Prof. V. A.
Avena
Entries in the Course of Business
MANALO V. ROBLES
G.R. No. L-8171;
August 16, 1956; Montemayor
(Chrislao)
FACTS:
-On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by
defendant Robles Transportation Company, Inc. (the
Company) and driven by Hernandez its driver, collided
with a passenger truck. In the course of and a result of
the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an
eleven year old, causing him physical injuries which
resulted in his death several days later.
-Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through
reckless imprudence and after trial was found guilty. He
served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity.
2 writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy
the amount but both writs were returned unsatisfied by
the sheriff.
-On February 17, 1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his
wife Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of
Armando filed the present action against the Company
to enforce its subsidiary liability, pursuant to Articles
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
-It also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint unless
and until the convicted driver Hernandez was included
as a party defendant, the Company considering him an
indispensable party. The TC and CA both correctly ruled
that Hernandez was not an indispensable party
defendant. The Company is now before SC.
-To prove their case against the defendant Company,
the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the
criminal case convicting Hernandez of homicide
through reckless imprudence, the writs of execution to
enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the
sheriff showing that the two writs of execution
were not satisfied because of the insolvency of
Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any
property in his name. Over the objections of the
Company, the trial court admitted this evidence
and based its decision in the present case on the
same.
-The Company contends that this kind of evidence is
inadmissible. The Company also claims that in
admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the writs of
execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez,
Evidence
without requiring said opportunity to cross-examine
said sheriff.
ISSUE:
WON the Company is correct.
HELD:
NO. The Company is mistaken. A sheriff's return is
an official statement made by a public official in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
the law and forming part of official records, and
is prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123,
section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff's making the
return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in
his entry. In the case of Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil.,
151 citing Wigmore on Evidence, this court said:
To the foregoing rules with reference to the
method of proving private documents an
exception is made with reference to the
method of proving public documents executed
before and certified to, under the land of seal
of certain public officials. The courts and the
legislature have recognized the valid reason
for such an exception. The litigation is
unlimited in which testimony by officials is
daily needed, the occasion in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary
duties to declare as a witness are numberless.
The public officers are few in whose daily work
something is not done in which testimony is
not needed from official statements, host of
official would be found devoting the greater
part of their time to attending as witness in
court or delivering their depositions before an
officer. The work of Administration of
government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike
suffer in consequence.
And this Court added:
The law reposes a particular confidence in
public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trust with accuracy
and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they
do in discharge of their public duty may be
given in evidence and shall be taken of their
public duty may be given in evidence and
shall be taken to be true under such a degree
A2010
of caution as the nature and circumstances of
each a case may appear to require.
CANQUE V CA (SOCOR CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION)
MENDOZA; APRIL 13, 1999
(jaja)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Canque is a contractor doing business under the name
and style RDC Construction. At the time material to
this case, she had contracts with the government for
(a) the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the
asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the
asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City. In
connection with these projects, petitioner entered into
two contracts with private respondent Socor
Construction Corporation. The first contract (Exh. A),
dated April 26, 1985, provided:
The Sub-Contractor (SOCOR Corporation) and the
Contractor (RDC Construction) for the consideration
hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
a. The Sub-Contractor agrees to perform
and execute the Supply, Lay and
Compact Item 310 and Item 302;
b. That Contractor shall provide the labor
and materials needed to complete the
project;
c. That the Contractor agrees to pay the
Sub-Contractor the price of One
Thousand Pesos only (P1,000.00) per
Metric Ton of Item 310 and Eight
Thousand Only (P8,000.00) per Metric
Ton of Item 302.
d. That the Contractor shall pay the Sub-
Contractor the volume of the supplied
Item based on the actual weight in
Metric Tons delivered, laid and
compacted and accepted by the
MPWH;
e. The construction will commence upon
the acceptance of the offer.
The second contract (Exh. B), dated July 23, 1985,
stated:
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
The Supplier (SOCOR Construction) and the Contractor
(RDC Construction) for the consideration hereinafter
named, hereby agree as follows:
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
a. The Supplier agrees to perform and
execute the delivery of Item 310 and
Item 302 to the jobsite for the Asphalting
of DAS Access Road and the Front Gate
of ACMDC, Toledo City;
b. That the Contractor should inform or give
notice to the Supplier two (2) days before
the delivery of such items;
c. That the Contractor shall pay the Supplier
the volume of the supplied items on the
actual weight in metric tons delivered
and accepted by the MPWH fifteen (15)
days after the submission of the bill;
d. The delivery will commence upon the
acceptance of the offer.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a
bill (Exh. C), containing a revised computation, for
P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month,
representing the balance of petitioner’s total account of
P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services
rendered by private respondent under the two
contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the
amount, claiming that private respondent failed to
submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight
in metric tons of the items delivered and the
acceptance thereof by the government.
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent
brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to
recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus
interest at the rate of 3% a month.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the
contracts with private respondent as well as receipt of
the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986. However, she
disputed the correctness of the bill ¾
. . . considering that the deliveries of [private
respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by the
checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat it
delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water, and
[petitioner] has already paid [private respondent] about
P1,400,000.00 but [private respondent] has not issued
any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments and there
is no agreement that [private respondent] will charge
3% per month interest.
Evidence
Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying
she had entered into sub-contracts with private
respondent.
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff,
presented its vice-president, Sanchez, and Aday, its
bookkeeper. Petitioner’s evidence consisted of her lone
testimony. On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered
its decision ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at
12% per annum, and costs. It held:
. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiff’s Book of
Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh.
“K”) this Court is convinced that the entries (both
payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible.
Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of
SOCOR’s commercial transactions with RDC which were
entered therein in the course of business. We cannot
therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit
“K” because the fact of their having been made in the
course of business carries with it some degree of
trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever offered to
demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus,
there is then no cogent reason for us to doubt their
authenticity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the
trial court’s reliance on private respondent’s Book of
Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130,
§37of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES
1. WON the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts
(Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such
delivery
2. WON there is no competent evidence of private
respondent’s claim
HELD
NO. Considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not
itself constitute evidence. As explained in Borromeo v.
Court of Appeals:
Under the above provision (Rule 132, §10), the
memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be
admitted as such, for the simple reason that the
witness has just the same to testify on the basis of
refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness
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has testified independently of or after his testimony has
been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness
may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible
just because he supports his open-court declaration
with written statements of the same facts even if he did
prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the
proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid
down. What is more, even where this requirement has
been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is
that such evidence must be received with caution, if
only because it is not very difficult to conceive and
fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true
when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise
from the admission of such evidence . . . .
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made
based on personal knowledge, they could only
corroborate Dolores Aday’s testimony that she made
the entries as she received the bills.
2. NO. The entries recorded under Exhibit “K” were
supported by Exhibits “L”, “M”, “N”, “O” which are all
Socor Billings under the account of RDC Construction.
These billings were presented and duly received by the
authorized representatives of defendant. The
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show
that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC
never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the
aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did
defendant immediately protest to plaintiff’s alleged
incomplete or irregular performance. In view of these
facts, we believe Art. 1235 of the New Civil Code is
applicable.
Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the
performance, knowing its incompleteness and
irregularity and without expressing any protest or
objection, the obligation is deemed complied with.
After a conscientious scrutiny of the records, we find
Exhibit “D-1” (p. 85 record) to be a material proof of
plaintiff’s complete fulfillment of its obligation. There is
no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction
with Item 302 (Bitunimous Prime Coat), Item 303
(Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310 (Bitunimous
Concrete Surface Course) in all the three projects of the
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
latter. The Lutopan Access Road project, the Toledo
wharf project and the Babag-Lapulapu Road project.
On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by
defendant to show the presence of other contractors in
those projects. We can therefore conclude that it was
Socor Construction Corp. ALONE who supplied RDC
with Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous Tack Coat and
Bituminous Concrete Surface Course for all the
aforenamed three projects. Indeed, while petitioner had
previously paid private respondent about
P1,400,000.00 for deliveries made in the past, she did
not show that she made such payments only after the
delivery receipts had been presented by private
respondent. On the other hand, it appears that
petitioner was able to collect the full amount of project
costs from the government, so that petitioner would be
unjustly enriched at the expense of private respondent
if she is not made to pay what is her just obligation
under the contracts.
Disposition Decision affirmed
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR v. CITIBANK, N.A.,
(Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; March 28, 2007
(edel)
NATURE: CERTIORARI
Facts:
-Aznar, a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a
Preferred Mastercard issued by Citibank with a credit
limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren, on an Asian
tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of
P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of
increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.
-With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane
tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth
P237,000.00.
-During the trip, Aznar claims that when he presented
his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored.
-And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and
Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase
plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the
Evidence
reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such
dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash.
-Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank,
claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross
negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him,
his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour
destinations and prevented them from buying certain
items in their tour.
-He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful
blacklisting of his card
-To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard,
Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as
ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh.
"G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi
which shows that his card in question was "DECL
OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.
-Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted
Aznar’s card. To prove that they did not blacklist
Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head,
Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation
Bulletins, which contained the list of its canceled cards
covering the period of Aznar’s trip. Aznar’s wasn’t in
the list.
-RTC of Cebu dismissed Aznar’s complaint for lack of
merit and held that as between the computer print-out
presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more
weight as their due execution and authenticity were
duly established by Citibank.Also held that even if it
was shown that Aznar’s credit card was dishonored by
a merchant establishment, Citibank was not shown to
have acted with malice or bad faith when the same was
dishonored.
-Aznar filed a MFR with motion to re-raffle the case
saying that Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he
himself is a holder of a Citibank credit card. The case
was re-raffled with the new judge granting Aznar’s MR
saying that it was improbable that a man of Aznar’s
stature would fabricate the computer print-out which
shows that Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored for the
reason that it was declared over the limit; Exh. "G" was
printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of
business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi
was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country
and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial
notice of the practice of automated teller machines
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(ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out
bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima
facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard;
no rebutting evidence was presented by Citibank to
prove that Aznar’s Mastercard was not dishonored, as
all it proved was that said credit card was not included
in the blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted the
additional deposit of P485,000.00 from Aznar, there
was an implied novation and Citibank was obligated to
increase Aznar’s credit limit and ensure that Aznar will
not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use
of his Mastercard; Citibank’s failure to comply with its
obligation constitutes gross negligence as it caused
Aznar inconvenience, mental anguish and social
humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of the credit card
limiting the liability of the bank to P1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven, whichever is lower, is a contract
of adhesion which must be interpreted against Citibank.
-Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel
filed an administrative case against Judge De la Peña
for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence, claiming among others that said judge
rendered his decision without having read the
transcripts. The administrative case was held in
abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal filed by
Citibank with the CA.
-CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the
blacklisting of his card and only presumed the same
when it was dishonored in certain establishments; such
dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was
blacklisted by Citibank; Exh. "G" is an electronic
document ,which must be authenticated pursuant to
Sec. 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence or
under Sect.20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by
anyone who saw the document executed or written;
Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh.
"G", thus it must be excluded; the unrefuted testimony
of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan
Agency and certain establishments abroad is not
sufficient to justify the award of damages in his favor,
absent any showing that Citibank had anything to do
with the said dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control
over the actions of its merchant affiliates, thus it should
not be held liable for the dishonor of Aznar’s credit card
by said establishments.
-Aznar’s MR was denied by the CA.
-As regards the admin case, J. Dela Pena was adjudged
guilty.
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
Issue: WON Aznar has established his claim against
Citibank. If so, WON Citibank is liable for damages.
HELD: NO to both.
On his claim:
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests
on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a
preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a
fact also has the burden of proving it.
-Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of
evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or
placed the same on the "hot list.
-Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no
personal knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted
by Citibank and only presumed such fact from the
dishonor of his card.
-The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to
support a conclusion that said credit card was
blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar’s
own admission that in other merchant establishments
in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was
accepted and honored.
-Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT,
a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan
Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his
Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted.
-But such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as
its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by Aznar as per Sec 20 of Rule 132 of the
RoC. It provides that whenever any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a)
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
-Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did
not actually see the document executed or written,
neither was he able to provide evidence on the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi,
who handed to him said computer print-out.
-Even under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of
Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. � The
person seeking to introduce an electronic
Evidence
document in any legal proceeding has the burden
of proving its authenticity in the manner provided
in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. � Before any
private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be
proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by
the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security
procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
-Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued
by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in
passing how he was able to secure the print-out from
the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific
business address of the source of the computer print-
out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was
mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not
reflected in the print-out.
-Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the
information reflected on the print-out was generated
and how the said information could be relied upon as
true.
-Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, which pertains to entries in the course of
business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. �
Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions
are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead,
or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries;
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4. the entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
- Also, It is not clear it was Nubi who encoded the
information stated in the print-out and was the one who
printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed
by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was
Mario who printed the same and only handed the print-
out to Nubi.
-The identity of the entrant, required by the provision
above mentioned, was therefore not established.
Neither did petitioner establish in what professional
capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether
the entries were made in the performance of their duty
in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
-And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only
shows that the use of the credit card of petitioner was
denied because it was already over the limit. There is
no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that
there was gross negligence on the part of Citibank in
declaring that the credit card has been used over the
limit.
-The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) which
covered the period when plaintiff traveled in the
aforementioned Asian countries showed that said
Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed
in a “hot list” or the same was blacklisted, let alone the
fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled
by the defendant bank were all contained, reported and
listed in said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were
issued and released on a regular basis.
-Citibank produced 300 documents to show that Aznar
was not among those found in said bulletins as having
been cancelled for the period for which the said
bulletins had been issued.
-Between said computer print out (exh.G) and the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins the latter
documents adduced by defendant are entitled to
greater weight than that said computer print out
presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of
whether the plaintiff’s preferred master card was
actually placed in the “hot list” or blacklisted for
the following reasons:
1) the due execution and authentication of these
Warning Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly
established and identified by Citibank’s witness, Dennis
Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is the head of its
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
credit card department, and, TF, competent to testify
on the said bulletins as having been issued by the
defendant bank showing that plaintiff’s preferred
master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in
the Bank’s “hot list”. While Aznar’s computer print out
was never authenticated or its due execution had never
been duly established. Thus, between a set of duly
authenticated commercial documents, the Warning
Cancellation Bulletins presented by defendants (sic)
and an unauthenticated private document, plaintiff’s
computer print out (Exh. G), the former deserves
greater evidentiary weight supporting the findings of
this Court that plaintiff’ s preferred master card had
never been blacklisted at all or placed in a so-called
“hot list” by defendant.
2) On implied novation (when he added addt’l funds to
increase credit limit): the Court finds that petitioner's
argument on this point has no leg to stand on.
On damages:
-the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and
conditions of Citibank’s Mastercard constitute a
contract of adhesion. It is settled that contracts
between cardholders and the credit card companies are
contracts of adhesion, so-called, because their terms
are prepared by only one party while the other merely
affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.
-On Par 7 of said contract: While it is true that Citibank
may have no control of all the actions of its merchant
affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is
incorrect, however, to give it blanket freedom from
liability if its card is dishonored by any merchant
affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the
statement vague and as the said terms and conditions
constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its
provisions must be construed against the party who
prepared the contract,Citibank.
On limiting its liability to P1k or the actual damage
proven, whichever is lesser: such stipulation cannot be
considered as valid for being unconscionable as it
precludes payment of a larger amount even though
damage may be clearly proven.
-The invalidity of the terms and conditions being
invoked by Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court
still cannot award damages in favor of petitioner.
-The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach
Evidence
before damages may be awarded and the breach of
such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
-the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed
to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank
breached any obligation that would make it answerable
for said suffering.
BPI v. CA: xxx… there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury to
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
Disposition: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
LLEMOS V. LLEMOS
513 SCRA 128
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 26, 2007
(chriscaps)
FACTS
- Complaint was filed by respondents, the compulsory
heirs of Saturnina Salvatin, seeking to declare the
nullity of TCT of petitioners on ground that their
predecessor-in-interest, Felipe Llemos, acquired the
prop thru forged deed of sale.
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, then the defendants.
It held that though respondent Eusebia testified that
Saturnina was her grandma and that she died in 1938,
Eusebia didn’t testify on the fact of death fr personal
knowledge; the cause of action heavily rests on
Certificate of Death only and no other evidence.
- RTC: The Certificate of Death is a pvt doc and must
be authenticated. The respondents failed to
authenticate the same.
- CA reversed. It held that entries in Registry Book of
St. John Metropolitan Cathedral may be considered
entries made in the course of business, an exception to
the hearsay rule. It held that the Deed of Absolute Sale
purportedly executed in 1964 is invalid, as there
couldn’t be a meeting of the minds between a dead
person and a living one. It held that Saturnina died in
1938.
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ISSUE/S
1. WON prescription / laches has set in
2. WON the church registries are covered by the
hearsay rule
HELD
1. NO.
- An action for annulment of title / reconveyance based
on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in
possession of the prop subject of the acts.
- Laches can’t be used to defeat justice or perpetuate
fraud. Neither should it be used to prevent rightful
owners of prop fr recovering what was fraudulently
registered in another’s name.
2. YES.
- Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths
subsequent to General Orders No. 68 and Act No. 190
are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials. They are private writings.
Their authenticity must be proved.
- Respondents failed to establish due execution and
authenticity of Certificate of Death.
- CA erred in considering the entry as an entry in the
course of official business.
- Respondents failed to submit Register of Dead of St.
John Metropolitan and failed to comply w/ Sec 5 Rule
130
- Register of Dead is in custody of the cathedral but
respondents failed to show that it presented the
Certificate of Death bec Register of Dead can’t be
produced in court.
- Moreover, Court notes the absence of evidence
showing that “Salvatin Salvatin” mentioned in the Cert
of Death is the “Saturnina Salvatin” who is their
predecessor-in-interest.
- On the other hand, petitioners presented the Deed of
Absolute Sale, a notarized doc. A notarized doc is
executed to lend truth to statements contained therein
and to authenticity of signatures. They enjoy
presumption of regularity.
- Respondents failed to establish date of death of
Saturnina, w/c could have proven that the thumbmark
in the Deed of Absolute Sale was fraudulently affixed.
NESTLE V FY SONS INC.
G.R. No. 150780
CORONA; May 5, 2006
96
 Prof. V. A. Avena
(joey)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS
- Petitioner and respondent entered into a
distributorship agreement whereby petitioner would
supply its products for respondent to distribute to its
food service outlets. A deed of assignment was
executed by respondent, assigning to petitioner the
time deposit of Laureano in the amount of P500,000 to
secure respondent’s credit purchases. An SPA was
likewise executed by Laureano authorizing the
respondent to use the time deposit as collateral.
- Petitioner fined respondent P20,000 for selling 50
cases of Krem-Top liquid coffee creamer to Lu Hing
Market, a retail outlet in Tarlac. Respondent paid the
fine. Later, Krem-Top liquid coffee creamer was sold to
Augustus Bakery and Grocery. Petitioner again
imposed a P40,000 fine which respondent refused to
pay. The selling was allegedly done in violation of the
agreement.
- Respondent wrote petitioner to complain about the
latter’s breaches of their agreement and the various
acts of bad faith committed by petitioner against
respondent. Respondent demanded the payment of
damages. In turn, petitioner sent respondent a demand
letter and notice of termination, alleging that the latter
had outstanding accounts of P995,319.81. When the
alleged accounts were not settled, petitioner applied
the P500,000 time deposit as partial payment.
- Respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner, alleging bad faith. According to respondent,
petitioner made representations and promises of
rendering support, including marketing support,
assignment of representatives by way of assistance in
its development efforts, and assurances of income in a
marketing area not previously developed. Thus,
respondent was lured into executing a distributorship
agreement with the petitioner. However, not only did
petitioner fail to give promotional support, it also
deliberately failed to promptly supply the respondent
with the stocks for its orders; supported a non-
distributor; and concocted falsified charges to cause
the termination of the distributorship agreement
without just cause.
- RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA affirmed
Evidence
ISSUES
1. WON “the ratiocinations of the appellant as to the
appellee’s alleged violation of the contract were weak
and unconvincing” and “the appellee’s alleged non-
payment and outstanding balance was not sufficiently
proven”
2. WON the testimony of the witness, who prepared the
statement of account should have been disregarded for
being incompetent evidence
3. WON the award of actual damages and the refund of
the time deposit were justified
4. WON petitioner should be awarded its counterclaim
HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner asserts that Florentino Yue, Jr., a director
and officer of respondent corporation, admitted in open
court that the respondent had an unpaid obligation to
petitioner in the amount of “around P900,000.”
- Respondent counters that this statement was merely
in answer to the question of the presiding judge on
what ground petitioner supposedly terminated the
agreement. The witness was not being asked, nor was
he addressing, the truth of such ground.
- Petitioner quoted Mr. Yue’s statement in isolation from
the rest of his testimony and took it out of context.
Obviously, Yue’s statement cannot be considered a
judicial admission.
2. YES
- The appellant’s Statement of Account showing such
alleged unpaid balance is undated, and it does not
show receipt thereof by the appellee, and when, if such
indeed was received. Moreover, there are no
supporting documents to sustain such unpaid accounts.
- Section 43, Rule 130 of the ROC does not apply to this
case because it does not involve entries made in the
course of business. Rayos testified on a statement of
account she prepared on the basis of invoices and
delivery orders which she knew nothing about. She had
no personal knowledge of the facts on which the
accounts were based since she was not involved in the
delivery of goods and was merely in charge of the
records and documents of all accounts receivable as
part of her duties as credit and collection manager. She
thus knew nothing of the truth or falsity of the facts
stated in the invoices and delivery orders, i.e., whether
such deliveries were in fact made in the amounts and
on the dates stated, or whether they were actually
received by respondent. She was not even the credit
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and collection manager during the period the
agreement was in effect. This can only mean that she
merely obtained these documents from another without
any personal knowledge of their contents.
- The invoices and delivery orders presented by
petitioner were self-serving. Having generated these
documents, petitioner could have easily fabricated
them. Petitioner’s failure to present any competent
witness to identify the signatures and other information
in those invoices and delivery orders cast doubt on
their veracity.
3. YES
- Petitioner did not challenge the findings that it
committed various violations of the agreement. Hence,
there was legal basis for the grant of actual damages.
- Petitioner asserts that the documentary evidence
presented by respondent to prove actual damages in
the amount of P4,246,015.60 should not have been
considered because respondent’s complaint only
prayed for an award of P1M.
- Indeed, a court acquires jurisdiction over the claim of
damages upon payment of the correct docket fees. In
this case, it is not disputed that respondent paid docket
fees based on the amounts prayed for in its complaint.
Respondent adduced evidence to prove its losses. It
was proper for the CA and the RTC to consider this
evidence and award the sum of P1M. Had the courts
below awarded a sum more than P1M, which was the
amount prayed for, an additional filing fee would have
been assessed and imposed as a lien on the judgment.
However, the courts limited their award to the amount
prayed for.
4. NO
- Petitioner failed to prove the alleged outstanding
accounts of respondent. Thus, it is not entitled to the
supposed unpaid balance.
- Petitioner, being at fault and in bad faith, and there
being no proof that respondent was guilty of any
wrongdoing, cannot claim moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees from respondent.
Dispositive Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. CA
decision and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
97
 Prof. V. A. Avena
SECURITY BANK v. GAN
G.R. No. 150464
CORONA; June 27, 2006
(ricky)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Security Bank and Trust Company is a banking
institution duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. In 1981, Eric Gan opened a current
account at its Soler Branch in Santa Cruz, Manila.
Security Bank alleged that it had an agreement with
Gan wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount
in his current account and he could draw checks on
said account provided there were sufficient funds to
cover them. Furthermore, under a special arrangement
with the branch manager, Mr. Qui, he was allowed to
transfer funds from his account to another person’s
account also within the same branch. He availed of
such arrangement several times by depositing checks
in his account and even before they cleared, he
withdrew the proceeds and transferred them to the
other account. These transactions were covered by
what were known as “debit memos” since Gan had no
sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
- Gan purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative
balance in his account. As of December 14, 1982, the
overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78. According
to Security Bank, Gan refused to heed repeated
demands for payment. For the period December 14,
1982 to September 15, 1990, his total obligation
reached P297,060.01, inclusive of interest.
- In 1991, Security Bank filed a complaint for sum of
money in the Manila RTC against Gan to recover the
P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum from
September 16, 1990 until fully paid, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs of suit.
- Gan denied liability and contended that the alleged
overdraft resulted from transactions done without his
knowledge and consent. RTC dismissed the complaint
holding that Security Bank was not able to prove that
Gan owed it the amount claimed considering that the
Evidence
ledger cards it presented were merely hearsay
evidence. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in ruling that Security Bank has not
sufficiently proved its cause of action against Gan and
that the ledger cards and the testimony of Patricio
Mercado was not the best evidence of the transactions
made by Gan relative to his account.
HELD
NO.
Ratio Under the exception to the hearsay rule in Sec
43 of Rule 130, the admission in evidence of entries in
corporate books required the satisfaction of the
following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, or
unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or
in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty
Reasoning The ledger entries did not meet the first
and third requisites. Security Bank presented Patricio
Mercado, who was the bookkeeper who prepared the
entries, to testify on the transactions pertaining to
Gan’s account. It was in the course of his testimony
that the ledger entries were presented. There was,
therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person who made
them was available to testify in court. Moreover,
Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts
constituting the entries, particularly those entries which
resulted in the negative balance. He had no knowledge
of the truth or falsity of these entries.
- The transfers were made under the authority of Qui.
Gan denied that he authorized these funds transfers.
The entries in the ledger were not competent evidence
to prove that Gan consented to the transfers of funds.
These entries merely showed that the transfers were
indeed made and that Qui approved them. Security
Bank’s claim that Gan availed of a special arrangement
to transfer funds from his account to another person’s
account was a bare allegation that was never
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substantiated. (Hence, the bank’s allegation that Gan is
estopped was also rejected there being no proof that
Gan received copies of the ledgers.) Admittedly,
Mercado had no personal knowledge of this
arrangement. The bank could have presented Qui
whom they alleged allowed the special arrangement
with Gan. But it did not.
Disposition Petition is DENIED. Decision of the CA
affirmed in toto.
Entries in Official Records
LAO v. STANDARD INSURANCE
G.R. No. 140023
QUISUMBING; August 14, 2003
(ricky)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck, with
Plate No. FCG-538, insured with respondent Standard
Insurance Co. for the maximum amount of P200,000
and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any
damages that might be caused to his goods.
- While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred:
the insured truck bumped another truck, also owned by
Lao. The latter truck, with Plate No. FBS-917, was
running ahead of the insured truck and was bumped
from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages
estimated to be around P110,692, while the damage to
the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the
accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less.
- Lao filed a claim with the insurance company for the
proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was
denied on the ground that the driver of the insured
truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s
license at the time of the accident. The restriction in
Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license provided that he can
only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more
than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving
weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated
the “authorized driver” clause of the insurance policy.
In addition, the insurance company cited the following
excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit:
98
 Prof. V. A. Avena
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES – R/
IMPRUDENCE
11:30 PM – Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a
collision took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC.
Investigation conducted by Pat. Villahermosa, assisted
by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed that at about 8:00 PM
this date at the aforementioned place, a collision took
place between a truck (Hino) with Plate Nr FB[S] 917
owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE Y COYEL,
38 yrs, a res. of Balasan, Iloilo, with License Nr DLR
1108142 and another truck with Plate Nr. FCG-538
owned by Rudy Lao and driven by LEONARDO ANIT Y
PANES, 33 yrs, a res. of Brgy Laya, Balasan, Iloilo with
License Nr 1836482.…
- Lao claims that at the time of the accident, it was in
fact Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the insured
truck. Giddie Boy possessed a driver’s license
authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck
which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence, Lao
presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report wherein
the Investigating Officer, Pat. Villahermosa, stated that
it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not
Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days
after the accident. However, the insurance company
was firm in its denial of the claim.
- The RTC, after trial, dismissed the case finding that
Lao lacks sufficient cause of action and further ordered
him to pay the defendant P20,000 as attorney’s fees
plus P500 for appearance fee and P50,000 as
exemplary damages. The CA affirmed.
ISSUES
1. WON the admissibility and evidentiary weight given
to the police blotter was proper.
2. WON the credence given by the trial court to the
version of the respondent vis-à-vis the testimony of the
witnesses was proper.
3. WON the award of exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees was proper.
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio Entries in police records made by a police officer
in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by
law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated,
and their probative value may be either substantiated
or nullified by other competent evidence.
Evidence
Reasoning Although police blotters are of little
probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to
refute the facts stated therein.
- In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected
the information subject of the controversy. Stated
therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the
insured truck with plate number FCG-538. Furthermore,
the police blotter was identified and formally offered as
evidence. The person who made the entries was
likewise presented in court; he identified and certified
as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The
information was supplied to the entrant by the
investigating officer who did not protest about any
inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No
explanation was likewise given by the investigating
officer for the alleged interchange of names.
2. YES.
Ratio Great weight, and even finality, is given to the
factual conclusions of the CA which affirm those of the
trial courts.
Reasoning We find on this score no reason to overturn
such conclusions.
