
While this case was pending in the lower court, counsel
for appellants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground,
amount others, but the alleged verbal agreement
between Santiago Babao and Celestina Perez was
enforceable under the Statute of frauds. The trial court
denied this motion on the ground that it appears from
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the complaint "that Santiago fully complied with his
part of the oral contract between the parties and that
this is an action not only specific performance but also
for damages." Consequently, the court held that the
Statute of frauds cannot be invoked for the reason that
"performance by one party of his part of the contract
takes the case out of the statute." And pursuant to such
ruling, when the case was tried on the merits, the court
overruled to the introduction of oral testimony to prove
the alleged verbal agreement.
ISSUE
WON the testimony of plaintiff Bernardo Babao and that
of his mother Cleofe Perez as to what occurred between
Celestina Perez and Santiago Babao, with regard to the
agreement should not be admitted
HELD
YES
RATIO
During the trial of this case, counsel for appellants
objected the admission of the testimony of plaintiff
Bernardo Babao and that of his mother Cleofe Perez as
to what occurred between Celestina Perez and Santiago
Babao, with regard to the agreement on the ground
that their testimony was prohibited by section 26(c) of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. This rule prohibits
parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator of a deceased person upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person
from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person. But the court
overruled the opposition saying that said rule did not
apply where the complaint against the estate of a
deceased person alleges fraud, citing the case of Ong
Chua vs. Carr. Here again the court is in error because
if in that case the witness was allowed to testify it was
because the existence of fraud was first established by
sufficient and competent evidence. Here, however, the
alleged fraud is predicated upon the existence of the
agreement itself which violates the rule of petitio
principii. Evidently, the fraud to exist must be
established by evidence aliunde and not by the same
evidence which is to sought to be prevented. The
infringement of the rule is evident.
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. . . The reason for this rule is that "if death has closed
the lips of one party, the policy of the law is to close the
lips of the other.' Another reason is that `the
temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases
is considered too great to allow the surviving party to
testify in his own behalf.' Accordingly, the
incompetency applies whether the deceased died
before or after the commencement of the action
against him, if at the time the testimony was given he
was dead and cannot disprove it, since the reason for
the prohibition, which is to discourage perjury, exists in
both instances.
Disqualification by Reason of Privileged
Communication
BARTON V LEYTE ASPHALT
G.R. L-21237
STREET; March 22, 1924
(aida)
FACTS
- James Barton is a US citizen residing in Manila while
Leyte Asphalt is a Philippine company which has its
principal office in Cebu.
- Barton sought to recover the sum of $318,563.30 in
damages from Leyte Asphalt due to breach of contract
along with a judicial pronouncement that he was
entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales
agencies specified in the contract (Exhibit A).
- Leyte Asphalt appears to be the owner of the Lucio
Mine in Leyte, a valuable deposit of bituminous
limestone and other asphalt products.
- William Anderson, the general manager of Leyte
Asphalt, wrote a letter to Baron authorizing the latter to
sell the products of the Lucio Mine in the
Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a
scale of prices indicated in said letter.
- Exhibit A, the authorization Baron relies on, contained
the following stipulations (among others):
- Baron is given the sole and exclusive sales agency for
the bituminous limestone and other asphalt products of
the Leyte Asphalt in Australia, Saigon, Java, New
Zealand, India, China, Tasmania, Sumatra, Siam, the
Strait Settlements, USA and Hongkong until May 1,
1921.
- No orders for less than one thousand (1,000) tons will
be accepted except under special agreement with
Evidence
Leyte Asphalt. It also contained a breakdown of the
prices per ton.
- If “the sales in the above territory equal or exceed ten
10,000 tons in the year ending October 1, 1921 then in
that event the price of all shipments made during the
above period shall be ten pesos (P10) per ton, and any
sum charged to any of your customers or buyers in the
aforesaid territory in excess of ten pesos (P10) per ton”
shall be rebated to Baron.
- Baron also had full authority to sell the Lucio mine
products for any sum he saw fit in excess of the prices
quoted above and such excess in price was to be his
extra and additional profit and commission.
- All ships, steamers, boats or other carriers were to be
loaded promptly with not less than 1,000 tons each 24
hours after March 1, 1921, unless there was to be prior
notice. It was also stipulated that Leyte Asphalt shall
not be required to ship orders of 5,000 tons except on
30 days notice and 10,000 tons except on 60 days
notice.
- Baron entered into subagency agreements in San
Francisco and Australia.
- In San Francisco, he entered into an agreement with
Ludvigsen & McCurdy. Ludvigsen & McCurdy was
instituted as a subagent and given the sole selling
rights for the bituminous limestone products of Leyte
Asphalt for 1 year.
- Baron had also gone to Australia where he instituted
Frank Smith as his sales agent.
- February 5, 1921 – Ludvigsen & McCurdy advised
Baron of an order of 6,000 tons of bituminous limestone
which Baron accepted.
- Anderson informed Baron that Leyte Asphalt was
behind construction so it could not handle big contracts
as of the moment. The two met in Manila on March 12
and Baron told Anderson about the San Francisco order.
Anderson said that, owing to lack of capital, adequate
facilities had not been provided by the company for
filling large orders and suggested that Baron had better
hold up in the matter of taking orders.
- Despite Anderson’s response, Baron wrote a
notification to Leyte Asphalt for the company to be
prepared to ship five thousand tons of bituminous
limestone to San Francisco. He also made additional
orders for Smith in Australia.
- Leyte Asphalt acknowledged the orders for Australia
and San Francisco but stated that no orders would be
entertained without a cash deposit.
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- The CFI absolved Leyte Asphalt from four of the six
causes of action. The CFI allowed Barton to recover
$202,500 from the first cause of action and $405,000
from the fourth cause of action.
- Among the evidence presented was a carbon copy of
a letter written by Baron to Atty. Ingersoll, his lawyer.
In the said letter, Baron wrote that his profit from the
San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of
85 cents per ton.
- When the letter was offered in evidence by the
attorney for the defendant, the counsel for the plaintiff
announced that he had no objection to the introduction
of this carbon copy in evidence if counsel for the
defendant would explain where this copy was secured.
- The attorney for the defendant informed the court
that he received the letter from the former attorneys of
the defendant without explanation of the manner in
which the document had come into their possession.
- Baron’s lawyer then made an announcement that
unless the defendant’s counsel explained how the letter
came to the defense’s possession, he proposed to
object the letter’s admission on the ground that it was
a confidential communication between client and
lawyer.
- The trial judge excluded the letter.
ISSUE
WON the letter should be excluded
HELD
NO
Ratio When papers are offered in evidence a court will
take no notice of how they were obtained, whether
legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it
form a collateral issue to try that question.
Reasoning
- Even supposing that the letter was within the privilege
which protects communications between attorney and
client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to
the hands of the adverse party and it makes no
difference how the defense acquired possession.
- The law protects the client from the effect of
disclosures made by him to his attorney in the
confidence of the legal relation, but when such a
document, containing admissions of the client, comes
to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary,
it is admissible in evidence.
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- According to Wigmore: “Since the means of
preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the
client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation
from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly
construed, it would be improper to extend its
prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of
the communications. One who overhears the
communication, whether with or without the client's
knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege.
The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously
reads or obtains possession of a document in original or
copy.”
Disposition Judgment reversed
PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN (Honrada; Paredes;
Sansaet)
G.R. Nos 115439-41
REGALADO; July 16, 1997
(kooky)
NATURE:
Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS:
- Mansueta Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer of the First MCTC, San Francisco-
Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Ceferino Paredes
was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur, then Governor, and is at present a Congressman.
Generoso Sansaet was a practicing attorney who
served as counsel for Paredes in several instances
pertinent to the criminal charges involved herein.
- in 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over a lot of
Rosario Public Land Subd Survey. This was approved
and an OCT was issued in his favor.
- in 1985, Director of Lands filed an action for the
cancellation of Paredes' patent and certificate of title
since the land had been designated and reserved as a
school site in the subdivision survey. The TC nullified
the patent and title after finding that Paredes had
obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Sansaet served
as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
- upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang
Bayan, an information for perjury was filed against
Paredes in the MCTC. Provincial Fiscal was, however,
directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for
the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
Evidence
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated.
Paredes was represented by Sansaet.
- Paredes was then haled before the Tanodbayan for PI
on the charge that, by using his former position as
Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau
of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for
free patent, he had violated Sec 3(a) of RA 3019.
Sansaet was again Paredes' counsel..
- On Aug 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution
recommending the criminal prosecution of Paredes.
Sansaet, as counsel, moved for reconsideration, saying:
. . . respondent had been charged already by the
complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on
detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and
the same evidence . . . but said case after
arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court
upon recommendation of the Department of
Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of
arraignment and the recommendation of the
Department of Justice are hereto attached for
ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be
a case of double jeopardy for respondent
herein . . .
- A criminal case was subsequently filed with
Sandiganbayan, charging Paredes with violation of Sec
3 (a) of RA 3019. However, a motion to quash was later
granted and the case was dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
- On Jan 23, 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had
initiated the perjury and graft charges against Paredes,
sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the
investigation of the three respondents herein for
falsification of public documents. He claimed that
Honrada, in conspiracy with Paredes and Sansaet,
simulated and certified as true copies certain
documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic
notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of
Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified
documents were annexed to Paredes' motion for
reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the
filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support
his contention that the same would constitute double
jeopardy.
- Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no
notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection
with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding
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Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury case in his court
did not reach arraignment since action was suspended
pending the review of the case by the DOJ.
- Respondents filed their counter-affidavits, but Sansaet
subsequently discarded and repudiated the
submissions he had made. In an Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications, Sansaet revealed that
Paredes contrived to have the graft case under
preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of
double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury
case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had
been arraigned. For that purpose, the documents which
were later filed by Sansaet in the preliminary
investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-
respondents in the house of Paredes.
- To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, Sansaet claimed that he did so upon the
instigation and inducement of Paredes. This was
intended to pave the way for his discharge as a
government witness.
- in a resolution dated Feb 24, 1992, the Ombudsman
approved the filing of falsification charges against
Honrada, Paredes and Sansaet. The proposal for the
discharge of Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by
the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe
that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly
induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel
for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty.
Sansaet had control over the case theory and the
evidence which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty.
Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged
communication between the lawyer and his client
which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
- The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution
and, ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he
decided to file separate informations for falsification of
public documents against each of the respondents.
Thus, three criminal cases were filed in the graft court.
These were consolidated for joint trial in the
Sandiganbayan.
- a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for
the discharge of Sansaet as a state witness. It was
submitted that all the requisites, as provided in Sec 9,
Rule 119 ROC, were satisfied insofar as Sansaet was
concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the
eyewitness testimony of Sansaet, there was no other
33
 Prof. V. A. Avena
direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification
of documents by Honrada and Paredes.
- Sandiganbayan resolved to deny the desired
discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was
able to establish that client and lawyer relationship
existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino
Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period
alleged in the information. In view of such
relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and
other confidential matter must have been
disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused
Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity.
Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the
facts surrounding the offense charged in the
information is privileged.
ISSUES:
1. WON the projected testimony of Sansaet, as
proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client
privilege
2. WON, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for
discharge to testify as a particeps criminis
HELD:
1. NO. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in
these cases, as the facts and actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.
a. It may be assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in
connection with the criminal case for falsification, and
this may be expected since Paredes was the accused
and Sansaet his counsel. The fact that Sansaet was
called by Paredes and Honrada to witness the
preparation of the falsified documents was as eloquent
a communication, if not more than, as verbal
statements by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of
such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary
rule on this point has always referred to "any
communication," without distinction or qualification.
In the American jurisdiction, there is no particular mode
by which a confidential communication shall be made
by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined
to verbal or written communications made by the client
to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by the client to the attorney by other
means.
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process,
considering their past and existing relations as counsel
Evidence
and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which
such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all
passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject
matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this
conclusion is that the documents were thereafter filed
by Sansaet as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the
graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and
words of the parties during the period when the
documents were being falsified were necessarily
confidential since Paredes would not have invited
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the
same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.
b. It is postulated that a distinction must be made
between confidential communications relating to past
crimes already committed, and future crimes intended
to be committed, by the client. The announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe
that it is here dealing with a past crime, and that
Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of
Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be
testified to are concerned, those crimes were
necessarily committed in the past. But for the
application of the attorney-client privilege, however,
the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to
the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in
the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. In other words, if the client
seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that
the former has committed, he is given the protection of
a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client
privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client's consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to
a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or
in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the
lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the
commission of a crime already committed, made by a
party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as
such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the
unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client having to
A2010
do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in
aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak
of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client.
The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet are
the communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he
and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the
process of falsifying, the documents which were later
filed in the Tanodbayan and culminated in the criminal
charges now pending in Sandiganbayan. Clearly,
therefore, the confidential communications made by
Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in
reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet
been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his co-respondents, later committed.
Having been made for purposes of a future offense,
those communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.
c. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in
the commission of that crime of falsification which he,
Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the
authorities. It is well settled that in order that a
communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
In fact, the "prosecution of the honorable relation of
attorney and client will not be permitted under the
guise of privilege, and every communication made to
an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only
lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the
interest of justice."
It was error for Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal
purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent
a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a
crime which was later committed pursuant to a
conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his
conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties
in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble
profession of law.
2. YES
- Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification,
and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one
34
 Prof. V. A. Avena
is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on
all members of the conspiracy. One of the requirements
for a state witness is that he "does not appear to be the
most guilty" and not that he must be the least guilty as
is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query
would then be whether an accused who was held guilty
by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to
be a state witness. The rule of equality in the penalty to
be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal
offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent
in their minds and translated into concerted physical
action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity.
Since the RPC is based on the classical school of
thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is
considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty
on the consequential theory that the act of one is
thereby the act of all. This is an affair of substantive
law which should not be equated with the procedural
rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This
adjective device is based on other considerations, such
as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order
that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience
that the candid admission of an accused regarding his
participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully.
