A.m. no.

02-11-10SC
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file
his answer within fifteen days from service of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of
publication in case of service of summons by
publication. The answer must be verified by the
respondent himself and not by counsel or attorneyin-fact.

5.
A Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, which
although not jurisdictional, the same is obligatory;
[15]
6. An Explanation in case the pleading is not filed
personally to the Court. Likewise, for pleading
subsequent to the complaint, if the same is not
served personally to the parties affected, there must
also be an explanation why service was not done
personally.[16]

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in
nature, there must be:
shall not declare him or her in default.
A Proof of Service, which consists in the written
admission of the party served, or the official return
of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The person mailing. If service is by registered mail, proof
petition shall allege the complete facts constituting shall be made by such affidavit and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office.
the cause of action.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does
not tender an issue, the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists
between the parties.

SPS.
CARLOS
MUNSALUD
and
WINNIE In case a party is represented by counsel de parte,
MUNSALUD G.R. No. 167181 vs NATIONAL additional requirements that go into the form of the
pleading should be incorporated, viz.:
HOUSING AUTHORITY
Petitioners action designated as mandamus was 1. The Roll of Attorneys Number;
dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it is 2. The Current Professional Tax Receipt Number; and
insufficient in form and substance. This begs the 3. The IBP Official Receipt No. or IBP Lifetime
question: when is an action sufficient in form and Membership Number.[18]
4. MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate
when is it sufficient in substance?
Number and Date of Issue (effective January 1,
To begin with, form is the methodology used to 2009).[19]
express rules of practice and procedure.[8] It is the
order or method of legal proceedings.[9] It relates to In the case at bench, a naked perusal of the
technical details.[10] It is ordinarily the antithesis of complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q03- 49278
substance.[11] It is an established method of designated by petitioners as mandamus reveals that
expression or practice. It is a fixed or formal way of it is sufficient in form. It has the caption with the
name of the court, the name of the parties, and the
proceeding.[12]
docket number. The complaint contains allegations
A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the of petitioners claims. It has a prayer and the date
following:
when it was prepared. The signature page shows the
1.
A Caption, setting forth the name of the signature and name of petitioners counsel, the
court, the title of the action indicating the names of counsels IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorneys Numbers.
the parties, and the docket number which is usually The complaint was also verified and accompanied by
left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a certificate of non-forum shopping and signed by
petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with
a docket number;
the office of the clerk of court.
2.
The Body, reflecting the designation, the
allegations of the partys claims or defenses, the Now, is the petition insufficient in substance?
relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading?
Substance is that which is essential and is used in
3.
The Signature and Address of the party or opposition to form.[20] It is the most important
element in any existence, the characteristic and
counsel;[13]
essential components of anything, the main part,
4.
Verification. This is required to secure an the essential import, and the purport.[21] It means
assurance that the allegations have been made in not merely subject of act, but an intelligible abstract
good faith, or are true and correct and not merely or synopsis of its material and substantial elements,
though it may be stated without recital of any
speculative;[14]
details.[22] It goes into matters which do not
sufficiently appear or prejudicially affect the

substantial rights of parties who may be interested themselves, although the official name of the payor
therein and not to mere informalities.[23]
indicated therein was still that of the deceased
Lourdes Bulado;
As used in reference to substance of common-law
actions, substance comprehends all of the essential x x x x
or material elements necessary to sufficiently state
a good cause of action invulnerable to attack by 12. Significantly, that receipt contained the
annotation appearing on the left side thereof, that
general demurrer.[24]
the amount paid thereon constituted full payment;
Substance is one which relates to the material
allegations in the pleading. It is determinative of 13. Since then, Plaintiffs have been demanding from
whether or not a cause of action exists. It is the the Defendant the issuance of the deed of sale and
central piece, the core, and the heart constituting the title over the property in question, but,
the controversy addressed to the court for its inexplicably, and without any legal justification
consideration. It is the embodiment of the essential whatsoever, Defendant has refused to issue that
facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court. deed of sale and title;
The court a quo anchored the dismissal of
petitioners complaint on the basis of Rule 65,
Section 3[25] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
found that there was no reference to any law which
respondent NHA, by reason of its office, trust or
station, is specifically enjoined as a duty to perform.
It declared that there was no allegation in the
petition below that respondent is unlawfully
excluding petitioners from using or enjoying any
right or office which said petitioners are entitled to.