3. NO.
Ratio Although exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, they also need not be
proved. But a complainant must still show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether
or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Reasoning The insurance company had not shown
sufficient evidence that Lao indeed schemed to procure
the dubious documents and lied through his teeth to
establish his version of the facts. What was found was
that the document he presented was inadmissible, and
its contents were dubious. However, no proof was
adduced to sufficiently establish that it came to his
hands through his employment of underhanded means.
Thus, it was error for the courts below to award
exemplary damages in the absence of any award for
moral, temperate or compensatory damages.
- The award of attorney’s fees must also be deleted.
Such award was given in its extraordinary concept as
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to
the prevailing party. But it was not sufficiently shown
that Lao acted maliciously in instituting the claim for
damages.
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Disposition Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees is DELETED.
HERCE, JR., V MUNICIPALITY OF CABUYAO
G.R. No. 166645
YNARES-SANTIAGO; November 11, 2005
(mini)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision affirming
RTC decision to reopen the decree of registration
issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in favor
of petitioner
FACTS
- Sometime in 1956 and 1957, Juanita Carpena and
co. applied for the judicial registration of 44 parcels of
land all situated in Cabuyao, Laguna. The trial court
granted the application and directed the issuance of a
decree of registration. However, only 42 were issued
decrees. One of these two parcels for which no decree
of registration was issued was made the subject of
cadastral proceedings instituted by the Republic of the
Philippines in 1976.
- Petitioner Vicente D. Herce filed an opposition to the
proceedings (he had acquired ownership over the
subject property, having purchased it from a certain
Jose Carpena, one of Juanita’s hers, in August 1975.)
- After trial, the court awarded property in favor of
Herce. However, a decree of registration could not be
immediately issued considering that the subject
property was included in the 1956-57 case filed by
Juanita Carpena. Thus in June 1995, Herce filed a
Motion to Modify Decision explaining that since no
decree was issued yet in the original LRC Case, the
decision therein could still be modified by excluding the
subject property in order to facilitate the issuance of
the decree to him.
- After hearing, the trial court issued an order dated
May 3, 1996 granting the motion and directing the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to finally issue a decree of
registration in the name of petitioner Herce.
- Municipality of Cabuyao filed, on May 15, 1996, a
petition for the reconstitution of its alleged title over
the disputed property before the RTC Laguna, arguing
that it was issued a decree of registration over the said
99
 Prof. V. A. Avena
property as early as 1911. This was dismissed in Feb
1996. In the meantime, the LRA issued a decree of
registration in favor of Herce followed by the issuance
of Original Certificate of Title in his name.
- On Jan 27, 1998, the Municipality of Cabuyao filed a
petition for the reopening of the decree of registration
issued in favor of Herce.
- This led to the issuance of the questioned 1998 RTC
Order directing the reopening and review of the decree
of registration. “Considering the Report dated Dec 2,
1980, of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration
that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911 in
LRC (GLRO), Record No. 6763, in favor of the
Municipality of Cabuyao for apparently the same parcel
of land applied for herein, this Court resolves to open
the decree of registration issued herein.”
- Herce sought reconsideration; CA denied. CA found
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering the reopening of the decree of registration. It
held that the trial court properly granted the reopening
of the decree of title considering the existence of two
conflicting titles – one in favor of petitioner and the
other in the name of the Municipality of Cabuyao.
* Petitioner’s Contentions
- There is no record of Decree No. 4244 that was
purportedly issued in favor of the municipality on March
3, 1911 other than the entry in the Ordinary
Registration Book of the LRA. Hence, there is no way
of determining which of the six lots applied for
registration is/are covered by the decree.
Petitioner insists that the lack of documentary proof
and the fact that respondent municipality never had
possession of the subject property prove that it never
owned the disputed property.
- The petition to open a decree of registration will not
prosper if the alleged fraudulent deprivation of
ownership had been controverted, litigated, and
resolved. Municipality could no longer question the
factual findings of the cadastral court.
* Municipality’s Comment
- Decree No. 4244 was issued in its favor although
pertinent records evidencing said decree of registration
were lost or destroyed during the war. It points out that
the entries in the approved survey plan for the
Municipality of Cabuyao show that Decree No. 4244
was issued on March 3, 1911 under Cadastral Case No.
6763, as confirmed by the report submitted by the LRA
to then CFI, Branch 1, Biñan, Laguna.
Evidence
ISSUES
1. WON Decree No. 4244 issued in favor of the
Municipality has become indefeasible
2. WON the Ordinary Decree Book is prima facie
proof of the entries appearing therein
HELD
1. YES
Ratio A land already decreed and registered in an
ordinary registration proceedings cannot again be the
subject of adjudication. Indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land
registration proceedings. Thus, once a decree of
registration is made under the Torrens system, and the
reglementary period has passed within which the
decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and
cannot be collaterally questioned later on.
Reasoning (City of Manila v Lack) The purpose of the
legislature in creating the Court of Land Registration
was to bring the land titles of the Philippine under one
comprehensive and harmonious system. The Court of
Land Registration does not create or vest a title. It
simply confirms a title already created and already
vested, rendering it forever indefeasible.
2. YES
Ratio The trustworthiness of public documents and the
value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on -
(1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made,
(2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty,
(3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and
(4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the
prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
Reasoning Since Decree No. 4244 has become
indefeasible, Herce is now barred from claiming the
subject land. Although the municipality’s claim of
ownership is based on the entry in the Ordinary Decree
Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree
No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911 and that Lot 1
Plan II-2719 was one of the six parcels of land
previously applied for registration by the Municipality of
Cabuyao in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6763, being a
public document, the Ordinary Decree Book is prima
facie proof of the entries appearing therein.
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- These incidents were attested to by Acting Chief,
Division of Ordinary Registration, Silverio G. Perez, in
the report dated December 2, 1980.
- In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763,
showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3,
1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the
accountable public officers who enjoy the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of their
functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the
issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality
of Cabuyao cannot be overturned without any
countervailing proof to the contrary.
- Tichangco v. Enriquez: To overturn this legal
presumption carelessly will not only endanger judicial
stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the
Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the
vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to
meaningless verbiage.
Disposition Petition is DENIED. The validity of Decree
No. 4244 issued on March 3, 1911 in favor of
respondent Municipality of Cabuyo, Laguna is
AFFIRMED, whereas Decree No. N-216115 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-2099, issued in the name of
petitioner Herce, are declared NULL and VOID.
JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ V CA (CARLITO
FERNANDEZ)
GR 108366
PUNO; Feb 16, 1994
(bauza)
FACTS
- Petitioners filed a case for support against private
respondent before QC RTC. The complaint was
dismissed on Dec 9, 1986 on the ground that "there is
nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that
seeks to compel (private respondent) to
recognize/acknowledge (petitioners) as his illegitimate
children," and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove petitioners’ filiation.
- Feb 19, 1987: petitioners file the case at bench,
another action for recognition and support against the
private respondent before another branch of the QC
RTC.
- The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA,
single, the mother and guardian ad litem of the 2
petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN
100
 Prof. V. A. Avena
PAUL FERNANDEZ, met Carlito sometime in 1983, at
the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco
employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to
spend his weekends regularly at said courts, where
Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
- Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her 2 sons.
She claimed that they started their illicit sexual
relationship 6 months after their 1st meeting. The tryst
resulted in the birth of petitioners. Violeta claims not to
have known that Carlito was married until the birth of
her 2 children. She averred they were married in civil
rites in Oct 1983. In March 1985, however, she
discovered that the marriage license which they used
was spurious.
- To bolster their case, petitioners presented the
following documentary evidence: their certificates of
live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father;
the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also
states that his father is respondent Carlito;
photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of
petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and
Claro taken at the home of Violeta.
- Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario
Cantoria, Dr. Milagros Villanueva, Ruby Chua Cu, and
Fr. Liberato Fernandez. The first 3 witnesses told the TC
that Violeta had, at different times, introduced Carlito
to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other
hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented
himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the
latter's baptism.
- In defense, respondent denied Violeta's allegations
that he sired the petitioners. He averred that he only
served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of
petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the
testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of
Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of Claro during his
baptism. Carlito also presented as witness, Fidel
Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He
disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent
Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their
affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta and Carlito
together at the said restaurant. Respondent also
declared that he only learned he was named in the
birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after
he was sued for support in (the 1st case)
- Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, TC
ruled for petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so
holds that the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein)
Evidence
are entitled to the relief's prayed for in the complaint.
The defendant (herein private respondent) is hereby
ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Fernandez, now
aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 4 ½ as
his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has
a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the
plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each a
month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra,
the children's mother and natural guardian, with
arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on
February 19, 1987.
- On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners’
complaint was dismissed by the CA in its impugned
decision. It found that the "proof relied upon by TC is
inadequate to prove the (private respondent's)
paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further held
that the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the
dismissal of the petitioners’ earlier complaint.
- MFR denied.
ISSUE/S
1. WON objects presented were sufficient to determine
filiation.
2. WON documents presented were sufficient to
determine filiation.
3. WON the testimonies presented were sufficient to
determine filiation.
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning Petitioners cannot rely on the photographs
showing the presence of the private respondent in the
baptism of petitioner Claro. These are far from proofs
that Carlito is the father of Claro. As explained by
Carlito, he was in the baptism as a sponsor of Claro.
This was corroborated by Pagtakhan.
The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing
private respondent showering affection to Claro also fall
short of the evidence required to prove paternity. As
held in Tan vs. Trocio: “the pictures of Jewels and
Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to
each other is inconclusive to prove paternity and much
less would prove violation of complaint's person and
honor.”
2. NO.
Reasoning The baptismal certificates of petitioner
Claro naming private respondent as his father has
scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that
private respondent participated in its preparation. As
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held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al.: “… the rule is
that although the baptismal record of a natural
child describes her as a child of the decedent,
the baptismal record cannot be held to be a
voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The
reason for this rule that canonical records do not
constitute the authentic document prescribed by
Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation
of a child in that such canonical record is simply
proof of the only act to which the priest may
certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an
act done by himself or in his presence, like the
administration of the sacrament upon a day
stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the
record with respect to the parentage of the child
baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which
require separate and concrete evidence.”
In Macandang vs. CA, SC also ruled that while
baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacraments on the
dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child's paternity.
The certificates of live birth of petitioners identifying
private respondent as their father are also incompetent
evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the
records do no show that private respondent had a hand
in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these
certificates, the CA ruling is in accord with Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar: “. . . Sec 5 of Act No. 3793 and
Article 280, CC explicitly prohibited, not only the
naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock,
when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not
filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make or record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person
and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child.“
SC reiterated this rule in Berciles: "a birth certificate
not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not
competent evidence of paternity."
3. NO.
Reasoning Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of
Fr. Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony
of Claro. He declared on the witness stand that he
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
remembered who was presented as Claro’s father in
the baptism and when asked to identify said person, he
pointed at Carlito.
However, on cross examination, Fr. Fernandez admitted
that he had to be shown a picture of the private
respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize him. He
also stated that it was Violeta who said that private
respondent was the father.
There is no proof that Fr. Fernandez is a close friend of
Violeta and Carlito w/c should render unquestionable
his identification of the private respondent during
petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof,
we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez
who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in
and day out can remember the parents of the children
he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the CA on the
credibility of Violeta. Her testimony is highly suspect as
it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the
paternity of the petitioners.
Res judicata unnecessary to discuss considering that
petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their cause
of action.
Disposition IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent court is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
MANALO V. ROBLES
G.R. No. L-8171;
August 16, 1956; Montemayor
(Chrislao)
FACTS:
-On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by
defendant Robles Transportation Company, Inc. (the
Company) and driven by Hernandez its driver, collided
with a passenger truck. In the course of and a result of
the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an
eleven year old, causing him physical injuries which
resulted in his death several days later.
-Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through
reckless imprudence and after trial was found guilty. He
served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity.
Evidence
2 writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy
the amount but both writs were returned unsatisfied by
the sheriff.
-On February 17, 1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his
wife Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of
Armando filed the present action against the Company
to enforce its subsidiary liability, pursuant to Articles
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
-It also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint unless
and until the convicted driver Hernandez was included
as a party defendant, the Company considering him an
indispensable party. The TC and CA both correctly ruled
that Hernandez was not an indispensable party
defendant. The Company is now before SC.
-To prove their case against the defendant Company,
the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the
criminal case convicting Hernandez of homicide
through reckless imprudence, the writs of execution to
enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the
sheriff showing that the two writs of execution
were not satisfied because of the insolvency of
Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any
property in his name. Over the objections of the
Company, the trial court admitted this evidence
and based its decision in the present case on the
same.
-The Company contends that this kind of evidence is
inadmissible. The Company also claims that in
admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the writs of
execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez,
without requiring said opportunity to cross-examine
said sheriff.
ISSUE:
WON the Company is correct.
HELD:
NO. The Company is mistaken. A sheriff's return is
an official statement made by a public official in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
the law and forming part of official records, and
is prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123,
section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff's making the
return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in
his entry. In the case of Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil.,
151 citing Wigmore on Evidence, this court said:
To the foregoing rules with reference to the
method of proving private documents an
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exception is made with reference to the
method of proving public documents executed
before and certified to, under the land of seal
of certain public officials. The courts and the
legislature have recognized the valid reason
for such an exception. The litigation is
unlimited in which testimony by officials is
daily needed, the occasion in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary
duties to declare as a witness are numberless.
The public officers are few in whose daily work
something is not done in which testimony is
not needed from official statements, host of
official would be found devoting the greater
part of their time to attending as witness in
court or delivering their depositions before an
officer. The work of Administration of
government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike
suffer in consequence.
And this Court added:
The law reposes a particular confidence in
public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trust with accuracy
and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they
do in discharge of their public duty may be
given in evidence and shall be taken of their
public duty may be given in evidence and
shall be taken to be true under such a degree
of caution as the nature and circumstances of
each a case may appear to require.
(SOLINAP V LOCSIN)
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
JUAN LOCSIN SR.
G.R. No. 146737
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ: December 10, 2001
(da)
FACTS:
-Eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died
intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E.
Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition for Letters of Administration"
praying that he be appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased. He allegedthat he is
an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin
and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the
decedent.
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
-January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs
of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla,
claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an
opposition to respondent's petition for letters of
administration. They averred that respondent is not a
child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan
C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in
his name.
-January 5, 1993 , another opposition to the petition
was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria
Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel
Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin
alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is
barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
-The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother
of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the
estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This
was followed by an appearance and opposition dated
January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another
sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no
filial relationship between herein respondent and the
deceased.
-To support his claim that he is an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased respondent submitted a
machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth
records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo
City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that
respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he
was the informant of the facts stated therein, as
evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3").
To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine
copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and
identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of
birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 is included. Respondent also offered in
evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") showing him and
his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph,
respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have
been recognized as family members of the deceased.
-Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified
true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in
the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as
Exhibit "8", indicating that the birth of respondent was
reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the
Evidence
same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C.
Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while
respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth
was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was
recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon
the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956
form, already used before respondent's birth. This
scenario dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified.
Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a
handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of
Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus
concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious
document surreptitiously inserted into the bound
volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City.
ISSUE:
WON Juan E. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is
qualified to be granted letters of administration (Which
of the two documents is genuine)
HELD:
Juan E. Locsin, Jr is not an interested person within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration since he failed to prove his filiation with
the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. (Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious)
Reasoning:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the persons preferred who are entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
XXX
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Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that
a petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of
administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x"
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not
survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of
letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is
an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying
that he is an interested person in the estate and is
considered as next of kin. But has respondent
established that he is an acknowledged natural son of
the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like
legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated
on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
order to establish the child's
acknowledgment." (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with
the deceased, presented to the trial court his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a
photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the
deceased.
Exhibit D spurious:
-Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish
a Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and
municipalities in the Philippines are officially and
regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the
records of births cover several decades and come from
all parts of the country, to merely access them in the
Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one
single birth record from the mass, a regular employee,
if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that
any of these employees in Metro Manila would have
reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by
interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving
the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing
evidence than those considered by the trial court
should have been presented by respondent.
-Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form.
Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that
"x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were
already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had
requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958
Revised Form."
-Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners
found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is
on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We
find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume
that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several
years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in
1957 is unlikely.
-The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local
Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely
pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other
entries.
-The documents bound into one volume are original
copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged
original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the
entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all
Evidence
other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents
of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate
important particulars, such as the alleged father's
religion, race, occupation, address and business. The
space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the
child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is
a purported signature of the alleged father, but the
blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
-There is no explanation why out of so many
certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was
merely pasted with the volume.
The records of the instant case adequately support a
finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not
respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more
faith and credence by the courts below.
-The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local
Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates
and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil
Registrar General.A copy of the document sent by the
Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General
should be identical in form and in substance with the
copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case,
Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General
is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should
have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious
document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was
made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the
signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as
respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28,
1954 do not appear.
-In Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly
prohibit, not only the naming of the father of
the child born out of wedlock, when the birth
certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or
made by him, but also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he
could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the
certificate of birth of an illegitimate child,
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when signed only by the mother of the latter,
is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child." (Emphasis ours)
-The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is
further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeal
where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed
by the alleged father (who had no hand in its
preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
-A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained
where there exists strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records
of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without
doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was
removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of
Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section
23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In
this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in
the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8"
recorded in the Civil Registry General.
-Respondent's photograph with his mother near the
coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very
dangerous precedent that would encourage and
sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and
thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.
AFRICA V CALTEX
G.R. No. L-12986
MAKALINTAL; March 31, 1966
(rean)
NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
FACTS
- The action is for damages under A1902 and A1903
OCC. In the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke
out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo St. and Rizal Ave, Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal properties
and effects inside them. Their owners, among them
petitioners Sps Africa and Heirs of Ong, sued
respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the
first as alleged owner of the station and the second as
its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part
of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
- CFI and CA found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due
care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees.
- Police Dept report: At about 4p.m. March 18, 1948,
while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a
tank truck, into the underground tank of the Caltex Gas
Station located at corner of Rizal Ave and Antipolo St, in
Manila, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and
threw the burning match stick near the main valve of
the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes,
fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in
pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with
the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion.
But, the flames scattered due to the hose from which
the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck and the
ff. accessorias and residences.
- The Fire Dept report: Re their allegation that the
premises were subleased for the installation of a coca-
cola and cigarette stand, the complainants furnished
this Office a copy of a photo taken during the fire and
which is submitted herewith. It appears in this picture
that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a
rack which accdg. to information gathered in the
neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches,
installed between the gasoline pumps and the
underground tanks.
ISSUE/S
WON reports on the fire by the Manila Police and Fire
Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the AFP
are admissible.
Evidence
HELD
NO
- Petitioners maintain that the reports in themselves,
i.e, without further testimonial evidence on their
contents, fall within the scope of Sec35, Rule 123,
which provides that "entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated."
- There are three requisites for admissibility under the
rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person specially enjoined
by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information
- Of the 3 requisites just stated, only the last need be
considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in
the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the
fire were not within the personal knowledge of the
officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them
through official information? As to some facts the
sources thereof are not even identified. Others are
attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an EE at
the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro
Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was
being transferred at the time to the underground tank
of the station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who
could not give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To
qualify their statements as "official information"
acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the
persons who made the statements not only must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have
the duty to give such statements for record
- The reports in question do not constitute an exception
to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not
acquired by the reporting officers through official
information, not having been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so.
- Although such reports were not admissible, the court
discussed and ruled that the doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur is applicable in this case contrary to what the
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CFI and CA ruled. It cited the case of Jones vs. Shell
Petroleum Corporation, which has a similar set of facts,
as basis or authority.
- Re negligence, Court said: the gasoline station, with
all its appliances, equipment and employees, was
under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein
and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire
started were appellees and their employees, but they
gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care. So Court ruled that Caltex and
Boquiren are liable to the petitioners.
Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
Caltex and Boquiren are held liable solidarily to
appellants Africa.
SALMON, DEXTER & CO. V. WIJANGCO
G.R. No. L-21649
Villamor; 9 October 1924
(ice)
FACTS
-Salmon, Dexter, and Co. entered into a contract with
Wijangco for the purchase and sale of a tractor and
threshing machine upon the conditions specified in said
contract. The price of the machineries sold is P12,400,
payable by installments as follows: P400 at the signing
of the contract sale, to wit, October 8, 1920; P4,000
upon the delivery of said machineries by the defendant
to the plaintiff; another P4,000 on June 15, 1921, and,
finally, another P4,000 on December 15, 1921.
-The plaintiff prays for a sum of money plus legal
interests.
-Wijangco denies generally and specifically the facts
alleged in the complaint. He alleged that the tractor
and threshing machine, which is the subject-matter of
the contract was sold by the plaintiff company to the
defendant, does not meet the conditions specified and
guaranteed in the aforesaid contract of sale.
Lower court rendered judgment sentencing the
Wijangco (defendant) to pay the plaintiff relying among
other evidence to the certificate issued by the Director
of the Bureau of Agriculture
ISSUE
WON the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of
Agriculture as to the average crop of palay produced in
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
the municipality of Magalang in the 1920-1921
agricultural year should be admissible.
HELD
Yes. The statistics prepared by the Bureau of
Agriculture is chiefly based on the quarterly reports of
the municipal presidents made pursuant to section
2202 of the Administrative Code. The certificate issued
by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in evidence
as an official document issued by a public officer
authorized by law. Wigmore, in his treatise on
evidence, vol. 3, section 1636, speaking of exceptions
to the rule as to the inadmissibility of hearsay
evidence, among other things, says:
6. Certificates. Every officer has an implied
duty or authority to prepare and deliver out to
an applicant a certificate stating anything
which has been done or observed by him or
exists in his office by virtue of some authority
or duty, and the certificate is admissible.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE
COMPANIES V RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK,INC
G.R. No. 147039
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 27, 2006
(owen)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 RoC seeking the
review of the CA Decision affirming RTC Makati
Decision reducing interest rate to 6% per annum
FACTS
- Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RADIO), who owns
several broadcasting stations all over the country, filed
a civil case against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance
Companies (DBP) and Provident Insurance Corporation
(PROVIDENT) for recovery of insurance benefits.
PROVIDENT covered RADIO’s transmitter equipment
and generating set for P13,550,000.00 under a Fire
Insurance Policy, while DBP covered RADIO’s
transmitter, furniture, fixture and other transmitter
facilities for P5,883,650.00 under a Fire Insurance
Policy.
Evidence
- July 27, 1988 evening, RADIO’s station in Bacolod City
was razed by fire causing damage in the amount of
P1,044,040.00. RADIO sought recovery under the two
insurance policies but the claims were denied on the
ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk
excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d)
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or
damage occasioned by or through or in
consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the
following consequences, namely:
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or
warlike operations (whether war be declared or not),
civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped
power.
The insurance companies denied the claims by
maintaining that the evidence showed that the fire was
caused by members of CPP/NPA. Hence, the civil case.
- RTC Makati: in favor of RADIO. PROVIDENT to pay
P450,000.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2,
1990 the date of the filing of the Complaint. DBP to
pay P602,600.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2,
1990.
- CA: affirmed the decision, with the modification that
the applicable interest rate reduced to 6% per annum.
MFR denied.
- DBP assails: factual finding of both RTC and CA that
its evidence failed to support its allegation that the loss
was caused by an excepted risk, (members of the
CPP/NPA)
RTC
+ testimony of witnesses Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3
Rochar, who were admittedly not present when the fire
occurred, was limited to the fact that an investigation
was conducted and in the course of the investigation
they were informed by bystanders that “heavily armed
men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in
it and then lit it. After that, they went out shouting
“Mabuhay ang NPA”.
+ persons whom they investigated and actually saw
the burning of the station were not presented as
witnesses
+ documentary evidence, which includes a letter
released by the NPA merely mentions some
dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the
media in Bacolod, do not satisfactorily prove that the
author of the burning were members of the NPA..
CA
A2010
+ police blotter of the burning of DYHB
+ certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated
National Police, Bacolod City regarding the incident
+ letter of alleged NPA members Magsilang claiming
responsibility for the burning of DYHB
+ fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988
+ testimonies of Lt. Col. Torres and SFO III Rochas
ISSUES
1. WON police blotter of the burning of DYHB, the
certification issued by the Integrated National Police of
Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared
by SFO III Rochas is deemed sufficient (Entry in Official
Records)
2. WON the testimony of Lt. Col. Torres is admissible
3. WON the letter of Magsilang, who claims to be a
member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person
which is not a party to the present action, is admissible
(Admission & Confessions)
4. WON the excepted risk was not proven by DBP
5. WON the reports of witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO
II Rochar that the bystanders they interviewed claimed
that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA is
an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae
(Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence)
HELD
1. NO
- The documentary evidence may be considered
exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official
records, nevertheless, none of these documents
categorically stated that the perpetrators were
members of the CPP/NPA.
> police blotter: “a group of persons accompanied by
one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA … more or
less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,”
> certification from the Bacolod Police station: “…
some 20 or more armed men believed to be members
of the New People’s Army NPA,”
> fire investigation report: “(I)t is therefore believed by
this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is
intentional, and the armed men suspected to be
members of the CPP/NPA were the ones responsible …”
- All these documents show that indeed, the
“suspected” executor of the fire were believed to be
members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not
sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the
quantum of proof.
2. NO
106
 Prof. V. A. Avena
- The only person who seems to be so sure that that the
CPP-NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col.
Torres. However, though his testimony is persuasive, it
cannot be admit as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA
was really involved in the incident considering that he
admitted that he did not personally see the armed men
even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt.
Col. Torres was presented as witness, he was presented
as an ordinary witness only and not an expert witness.
Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of the
armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible in
evidence.
3. NO
- Under Section 22, Rule 130 RoC. An admission is
competent only when the declarant, or someone
identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the
action.
4. YES
- In insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the
terms of a policy which insures against other perils or
hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense
which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed
that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking
to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation
in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss
comes within the purview of the exception or limitation
set up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a
contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to
prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is
excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause
which limits its liability.
- Consequently, it is sufficient for RADIO to prove the
fact of damage or loss. Once RADIO makes out a
prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to DBP to controvert RADIO’S prima
facie case. In this case, since DBP alleged an excepted
risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to DBP to
prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has
sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused
by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift
back to respondent who is then under a duty of
producing evidence to show why such excepted risk
does not release petitioner from any liability
5. NO
- A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge, which means those
facts which are derived from his perception. A witness
may not testify as to what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the
Evidence
same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not
given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-
examination by opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the
out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on
which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
- Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or after the commission of
the crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule
in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not
testify and provided that the testimony of the witness
who heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise
a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
- It is reasonable to assume that when these
statements were noted down, the bystanders already
had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to
one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take
place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether
these utterances were the products of truth. That the
utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote. At
best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres that these statements were made may be
considered as independently relevant statements
gathered in the course of their investigation, and are
admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact
that they had been thus uttered.
- Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
A2010
- Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders
that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused
the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow
that such declarations are sufficient proof. These
declarations should be calibrated vis-à-vis the other
evidence on record.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES V NLRC
G.R. No. 108433
ROMERO; October 15, 1996
(monch)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Private respondent Joselito V. Macatuno was hired by
Wallem Shipmanagement Limited thru its local
manning agent, Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., as an
able-bodied seaman on board the M/T Fortuna, a vessel
of Liberian registry.
- On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was in Japan, he
and a fellow Filipino crew member Gurimbao had an
altercation with a cadet/apprentice officer of the same
nationality as the captain of the vessel. The master
entered the incident in the logbook.
- As such, they were repatriated to the Philippines. Both
then filed illegal dismissal complaints with the POEA.
- According to Macatuno and Gurimbao, the incident
started when Gurimbao was asked by an
cadet/apprentice to shovel off dirty water (mixed with
oil and dirt) and throw it overboard. Gurimbao didn’t
want to at first, since such act was prohibited, but the
cadet got mad and started shouting. Gurimbao
thereafter complied. Gurimbao complained to
Macatuno. The two confronted the cadet and said to
him that he was a mere apprentice and has no right to
order people. The cadet started shouting. Macatuno
107
 Prof. V. A. Avena
pushed him twice. Gurimbao mildy hit his arm. The
cadet ran to the captain “who happened to witness the
incident” from the cabin’s window.
- The captain summoned them both and then told them
that they were being terminated and would be
disembarked at the next port. After disembarkation,
they flew back to the Philippines. There, they were told
that they would not be given their salaries and their
repatriation expenses would not be reimbursed.
- According to Wallem, it was not the Macatuno and
Gurimbao’s first infraction. They apparently left during
working hours before, as evidenced by the logbook. As
such, they were warned. They were also to have been
alleged to assault an officer and was given a sever
warning.
- The POEA officer ruled that the dismissal was without
just and valid cause. He did not give weight to the
certified true copy of the logbook because the alleged
entries therein were only handpicked and copied from
the official logbook. There is no way of verifying the
truth of these entries. Also, no documentary evidence
was submitted to support the alleged official logbook.
Finally, the copy of the alleged official logbook was not
properly authenticated.
- NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE/S
1. WON there was valid dismissal
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- The ship captain’s logbook is a vital evidence as
Article 612 of the Code of Commerce requires him to
keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the
vessel’s head. Thus, in Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC
the Court held that a copy of an official entry in the
logbook is legally binding and serves as an exception to
the hearsay rule.
- However, the ruling in such case does not apply in the
case at bar. In said case, there was an investigation
before the seaman was dismissed. There facts in the
logbook were supported by facts in the investigation. In
the case at bar, because no investigation was made,
the contents of the logbook have to be duly identified
and authenticated lest an injustice result from a blind
Evidence
adoption of such contents which merely serve as prima
facie evidence of the incident in question.
- Moreover, what was presented in the Haverton
Shipping case was a copy of the official entry from the
logbook itself. In this case, petitioners did not submit
as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or even
authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof. What
was offered in evidence was merely a typewritten
collation of excerpts.
- Under the Table of Offenses and Corresponding
Administrative Penalties appended to the contract of
employment between the parties, the offense
described by the logbook entry may well fall under
insubordination and may constitute assaulting a
superior officer “with the use of deadly weapon”
punishable with dismissal. However, the man they
assaulted (Sason) was only an apprentice and cannot
be considered a superior officer.
- Moreover, the aforequoted entry in the logbook is so
sketchy that, unsupported by other evidence, it leaves
so many questions unanswered
- Hence, as the typewritten excerpts from the
“logbook” were the only pieces of evidence presented
by petitioners to support the dismissal of private
respondent, have no probative value at all, petitioners’
cause must fail. Their failure to discharge the onus
probandi properly may have no other result than a
finding that the dismissal of private respondent is
unjustified
- Also, due process was not observed in this case. The
fact that the captain witnessed the incident does not
dispense the requirement of notice and hearing
Disposition Petition denied.
ESCOBAR V LUNA
A2010
G.R. No. 169204
QUISIMBING; March 23, 2007
(Anton)
NATURE
An appeal from the decision dated May 19, 2005 of the
CA and its Resolution dated August 4, 2005 denying
reconsideration.
FACTS
- Adelaida Escobar and Lolita Escobar (petitioners)
separately bought two parcels of land located in Barrio
Tolentino, Tagaytay City on February 28, 1979 and
were issued TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295)
T-13362, respectively, on the same date.
- Eleven years later, on September 11, 1990, Clodualdo
Luna filed a complaint before the RTC of Tagaytay City,
seeking to nullify the two titles of the Escobars. Luna
claimed that he had been in actual, public,
adverse, continuous, and notorious physical
possession of an unregistered parcel of land
located in Barrio Tolentino, Tagaytay City since March
21, 1941, as shown in Tax Declaration No. GR-019-
0173, which was issued to him in 1985.
- Sometime in 1990, when he engaged the services of a
geodetic engineer to survey the same parcel of land to
have his title confirmed under the provisions of Act No.
496, as amended by PD No. 1529, he alleged that he
discovered that the land had been illegally and
fraudulently titled in the names of the Escobars by the
use of fictitious and simulated documents and court
records.
- The Escobars allegedly made it appear that the
two titles originated from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 5483, which however, did not
exist in the records of the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Batangas per certification of
Atty. Eva Cainza-Valenton, Acting Register of
Deeds, issued on June 11, 1990.
- Decree No. 3465, on which OCT No. 5483 appeared to
have been issued, pertained to a parcel of land located
in San Juan, Batangas, not to the subject properties
located in Tagaytay City. Similarly, Survey Plan Psu-
24039, which supposedly technically described the land
mentioned in OCT No. 5483, did not pertain to the
subject properties but to a different parcel of
land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, per letter
of Privadi JG. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Lands Management
108
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Bureau, DENR. Luna further alleged that the Escobars
acted with knowledge of the infirmity and defect of OCT
No. 5483 as nonexistent and knew that he was in actual
possession of the subject land in the concept of an
owner for 50 years.
- October 9, 1990: the Escobars filed a motion to
dismiss. They alleged that the complaint was barred by
prior judgment or by statute of limitations; that the
complaint stated no cause of action.
- February 1, 1991: Luna filed an amended complaint
which the trial court admitted on February 5, 1991.
However, on February 22, 1991, the trial court, upon
reiteration by the Escobars of their motion, dismissed
the amended complaint on the ground that it was
insufficient in form and substance and that certain
indispensable parties were not impleaded.
- Luna filed a motion for reconsideration and a second
amended complaint impleading as party defendants
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority,
the Director of the Bureau of Lands, the National
Treasurer, the Registry of Deeds and City Assessor of
Tagaytay City. The trial court granted a subsequent
MTD filed by the Escobars.
- Luna filed an appeal to the CA, which rendered a
decision on May 18, 1995 reversing the dismissal. The
CA held that the trial court should have
conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss
considering that Luna's complaint alleged that OCT No.
5483 (from which the TCTs of the Escobars were
derived) was nonexistent.
- The Escobars elevated the appellate court's decision
to the Supreme Court, but the petition was denied in a
Minute Resolution. The case was remanded to the Trial
Court.
- During trial, Luna died and was substituted by his
heirs (respondents). They submitted the case on the
basis of the documentary evidence, arguing that,
allegedly, the CA had already ruled on the first appeal
that the Escobars' titles were void.
- RTC rejected respondents' argument that the
appellate court's ruling in the first appeal
constituted the law of the case, and proceeded to
find the Escobars as purchasers in good faith and for
value who were accordingly entitled to the benefits of
the principle of indefeasibility of title.
- Trial court further ruled that respondents failed
to prove their case for cancellation of TCTs since
the documentary evidence they submitted, not
Evidence
being supported by testimonial evidence, were
hearsay.
- On appeal the CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE(S)
1. What the law on the case is.
2. WON the respondents' evidence admissible to
prove the nullity of the TCTs in question. (YES)
3. WON being purchasers in good faith, the Escobars
are entitled to protection from suits to annul their
titles. (NO)
HELD
1.
Ratio Under the principle of the law of the case,
whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule or decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case, so long
as the facts on which the decision was predicated
continues.
Reasoning
- Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness and
economy require such stability in the final judgments of
courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.
- The law of the case is the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. It applies to an established rule that
when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled becomes the
law of the case upon subsequent appeal. As a rule, a
decision on a prior appeal of the same case is
held to be the law of the case whether that
question is right or wrong, the remedy of the
party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a
rehearing.
- In this instance, the records show that the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37139, the first appeal,
resolved only the issue of whether the Order dated June
28, 1991 dismissing the second amended complaint
was valid or not. The appellate court did not resolve
any issue bearing on the merits of the cancellation
case. As regards the merits of the case,
therefore, there is no law of the case to speak of.
The appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 37139
merely ordered the trial court to determine the
intrinsic validity of the titles by probing into the
technical data of OCT No. 5483, Decree No. 3465,
and Survey Plan Psu-24039 among others.
A2010
2. YES
Ratio Respondents' evidence are competent evidence,
having been issued by government offices, certified by
authorized personnel who were clothed with authority
and duty to issue such certifications.
Reasoning
- The certification, without testimony of the person
giving the certification, is sufficient and competent
evidence which is an exception to the hearsay rule as
provided in Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Section 44 should be read in conjunction with
Section 28, Rule 132 of the same Rules which allows
the admission of the said document.
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record.—a written
statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
- The certification dated June 11, 1990 issued by Atty.
Cainza-Valenton, who was duly authorized to issue the
certification, stating that OCT No. 5483 was not existing
in the files of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Batangas and which confirmed that OCT No. 5483 was
fictitious, making the titles derived from it spurious, is
sufficient evidence for the stated purpose. The Register
of Deeds of the Province of Batangas is the repository
of all records regarding OCTs issued in that province,
and the certification is therefore competent and
admissible evidence to prove that the titles of the
Escobars derived from it are from a fictitious source.
The same holds true for:
a) The certification of Mr. Felino M. Cortez, Chief
of the Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division,
Land Registration Authority, stating that per CLR
Record No. 3995, Decree No. 3465 was issued on
February 23, 1909; and a copy of Decree No. 3465
which states that it was issued by the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Case No. 29, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 2379 and that the subject matter of
that Case No. 29 was the land situated in San Juan,
Batangas - not the land situated in Barrio
Tolentino, Talisay, Batangas;
b) The reply-letter of Mr. Privadi JG. Dalire
addressed to Engr. Ruperto T. del Carmen, stating
that plan Psu-24039 was a survey of property
109
 Prof. V. A. Avena
located at Pinmaludpod, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
which is a long way from the Barrio Tolentino,
Talisay, Batangas property;
c) The certification dated August 6, 1993 issued
by Mr. Jose C. Mariano, Chief of the Records
Management Division, Lands Management Bureau,
DENR, certifying to the fact that his office has no
available record of the alleged plan Psu-24039,
which shows that Psu-24039 does not exist and it
cannot serve as basis for the two titles; and
d) The certification dated July 29, 1993 issued
by Mr. Felino M. Cortez, certifying to the true
and correct reproduction of page 140 of Survey
Record Book No. 3, that there appears to be no
entry corresponding to plan Psu-24039 indicating
that said plan does not appear to have been the
subject of an application for original registration
under Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529,
which shows that the titles are spurious, having
had spurious sources.
- Most significantly, these documents, which constitute
certifications from government officials who are
responsible for safeguarding the TCTs and OCTs in their
possession because of their official capacity, have not
been controverted as to their existence and due
execution. Their existence was also never denied
under oath.
3. Even if petitioners were innocent purchasers for
value and in good faith, no right passed to a transferee
from a vendor who did not have any right in the first
place. Void ab initio land titles issued cannot ripen into
private ownership. A spring cannot rise higher than its
source.
DISPOSITION
Wherefore, the instant petition is denied for lack of
merit. The Decision dated May 19, 2005 and Resolution
dated August 4, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed.
BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. V CIR
G.R. No. 157064
CHICO-NAZARIO; Aug 7, 2006
(marge)
Evidence
NATURE
Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside
the CA Decision ordering the petitioner to pay the
Government the amount of P826,698.31 as deficiency
income tax for the year 1987 plus 25% surcharge and
20% interest per annum; and Resolution denying MR.
FACTS
-Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known
as UBP Securities, Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the
trading of securities.
-14 April 1988: petitioner filed its Annual ITR for taxable
year 1987. After an audit investigation conducted by
the BIR, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued an assessment for deficiency income tax in the
amount of P826,698.31 arising from the disallowance of
the item on salaries, bonuses and allowances in the
amount of P1,219,093,93 as part of the deductible
business expense, since petitioner failed to subject the
salaries, bonuses and allowances to withholding taxes.
This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment
Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 dated 1 Feb 1991,
which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner
through registered mail on 6 Feb 1991. However,
petitioner denies receiving the formal assessment
notice.
-17 March 1992: petitioner was served with a Warrant
of Distraint and/or Levy to enforce collection of the
deficiency income tax for the year 1987. Petitioner filed
a formal protest, dated 25 March 1992, against the
Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy, requesting for its
cancellation. On 3 July 1998, petitioner received a letter
dated 30 April 1998 from the respondent denying the
protest with finality.
-31 July 1998: petitioner filed a petition for review with
the CTA. After due notice and hearing, the CTA
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on 17 May
2000. The CTA ruled on the primary issue of
prescription and found it unnecessary to decide the
issues on the validity and propriety of the assessment.
It maintained that while a mailed letter is deemed
received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is
merely a disputable presumption. It reasoned that the
direct denial of the petitioner shifts the burden of proof
to the respondent that the mailed letter was actually
received by the petitioner. The CTA found the BIR
records submitted by the respondent immaterial, self-
serving, and therefore insufficient to prove that the
A2010
assessment notice was mailed and duly received by the
petitioner.
-25 July 2000: Respondent’s MR was denied by the CTA.
Thereafter, respondent appealed to the CA.
-Reversing the CTA decision, the CA found the evidence
presented by the respondent to be sufficient proof that
the tax assessment notice was mailed to the petitioner,
therefore the legal presumption that it was received
should apply. Petitioner filed MR but the same was
denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE
WON respondent’s right to assess petitioner’s alleged
deficiency income tax is barred by prescription
HELD
YES. Evidence offered by the respondent fails to
convince SC that Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-
87-91-000649 was released, mailed, or sent before 15
April 1991, or before the lapse of the period of
limitation upon assessment and collection prescribed
by Section 203 of the NIRC. Such evidence, therefore, is
insufficient to give rise to the presumption that the
assessment notice was received in the regular course
of mail. Consequently, the right of the government to
assess and collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred
by prescription.
-Under Sec. 203 of the NIRC, respondent had 3years
from the last day for the filing of the return to send an
assessment notice to petitioner. An assessment is
made within the prescriptive period if notice to this
effect is released, mailed or sent by the CIR to the
taxpayer within said period. Receipt thereof by the
taxpayer within the prescriptive period is not necessary
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Bautista). The rule
does not dispense with the requirement that the
taxpayer should actually receive, even beyond the
prescriptive period, the assessment notice which was
timely released, mailed and sent.
-In the present case, records show that petitioner filed
its Annual ITR for taxable year 1987 on 14 April 1988.
The last day for filing by petitioner of its return was on
15 April 1988, thus, giving respondent until 15 April
1991 within which to send an assessment notice. While
respondent avers that it sent the assessment notice
dated 1 February 1991 on 6 February 1991, within the
three (3)-year period prescribed by law, petitioner
denies having received an assessment notice from
respondent. Petitioner alleges that it came to know of
110
 Prof. V. A. Avena
the deficiency tax assessment only on 17 March 1992
when it was served with the Warrant of Distraint and
Levy.
-Protector’s Services, Inc. v. CA: when a mail matter is
sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set
forth under Rule 131.3(v) that it was received in the
regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order
to raise this presumption are: (a) that the letter was
properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b) that
it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received
by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is
still merely a disputable presumption subject to
controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof
shifts the burden upon the party favored by the
presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed
received by the addressee.
-Here, no substantial evidence was ever presented to
prove that the assessment notice No. FAN-1-87-91-
000649 or other supposed notices subsequent thereto
were in fact issued or sent to the taxpayer. CIR only
submitted the BIR record book which allegedly contains
the list of taxpayer’s names, the reference number, the
year, the nature of tax, the city/municipality and the
amount. However, as can be gleaned from the face of
the exhibit, all entries thereon appears to be immaterial
and impertinent in proving that the assessment notice
was mailed and duly received by petitioner. Nothing
indicates therein all essential facts that could sustain
the burden of proof being shifted. What is essential to
prove the fact of mailing is the registry receipt issued
by the Bureau of Posts or the Registry return card
which would have been signed by the Petitioner or its
authorized representative. And if said documents
cannot be located, Respondent at the very least, should
have submitted to the Court a certification issued by
the Bureau of Posts and any other pertinent document
which is executed with the intervention of the Bureau
of Posts. Any of these independent evidence could have
easily been obtained. Yet respondent failed to present
such evidence.
-CIR offered the entry in the BIR record book and the
testimony of its record custodian as entries in official
records in accordance with Rule 130.44 of the Rules
of Court. The foregoing rule on evidence, however,
must be read in accordance with this Court’s
pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., where it
has been held that an entrant must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts
Evidence
were acquired by him from reports made by persons
under a legal duty to submit the same.
-There are three requisites for admissibility under
the rule just mentioned:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information x x x.
-In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were
not based on her personal knowledge as she did not
attest to the fact that she personally prepared and
mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the
transcript of stenographic notes how and from whom
she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she
did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports
from persons under a legal duty to submit the same.
Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the
present case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent
does not qualify as an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence.
-Nava v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue: “While we
have held that an assessment is made when sent
within the prescribed period, even if received by the
taxpayer after its expiration, this ruling makes it the
more imperative that the release, mailing, or sending of
the notice be clearly and satisfactorily proved. Mere
notations made without the taxpayer’s intervention,
notice, or control, without adequate supporting
evidence, cannot suffice; otherwise, the taxpayer would
be at the mercy of the revenue offices, without
adequate protection or defense.”
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and
set aside . CTA decision reinstated.
Testimony in Former Deposition or Proceeding
TAN V CA
May 16, 1967; SANCHEZ, J.
(lora)
FACTS
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- This is a suit aimed at establishing a children-to-
father, illegitimate relationship between petitioners and
the principal respondent Francisco Tan, and to compel
the latter to support petitioners.
- Petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as
guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan in the CFI of
Manila for acknowledgment and support. 1䷰h ‫�ﱮ‬/cite>
- Celestina Daldo after petitioners had already
presented oral and documentary evidence and were
about to rest their case moved to dismiss the foregoing
civil case upon the ground that the parties had come to
an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be
dismissed with prejudice and without recourse of
appeal.
- She subscribed before the clerk of the CFI of Manila to
an affidavit categorically stating that respondent
Francisco Tan, "is not the father of my said minor
children named Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein
petitioners) but another person whose name I cannot
divulge"; and that she prepared said affidavit precisely
"to record what is true and to correct what
misinterpretation may arise in the future".
- CFI of Manila dismissed the case with prejudice.
- 1 year and 8 months after the civil case was
dismissed — petitioners, thru their maternal
grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem,
commenced an action before the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court for acknowledgment and support,
involving the same parties, cause of action and subject
matter.
- The JDRC rendered judgment declaring that "the
present case is res judicata by reason of the dismissal
with prejudice of Civil Case 26909 of the CFI of Manila;
and that, even on the merits, plaintiffs have not made
out their case with sufficient evidence," and dismissed
the complaint.
- Petitioners moved to reconsider.
- JDRC reconsidered, declared the minors Carmelita and
Rodolfo Tan to be the illegitimate children of the
defendant Francisco Tan alias Tan Uh Bak and Tang
Seng Ka; ordered the defendant to support said minors
and to help them defray their matriculation expenses;
to reimburse Servillano Daldo his expenses in
supporting plaintiff minors during the pendency of the
case and to pay plaintiff minors' attorney's fees of
P500; and to pay the costs of this proceedings.
- Respondent Francisco Tan appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
- CA in turn reversed the last-named judgment and
dismissed the complaint.
- Petitioners appealed to Court in forma pauperis.
ISSUES
1. WON Exhibits H and I, testimony of petitioners'
witnesses in the former case are admissible.
2. WON petitioners had reasonably made out a case
against respondent.
HELD
1. NO. Rule 130, SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial.
— The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former case
between the same parties, relating to the same matter,
the adverse party having had an opportunity to cross-
examine him, may be given in evidence.
- Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were
subpoenaed by the JDRC a number of times. These
witnesses did not appear to testify. These witnesses are
not dead. They are not outside of the Philippines.
- Can they be categorized as witnesses of the class
unable to testify? The CA, construing this term, held
that "subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat
[second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first trial
does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to
death, as when the witness is old and has lost the
power of speech.
- Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only,
they refused to testify. Certainly, they do not come
within the legal purview of those unable to testify.
- Besides petitioners could have urged the court to
have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt.
Petitioners failed to avail of these remedies, went
ahead and submitted their case.
- The Court noted petitioners' argument that to follow
strictly the law of admissibility of testimony in former
trials, is to permit party litigants to buy witnesses to
dissuade them from testifying again. Nothing extant in
the record will as much as intimate that respondent
was responsible for the non-appearance of these
witnesses. The danger of tampering with witnesses is a
problem that attends trials in many a time and in
number of imaginable situations. And, petitioners
argument works both ways. Because, witnesses at the
former trial can be bought not to testify at the second
trial, in just the same way that they could have been
bought to give their original testimony. Solution of this
Evidence
problem lies elsewhere, not in the non-enforcement of
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
2. NO. Petitioners tried to prove that Celestina Daldo
and respondent Francisco Tan lived together as
husband and wife for more than eight years
commencing from 1936 to 1944. Petitioners Carmelita
Tan and Rodolfo Tan are allegedly the fruits of such
cohabitation. Respondent stoutly denies this claim,
avers that he is very much a married man with
children. Celestina Daldo, by her own admission, had
been a nursemaid (yaya) in respondent's residence but
for l short period of not less than one year in 1939.
Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo, on
September 11, 1944.
- The validity of the testimony of petitioners' witnesses
in the present case was considerably downgraded by
the affidavit of Celestina Daldo, heretofore adverted to,
attached to the record of the former Case 26909. In
that affidavit, Celestina deposed that petitioners were
not fathered by Francisco Tan, but, in Celestina's own
words, by "another person whose name I cannot
divulge."
- Striking is the fact that this affidavit was executed
after petitioners in the former case had finished with
their oral and documentary evidence and were about to
submit their case. By then, their counsel had a grasp of
the situation. Petitioners and their guardian ad litem
could have known whether they had reasonably made
out a case against respondent.
- Correctly then did the CA rule out the probative value
of petitioners' evidence and found for respondent.
- CA: the evidence for the plaintiffs-appellees fall short
of the requirement of clear strong and convincing
evidence. We agree with the findings of the trial court
in its original correctly appreciating the evidence of the
plaintiffs as unsatisfactory and insufficient, in view of
the following considerations:
1. That Exhibits H and I, former testimonies of
witnesses in Civil Case No. 26909, are inadmissible.
2. That the baptismal certificates are not admissible
proofs of filiation. The birth certificate is likewise
inadmissible against the defendant because the alleged
illegitimate father did not sign it under oath. It should
be noted that said baptismal certificates are also
useless to prove the dates of birth of the appellees-
minors, considering that the period of cohabitation or
any intimate relations at all between their mother and
the appellant has been denied and that same has not
been satisfactorily proved.
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3. The oral evidence for the plaintiffs, consisting
principally of the testimonies of the grandfather and of
the mother of the minors, are unsatisfactory, being
inconsistent and contradictory on material points, and
unbelievable. The loose character of the mother of the
minors who admittedly had lived and begotten children
with several men of different nationalities, cannot also
be overlooked.
- Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, employs the
commanding language that "only questions of law may
be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of
the Court of Appeals. That judgment, jurisprudence
teaches, is conclusive as to the facts. The Court is not
to alter said facts — they bind it, or to review the
questions of fact
Disposition Judgment of CA Affirmed.
MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN
G.R. No. 150157
Chico-Nazario; January 25, 2007
(mel)
NATURE Petition for review assailing the decision of CA
(affirming TC)
FACTS
Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his
way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-
type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound
for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles
collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter
to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a
ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage.
The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters
from point of collision. Calaunan suffered minor injuries
while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in
Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the
Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
A criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and
PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City. The criminal
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those
who testified in the criminal case were respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent
prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in
the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law,
respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then.
Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother,
Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work.
Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo
Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She
narrated that she thought her husband went to his
hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return
after one month. She went to her husband’s hometown
to look for him but she was informed that he did not go
there.
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch
8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where the criminal
case was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in said case, together with other documentary
evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of
Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court
Interpreter, who appeared before the court and
identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses
and other pertinent documents he had brought.
Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in
the instant case, but since the same were not brought
to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised
that said TSNs and documents could be offered by
counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence. For the
defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor
Oscar Buan testified. The TSN of the testimony of
Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in the
criminal case was marked and allowed to be adopted in
the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents,
as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs of the testimonies of
Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in
the criminal case.
Evidence
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI. CA affirmed.
ISSUE WON the admission in evidence of the TSN’s and
other documents presented in the criminal case is valid
HELD YES
RATIO Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos should not be admitted in
evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the
requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or
unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the
same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence
of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a
testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in the criminal case,
had no opportunity to cross-examine the three
witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed
exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner
PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal
cases instituted against their employees.
REASONING
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not
a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the
three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that
petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the
time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered
in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege
which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to
the evidence because it does not conform to the
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents
are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
A2010
failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted
and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient
to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be
considered and given the importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the
TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case when the same were offered in
evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted
by both petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even
offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of
Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI
argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s
witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted
in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal
case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its
cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the
testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the
criminal case should not be admitted and at the same
time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness
for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow
admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony
of Ganiban would be unfair.
The Court does not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s
argument that it will be denied due process when the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be
admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner
PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground
for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure
to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object
that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal
case should not have been admitted in the instant civil
case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
"testimony or deposition." We find such contention to
be untenable. Though said section speaks only of
testimony and deposition, it does not mean that
documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be
admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being
part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
113
 Prof. V. A. Avena A2010
Evidence
admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same that her properties would be sold at • Avelina personally appeared before the
weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. public auction by virtue of a petition for notary public.
DISPOSITION petition for review denied. CA decision extrajudicial foreclosure filed by - Avelina died and was substituted by her
affirmed petitioner; heirs.
Opinion Evidence • After inquiring from petitioner, she - RTC: Complaint and Counterclaim
learned that she allegedly executed a Dismissed.
CHINA BANKING CORP., INC VS CA (HEIRS real estate mortgage and a surety - CA: Reversed.
OF AVELINA VDA. DE PIÑERO AND agreement to secure a loan of one • Deceased Avelina was an old widow, 80
EMMANUEL PIÑERO) Alfredo Kipte, whom she does not know; years of age and blind even before she
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; July 24, 2007 • The foreclosure is void since she never purportedly signed the Real Estate
[maem] voluntarily executed the mortgage or Mortgage and Surety Agreement on
surety agreement, never appeared before August 26, 1991 and August 29, 1991,
NATURE the notary public, never received any respectively;
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule proceeds from the loan, and was never a • That Rebecca Piñero-Galang, daughter
45 business associate of Kipte; of Avelina, testified that in 1985, her
• Sometime in 1990, Emmanuel’s mother became totally blind, was not
FACTS common-law wife, Ludivina Rinnoces, physically fit, and suffered an eye
- Deceased Avelina Vda. de Piñero (Avelina), asked Avelina to sign some documents disease or glaucoma;
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, was allegedly pertaining to a loan from one • Avelina herself testified that she was
the registered owner of two adjoining Cerila de Leon; only persuaded to sign the questioned
parcels of land with improvements,
consisting of 510 sq m situated in • Avelina signed these documents
documents as witness; that Ludivina
guided her when she signed the
Mandaluyong City. without reading the same, as she is
foregoing documents; that she did not
- [August 27, 1991] Alfonso Kipte obtained a blind, and without knowing the contents
receive from Kipte, the principal
P1,200,000.00 loan from Avelina, secured by thereof;
borrower, any amount as consideration of
a promissory note and a real estate • In 1991, Ludivina again asked her to the mortgage attests to her credible
mortgage signed by Avelina over her sign some documents, allegedly to pay theory that she was only a witness to the
properties. The mortgage was annotated on the account to Cerila; again, Avelina was execution of the documents;
the titles. The loan was also secured by a not able to read or know the contents of
• That her deportment in court and the
surety agreement signed by Kipte as these documents;
fact that she had to be guided to take
principal and by Avelina as surety. Due to • The alleged mortgage was annotated the witness stand constituted the
Kipte’s failure to pay his indebtedness, the on TCT No. 64018, but not on TCT No. “strongest proof of blindness”;
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and 59833;
• That the notary public, Atty. Restituto
auction sale was scheduled on August 17, • TCT No. 64018 also contained a Fano, who claimed to have notarized the
1992. cancellation of a mortgage in favor of Surety Agreement, said that he
- Avelina and respondent Emmanuel Piñero Jose Macaraig and Cerila de Leon, both of remembered Avelina to be an old lady,
sued China Banking Corporation, Inc., Notary whom she does not know. with white complexion and white hair,
Public Ernesto Bonifacio, Alfonso Kipte, - China Banking contends that: and who had to be assisted and
Marivic Kipte and the Register of Deeds of • Upon execution of the documents, accompanied to his table to be able to
Rizal for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Avelina was furnished with copies sign the questioned agreements; he
Foreclosure of Mortgage, Notice of Auction thereof; noticed that “she could hardly see”;
Sale and Damages with Prayer for Issuance • Avelina freely and voluntarily signed
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or • That it was unusual for Avelina, a
the documents; woman of old age, to be so willing to act
Preliminary Injunction with the RTC. • At the time of the execution of the
- Avelina denies having signed the as surety to a promissory note of Kipte, a
documents, though physically weak, she complete stranger, which involved the
documents, and alleged that: was mentally sound and in complete large amount of P1,200,000.00.
• Sometime in September 1992, Avelina possession of her faculties, and she
was surprised to receive a foreclosure understood the nature of the ISSUE
notice from the notary public, stating transactions;

114
 Prof. V. A. Avena A2010
Evidence
I: WON Avelina signed the real estate by anyone with sufficient familiarity of such Rebecca Piñero-Galang. Even the notary
mortgage and surety agreement knowingly fact. Avelina during trial categorically before whom she supposedly appeared
and voluntarily, with full knowledge of its testified and attested to her own blindness, testified to the fact that she was indeed
contents? a fact which even the trial court noted, blind and that she was not made to
viz: understand the documents.