For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain
qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial
experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
b. The other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as a
state witness are present and should have been
favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan. Sansaet
is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual
commission of the falsification charged in the criminal
cases, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable
task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and
stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other
direct evidence available for the prosecution, hence
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
Sansaet. He has indicated his conformity thereto and
has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed
the substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit
of Explanation and Rectifications. His testimony can
also be substantially corroborated on its material points
by reputable witnesses. Moreover, it does not appear
that Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
Disposition Writ of certiorari is granted
Evidence
REGALA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 105938
KAPUNAN; September 20, 1996
(eva)
NATURE
Petition for Certiorari
FACTS
- The matters raised here are an offshoot of the
institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by RP, through the PCGG against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
corporations in PCGG Case entitled "RP vs. Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al." (Civil Case No.0033).
- Among the defendants named in the case are herein
petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino
V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor
P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini,
and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all
were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law
Firm).
- ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its
clients, which included, among others, the organization
and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental
services where its members acted as incorporators, or
simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the
performance of these services, the members of the law
firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of
trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course
of their dealings with their clients, the members of the
law firm acquire information relative to the assets of
clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances.
- As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included
in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
A2010
- August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint"
which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from
the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 as party-
defendant. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of
private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder
in the companies involved in Civil Case No. 0033.
- Petitioners were included in the Third Amended
Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
Defendants Cojuangco, Angara, Concepcion, Regala,
Cruz, Vinluan, Escueta, Hayudini and Roco of ACCRA
plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and
confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut
levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of
San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation,
became the holder of approximately 15M shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of March 1987. This ranks
ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the
top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has
approximately 1.4M shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as
holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February,
1984.
- In their answer ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
> Defendants-ACCRA lawyers’ participation in the acts
with which their co-defendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
> In the course of rendering professional and legal
services to clients, defendants became holders of
shares of stock in the corporations listed under their
respective names as incorporating or acquiring
stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any
proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.
> Defendant Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976
of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was
organized for legitimate business purposes not related
to the allegations of the expanded Amended
Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any
35
 Prof. V. A. Avena
material interest therein and therefore denies that the
‘shares’ appearing in his name are his assets.
- Petitioner Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA,
filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the
complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten
wealth.
- ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT
AND/OR OPPOSITION" with Counter-Motion that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded
Roco.
- In its "Comment," PCGG set the following conditions
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a)
the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds
of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings.
- Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to
substantiate compliance by Roco of the conditions
precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-
defendant in Civil Case No. 0033: (a) Letter to PCGG of
the counsel of Roco reiterating a previous request for
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil
Case No. 0033); (b) Affidavit executed by Roco as
Attachment to the letter aforestated; and (c) Letter of
the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices to the PCGG
in behalf Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation
and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG
against Roco in PCGG Case No. 33.
- during said proceedings, Roco did not refute
petitioners' contention that he did not actually reveal
the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33,
nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the
client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
- Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein
questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in
PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG.
- This is what appears to be the cause for which they
have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein.
> The PCGG is satisfied that Roco has demonstrated
his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his
principal, which revelation could show the lack of
cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG
to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency
and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the
Evidence
Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan
(173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers
the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure
in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings. The
ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the
PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the
same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be
accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion for the same
treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is
DENIED.
- ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the
above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers
filed the petition for certiorari.
- Hayudini filed a separate petition for certiorari on the
same grounds averred by petitioners ACCRA lawyers.
- PCGG refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not within the
ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor
are the documents it required (deeds of assignment)
protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status.
ISSUES
1. WON Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably
acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to
the strict application of the law of agency.
2. WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG.
3. WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers
and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore,
deserving of equal treatment.
A) There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of
the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder.
B) Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the
disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction
A2010
as would make the classification reasonable under the
equal protection clause.
C) Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue
preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal
protection clause.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio It would seem that petitioners are merely
standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on
the basis of activities and services performed in the
course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously,
petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint
is merely being used as leverage to compel them to
name their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case,
respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as
against petitioners and should exclude them from the
Third Amended Complaint.
Reasoning It is quite apparent that petitioners were
impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them
to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly,
respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
“bigger fish” as they say in street parlance. This ploy is
quite clear from the PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal
with petitioners -- the names of their clients in
exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The
statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
“ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice.
But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.”
2. YES.
Ratio As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity
should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise,
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of
his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule
are well established.
36
 Prof. V. A. Avena
First, the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist
only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege
generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship. Finally, due process considerations require
that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know
his adversary.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule
is however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is
privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the
general rule. For example, the content of any client
communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it
is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem
on which the client seeks legal assistance. Moreover,
where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has
been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client
has been held to be privileged, since such revelation
would otherwise result in disclosure and the entire
transaction. Summarizing these exceptions,
information relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name
itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
Reasoning The circumstances involving the
engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least
two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish said
client's connection with the very fact in issue of the
case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter
Evidence
or the substance (without which there would be no
attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the
legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners’ ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto: the disclosure of the identity of its
clients; submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and the submission of the
deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of
their clients covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up
of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners
gave their professional advice in the form of, among
others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their clients’ shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the
aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners’ legal service to their clients. More
important, it constituted an integral part of their duties
as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate
fear that identifying their clients would implicate them
in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
- Furthermore, under the third main exception,
revelation of the client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case,
where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words
of Baird, “that would inevitably form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a...
crime."
- An important distinction must be made between a
case where a client takes on the services of an attorney
for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go
around the law for the purpose of committing illegal
activities and a case where a client thinks he might
have previously committed something illegal and
consults his attorney about it. These cases may be
readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be
invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the
first example; while the prosecution may not have a
case against the client in the second example and
cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a
A2010
case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is
that it is not within the professional character of a
lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime.
The reason for the second has been stated in the cases
above discussed and are founded on the same policy
grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in
general, exists.
- In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately
hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has
a case against their clients, the latter's case should be
built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them
from their own sources and not from compelled
testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals much
about the nature of the transaction which may or may
not be illegal. A lawyer cannot reveal such
communication without exposing himself to charges of
violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the
entire attorney-client relationship.
- We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not
to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because
the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client’s name
is not privileged information. By compelling petitioners,
not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but
worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating
the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG
would exact from petitioners a link “that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a crime.”
LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; BOUND
BY RULES, ETHICAL CONDUCT AND DUTIES;
RATIONALE:
In the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are
rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into
it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is
of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,
that is required by reason of necessity and public
interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from
seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is
fatal to the administration of justice. It is also the strict
sence of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that
distinguishes him from any other professional in
society. This conception is entrenched and embodies
centuries of established and stable tradition.
37
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client
relationships are many and serve several constitutional
and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the
privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct
rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If
a client were made to choose between legal
representation without effective communication and
disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets
revealed then he might be compelled, in some
instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial
system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of
disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self
incrimination, then the flow of information would be
curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory. The threat this represents against another
sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed
innocent is at once self-evident. Encouraging full
disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services
opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options
which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited
information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An
effective lawyer-client relationship is largely between
lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation
which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and
flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order
to attain effective representation, the lawyer must
invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a
matter of duty and professional responsibility.
- In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old
Code of Civil Procedure. Section 383 specifically
“forbids counsel, without authority of his client to
reveal any communication made by the client to him or
his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment.”
- Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of
Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded
provides: Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. - The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases: An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorney’s secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity.
Evidence
- Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is
the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client,
and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client’s business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval.
- This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
- Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client: The lawyer owes
"entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end
that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by
the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial
disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from
the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the land,
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in
mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the
law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or
any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client.
3. YES
Ratio As to the bare statement that Roco merely acted
as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in his out-
of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to
state that petitioners have likewise made the same
claim not merely out-of- court but also in their Answer
to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by
counsel, claiming that their acts were made in
furtherance of "legitimate lawyering.” Being "similarly
situated" in this regard, public respondents must show
that there exist other conditions and circumstances
which would warrant their treating the private
respondent differently from petitioners in the case at
bench in order to evade a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Reasoning To this end, public respondents contend
that the primary consideration behind their decision to
sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a
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defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of
the clients in question. However, respondents failed to
show - and absolutely nothing exists in the records of
the case at bar - that private respondent actually
revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since
the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the
entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG,
an undertaking which is so material as to have justified
PCGG's special treatment exempting the private
respondent from prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the
undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion"
that private respondent did indeed comply with the
undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only
three documents were submitted for the purpose, two
of which were mere requests for re-investigation and
one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners
(ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal.
These were clients to whom both petitioners and
private respondent rendered legal services while all of
them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients
which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged
questioned transactions.
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from
the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court
without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively
show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart from
the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a
classification which made substantial distinctions based
on real differences. No such substantial distinctions
exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation
of the equal protection clause.
- The equal protection clause is a guarantee which
provides a wall of protection against uneven application
of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the
guarantee operates against uneven application of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances
would be accorded the same treatment. Those who fall
within a particular class ought to be treated alike not
only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities
imposed.
DISPOSITIVE
We find that the condition precedent required by the
respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion
as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition
also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection
38
 Prof. V. A. Avena
clause of the Constitution. It is grossly unfair to exempt
one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without
allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover,
the PCGG’s demand not only touches upon the question
of the identity of their clients but also on documents
related to the suspected transactions, not only in
violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing
expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by
petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is
premature and that they should wait until they are
called to testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before they can raise
their objections. But petitioners are not mere
witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made
their position clear from the very beginning that they
are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled
to testify in view of their constitutional right against
self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right
to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should
never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to
suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means
of coercing them to disclose the identities of their
clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to
them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud
at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here countenance. The
case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial
Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should
not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG’s legal
mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection
guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and
subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan
is further ordered to exclude petitioners as parties-
Evidence
defendants in Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al..
Dissenting Opinion
DAVIDE:
The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client
relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is
merely a ground for disqualification of a witness (Sec.
24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked
at the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under
compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having
taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to such
confidential communication or advice, or is being
otherwise judicially coerced to produce, through
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other
documents containing the same privileged matter.
- Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to
agree with the majority opinion that the petitioners are
immune from suit or that they have to be excluded as
defendants, or that they cannot be compelled to reveal
or disclose the identity of their principals, all because of
the sacred lawyer-client privilege. This privilege is well
put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The majority
seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule on the
lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of American
jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the
identity of the client under the exceptional situations
narrated therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two
facts stand out in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of
privilege contested therein arose in grand jury
proceedings on different States, which are primarily
proceedings before the filing of the case in court, and
we are not even told what evidentiary rules apply in the
said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is
invoked in the court where it was already filed.
Secondly, and more important, in the cases cited by the
majority, the lawyers concerned were merely
advocating the cause of their clients but were not
indicted for the charges against their said clients.
Here, the counsel themselves are co-defendants duly
charged in court as co-conspirators in the offenses
charged. The cases cited by the majority evidently do
not apply to them.
- I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the
lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the
commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the
lawyer therefor. We do not even have to go beyond
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our shores for an authority that the lawyer-client
privilege cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of
a client's identity where the lawyer and the client are
conspirators in the commission of a crime or a fraud.
Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are mandated not to
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility) and
to employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19,
Id). And under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a
lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind that his great
trust is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the
honor of his profession and the best interest of his
client when he renders service or gives advice tending
to impress upon the client when he renders service or
gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his
undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons
strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client, privilege whenever
he conspires with the client in the commission of a
crime or a fraud.
PUNO:
- The attorney-client privilege can never be used as a
shield to commit a crime or a fraud. Communications
to an attorney having for their object the commission of
a crime "x x x partake the nature of a conspiracy, and it
is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but
under certain circumstances it might become the duty
of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice
require that no such shield from merited exposure shall
be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel
how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of
counsel in concocting crimes."
- As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does
not include the right of non-disclosure of client
identity. The general rule, however, admits of well-
etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to
recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are
accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury
Investigation. The Circuits have embraced various
"exceptions" to the general rule that the identity of a
client is not within the protective ambit of an attorney-
client privilege. All such exceptions appear to be firmly
grounded in the Ninth Circuit's seminal decision in Baird
v. Koerner. 'The name of the client will be considered
39
 Prof. V. A. Avena
privileged matter where the circumstances of the case
are such that the name of the client is material only for
the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on
the part of such client of the very offenses on account
of which the attorney was employed.' 'A significant
exception to this principle of non-confidentiality holds
that such information may be privileged when the
person invoking the privilege is able to show that a
strong possibility exists that disclosure of the
information would implicate the client in the very
matter for which legal advice was sought in the first
case.' Another exception to the general rule that the
identity of a client is not privileged arises where
disclosure of the identity would be tantamount to
disclosing an otherwise protected confidential
communication. To the general rule is an exception,
firmly embedded as the rule itself. The privilege may
be recognized where so much of the actual
communication has already been disclosed that
identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a
confidential communication. The privilege may be
recognized where so much of the actual communication
has already been disclosed [not necessarily by the
attorney, but by independent sources as well] that
identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts to
disclosure of a confidential communication. Another
exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en banc
decision of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick) is
recognized when disclosure of the identity of the client
would provide the "last link" of evidence.
− The person claiming the privilege or its exception
has the obligation to present the underlying facts
demonstrating the existence of the privilege.
When these facts can be presented only by
revealing the very information sought to be
protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the
lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in
and in camera hearing. The hearing can even be
in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held
that "a well-recognized means for an attorney to
demonstrate the existence of an exception to the
general rule, while simultaneously preserving
confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to
move the court for an in camera ex-parte hearing.
Without the proofs adduced in these in camera
hearings, the Court has no factual basis to
determine whether petitioners fall within any of the
exceptions to the general rule.