14. On January 28, 2003, Plaintiffs, through counsel,

sent a letter to the Defendant seeking the issuance
of that deed of sale and title but, despite receipt
thereof, Defendant again refused and failed [to] act
favorably thereon;
xxxx

20. At this point that the lot in question had already

been fully paid for by the Plaintiffs, there is now a
need to compel the Defendant to comply with its
duty to issue a deed of sale in favor of the heirs of
Although the complaint
was captioned as the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs
Mandamus, petitioners averments, as well as the Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, as well to issue a title
relief sought, called for an action for specific over the same property in favor of the same heirs.
performance. Pertinent portions of the complaint for
mandamus provide:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered commanding the Defendant,
3. Plaintiff Winnie Munsalud is the daughter of the after due notice and hearing, to issue a deed of sale
late Lourdes Bulado, and as such is one of Bulados and/or a title, in favor of the heirs of the deceased
compulsory heirs. x x x;
Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs Carlos and
4. During the lifetime of Bulado, she was awarded a Winnie Munsalud, over the property subject of this
parcel of land at a land for the landless program of action.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
the defendant;

A plain reading of the allegations of the complaint

reveals that petitioner Winnie Munsalud assumed
xxxx
the obligations of her deceased mother, the original
6. When Bulado died in 1985, Plaintiffs assumed her awardee of respondents Land for the Landless
obligations over the aforesaid property, particularly Program. One of the obligations of an awardee is to
the payment of the amortizations therein;
pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioners complied
with said obligation and religiously paid the
7. Defendant recognized this assumption of Bulados amortizations until these were fully paid.
obligations by the Plaintiffs considering that in the
receipts covering the amortizations, the names of Indeed, petitioners have complied with what is
the Plaintiffs as the ones paying the Defendant were incumbent upon them under the program. Hence, it
indicated therein;
is now the turn of respondent to comply with what is
incumbent upon it.
8. In fact, Defendant also allowed Plaintiffs to move
into, and occupy, as they continue to occupy up to In a letter dated February 21, 2003,[27] respondent
now, the above described premises;
informed petitioners counsel that per its records, the
name of petitioner Winnie Munsalud does not
xxxx
appear as a beneficiary. For the guidance of
10. On September 14, 1989, Plaintiffs completed the respondent, Winnie Munsalud is not actually a
payment of the amortizations due over the property beneficiary. The beneficiary of its program is Lourdes
in question, and this is evidenced by an official Bulado, her deceased mother. This fact was made
receipt, numbered 19492, which Defendants cashier, known to respondent when another letter dated
Yasmin D. Aquino, issued to the Plaintiffs March 6, 2003[28] was sent by the counsel of the

heirs of Lourdes Bulado. In the same letter, contractual obligation under the Land for the
respondent was informed that petitioner Winnie is Landless Program.
representing her deceased mother, Lourdes Bulado,
The trial court is reminded that the caption of the
viz.:
complaint is not determinative of the nature of the
In view of the contents of that letter, we would like action.[32] The caption of the pleading should not
to notify you that Ms. Munsalud is actually be the governing factor, but rather the allegations in
representing her deceased mother, Lourdes Bulado, it should determine the nature of the action,
who, on September 14, 1989 completed her because even without the prayer for a specific
payment for Lot 12, Block 79 of the Maricaban remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the
Estate. A copy of the receipt evidencing that proper relief as may be warranted by the facts
completed is attached hereto as Annex B for your alleged in the complaint and the evidence
easy reference.
introduced.[33]
In view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the
issuance of the title over the aforesaid property in
the name of Lourdes Bulado.[29] (Underscoring
supplied)
The letter was received by respondent on March 12,
2003. On account of this second letter, respondent
could have easily verified if the name of Lourdes
Bulado appears as a beneficiary and awardee of its
Land
for
the
Landless
Program.
However,
respondent never responded to the second letter.
This left petitioners with no recourse but to bring the
action to the trial court.
Evidently, the action commenced by petitioners
before the trial court, although designated as
mandamus, is in reality an action to perform a
specific act. The averments of the complaint are
clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as
to apprise the court of the nature of the case. The
relief sought to be obtained aims to compel
respondent to issue a deed of sale and the
corresponding title over the property awarded to
Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint
sufficient in substance.
The designation or caption is not controlling, more
than the allegations in the complaint, for it is not
even an indispensable part of the complaint.
Instead of focusing on what an action for mandamus
should contain, the court a quo should have
proceeded to examine the essential facts alleged in
petitioners complaint. For what determines the
nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.[30]
The cause of action in a complaint is not determined
by the designation given to it by the parties. The
allegations in the body of the complaint define or
describe it. The designation or caption is not
controlling more than the allegations in the
complaint. It is not even an indispensable part of the
complaint.[31]
There is no need to make reference to any law which
respondent by reason of its office is enjoined as a
duty to perform. Respondents duty arose from its