HELD - Clearly, Avelina was in fact blind, that she
China Banking: Avelina’s signature was q- You are an educated did not know the contents of the documents
admitted as authentic. As notarial person Mrs. Witness, is she signed, and more importantly, that she
documents, they are prima facie regular and it not true that it is did not know the capacity in which she was
duly executed; Avelina was duly informed of basic for a person signing these documents.
the nature and purpose of these agreements before signing a
by petitioner’s branch manager and the document to read it DISPOSITION
notary public before she affixed her first? CA Affirmed.
signature; and respondents did not even
submit a medical certificate attesting to the ATTY. DE GUZMAN: Objection.
supposed blindness of Avelina or made an Presumptions
ophthalmologist take the witness stand. ATTY. CASIDING: I am asking
Notarization the witness if she BORJE V SANDIGANBAYAN
- The admission of the signature’s knows? G.R. 55436
authenticity does not by itself prove GUERRERO; November 15, 1983
petitioner’s case. The issue is whether COURT: Yes, but precisely the (aida)
Avelina gave her consent to be bound as witness is blind.
surety, not whether she affixed her
signature. Also Ludivina’s testimony established FACTS
Mayor v Belen: Notarization per se is that: - Borje (as the former Provincial Plant Industry Officer of
not a guarantee of the validity of the • Avelina was already blind when she was the Bureau of Plant and Industry in San Fernando, La
contents of a document. Generally a manipulated into signing the questioned Union) was charged with falsification of a public
notarized document is presumed regular, but documents by her daughter-in-law, who document. He was accused of falsifying the timebook
such is rebuttable. did not explain to her the contents and and payroll of his office for the periods covering January
true nature of the documents to March 1977, the daily time record of Ducusin and a
When Expert Opinion Necessary beforehand; certification for the amount of P225.
Reyes v Sisters of Mary Hospital; • Her hand had to be guided by Ludivina - According to testimonial evidence, Ducusin was
Ramos v CA: The rule requiring the opinion during the act of signing; employed as Plant Pest Officer with BPI San Fernando
of expert witnesses applies only to such • Avelina did not know that the Surety from February 2, 1975 up to his resignation on April 30,
matters clearly within the domain of medical Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage she 1978. From February 2, 1975 up to December 1976, he
science, and not to matters that are within signed were to secure the loan Kipte was detailed as production technician in the Gulayan
the common knowledge of mankind which contracted from the petitioner; Program of the BPI and the Bureau of Agricultural
may be testified to by anyone familiar with • She was made to understand that she Extension receiving incentive pay from the National
the facts. was to sign only as witness; Food and Agricultural Council during said period. In
1977, however, Ducusin was no longer entitled to the
• Kipte was a total stranger to her, and,
Attesting to Blindness does not need NFAC incentive pay as he was detailed to the
by this reason, it is implausible that she
Expert Opinion Surveillance and Early Warning Services (SEWS) Team
agreed to be his surety. In fact, it was
Thus, to prove whether one is blind, of the Bureau of Plant Industry from January 1977 up to
only after Avelina received the notices of
it is not necessary to submit a medical April 30, 1978.
foreclosure that she learned that there
certificate attesting to the blindness or to - Ducusin was informed by Castro that he was entitled
was a mortgage document among the
require an expert witness, such as an to receive NFAC incentive pay because his name was
papers she signed.
ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, included in the special order enumerating those
- Avelina's blindness was further confirmed
since the fact of blindness can be included in the program. Before one can receive the
by the testimonies of her children,
determined through common knowledge and incentive pay, a person must prepare his daily time
respondents Emmanuel M. Piñero and

115
 Prof. V. A. Avena
record and a certification that he was indeed detailed in
the said program. Ducusin went to the BPI’s
accounting division where he discovered that the
payroll for the periods of January, February and March
1977 all bore his name and signature even if he had
never done so.
- Ducusin referred the matter to accused Borje who
confessed that he (Borje) had taken Ducusin’s incentive
pay and repeatedly offered him P225 to cover the
incentive pay which Ducusin did not accept.
- Ducusin reported the matter to the BPI Regional
Director’s attention and later to the BPI president and
director. Ducusin later resigned, saying he had lost
faith in the way the matter was being handled.
- Borje contends that Ducusin was paid his incentive
pay and he confirms substantially the official procedure
in the preparation of the payroll and subsequent
payment of the incentive pay to the production
technicians as described by witness Lorenzo, disbursing
officer and cashier of BPI. He vigorously denies having
received the payroll and the corresponding checks from
witness Lorenzo as his participation in the preparation
of the said payroll ended with his signing thereof after
which the payroll goes to the disbursing officer for the
preparation and issuance of the checks to the payees.
- Borje claims that he had nothing to do with the
falsification charges filed against Ducusin but alleges
that Ducusin’s falsification charges filed against him
was the latter’s way of getting back at him. He also
alleged that Ducusin performed dual work – first with
the Gulayan program and second with the SEWS team
as Plant Pest Control Officer and that his resignation
was a way for him to avoid facing the charges in
connection with this dual work performed.
- Borje pleaded not guilty but the Sandigabayan
declared him otherwise.
ISSUE
WON the Sandigabyan erred in declaring Borje guilty of
falsification of public documents
HELD
YES, the prosecution was unable to satisfactorily
overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to
accused Borje.
Ratio The constitutional presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused has not been satisfactorily
overcome by the prosecution evidence in this case
where the conviction of Borje for falsification of public
Evidence
documents was based principally on the mere
assumption that as possessor of the falsified
documents, he is presumed to be the author of the
falsification.
Reasoning
- There is no direct proof showing that Borje, who had
many subordinate employees and personnel under him
engaged in agricultural field work and assigned in the
rural areas, had personally and actually falsified the
public documents in question.
- In the face of the documents presented (timebook,
payroll and daily time record), the liability of Borje as
head of the office who had signed the certification and
verificationmust be limited to the contents of said
verification and certification for which he does not
necessarily incur criminal responsibility if the entries,
data or statements certified and verified turn out not to
be true. In such a scenario, the employee or personnel
making the entries, data or statements as to his
services and attendance is solely and separately
responsible.
- The Sandiganbayan convicted Borje on the basis of
the testimony of the cashier Lorenzo who testified that
she delivered the payroll and checks to Borje, relying
further on the presumption that as possessor of the
document, the accused is presumed to have falsified it.
But in reviewing the testimony of Lorenzo, the Court
found that she said that she delivered the payroll and
the checks to Ducusin, even identifying the genuine
signature of Ducusin on the payroll.
- Lorenzo’s claim that she was forced to testify for Borje
on pain of being implicated in the case does not hold
water. Lorenzo’s position as cashier is not subordinate
to Borje’s position so she cannot be easily said to be
intimidated by him.
- The Court rejects the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the
presumption that as possessor of the document, the
accused is presumed to be the author of the
falsification on the following grounds:
- The Lorenzo testimony is deemed to be
questionable.
- Borje has denied vigorously the testimony of
Lorenzo that he received the payroll and the
checks from her. He said that his participation
in the preparation of the payroll ended with his
act of affixing his signature.
- Exhibit A (payroll and timebook) appears to
be also signed by 10 other production
technicians listed in the payroll, besides
A2010
Ducusin. It is initialled by 3 personnel in the
Accounting Services Unit and further signed by
the Regional Accountant and for the Regional
Director. All of these persons were at one time
or another in possession of the document, all
of them had the same opportunity to commit
the falsification along with the messengers
who presumably delivered the documents.
Other employees may have handled the
document also or purposes of typing, funding,
initialling, verification, certification,
accounting, recording, drawing of the check
and finally, issuing of the check.
- Only photocopies of the alleged documents were
presented in court and the Sandiganbayan stated that
the issue of bringing out the original would have been
relevant if he issue confronting the Court been one of
alteration or superimposition of signatures or words or
figures.
- With regard to the defense’s portrayal of the accused
as an exemplary public servant, the court held that an
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because
of his previous good moral character and exemplary
conduct if the court believes he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Disposition Judgment reversed.
CAPILI v CARDANA
G.R. No. 157906
QUISUMBING; Nov 2, 2006
(kooky)
NATURE:
Petition for review
FACTS:
- On Feb 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along
the perimeter fence of San Roque Elementary School
when a branch of a caimito tree located within the
school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous
death. Her parents filed a case for damages before RTC
of Palo, Leyte against Joaquinita Capili, the school
principal.
- The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as
early as Dec 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay,
Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the
tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to Capili
the tree that stood near the principal’s office. The
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
Cardañas averred that Capili’s gross negligence and
lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
- Capili denied the accusation and said that at that time
Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied
knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. To prove
her point, she presented witnesses who attested that
she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other
teachers during a meeting on Dec 15, 1992 and
assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
- TC dismissed the complaint for failure of Cardañas to
establish negligence on the part of Capili. It gave
credence to the claim of Caopili that she had no
knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting
and that Lerios merely informed her that he was going
to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that petitioner
exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances require and that there was an absence
of evidence that would require her to use a higher
standard of care more than that required by the
attendant circumstances.
- CA reversed, finding Capili liable for Jasmin’s death. It
ruled that petitioner should have known of the
condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no
matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have
had the tree removed and not merely delegated the
task to Palaña. The appellate court ruled that the dead
caimito tree was a nuisance that should have been
removed soon after petitioner had chanced upon it.
Capili’s MR was denied. Thus, this appeal.
- Petitioner’s Arguments: she was not negligent
about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned
her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its disposal; that
despite her physical inspection of the school grounds,
she did not observe any indication that the tree was
already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers inform her
that the tree was already rotten; and that moral
damages should not be granted against her since there
was no fraud nor bad faith on her part. She contends
she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting
tree because Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and
did not inform her of its condition. Neither did any of
her teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent
danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see
the immediate danger posed by the tree by its mere
sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted
ground inspections. She further argues that, even if she
should have been aware of the danger, she exercised
her duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to
another teacher.
Evidence
- Respondents’ comment: they insist that Capili
knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did
not exercise reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have done in the same
situation.
ISSUE:
WON Capili was negligent and therefore liable for the
death of Jasmin Cardaña
HELD:
YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
Ratio Where (1) the accident was of such character as
to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2)
the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured, the doctrine applies.
Ratio The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed
once respondents established the requisites for the
doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima
facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to
petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference may
be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption,
such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh
the inference.
- A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely
carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and
may be one which creates a situation involving an
unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable
action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force
of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary
prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or
similar circumstances, would foresee such an
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not
to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.
-- In every tort case filed under Art 2176 CC, the
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault
or negligence of the defendant or some other person
for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred.
A2010
- The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter,
Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree
within the school’s premises shows that the tree was
indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and
calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
- The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to
warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which
caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result
of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the
school.
- D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
- While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or
presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an
inference or presumption that it was due to negligence
on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as
to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence. x x x
where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality
which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those
who had its control or management used proper care,
there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendant’s want of care.
- Petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have
the tree removed immediately is not sufficient to
exculpate her. As school principal, petitioner is
expected to oversee the safety of the school’s
premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate
danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she
failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her
position. Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned
disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises
supervision over her assignee. The record shows that
more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner
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gave instruction to her assistant Palaña to the time the
incident occurred. Clearly, she failed to check
seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had
been removed.
Disposition Petition denied.
Laying the Predicate
PEOPLE V. MOLO
G.R. No. L-44680
Per Curiam; 11 January 1979
(ice)
Nature
Automatic Review
Facts
Molo was accused of Murder. He allegedly attacked and
assaulter Gapisa in Romblon with a bolo.
-Venancio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa, husband
and wife, retired to sleep. The couple lived in a typical
hut made of bamboo flooring and dilapidated buri
walling surrounded by fruit bearing banana plants.
Simeona, who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an
indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing of teeth. She
saw accused Dominador Molo by peeping in a hole. She
immediately lighted a kerosene lamp and placed it on
top of the trunk nearby. She tried to awaken her
husband, but the latter did not respond. The accused
had already climbed up the house which was only a
flight of two steps. The accused forcibly pushed the
sliding door and barged into the house. He inquired
from Simeona where Venancio was and she replied that
he was asleep. Finding Venancio sleeping near the
door, he immediately grabbed his left wrist and started
hacking at the sleeping old man. Rudely awakened,
Venancio quickly stood up and with his right hand
reached for his bolo which was atop the table nearby;
but he was not able to retaliate in as much as
Dominador Molo was quick to hack at him again.
Fearing for her own life, Simeona rushed out of the
house through the door of the unfinished kitchen to
summon help from her son, Alejandro Gapisa, who was
at Roman Mangaring's house some 100 meters away.
Trembling, she told him that his father was boloed by
Boslo, the name by which accused-appellant was
known in their locality.
Evidence
Upon being informed, Alejandro and Roman ran
towards the house of Venancio, followed by Simeona.
Upon arrival. they saw Venancio bleeding profusely and
in weakened condition. He was sitting in the floor of the
kitchen, defecating in his pants. When Alejandro took
him in his arms, Venancio told him that he was boloed
by Boslo. Roman Mangaring who was present also
inquired from Venancio who his assailant was and
elicited the answer, "Boslo". Venancio was then rushed
to the hospital and arrived there at about 1:50 a.m. He
expired a few minutes after.
-Testimonies were presented from (1) the victim's wife,
Simeona Gapisa, an eye witness to the alleged murder;
(2) Alejandro Gapisa, a son of the victim who went to
the rescue of his father after he was stabbed by
accused-appellant and was able to talk with him before
he succumbed to several bolo wounds; (3) Roman
Mangaring, a neighbor of Alejandro; and (4) Dr. Victorio
Benedicto, who performed the autopsy and
accomplished the Autopsy Report. PC soldiers and
policemen were dispatched to the house of Dominador
Molo some one and a half (1-1/2) kilometers away from
the scene of the killing Dominador Molo was placed
under arrest and brought by the arresting officers to
the poblacion. Investigated at the PC barracks.
Trial Court relying on the testimony of Simeona Gapisa
who was an eye-and ear-witness to the incident and the
corroborating testimonies of Alejandro Gapisa and
Roman Mangaring, who testified on the ante-mortem
statements of the victim identifying accused as the
assailant; discounting the defense of alibi put forth by
the accused and his wife; appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, recidivism and reiteration
alleged in the Information, and a mitigating
circumstance, voluntary surrender, sentenced the
accused.
Issues
(The court tried to answer each allegations of Molo)
WON there is no proof of motive on appellant's part.
Motive need not be shown where there is positive
Identification. Even in the absence of proof of motive,
the conviction of accused- appellant can stand
inasmuch as he had been positively Identified by
Simeona Gapisa and by the deceased himself through
his dying declaration. Motive need not be shown when
there is positive Identification. (People vs. Feliciano, 58
SCRA 383; People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172).
A2010
WON Molo’s Identity as assailant was not established
beyond reasonable doubt.
The alleged inconsistent statement given to the police
was neither offered as evidence nor shown to witness
in order to enable her to explain the discrepancies if
any in accordance to Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. The proper bast was, therefore, not laid to
impeach Simeona's testimony on the basis of alleged
inconsistent statements which she allegedly made
before the police. Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies
inconsequential. Inconsistencies on minor details or on
matters that are not of material consequence as to
affect the guilt or the innocence of the accused do not
detract from the credibility of the witnesses. The
discordance in their testimonies on collateral matters
heightens their credibility and shows that their
testimonies were not coached or rehearsed. Far from
being evidence of falsehood, they could justifiably be
regarded as a demonstration of good faith.
On the alleged inconsistent averments regarding the
presence of light. A review of the transcript of the
testimony shows that the foregoing is an inaccurate
representation of Simeona's testimony. For she clarified
that her husband was already boloed before the light
was snuffed out.
With regard to alleged incredible assertions, i.e. that it
was very unusual that she remained silent while
witnessing the attack on her husband. The transcripts
showan answer to the misgivings by showing that she
was scared of being boloed as well which the court
finds reasonable.
With regard to the assertion that Simeona only pointed
to the accused as the killer because he was a hated
criminal in the locality
No. There was certainty in the identification of Molo.
WON Simeona's account is contrary to physical facts
(i.e how Molo stabbed her husband)
No it is not. To simply thrust a bolo at a lying person is
not as forceful as to hack him with it. The first is an
awkward if not difficult movement, but the second is
natural and can be done with facility.
WON Simeona could have been able to recognize Molo
(given that he was at the foot of the stairs and there is
a banana plant obstructing the moonlight)
Yes. Simeona testified that the banana plants did not
obstruct the light cast by the moon and the defense did
not disprove this fact. Indeed, Simeona had no difficulty
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in recognizing the accused, considering that their house
was only elevated by two steps and at the time she saw
him through the dilapidated burl wall he was already at
the foot of the stairs.
WON the dying declarations should not be accorded
credence because the victim could not have recognized
his assailant, since as testified by Simeona he was
asleep when attacked
No, it was only at the initial stage of the attack when
the victim was asleep, because he was awakened by
the first blows and stood up to defend himself. The
statements of Venancio Identifying Dominador Molo as
his assailant to Alejandro, his son, and Roman, his
neighbor are dying declarations.
Considering the nature and extent of the wounds, eight
in all, Venancio must have realized the seriousness of
his condition and it can therefore be inferred that he
made the incrimination under the conciousness of
impending death, which, in fact, supervened barely 4-
1/2 hours after he was boloed.
Disposition
Affirmed
JUAN YSMAEL & CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant VS
NAGEEB T. HASHIM and AFIFE ABDO CHEYBAN
GORAYEB, defendants. (AFIFE ABDO CHEYBAN
GORAYEB, appellant)
GR No. 26247
OSTRAND; March 18, 1927
(eva)
FACTS
- The complaint in the present case sets forth two
causes of action:
1) plaintiff alleges that the defendant Nageeb T.
Hashim on Sept.21, 1916 executed a chattel mortgage
in favor of said plaintiff for the sum of P13,160.87, with
interest at 8% p.a., the mortgage falling due on
Sept.21, 1917; that defendant failed to pay and so the
chattel mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged
property sold by the sheriff on Jan.15, 1921; that a
balance of P11,060.87 was left after applying the
proceeds from the sale, which, with the corresponding
interest at 8% from Sept.21, 1916 to Jan.9, 1925, now
amounts to the sum of P19,134.32
Evidence
2) plaintiff alleges that the defendant Hashim has been
indebted in the sum of P14,646.47 to the Hashim
Commercial & Trading Company, Ltd., a limited co-
partnership, and that, for good and valuable
consideration, the said co-partnership assigned the
amount due it on said indebtedness to the plaintiff on
October 3, 1921, together with its other bills receivable,
fixtures, cash on hand in banks, and its entire stock of
goods; that the plaintiff has demanded payment from
the defendants and now asks judgment against them.
The plaintiff also prayed for a writ of attachment of the
property of the defendants, which prayer was granted.
- Hashim admits all of the allegations of the complaint
and consents to the rendition of the judgment in
conformity therewith. The defendant Afife Abdo
Cheyban denies all other allegations contained in the
complaint and set up as a special defense that the
action is the result of a conspiracy between Hashim and
his relations, the stockholders is Juan Ysmael & Co.,
Inc., to defraud her of the alimony granted her in a civil
case. She also alleges that she has suffered damages in
the sum of P20,000.
- CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
full amount demanded under the first cause of action,
but dismissed the second cause of action on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to show that the credit upon
which said cause of action is based had been legally
assigned to it.
ISSUES
1. WON the court erred in dismissing the second cause
of action.
2. WON the court erred in rendering judgment upon the
first cause of action in favor of the plaintiff.
3. WON the trial court erred in prohibiting Cheyban
from inquiring into the details of the account set forth
in Exhibit 3.
4. WON the trial court erred in refusing to receive the
testimony of the defendant N. T. Hashim, that of A. T.
Hashim, and that of K. N.Hemady in the former action.
HELD
1. NO.
- Ysmael assigns as error the finding of the trial court
that the indebtedness of the defendant Nageeb T.
Hashim to the Hashim Commercial & Trading Co., Ltd.,
in the amount of P14,646.47, was assigned by the
latter to the Asia Banking Corporation and not to it, and
that the court likewise erred in dismissing the second
A2010
cause of action alleged in the complaint. This
contention is principally based on a resolution of the
stockholders of the Hashim Commercial & Trading Co.,
Ltd., the last three paragraphs of which reads as
follows: “...on condition that this company transfer to
Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. its entire stock of goods, cash
on hand and in banks, bills receivable, fixtures, and to
have access to the books whenever required by
them; ...that Mr. A. T. Hashim be and hereby is,
authorized in an irrevocable manner to transfer in favor
of Messrs. Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc., its entire stock of
goods, cash on hand and in banks, bills receivable,
fixtures and to have access to the books whenever
required by them; and be it further; ...Mr. A. T. Hashim
be and hereby is authorized in an irrevocable manner
to execute, acknowledge, and deliver all such
documents and instruments in writing as may be
necessary to effectuate the foregoing purpose.”
- It does not appear that the assignment authorized by
this resolution was ever made and the same
stockholders, together with Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc.,
also a stockholder, adopted another resolution which
practically revoked the resolution of October 3, 1921:
“...Now, therefore, be it resolved that the transfer made
by A. T. Hashim, as aforesaid, to the Asia Banking
Corporation, of all goods, wares and merchandise, as
per said agreement, be and the same approved, and
transfer ratified.”
- As will be seen the only assignment actually effected
was that to the Asia Banking Corporation. Upon the
facts shown by the record, Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc.
might, perhaps, have compelled the Hashim
Commercial & Trading Co. to execute an assignment of
the credit in controversy, but it does not follow that the
same facts would constitute a valid assignment as
against third parties and that the prospective assignee
may maintain an action against the debtor for the
collection of the credit without a formal assignment of
such credit. The debtor has the right to demand that
the person who sues him for the debt shall be the real
party in interest and shall show a valid title to the
chose in action; a mere equitable right to the
assignment thereof is not sufficient.
2. NO, but amount modified.
In discussing their first assignment of error, counsel for
the defendant-appellant insist that, taking into
consideration the facts of the case and the
circumstances preceding the same, it is obvious that
the case is "fraudulent and that even if the
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indebtedness claimed were over a true indebtedness,
either the same had been paid or payment thereof
waived." This contention is not entirely without
foundation, and in view of the very apparent
unreliability of some of the oral evidence presented,
the plaintiff's recovery on its first cause of action should
be limited to the amount shown by its books of
account.
- On December 31, 1924, the plaintiff's ledger showed a
balance of P12,238.02 against the defendant Hashim,
and it does not appear that he has incurred any further
indebtedness to the plaintiff since that date. The
plaintiff explains that the amount claimed in excess of
the sum shown by the ledger represents interest of 8%,
but under the circumstances of the case, we cannot
give much weight to this explanation. It clearly appears
that the chattel mortgage debt, upon which the
plaintiff's first cause of action is based, is included in
the ledger account and it may properly be considered
as merged therein.
3. YES.
The court below undoubtedly erred in denying the
defendant-appellant the opportunity to inquire into the
sources of the entries found in the plaintiff's books of
account in relation to the indebtedness of the
defendants; the fact that such sources might have been
examined in civil case No. 19569 of the CFI cannot be
regarded as a bar to a reasonable inquiry into the
character of the debt in the present case. The issues in
the two cases are entirely different; the former case
dealt with the validity of a chattel mortgage, while in
the present case, we are dealing with the amount of
the defendant's indebtedness to the plaintiff. For much
the same reasons, the defendant-appellant should have
been permitted to present evidence in support of her
special defense of conspiracy.
4. NO.
In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr.
Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case, the
defendant-appellant did not claim that said testimony
contained admissions against interest by the parties to
the action or their agents; if such had been the case,
the testimony would have been admissible without the
laying of a foundation and without the witnesses having
testified in the case at bar. But the purpose of the offer
of the testimony was evidently to impeach the
testimony of the same witnesses in the present case
and if so, a foundation should have been laid by calling
the attention of the witnesses to the former statements
Evidence
so as to give them opportunity to explain before the
statements were offered in evidence.
DISPOSITIVE
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, modified by
reducing the plaintiff's recovery to the sum of
P12,238.02, with interest at the rate of 6% from
January 13, 1925, the date of the filing of the
complaint. In all other respects said judgment is
affirmed without costs in this instance.
Reference to Memorandum
FIGUERAS VS. SERRANO
G.R. No. 28208
September 3, 1928, J. ROMUALDEZ
(SJ)
NATURE
This is an action to collect the balance of professional
fees, for medical services amounting to P52,229, with
P7,310 interest, plus P5,000 damages, and the costs of
the action.
FACTS
According to the complaint of Dr. Gregorio Figueras, the
services for which compensation is here claimed
consist in medical attendance during the years 1919,
1920, and 1921, on Primitiva Serrano as well as on her
father Leandro Serrano, for which purpose the plaintiff,
who at that time lived in Vigan, had to make many trips
to the town of Cabugao, 27 kilometers distant from
where said patients lived. Leandro Serrano is now dead,
and the complaint here is directed against his estate,
represented by the defendant administrator. It is also
alleged therein that Leandro Serrano promised to pay
for plaintiff's trip to the town of Cabugao at the rate of
P4 per kilometer.
The principal evidence adduced to prove this promise is
the letter Exhibit C which is alleged to be addressed to
the plaintiff and signed by Leandro Serrano. The
defendant assails the authenticity of this letter and the
signature at the bottom thereof. Exhbit Q and R on the
other hand were presented as memoranda where Dr.
Fugueras noted down his visits accompanied by
statements as to the services rendered.
ISSUE
A2010
Whether or not Exhibit C is genuine and therefore
admissible in evidence.
Whether or not Exhibit Q and R are admissible in
evidence.
HELD
1. NO
Indeed, we notice as to the context that the typewritten
characters therein are very similar to those of Exhibit 2.
(p. 184 of the record) which is a letter written by the
plaintiff's brother. The difference we observe in the
typewriting of these documents consists in that in
Exhibit C the type is more worn, thus suggesting the
fact that it was written later. The prior date appearing
in it does not preclude this conclusion, for any date,
past or future, may at a given time be written on any
document.
A careful examination of Exhibit C reveals some details
which bear out the presumption that it was written on
the same typewriter as document Exhibit 2. And the
changes and erasures which have not been satisfactory
explained, likewise argue against the admissibility of
this exhibit.
The remarkable resemblance almost identical, in point
of size and contour, between the signature in Exhibit C
and the one in Exhibit J, as may be clearly seen by
placing one upon the other, casts serious doubts on its
genuineness. It seems hardly probable that Leandro
Serrano should have been able to write two signatures
so exactly alike, not only in the curvature at the base of
the letters, and in the form of the small as well as the
capital letters, but also in the distance between them,
the space they occupy, and the slant of the strokes of
the whole signature as well as of each letter thereof,
and even in the length, contour, and other details of
the paraph.
As these details strongly indicate that Exhibit C is not
genuine, we cannot consider it as reliable proof in this
case. The burden of proof was on plaintiff to show, at
least by a preponderance of evidence, that this
document was admissible evidence of record, and, in
this case the preponderance militates against the
document.
It cannot be held proven, therefore, that Leandro
Serrano promised to pay the plaintiff P4 for every
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kilometer of his trips to Cabugao on his medical visits.
The preponderance of admissible evidence of record is
to the effect that the cost of each of such visits to
Cabugao is about P25. Considering plaintiff's social
standing, he was entitled to use an automobile as the
most adequate mode of transportation.
2. NO
Exhibits Q and R are objected to by the defendant as
not duly identified and as incompetent evidence. It is
true that the witnesses Parto and Florendo testified that
they recognized the writing in said notebooks as
plaintiff's, but there is no proof that the notes in these
exhibits were written with the knowledge and consent,
or even in the presence, of Leandro Serrano. Neither
does it appear that such notes were made at the time
of the visits and professional services referred to
therein, or that they were written about that time. And
the appearance of the writing in these books (Exhibit Q
and R ) does not show that such notes were made
therein on different occasions and at different periods
of time, considering the noticeable uniformity of the
handwriting and of the color of the ink used (in Exhibit
Q), in almost all the entries, notwithstanding the fact
that these entries cover a period of over one year.
It is absolutely necessary for the admission of such
entries to prove that they were made at or about the
time of the transaction to which they relate. Once this
is proven they may be admitted to corroborate the
testimony of the person who made them.
WRITTEN MEMORANDA MADE AT OR ABOUT THE TIME
OF THE TRANSACTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE ARE
SOMETIMES ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE
THE TESTIMONY OF THE PERSON BY WHOM THEY WERE
MADE. (22 C.J., 869.)
But the fact is that Exhibits Q and R not only do not
meet the requirement as to being contemporaneous,
but it appears that the plaintiff who made the
memoranda noted therein did not even testify
concerning them.
These exhibits cannot, therefore, be taken into
consideration to determine the number of visits made
by the plaintiff nor that of the times he rendered
professional services.
Evidence
The appellee alleges that said entries are corroborated
by the witness Florendo, Formoso, Figueras and
Arcebal, the first three of whom, chauffeurs who
successively took the plaintiff to Cabugao, among
themselves fixed the total number of trips to Cabugao
at about one hundred, and Arcebal testified that at the
time in question, he saw the plaintiff stop in front of the
municipal building of Cabugao two or three times a
week, going in the direction of Leandro Serrano's
house. The number of times testified to by these
witnesses, is, as it could not otherwise be as inferred
from their own testimony, mere conjecture, without
sufficient assurance of approximation, much less
exactness. What these witnesses definitely established
and wherein they corroborate the notebooks Exhibits Q
and R, is that the plaintiff made trips to Cabugao, a fact
admitted by the defendant. But as to the number of
said trips, which is the point in question, the testimony
of these witnesses, with all its uncertainty on this point,
cannot be considered as either direct or corroborative
evidence.