− later. hehe
Evidence
BANCO FILIPINO, vs. MONETARY BOARD, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 70054 (RESOLUTION)
July 08, 1986
(SJ)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS1
It appears that due to the financial troubles of Banco
Pilipino, it was placed under conservatorship by the
Monetary Board. The Conservator Mr. TIAOQUI
tendered his report dated January 19, 1995. To
adequately address the contents of the report, Banco
Filipino filed a motion for production of certain papers
and records invoking Rule 27.1.The documents asked
to be produced, inspected, and copied are the
following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary
Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco
Filipino (BF) and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and
March 22, 1985;
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first
conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to
Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez;
(3) Papers showing computations of all the interests
and penalties charged by the CB against BF;
(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves
per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19, 1995;
(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report;
(6) Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of the joint report of
Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela;
1
If you recall, we had an extensive discussion of Banco
Filipino case with Dean Carlota in connection with due
process (whether a hearing is required on the Tiaoqui
report) and the substantial evidence rule re sufficiency
of the Tiaoqui report as substantial evidence. Now we
know, that in this round Banco Filipino won, only to lose
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(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB-premises of Paseo
de Roxas of same report;
(8) Schedule of BF's assets from P5,159.44 B to
P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985;
(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mr. Carlota
Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.
In issuing the challenged order, the court below took
the view that the Supreme Court's resolution referring
to it the matters relative to the bank's closure does not
preclude the petitioner from availing of his mode of
discovery as an additional means of preparing for the
hearing. IT CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO
BE PRODUCED AS NOT PRIVILEGED BECAUSE THESE
CONSTITUTE OR CONTAIN EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO THE
ISSUE INTO BY THE COURT
Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take
exception to the said order and pray in their petition
before this Court for the reversal and setting aside of
the same. It opined that the ratiocination of the trial
court is wholly in error because the proceedings before
it, do not at all deal with either the administrative
proceedings conducted by the respondents or the
regularity and impartiality of the CB actions on BF; it
does so simply upon the charge that no "hearing" was
given BF prior to those actions of no "hearing" was
given BF prior to those actions of closure and
liquidation. However, no such prior hearing had been
called as none is required by the law and by the
Supreme Court decisions in force to this date (Rural
Bank of Lucena, Inc. vs. Arca, 15 SCRA 66, and Rural
Bank of Bato vs. IAC, G.R. 65642, Oct. 15, 1984). It also
argued that the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary
Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to
Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.2
2
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal
interest. Whenever any member attending a meeting
of the Monetary Board has a material personal interest,
directly or indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of
any given matter, said member and must retire from
the meeting during the deliberation thereon. The
subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a
member had a personal interest in it, shall be made
available to the public. The minutes of the meeting
shall note the withdrawal of the member concerned.
40
 Prof. V. A. Avena
ISSUES
Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it granted the motion for production
of documents.
Whether or not the tapes and transcripts of the
Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco
Filipino and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and March
22, 1985, are privileged communication that may not
be inquired into.
HELD
1. NO.
RATIO
The motion for the production of the subject documents
was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27,
of the Rules of Court. It has been held that "a party is
ordinarily entitled to the production of books,
documents and papers which are material and relevant
to the establishment of his cause of action or defense."
(General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for
Alameda County, 45 C. 2nd 879, cited in Martin, Rules
of Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be
applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy
of documents and the sufficiency of their description is
one of reasonableness and practicability" (Line Corp. of
the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On the
ground of public policy, the rules providing for
reproduction and inspection of books and papers do not
(As amended by PD No. 1827).
"Sec. 15. Responsibility. Any member of the
Monetary Board or officer or employee of the Central
Bank who wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of
gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall
be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank
as a result of such violation or negligence. Similar
responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any
information of a confidential nature about the
discussion or resolutions of the Monetary Board,
except as required in Section 13 of this Act, or
about the operation of the Bank, and to the use
of such information for personal gain or to the
detriment of the Government, the Bank or third
parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72).
mphasis supplied).
Evidence
authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter, that is, books, papers which because of their
confidential and privileged character could not be
received in evidence" (27) CJS 224). "In passing on a
motion for discovery of documents, the courts should
be liberal in determining whether or not documents are
relevant to the subject matter of action" (Hercules
Powder Co. vs. Haas Co. U.S. Dist, Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9
Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited in Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise,
"any statute declaring in general terms that official
records are confidential should be liberally construed,
to have an implied exception for disclosure when
needed in a court the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1
Cr. 137, 143).
REASONING
With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the
annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector,
Dept. II (SES) Reports submitted to the Central Bank
and Monetary Board which were taken into
consideration by said respondents in closing petitioner
bank. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to the
petitioner. We, therefore, fail to see any proper reason
why the annexes thereto should no withheld. Petitioner
cannot adequately study and properly analyze the
report without the corresponding annexes. Pertinent
and relevant, these could be useful and even necessary
to the preparation by petitioner of its comment,
objections and exceptions to the Conservator's reports
and receiver's reports.
Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first
Conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the Monetary
Board and to Central Bank Governor Fernandez these
appear relevant as petitioner has asserted that the
above-named Conservator had in fact to resume
normal operations of Banco Filipino but then he was
thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The latter
and reports could be favorable or adverse to the case
of petitioner but whatever the result may be, petitioner
should be allowed to photocopy the same.
2. NO.
RATIO
The deliberations may be confidential but not
necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no
specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in
Section 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely
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the courts from conducting an inquiry on said
deliberations when these are relevant or material to a
matter subject of a suit pending before it. The
disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for
personal gain. There is no indication that such
disclosure would cause detriment to the government,
to the bank or to third parties. Significantly, it is the
bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it
considers as information useful and indispensably
needed by it to support its position in the matter being
inquired to by the court below.
REASONING
As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board
deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its
meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item
No. 1), respondents contend that "it is obvious from the
requirement (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank
Act) that the subject matter ( of the deliberations),
when resolved . . . shall be made available to the public
but the deliberations themselves are not open to
disclosure but are to be kept in confidence."
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule
130, Rules of Court which states:
"Section 21. Privilege Communications. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his
term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court finds
that the public interest would suffer by disclosure."
BUT THIS PRIVILEGE, AS THIS COURT NOTES, IS
INTENDED NOT FOR THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS BUT FOR THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC
INTEREST (Vogel vs. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 cited in
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol.
5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest that would
be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.
"The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to
communications made to him in official confidence
does not apply when there is nothing to show that the
public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. .
. .", (Agnew vs. Agnew, 52 SD 472, cited in Martin Rules
of Court of the Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 199).
41
 Prof. V. A. Avena
In the case at bar, the respondents have not
established that public interest would suffer by the
disclosure of the papers and documents sought by
petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already
closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the
aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this
time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither
will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state
secrets. Respondent's reason for their resistance to the
order of production are tenuous and specious. If the
respondents public officials acted rightfully and
prudently in the performance of their duties, there
should be nothing at all that would provoke fear of
disclosure.
On the contrary, public interests will be served by the
disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its
employees but also its numerous depositors and
creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or
not there was a valid and legal justification for the
petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that
"Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it
means something ion which the public, the community
at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their
legal rights or liabilities are affected" (State vs. Crocket,
206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p.
229).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce
documents dated February 17, 1986 issued by the
court below in S.C.-G.R. NO. 70054, is hereby affirmed,
except as to the copies of the tapes relative to the
Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco
Filipino on January 25, 1985 and its meeting on July 27,
1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if such tapes are
actually no longer available taking into account
respondent Monetary Board's manifestations that the
tape recording of the deliberations of that Board are,
for purposes of economy, used over and over again
inasmuch as these tapes are not required to be kept or
stored.
SENATE V ERMITA
GR 169777
CARPIO-MORALES;April 20, 2006
(da)
Evidence
FACTS
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a
truly republican state. Even in the early history of
republican thought, however, it has been recognized
that the head of government may keep certain
information confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in
only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the
U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent
degree than the proceedings of any greater number;
and in proportion as the number is increased, these
qualities will be diminished.History has been witness,
however, to the fact that the power to withhold
information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity
to guard it zealously.
This is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari
and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
no. 464 issued Sept. 28, 2005.Between Sept. of 2005 to
Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear in
public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The
alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the
Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the
Venable contract
The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed
requests for postponement of hearings for varying
reasons such as existence of urgent operational
matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive
report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to
their requests because the requests were sent
belatedly and that preparations and arrangements
have already been completed.
On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which
took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive
Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed
that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate
or Congressional hearings without consent (written
approval) from the President, which had not been
granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack
of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to
E.O. 464. Thereafter, several cases were filed
challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a
TRO enjoining respondents from implementing,
enforcing, and observing the assailed order.
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Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed
for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit.
ISSUES
1. WON the officials of the executive department
may evade the congressional inquiry by virtue
of EO 464 (WON EO 464 is valid)
HELD
1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive
branch to withhold information sought by the Congress
in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so,
and without stating reasons therefor.
− Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of
executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the
right to know why the executive dept. considers
requested information privileged. E.O. 464 allows
the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without the need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering
its reasons therefor. By mere expedient of invoking
provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is
frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials
of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed to be valid.
−
Reasoning
Executive Privilege:
Schwartz - "the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress."
Rozell-"the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."
Tribe- while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak
of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to
furnish information may be actuated by any of at least
three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be
asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the
context of either judicial or legislative investigations."
1.The state secrets privilege invoked by U.S.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground
that the information is of such nature that its disclosure
would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives.
42
 Prof. V. A. Avena
2.Informer's privilege, or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of persons who
furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with the enforcement of that law.
3.A generic privilege for internal deliberations has been
said to attach to intragovernmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
In re Sealed Case:Since the beginnings of our nation,
executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges
to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of
which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique
role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our
government. Courts ruled early that the executive had
a right to withhold documents that might reveal
military or state secrets. The courts have also granted
the executive a right to withhold the identity of
government informers in some circumstances and a
qualified right to withhold information related to
pending investigations. x x x"
-This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers, exempts the executive from
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary
citizen or organization where such exemption is
necessary to the discharge of highly important
executive responsibilities involved in maintaining
governmental operations, and extends not only to
military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents
integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive
domestic decisional and policy making functions, that
is, those documents reflecting the frank expression
necessary in intra-governmental advisory and
deliberative communications.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged
does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the
question that must be asked is not only whether the
requested information falls within one of the traditional
privileges, but also whether that privilege should be
honored in a given procedural setting.
U.S. v. Nixon:In issue in that case was the validity of
President Nixon's claim of executive privilege against a
subpoena issued by a district court requiring the
production of certain tapes and documents relating to
Evidence
the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege
was based on the President's general interest in the
confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is
no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in
the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the
extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a
President's powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected
the President's claim of privilege, ruling that the
privilege must be balanced against the public interest
in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably,
the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there
addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil
litigation or against congressional demands for
information.
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege
was recognized by this Court in Almonte v.
Vasquez.Almonte used the term in reference to the
same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following
portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis
for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of
his conversations and correspondences, like the claim
of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example,
has all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. A President and those
who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in
the process of shaping policies and making decisions
and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution x x x "
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by
the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did
not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the
right of the people to information. Nonetheless, the
Court recognized that there are certain types of
information which the government may withhold from
the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in
name, that executive privilege may be claimed against
citizens demands for information.
A2010
In Chavez v. PCGG,the Court held that this jurisdiction
recognizes the common law holding that there is a
"governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
and other national security matters." The same case
held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a
recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority the
Court ruled that the right to information does not
extend to matters recognized as "privileged
information under the separation of powers," by which
the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on
military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting
national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused were exempted from the
right to information.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending
on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition
that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character
of the exemptions indicates that the presumption
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure.
Validity of Specific EO 464 provisions
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited
only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in
the question hour (because of its specific reference to
sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face.
- Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads
of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered
by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be
conclusive on the other branches of government. It
may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by
the Pres. regarding the nature and scope of executive
privilege.
- Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464
43
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Provides that once the head of office determines that a
certain info. is privileged, such determination is
presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the
effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the
Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official.
It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by
mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is
contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due
to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary
power, the Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to
exercise it. Such power must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy.
- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it
does not assert but merely implies the claim of
executive privilege. It does not provide precise and
certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O.
464 coupled with an announcement that the President
has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for
Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each
case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry.
Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b)
and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1
and 2(a) are VALID.
Admissions and Confessions
HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMENA Y ZURBANO
V HEIRS OF IRENE BIEN
G.R. 155508
CORONA; September 11, 2006
(maia)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45
FACTS: This case involves a land dispute between
Pedro Clemena and Irene Bien, both of them claiming
that they acquired the property through purchase (its
Evidence
actually through a series of purchases tracing back to
the original owner, Pedro Clemena y Conde). Irene filed
a complaint to recover the property, which was in
possession of Pedro. In his answer, Pedro alleged that
the land was his by purchase and that it was in his
exclusive possession.
- Both the original parties died thereafter and were
succeeded by their respective heirs.
- RTC: Irene owned the land, but in the MFR, RTC
reversed and said that both parties failed to prove their
respective claims of ownership and ruled that the land
still belonged to the original owner Pedro Clemena y
Conde.
- CA: reversed resolution of RTC and ruled that Irene
was the rightful owner. CA also ordered Heirs of Pedro
to pay heirs of Irene P118k in damages as
compensation for having been deprived of possession
and the owner’s share in the harvest. CA based the
award on the testimony of Gregorio Clemena, the
husband of Irene, which essentially declared that the
average share of the owner in the harvest was 50
cavans of palay, that the Pedro (or his heirs upon his
death) were the ones who received the owner’s share,
and that the price of palay had gone up after the war,
from P15 to P25.
- Heirs of Pedro now assail the judgment of CA ordering
them to pay compensation for deprivation of
possession and the owner’s share in the harvest. They
no longer dispute Irene’s ownership of the property.