All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her

capacity as a compulsory heir of the awardee,
becomes a beneficiary of the program is a question
best ventilated during trial on the merits. The
conditions, terms, and provisions of the program in
case an awardee dies are evidentiary and should be
presented for determination of the court. Even the
effect and the consequence of the assumption of
obligation of the awardee as well as the presence of
other compulsory heirs are issues that should be
addressed for the courts evaluation on the basis of
the evidence to be laid down before its eyes.
JELBERT B. GALICTO vs H.E. PRESIDENT
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
The respondents claim that the petition should be
dismissed for failing to comply with Section 3, Rule 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the
party or the counsel representing him to sign the
pleading and indicate an address that should not be
a post office box. The petition also allegedly violated
the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated
November 12, 2001, requiring counsels to indicate
in their pleadings their Roll of Attorneys Number,
their PTR Number and their IBP Official Receipt or
Lifetime Member Number; otherwise, the pleadings
would be considered unsigned and dismissible. Bar
Matter No. 1922 likewise states that a counsel
should note down his MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption in the
pleading, but the petitioner had failed to do so.[40]
We do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure as the petition bears the
petitioners signature and office address. The present
suit was brought before this Court by the petitioner
himself as a party litigant and not through counsel.
Therefore, the requirements under the Supreme
Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001
and Bar Matter No. 1922 do not apply. In Bar Matter
No. 1132, April 1, 2003, we clarified that a party who
is not a lawyer is not precluded from signing his own
pleadings as this is allowed by the Rules of Court;
the purpose of requiring a counsel to indicate his IBP
Number and PTR Number is merely to protect the
public from bogus lawyers. A similar construction
should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which
requires lawyers to indicate their MCLE Certificate of

Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; otherwise, said that a provincial governor sued in his official
the provision that allows parties to sign their own capacity may engage the services of private counsel
pleadings will be negated.
when "the complaint contains other allegations and
a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the
However, the point raised by the respondents defendants, must be satisfied by them in their
regarding the petitioners defective jurat is correct. private capacity.16 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated February 19,
2008, calls for a current identification document Consequently Attys. Fandio and Saulon had the
issued by an official agency bearing the photograph authority to represent petitioner at the initial stages
and signature of the individual as competent of the litigation and this authority continued even up
evidence of identity. Nevertheless, we hasten to to his appeal17 and the filing of the petition for
clarify
that
the
defective
jurat
in
the certiorari with the CA respecting the execution of the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is RTC judgment.18It was therefore an error for the CA
not a fatal defect, as we held in In-N-Out Burger, Inc. to have dismissed the said petition for certiorari on
v. Sehwani, Incorporated.[41] The verification is only the ground of unauthorized representation.
a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the
Court may waive.
NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO vs
G.R. No. 191691 January 16, 2013 ROMEO A.
GONTANG, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
MAYOR
OF
GAINZA,
CAMARINES
SUR,
Petitioner,
VS
ENGR.
CECILIA
ALAYAN,
Respondent.

PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
FRANCISCO
ARCE,
BENJAMIN
BARBERO,
ROBERTO NAVARRO

BANK,
ATTY.
and

In the case at bench, the petitioners claim that the

petition for certiorari that they filed before the CA
substantially complied with the requirements
The present case stemmed from Special Civil Action
provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
No. 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages.13 The
on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
damages sought therein could have resulted in
Shopping.
personal liability, hence, petitioner cannot be
deemed to have been improperly represented by
private counsel.14 In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San The Court disagrees.
Carlos City, Negros Occidental,15 the Court ruled
that in instances like the present case where Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
personal liability on the part of local government Procedure provide:
officials is sought, they may properly secure the
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise
services of private counsel, explaining:
specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need
It can happen that a government official, ostensibly not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
acting in his official capacity and sued in that affidavit.
capacity, is later held to have exceeded his
authority. On the one hand, his defense would have A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant
then been underwritten by the peoples money has read the pleadings and that the allegations
which ordinarily should have been his personal therein are true and correct of his personal
expense. On the other hand, personal liability can knowledge or based on authentic records.
attach to him without, however, his having had the
benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. A pleading required to be verified which contains a
In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge verification based on information and belief or upon
of governmental functions, municipal corporations knowledge, information and belief or lacks a proper
are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
and when, and only to the extent that, they have pleading.
acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with
the requirements thereof.
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
representation by private counsel.1wphi1 In one claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
case, We held that where rigid adherence to the law thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
on representation of local officials in court actions he has not theretofore commenced any action or
could deprive a party of his right to redress for a filed any claim involving the same issues in any
valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
be proper. And in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim
The petition is meritorious.

is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending

action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.

truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition

signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in

verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
shall not be curable by mere amendment of the substantial compliance or presence of special
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be circumstances or compelling reasons.
cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion 5) The certification against forum shopping must be
and after hearing. The submission of a false signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
certification or non-compliance with any of the otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
contempt of court, without prejudice to the circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute common cause of action or defense, the signature of
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same only one of them in the certification against forum
shall be ground for summary dismissal with shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping
must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
In this regard, the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
Bobongon
Banana
Growers
Multi-Purpose reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
Cooperative,[10] is enlightening:
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Respecting the appellate courts dismissal of
petitioners appeal due to the failure of some of them The petition for certiorari filed with the CA stated the
to sign the therein accompanying verification and following names as petitioners: Nellie Panelo Vda.
certification against forum-shopping, the Courts De Formoso, Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger
guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo, Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso,
which
were
culled
from
jurisprudential Benjamin Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba.
pronouncements, are instructive:
Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court mentioned, only Malcaba signed the verification and
restates in capsule form the jurisprudential certification of non-forum shopping in the subject
pronouncements already reflected above respecting petition. There was no proof that Malcaba was
non-compliance with the requirements on, or authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them.
submission of defective, verification and certification
against forum shopping:
There was no special power of attorney shown by
the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney1) A distinction must be made between non- in-fact in filing a petition for review on certiorari.
compliance with the requirement on or submission Neither could the petitioners give at least a
of defective verification, and non-compliance with reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the
the requirement on or submission of defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
In Athena Computers, Inc. and Joselito R. Jimenez v.
certification against forum shopping.
Wesnu A. Reyes, the Court explained that:
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein does not necessarily render the The verification of the petition and certification on
pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its non-forum shopping before the Court of Appeals
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the were signed only by Jimenez. There is no showing
attending circumstances are such that strict that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena,
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in his co-petitioner.
order that the ends of justice may be served Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading
is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
thereby.
the pleading and that the allegations therein are
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the Consequently, the verification should have been

signed not only by Jimenez but also by Athenas duly

authorized representative.
In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate
of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the
signing by only one of them is insufficient. The
attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party executing the same, and the
lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have
personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his
co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as
similar to the current petition.
The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72284 is fatally defective, not having been
duly signed by both petitioners and thus warrants
the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. We have
consistently held that the certification against forum
shopping must be signed by the principal parties.
With respect to a corporation, the certification
against forum shopping may be signed for and on its
behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document.
While the Rules of Court may be relaxed for
persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant
from an injustice commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedures, nevertheless
they must be faithfully followed. In the instant case,
petitioners have not shown any reason which
justifies relaxation of the Rules. We have held that
procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules,
they are required to be followed except for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed.
Not one of these persuasive reasons is present here.
In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing the petition for certiorari in view of the
procedural lapses committed by petitioners.[11]
[Emphases supplied]

Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in

some cases.[13] In these cases, however, those who
did not sign were relatives of the lone signatory, so
unlike in this case, where Malcaba is not a relative
who is similarly situated with the other petitioners
and who cannot speak for them. In the case of Heirs
of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,
[14] it was written:
In the instant case, petitioners share a common
interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively
claim a right not to be dispossessed of the subject
lot by virtue of their and their deceased parents
construction of a family home and occupation
thereof for more than 10 years. The commonality of
their stance to defend their alleged right over the
controverted lot thus gave petitioners xxx authority
to inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the other
petitioners that they have not commenced any
action or claim involving the same issues in another
court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending
action or claim in another court or tribunal involving
the same issues.
Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who
share a common interest in the land sought to be
reconveyed and a common cause of action raising
the same arguments in support thereof. There was
sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez,
Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners
when he certified that they had not filed any action
or claim in another court or tribunal involving the
same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that
Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial
compliance under the Rules. [Emphasis supplied]
The same leniency was accorded to the petitioner in
the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana
Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,[15] where it
was stated:
The same leniency was applied by the Court in
Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner
who executed the certification of non-forum
shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other
petitioners with whom he shares a common interest.
x x x[16]

Furthermore, the petitioners argue that the CA

should not have dismissed the whole petition but
should have given it due course insofar as Malcaba
is concerned because he signed the certification.
The petitioners also contend that the CA should
have been liberal in the application of the Rules Considering the above circumstances, the Court
because they have a meritorious case against PNB.
does not see any similarity at all in the case at
bench to compel itself to relax the requirement of
The Court, however, is not persuaded.
strict compliance with the rule regarding the
certification against forum shopping.
The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to
comply with the Rules when they filed their motion At any rate, the Court cannot accommodate the
for reconsideration, but they refused to do so. petitioners request to re-examine the testimony of
Despite the opportunity given to them to make all of Malcaba in the transcript of stenographic notes of
them sign the verification and certification of non- the April 25, 1999 hearing concerning his alleged
forum shopping, they still failed to comply. Thus, the testimonial proof of damages for obvious reasons.
CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm
the earlier resolution.[12]
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
categorically states that the petition filed shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set

forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt

as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.[17]

The rule, its relaxation and their rationale were

discussed by the Court at length in Tible & Tible
Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association
where we said:

Much reliance is placed on the rule that "Courts are

not slaves or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have
always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities
take a backseat against substantive rights, and not
the other way around." This rule must always be
In this case, the petition clearly raises a factual used in the right context, lest injustice, rather than
issue. As correctly argued by PNB, the substantive justice would be its end result.
issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled
to moral and exemplary damages as well as It must never be forgotten that, generally, the
attorneys fees is a factual issue which is beyond the application of the rules must be upheld, and the
province of a petition for review on certiorari.
suspension or even mere relaxation of its
Secondly, even if the Court glosses over the application, is the exception. This Court previously
technical defects, the petition for relief cannot be explained:
granted. A perusal of the Petition for Relief of
Judgment discloses that there is no fact constituting The Court is not impervious to the frustration that
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter
which are the grounds therefor. From the petition in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice
itself, it appears that the petitioners counsel had a requires correct observance of indispensable
copy of the transcript of stenographic notes which technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper
was in his cabinet all along and only discovered it dispensation. It has long been recognized that strict
when he was disposing old and terminated cases. compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable
[18] If he was only attentive to his records, he could for the prevention of needless delays and for the
have filed a motion for reconsideration or a notice of orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
appeal in behalf of the petitioners.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the
Vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in
BARZA
ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to
of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper
abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural
litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to
requirements it imposes. The verification of a
provide for a system under which a suitor may be
complaint and the attachment of a certificate of
heard in the correct form and manner and at the
non-forum shopping are requirements that as
prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a
pointed out by the Court, time and again are basic,
judge whose authority they acknowledge.
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
Thus, we cannot simply and in a general way apply
given the factual circumstances of this case the
liberal jurisprudential exception in Shipside and its
line of cases to excuse BPIs failure to submit a board
resolution. While we may have excused strict
compliance in the past, we did so only on sufficient
and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal
approach while avoiding the effective negation of
the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. In
other words, the rule for the submission of a
certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form
and substance, remains to be a strict and
mandatory rule; any liberal application has to be
justified by ample and sufficient reasons that
maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from,
the mandatory character of the rule.