We therefore find that the plaintiff's evidence does not
supply data legally competent to ascertain the number
of times he was in Cabugao to render professional
services to Primitiva Serrano.
According to the defendant's evidence consisting of
Exhibits 6, 7, 9 and 10, identified by Pedro Suero and
Simeon Serrano, the plaintiff made twenty-six medical
visits to Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao, and ninety in
Vigan. Not only are these Exhibits 6, 7, 9 and 10,
identified, but it appears from the testimony of Pedro
Suero, that he, as former clerk to Leandro Serrano, was
enjoined to note down in Exhibits 6 and 7, which are
Bristol Almanacs for the years 1919 and 1920, the
name of Gregorio Figueras, whenever said physician
paid a professional visit to Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao
that he used to record plaintiff's medical visits to
witness' sister, Primitiva Serrano, in Vigan, in the
almanacs Exhibits 9 and 10 with the initial G and the
letters "a.m." or "p.m." according as they were made in
the morning or afternoon.
Unlike the entries in Exhibits Q and R, those of Exhibits
6, 7, 9 and 10, are competent evidence, because, in
addition to being sufficiently identified by the persons
who made them at the time of the visits, their
A2010
appearance, details, and the fact that they were made
at the time of the visits so recorded, render them
competent corroborative evidence under the rule above
quoted from Corpus Juris (22 C.J., 896) and in
accordance with the provision of section 279 of our
present Code of Civil Procedure.
Consequently we conclude that the number of visits
proven in these proceedings is 26 in Cabugao and 90 in
Vigan, and that the evidence shows that the plaintiff is
entitled to receive P25 for each visit to Primitiva
Serrano in Cabugao and P2 for each visit to her in
Vigan, or a sum total of P830, as professional fees. It
has not been sufficiently proven that these amounts do
not include the fees for the treatment given on such
visits, nor that the reasonable price of electrical
treatments, injections and eye treatments (which in
themselves are not sufficiently established) is P15 for
each electrical treatment, P5 for each injection, and P2
for each eye treatment.
MALCOLM, J., DISSENTING:
The issue in this case is the reasonable value of the
professional services performed by Dr. Gregorio
Figueras for Leandro Serrano. The issue is not as to
whether Dr. Gregorio Figueras is criminally guilty of
fabricating the much discussed Exhibit C. With or
without Exhibit C, there is sufficient evidence, including
the physician's book of account, which establishes
satisfactory the approximate number of visits made by
Doctor Figueras to Mr. Serrano and the proper amount
for each visit. (30 Cyc., 1603.) The total demanded by
Doctor Figueras of the estate of Mr. Serrano coming to
over P60,000 is grossly exaggerated. Even the sum of
P19,144 granted by trial judge is too high. Yet there is
no need to be so carried away by an enthusiastic desire
to condemn unethical and unprofessional practices in
making evidence to establish claims when no such
evidence is necessary, as to throw out the action
entirely and concede nothing to Doctor Figueras.
Figuring on a basis of approximately two hundred visits
to Cabugao, the home of the deceased, at P20 a visit
and nearly the same number of consultation at the
office of the physician at P2 a consultation, and adding
a reasonable sum for special service and treatments,
and taking into consideration the professional standing
of Doctor Figueras, it is my opinion that the physician
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
should be allowed P5,000 for his services. That is my
vote and to that extent I dissent.
PEOPLE V ODENCIO
88 SCRA 1
AQUINO: January 9, 1979
(da)
FACTS:
While Prowa Talib (Palua Talib), a forty-year old farmer,
was in the yard of his house located at Barrio
Simsiman, Pigcawayan, North Cotabato, handing a pot
of rice to his wife, Setie Mamalintao, who was near the
stairs, he was felled down by a volley of shots. Setie
rushed to the aid of her husband. When she looked in
the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw
Guiamelon Mama holding a gun near a coconut tree
around six brazas away. Then, she heard another volley
of shots. She saw Florencio Odencio (Poren), also
holding a gun near another coconut tree around ten
meters away in the yard of the house of her neighbor,
Daongan Karaing. She noticed that Kadir Oranen was
also shot dead.
While Setie was comforting her husband, he
allegedly told her that he was going to die. He
directed her to remember what had happened to
him and that they had seen Guiamelon Mama and
Poren armed with guns. Prior to that shooting
incident, Prowa Talib had reported to the barrio captain
that Florencio Odencio had stolen his lumber.
The two assailants fled westward and encountered
Japal Rongot who was on his way to Talib's Upon
reaching Talib's houseSetie told him that Talib was shot
by Guiamelon and she pointed to him Oranen's corpse.
Ngelam Towa another neighbor and the uncle of Setie
went to get assistance from his father-in-lawand while
crossing the trail his flashlight focussed on Florencio
Odencio with two companions leaving the scene of the
crime.
Policemen arrived at Talib's house. Setie informed them
that Guiamelon was the gunwielder. They brought
Talib to a medical clinic where he was
interrogated by Patrolman Joaquin Sañada Talib
told Sañada that his assailants were Guiamelon,
Florencio Odencio and Florencio's father, Joseph
Evidence
Odencio. Due to the critical condition of Talib
(nagaagonto), he was not able to sign his dying
declaration (Exh. B) as taken down by Patrolman
Sañada Talib was brought to the hospital. He
died on the following day.
In that unsigned antemortem declaration, Talib
revealed that Florencio Odencio suspected that he and
Oranen had masterminded the theft of Joseph
Odencio's two carabaos, and that, on the other hand,
Guiamelon suspected Talib of having stolen the
carabao of Damiog, the father-in-law of Guiamelon. It
was stated further in the same dying declaration that
Talib had told Patrolman Sañada that he wanted to sign
it but that he could not do so because of the wound in
his arm. Talib also articulated his belief that he was
going to die because he could hardly breathe and his
wound was painful. Within forty-eight hours after taking
Talib's unsigned antemortem statement, Sañada
executed an affidavit reciting the circumstances
surrounding the taking thereof. Sañada testified in
court on Talib's dying declaration.
TC acquitted Joseph and convicted only Florencio and
Guiamelon. In disbelieving the alibis of Florencio and
Guiamelon, the trial court observed that the
accused were indubitably Identified as the
assailants in Talib's dying declarations to his wife
and Patrolman Sañada. Setie Mamalintao in her
statement to the police declared that she was
able to recognize Florencio and Guiamelon
because there was a "big torch" in front of her
house and Karaing's house (No. 19, Exh. 1, p. 11,
Record).
Appellants' counsel contends that they were convicted
on the basis of the wife's uncorroborated testimony
"which is open to suspicion due to inherent
improbabilities'' and "motives to falsify the truth".
ISSUE:
WON the accused were convicted solely on the
basis of the wife’s uncorroborated testimony
HELD:
No. Talib's antemortem statement fortifies the
testimony of his widow, an eyewitness. We have
stressed that two other witnesses saw the appellants
leaving the scene of the crime.
A2010
Moreover, Talib's dying declaration was
sufficiently proven. The rule is that a dying
declaration may be oral or written If oral, the
witness, who heard it, may testify thereto
without the necessity, of course, of reproducing
exactly the words of the decedent, if he is able to
give the substance thereof. An unsigned dying
declaration may be used as a memorandum by
the witness who took it down. (See 5 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 315-
316.)
Classes of Documents
DELFIN V BILLONES
GR 146550
TINGA; March 17, 2006
(maia)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari decision and resolution
of CA (reversed decision of RTC)
FACTS
- in issue here are two deeds of absolute sale
Sale no. 1: between Teresa Danos, Esperanza, Estrella,
and Maria Darador, and Cipriano Degala (for marital
consent only as husband of Teresa), as vendors, and
Delfin Spouses as vendees. Executed on 29 July 1960,
whereby Esperanza and Estrella affixed their
signatures, and Teresa, Cipriano, and Maria affixed
their thumb marks. The deed was notarized. The deed
was registered with the register of deeds only on 18
November 1980, and a new TCT was issued in the
name of the Delfins.
Sale no. 2: between Teresa Danos, Trinidad, Leopoldo,
Presentacion, Rosario, and Pedro Degala, as vendors,
and the Delfin Spouses as vendees. Executed on March
1965, the deed likewise bears either the signatures or
thumb marks of the sellers and was notarized. Again,
the new TCT in the name of the Delfins was issued on
24 June 1980.
-Delfin spouses consolidated the two lots and
subdivided these into 6 small lots, and sold 2 of said
lots to 3rd parties.
- 12 April 1994, heirs of the vendors filed action for
annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages. According to them, it was
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
only in 1989 when they found out that Teresa, sick and
in dire need of money, was constrained to mortgage
the 2nd lot to the Delfins. Delfins made her sign a
document purporting to be a mortgage, but turned out
to be an extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute
sale. On the other hand, wrt to the 1st lot, the heirs
allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and
signatures and thumb marks therein where all forged
because Edtrella, Esperanza, and Cipriano all died prior
to the execution of the deed. As proof, they presented
certifications on the deaths of Esperanza and Cipriano
by the Local Civil Registrar.
- RTC: in favor of Delfins. CA: reversed and annulled the
deeds of sale, saying that wrt to the 2nd lot,
circumstances surrounding the execution of the
document show that the real intention was merely to
secure a loan of P300, thus it was an equitable
mortgage and not a sale. Wrt to the 1st lot, CA said that
the deed of sale could not have been executed since
some of the vendors were already dead, and that due
execution cannot prevail over the fact that 2
signatories were already dead (based on the 2 death
certificates presented)
ISSUE
1. WON the deeds of sale are valid
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred
from circumstances, and the circumstances proved
may in some cases raise a presumption of its existence.
However, while fraud may be proved by circumstances
or presumed from them, it cannot be demonstrated by
mere construction, but must be proven in all cases.
Reasoning In essence, petitioners insist that
respondents failed to prove that fraud attended the
sale of the Lots. The Court agrees.
- A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful
must be treated as such until it is shown to be
otherwise by either positive or circumstantial evidence.
A duly executed contract carries with it the
presumption of validity. The party who impugns its
regularity has the burden of proving its simulation. A
notarized document is executed to lend truth to the
statements contained therein and to the authenticity of
the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the
Evidence
presumption of regularity which can be overturned only
by clear and convincing evidence (Lao v. Villones-Lao).
- As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court,
respondents (the heirs) have the burden to establish
their case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it. Hence, parties who
have the burden of proof must produce such quantum
of evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on the
strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of
the defendant’s.
-As regards the 2nd lot, the heirs specifically alleged
that the Delfins trickery and fraud. They claimed that
the original owners of the Lot did not intend to execute
a deed of extra-judicial partition and absolute sale but
only a mortgage instrument. However, all that
respondents came out with were bare allegations that
the said owners were either old and sickly or illiterate;
that the purported selling price of P300.00 was
unconscionable; and that petitioners failed to eject
respondents from the subject land, as respondents
were unable to present any evidence to substantiate
their claims, much less the charge of fraud. Their bare
and unsupported allegations are not enough to
overthrow the presumption of the validity of said
agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud.
-Considering that the heirs failed to establish the
existence of fraud in the spouses Delfin’s acquisition of
the 2nd lot, it cannot be said that implied or constructive
trust was created between respondents and the Delfins.
The action for reconveyance of the 2nd lot must fail. In
view of the heirs’ failure to show their valid title to said
lot or even their occupation thereof, the case cannot
prosper even when it is viewed as one for quieting of
title.
- WRT to the 1st Deed of Sale (and on the topic of
documents):
- CA annulled the 1st Deed of Absolute Sale because
“one of the vendors therein was already dead,” relying
on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
In assailing this declaration, petitioners once more
point out that the Deed of Sale, being a duly notarized
document, should be given full faith and credit. Also,
they argue that the appellate court’s conclusion is
based on the disputable presumption that identity of
names means identity of persons.
-Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
A2010
Public documents may be proved by the original copy,
an official publication thereof, or a certified true copy
thereof; and when a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation by
the officer having legal custody of the record must
state that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be.
- A duly-registered death certificate is considered a
public document and the entries found therein are
presumed correct, unless the party who contests its
accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing
otherwise. Nevertheless, this presumption is disputable
and is satisfactory only if uncontradicted, and may be
overcome by contrary evidence
- The documents presented by the heirs were mere
certifications and not the certified copies or duly
authenticated reproductions of the purported death
certificates of Esperanza and Cipriano. They are not the
public documents referred to by the Rules of Court, nor
even records of public documents; thus, they do not
enjoy the presumption granted by the Rules. The heirs
did not even present the local civil registrar who
supposedly issued the certifications to authenticate and
identify the same.
- Likewise, respondent/witness Jolly Datar who adverted
to the certifications did not testify on how the
certifications were obtained, much less his role therein.
As a consequence, the trial court did not admit the
certifications as independent pieces of evidence but
merely as part of the testimony of Jolly Datar. A
document or writing which is admitted not as
independent evidence but merely as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the
facts related therein. Clearly then, the certifications
cannot be given probative value, and their contents
cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts
therein stated.
- More importantly, the very exhibits of the heirs dispel
the presumption of regularity of the issuance of the
certifications of death relied upon by the CA. The
certifications state that both Esperanza Daradar and
Cipriano Degala died in 1946 at ages 24 and 63,
respectively. However, a careful study of the records of
the case shows that in the OCT, Esperanza was already
20 years old in 1929, making her date of birth to be
sometime in 1909. This is totally incongruous with her
supposed age of 24 years in 1946, which places the
year of her birth in 1922. Likewise, the Court takes note
of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 31739, wherein
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
the CA in its statement of facts found that Esperanza
Daradar died on 10 August 1940, while Estrella Daradar
died on 15 June 1943, contrary to the claim of
respondents in this case. The Esperanza Daradar
named in the OCT and the one referred to in the
aforesaid Decision could not have been the same
Esperanza Daradar in the Local Civil Registrar’s
certification.
- Under the circumstances, therefore, respondents were
unable to overthrow the presumption of validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale.
Disposition Petition is granted. Decision reversed.
Authentication of Private Document
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR v. CITIBANK, N.A.,
(Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; March 28, 2007
(edel)
NATURE: CERTIORARI
Facts:
-Aznar, a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a
Preferred Mastercard issued by Citibank with a credit
limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren, on an Asian
tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of
P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of
increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.
-With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane
tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth
P237,000.00.
-During the trip, Aznar claims that when he presented
his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored.
-And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and
Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase
Evidence
plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the
reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such
dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash.
-Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank,
claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross
negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him,
his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour
destinations and prevented them from buying certain
items in their tour.
-He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful
blacklisting of his card
-To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard,
Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as
ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh.
"G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi
which shows that his card in question was "DECL
OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.
-Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted
Aznar’s card. To prove that they did not blacklist
Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head,
Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation
Bulletins, which contained the list of its canceled cards
covering the period of Aznar’s trip. Aznar’s wasn’t in
the list.
-RTC of Cebu dismissed Aznar’s complaint for lack of
merit and held that as between the computer print-out
presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more
weight as their due execution and authenticity were
duly established by Citibank.Also held that even if it
was shown that Aznar’s credit card was dishonored by
a merchant establishment, Citibank was not shown to
have acted with malice or bad faith when the same was
dishonored.
-Aznar filed a MFR with motion to re-raffle the case
saying that Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he
himself is a holder of a Citibank credit card. The case
was re-raffled with the new judge granting Aznar’s MR
saying that it was improbable that a man of Aznar’s
stature would fabricate the computer print-out which
shows that Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored for the
reason that it was declared over the limit; Exh. "G" was
printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of
business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi
was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country
and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial
A2010
notice of the practice of automated teller machines
(ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out
bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima
facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard;
no rebutting evidence was presented by Citibank to
prove that Aznar’s Mastercard was not dishonored, as
all it proved was that said credit card was not included
in the blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted the
additional deposit of P485,000.00 from Aznar, there
was an implied novation and Citibank was obligated to
increase Aznar’s credit limit and ensure that Aznar will
not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use
of his Mastercard; Citibank’s failure to comply with its
obligation constitutes gross negligence as it caused
Aznar inconvenience, mental anguish and social
humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of the credit card
limiting the liability of the bank to P1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven, whichever is lower, is a contract
of adhesion which must be interpreted against Citibank.
-Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel
filed an administrative case against Judge De la Peña
for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence, claiming among others that said judge
rendered his decision without having read the
transcripts. The administrative case was held in
abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal filed by
Citibank with the CA.
-CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the
blacklisting of his card and only presumed the same
when it was dishonored in certain establishments; such
dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was
blacklisted by Citibank; Exh. "G" is an electronic
document ,which must be authenticated pursuant to
Sec. 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence or
under Sect.20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by
anyone who saw the document executed or written;
Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh.
"G", thus it must be excluded; the unrefuted testimony
of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan
Agency and certain establishments abroad is not
sufficient to justify the award of damages in his favor,
absent any showing that Citibank had anything to do
with the said dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control
over the actions of its merchant affiliates, thus it should
not be held liable for the dishonor of Aznar’s credit card
by said establishments.
-Aznar’s MR was denied by the CA.
-As regards the admin case, J. Dela Pena was adjudged
guilty.
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
Issue: WON Aznar has established his claim against
Citibank. If so, WON Citibank is liable for damages.
HELD: NO to both.
On his claim:
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests
on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a
preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a
fact also has the burden of proving it.
-Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of
evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or
placed the same on the "hot list.
-Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no
personal knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted
by Citibank and only presumed such fact from the
dishonor of his card.
-The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to
support a conclusion that said credit card was
blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar’s
own admission that in other merchant establishments
in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was
accepted and honored.
-Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT,
a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan
Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his
Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted.
-But such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as
its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by Aznar as per Sec 20 of Rule 132 of the
RoC. It provides that whenever any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a)
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
-Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did
not actually see the document executed or written,
neither was he able to provide evidence on the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi,
who handed to him said computer print-out.
-Even under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of
Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Evidence
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. � The
person seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden
of proving its authenticity in the manner provided
in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. � Before any
private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be
proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by
the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security
procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
-Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued
by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in
passing how he was able to secure the print-out from
the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific
business address of the source of the computer print-
out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was
mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not
reflected in the print-out.
-Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the
information reflected on the print-out was generated
and how the said information could be relied upon as
true.
-Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, which pertains to entries in the course of
business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. �
Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions
are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead,
or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
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3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
- Also, It is not clear it was Nubi who encoded the
information stated in the print-out and was the one who
printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed
by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was
Mario who printed the same and only handed the print-
out to Nubi.
-The identity of the entrant, required by the provision
above mentioned, was therefore not established.
Neither did petitioner establish in what professional
capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether
the entries were made in the performance of their duty
in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
-And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only
shows that the use of the credit card of petitioner was
denied because it was already over the limit. There is
no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that
there was gross negligence on the part of Citibank in
declaring that the credit card has been used over the
limit.
-The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) which
covered the period when plaintiff traveled in the
aforementioned Asian countries showed that said
Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed
in a “hot list” or the same was blacklisted, let alone the
fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled
by the defendant bank were all contained, reported and
listed in said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were
issued and released on a regular basis.
-Citibank produced 300 documents to show that Aznar
was not among those found in said bulletins as having
been cancelled for the period for which the said
bulletins had been issued.
-Between said computer print out (exh.G) and the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins the latter
documents adduced by defendant are entitled to
greater weight than that said computer print out
presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of
whether the plaintiff’s preferred master card was
actually placed in the “hot list” or blacklisted for
the following reasons:
1) the due execution and authentication of these
Warning Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
established and identified by Citibank’s witness, Dennis
Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is the head of its
credit card department, and, TF, competent to testify
on the said bulletins as having been issued by the
defendant bank showing that plaintiff’s preferred
master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in
the Bank’s “hot list”. While Aznar’s computer print out
was never authenticated or its due execution had never
been duly established. Thus, between a set of duly
authenticated commercial documents, the Warning
Cancellation Bulletins presented by defendants (sic)
and an unauthenticated private document, plaintiff’s
computer print out (Exh. G), the former deserves
greater evidentiary weight supporting the findings of
this Court that plaintiff’ s preferred master card had
never been blacklisted at all or placed in a so-called
“hot list” by defendant.
2) On implied novation (when he added addt’l funds to
increase credit limit): the Court finds that petitioner's
argument on this point has no leg to stand on.
On damages:
-the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and
conditions of Citibank’s Mastercard constitute a
contract of adhesion. It is settled that contracts
between cardholders and the credit card companies are
contracts of adhesion, so-called, because their terms
are prepared by only one party while the other merely
affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.
-On Par 7 of said contract: While it is true that Citibank
may have no control of all the actions of its merchant
affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is
incorrect, however, to give it blanket freedom from
liability if its card is dishonored by any merchant
affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the
statement vague and as the said terms and conditions
constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its
provisions must be construed against the party who
prepared the contract,Citibank.
On limiting its liability to P1k or the actual damage
proven, whichever is lesser: such stipulation cannot be
considered as valid for being unconscionable as it
precludes payment of a larger amount even though
damage may be clearly proven.
-The invalidity of the terms and conditions being
invoked by Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court
still cannot award damages in favor of petitioner.
-The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in
Evidence
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach
before damages may be awarded and the breach of
such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
-the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed
to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank
breached any obligation that would make it answerable
for said suffering.
BPI v. CA: xxx… there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury to
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
Disposition: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
HEIRS OF LACSA V CA (HEIRS OF SONGCO)
G.R. Nos. 79597-98
PADILLA; May 20, 1991
(owen)
FACTS
- Action for recovery of possession with damages and
preliminary injunction (Civil Case 1) and action for
cancellation of title, ownership with damages and
preliminary injunction (Civil Case 2) filed by Heirs of
Lacsa against Heirs of Songco (1) that during Demetria
Lacsa’s (decedent) lifetime, was the owner of a certain
parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and partly
of uncultivated open space in Guagua, Pampanga,
evidenced by OCT RO-1038 (11725);
(2) that Heirs of Songco are neither co-owners of the
land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and other
forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or
possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land and
caused the open space therein to be cleared for
expanded occupancy thereof;
(3) that they refused to vacate the same despite their
demands to vacate but later abandoned the same but
only after the case was filed and after all the fish were
transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by them;
(4) that Heirs of Songco presented to the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga certain forged and absolutely
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simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL
CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION
EXTRAJUDICIAL" (TRADUCION) and "ESCRITURA DE
VENTA ABSOLUTA" (ESCRITURA); and
- Heirs of Songco claim that Heirs of Lacsa lacks
cause of action, for the reason that OCT RO-1038
(11725) was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April
1983 upon Heirs of Lacsa’s expedient claim that the
owner's duplicate copy thereof had been missing when
the truth of the matter was that
(a) OCT RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria
Lacsa, had long been cancelled and superseded by
TCT No. 794 by virtue of the document TRADUCION
(written in the Spanish language) entered into by her
two daughters Alberta Guevarra and Ambrocia
Guevarra with their respective husbands Juan Limpin
and Damaso Cabais for an extrajudicial partition of
the properties;
(b) the Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin and the
Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais executed on
April 7, 1923, another deed of partition (in the
Pampango dialect) wherein the fishpond in question
was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra and as a
consequence, OCT No. 794 was issued to Alberta
Guevarra and Juan Limpin;
(c) the latter TCT was in turn superseded by TCT No.
929 issued in the name of Inocencio Songco
(decedent of respondents) by virtue of a document
ESCRITURA executed by spouses Juan Limpin and
Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo
and duly registered in the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification
of the Deputy Register of Deeds;
(d) as a result of this sale, TCT No. 794 in the name
of the Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin was
cancelled by the Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga and TCT No. 929 was issued to Inocencio
Songco
- TC: the fishpond in question belongs to Heirs of
Songco, having been inherited by them from their
deceased father Inocencio Songco.
- CA: affirmed, MFR denied
- Heirs of Lacsa claim that Ancient Document Rule
under Section 2 Rule 132 is misapplied because for a
document to be classified as an "ancient document", it
must not only be at least thirty (30) years old but it
must also be found in the proper custody and is
unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from
suspicion. Thus, TRADUCION and ESCRITURA cannot
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
qualify because the "first pages" of said documents do
not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto,
this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget
unlimited alterations.
ISSUE
WON CA erred in applying the “Ancient Document
Rule” on the questioned document entitled 'ESCRITURA
DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL' and 'ESCRITURA DE
VENTA ABSOLUTA
HELD
NO
Ratio Under the "ancient document rule," for a private
ancient document to be exempt from proof of due
execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be
more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that
the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any
alteration or circumstances of suspicion.
"Ancient Document Rule" provided in Sec. 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states that:
"SEC. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.
Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations
or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given."
Reasoning
(1) TRADUCION was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas
ESCRITURA was executed on 20 January 1924. These
documents are, therefore, more than thirty (30) years
old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents
were certified as exact copies of the original on file with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the
Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further
certification with regard to the Pampango translation of
the document of extrajudicial partition which was
issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records
Management of the Department of General Services.
Documents which affect real property, in order that
they may bind third parties, must be recorded with the
appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in
question, being certified as copies of originals on file
with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to
be found in the proper custody. Clearly, therefore, the
first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document
rule" were met.
Evidence
(2) As to the last requirement that the document must
on its face appear to be genuine, Heirs of Lacsa did not
present any conclusive evidence to support their
allegation of falsification of the said documents. They
merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on
the first two (2) pages could have easily led to their
substitution. As held in one case, a contract apparently
honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such
and one who assails the genuineness of such contract
must present conclusive evidence of falsification.
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient
document rule" that a document must be unblemished
by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers
to the extrinsic quality of the document itself The lack
of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be
held to detract from the fact that the documents in
question, which were certified as copied of the originals
on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are
genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of
suspicion.
Disposition Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed
COGTONG v. KYORITSU INTERNATIONAL
GR No. 160729
QUISUMBING; July 27, 2007
(glaisa)
FACTS
- Cogtong learned from the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale that
her house and lot had been mortgaged to Kyoritsu.
She claims that she did not execute a deed of Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) nor a promissory note in favor
of Kyoritsu, and that the signatures thereon are not
hers but forgeries. She also avers that her son, William
Lao, admitted that he was the one who forged her
signature and mortgaged the property to Kyoritsu.
Hence, an action was filed by petitioner on March 10,
1997 seeking to enjoin Kyoritsu from proceeding with
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
- Kyoritsu denies petitioner’s allegation of forgery and
alleges that she is its legitimate creditor. Kyoritsu
presented in court Mr. George Gusilatar, Jr., the head of
its credit investigation panel. Gusilatar testified that
petitioner went to the office of Kyoritsu; that she
submitted a duly-filled application which was signed by
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her; that upon his advice, she sought a co-maker, her
son William Lao. Upon approval of the loan, petitioner
and Lao signed a promissory note and deed of REM.
After that, a check was issued by Kyoritsu in the
amount of P339,000 to cover the loan.
- Kyoritsu required Lao to issue postdated checks.
Since some of the checks bounced, verbal demands
were made upon the petitioner and Lao to pay. Despite
the extension, they did not pay. When petitioner
received the demand letter, she called up Kyoritsu’s
office and promised to pay. However, she failed to do
so. Hence, the foreclosure proceedings.
- TC declared that the signatures of petitioner were
forged; that the deed of REM and the promissory note
were null and void; and that Kyoritsu should return to
petitioner her copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title and
all documents relating to the land in question. It also
enjoined the sheriff of Pasay City from doing any act in
furtherance of the intended foreclosure and auction sale
of the property.
- CA reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial
court. It held that petitioner’s signatures on the REM
and promissory note were not forged, and should be
given effect.
ISSUE
WON petitioner Cogtong’s signature was forged.
HELD
NO. The genuineness of a handwriting may be proved
by a comparison made by the court of the questioned
handwriting and writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge. The Court may validly determine forgery
from its own independent examination of the
documentary evidence at hand. Hence, this Court
scrutinized the evidence on record to determine
whether the signature of petitioner was in fact forged.
- Passage of time and a person’s increase in age may
have a decisive influence in his handwriting
characteristics. In order to bring about an accurate
comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison
must be as close as possible in point of time to the
suspected signature. The standards should, if possible,
have been made at the same time as the suspected
document. The standards should embrace the time of
the origin of the document, so that one part comes from
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
the time before the origin and one part from the time
after the origin.
- Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence and whoever
alleges it has the burden of proving the same, a burden
which petitioner failed to discharge convincingly. Here,
petitioner failed to override the evidentiary value of the
duly notarized deed of REM and promissory note. As a
notarized document, the deed of REM and promissory
note enjoy the presumption of due execution. However,
no evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome this
presumption. Other than her own declaration that her
signatures on the questioned documents were forged and
the prayer booklets which she presented during trial,
petitioner presented no other proof to corroborate her
claim. Such an allegation and evidence are insufficient to
overcome a notarized document’s presumption of due
execution. Hence, this Court cannot accept the claim of
forgery in the absence of other witnesses, save for
petitioner herself, who would testify that petitioner’s
signatures on the prayer booklets are in fact her
customary way of signing.