However, they claim they cannot be held liable to the
heirs of Irene for the harvest because (1) they never
took possession of the property and (2) the evidence
the CA relied on to determine the amount of damages,
proceeding as it did from one of the heirs of Irene, was
self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper
basis for such award.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the heirs of Pedro should not be ordered to pay
the damages awarded by CA for the reason that:
a. they never took possession of the property
b. testimony of Gregorio was self-serving, thus an
improper basis for the award
HELD:
1. a. NO (heirs of pedro should pay)
Ratio: A judicial admission conclusively binds the party
making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The
exception is found only in those rare instances when
A2010
the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and
because of strong reasons to support its stand, may
relieve a party from the consequences of his admission
Reasoning: Pedro himself alleged in his answer that
the land was in his exclusive possession. Such took on
the character of a judicial admission which cannot be
contracted except through showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or no such admission was
made. The heirs of pedro, as mere substituting
defendants, are bound by the admissions made by
pedro himself.
-further, the question of possession is a question of
fact, the findings of which SC should not disturb
1.b. NO (testimony was not self-serving, thus not an
improper basis for the award of damages)
Ratio: “Self-serving evidence” is not to be taken
literally to mean any evidence that serves its
proponent’s interest. The term, if used with any legal
sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a
party in his own interest at some place and time out of
court, and it does not include testimony that he gives
as a witness in court.
Reasoning: “Self-serving evidence,” perhaps owing to
its descriptive formulation, is a concept much
misunderstood. Not infrequently, the term is employed
as a weapon to devalue and discredit a party’s
testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the
sense in which petitioners are using it now.
- Evidence of this sort (self-serving) is excluded on the
same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party
and on the consideration that its admission would open
the door to fraud and fabrication. In contrast, a party’s
testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-
examination by the other party, and therefore, not
susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-
serving.
- At any rate, petitioners never alleged, nor tried to
show, that Gregorio’s testimony was inaccurate or
untrue. Petitioners’ objection is founded solely on the
mere fact that he, being a plaintiff, was a witness
interested in the outcome of the case. Now, it is true
that a party’s interest may to some extent affect his
credibility as a witness. To insist otherwise would be
the height of naiveté. Nonetheless, the Court cannot
subscribe to the view, implicit in petitioners’ argument,
that a party’s testimony favorable to himself must be
disregarded on account solely of his interest in the
44
 Prof. V. A. Avena
case. Our justice system will not survive such a rule for
obdurate cynicism on the part of a court is just as
odious to the administration of justice as utter
gullibility.
-National Dev’t Company v. WCC: interest alone is not a
ground for disregarding a party’s testimony.
-obiter in other cases: interest of a witness does not
ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or
require it to be disregarded, and the trier of facts is
entitled to accept as much of the witness’ testimony as
he finds credible and to reject the rest.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE
COMPANIES V RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK,INC
G.R. No. 147039
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 27, 2006
(owen)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 RoC seeking the
review of the CA Decision affirming RTC Makati
Decision reducing interest rate to 6% per annum
FACTS
- Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RADIO), who owns
several broadcasting stations all over the country, filed
a civil case against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance
Companies (DBP) and Provident Insurance Corporation
(PROVIDENT) for recovery of insurance benefits.
PROVIDENT covered RADIO’s transmitter equipment
and generating set for P13,550,000.00 under a Fire
Insurance Policy, while DBP covered RADIO’s
transmitter, furniture, fixture and other transmitter
facilities for P5,883,650.00 under a Fire Insurance
Policy.
- July 27, 1988 evening, RADIO’s station in Bacolod City
was razed by fire causing damage in the amount of
P1,044,040.00. RADIO sought recovery under the two
insurance policies but the claims were denied on the
ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk
excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d)
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or
damage occasioned by or through or in
consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the
following consequences, namely:
Evidence
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or
warlike operations (whether war be declared or not),
civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped
power.
The insurance companies denied the claims by
maintaining that the evidence showed that the fire was
caused by members of CPP/NPA. Hence, the civil case.
- RTC Makati: in favor of RADIO. PROVIDENT to pay
P450,000.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2,
1990 the date of the filing of the Complaint. DBP to
pay P602,600.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2,
1990.
- CA: affirmed the decision, with the modification that
the applicable interest rate reduced to 6% per annum.
MFR denied.
- DBP assails: factual finding of both RTC and CA that
its evidence failed to support its allegation that the loss
was caused by an excepted risk, (members of the
CPP/NPA)
RTC
+ testimony of witnesses Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3
Rochar, who were admittedly not present when the fire
occurred, was limited to the fact that an investigation
was conducted and in the course of the investigation
they were informed by bystanders that “heavily armed
men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in
it and then lit it. After that, they went out shouting
“Mabuhay ang NPA”.
+ persons whom they investigated and actually saw
the burning of the station were not presented as
witnesses
+ documentary evidence, which includes a letter
released by the NPA merely mentions some
dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the
media in Bacolod, do not satisfactorily prove that the
author of the burning were members of the NPA..
CA
+ police blotter of the burning of DYHB
+ certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated
National Police, Bacolod City regarding the incident
+ letter of alleged NPA members Magsilang claiming
responsibility for the burning of DYHB
+ fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988
+ testimonies of Lt. Col. Torres and SFO III Rochas
ISSUES
A2010
1. WON police blotter of the burning of DYHB, the
certification issued by the Integrated National Police of
Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared
by SFO III Rochas is deemed sufficient (Entry in Official
Records)
2. WON the testimony of Lt. Col. Torres is admissible
3. WON the letter of Magsilang, who claims to be a
member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person
which is not a party to the present action, is admissible
(Admission & Confessions)
4. WON the excepted risk was not proven by DBP
5. WON the reports of witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO
II Rochar that the bystanders they interviewed claimed
that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA is
an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae
(Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence)
HELD
1. NO
- The documentary evidence may be considered
exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official
records, nevertheless, none of these documents
categorically stated that the perpetrators were
members of the CPP/NPA.
> police blotter: “a group of persons accompanied by
one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA … more or
less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,”
> certification from the Bacolod Police station: “…
some 20 or more armed men believed to be members
of the New People’s Army NPA,”
> fire investigation report: “(I)t is therefore believed by
this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is
intentional, and the armed men suspected to be
members of the CPP/NPA were the ones responsible …”
- All these documents show that indeed, the
“suspected” executor of the fire were believed to be
members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not
sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the
quantum of proof.
2. NO
- The only person who seems to be so sure that that the
CPP-NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col.
Torres. However, though his testimony is persuasive, it
cannot be admit as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA
was really involved in the incident considering that he
admitted that he did not personally see the armed men
even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt.
Col. Torres was presented as witness, he was presented
as an ordinary witness only and not an expert witness.
45
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of the
armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible in
evidence.
3. NO
- Under Section 22, Rule 130 RoC. An admission is
competent only when the declarant, or someone
identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the
action.
4. YES
- In insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the
terms of a policy which insures against other perils or
hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense
which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed
that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking
to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation
in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss
comes within the purview of the exception or limitation
set up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a
contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to
prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is
excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause
which limits its liability.
- Consequently, it is sufficient for RADIO to prove the
fact of damage or loss. Once RADIO makes out a
prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to DBP to controvert RADIO’S prima
facie case. In this case, since DBP alleged an excepted
risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to DBP to
prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has
sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused
by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift
back to respondent who is then under a duty of
producing evidence to show why such excepted risk
does not release petitioner from any liability
5. NO
- A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge, which means those
facts which are derived from his perception. A witness
may not testify as to what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the
same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not
given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-
examination by opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the
Evidence
out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on
which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
- Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or after the commission of
the crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule
in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not
testify and provided that the testimony of the witness
who heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise
a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
- It is reasonable to assume that when these
statements were noted down, the bystanders already
had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to
one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take
place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether
these utterances were the products of truth. That the
utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote. At
best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres that these statements were made may be
considered as independently relevant statements
gathered in the course of their investigation, and are
admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact
that they had been thus uttered.
- Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
- Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders
that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused
the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow
that such declarations are sufficient proof. These
declarations should be calibrated vis-à-vis the other
evidence on record.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
A2010
PEOPLE V REYES
G.R. No. L-1846-48
BENGZON; January 18, 1948
(aida)
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI Pampanga
FACTS
- Vicente Gatchalian, Severino Austria, Pedro Reyes,
Eusebio Perez, Gervasio Due and Marcelo Due were
charged in two separate cases with the deaths of
Benjamin Nery and Alfredo Laguitan. In another case,
they were accused of causing physical injuries to
Francisco Orsino.
- April 19, 1946, Good Friday in Cacutud, Arayat,
Pampanga – While the “pabasa” was being performed,
the appellants, assisted by Marcelo Due, Gervasio Due
and one Peping and carrying pistols, approached Nery,
Laguitan and Orsino who were members of the military
police.
- The three MPs were sitting on one corner, watching
the proceedings. At gunpoint, the three MPs were
driven to the road and when they were about ten
meters away from where the “pabasa” was being done,
they were shot from behind. Nery and Laguitan were
killed instantly while Orsino fractured a leg which took
6 months to heal.
- The motive for the killing was the conflict between the
MPs and the Huks, the attackers being Huk members.
- Six people testified for the prosecution, including
Reyes.
- Eusebio Perez said he was attending the pabasa and
when he heard gunshots, he grabbed his wife and ran.
The next day he saw three of the assailants including
Maximo Austria and they said they were going into
hiding because they had taken part in the shooting the
night before. Perez did not mention Gatchalian.
- Lt. Martinez testified that in the investigation
conducted by Quintans, Gatchalian stated that each of
them approached an MP and fired at them and that he
was sure they would die.
- Witnesses for the defense gave their own testimonies.
- Segundo Guevara saw Gatchalian during the pabasa
and when gunshots were heard, he saw Gatchalian run
carrying his child and then the latter lay in a pile of
palay. Gatchalian remained in Guevara’s house the
whole night. This was corroborated by a testimony by
Evaristo Paras.
46
 Prof. V. A. Avena
- The fiscal filed a motion for the dismissal of the case
against Eusebio Perez for insufficiency of evidence. This
was granted. He also asked that the accused Pedro
Reyes be discharged so that the latter may be used as
prosecution witness. This was also granted.
- The CFI judge found the accused Maximino Austria
alias Severino Australia alias Big Boy and Vicente
Gatchalian alias Magallanes guilty of the offenses set
forth in the different informations. They were
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnity for the
deaths of Nery and Laguitan.
- Reyes did become a state witness but he did not
confirm every statement he had previously made at the
fiscal's investigation. He testified that before the crime
was committed, Gervacio had asked him to talk to the
MPs but he refused. Later on, he heard gunshots and
when he ran to the ricefield, he saw and heard Gervacio
saying that the MP he shot would surely die and
Gatchalian assuring him that the MO would indeed die.
- Orsino narrated a similar incident but could not
identify the assailants except Austria. Lts. Martinez and
Quintans declared under oath that Gatchalian admitted
to them during the investigation that he had shot one
of the MPs. Gatchalian even demonstrated how he shot
the victim whih was captured in a photograph.
- Lt. Quintans also testified that Austria had voluntarily
signed the confession.
- Gatchalian denies that he made a confession before
Lt. Quintans. He denied that he had taken part in the
killing and that he was merely threatened to be killed
lest he reenact the crime as shown in the photograph.
He alleged that he was maltreated and even showed
his supposed injuries in court.
ISSUE
WON the judgment appealed from should be reversed
HELD
NO
Reasoning
- The picture of the reenactment of the crime is
convincing enough to show the guilty participation of
the appellants.
- Their defense of alibi is weak and untenable. The
Solicitor General's brief substantially proves conspiracy
between them and their other co-accused who are still
at large.
Disposition Judgment affirmed
Evidence
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [dissent]
- Appellants' guilt not having been proved beyond all
reasonable doubt, they are entitled to acquittal.
- The testimony of Eusebio Perez to the effect that on
April 20, 1946, appellants told him that they wanted to
hide because of their participation in the shooting the
previous night, is absolutely incredible. If appellants
had wanted to hide, it is incomprehensible that they
should start by admitting to Eusebio Perez that they
took part in the shooting affray and then confiding to
him their intention to hide.
- The testimony of Pedro Reyes cannot be taken
seriously, not only because it comes from a polluted
source, but because it is inherently unbelievable that
the authors of the shooting could have been so reckless
enough to make comments on the results of the
shooting in the field, near the scene, and at the hearing
distance of Pedro Reyes. According to the latter,
everybody, including the assailants, ran away afield;
but it is unbelievable that the assailants should stop in
their flight just to make comments and seemingly
should to afford Pedro Reyes the opportunity to over-
hear their conversation.
- The testimonies of Fidel Martinez and Segundino S.
Quintans as to the supposed oral admission of Vicente
Gatchalian and the written statement signed by
Severino Austria, are completely valueless because of
the uncontradicted testimonies of the two appellants to
the effect that they were maltreated, tortured and
threatened to be killed.
- Orsino testified that the shooting took place in front of
the place where the pabasa was being held in the
presence of many people. Not one of those many had
witnessed the shooting was called by the prosecution
to testify as to who did the shooting and how it took
place, with the single exception of Orsino.
LICHAUCO V ATLANTIC
GR NO.L-27434
OZAETA; August 23, 1949
(monch)
FACTS
A2010
- Appelant Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila
is a foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to
do business in the Philippines, with its office and
principal place of business in the City of Manila. Richard
T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the
largest stockholders of said company when the Pacific
war broke out on December 8, 1941. He held 1,00
shares of stock, 545 of which was not fully paid. He
executed promissory notes in favor of the company
worth P245,250 (540 per share) for those shares. In
1941 he already paid P64.5k.
- Fitzsimmons had an agreement with the company
that should he die without having paid in full, the
company, at its option, may either reacquire the said
545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the
amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate
the corresponding number of the company's shares of
stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a
share.
- On Jan 1942, the Japanese occupied Manila and seized
all assets of the company. Fitzsimmons died on 1944
and special proceeding was instituted. Atlantic
resumed business in 1945.