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules

have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice.
Justice has to be
administered according to the Rules in order to
obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We
have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot v.
Court of Appeals, et al., that:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the
orderly administration of justice and the protection
of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial
proceedings.
It is a mistake to propose that
substantive law and adjective law are contradictory
to each other or, as often suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly

true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a

matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both
kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the
just and speedy resolution of the dispute between
the parties. Observance of both substantive rights
is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.

file said petition. Thus, proper authority existed but

was simply not attached to the petition. On this
submission, the petitioner sought and the Court
positively granted relief.
In the present case, we do not see a situation
comparable to the cited Shipside. BPI did not submit
any proof of authority in the first instance because it
did not believe that a board resolution evidencing
such authority was necessary. We note that instead
xxxx
of immediately submitting an appropriate board
resolution after the First Union and Linda filed their
x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only motion to dismiss BPI argued that it was not
when for the most persuasive of reasons them may required to submit one and even argued that:
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate
with
the
degree
of
his The Complaint can only be dismissed under Section
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there
prescribed. x x x While it is true that a litigation is was no certification against forum shopping. The
not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that Complaint has. The provision cited does not even
the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at require that the person certifying show proof of his
random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation authority to do so x x x.[54]
and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
In fact, BPI merely attached to its opposition a
special power of attorney issued by Mr. Kabigting, a
In particular, on the matter of the certificate of non- bank vice-president, granting Asis and Ong the
forum shopping that was similarly at issue, Tible[52] authority to file the complaint. Thus, no direct
pointedly said:
authority to file a complaint was initially ever given
by BPI the corporate entity in whose name and
x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular behalf the complaint was filed. Only in its Reply to
No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is the Comment to plaintiffs Opposition to the Motion
mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said to Dismiss did BPI beg the kind indulgence of the
requirement does not excuse a party's failure to Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit
comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases with the Special Power of Attorney the Corporate
where this Court excused the non-compliance with Secretarys Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo
the requirement of the submission of a certificate of Kabigting to appoint his substitutes.[55] Even this
non-forum shopping, it found special circumstances submission, however, was a roundabout way of
or compelling reasons which made the strict authorizing the filing officers to file the complaint.
application of said Circular clearly unjustified or
inequitable. x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
BPI, interestingly, never elaborated nor explained its
belatedly claimed inadvertence in failing to submit a
This same rule was echoed in Mediserv v. Court of corporate secretarys certificate directly authorizing
Appeals[53] where we said in the course of allowing its representatives to file the complaint; it
a liberal justification:
particularly failed to specify the circumstances that
It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may led to the claimed inadvertence. Under the given
be invoked in situations where there may be some facts, we cannot but conclude that, rather than an
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, inadvertence, there was an initial unwavering stance
provided that the same does not subvert the that the submission of a specific authority from the
essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a board was not necessary. In blunter terms, the
reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. omission of the required board resolution in the
After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a complaint was neither an excusable deficiency nor
very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to an omission that occurred through inadvertence. In
help secure substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.] the usual course in the handling of a case, the
failure was a mistake of counsel that BPI never cared
To be sure, BPIs cited Shipside case also involved the to admit but which nevertheless bound it as a client.
absence of proof attached to the petition that the From this perspective, BPIs case is different from
filing officer was authorized to sign the verification Shipside so that the ruling in this cited case cannot
and non-forum shopping certification. In the Motion apply.
for Reconsideration that followed the dismissal of
the case, the movant attached a certificate issued Under the circumstances, what applies to the
by its board secretary stating that ten (10) days present case is the second paragraph of Section 5,
prior to the filing of the petition, the filing officer had Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which states:
been authorized by petitioners board of directors to