Dispositive the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision dated March 17, 2003 of
the CA and its Resolution dated November 11, 2003 in
CA-GR CV No. 62432 are AFFIRMED.
Offer of Evidence
PAREL V PRUDENCIO
G.R. 146556
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; April 19, 2006
(aida)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- February 27, 1992 – Prudencio filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against Parel.
Prudencio alleged that he owned a two-storey
residential house in Baguio City, the construction of
which was funded by his own money and declared in
his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048. The
construction began in 1972 and was completed after
three years.
- In 1973, when the second storey of the house was
undergoing construction, Prudencio allowed Parel’s
Evidence
parents (the late Florentino and Susana) to move in so
that the couple could supervise the construction of the
house and to safeguard the materials. When the
second storey was completed, he allowed the Parels
and their children to temporarily live in the house out of
sheer magnanimity because Florentino was his brother-
in-law.
- November 1985 – Prudencio wrote Florentino, asking
the latter to vacate the house as the former was due
for retirement. This request was acceded to by
Florentino and Susana when they migrated to the US in
1986.
- Without Prudencio’s knowledge, Parel and family
unlawfully entered the house and took possession of
the ground floor. They refused to leave despite
Prudencio’s demands which prompted the respondent
to institute an action for recovery. Prudencio also
asked for a monthly rental of P3,000 from April 1988
until Parel vacates the house.
- In his counterclaim, Parel alleges that his parents are
the co-owners of the said house. He claim that he
occupied the ground floor of the house with his father
Florentino’s knowledge.
- The RTC found that the house was co-owned by
Florentino and Prudencio thus the latter cannot evict
Parel. The RTC found that:
- Florentino was an allocatee of the land on
which the subject house was erected, as one
of the lowly-paid government employees at
that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal
gave them the chance to construct their own
house on said reservation.
- Prudencio failed to show proof of any
contract, written or oral, express or implied,
that Florentino and his family stayed on the
house not as co-owners but as mere lessees,
nor any other proof that would clearly
establish his sole ownership of the house.
- Prudencio and Florentino agreed to
contribute their money to complete the house.
Since the land on which said house was
erected has been allocated to Florentino, the
parties had the understanding that once the
house was completed, Florentino could keep
the ground floor while Prudencio could have
the second floor.
- The RTC did not give credence to the tax
declaration as well as the several documents
showing the City Assessor’s assessment of the
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property all in Prudencio’s name since tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership.
- Upon appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC
decision. The CA found as meritorious Prudencio’s
contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer
in evidence any documentary evidence, there is
nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent.
- It ruled that the trial court’s statement that
Parel’s occupancy of the house is due to a
special power of attorney executed by his
parents most specially the deceased
Florentino Parel who is in fact a co-owner of
said building" is wanting of any concrete
evidence on record.
- The said power of attorney was never
offered, hence, could not be referred to as
evidence to support Parel’s claim.
- Except for the bare testimonies of Candelario
Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it was
Florentino who constructed the house and
Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain,
who testified that the lot was allocated to
Florentino, there was no supporting document
which would sufficiently establish factual
bases for the TC’s conclusion; and that the
rule on offer of evidence is mandatory.
- An affidavit dated September 24, 1973 was
issued by Florentino. The said affidavit stated
that Prudencio, not Florentino, was the owner
of the house. The CA found the affidavit to be
conclusive proof of Prudencio’s sole ownership
of the house since it was a declaration made
by Florentino against his interest.
- The CA also found the tax declarations and
official receipts representing payments of real
estate taxes of the questioned property
covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to
establish Prudencio’s case which constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property.
ISSUES
WON Parel was able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that his father was a co-owner of the subject
two-storey residential house
HELD
YES
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
Reasoning
- The building plan of the residential house dated
January 16, 1973 was in the name of respondent and
his wife. It was established during petitioner’s cross-
examination that the existing structure of the two-
storey house was in accordance with said building plan.
- Court reasoning relevant to declaration against
interest
- The rule on declaration against interest is in
Rule 130, Sec. 38.
- The theory under which declarations against
interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the
reception of such evidence advisable and,
further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are against his own
pecuniary or moral interest.
- In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the
residential building, he is not the owner of the
same as it is owned by respondent who is
residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume
that he would not have made such declaration
unless he believed it to be true, as it is
prejudicial to himself as well as to his
children’s interests as his heirs. A declaration
against interest is the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.
- Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from
1973 (the year he executed said affidavit) until
1989 (the year of his death), there is no
showing that he had revoked such affidavit
even when a criminal complaint for trespass to
dwelling had been filed by respondent against
him and his son.
- While tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute
at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. The house which Parel claims to be co-
owned by Florentino had been consistently declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Prudencio, and this
fact, taken with the other circumstances above-
mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that
respondent is the sole owner of the house subject
matter of the litigation.
- Court reasoning as to offer of evidence
- The rule on offer of evidence is in Rule 132,
Evidence
Sec. 34.
- The records show that although Parel’s
counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his
documentary evidence in writing, he, however,
did not file the same. Thus, the CA did not
consider the documentary evidence presented
by petitioner.
- A formal offer is necessary because it is the
duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is
a settled rule that the mere fact that a
particular document is identified and marked
as an exhibit does not mean that it has
thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party.
- Petitioner insists that although his
documentary evidence were not formally
offered, the same were marked during the
presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus
it can properly be taken cognizance of relying
in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.
- The reliance in Bravo v. Borja is misplaced.
In Bravo, the Court allowed evidence on
minority by admitting the certified true copy of
the birth certificate attached to a motion for
bail even if it was not formally offered in
evidence. This was due to the fact that the
birth certificate was properly filed in support of
a motion for bail to prove petitioner’s minority
which was never challenged by the
prosecution and it already formed part of the
records of the case. The rule referred to in the
Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the
RoC and not Section 34 of Rule 132.
- The testimonies of Parel and his witnesses failed to
show that the subject house is co-owned by Florentino
and respondent.
Disposition Judgment affirmed.
HEIRS OF PASAG V PAROCHA
G.R. No. 155483
VELASCO, JR; Apro 27, 2007
(giulia)
Nature
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
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Facts
-The instant case arose from a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance,
Partition and Damages filed by petitioners in the RTC
against respondents. Petitioners alleged a share over
three (3) properties owned by respondents, which
formed part of the estate of petitioners intestate
grandparents, Sps Pasag. However, Severino (1 of the
Sps Pasag's 8 children), the predecessor of
respondents, claimed in an affidavit of self-adjudication
that he is the sole, legal, and compulsory heir.
Consequently, he was able to appropriate to himself
the properties. Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of
absolute sale over the said properties in favor of his
daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Moreover,
petitioners alleged that Severino used the same
affidavit of self-adjudication to secure a free patent
over an agricultural land that had long been under the
possession of Benito and Florentina Pasag.
Respondents averred in their Answer that the
properties left behind by the Sps Pasag had already
been partitioned among their eight (8) surviving
children. They claimed that the 2 parcels of land are
Bonifacio's share of which he later on renounced in a
Quitclaim Deed in favor of his brother, Severino. As
regards 3rd parcel of land, respondents asserted that
the said land had been in Severino's possession and
occupation since 1940, thus, giving him the right to
apply for and be granted a free patent over it. Having
complied with the requirements of law, Severino's title
had now become indefeasible.
-In the course of the trial, petitioners asked the TC to
give them extension to submit their offer of evidence;
and court granted their motion. However, on the due
date of the extension, they again failed to submit their
offer of evidence and moved for another extension.
Unfortunately, petitioners still failed to submit their
formal offer of evidence within the extended period.
Consequently, TC deemed waived petitioners' right to
make their formal offer of evidence.
-Later, petitioners moved for the admission of their
offer of evidence. However, TC denied if for their
constant failure to submit it.
-Respondents filed a MTD on Demurrer to Evidence. TC
granted demurrer to evidence and ordered the
dismissal of the Complaint. Petitioners' MR was denied
for lack of merit.
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
-Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. CA affirmed
the ruling of the TC. CA held that petitioners failed to
prove their claim by a preponderance of evidence. It
observed that "no concrete and substantial evidence
was adduced by [petitioners]" to substantiate their
allegation that Severino, the predecessor of
respondents, fraudulently executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication in order to exclude petitioners from the
settlement of the estate of Sps Pasag.
Issues
WON there was waiver of petitioners' offer of
documentary evidence
WON LC erred in the dismissal of the Complaint on a
demurrer to evidence.
Held
Waiver of the Offer of Evidence
Yes. The Rule 132.34 provides that "the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are
mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the
trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence. This also
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and
object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review
as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the TC.
-There should be strict adherence to the rule. The Court
in Constantino v. CA ruled that the formal offer of one's
evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it
within a considerable period of time. It explained that
the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after
a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would
"condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance
with a court order which, in effect, would encourage
needless delays and derail the speedy administration of
justice."
The pre-trial guidelines and Rule 132.35 jointly
considered makes it is clear that the party who
terminated the presentation of evidence must make an
oral offer of evidence on the very day the party
presented the last witness. Otherwise, the court may
consider the party's documentary or object evidence
waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial
court may allow the offer to be done in writing, this can
only be tolerated in extreme cases where the object
Evidence
evidence or documents are large in number say from
100 and above, and only where there is unusual
difficulty in preparing the offer.
-No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and
offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-
in-chief other than those that had been identified below
and pre-marked during the pre-trial. Any other
evidence not indicated or listed below shall be
considered waived by the parties. However, the Court,
in its discretion, may allow introduction of additional
evidence in the following cases: (a) those to be used on
cross-examination or re-cross-examination for
impeachment purposes; (b) those presented on re-
direct examination to explain or supplement the
answers of a witness during the cross-examination; (c)
those to be utilized for rebuttal or sur-rebuttal
purposes; and (d) those not available during the pre-
trial proceedings despite due diligence on the part of
the party offering the same.
From the foregoing provisions, both parties should
obtain, gather, collate, and list all their respective
pieces of evidence whether testimonial, documentary,
or object, even prior to the preliminary conference
before the clerk of court or at the latest before the
scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of
evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial
proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile.
The parties should strictly adhere to the principle of
"laying one's cards on the table." In the light of these
issuances and in order to obviate interminable delay in
case processing, the parties and lawyers should closely
conform to the requirement that the offer of evidence
must be done orally on the day scheduled for the
presentation of the last witness.
-Thus, the TC is bound to consider only the testimonial
evidence presented and exclude the documents not
offered. Documents which may have been identified
and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but
which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in
any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such
unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight
and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant
distinction between identification of documentary
evidence and its formal offer. Identification of
documentary evidence is done in the course of the pre-
trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the
evidence as an exhibit; while the formal offer is done
only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a
particular document is identified and marked as an
A2010
exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered
as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any
evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by
the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.
Dismissal of the Complaint on a Demurrer to Evidence
No. A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action; thus, abbreviating
judicial proceedings. It is defined as "an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or
not) to make out his case or sustain the issue." (Black's
Law Dictionary)
-The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's evidence to sustain a verdict. The court is
merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment
or to support a verdict of guilt.
-In the present case, petitioners have failed to
sufficiently prove their allegations. It is a basic rule in
evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who
makes the allegations. However, petitioners did not
substantiate their allegations and merely argued that
the Complaint should be "threshed out in a full blown
trial in order to establish their respective positions on
issues [which are] a matter of judicial appreciation."
-It must be stressed that fraud is not presumed; and it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and
not by mere conjectures or speculations. No such
evidence was presented in this case to sustain
petitioners' allegations.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
assailed Resolution of the CA, with costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SALAS VS STA. MESA MARKET CORPORATION
GR 157766
CORONA; July 12, 2007
(athe)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
130
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Primitivo E. Domingo handed the management of his
estate, including the respondent corporation Sta. Mesa
Market Corporation (SMMC), to petitioner Ernesto L.
Salas. As estate manager, petitioner was primarily
tasked to ensure SMMC's continued viability and
profitability by redeveloping the Sta. Mesa market and
restructuring the corporation's finances. Domingo, on
the other hand, bound himself to transfer 30% of
SMMC's subscribed and paid-up capital stock to
petitioner as part of his compensation. But, if
petitioner failed to achieve a monthly market revenue
of at least P350,000, he would be obliged to return the
shares of stock of SMMC to Domingo.
Shortly after the execution of the contract, SMMC,
under petitioner's management, leased the Sta. Mesa
market to Malaca Realty Corporation (Malaca). But it
became apparent soon thereafter that Malaca was
financially incapable of improving and expanding the
existing facilities of the Sta. Mesa market. In fact, it was
unable to pay the monthly rent. Thus, SMMC
terminated its lease contract with Malaca. As a result,
its board of directors became dissatisfied with
petitioner's management of the corporation.
Thereafter, it ended its management contract with
petitioner (and Inter-Alia).
On June 8, 1987, petitioner filed an action for specific
performance and damages against SMMC and
Domingo in the RTC of Quezon City. He alleged that
SMMC's monthly market revenue had surpassed
P350,000 yet Domingo refused to comply with his
obligation to deliver 30% of the subscribed and paid-up
capital stock of SMMC to him.
In his answer, Domingo argued that petitioner was
not entitled to the shares of SMMC. On the contrary, the
corporation suffered additional losses and incurred new
liabilities (which respondents consistently itemized in
their pleadings) amounting to P1,935,995.06 over the
twenty-one (21) months petitioner was managing it.
PROCEDURE
RTC (Action for specific performance and damages) -
in favor of Salas . The trial court considered copies of
SMMC's audited financial statements which showed an
improvement in the corporation's monthly average
gross income (from P251,790 in 1984 to P409,794 in
1985).
CA (Appeal) – Decision reversed. Petitioner failed to
prove the authenticity of the audited financial
statements. He did not present a representative of
Evidence
SMMC's external auditor, Bejarin Jimenez & Co., to
testify on the genuineness and due execution of the
audited financial statements of SMMC. Instead,
petitioner presented a memorandum prepared by a
member of his management team attesting to the
increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue.
For this reason, the appellate court ruled that the
audited financial statements were not only self-serving
but also hearsay.
MR - denied.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in holding that the audited financial
statements were inadmissible in evidence due to lack
of proper authentication
HELD
NO. Ratio Financial statements, whether audited or
not, are, as general rule, private documents. However,
once financial statements are filed with a government
office pursuant to a provision of law, they become
public documents. Whether a document is public or
private is relevant in determining its admissibility as
evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are
inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly
authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Reasoning
a. Petitioner and respondents agree that the
documents presented as evidence were mere copies of
the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR
and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented
were certified true copies of audited financial
statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the
SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have
been public documents. Thus, the statements
presented were private documents. Consequently,
A2010
authentication was a precondition to their admissibility
in evidence. But in this case, petitioner merely
presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in
the corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by
a member of his management team. While there is no
fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent
evidence to establish the authenticity of a private
document, the best proof available must be presented.
The best proof available, in this instance, would have
been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's
external auditor who prepared the audited financial
statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the audited
financial statements were never authenticated.
b. The petitioner cannot also insist on the application of
an exception to this rule: authentication is not
necessary where the adverse party has admitted the
genuineness and due execution of a document because
the fact was that nowhere in his testimony did Amado
Domingo categorically admit the authenticity of the
copies of the audited financial statements. He only
testified that SMMC regularly submitted its audited
financial statements to the BIR and SEC. There was
never any admission that the documents presented by
petitioner were true or faithful copies of those
submitted to the BIR and the SEC.
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED. The resolution of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
DELGADO v RUSTIA
CORONA; January 27, 2006
G.R. No. 155733
(jojo)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to
reinstate decision of the RTC of Manila
FACTS
Claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado:
(1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado – half- and full-
blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews
and grandnieces
131
 Prof. V. A. Avena
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia – sisters, his
nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
- Felisa + Ramon Osorio (union in dispute) = Luis
Delgado
- Felisa + Luio Campo (admittedly without the
benefit of marriage) = Josefa, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba and Gorgonio (all natural children)
- Petitioners ( collateral relatives of Josefa):
Ramon and Felisa were never married – no evidence
was ever presented to establish the marriage, not even
so much as an allegation of the date or place of the
alleged marriage; Felisa retained the surname Delgado
and so did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on,
when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento
stated that he was the natural child of Felisa,
significantly omitting any mention of the name and
other circumstances of his father.
- Oppositors (now respondents): the absence of a
record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily
mean that no marriage ever took place.
- Josefa died in 1972 without a will. She was survived
by Guillermo and the petitioners. Several months later,
Guillermo executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her
estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado
- In 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but
whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
- Petitioners: the two eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married; no record of
the contested marriage existed in the civil registry; a
baptismal certificate naming Josefa as one of the
sponsors referred to her as “Señorita” or unmarried
woman.
- Respondents: the absence of a marriage certificate
did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired;
Guillermo and Josefa were married on June 3, 1919 and
from then on lived together as husband and wife until
the death of Josefa - during this period spanning more
than half a century, they were known among their
relatives and friends to have in fact been married.
They presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia
Evidence
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D.
Rustia on June 25, 1947
3. Application with for Pension or Compensation with
the Veterans Administration of the USA wherein
Guillermo himself swore to his marriage to Josefa in
Manila on 3 June 1919
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo
indicated that he was married to Josefa.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
- Guillermo + Josefa = no child but took into their
home, but never legally adopted, youngsters
Guillermina Rustia and Nanie Rustia
- Guillermo + Amparo Sagarbarria = Guillerma Rustia
(illegitimate)
- Guillerma: Guillermo treated her as his daughter,
his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth in
1920 until her father’s demise; Josefa’s obituary which
was prepared by Guillermo, named her as one of their
children; her report card from UST identified Guillermo
as her parent/guardian.
- Respondents: Guillerma has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child; Gullerma’s right
to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when
Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim
voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she
presented were not the authentic writings prescribed
by the new Civil Code.
- More than a year after the death of Josefa, Guillermo
filed a petition for the adoption of Guillermina and
stated under oath “that he had no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural
children by legal fiction.” The petition was overtaken by
his death. Guillermo Rustia died without a will.
ISSUES
1. WON there was a valid marriage between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado
2. Who are the legal heirs of Guillermo Rustia?
3. Who are the legal heirs of Josefa Delgado?
4. Who should be issued letters of administration?
HELD
1. YES
Rule 131, Section 3 of the ROC provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
A2010
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
- Several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo and
Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was
such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in
1975 referred to them as “spouses.” Yet, petitioners
maintain that Josefa and Guillermo had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. They make much of the absence of a record
of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness
attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal
certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
“Señorita” or unmarried woman.
- First, although a marriage contract is considered a
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always
proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof. The evidence need not
necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must
at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to
Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to
her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no
less than Guillermo that he was married to Josefa and
the titles to the properties in the name of “Guillermo
Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,” more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage.
These are public documents which are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.
- Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness
whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support
their position, confirmed that Guillermo had proposed
marriage to Josefa and that eventually, the two had
“lived together as husband and wife.” This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
- Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof
only of the baptism administered by the priest who
baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein,
such as the alleged single or unmarried (“Señorita”)
civil status of Josefa who had no hand in its preparation.
132
 Prof. V. A. Avena
- Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of
marriage of Guillermo and Josefa. In this jurisdiction,
every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is
the usual order of things in society and, if the parties
are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common
rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
2. Sisters, nieces and nephews
Guillerma is an illegitimate child of Guillermo. As such,
she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She,
however, claimed the status of an acknowledged
illegitimate child of Guillermo only after the death of
the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
- Under the old Civil Code, illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian
edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate
children but only on
condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
- Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory
or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status
of a child of the alleged father (or mother)[61] by the
direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time
when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father. [62]
- On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing.
- Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child and second, voluntary recognition through
authentic writing.
- There was apparently no doubt that she possessed
the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until
the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
Evidence
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a
mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any
judicial action for compulsory acknowledgment has a
dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime
of the putative parent. On the death of either, the
action for compulsory recognition can no longer be
filed. In this case, Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the
death of Guillermo.
- The claim of voluntary recognition must likewise fail.
An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable
writing of the parent. This includes a public instrument
or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The report card from UST and Josefa’s obituary
prepared by Guillermo do not qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code. The report card did
not bear the signature of Guillermo. The fact that his
name appears there as Guilerma’s parent/guardian
holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it
was Guillermo himself who drafted the notice of death
of Josefa Delgado which was published, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated
by the law. What could have been admitted as an
authentic writing was the original manuscript of the
notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo himself and
signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed
manuscript was fatal to Guillerma’s claim.
- The same misfortune befalls Guillermina, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a
petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo, it never
came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s
death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the
deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato.
- Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are
no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the
lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and
nephews.
3. All her siblings (full and half blood) and their
children who were still alive at the time of her
death
A2010
- Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage
of Felisa and Ramon. The respondents chose merely to
rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in
the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon
Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s
and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento
identifying Luis as “hijo natural de Felisa Delgado” (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).
- All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa and Ramon were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa out of her
relations with Ramon and Lucio, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado, were her natural children.
- The law prohibits reciprocal succession between
illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of
blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato from another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from
that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate
child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when
all the children are illegitimate children of the same
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They
all stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit,
therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to
them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters
should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers
and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of
the half-blood, they shall share equally.
- We note, however, that the petitioners before us are
already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa . Under Article 972 of the new
Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral
line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
133
 Prof. V. A. Avena
and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her
intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death on
September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to
participate in the inheritance. The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to
determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters
(or their children) of Josefa at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to
inherit from Josefa in accordance with Article 1001 of
the new Civil Code:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
- Since Josefa had heirs other than Guillermo,
Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s
estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the ROC is
clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir to the estate.
4. Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a
nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo
- An administrator is a person appointed by the court
to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. In
the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to
be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out
the appointment of co-administrators, specially in
cases where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
- It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint
administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and
nieces of Guillermo. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Delgado and Guillermo,
respectively.
BAUTISTA V. SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-45137
CUEVAS, September 23, 1985
(cha)
NATURE
Evidence
Special civil action of Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction
FACTS
-Dr. Leticia Yap charged the defendants Fe Bautista,
Milagros Corpus, and Teresita Vergere with estafa.
Teresita Vergere was granted a separate trial.
-The information alleges that the two accused received
jewelries from Dr. Yap on consignment. The pieces of
jewelry were to be sold by the accused on commission
basis (as agents of Dr. Yap) and would pay or deliver
the proceeds to Dr. Yap if sold, and if not, then the
jewelry would be returned. The accused failed and
refused and still failed and refused to return the
jewelries or deliver the proceeds to Dr. Yap even after
previous demands (as evidenced by the demand letter
presented as evidence). Dr. Yap was the only witness
presented by the prosecution.
-the defendants moved to dismiss the case by way of
demurrer to the evidence, believing the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, RTC denied their motion.
ISSUES
*Propriety of certiorari (can’t petition for certiorari if
merely involves an interlocutory order, not among
exception)
WON there was a finding of a prima facie case of Estafa
against the defendants
HELD
YES
Ratio. A prima facie case is that amount of evidence
which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general
presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if
not encountered and controlled by evidence tending to
contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove
other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment
of a prima facie case does not take away the
presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of
the jury be such as to rebut and control it.
-There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the
guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. Put
when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to
dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the prosecution had established a prima facie case
against them, they assume a definite burden. It
becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce
A2010
evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the
prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift in
the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof
as petitioners would seem to believe.
-When a prima facie case is established by the
prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the
burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It
remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom
it is imposed — the prosecution. It is the burden of
evidence which shifts from party to party depending
upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the
trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is
met by evidence which balances that introduced by the
prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.
-A prima facie case need not be countered by a
preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater
weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the
weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in
equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to
go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the
trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at
equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff
who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.
Reasoning. The petitioners refused to present
evidence, and this justified an inference of their guilt.
The burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their
innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to
their guilt.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, finding the order
complained of to be well-taken and there being no
grave abuse of discretion that attended its issuance,
the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against
petitioners. The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga where this case is now assigned, is
hereby ordered to continue immediately with the trial
of Criminal Case No. 808 until its final disposition. SO
ORDERED.
ABARQUEZ V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 150762
CARPIO; January 20, 2006
(rach)
NATURE
134
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Petition for review of the CA decision affirming RTC
which found Abarquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as an accomplice in the crime of homicide
FACTS
The Version of the Prosecution
- The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide in two Informations.
(Quejong died; Paz was injured.)
- Paz, Quejong, Tong, Abarquez’s son Bardie and
Masula were on their way home from a drinking party in
Sta. Mesa, Manila. They proceeded towards the exit of
San Jose St. Meanwhile, there was another drinking
session in front of a certain Almojuela’s house. As the
group of Paz was passing towards the main road,
Almojuela and his companions blocked their path.
- Almojuela asked Paz, “Are you brave?” Paz replied,
“Why?” Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a
knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but
sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both
shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz
asked Abarquez, “What is our atraso, we were going
home, why did you block our way?” Abarquez
answered, “Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na,
tumigil ka na.”
- Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an
altercation. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who
continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and
Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free
himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and
found him already bloodied. Almojuela stabbed
Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but
failed. He ran away to ask for help. When Paz and his
companions returned, they found Quejong still on the
ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the
area.
The Version of the Defense
- Abarquez countered that he was in his residence
when Almojuela’s wife informed him that the group of
Paz was challenging Almojuela to a fistfight.
Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded
to Almojuela’s house. When he arrived at
Almojuela’s house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the
ground being strangled by Quejong. Paz was holding
Almojuela’s waist and boxing him at the stomach.
- Masula was near Almojuela’s head holding a piece of
stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez
shouted at the group to stop. The group did not heed
Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the
Evidence
air. Still, the group did not heed him who then fired a
second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula
scampered away. Almojuela told Abarquez that he was
merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking
marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house while
Abarquez went home.
RTC and CA Rulings
- RTC held that the prosecution failed to prove that
Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the
killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be
convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide.
However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding
and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping
Quejong and allowed Almojuela to pursue his criminal
act without resistance. Hence, he is an accomplice.
- CA affirmed RTC. The CA sustained the trial court in
giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. CA
rejected Abarquez’s allegation that he was merely at
the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the prosecution was able to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
2. WON the prosecution’s evidence satisfied the test of
moral certainty
HELD
NO
Ratio The rule is that the trial court is in the best
position to determine the value and weight of the
testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial
court failed to consider certain facts of substance and
value, which if considered, might affect the result of the
case.
- As an accomplice, the cooperation that the law
punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which
cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed. Mere presence
of the accused at the crime scene cannot be
interpreted to mean that he committed the crime
charged.
- In People v. Fabros: “To be deemed an accomplice,
one needs to have had both knowledge of and
participation in the criminal act.”
Reasoning This must concur before a person becomes
liable as an accomplice:
(1) community of design, which means that the
accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation; and
A2010
(2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime.
2. NO
Ratio When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused,
the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus: “The
prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact
establishing guilt. The defense of the accused, even if
weak, is no reason to convict.”
- We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is
doubt on which side the evidence preponderates,
the party having the burden of proof loses. “The
equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce
a conviction.”
Reasoning In convicting Abarquez, the RTC and CA
relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified
that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders,
thus preventing him from helping Quejong who
was grappling with Almojuela. Paz’s testimony does
not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela’s
criminal design. “Tumigil” literally means “stop.”
Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining
the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he
was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz
could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he
tried to portray, because Almojuela was already
grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted
Abarquez’s action as an attempt to prevent him from
helping Quejong which was adopted by the RTC and
CA.
- Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while
restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding
him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that
Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping
Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was
trying to stop Paz from joining the fight.
Abarquez’s act of trying to stop Paz does not translate
to assistance to Almojuela.
- Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop
Almojuela. However, Paz testified that Abarquez’s son
Bardie, who was one of Paz’s companions, was the one
trying to pacify Almojuela.
135
 Prof. V. A. Avena
- The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in
his duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending
assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This,
however, does not necessarily show concurrence in
Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz ran away,
Abarquez shouted at him that he left his wounded
companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of
the extent of Quejong’s injury and he expected Paz to
look after his own companion.
Disposition Petition granted. We ACQUIT Coverdale
Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime
of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE
COMPANIES V RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK,INC
G.R. No. 147039
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 27, 2006
(owen)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 RoC seeking the
review of the CA Decision affirming RTC Makati
Decision reducing interest rate to 6% per annum
FACTS
- Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RADIO), who owns
several broadcasting stations all over the country, filed
a civil case against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance
Companies (DBP) and Provident Insurance Corporation
(PROVIDENT) for recovery of insurance benefits.
PROVIDENT covered RADIO’s transmitter equipment
and generating set for P13,550,000.00 under a Fire
Insurance Policy, while DBP covered RADIO’s
transmitter, furniture, fixture and other transmitter
facilities for P5,883,650.00 under a Fire Insurance
Policy.
- July 27, 1988 evening, RADIO’s station in Bacolod City
was razed by fire causing damage in the amount of
P1,044,040.00. RADIO sought recovery under the two
insurance policies but the claims were denied on the
ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk
excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d)
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or
damage occasioned by or through or in
consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the
following consequences, namely:
Evidence
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or
warlike operations (whether war be declared or not),
civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped
power.