- Atlantic filed a claim on the estate worth P63,868.67
Fitzsimmons owed them. It also wanted to exercise its
option to acquire the 545 shares by returning the
P64.5k Fitzsimmons paid. They requested a set-off.
Lichauco, the administrator, denied any indebtedness.
He expressed conformity however to the refund of
P64.5k. He also interposed a counterclaim worth P90k
for salaries allegedly due.
- Santiago Inacay, chief of the accounting department
of the Atlantic testified that the officers had maintained
personal accounts with the company. Fitzsimmons
maintained one. He testified that at the end of 1941,
the account shows that Fitzsimmons owed 63k to the
company. He said that he specifically knew the balance
of the said account because it would be very
“shameful” on his part if the officers asked him for their
balance and he didn’t know.
- Modesto Flores, the assistant accountant, also
testified that Fitzsimmons had a balance of 63k. He
knew this because as accountant, he made the entries
in the books of the company. He also signed receipts
whenever Fitzsimmons would withdraw funds.
- Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vice-
president-treasurer and president were also called to
testify but the TC refused to admit them because they
were not only large stockholders and members of the
47
 Prof. V. A. Avena
board of directors but also vice-president-treasurer and
president, respectively, of the claimant company.
However, if allowed to testify, they said that they would
also say that they had personal knowledge that
Fitzsimmons owed the company 63k.
- The administrator as evidence showed Exhibit 1,
which contains the gross value of assets of the conjugal
partnership of Fitzsimmons and Miguela Malayto. He
testified that he was the attorney in the divorce case
(1943) between them and that Fitzsimmons prepared
Exhibit 1 for the division of assets of the partnership. In
said exhibit, there is no indication of any debt to the
company
ISSUE/S
1. WON the officers of a corporation which is a party to
an action against an executor or administrator of a
deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 130.23)
2. WON Exhibit 1 is admissible because it is self-serving
2. WON the deceased Richard T. Fitzsimmons was
entitled to his salary as president of the Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Company of Manila from January, 1942, to June
27, 1944, when he died in the Santo Tomas internment
camp
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of
parties. The officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or
against the corporation which is a party to an action
upon a claim or demand against the estate of a
deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person
Reasoning
- This provision was taken from section 383, paragraph
7, of our former Code of Civil Procedure, which in turn
was derived from section 1880 of the Code of Civil
Procedure of California.
- City Savings Bank vs. Enos: To hold that the statute
disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers
or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to
materially amending the statute by judicial
interpretation. Plainly the law disqualifies only "parties
or assignors of parties," and does not apply to persons
Evidence
who are merely employed by such parties or assignors
of parties
- Merriman vs. Wickersman: An examination of the
authorities from other states will disclose that their
decisions rest upon the wordings of their statutes, but
that generally, where interest in the litigation or its
outcome has ceased to disqualify, officers and directors
of corporations are not considered to be parties within
the meaning of the law.
- The trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of
Messrs. Belden and Garmezy. It is not necessary,
however, to remand the case because it would be
merely corroborative, if at all, and in any event what
said witnesses would have testified, if permitted,
already appears in the record as hereinabove set forth,
and we can consider it together with the testimony of
the chief accountant and the assistant accountant who,
according to the appellant itself, were "the only ones in
the best of position to testify on the status of the
personal account" of the deceased Fitzsimmons
2. NO
Reasoning A self-serving declaration is a statement
favorable to the interest of the declarant. It is not
admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted.
On the other hand, a declaration against the interest of
the person making it is admissible in evidence,
notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration
is relevant and the declarant has died, become insane,
or for some other reason is not available as a witness.
- Insofar, at least, as the appellant was concerned,
there was no probable motive on the part of
Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1 by not
including therein appellant's present claim of P63,000
among his obligations or liabilities to be deducted from
the assets of the conjugal partnership between him and
his divorced wife. He did not know then that he would
die within one year and that the corporation of which
he was the president and one of the largest
stockholders would present the claim in question
against his estate. Neither did he know that the books
and records of that corporation would be destroyed or
lost. Yet, although he listed in said inventory his
obligations in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust
Company and the Philippine Bank of Commerce
aggregating more than P30,000, he did not mention at
all any obligation in favor of the corporation of which he
was the president and one of the largest stockholders.
A2010
- A possible explanation such conflict between the
company and Fitzsimmons can be seen in Inacay’s
testimony. The latter said that at the end of the year,
the personal accounts would be on the credit side since
the dividend, bonuses and fees would be credited. On
the year 1941, such did not happen because of the war.
Fitzsimmons could have believed that such amount was
credited, therefore, he did not include any obligations
he had to the company in Exhibit 1. However, since the
counsels did not pursue this point, the court cannot rule
on this point. Leaving this foregoing reflection, the
court held that since the testimonies are based only on
memory, and given that human memory, especially
with regard to figures after more than 5 years, is
unreliable, they cannot overturn the TC decision.
3. No
ReasoningThere was no resolution either of the
stockholders of the board of directors of the company
authorizing the payment of the salaries of the president
or any other officer or employee of the corporation for
the period of the war when the corporation was forced
completely to suspend its business operations and
when its officers were interned or virtually held
prisoners by the enemy
PEOPLE VS YATCO
(giulia)
UNITED STATES vs BAY
CARSON; Aug 14, 1914
(athe)
FACTS
Servando Bay was charged of rape of Florentina
Alcones. The accused met Alcones walking along the
beach, caught hold her, picked her up, and carried her
to the edge of some thickets, where he threw her on
the ground and attempted to have carnal intercourse
with her. However, a party who were passing near the
place where the crime was committed heard her cries.
One of the parties stepped ashore, and seeing the
accused get up from the place where the woman claims
the crime was committed, asked "What's this?” The
accused made no explanation of his conduct or his
presence there, and left the place forthwith.
Immediately thereafter the woman, accompanied by
some of the party from the boat, went to the
councilman of the barrio and made complaint. The
accused, having been brought before the councilman
48
 Prof. V. A. Avena
and asked had he committed the crime of which he was
charged, admitted that he had. Thereafter the accused
was sent to the justice of the peace, who held him for
trial.
The accused was convicted.
ISSUE
WON finding the accused guilty has basis
HELD
YES. There can be no possible doubt that he was
present when the party on board the boat was
attracted to the place where the victim raised her
outcry charging him with the assault, and that he was
present later on when the victim presented her
complaint to the councilman of the barrio. Under such
circumstances, we are convinced that an innocent man
would instantly and indignantly repudiate such a
charge, and attempt there and then to establish his
innocence, explaining how he came to be there present
with the woman, and the conditions under which she
had made the false charge; yet there is not the
slightest indication in the evidence that there was on
the part of the accused any such indignant denials and
protests as would be expected from an innocent man
suddenly confronted with such a charge under such
circumstances. Indeed, his conduct at that time was, to
the minds of the Court, wholly at variance with that
which might fairly be expected from him, granting the
truth of his testimony and that of the other witnesses
for the defense.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
ABALLE v PEOPLE
FERNAN; March 15, 1990
G.R. No. 64086
(jojo)
NATURE
Evidence
- Direct appeal from the decision of the CFI of Davao
City, finding petitioner Peter Paul Aballe guilty of
homicide.
FACTS
- At around 7PM of Nov.7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril,
Davao City, Quirino Banguis, a 42-year old driver,
attended a birthday party at the residence of his
neighbor Aguilles Mora. He brought along his wife and
other children, leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jennie
alone in their house. Upon their return at around 8:30
that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lying
prostrate, bathed in her own blood with multiple
wounds on different parts of her body. There were no
eyewitnesses to the bizarre killing.
- The postmortem report disclosed that Jennie
sustained a total of 32 stab wounds. Cause of death
was attributed to hemorrhage secondary to multiple
stab wounds.
- At daybreak of the following day, Nov. 8, acting on
information furnished by the victim's father, a police
team headed by Sgt Marante sought the accused for
questioning. They found him just as he was coming out
of the communal bathroom in Saypon and wearing
what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon
seeing Sgt. Marante, the accused without anyone
asking him, orally admitted that he killed Jennie
Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the
Toril police station for interrogation.
- While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 years
old, a school dropout (he finished second year high
school) and next door neighbor of the victim, brought
the police to his house and pointed to them the pot at
the "bangera" where he had concealed the death
weapon which was a 4-inch kitchen knife. Also taken
from Aballe was the bloodstained red and white striped
T-shirt which he claimed he wore during the
commission of the crime. Aballe also made an
extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing
Jennie while under the influence of liquor and
marijuana. ( Pls. see original copy re sworn affidavit)
Thereafter, an information was filed against Aballe,
charging him with homicide penalized under Article 249
of the RPC. At his arraignment on Apr. 13, 1981, he
pleaded not guilty. He also disavowed his extrajudicial
confession on the ground that it was obtained through
coercion and in the absence of counsel.
Notwithstanding the repudiation of his earlier
confession, Aballe was convicted of the crime of
homicide.
A2010
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court erred in giving full weight to
Aballe’s extrajudicial confession taken during custodial
investigation and in imposing a penalty which was not
in accordance with law.
2. WON the guilt of the accused has been established
beyond reasonable doubt
HELD
1. YES
- Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been
disregarded by the lower court for having been
obtained in violation of Aballe's constitutional rights.
Throughout the custodial interrogation, the
accused's parents and relatives were almost always
around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it
shown that the youthful offender was ever represented
by counsel. Since the execution of the extrajudicial
statement was admittedly made in the absence of
counsel, whether de oficio or de parte, and the waiver
of counsel was not made with the assistance of counsel
as mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, said confession should have
been discarded by the lower court.
- Equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife recovered
from Aballe after his capture and after the police had
started to question him. Together with the extrajudicial
confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a
constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must
consequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt,
however, is admissible, being in the nature of an
evidence in plain view which an arresting officer may
take and introduce in evidence.
- The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "an
officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested any money or property found upon his person
which was used in the commission of the crime or was
the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the
prisoner with the means of committing violence or
escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial
of the cause. . ."
2. YES
- It is well to note that even before the taking of the
extrajudicial confession, the accused, upon being
picked up in the morning of Nov. 8, 1980 as he was
coming out of the communal bathroom and wearing a
T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to cover
with his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt before
49
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Sgt. Marante and confessed that he killed Jennie
Banguis. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oral
confession is competent evidence to positively link the
accused to the aforesaid killing. ( Pls see orig copy re
testimony)
- The declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may be
given in evidence against him. The rule is that any
person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood
all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its
substance.
- Compliance with the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation is not applicable to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby
the accused orally admitted having slain the victim.
- Inappropriateness of penalty discussed
PEOPLE V. MOLAS
G.R. Nos. 97437-39
GRIÑO-AQUINO, February 5, 1993
(cha)
NATURE
Appeal
FACTS
-Josue Molas (accused-appellant) and Dulcesima
Resonable (Dulcesima, victim) were sweethearts and
were engaged to be married. Dulcesima was the
daughter of Bernardo and Soledad Resonable, and the
sister of Nicolas and Abelardo Resonable
-on Feb 2, 1983, at about 6:00 pm after farm work,
Bernardo arrived at their house and found 8-y.o.
Abelardo at the doorway of their house bathed in his
own blood. Bernardo carried Abelardo into their house.
Abelardo informed his father that Josue Molas was the
person who not only inflicted his injuries but also
stabbed Dulcesima and Soledad. Bernardo then looked
for Dulcesima, who he found dead in a dried carabao
mud pool 3-arms length from the house, and Soledad,
who he found near the bench by the door of the house.
Bernardo ran to the barangay captain and sought help
from authorities. Abelardo was brought to the Provincial
hospital but died the next day.
Evidence
-dawn of Feb 3, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes,
surrendered to Patrolman Geronimo Vallega, together
with the “hunting knife I used in killing the mother, the
daughter and the boy”. Patrolman Vallega then lodged
Molas in jail. Molas was transferred to Valencia Police
Station later.
-next morning, after being informed of his
Constitutional rights, refused to give any statement to
the police. Eventually, Molas freely and voluntarily
related the “whole story”, as taken down by Patrolman
Fetalvero. The following are contained in Molas’ sworn
statement: In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas,
Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad
Resonable lighted a gas lamp in their store and said,
"maayo kay naabot na ta walay makaboot nako ug
patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you have
arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own daughter]
at the same time went near Dulcesima, her daughter
and grabbed her hair and boxed her to the different
parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy, I
stopped Solidad by holding her hands to prevent her
boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention, Soledad
boxed me hitting my head and arms. Due to blocks I
made she was tired and again went back to Dulcesima
and again boxed her to the different parts of her body.
Because I was hurt on the part of Dulcisima, my wife-to-
be and no other means to prevent Solidad, I was able to
grab the weapon on my waist and stabbed Solidad
hitting her first on the breast, then on the back after
which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's younger brother at
my back holding and boxing my buttock. I stabbed him
on the breast and followed again at the back causing
him to fall down on the ground, leaving therein the
weapon I used causing incised wound on my right little
finger and ran away but Dulcisima stopped me by
holding my left hand and said, "puslang nabuhat sa
akong ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag
onong ta sa kamatayon." [How could you do this to my
parent, kill me also so we'll all die together]. Hearing
such words, I responded, "papatay ka diay kanako,"
[You'll kill me after all?] I went back where Abelardo
was and pulled the penetrated weapon and stabbed
Dulcisima who at that time was following me hitting her
breast and caused her life to end. When I saw Solidad
her mother walking towards the seat of their store and
sat down, I followed her and slashed her neck and
stabbed her stomach and immediately ran home.” The
said confession was signed before Judge Tayrosa of the
MTC fo Valencia after it was translated to Cebuano.
A2010
Molas did not object to any of the contents of his
affidavit as translated. He signed the document
willingly.
-3 separate information for murder were filed against
Molas, to which he pleaded not guilty.