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements

shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing.
We thus hold that the dismissal of the case is the
appropriate ruling from this Court, without prejudice
to its refiling as the Rules allow.
We end this Decision by quoting our parting words in
Melo v. Court of Appeals:[56]
We are not unmindful of the adverse consequence to
private respondent of a dismissal of her complaint,
nor of the time, effort, and money spent litigating up
to this Court solely on a so-called technical ground.
Nonetheless, we hold that compliance with the
certification requirement on non-forum shopping
should not be made subject to a partys afterthought,
lest the policy of the law be undermined.
G.R. No. 141947
July 5, 2001 ISMAEL V.
SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE and HILARIO M.
PASTRANA, petitioners vs COURT OF APPEALS,
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC., LUIS P.
LORENZO,
JR.
and
FREDERICK
DAEL,
respondents.
We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank v.
Sia13 that a certification against forum shopping may
be signed by an authorized lawyers who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document. However, BA Savings
Bank must be distinguished from the case at bar
because in the former, the complainant was a
corporation, and hence, a juridical person.
Therefore, that case made an exception to the
general rule that the certification must be made by
the petitioner himself since a corporation can only
act through natural persons. In fact, physical
actions, e.g., signing and delivery of documents,
may be performed on behalf of the corporate entity
only by specifically authorized individuals. In the
instant case, petitioners, are all natural persons and
there is no showing of any reasonable cause to
justify their failure to personally sign the
certification.14 It is noteworthy that PEPSI in its
Comment stated that it was petitioners themselves
who executed the verification and certification
requirements in all their previous pleadings. Counsel
for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy,
a Special Power of Attorney is executed to promptly
and effectively meet any contingency relative to the
handling of a case. This argument only weakens
their position since it is clear that at the outset no
justifiable reason yet existed for counsel to
substitute petitioners in signing the certification. In

fact, in the case of natural persons, this policy

serves no legal purpose. Convenience cannot be
made the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.
Neither are we convinced that the out-right
dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice. Petitioners argue that there
are very important issues such as their livelihood
and the well being and future of their
families.15 Every petition filed with a judicial tribunal
is sure to affect, even tangentially, either the well
being and future of petitioner himself or that of his
family. Unfortunately, this does not warrant
disregarding the Rules.
Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material
dates that would show the timeliness of the filing
thereof with the Court of Appeals. There are three
(3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition
for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date
when notice of the judgment or final order
or Resolution was received; second,when a motion
for new trial or reconsideration was filed;
and third, when notice of the denial thereof was
received. Petitioners failed to show the first and
second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the
impugned NLRC Decisionas well as the date of filing
of their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners
counter by stating that in the body of the petition for
certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals, it was
explicitly stated that the, NLRC Resolution dated 11
May 1999 was received by petitioners through
counsel on 30 July 1999. They even reiterate this
contention in theirReply.
The requirement of setting forth the, three(3) dates
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the
purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a
petition is required to be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or Resolution sought to be assailed.16 Therefore, that
the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41)
days from receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of
Appeals was not in any position to determine when
this period commenced to run and whether the
motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time
since the material dates were not stated. It should
not be assumed that in no event would the motion
be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules
of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends
of justice. These are provided to effect the proper
and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively
prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter
disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized
by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 17

But even if these procedural lapses are dispensed

with, the instant petition, on the merits, must still
fail. Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC for holding that the CDS and
ADM positions were dissimilar, and for concluding
that the redundancy program of PEPSI was
undertaken in good faith and that the case
of International Hardware v. NLRC18 was applicable.
This Court is not a trier of facts. The question of
whether the duties and responsibilities of the CDS
and ADM positions are similar is a question properly
belonging to both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In
fact, the NLRC merely affirmed the finding of the
Labor Arbiter on this point and further elaborated on
the differences between the two (2). Thus it ruled -

standards") in keeping with the promotional thrust of

the company.
Factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they
coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are
accorded respect, even finality, and will not be
disturbed for as long as such findings are supported
by substantial evidence,19 defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 20 In this case,
there is no doubt that the findings of the NLRC are
supported by substantial evidence. The job
descriptions submitted by PEPSI are replete with
information and is an adequate basis to compare
and contrast the two (2) positions.