The insurance companies denied the claims by
maintaining that the evidence showed that the fire was
caused by members of CPP/NPA. Hence, the civil case.
- RTC Makati: in favor of RADIO. PROVIDENT to pay
P450,000.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2,
1990 the date of the filing of the Complaint. DBP to
pay P602,600.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2,
1990.
- CA: affirmed the decision, with the modification that
the applicable interest rate reduced to 6% per annum.
MFR denied.
- DBP assails: factual finding of both RTC and CA that
its evidence failed to support its allegation that the loss
was caused by an excepted risk, (members of the
CPP/NPA)
RTC
+ testimony of witnesses Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3
Rochar, who were admittedly not present when the fire
occurred, was limited to the fact that an investigation
was conducted and in the course of the investigation
they were informed by bystanders that “heavily armed
men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in
it and then lit it. After that, they went out shouting
“Mabuhay ang NPA”.
+ persons whom they investigated and actually saw
the burning of the station were not presented as
witnesses
+ documentary evidence, which includes a letter
released by the NPA merely mentions some
dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the
media in Bacolod, do not satisfactorily prove that the
author of the burning were members of the NPA..
CA
+ police blotter of the burning of DYHB
+ certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated
National Police, Bacolod City regarding the incident
+ letter of alleged NPA members Magsilang claiming
responsibility for the burning of DYHB
+ fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988
+ testimonies of Lt. Col. Torres and SFO III Rochas
ISSUES
A2010
1. WON police blotter of the burning of DYHB, the
certification issued by the Integrated National Police of
Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared
by SFO III Rochas is deemed sufficient (Entry in Official
Records)
2. WON the testimony of Lt. Col. Torres is admissible
3. WON the letter of Magsilang, who claims to be a
member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person
which is not a party to the present action, is admissible
(Admission & Confessions)
4. WON the excepted risk was not proven by DBP
5. WON the reports of witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO
II Rochar that the bystanders they interviewed claimed
that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA is
an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae
(Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence)
HELD
1. NO
- The documentary evidence may be considered
exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official
records, nevertheless, none of these documents
categorically stated that the perpetrators were
members of the CPP/NPA.
> police blotter: “a group of persons accompanied by
one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA … more or
less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,”
> certification from the Bacolod Police station: “…
some 20 or more armed men believed to be members
of the New People’s Army NPA,”
> fire investigation report: “(I)t is therefore believed by
this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is
intentional, and the armed men suspected to be
members of the CPP/NPA were the ones responsible …”
- All these documents show that indeed, the
“suspected” executor of the fire were believed to be
members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not
sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the
quantum of proof.
2. NO
- The only person who seems to be so sure that that the
CPP-NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col.
Torres. However, though his testimony is persuasive, it
cannot be admit as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA
was really involved in the incident considering that he
admitted that he did not personally see the armed men
even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt.
Col. Torres was presented as witness, he was presented
136
 Prof. V. A. Avena
as an ordinary witness only and not an expert witness.
Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of the
armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible in
evidence.
3. NO
- Under Section 22, Rule 130 RoC. An admission is
competent only when the declarant, or someone
identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the
action.
4. YES
- In insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the
terms of a policy which insures against other perils or
hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense
which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed
that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking
to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation
in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss
comes within the purview of the exception or limitation
set up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a
contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to
prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is
excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause
which limits its liability.
- Consequently, it is sufficient for RADIO to prove the
fact of damage or loss. Once RADIO makes out a
prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to DBP to controvert RADIO’S prima
facie case. In this case, since DBP alleged an excepted
risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to DBP to
prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has
sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused
by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift
back to respondent who is then under a duty of
producing evidence to show why such excepted risk
does not release petitioner from any liability
5. NO
- A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge, which means those
facts which are derived from his perception. A witness
may not testify as to what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the
same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not
given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-
examination by opposing counsel to test the
Evidence
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the
out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on
which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
- Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or after the commission of
the crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule
in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not
testify and provided that the testimony of the witness
who heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise
a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
- It is reasonable to assume that when these
statements were noted down, the bystanders already
had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to
one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take
place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether
these utterances were the products of truth. That the
utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote. At
best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres that these statements were made may be
considered as independently relevant statements
gathered in the course of their investigation, and are
admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact
that they had been thus uttered.
- Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
- Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders
that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused
the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow
that such declarations are sufficient proof. These
declarations should be calibrated vis-à-vis the other
evidence on record.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
A2010
PEOPLE V VALLA
G.R. No. 111285
QUISUMBING; January 24, 2000
(apple)
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
FACTS
-On April 14, 1991, 9 am: Myra Pines (12 y/o), while
passing by the ricefield in Brgy Ilayang Tayuman, heard
a voice coming from the direction of the forested area
of the place, and it seemed to her that someone was
being strangled.
-She recognized the voice as belonging to her
playmate, Dyesebel de la Cruz (8 y/o). Frightened by
such thought, Myra scampered and proceeded to the
crossing where she was originally headed.
-4 pm: Dyesebel's mother, Mila, went to Brgy Captain
Aristeo Allarey to report that her daughter was missing.
-A search party was organized by Allarey, joined by
Dyesebel's father, Gonzalo
-Captain Allarey learned from Gonzalo that, earlier,
Dyesebel was in the company of accused-appellant
Vicente Valla, and that both of them were tasked to
watch the ricefield. They went to the ricefield but
appellant was not there. Allarey learned from a
barangay tanod that appellant was drinking liquor in a
friend's house. He summoned appellant but the latter
failed to immediately report to him
-Allarey and his party started their search that
afternoon, and resumed the following morning
-While they was searching for Dyesebel, they were
joined by appellant who trailed behind them.
-At around 11 am, they found Dyesebel's body near the
river, with her neck blackened and her vagina bloodied.
She was still wearing her dress but her panty had been
pulled down to her mid-thigh.
-Allarey and his companions confronted appellant, who
admitted that he raped and killed Dyesebel. Thereafter,
he addressed Dyesebel's father, in the presence of
137
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Allarey and company, offering his own daughter in
payment of Dyesebel's life which he took, and begged
for forgiveness.
-On August 14, 1990, appellant was charged with the
crime of "rape with murder"
-Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel
de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty
-Myra Pines, the victim's 12 year-old playmate, who
heard the victim's cries as she was being strangled,
and Aristeo Allarey, Gonzalo de la Cruz, Reynaldo
Merle, members of the search party, were among
those who were presented by the prosecution as
witnesses
-TC found appellant guilty of the crime of "rape with
homicide"
-Hence, the present appeal
-In his brief, appellant claims that the testimony of
prosecution witness Allarey was inconsistent since on
direct examination, Allarey narrated that when he
summoned appellant, the latter did not immediately
appear, but on cross-examination, he said that
appellant immediately reported to him. Appellant also
contends that Merle's testimony that appellant was
"tulala" at the time he confessed to the commission of
the crime was inconsistent with appellant's alleged
begging for forgiveness for the crime
ISSUE
WON the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
should be given full faith and credence despite the
inconsistencies
HELD
Yes.
-As consistently held by the Court, the trial judge's
evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally
accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality,
unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or
misunderstood but which could change the result.
-Having had the direct opportunity to observe the
witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage
position to assess his demeanor, and determine if he
was telling the truth or not.
-The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Allarey
as to whether appellant immediately reported to him
after being summoned, and in the testimony of Merle
that appellant was "tulala" at the time he admitted
responsibility for the crime, merely refer to minor
details which do not in actuality touch upon the "whys"
and "wherefores" of the crime committed.
Evidence
-Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses
when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. Although there may be
inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not
impair the credibility of the witnesses where
there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the
assailants.
-In fact, some minor inconsistencies could show
that the witness was not previously coached so
as to tailor his testimony, and thus they serve as
badges of credibility.
-Further, the prosecution witnesses, particularly the
barangay officials, had no motive to falsely testify
against appellant.
-Also, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his
guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against
him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is
corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by
Section 3 of Rule 133.
-The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness
and even offering his own daughter in exchange for his
crime may also be regarded as part of the res gestae
under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Dispostion
Assailed decision affirmed
REPUBLIC, represented by PCGG v. OMB
DESIERTO
GR 135123
January 22, 2007; AZCUNA
(Ina)
FACTS
PCGG filed a complaint against private respondents
(some Marcos cronies) for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). Ombudsman (OMB)
dismissed the complaint for lack of factual basis to
charge them of the offense charged.
It is alleged that, on March 11, 1982, private
respondent Herminio T. Disini, a personal friend and
golfing partner of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, gave to the former Chief Executive shares of
stock of Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation
A2010
(VIMC) and The Energy Corporation (TEC) worth P40M
and P25M, respectively, which shares of stock were in
the name of Herdis Group, Inc. (HGI for short), a local
corporation controlled by Disini. The stock certificates
covering the above mentioned shares of stocks were
among the documents found in Malacañang in the
possession of the late President when he fled to Hawaii
sometime in February 1986.
PCGG submitted the following in support of its
charge:
1. letter of Herminio Disini, wherein shares of stocks of
VIMC and TEC, both subsidiaries of Herdis Group, Inc.,
were turned over by him to the late President Marcos;
2. an affidavit by one of the private respondents,
Manahan (The affidavit stated the divestment plan to
turn over shares to Marcos);
3. the stock certificates of VIMC and TEC found in
Malacañang after the late President fled the country.
OMB, in its dismissal of the complaint, considered
only #1 above and ignored #s 2 and 3. OMB said the
letter written by Disini to Marcos had no evidentiary
value because it wasn’t identified nor authenticated by
a qualified person, and that the contents are pure
hearsay because it wasn’t affirmed by Disini.
ISSUE
WON OMB acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the assailed resolution
and order
RULING
YES.
The rule is OMB ruling will not be overturned as
long as substantial evidence supports it. However,
where there appears to be a grave abuse of discretion,
as there appears to be here, the Court will so declare
and direct that the proper complaint or information be
filed. The resolution of dismissal is not based on the
evidence presented and is not warranted by the facts
thus far available to OMB.
These documents (#s 2 and 3 above) constituted
probable cause for violation of Sections 3 and 4 of
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Stated in the affidavit was a divestment
plan to turn over several shares of VIMC and TEC to the
former President. Moreover, the stock certificates
showed that private respondents, in conspiracy with
138
 Prof. V. A. Avena
the former President, were the authors of the acts
subject of the complaint.
The affidavit of private respondent Manahan
relates facts that are based on personal knowledge and
perception, the affiant having held important positions
in Herdis Group, Inc. As one of the trusted men of
private respondent Herminio Disini, he knew very well
the latter’s handwriting and signature. Hence, private
respondents could not simply feign ignorance of the
divestment plan, because all of them appear to have
approved it. Private respondent Manahan himself
appears to have prepared the aide memoir, with the
assistance of his subordinates, prior to its submission to
private respondent Herminio Disini.
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive
cause or import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. It has been defined as
the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted. Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a
trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge.
The wide latitude in determining the existence of
probable cause or the lack of it cannot be exercised
arbitrarily. The Ombudsman must weigh facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
our technical rules of evidence. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men
have an abundance of. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and, definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of
probable cause is not a pronouncement of guilt.
VALEROSO V. PPL
G.R. No. 164815
Feb. 22, 2008; Reyes, R.T.
(Chrislao)
Evidence
Facts:
-SPO2 Disuanco received a dispatch order from the
desk officer. The order directed him & 3 other
policemen to serve a warrant of arrest vs. Sr. Insp.
Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom.
-When they caught him, they put him under arrest,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily
searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter
Arms, bearing a Serial Number with 5 live ammunition.
-A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms
and Explosives Division revealed that it was not issued
to Valeroso but to a certain Salvatierra. Deriquito, the
records verifier, presented a certification to that effect
signed by Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms
and Explosive Division.
-Valeroso was then charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.
-Valeroso, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty when arraigned. Trial on the merits ensued.
-SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the
prosecution in the manner stated above.
-Upon the other hand, Valeroso had a different version
was supplied by the combined testimonies of petitioner
Sr. Insp. Valeroso, SPO3 Timbol, Jr. and Yuson.
-According to Valeroso, the search done in the boarding
house was illegal. The gun seized from him was duly
licensed and covered by necessary permits.
-SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued to Valeroso a
Memorandum Receipt covering the subject firearm and
its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction of
Col. Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature on
the said receipt.
-RTC and CA found him guilty. Hence this petition
before the SC.
Issue: WON CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING HIS CONVICTION
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Ruling: NO. CA did not err. Valeroso IS GUILTY. In
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the twin
elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and
ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who
possessed or owned the same does not have the
corresponding license for it. The prosecution was able
to discharge its burden.
A2010
-The existence of the subject firearm and its
ammunition was established through the testimony of
SPO2 Disuanco. Defense witness Yuson also identified
the firearm. Its existence was likewise admitted by no
less than Valeroso himself. As for Valeroso’s lack of
authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that
a verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing a
Serial No. revealed that the seized pistol was not issued
to Valeroso. It was registered in the name of a certain
Salvatierra. As proof, Deriquito presented a certification
signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same
office.
-The Court on several occasions ruled that either the
testimony of a representative of, or a certification from,
the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution more
than complied when it presented both. The certification
from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an
exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130,
Section 44 of the Rules of Court (Entries in official
records).
AS REGARDS OIUR TOPIC ON WEIGHT AND
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
-Petitioner, however, raises several points which he
says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.
The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies
with the trial court.
-Valeroso’s version of the manner and place of his
arrest goes into the factual findings made by the trial
court and its calibration of the credibility of witnesses.
However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in
People v. Rivera:
x x x the manner of
assigning values to declarations of
witnesses on the witness stand is
best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who had
the unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and assess
their credibility by the various indicia
available but not reflected on record.
xxx We have consistently
ruled that when the question arises
as to which of the conflicting versions
of the prosecution and the defense is
139
 Prof. V. A. Avena
worthy of belief, the assessment of
the trial courts are generally viewed
as correct and entitled to great
weight. Furthermore, in an appeal,
where the culpability or innocence of
the accused depends on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the
veracity of their testimonies, findings
of the trial court are given the highest
degree of respect if not finality.
-The TC found the prosecution version worthy of
credence and belief. SC finds no compelling reason not
to accept its observation on this score.
The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is
not legally authorized to possess the subject
firearm and its five (5) ammunition.
-Second, Valeroso insists that he is legally authorized
to possess the subject firearm and its ammunition on
the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by
the PNP Narcotics Command.
-Although Valeroso is correct in his submission that
public officers like policemen are accorded presumption
of regularity in the performance of their official duties,
it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to
rebut the presumption when it proved that the issuance
to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything
but regular.
Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as
evidence is not fatal provided there is competent
testimony as to its existence.
-Third, Valeroso claims that the subject firearm and
ammunition should have been excluded as evidence
because they were not formally offered by the
prosecution in violation of Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. Valeroso’s contention has no leg to
stand on. Contrary to Valeroso’s claim, the subject
firearm and its 5 live ammunition were offered in
evidence by the prosecution. Even assuming arguendo
that they were not offered, Valeroso’s stance must still
fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be
established by testimony, even without its presentation
Evidence
at trial. In People v. Orehuela, the non-presentation of
the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO AND Y REALTY
CORPORATION V SANDIGANBAYAN ET AL
CARPIO MORALES; JANUARY 20, 2006
(jaja)
FACTS
These five consolidated petitions pray for the
nullification of certain issuances of the Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case No. 0002, “Republic of the Philippines v.
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.” The complaint in
Civil Case No. 0002 (or the case) was filed before the
Sandiganbayan on July 16, 1987 by the Republic of the
Philippines (the Republic) through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against
former President and Mrs. Marcos, their three children,
and some other individuals. The complaint was later
amended to implead additional defendants.
The case is for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, among which are shares of stock in
the Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC): 76,779 shares in the name of
Ramon U. Cojuangco, 21,525 shares in the name of
Imelda O. Cojuangco, and 111,415 shares in the name
of Prime Holdings Incorporated (PHI). PTIC is the
biggest stockholder of PLDT, it owning some 28% of the
outstanding shares in PLDT at the time Civil Case No.
0002 was filed.
In the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0002,
the first three petitions assailing interlocutory orders of
the Sandiganbayan were filed before this Court. Thus,
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 149802 and 150320, filed
by Alfonso Yuchengco and Y Realty Corporation,
complainants-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 0002,
assail via petition for certiorari orders and resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan denying their motions to suspend
trial pending discovery proceedings and to re-set trial
dates (with alternative prayer for a change in the order
of trial), and declaring them as having waived their
right to present evidence. The petition in G.R. No.
150367, filed by the Republic, assails via petition for
certiorari the Sandiganbayan Orders denying its
Respectful Motion for Additional Time to Complete the
A2010
Presentation of Evidence and directing it to submit its
offer of evidence within 30 days.
During the pendency of these first three petitions, the
Sandiganbayan continued with the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 0002, no restraining order enjoining the same
having been issued by this Court. The Sandiganbayan,
still during the pendency of the first three petitions,
promulgated in Civil Case No. 0002 a Partial Decision
on May 6, 2002 dismissing the complaint of plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines on the PLDT shares subject
of separate trial for lack of merit, granting the Motion
for Summary Judgment [filed by Imelda Cojuangco, et
al], and dismissing the Complaint-in-Intervention [filed
by the Yuchengcos].
The last two of the five petitions at bar, both for review
on certiorari, were thereupon filed. The petition in G.R.
No. 153207 filed by the complainants-in-intervention
Yuchengcos, and that in G.R. No. 153459 filed by the
Republic, both challenge the Partial Decision.
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 149802, 150320 and
150367 contend they were denied due process when
the Sandiganbayan in effect directed them to terminate
the presentation of their respective evidence. There is
no disagreement with respect to the disposition-
dismissal by the minority of the first three petitions –
the first having become moot, and the second and third
for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan. There is also no disagreement with
respect to the disposition-denial by the minority of the
fourth petition (G.R. No. 153207) in the absence of
reversible error on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
It is with respect to the disposition-denial by the
minority of the fifth petition (G.R. No. 153459) insofar
as it denied the prayer of the Republic for a judgment
ordering the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco
(Cojuangco), Imelda O. Cojuangco, PHI, their assigns,
nominees and agents to reconvey to the Republic
111,415 PTIC shares registered in the name of PHI that
the majority does not agree, in light of the immediately
following discussions
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PHI AND ITS
DEALINGS WITH PTIC
140
 Prof. V. A. Avena
PHI was registered on October 5, 1977 with the
following five (5) incorporators: Jose D. Campos, Jr.
(son of Jose Yao Campos), Rolando Gapud
(Gapud), Renato Lirio (Lirio), Ernesto Abalos
(Abalos), and Gervacio Gaviola (Gaviola), with 400
shares each, with a par value of P100 per share. The
total amount of capital stock subscribed was thus
P200,000.00, P50,000.00 of which was actually paid.
[5] Its place of business was at 66 United Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
The five PHI incorporators, in their capacity as
stockholders, elected themselves as directors on
October 10, 1977. On even date, they elected the
following as officers of the corporation:
Rolando C. Gapud - President
Jose D. Campos, Jr. - Vice-
President
Gervasio T. Gaviola - Treasurer
Francisco G. De Guzman - Secretary
Rodolfo R. Dimaano - Assistant
Secretary
Meanwhile, 54,349 shares in another corporation, PTIC,
were “contributed to and/or abandoned” by one of its
stockholders, General Telephone and Electronics (GTE),
an American corporation, in favor of PTIC. On
December 20, 1977, the PTIC Board of Directors
resolved to sell such 54,349 shares to its stockholders
in proportion to their holdings. No stockholder, apart
from Cojuangco, PTIC President and member of its
Board of Directors, expressed interest in purchasing the
shares. All the 54,349 shares were then transferred to
his name.
Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla (Rivilla), another
stockholder of PTIC, together with PHI President Gapud,
forged an agreement dated January 27, 1978 referring
to the “various discussions during which [Cojuangco
and Rivilla] offered to sell and [PHI] agreed to purchase
partially paid subscriptions and common shares of
[PTIC].” The agreement which indicated the basic terms
and conditions of the transaction states that the
number of PTIC shares which Cojuangco and Rivilla
were prepared to sell to PHI was “111,415 common
shares representing 46.1250% of the subscribed and
outstanding shares of PTIC.”
Evidence
On April 20, 1978, the PTIC Board of Directors granted
Cojuangco and Rivilla authorization to transfer their
PTIC shares to PHI. Cojuangco thereafter ceded to PHI
77,719 PTIC shares registered in his name via two
separate deeds of assignment both dated May 2, 1978,
one for 44,023 shares and the other for 33,696 shares.
Rivilla likewise conveyed PTIC 33,696 shares registered
in his name to PHI via a deed of assignment also dated
May 2, 1978. Thus, a total of 111,415 PTIC shares
was transferred to PHI on May 2, 1978.
Gapud and Jose D. Campos, Jr. later assigned all their
shares in PHI (400 shares each) to Cojuangco and PTIC
Director Oscar Africa (Africa), respectively, via two
separate deeds of assignment dated February 18,
1981.
On May 9, 1981, Cojuangco and Africa were elected
directors of PHI, replacing Gapud and Jose D. Campos,
Jr., while the other directors – Lirio, Abalos, and Gaviola
– remained as such. On even date, Cojuangco and
Africa were elected by the PHI Board of Directors as
President and Vice-President, respectively, while de
Guzman and Gaviola remained as Secretary and
Treasurer, respectively.
Subsequently, by Deed of Assignment dated June 1983
(the day is not indicated), Africa transferred all his 400
PHI shares — 240 to Antonio Cojuangco and 160 to
Trinidad Cojuangco Yulo. On even date, the remaining
incorporators on the board of directors – Lirio, Abalos,
and Gaviola – each executed a deed of assignment
transferring their PHI shares to members of the
Cojuangco family. Thus Lirio transferred 240 shares to
Antonio Cojuangco and 160 to Trinidad C. Yulo; Abalos
transferred 320 shares to Ramon O. Cojuangco, Jr. and
80 to Miguel O. Cojuangco; and Gaviola transferred 320
shares to Ma. Victoria O. Cojuangco Yulo and 80 also to
Antonio Cojuangco.
Significantly, respondents in G.R. No. 153459, namely:
Estate of Ramon Cojuangco, Imelda O. Cojuangco, PHI,
and Imelda R. Marcos all agree with petitioner Republic
that PHI has an undisclosed beneficial owner, their only
disagreement being who this owner is.
The Cojuangcos and PHI in their Comment proffer that
the beneficial owners are the Cojuangcos. Imelda
A2010
Marcos, on the other hand, consistent with the theory of
petitioner Republic, claims that she, her late husband
President Marcos, and their family were the beneficial
owners of PHI.
ISSUE
WON the preponderance of evidence lies with the
Republic
HELD
YES. E.O. No. 14-A clearly states that the degree of
proof required in cases such as the one at bar is
preponderance of evidence.
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully
acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379
or for restitution, reparation of damages, or
indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil actions under the
Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate
family, close relatives, subordinates, close
and/or business associates, dummies, agents
and nominees, may proceed independently of
any criminal proceedings and may be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
(Underscoring supplied)
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, was not to look for proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based on
the evidence presented, in light of common human
experience, which of the theories proffered by the
parties is more worthy of credence. The case of
Joaquin v. Navarro [instructs:
x x x “Juries must often reason," says one
author, "according to probabilities, drawing an
inference that the main fact in issue existed
from collateral facts not directly proving, but
strongly tending to prove, its existence. The
vital question in such cases is the cogency of
the proof afforded by the secondary facts.
How likely, according to experience, is
the existence of the primary fact if
certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore
on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us
of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing
141
 Prof. V. A. Avena
the inference that the person who was caught
firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his
land was the person who fired a shot about an
hour before at the same animal also
trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight,
but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the
illustration leave greater room for another
possibility than do the facts of the case at
hand.
In conclusion, the presumption that Angela
Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is
based purely on surmises, speculations, or
conjectures without any sure foundation in the
evidence. The opposite theory - that the
mother outlived her son - is deduced from
established facts which, weighed by
common experience, engender the
inference as a very strong probability.
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance
of evidence by which civil cases are
decided, this inference ought to prevail. x
x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The evidence presented by the parties shows that the
preponderance clearly lies with the Republic, but the
Sandiganbayan grossly misappreciated it and,
therefore, committed a reversible error. In Ramos, Sr.
v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., this Court ruled:
Once again, we apply the rule that findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on
the Supreme Court and will not be overturned
when supported by the evidence on record
save in the known exceptions such as gross
misappreciation of the evidence or
misapprehension of facts. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Moreover, the case of Salazar v. Gutierrez teaches:
It bears repeating that the finding thus made,
although apparently factual in character, is
premised upon supposed absence of evidence,
and therefore is reviewed by this Court if the
premise is clearly contradicted by the record
or unjustified upon other considerations which
Evidence
logically lead to a different conclusion, but
which the decision under review did not take
into account. (Underscoring supplied)
THE TESTIMONIES OF CAMPOS, GAPUD, AND
ATTY. FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN (De Guzman)
ESTABLISH THE MARCOSES’ OWNERSHIP OF PHI
SWORN STATEMENT AND DEPOSITION OF JOSE YAO
CAMPOS
It is not disputed that Jose Yao Campos (hereinafter
referred to as Campos) is a former Marcos crony who,
after the February 1986 EDSA Revolution, surrendered
to the government substantial assets which he
confessed to have held in behalf of Marcos. He is one of
the Republic’s witnesses in the case.
The Sandiganbayan, after finding that “almost all the
documents offered by the Republic are photocopies”
(underscoring supplied) and ruling that the same were
unreliable, omitted any discussion of the evidentiary
weight of the Republic’s testimonial evidence,
including the deposition-statement of Campos.
Notwithstanding Campos’ testimony linking Marcos to
PHI (and thus to the subject PTIC shares pertaining to
PHI), the graft court concluded that “[t]here is no
competent evidence to tie defendant Ferdinand Marcos
with PTIC.”
In so ruling, the Sandiganbayan grossly
misappreciated, it bears repeating, the weight of the
evidence presented by the Republic, reducing to
naught Campos’ categorical statement that PHI is one
of the corporations he organized in behalf of
Marcos and that in “[a]ll the corporations [he]
organized – that was the standard policy – that
we surrendered [a Deed of Trust or Deed of
Assignment] direct to President Marcos.” His
sworn admission that PHI was a dummy corporation
organized for former President Marcos constitutes
convincing evidence that PHI was beneficially owned by
Marcos.
DEPOSITION OF GAPUD
Gapud, one of the incorporators of PHI, affirmed
Campos’ sworn statement quoted above that he is his
A2010
associate. His deposition taken at the Philippine
Consulate Office in Hong Kong on October 18-20 and
December 11-12, 1995 substantially corroborates the
statements of Campos and further establishes that PHI
was a dummy corporation of the Marcoses.
As with the testimony of Campos, the Sandiganbayan
did not explain its reasons for holding that,
notwithstanding the existence of Gapud’s testimony in
the records, there is no competent evidence to support
the Republic’s thesis. The minority, however, passing
upon the above-quoted testimony, expresses the view
that Gapud contradicted himself with respect to the
disposition of his 400 shares in PHI, since “it would
have been implausible for him to make the assignment
to Mr. Cojuangco if the covering certificates had
previously been delivered to Pres. Marcos.”
(Underscoring supplied)
This argument, however, misinterprets the statement
of Gapud, since he did not specifically state that
covering certificates were delivered to President
Marcos, but only that “shares of stock and/or the
assignments indorsed in blank were delivered to
President Marcos by Mr. Campos” (emphasis and
underscoring supplied). Gapud was thus proferring the
possibility that only deeds of assignment were
delivered to the former President. Hence, there is no
reason to read a contradiction into his statements.
Significantly, de Guzman would confirm in his
testimony that only deeds of assignment, and not stock
certificates, were issued in PHI, as will be discussed
below.
Gapud’s statement relating the subsequent execution
of deeds of assignment to Cojuangco and his kin does
not detract from the prior delivery of blank deeds to
President Marcos, especially so in this case where, by
Gapud’s own recounting, he and his co-incorporators
executed the 1981 and 1983 deeds of assignment with
the knowledge and authorization of the same person to
whom the earlier deeds were delivered – President
Marcos. Gapud’s statements thus complement those
made by Campos, further strengthening the Republic’s
claim that PHI is a corporation beneficially owned by
the Marcoses.
DEPOSITION OF DE GUZMAN
142
 Prof. V. A. Avena
The Republic also presented the deposition of de
Guzman, former corporate secretary of PHI, taken at
the Mandarin Hotel, Makati City on June 12, 2001. His
testimony also sheds light on the origins and
organization of PHI, and substantially corroborates the
statements of Campos and Gapud. The statements of
de Guzman support the thesis
of the Republic that PHI is a dummy of the
Marcoses, it having been completely organized
by associates of Campos, who had categorically
testified to having organized PHI for the benefit
of President Marcos. On the other hand, there is
hardly any evidence on Cojuangco’s role in the
organization of PHI to substantiate the thesis
that the same was beneficially owned by him.