-for the defense, only Molas was presented. In essence,
he testified that at about 6 pm on Feb 2, he saw his
fiancé lifeless beside the dried mud pool 3 fathoms
away from the store/house. He hugged Dulcesima but
she was dead so he ran to the store. There, he saw
Soledad wounded in the neck and bathed with blood.
He also saw Abelardo under a table with a hunting knife
in his back which he pulled from Abelardo. He shouted
for help then suddenly a voice from behind the store
said “Don’t shout, Bay, if you don’t want to die!” 3
unidentified men started chasing him afterwards.
During the said flight he stumbled, causing the injury in
his hands. He informed his mother regarding what
happened, and with his blood-stained clothes, he
proceeded to the police station. While he was being
investigated, Patrolman Vallaga arrived and informed
Patrolman Renzal that Abelardo tagged him as the
killer. He also alleged, though unsubstantiated, that
Patrolman Quitoy manhandled him. He denied knowing
the contents of the affidavit because it was written in
English and was not translated to him.
-RTC: GUILTY
ISSUES
1. WON the court erred in giving credence to Abelardo’s
dying declaration
2. WON his extrajudicial admission was validly admitted
by the court
HELD
1. NO. Correct in giving credence to it as a dying
declaration.
Ratio. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1)
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was made,
the declarant was under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) that he was a competent witness; and (d)
that his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal
case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the
declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of
Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427).
Reasoning. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue
Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his
mother and sister was given to his father, while he
50
 Prof. V. A. Avena
(Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab
wounds in his colon and spinal cord, as a result of
which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a
dying declaration. All of the circumstances required
were present when Abelardo made his dying
declaration.
2. YES
Ratio. While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial
confession was made without the advice and assistance
of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be
treated as a verbal admission of the accused
established through the testimonies of the persons who
heard it or who conducted the investigation of the
accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; People vs.
Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA
249).
Reasoning. The Valencia Police Station investigator,
Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial
court on October 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of
the accused. The trial court, which observed his
deportment on the witness stand, found him credible.
- the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial
confession of the accused. Even if that confession were
disregard, there was more that enough evidence to
support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to
the police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, his
blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only
hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration,
and the testimonies of the policemen in the police
stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he
admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving
beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered
Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment
convicting Josue Molas for the murders of Dulcesima
Resonable, Soledad Resonable and Abelardo Resonable
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each of said murders is AFFIRMED, with
modification of the death indemnity which is hereby
increased to P50,000.00 for each case. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE V MAQUEDA
G.R. No. 112983
DAVIDE, JR.; March 22, 1995
(rach)
FACTS
Evidence
- Maqueda was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and
serious physical Injuries and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50T for the
death of William Horace Barker.
- After a substantial period of time, Maqueda was
finally arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon and was
brought by Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda
to the Benguet Provincial Jail. Before Maj. Anagaran's
arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the.
headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company
at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer,
Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno
to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according
to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the
Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the
crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991.
- On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention,
Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein
that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State
witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he
is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda
regarding such statement and asked him if he was in
the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in
entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an
affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda
that he would oppose the motion for bail since he,
Maqueda, was the only accused on trial.
- In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the
Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission
from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Maqueda narrated
to Salvosa this version of the story as well.
Accused’s Version
- Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial
and alibi. He stated that he was at the polvoron factory
owned by Minda Castrense located at Sukat,
Muntinlupa. He was employed as a caretaker. He and
his 8 co-employees all sleep inside the factory. He
accompanied an officemate, Rosely, home to
Guinyangan, Quezon. And then he was already arrested
by members of the CAGFU.
- He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail,
then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There
he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting
Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province
of Benguet. He was also told that if he would point to
A2010
accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he could
also become a state witness: He told them that he
could attest to the fact that he accompanied accused
Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.
* The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector
Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience and
SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the
polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, testified that
she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and
thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda
on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed
Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda
was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and
freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
RTC Decision
- Although the trial court had doubts on the
identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses
Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta
Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on
this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the
confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as
well as on circumstantial evidence. One of such
circumstances is that His Motion to Grant Bail contains
this statement that he is willing and volunteering to be
State witness. This in effect, supports his extrajudicial
confession taken at the police station. This is the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02
Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.
- Under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial
confession made by the accused is not sufficient for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken
without the assistance of counsel because it was of the
opinion that since an information had already benefited
in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a
warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang
Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial
investigation. The trial court then held that the
admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be
tested under Sec 12(1), Article III of the Constitution,
but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since
voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of
proving otherwise, which he failed to do.
- As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted
their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their
conversation but not to prove the truth of the
51
 Prof. V. A. Avena
admission because such testimony was objected to as
hearsay.
ISSUE
1. WON Maqueda’s Sinumpaang Salaysay is admissible
2. WON the extrajudicial admissions are admissible
2. WON Maqueda is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Morales vs. Enrile: At the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
mean by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
- The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02
Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in
palpable violation of his rights under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed
by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of
any of his constitutional rights under the said
section. The statement was also taken in the absence
of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is
wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section
12, Article III of the Constitution.
- The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to
that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a
person is "under investigation for the commission of an
offense."
2. YES
Ratio Aballe vs; People: The declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may
be given in evidence against him and any person,
otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the
Evidence
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood
it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By
analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial
admissions.
Reasoning The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to
Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a
different footing. These are not governed by the
exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate
not in the course of an investigation, but in connection
with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness;
and as to the other admission, it was given to a private
person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily
limitations on government, declaring the rights that
exist without governmental grant, that may not be
taken away by government and that government has
the duty to protect; or restriction on the power of
government found "not in the particular specific types
of action prohibited, but in the general principle that
keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that
governmental power is not unlimited.”
- To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission
is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly
.stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state
witness."
3. YES
Ratio In the light of his admissions (to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa) and his willingness to be
a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the
commission of the crime charged was established
beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile
because by his own admission he was not only at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he
also admitted his participation. Even if we disregard his
extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and
Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial
court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial
evidence.
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION v EXTRAJUDICIAL
ADMISSION
- A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay shows that is
only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction
between a confession and an admission as clearly
shown in Sec. 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the ROC:
- In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do
A2010
not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or
of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which
he is charged.
- Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission
as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms,
by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime
charged, while an admission is a statement by the
accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue and tending, in connection with proof of other
facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is
something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which
tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Reasoning The accused's arguments which stress the
incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected
because the trial court had ruled that they were not
able to positively identify Magueda. The trial court
based his conviction on his extrajudicial
confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well
as on circumstantial evidence which he did not
elaborate upon on his appeal.
- The following circumstances were duly proved in this
case:
(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away
from the Barker house an hour after the crime in
question was committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was
positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and
Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed
the crime;
(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in
Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime
in September 1991;
(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March
1992; and
(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state
witness stating that "he is the least guilty.
Disposition Appeal is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE V DOMANTAY
52
 Prof. V. A. Avena
G.R. No. 130612
MENDOZA; May 11, 1999
(apple)
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
FACTS
-On the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4
o'clock, the body of six-year old Jennifer Domantay was
found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The child's body bore several
stab wounds.
-The medical examination conducted by Dr. Macaranas,
the rural health physician of Malasiqui, showed that
Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and hypovolemic
shock secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back. Dr.
Macaranas found no lacerations or signs of
inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the
vaginal walls of the victim's genitalia, although the
vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with
minimal resistance.
-The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to
accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of
the victim's grandfather, as the lone suspect.
-At around 6:30 in the evening of that day, police
officers of the Malasiqui PNP picked up accused-
appellant at the Malasiqui public market and took him
to the police station where accused-appellant, upon
questioning by SPO1 Antonio Espinoza, confessed to
killing Jennifer Domantay. He likewise disclosed that he
had given the fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa
and Jorge Casingal, his aunt and uncle respectively. The
next day, SPO1 Espinoza and another policeman took
accused-appellant to Bayambang and recovered the
bayonet from a tricycle belonging to the Casingal
spouses.
-On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr.
Macaranas, SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the PNP chief
investigator at Malasiqui, filed a criminal complaint for
murder against accused-appellant before the MTC
-On October 25, 1996, Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal
expert of the NBI, performed an autopsy on the body of
Jennifer. The result of his examination of the victim's
genitalia indicated that the child's hymen had been
completely lacerated on the right side. Based on this
finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the criminal complaint
against accused-appellant to rape with homicide.
Evidence
-In addition to several other witnesses, the
prosecution, during the trial, presented SPO1
Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel who testified
that, on separate occasions, accused-appellant
had confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer
Domantay.
-SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-
appellant after the latter had been brought to the
Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17,
1996. Before he commenced his questioning, he
apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, in English, which was later translated into
Pangasinense.
-According to SPO1 Espinoza, accused-appellant agreed
to answer the questions of the investigator even in the
absence of counsel and admitted killing the victim.
Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the
bayonet he used in killing the victim.
-On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no
time during the course of his questioning was accused-
appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-
appellant's confession reduced in writing.
-Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court
over the objection of the defense.
-Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio
reporter of station DWPR, an AM station based in
Dagupan City. On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to
Malasiqui to interview accused-appellant who was then
detained in the municipal jail.
-According to Manuel, he presented himself as a media
practitioner with the tape recorder in his hand. When
asked if he committed the crime, the accused
answered "yes," and when asked why, the accused said
that it was about the boundary dispute, and he used
that little girl in his revenge.
-As in the case of the testimony of SPO1 Espinoza, the
defense objected to the admission of Manuel's
testimony, but the lower court allowed it.
-Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him.
-The trial court found accused-appellant guilty as
charged, hence, this appeal
ISSUE
WON the extrajudicial admissions made by the accused
to: 1. SPO1 Espinoza and 2. Celso Manuel are
admissible in evidence
HELD
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No to 1, yes to 2.
Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this section or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
-This provision applies to the stage of custodial
investigation, that is, "when the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect."
R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional
guarantee to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been "invited"
for questioning.
-Decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial
confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing.
-In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was
brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of
October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the
only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay.
-He was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III,
Section 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him.
-Although the accused waived the assistance of
counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made
in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver
is invalid and his confession is inadmissible.
-SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession
of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the
trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence,
being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
-The accused-appellant's confession to the radio
reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible.
-In People v Andan, this Court said: Confessions to the
newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the
53
 Prof. V. A. Avena
relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the
State and its agents.
-Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the
fact of death of Jennifer Domantay.
-In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by
the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material
points with his confession. He was seen walking toward
the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later, he
was seen standing near the bamboo grove where the
child's body was found.
-Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an
accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
-However, the court found that the fact that accused-
appellant also committed rape was not established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Disposition
Judgment rendered finding accused-appellant guilty of
homicide
PEOPLE v. MANTUNG
GR 130372; July 20, 1990; ROMERO
(Ina)
FACTS
One Monday morning, on the way to work, Mary
Ann, the manager of Cebuana Lhuiller Pawnshop in
Maywood, BF Paranaque, received information that 2
employees, Maribel and Renjie did not go home the
previous Saturday. She tried to contact Maribel, who
was the one who had the keys to the store, but couldn't
reach her. She sent another employee, Myrna, to go get
duplicate keys from Magallanes. When she got to the
store, she found Maribel's mom and Renjie's husband
waiting outside. When Mary Ann saw that only 2 of the
4 locks on the door were actually locked and that the
aircon was still running, she got suspicious and called
the police.
Meanwhile, another manager, Ricardo, got
information at 930am that the store wasn't open yet,
when it should've been opened at 830am. He got
suspicious and proceeded to the store, where he found
Mary Ann waiting outside with the police. He noticed
Evidence
that the Maribel and Renjie were nowhere in sight, and
that the security guard Mantung was also not there. He
also observed that the aircon and the lights inside and
outside the store were on. He peeped inside and saw
nothing unsual, but smelled a foul odor from the office.
When Myrna got to the store with the duplicate,
Mary Ann opened the store through the back door.
They first saw the safe room of the pawnshop in
disarray and the cash drawer was empty. On the messy
counter, there was a letter which appears to have been
written by Mantung addressed to her. Mantung wrote in
Filipino that he killed Maribel and Renjie because they
gave him pork which his Moslem religion prohibited him
from eating. He likewise admitted taking the cash and
jewelry inside the vault, claiming that he needed
money.
The bodies of Maribel and Renjie were found in the
vault, each with a bullet to the head. The jewelries kept
in the safe were gone. The total cash taken was P62k
and the jewelries were worth P5.3M.
The police looked for Mantung in his rented room in
Paranaque. Not finding him there, they went to
Novaliches on a tip. They finally caught him in Sultan
Kudarat, Cotabato. When they arrested him, some
jewelry from the store were recovered from him.
He was brought back to Paranaque, where Mayor
Joey Marquez held a press con. At the said conference,
when Mayor Marquez asked Mantung if he was the one
who killed the two pawnshop employees, he answered
in the affirmative and said that he killed them
because the victims had induced him to eat pork.
News reports about Mantung's admission to the killings
appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Manila
Bulletin the day following the press conference.
Clippings of these reports and pictures of the press
conference were presented as evidence by the
prosecution during trial.
Mantung was charged with robbery with homicide.
He was convicted and sentenced to death.
Mantung's defense
Three armed men robbed the bank, killed the
ladies with his gun, and brought him with them. He was
able to escape when they all stepped out of the
getaway car to smoke some cigarettes near the pier.
Seeing his opportunity, he boarded the ship bound for
Cebu. From there, he went home to Cotabato. (Obvious
bang hindi pinaniwalaan ng court?!)*
A2010
ISSUE
WON Mantung's admission during the press con can be
used to support his conviction.
RULING
YES.
Mantung's admission during the press
conference that he killed the victims because the
latter made him eat pork is competent evidence that
lends support to his conviction. Although the
clippings of the news articles reporting Mantung's
confession are indeed hearsay evidence as the writers
of the same were not presented to affirm the veracity
of the reports, the prosecution nevertheless presented
Ricardo who was at the press conference, as rebuttal
witness to prove that Mantung indeed claimed
responsibility for the killings. Since Ricardo's testimony
was based on his own personal knowledge about the
proceedings during the press conference, his
affirmation of Mantung's incriminating statements is
admissible as evidence against the latter. Worth
reiterating is the rule that the declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may
be given in evidence against him and any person,
otherwise competent to testify as a witness who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard.
The SC upheld the trial court's rejection of the
objection of defense to admit Mantung's extrajudicial
statements as evidence. The Constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by
the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
Never was it raised during the trial that Mantung's
admission during the press conference was coerced or
made under duress. As the records show, accused-
appellant voluntarily made the statements in response
to Mayor Marquez' question as to whether he killed the
pawnshop employees. Mantung answered in the
affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he
54
 Prof. V. A. Avena
killed the victims because they made him eat pork.
These circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung felt
compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he could
have chosen to remain silent or to do deny altogether
any participation in the robbery and killings but he did
not; thus, accused-appellant sealed his own fate. As
held in People vs. Montiero, a confession constitutes
evidence of high order since it is supported by
the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess
to a crime unless prompted by truth and his
conscience.
Rule 133.3 of the RoC prescribes that an
extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not
be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated
by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti has been
defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in
its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has
actually been committed. As applied to a particular
offense, it means the actual commission by someone of
the particular crime charged. In this case, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was
convincingly established by the prosecution. First, it
was proven that a robbery with homicide was
committed at the Maywood Branch of the Cebuana
Lhuiller Pawnshop on August 10, 1996. Second, the
concatenation of circumstantial evidence, coupled with
the extrajudicial confession of the accused established
beyond reasonable doubt that Mantung committed the
crime.
*His failure to identify, much less describe the alleged
malefactors who committed the crime, his
disappearance after the incident and failure to report
the crime, the recovery of part of the loot from his
possession at the time of his arrest, and his
extrajudicial confession during the press conference
clearly establish Mantung's guilt.
LADIANA v. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 144293.
December 4, 2002; PANGANIBAN, J
(Chrislao)
Facts:
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the
defense substantially relied upon the Sandiganbayan's
narration of the facts as follows:
"The prosecution presented 5 witnesses but I figured
that 2 of the testimonies are already sufficient. Their
respective testimonies, in essence, are as follows:
"1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter,
'Caridad') declared that she is the wife of Francisco San
Evidence
Juan (hereinafter 'Francisco'), the victim in the case at
bar. Caridad testified that Francisco was the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, until he
was shot and killed by accused Ladiana, who happens
to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
"Caridad recounted that she was in her house when an
unidentified woman came and told her that her
husband was killed by accused Ladiana. When she
reached the scene, many people were milling around,
and Caridad saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying in
the middle of the road and being examined by [SPO2]
Percival A. Gabinete.
"Caridad maintained that she was aware that her
husband was killed by accused Ladiana because this
was what the woman actually told her. Moreover,
accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police
authorities.
"5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter,
'Cortez') declared that he is a retired Assistant
Prosecutor of Laguna.
"Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief
on Cortez, the defense counsel made an
admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-
affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said
counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly
admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco.
However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in
self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly
attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact,
already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of
accused Ladiana.
-After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed
its formal offer of evidence and rested its case. The
Court issued a resolution admitting all the documentary
evidence submitted by the prosecution.
-Accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
File Demurrer to Evidence claiming, among others, that
the prosecution was allegedly merely able to prove the
fact of death of the victim, but not the identity of the
person who caused said death. Court denied demurrer
to evidence. Court thereafter received by mail the
Memorandum for the defense. As for the prosecution, it
opted not to file any.
-The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had
been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his
Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having
A2010
fired the fatal shots that caused the victim's death, may
be used as evidence against him. It underscored the
admission made by the defense as to the authorship,
the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution
of the Counter-Affidavit.
-Hence, this Petition.
RELEVANT ISSUE: (1) WON the Counter-Affidavit
Ladiana executed during the PI of this case is
admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime
RULING:
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
-It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities
required by the fundamental law of the land apply only
to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained
during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights
enumerated in the constitutional provision "exist only in
custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of
accused persons."
-In the present case, petitioner admits that the
questioned statements were made during the
preliminary investigation, not during the custodial
investigation. However, he argues that the right to
competent and independent counsel also applies during
preliminary investigations.
-SC disagrees. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry
or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. In
fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a
defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is
not under custodial interrogation.
-SC, however, DISAGREES with the Sandiganbayan's
characterization of petitioner's Counter-Affidavit as an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission.
Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. — The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.
"SEC. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein,
may be given in evidence against him."
-In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in
an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not
directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the
55
 Prof. V. A. Avena
criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is
charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the
accused admitting the commission of the act charged
against him but denying that it was done with criminal
intent is an admission, not a confession.
-Petitioner admits shooting the victim in his Counter-
Affidavit — which eventually led to the latter's death —
but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In
fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless,
whether categorized as a confession or as an
admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
-SC does not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-
Affidavit. In general, admissions may be rebutted by
confessing their untruth or by showing they were made
by mistake. Petitioner left the admissions unrebutted.
In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case
at bar, are evidence of great weight against the
declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a
mistake.
PEOPLE V ALING
AQUINO; MARCH 12, 1980
(jaja)
FACTS
Aling declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration
was translated into English) that he killed his wife
(whom he married according to Muslim rites because e
he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife
was living with another man and fooling around with
other men. He recounted the killing in this manner to
the police:
At or about one o'clock in the afternoon of
January 28, 1972, I was at the seashore of
Calarian relaxing since I have just arrived from
Jolo, Sulu that particular day. At that time, I
was already running away from the authorities
because I am an escapee from San Ramon
Prison and Penal Farm. Later on, I proceeded
to my father's house which is just near the
seashore, Upon reaching the house, I saw Nori
Mohamad but I had no time to talk to her
because immediately after seeing me, Nori ran
away, going to the direction of the street.
Evidence
Armed with the bolo which I had been carrying
with me, I chased after Nori and I catch up
with her at the street where I started stabbing
her with the bolo, hitting her on the different
parts of the body. When I saw Nori fell down
on the street badly wounded, I hurriedly left
the place and ran towards the far end of
Calarian. (Exh. 2).
Two policemen in their affidavit of March 24, 1972,
affirmed that Airol admitted to Sergeant Antonio
Macrohon in their presence that he stabbed his wife
because she had been going with many men (Exh. 1).
On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with
parricide in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City. It was alleged in the information that Airol was a
convict serving sentence at the penal colony for
robbery with frustrated homicide.
The case was first called for arraignment on March 15,
1974. The accused signified his willingness to plead
guilty although he had no lawyer. A counsel de oficio
was appointed for him. The trial court granted counsel's
motion to transfer the arraignment to March 18.
On that date, by agreement of the parties, the
arraignment was transferred to March 29, then to April
5, and later to April 30, 1974. On that last date, the
information was translated into the Tausug dialect
which is spoken by the accused. With the assistance of
his counsel, he pleaded guilty.
Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and
examined by his counsel. He admitted that he killed his
wife. He declared that after he was informed by his
counsel that the penalty for parricide is death or life
imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the killing of
his wife because that was the truth.
In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said
that he understood that by pleading guilty he could be
sentenced to death or reclusion perpetua because he
was an escaped convict.
He described the confrontation with his wife. When he
arrived at his home, his wife ran and he pursued her.
He overtook her, stabbed her but she was able to parry
the blow, and when -she fell on the ground, he
repeatedly stabbed her in the abdomen.
A2010
He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into
entering a plea of guilty. He admitted that he was a
prisoner in the penal colony. He was a Muslim
belonging to the Samal tribe of Siasi Sulu. He killed his
wife because while he was in prison, she did not visit
him and she neglected their four children.
He agreed that his father-in-law could have the custody
of his children. He was able to leave the penal colony
because he was a "living-out-prisoner". When he went
to his house on January 28, 1972, his purpose was to be
reconciled with his wife but when she saw him, instead
of waiting for him, she ran away. He had information
that his wife was guilty of infidelity or had a "kabit".
That was a grievous offense under Muslim customs.
He Identified his signature in his confession which was
sworn to before the clerk of court (Exh. B or 2).
The trial court sentenced Airol Aling to death and to
pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs
of Norija Mohamad. It noted that he pleaded guilty with
full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his
plea. The case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review of the death penalty.
ISSUE
WON the accused did not understand fully he nature
and effect of Ms plea of guilty
HELD
NO. The trial judge, a Muslim, took paIns to follow the
rule that in case a plea of guilty is entered in a capital
case, evidence should be received in order to leave no
room for reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of
the meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty
(People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
In this case, the arraignment was postponed three
times in order to enable his counsel to confer with him
and explain to him the consequences of his plea of
guilty. The accused testified. His confession and the
affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were
presented in evidence.
Disposition Judgment affirmed with the modification
that, for lack of one vote, the accused is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua
56
 Prof. V. A. Avena
PEOPLE v. LUCILA VALERO y VARILLA
G.R. No. L-45283-84
ERICTA; March 19, 1982
(edel)
NATURE: Automatic Review
FACTS:
-In the morning of February 22, 1969 between 7 and 9
o'clock of Saturday, Michael, aged 9 months, and
Annabel, aged 1 year and 9 months, both of whom are
the children of Ceferino Velasco, died of poisoning after
eating bread containing endrin, a commercial
insecticide. Likewise, Imelda, another minor child of
Ceferino, tasted the poisoned bread and would have
died as a consequence were it not for the timely
medical assistance given her. All these three minor
children were in the balcony of their house at San
Rafael, Bulacan, when they partook of the poisoned
bread.
- On the same morning at about the same time that the
three minor children partook of the poisoned bread,
three (3) puppies of Ceferino Velasco under the balcony
also died of poisoning.
Earlier that same morning at about 6:00 o'clock,
Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, was seen
throwing poisoned rats into a river near his house.
Investigations were conducted by Cpl. Bucot and Pat.
Arturo Ventuso both of the Police Department of San
Rafael, Bulacan. Upon their arrival, they saw the dead
bodies of Michael and Annabel in the house of Ceferino
Velasco and the dead puppies under the balcony. They
also saw several pieces of sliced pan scattered in the
sala of the house, near the balcony, and under the
balcony. They picked up some pieces of sliced bread
under the balcony, wrapped them in a piece of paper
and submitted them to a chemist for examination. It
was found that the bread contained endrin, a poisonous
insecticide.
- The two minor children, Michael and Annabel, were
also autopsied and the necropsy reports showed that
both children died of poisoning by endrin. Samples of
the blood and internal organs of both Michael and
Annabel were also examined by a chemist and it was
found that they contained endrin.
Evidence
-The evidence of the prosecution and the defense
conflict as to the source of the poisoned bread. The
evidence of the prosecution shows that the poisoned
bread was given to the children by Alfonso Valero alias
Pipe, a deaf-mute brother of the defendant Lucila
Valero, and that it was Lucila Valero who gave the
bread to Pipe for delivery to the minor children. On the
other hand, the defendant Lucila Valero denies that she
ever gave bread to her deaf-mute brother, Pipe, for
delivery to the minor children. The evidence for the
defense tends to show that the Velasco children might
have eaten one of the sliced poisoned bread used by
their father in poisoning rats in his garden.
- It is not denied that Ceferino Velasco has a vegetable
garden in his yard. He uses an insecticide called Polidol
to spray the vegetable and uses the same insecticide to
kill rats. According to the testimony of the defendant,
which was never rebutted by Ceferino Velasco, Ceferino
also planted vegetables in the yard of the defendant
whose house is just across the street from the house of
Ceferino Velasco. She further testified that Ceferino
dipped sliced bread into an insecticide called endrin,
dried them up and later used the poisoned bread as a
bait to kill rats in the yard located by the side of his
house.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was able to establish
Valero’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: NO. The testimonies of the witnesses Jaime and
Velasco were said to be hearsay for they were called to
merely convey what Pipe told them through sign
language. Pipe was never presented as a witness. The
presentation of such evidence likewise violates the
principle of res inter alios acta. The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another.
REASONING:
-Rodolfo Quilang, Federico Jaime, and Ceferino Velasco
were presented to prove that the defendant Lucila
Valero gave the poisoned bread to her deaf-mute
brother Pipe with the alleged instruction to deliver the
bread to the Velasco children.
- There was nothing in the testimonies pointing to
Lucila Valero as the source of the poisoned bread.
- What is evident is nothing but confusion. What Jaime
asked from Pipe was "Who gave the bread to the
children?" The evidence of the prosecution already
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shows that Pipe gave the bread to the children. In
reply, it seems that Pipe pointed to the defendant who
was standing nearby.
- Pipe could not have said that his sister handed over
the poisoned bread to the children because the
evidence of the prosecution shows that Pipe himself,
gave the bread to the children. It is clear that Pipe did
not understand the sign language of Jaime and vice-
versa.
- The Court examined the entire transcript of the
stenographic notes, and, except for the testimony of
Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, there is nothing in
the record showing that Pipe communicated to the
prosecution witnesses by comprehensible sign
language that his sister was the source of the poisoned
bread.
ON ADMISSIONS and CONFESSIONS:
- With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino
Velasco, its admission cannot be justified by claiming
that it is a part of the res gestae. When Pipe allegedly
revealed to Ceferino Velasco that the source of the
poisoned bread was the defendant, the children had
not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was yet poisoned. Stated
otherwise, there was no startling Occurrence yet.
- With reference to the testimony of Jaime, there is no
showing that Pipe made the extrajudicial revelation
spontaneously when he was still under the influence of
a startling occurrence. Pipe made his extrajudicial
revelation not spontaneously but after an interview
through the complicated process of sign language.
- The failure of the defense counsel to object to the
presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the
same does not give such evidence any probative value.
The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no
probative value.