By affirming that PHI was organized by Campos, by
identifying all the incorporators and himself as Campos
associates, and by revealing that the office of PHI was
within the premises of Campos – controlled UNILAB, de
Guzman substantially corroborates the Campos and
Gapud testimonies.
Furthermore, de Guzman also confirmed that all the
incorporators of PHI held their shares as mere
nominees and that there was a standard operating
procedure followed in the holding companies organized
by Campos regarding the issuance of deeds of
assignment in blank, which is again consistent with the
other testimonies mentioned. Notably, de Guzman
clarified that no stock certificates were issued in
PHI, but only deeds of assignment, which sheds light
on the statement of Gapud earlier adverted to.
De Guzman may have differed with Campos and Gapud
insofar as he stated that the original of the deeds
remained with the records of PHI and a xerox copy was
handed to its Treasurer Gaviola. This should not,
however, obscure the general consistency of his
statements with those of Campos’ and Gapud’s,
especially when it is considered that, as de Guzman
himself testified, the records were under the control of
Campos.
The Republic’s thesis that President Marcos is the
beneficial owner of PHI “is deduced from established
facts which, weighed by common experience, engender
the inference as a very strong probability.” Only a
Marcos ownership can make sense of the
Evidence
circumstances surrounding the origins of PHI, especially
its close ties with UNILAB and the Camposes.
Only a Marcos ownership of PHI can plausibly account
for the substantially corroborated admissions of
Campos and Gapud that they organized PHI in behalf of
Marcos. Indeed, even the minority had to acknowledge
that Gapud was a mere nominee, merely denying that
his principal was Marcos, contrary to Gapud’s own
admission. However, perhaps unable to account for
the undeniable fact that all the incorporators of PHI are
Campos associates, the minority implies that the true
owner was neither Marcos nor Cojuangco, but Campos
himself – contrary to the Cojuangcos’ submission that
Ramon Cojuangco was the beneficial owner, and to
Campos’ admission that he organized PHI for President
Marcos.
Moreover, the thesis that Marcos owned PHI is able to
make more sense of the undisputed assignment of PTIC
shares to PHI by Cojuangco. If PHI were beneficially
owned by Cojuangco, then the transfer of these PTIC
shares to PHI would merely have been a transfer to
himself. On the other hand, on the thesis that PHI is
beneficially owned by Marcos, the assignment thereof
to PHI was a transfer from Cojuangco to President
Marcos.
On the basis of the evidence, therefore,
President Marcos owned PHI and all the
incorporators thereof acted under his direction.
Once this is acknowledged, the following conclusions
inevitably follow:
1. Cojuangco was elected President and took over the
management of PHI in 1981 with the cooperation of the
Marcos nominees who, it must be emphasized, still held
the majority stockholding as of that date;
2. As the remaining incorporators on the Board
divested their shares only in 1983, Cojuangco managed
a Marcos-controlled corporation for at least two years;
3. The simultaneous divestment of shares by the three
remaining incorporators on the Board to Cojuangco’s
close relatives in 1983 were with the knowledge and
authorization of their principal – President Marcos.
A2010
Clearly, all these circumstances mark out Cojuangco
either as a nominee of Marcos as was Gapud whom he
replaced as President of PHI or, at the very least, a
close associate of Marcos. As such, the PCGG which is
charged, under E.O. No. issued by President Aquino
pursuant to her legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution, with assisting the President in regard to,
inter alia,
The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled
by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or
relationship (Underscoring supplied),
can and must recover for the Republic the 111,415
PTIC shares being held by PHI, they bearing the
character of ill-gotten wealth whether they be in the
hands of Marcos or those of Cojuangco.
On the other hand, respecting the thesis that PHI was,
from its inception, beneficially owned by Ramon
Cojuangco, the Cojuangcos can only point to the deeds
of assignment of PHI shares to members of their family
as confirming the same. The Sandiganbayan
considered these deeds as competent evidence, as
opposed to the purported lack of such evidence on the
part of the Republic. The most these deeds could
show, however, is that the Cojuangcos acquired PHI
shares in the years 1981 and 1983, long after the
111,415 PTIC shares were acquired in 1978 by PHI. On
the decisive question of whether the
incorporators who organized PHI in 1977 acted as
Marcos (or Cojuangco) nominees, these deeds
are absolutely silent.
In marked contrast, the testimonies of Campos, Gapud,
and de Guzman, persons who actually participated in
the formation and early years of operation of PHI,
constitute evidence that directly addresses the critical
issue.
143
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Underlying the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the
subject PHI shares are not part of the Marcos ill-gotten
wealth is its reliance on the supposed determinative
indicia set out in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co.,
Inc. (BASECO) v. PCGG. It bears noting that, in
BASECO, this Court determined the extent of the
powers vested in the PCGG for the purpose of
preserving suspected ill-gotten wealth. These were in
the nature of provisional remedies, e.g., sequestration,
freeze orders, and the like, preparatory to a judicial
finding that such properties are indeed ill-gotten. It is
unlike the case at bar where this Court will now finally
determine on the merits whether a particular property
is, in fact, ill-gotten.
A reading of BASECO would reveal that it did not intend
to establish evidentiary norms for all future cases
involving the Marcos wealth. Nowhere does it state
that the failure of the Republic to present as evidence
blank deeds of assignment is fatal to its cause. The
most that can be gathered from BASECO in this regard
is that this Court therein found that there were blank
deeds of assignment and stock certificates endorsed in
blank recovered in Malacañang which were considered
prima facie evidence to justify the exercise of PCGG’s
powers of sequestration, freeze order, and the like.
Nowhere in BASECO is any pronouncement that
only such kind of evidence suffices to prove
Marcos ownership of corporations, to the
exclusion of other evidence such as the
deposition-sworn statements of the confessed
Marcos cronies in the instant case.
DISPOSITION Petition of the Republic of the
Philippines in G.R. No. 153459 GRANTED to the extent
that it prays for the reconveyance to the Republic of
111,415 PTIC shares registered in the name of PHI;
Petitions in G.R. Nos. 149802, 150320, 150367, and
153207 DENIED
SPECIAL RULES
Rule re Minority
PEOPLE v. FILOMINO L. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 169643
CALLEJO, SR; April 13, 2007
Evidence
(edel)
Nature: Automatic Review
Facts:
(As per the Prosecution)
-BBB is the appellant’s daughter and was born on
January 23, 1983. In the evening of Dec.23, 1997, BBB,
together with her parents and her three brothers, spent
the night in her aunt’s house. Her mother left to attend
a wake. While inside the room with her brothers (who
were then sleeping), BBB asked for a glass of water
from appellant. After drinking, she felt dizzy. When she
woke up the following morning, her breasts and private
part were aching, but she did not do anything because
she thought that she had just been bitten by ants.
At around midnight in the first week of February 1998,
while BBB and her brothers were inside their room
sleeping, appellant went inside, raised (BBB�s) blouse
up to her neck and sucked her breasts.7 He likewise
pulled down her shorts and panty up to her thighs;8
kissed her lips;9 went on top of her;10 and inserted his
penis into her vagina.11 After satisfying his lustful
desire, appellant told her that he would kill her and her
family if she reported the matter to anyone.12 BBB did
not report the incident. She finally told her mother
when she learned that she was pregnant. Her mother
cried and got mad.13 BBB gave birth in October 1998.
The child was later adopted by her cousin.14
On July 7, 1998, BBB executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay15 before SPO1 Nixon Cruz of the Philippine
National Police. On the same day, SPO4 Cezar T.
Mangune, the Chief Investigator, filed a Criminal
Complaint16 against appellant before the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bamban-Capas-
Concepcion, Capas Tarlac. A preliminary investigation
was immediately conducted. On even date, the MCTC
issued a Resolution17 finding prima facie evidence of
rape. The Provincial Prosecutor sustained the findings
of the MCTC in a Resolution18 dated July 20, 1998. Two
(2) separate Informations were then filed with the RTC
of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 1288-(98) and 1289-(98). The Informations
contain the following accusatory portions:
That on or about December 23, 1997, in the x x x
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation,
A2010
succeed in having sexual intercourse with his daughter
BBB, a minor 15 years old.
xxxx
That sometime in the first week of February 1998, in
the x x x Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation,
succeed in having sexual intercourse with his daughter
BBB, a minor 15 years old.
(As per the Defendant)
Appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.
He testified that on the night of December 23, 1997, he
and his wife and children went to the house of his
sister-in-law where they spent the night. At 7:00 p.m.,
his wife and sister-in-law went to a wake.21 While his
wife was away, he and his children watched the
television. His wife arrived at 9:00 p.m. At 10:00 p.m.,
he decided to sleep and went inside the room where his
wife and children were sleeping. At that time, BBB was
sleeping beside her mother. Appellant then positioned
himself beside his wife.22 He denied that BBB asked
him to get a glass of water; at that time, BBB and his
other children were already asleep.
Appellant further claimed that he and his wife did not
have serious problems with each other except for petty
quarrels over who was going to cook in the
mornings.23 He did not have any misunderstanding
with his daughter BBB.24 He admitted that he did not
file a counter-affidavit at the MCTC because he was
surprised, and "they" hurt him. He did not, however,
report this matter either before the MCTC or other
authorities.25
RTC: On September 10, 2001, the RTC rendered a
Decision acquitting the appellant in Criminal Case No.
1288-(98), but convicting him for the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 1289-(98). The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. For Criminal Case No. 1288: For failure of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment
is hereby rendered acquitting him of the crime
charged.
2. For Criminal Case No. 1289: The prosecution
having successfully established the guilt of the
accused beyond any cavil of doubt of the
crime of rape, judgment is hereby rendered
144
 Prof. V. A. Avena
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection.
"If the crime of rape is committed where the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent x x x the imposition of the death penalty is
mandatory." (People vs. Tanco, 284 SCRA 251).
The accused is further ordered to pay, by way of
indemnity the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages, and another Twenty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.261awphi1.n�t
On the alleged rape committed on December 23, 1997,
the RTC concluded that, from the evidence presented,
the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the first
element of rape � sexual intercourse. The trial court
further stated that the offended party�s testimony �
that she felt dizzy after drinking the glass of water
given by the appellant, and felt pain on her breasts and
private part when she woke up the following morning �
are not positive indicia of defloration.27
The trial court, however, was convinced that appellant
committed the second charge of rape (the first week of
February 1998). The testimony of the offended party on
the matter was clear, frank, positive and convincing.
The apparent delay in reporting the incident was
justified since the appellant had threatened BBB.28 The
court further found that the offended party had no ill
motive to file false charges against the appellant.29
Consequently, the trial court convicted the accused and
sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The case was initially elevated to this Court on
automatic review. In deference to the ruling in People
of the Philippines v. Mateo,30 however, the case was
transferred to the CA.
CA: Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred
in imposing the death penalty despite the
prosecution�s failure to prove the qualifying
circumstance of minority.31 While appellant did not
question his conviction, he contested the penalty
imposed. He insisted that the minority of the offended
party had not been sufficiently proven because the
prosecution presented a mere photocopy of the birth
certificate which was not certified as a true copy of the
original.32
On May 30, 2005, the CA sustained the trial court�s
imposition of the death penalty. It held that the
qualifying circumstance of the victim�s minority had
been specifically alleged in the Information and duly
Evidence
proven during the trial. The appellate court, however,
modified the civil indemnity by increasing it from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, there being no error in the appealed
decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. 1289-C-98 of Qualified
Statutory Rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of Death, the Court hereby affirms the same
with the MODIFICATION that Civil indemnity is
increased to P75,000.00
However, instead of entering judgment, we hereby
certify and elevate the entire records of this case to the
Supreme Court for its final disposition.
SO ORDERED.33
HELD:
In the Court�s Resolution34 dated November 8, 2005,
the parties were required to submit their respective
supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General
manifested35 that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief since the arguments contained in
the Appellee�s Brief would only be reiterated. In his
Supplemental Brief, appellant alleged that he was no
longer questioning his conviction, and pleaded only for
a lighter sentence. He further averred that in view of
the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346
abolishing the death penalty, the present appeal should
now be deemed moot and academic.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful and meticulous review of the records of
the case, the Court finds no reason to overturn the
findings of facts and conclusions of the trial and
appellate courts. The prosecution adduced evidence to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant
raped BBB sometime in the first week of February 1998
in their house. The victim narrated in a spontaneous
and straightforward manner how appellant defiled her,
thus:
FISCAL CAPULONG:
Q How about in the month of February 1998
about the first week of February, do you recall
if your father did anything to you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And could you tell us what did your father do
to you?
A He sucked my breasts, Sir, and he inserted
his penis into my vagina.
Q And at what time was that when he did this
to you?
A2010
A Midnight already, Sir.
Q And whereat did he do this to you?
A In our house, Sir.
Q When you said in your house, are you
referring to the house of your aunt x x x?
A No, Sir.
xxx
Q You stated that at about midnight of the first
week of February 1998 your father sucked
your breasts and inserted his penis on your
private part. Before doing this, did he remove
your dress or did he do anything to you?
A He raised my blouse, Sir, and pulled down
my shorts.
Q Aside from your shorts, were you wearing
any other underwear like panty?
A Yes, Sir, I was wearing a panty then.
Q And what did your father do with your
panty?
A He also removed it, Sir.
Q When you said "removed it," did he remove
it from your two feet?
A No, Sir, he just pulled my panty up to my
thighs.
FISCAL CAPULONG
Q And after pulling down your panty to your
thighs, what else did he do, if anything?
A He threatened me, Sir.
Q How did he threaten you?
A He told me that he will kill my mother as
well as my brothers if I reported the matter to
anyone, Sir.
Q Did you not tell him anything when he pulled
down your shorts and panty?
A I told him to have mercy on me, Sir.
Q You stated that he likewise sucked your
breasts. How did he suck your breasts? Did he
remove your bra?
A He just raised my blouse, Sir, up to my neck.
Q Where did your father do this to you, in a
room or in what part of the house?
A Inside our room, Sir.
Q How about your brothers, where were your
brothers at that time when he did this to you
at the second time?
A They were also inside the room, Sir,
however, they were soundly (sic) asleep.
FISCAL CAPULONG
145
Prof. V. A. Avena
Q How about your mother? Where was your
mother at that time?
A She was not around then, Sir.
Q Where was your mother, if you know?
A She went to a fiesta, Sir.
Q After your father pulled down your shorts
and your panty up to your thighs, what else
did he do?
A He already kissed me on the lips, Sir, and
again he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q Did he succeed in penetrating your private
part?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you feel when your father inserted
his penis on your private part?
A It was painful, Sir.
Q And after he succeeded in penetrating your
private part, did he make any movement?
A What he told me is that if I reported the
matter to anyone he will also kill me, Sir.
COURT:
Q When did he tell you that he will kill you and
your mother and your brothers, after the
sexual intercourse or before?
A Before the sexual intercourse, Your Honor.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL CAPULONG:
Q And for how long was the private part of
your father inserted in your vagina?
A I do not know, Sir.
Q And after satisfying his lust, what else
transpired?
A No more, Sir.
COURT:
Q Was your father wearing anything when he
had sexual intercourse with you on the first
week of February 1998?
A At that time, Sir, he had no shirt on and
thereafter he also removed his shorts.
Q How about his brief?
A He also removed his brief.
Q So your father was entirely naked when he
had sexual intercourse with you on the first
week of February 1998?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you see him remove his short and brief?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Evidence
Q While he was removing his short and brief
what were you doing?
A I was pleading for mercy, Your Honor.
Q Were you lying down or what?
A I was lying down, your Honor.
Q When he inserted his penis on your private
part, how did he do it?
A Both of us were lying down, Sir, then he
inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q Who was on top?
A He was the one, Your Honor.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL CAPULONG:
Q At what time did your mother arrive on the
second time your father sexually abused you?
A I do not recall anymore the exact time my
mother arrived, Sir, but that was in the
morning because the preceding night she slept
in another house.
Q Did you not report to your mother what your
father did to you the first week of February
1998 when she arrived home?
A I did not, Sir.
Q Could you tell us why you did not report the
incident?
A I was afraid, Sir.
Q When for the first time did you report the
incident to your mother?
A When I got pregnant, Sir.
Q And how did your mother react?
A She was fuming mad and she cried, Sir.
Q Did you have yourself medically examined?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q After the first week of February 1998, was
there any other sexual intercourse between
you and your father?
A None, Your Honor.
Q So the incident on February 1998 was the
last?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And you were impregnated?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What happened to the child?
A At that time, Your Honor, my mother was
sick and we have no money that is why she
had my child adopted.
FISCAL CAPULONG:
A2010
May we just make of record, Your Honor, that
the witness is crying.
COURT:
Q When was your child born?
A In October 1998, I just could not recall the
exact date, Your Honor.36
The trial court gave credence and full
probative weight to the victim�s testimony,
and found it "clear, frank, positive and
convincing":
The Court had observed personally and
attentively the offended party when she
testified. The Court in its effort to discover
traces of falsehood in her testimony had
participated in asking searching questions. It
failed to unravel any vestige of untruthfulness.
Her testimony was clear, frank, positive and
convincing. It is consistent with human nature.
She was firm and categorical in denouncing
her own father�s lecherous act of stripping
her virginity. Offended party was only fifteen
(15) and of tender age at the time of the
commission of the offense. To the mind of the
court, she was inexperienced with the ways of
the world.37
The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court.
It is settled that the trial court�s evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is viewed as
correct and entitled to the highest respect
because it is more competent to so conclude,
having had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses� demeanor and deportment on the
stand, and the manner in which they gave
their testimony.38 Unless the trial court
ignored, misinterpreted or misunderstood
facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, would reverse or modify the
outcome of the case, its findings on the
credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed.39
Moreover, when a rape victim testifies in a
straightforward and candid manner, unshaken
by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by
inconsistencies, or contradictions on material
points, the testimony should be given full faith
and credit.40 And in view of the intrinsic
nature of rape, the only evidence that can be
offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the
testimony of the offended party.41
146
 Prof. V. A. Avena
Appellant admitted that no ill motive can be
attributed to the victim to falsely charge him
of the crime of rape:
Q: By the way do you have any
misunderstanding with your wife x x x?
A: Sometimes, we quarrel, sir over cooking in
the morning upon waking up.
Q: But you have no serious problem
whatsoever?
A: None, Sir.
Q: And so with your daughter, you have no
misunderstanding with her?
A: None, Sir.
FISCAL LLOBRERA:
Q: And you do not know of any reason whay
(sic) they filed these
complaints?
A: None Sir.42
Indeed, it would run counter to the natural order of
events and of human nature, and contrary to the
presumption of good faith, for a prosecution witness to
falsely testify if the appellant is truly innocent.43 Thus,
the presumption is that the victim told the truth; hence,
her testimony is entitled to full probative weight.
The strength of the prosecution�s case is further
bolstered by the fact that appellant no longer questions
his conviction for rape, and merely prays for a lesser
penalty. As such, we find no reason to disturb the trial
court�s finding of guilt.
Appellant insists, however, that he was wrongfully
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death,
since the special qualifying circumstance of minority
was not substantially proven.
The contention is without merit.
In People of the Philippines v. Pruna44 the Court laid
down the following guidelines in appreciating the age of
the victim:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic
document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
Evidence
testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim�s mother or a member of the family
either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth
of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below
3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below
7 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below
12 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live
birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim�s mother or
relatives concerning the victim�s age,
the complainant�s testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.45
Records reveal that the victim testified during the
hearing that she was born on January 23, 1983, and
that appellant did not offer any objection to her
testimony:
Q: Incidentally, could you tell us when were
you born?
A: I was born January 23, 1983, Sir.
Q: And do you have your birth certificate?
A: It is in your possession already, Sir.46
In fact, during cross-examination of the victim,
appellant�s counsel referred to her age:
Q: By the way, Miss witness, at that time on
December 23, 1997 you were already 15 years
old. Is it not?
A: Yes ma�am.47
The fact of minority was further established by
victim�s certificate of live birth, albeit a mere
photocopy of the original. In People of the Philippines v.
Mangitngit,48 People of the Philippines v. Barcena,49
and People of the Philippines v. Cayabyab,50 this Court
admitted and gave weight to a photocopied birth
A2010
certificate to prove the age of the offended party.
Specifically, we ratiocinated in this wise:
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis
that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the
absence of any showing that the original copy was lost
or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of
the prosecution, does not prove the victim�s minority,
for said photocopy does not qualify as competent
evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the "best
evidence rule" as expressly provided under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. � When the subject of the inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
xxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.51
A certificate of live birth is a public record in the
custody of the local civil registrar who is a public
officer. As such, the presentation of the photocopy of
the birth certificate of the victim is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of
the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court�s
discretion, whenever the opponent does not dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring production.52
In the present case, appellant did not dispute the
contents of the photocopied birth certificate. Having
failed to raise a valid and timely objection, the
document constitutes primary evidence; it is deemed
admitted, and the other party is bound thereby.53
Thus, the prosecution sufficiently established that at
the time of the commission of the crime of rape in the
first week of February 1998, the victim was only 15
years of age, having been born on January 23, 1983.
However, in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 on
June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.54
We affirm the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
which is awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty. The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in light of the presence of the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship, is likewise
147
 Prof. V. A. Avena
proper.55 However, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the award of moral damages should be
increased to P75,000.00.56
We would like to stress that even if the death penalty is
not to be imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the award of damages
under prevailing jurisprudence is not affected. This
award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty, but on the fact that the qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense.57
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated
May 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals finding appellant
Filomino L. Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.1awphi1.n�t The penalty of death is
reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No.
9346. The award of moral damages to the private
complainant is increased to P75,000.00.
Rules on Electronic Evidence
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR v. CITIBANK, N.A.,
(Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; March 28, 2007
(edel)
NATURE: CERTIORARI
Facts:
-Aznar, a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a
Preferred Mastercard issued by Citibank with a credit
limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren, on an Asian
tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of
P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of
increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.
Evidence
-With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane
tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth
P237,000.00.
-During the trip, Aznar claims that when he presented
his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored.
-And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and
Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase
plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the
reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such
dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash.
-Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank,
claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross
negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him,
his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour
destinations and prevented them from buying certain
items in their tour.
-He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful
blacklisting of his card
-To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard,
Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as
ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh.
"G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi
which shows that his card in question was "DECL
OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.
-Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted
Aznar’s card. To prove that they did not blacklist
Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head,
Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation
Bulletins, which contained the list of its canceled cards
covering the period of Aznar’s trip. Aznar’s wasn’t in
the list.
-RTC of Cebu dismissed Aznar’s complaint for lack of
merit and held that as between the computer print-out
presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more
weight as their due execution and authenticity were
duly established by Citibank.Also held that even if it
was shown that Aznar’s credit card was dishonored by
a merchant establishment, Citibank was not shown to
have acted with malice or bad faith when the same was
dishonored.
-Aznar filed a MFR with motion to re-raffle the case
saying that Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he
himself is a holder of a Citibank credit card. The case
was re-raffled with the new judge granting Aznar’s MR
A2010
saying that it was improbable that a man of Aznar’s
stature would fabricate the computer print-out which
shows that Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored for the
reason that it was declared over the limit; Exh. "G" was
printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of
business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi
was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country
and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial
notice of the practice of automated teller machines
(ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out
bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima
facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard;
no rebutting evidence was presented by Citibank to
prove that Aznar’s Mastercard was not dishonored, as
all it proved was that said credit card was not included
in the blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted the
additional deposit of P485,000.00 from Aznar, there
was an implied novation and Citibank was obligated to
increase Aznar’s credit limit and ensure that Aznar will
not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use
of his Mastercard; Citibank’s failure to comply with its
obligation constitutes gross negligence as it caused
Aznar inconvenience, mental anguish and social
humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of the credit card
limiting the liability of the bank to P1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven, whichever is lower, is a contract
of adhesion which must be interpreted against Citibank.
-Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel
filed an administrative case against Judge De la Peña
for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence, claiming among others that said judge
rendered his decision without having read the
transcripts. The administrative case was held in
abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal filed by
Citibank with the CA.
-CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the
blacklisting of his card and only presumed the same
when it was dishonored in certain establishments; such
dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was
blacklisted by Citibank; Exh. "G" is an electronic
document ,which must be authenticated pursuant to
Sec. 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence or
under Sect.20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by
anyone who saw the document executed or written;
Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh.
"G", thus it must be excluded; the unrefuted testimony
of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan
Agency and certain establishments abroad is not
sufficient to justify the award of damages in his favor,
148
 Prof. V. A. Avena
absent any showing that Citibank had anything to do
with the said dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control
over the actions of its merchant affiliates, thus it should
not be held liable for the dishonor of Aznar’s credit card
by said establishments.
-Aznar’s MR was denied by the CA.
-As regards the admin case, J. Dela Pena was adjudged
guilty.
Issue: WON Aznar has established his claim against
Citibank. If so, WON Citibank is liable for damages.
HELD: NO to both.
On his claim:
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests
on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a
preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a
fact also has the burden of proving it.
-Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of
evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or
placed the same on the "hot list.
-Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no
personal knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted
by Citibank and only presumed such fact from the
dishonor of his card.
-The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to
support a conclusion that said credit card was
blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar’s
own admission that in other merchant establishments
in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was
accepted and honored.
-Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT,
a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan
Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his
Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted.
-But such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as
its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by Aznar as per Sec 20 of Rule 132 of the
RoC. It provides that whenever any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a)
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
-Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did
not actually see the document executed or written,
neither was he able to provide evidence on the
Evidence
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi,
who handed to him said computer print-out.
-Even under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of
Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. � The
person seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden
of proving its authenticity in the manner provided
in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. � Before any
private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be
proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by
the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security
procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
-Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued
by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in
passing how he was able to secure the print-out from
the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific
business address of the source of the computer print-
out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was
mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not
reflected in the print-out.
-Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the
information reflected on the print-out was generated
and how the said information could be relied upon as
true.
-Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, which pertains to entries in the course of
business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. �
Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in
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the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions
are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead,
or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
- Also, It is not clear it was Nubi who encoded the
information stated in the print-out and was the one who
printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed
by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was
Mario who printed the same and only handed the print-
out to Nubi.
-The identity of the entrant, required by the provision
above mentioned, was therefore not established.
Neither did petitioner establish in what professional
capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether
the entries were made in the performance of their duty
in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
-And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only
shows that the use of the credit card of petitioner was
denied because it was already over the limit. There is
no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that
there was gross negligence on the part of Citibank in
declaring that the credit card has been used over the
limit.
-The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) which
covered the period when plaintiff traveled in the
aforementioned Asian countries showed that said
Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed
in a “hot list” or the same was blacklisted, let alone the
fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled
by the defendant bank were all contained, reported and
listed in said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were
issued and released on a regular basis.
-Citibank produced 300 documents to show that Aznar
was not among those found in said bulletins as having
been cancelled for the period for which the said
bulletins had been issued.
-Between said computer print out (exh.G) and the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins the latter
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 Prof. V. A. Avena
documents adduced by defendant are entitled to
greater weight than that said computer print out
presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of
whether the plaintiff’s preferred master card was
actually placed in the “hot list” or blacklisted for
the following reasons:
1) the due execution and authentication of these
Warning Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly
established and identified by Citibank’s witness, Dennis
Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is the head of its
credit card department, and, TF, competent to testify
on the said bulletins as having been issued by the
defendant bank showing that plaintiff’s preferred
master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in
the Bank’s “hot list”. While Aznar’s computer print out
was never authenticated or its due execution had never
been duly established. Thus, between a set of duly
authenticated commercial documents, the Warning
Cancellation Bulletins presented by defendants (sic)
and an unauthenticated private document, plaintiff’s
computer print out (Exh. G), the former deserves
greater evidentiary weight supporting the findings of
this Court that plaintiff’ s preferred master card had
never been blacklisted at all or placed in a so-called
“hot list” by defendant.
2) On implied novation (when he added addt’l funds to
increase credit limit): the Court finds that petitioner's
argument on this point has no leg to stand on.
On damages:
-the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and
conditions of Citibank’s Mastercard constitute a
contract of adhesion. It is settled that contracts
between cardholders and the credit card companies are
contracts of adhesion, so-called, because their terms
are prepared by only one party while the other merely
affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.
-On Par 7 of said contract: While it is true that Citibank
may have no control of all the actions of its merchant
affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is
incorrect, however, to give it blanket freedom from
liability if its card is dishonored by any merchant
affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the
statement vague and as the said terms and conditions
constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its
provisions must be construed against the party who
prepared the contract,Citibank.
On limiting its liability to P1k or the actual damage
proven, whichever is lesser: such stipulation cannot be
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Evidence
considered as valid for being unconscionable as it
precludes payment of a larger amount even though
damage may be clearly proven.
-The invalidity of the terms and conditions being
invoked by Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court
still cannot award damages in favor of petitioner.
-The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach
before damages may be awarded and the breach of
such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
-the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed
to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank
breached any obligation that would make it answerable
for said suffering.
BPI v. CA: xxx… there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury to
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
Disposition: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
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