-To give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime
and Ceferino Velasco, whether considered as hearsay
evidence or as part of res gestae and make the same
the basis for the imposition of the death penalty
gravely violates the constitutional right of the
defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to
subject Pipe to the rigid test of cross-examination, the
only effective means to test the truthfulness, memory,
intelligence, and in this particular case, the ability of
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
the deaf-mute, Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, to
communicate with the outside world. In conflict
between a provision of the constitution giving the
defendant a substantive right and mere technical rules
of evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to the
constitution.
-The cross-examination of Pipe, the source of the vital
information for the prosecution, would have shown
clearly his incompetence as a witness. During the
preliminary investigation in the Municipal Court,
experts on deaf-mutes examined Alfonsito Valero alias
Pipe and reported to the Municipal Court that
"questions addressed to him (Alfonso Valero) and
answers given by him cannot be accurately
interpreted".
-As a result of the testimonies and the report made by
the aforementioned experts, the Municipal Court
dismissed the murder and frustrated murder cases
against Alfonsito Valero, alias Pipe, who was then the
co-accused of Lucila Valero, "on the ground that he
(Pipe) is a deaf-mute and, therefore, all the proceedings
against him were beyond his comprehension".
- Even prosecution witnesses Ceferino Velasco and
Federico Jaime admitted on cross-examination that
their interpretations of the sign language of Pipe were
only guess work.
- Also, neither did Ceferino Valero confront Lucila Valero
upon allegedly learning that the latter poisoned his
children.
- When further repeatedly asked by the defense
counsel why Ceferino did not state in his affidavit that
he learned that Lucila was the source of the poisoned
bread, he gave irresponsive and evasive answers.
- When a witness makes two sworn statements and
these two statements incur in the gravest
contradictions, the Court cannot accept either
statements as proof.
A witness who changes his name and statements, like a
Chameleon changes color, does not inspire confidence.
- SC: Obviously, Ceferino Velasco is a lying witness. If
Ceferino Velasco really learned from Pipe that Lucila
Valero poisoned his three children, he might have
become violent. Surprisingly, he kept quiet. He did not
confront Lucila Valero. In fact, his first suspicion was
that his children were "nausog" (victim of witchcraft).
Other considerations which negate the guilt of
Valero:
Evidence
- There was no motive for Pipe and Lucila Valero to
poison the three children. Both Pipe and Lucila Valero
loved the children. Ceferino Velasco admitted that even
when Pipe was only a small boy, the latter frequented
his house to visit his children. When the children were
dying because of the poison, Pipe alternately fanned
Michael and Annabel.
- The prosecution even tried to show that there was a
quarrel bet. the wife of Ceferino and Valero when the
latter defended the children from their mother when
they were being scolded by the her. (See, she loves the
kids!) However, even Ceferino said that the matter was
just a trivial one (ergo not enough to justify killing the
kids. Besides, if based on that she intended to kill, she
would not have killed the kids as her quarrel was with
the mom.)
- Valero, in her testimony not rebutted by the
prosecution, Ceferino Velasco, who was her tenant,
dipped sliced pieces of bread in endrin dried them up
and used them as bait in his barn.
-Three puppies died of poisoning under the balcony.
The rats, the dogs, or maybe even his minor children
must have found the poisoned slices of bread
somewhere in the barn or in the house, scattered them,
and the children, not knowing the danger of the poison,
ate them.
-The thought that he might have poisoned his own
children must have caused Ceferino Velasco some kind
of trauma. So galling to a father is the thought that he,
himself, might have caused the death of his two
children and the near death of a third child, albeit
unintentionally, that his natural reaction is to escape
from it by throwing the blame to someone else not only
to appease his own conscience but also to avoid
embarrassment before his relatives, friends and
neighbors.
-Realizing that there is completely no motive for the
defendant to commit the heinous crime, the trial Judge
conjured up something as the probable cause that
might have impelled the defendant to commit the
crime. According to the observation of the Judge, Valero
was suffering from some kind of psychiatric
abnormality or mental disorder that can make her
violent. This procedure of the trial Judge practically
denies the accused the right to due process.
-The surprising finding of the Judge relates not only to
the credibility of a witness but to the sanity of the
defendant. Its aim is not only to weigh the testimony of
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the witness but to establish a motive for the crime
charged.
Disposition: Valero acquitted.
NAVALLO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
234 SCRA 175
VITUG; July 18, 1994
(chris c.)
FACTS
- Information charging petitioner for violating Art 217 of
RPC was filed. Warrant of arrest was issued, followed
by 2 alias warrants of arrest. Navallo couldn’t be
found.
- PD 1606 took effect, creating Sandiganbayan and
conferring on it orig & excl jurisdiction over crimes
committed by public officers.
- Navallo was arrested. He was released on provisional
liberty. He pleaded not guilty when arraigned by RTC.
- RTC transferred records to Sandiganbayan. Special
Prosecutor opined that since he had already been
arraigned, RTC shld continue.
- Ombudsman held otherwise.
- New order for his arrest was issued by
Sandiganbayan.
- He filed motion to quash contending (1) lack of
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over offense & person of
accused (2) double jeopardy
- Sandiganbayan issued resolution denying his motion.
- Navallo was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty.
- Evidence for prosec:
a. Provincial Auditor Espino made preliminary audit
exam and found Navallo to be short of P16K+.
b. Auditor then was merely able to prepare cash count
sheet since he still had to proceed to other
municipalities. Espino sealed the vault of Navallo.
c. Dulguime was directed by Espino to complete the
exam and conduct final audit. He broke the seal,
opened the vault, made a new cash account. He
examined the cashbook but didn’t examine the official
receipts reflected.
d. After the audit, he had cashbook deposited w/ same
ofc. He confirmed Navallo’s shortage, made a Report
of Examination, and wrote Navallo a letter demanding
restitution.
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
e. Navallo neither complied nor offered any
explanation. The receipts, cashbook, other records
were lost / damaged due to typhoon.
- Evidence for defense:
a. Navallo testified; his duties include collection of
tuition, preparation of vouchers for salaries, remittance
of collections.
b. Navallo & Macasemo both used the vault; there was
no formal turnover of accountability fr Macasemo to
Navallo.
c. Navallo said charge was motivated by personal
grudge on part of Espino.
d. When he was summoned, the safe used by him and
Macasemo was already open and the cash was placed
on top of a table. He didn’t see the actual counting of
money and no actual audit was made by Espino.
Navallo signed only because he was pressured by
Macasemo.
e. Navallo was in Manila when case was filed. He
didn’t exert effort to have Macasemo appear in PI,
relying on Macasemo’s assurance that he would settle
the matter.
− Sandiganbayan declared Navallo guilty.
− CA
ISSUE
1. WON there’s double jeopardy in this case
2. WON Navallo can invoke right under Sec 12, Art III of
Consti
3. WON Navallo should be held liable
HELD
1. NO.
- PD 1606 took effect 12/10/78. The law is clear: Case
under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan shall be
transferred to it so long as accused has not as yet been
properly arraigned elsewhere.
- Navallo’s arraignment before RTC on 7/18/85 is years
away fr 1978. The jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan had
become effective.
- There’s no double jeopardy bec RTC was devoid of
jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment.
Moreover, neither did the case there terminate w/
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
2. NO.
- Such rights are invocable only when accused is under
custodial investigation (questioning inititated by law
enforcement officers after person has been taken into
Evidence
custody or deprived of his freedom in any significant
way.)
- A person under normal audit is not under custodial
investigation.
3. YES
- In any case, his having been “pressured” to sign is
belied by his own testimony. Navallo may have been
persuaded, but not pressured to sign auditor’s report.
- The law he contravened creates a presumption of
evidence. Failure of public officer to have public funds /
prop w/ w/c he’s chargeable, upon demand by officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that has put missing
funds or prop to personal use.
Res Inter Alios Acta
BOSTON BANK (BANK OF COMMERCE) V MANALO
G.R. No. 158149
CALLEJO; February 9, 2006
(joey)
NATURE
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the
FACTS
- Xavierville Estate, Inc (vendor) and Overseas Bank of
Manila (vendee) executed a "Deed of Sale of Real
Estate" over some lots in Xavierville Estate Subdivision.
XEI continued selling the lots as agent of OBM.
- Manalo proposed to purchase two lots in the
Xavierville subdivision.
- In a letter, XEI Pres. Ramos confirmed the reservation
of Manalo’s lots. He pegged the price and scheduled
the giving of downpayment and signing of the Contract
of Conditional Sale on or before Dec. 31, 1972, but if
the selling operations of XEI resumed after that date,
the balance of the downpayment would fall due then,
and the spouses would sign the contract within 5 days
from receipt of the notice of resumption of selling
operations. In the meantime, the spouses may
introduce improvements subject to the rules and
regulations imposed by XEI in the subdivision.
- The spouses Manalo were notified of XEI’s resumption
of selling operations. However, they did not pay the
balance because Ramos failed to prepare a contract of
conditional sale and transmit the same to them.
- Subsequently, XEI twice furnished the spouses with a
statement of their account. In a letter, Manalo stated
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they had not yet received the notice of resumption of
XEI’s selling operations, and that there had been no
arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they
should not be charged with interest on the balance of
the downpayment on the property. Further, they
demanded that a deed of conditional sale over the two
lots be transmitted to them for their signatures.
- Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to
OBM. Register of Deeds issued the TCTs for Manalo’s
lots in favor of OBM.
- Commercial Bank of Manila acquired the Xavierville
Estate from OBM.
- CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it was the owner of
the lot. She informed them that her husband had a
contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the
property. She promised to send CBM the documents.
However, she failed to do so.
- CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the spouses.
- While the case was pending, the spouses Manalo
offered an amicable settlement, promising to abide by
the purchase price, per agreement with XEI, through
Ramos. CBM proposed a higher price, which the
spouses rejected. CBM moved to withdraw its
complaint.
- CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines.
After CBM filed its complaint against the spouses
Manalo, the latter filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before the
RTC.
- Plaintiffs again proposed an amicable settlement
based on the current market value of the lots. The
defendant still insisted on a higher price.
- During the trial, the plaintiffs adduced in evidence the
separate Contracts of Conditional Sale executed
between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI
continued selling residential lots in the subdivision as
agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots.
- Defendant presented in evidence the letters where
XEI proposed to sell the two lots subject to two
suspensive conditions: the payment of the balance of
the downpayment of the property, and the execution of
the corresponding contract of conditional sale.
- RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
- CA affirmed RTC. Boston Bank filed a MR, which the
CA denied.
ISSUES
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
1. WON the factual issues raised by the petitioner are
proper
2. WON there was a perfected contract to sell the
property
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed
on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on the SC unless
the case falls under any of the following exceptions: (1)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of
the CA are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
- The Court may consider an issue not raised during the
trial when there is plain error. Such issue may still be
considered and resolved by the Court in the interest of
substantial justice, if it finds that to do so is necessary
to arrive at a just decision, or when an issue is closely
related to an issue raised in the trial court and the CA
and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of
the case. When the trial court decides a case in favor of
a party on certain grounds, the Court may base its
decision upon some other points, which the trial court
or appellate court ignored or erroneously decided in
favor of a party.
Reasoning
- CA ruling is contrary to law and is not supported by
evidence. A careful examination of the factual
backdrop, as well as the antecedental proceedings
constrains us to hold that petitioner is not barred from
asserting that XEI or OBM, on one hand, and the
respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected
contract to sell the subject lots.
2. NO
Evidence
Ratio In a contract to sell property by installments, it is
not enough that the parties agree on the price as well
as the amount of downpayment. The parties must,
likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the
balance of the purchase price and on the other terms
and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer
makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such
payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the
perfection of any purchase and sale between the
parties.
Reasoning
- A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is
a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and the price. The agreement as
to the manner of payment goes into the price, such
that a disagreement on the manner of payment is
tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
- There is no showing, in the records, of the schedule of
payment of the balance of the purchase price on the
property amounting to P278,448.00.
Based on Ramos’ February 8, 1972 and August 22,
1972 letters to respondents, the determination of the
terms of payment of the P278,448.00 had yet to be
agreed upon on or before December 31, 1972, or even
afterwards, when the parties sign the contract of
conditional sale.
- So long as an essential element entering into the
proposed obligation of either of the parties remains to
be determined by an agreement which they are to
make, the contract is incomplete and unenforceable.
- There is no factual and legal basis for the CA ruling
that, based on the terms of payment of the balance of
the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and the other lot
buyers, respondents were obliged to pay the balance
with pre-computed interest of 12% p.a. in 120-month
installments. Courts should not undertake to make a
contract for the parties, nor can it enforce one, the
terms of which are in doubt.
- The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to
pay the balance of the purchase price of lots purchased
by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not
constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the
respondents the same mode and timeline of payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that he did the same or
similar thing at another time, although such evidence
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may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of
conduct or the intent of the parties.
- Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be
proved like any other facts. The offering party must
establish the degree of specificity and frequency of
uniform response that ensures more than a mere
tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct
that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party
must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that
might constitute evidence of habit. The examples
offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of
evidence must be numerous enough to base on
inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently
similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of
prejudice and confusion.
- In determining whether the examples are numerous
enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are
adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. It is
only when examples offered to establish pattern of
conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an
inference of systematic conduct that examples are
admissible.
- Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as a
matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct,
XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance
of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of
fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that
XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such
terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in
question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the
three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and
other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to
sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it
acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern
of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in
the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase
price of said lots in 120 months. It further failed to
prove that the trial court admitted the said deeds as
part of the testimony of respondent Manalo.
- Under Article 1469 of the New Civil Code, the price of
the property sold may be considered certain if it be so
with reference to another thing certain. It is sufficient if
it can be determined by the stipulations of the contract
made by the parties thereto or by reference to an
agreement incorporated in the contract of sale or
contract to sell or if it is capable of being ascertained
with certainty in said contract; or if the contract
contains express or implied provisions by which it may
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 Prof. V. A. Avena A2010
Evidence

be rendered certain; or if it provides some method or

criterion by which it can be definitely ascertained. Such
is not the case here.
Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. CA Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC is ordered to dismiss
the complaint.

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