Therefore, the two (2) positions being different, it

follows that the redundancy program instituted by
PEPSI was undertaken in good faith. Petitioners have
not established that the title Account Development
Manager was created in order to maliciously
terminate their employment. Nor have they shown
that PEPSI had any ill motive against them. It is
therefore apparent that the restructuring and
Second, CDS are filed personnel who drive assigned streamlining of PEPSI's distribution and sales
vehicles and deliver stocks to "dealers" who, under systems were an honest effort to make the company
the job description are those who sell and deliver more efficient.
the same stocks to smaller retail outlets in their
assigned areas. The ADMs are not required to drive Redundancy exists when the service capability of
trucks and they do not physically deliver stocks to the work force is in excess of what is reasonably
wholesale dealers. Instead, they help "dealers" needed to meet the demands of the enterprise. 21 A
market the stocks through retail. This conclusion is redundant position is one rendered superfluous by a
borne out by the fact (that) ADMs are tasked to number of factors, such as overhiring of
ensure that the stocks are displayed in the best workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of
possible locations in the dealer's store, that they a particular product line previously manufactured by
have more shelf space and that dealers participate the company or phasing out of a service previously
in promotional activities in order to sell more undertaken by the business.22
products.
Based on the fact that PEPSI's Metro Manila Sales
It is clear to us that while CDS are required to Operations were not meeting its sales targets, 23 and
physically deliver, sell and collect payments for on the fact that new positions were subsequently
softdrinks, they do so not primarily to retail outlets created, it is evident that PEPSI wanted to
but to wholesale dealers who have retail customers restructure its organization in order to include more
of their own. They are not required to assist the complex positions that would either absorb or render
dealers they deliver to in selling the softdrinks more completely unnecessary the positions it had
effectively whereas ADMs sell softdrinks to big retail previously declared redundant. The soundness of
outlets (groceries and malls who have shelves and this business judgment of PEPSI has been assailed
display cases and who require coolers and other by petitioners, arguing that it is more logical to
paraphernalia). They do not only sell but they have implement new procedures in physical distribution,
to effectively market the products or put them in the sales quotas, and other policies aimed at improving
best and most advantageous light so that the the performance of the division rather than to
dealers who sell the softdrinks retails can sell more reduce the number of employees and create new
softdrinks. The main thrust of the ADMs job is to positions.24
ensure that the softdrinks products ordered from
them are marketed in a certain manner ("Pepsi-Way This argument cannot be accepted. While it is true
that management may not, under the guise of
x x x x We cannot subscribe to the complainants'
assertions that the positions have similar job
descriptions. First CDS report to a CD Manager,
whereas the ADMs do not report to the CD Manager,
leading us to believe that the organizational setup of
the sales department has been changed.

invoking its prerogative, ease out employees and

defeat their constitutional right to security of tenure,
the same must be respected if clearly undertaken in
good faith and if no arbitrary or malicious action is
shown.
Similarly,
in Wiltshire
File
Co.,
Inc.
v.
NLRC25 petitioner company effected some changes
in its organization by abolishing the position of Sales
Manager and simply adding the duties previously
discharged by it to the duties of the General
Manager to whom the Sales Manager used to report.
In that case, we held that the characterization of
private respondent's services as no longer
necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly
terminable, was an exercise of business judgment
on the part of petitioner company. The wisdom or
soundness of such characterization or decision is not
subject to discretionary review on the part of the
Labor Arbiter or of the NLRC so long as no violation
of law or arbitrary and malicious action is indicated.
In the case at bar, no such violation or arbitrary
action was established by petitioners. The subject
matter being well beyond the discretionary review
allowed by law, it behooves this Court to steer clear
of the realm properly belonging to the business
experts.
We agree with the NLRC in its application
of International Hardware v. NLRC that the mandate
one (1) month notice prior to termination given to
the worker and the DOLE is rendered unnecessary
by the consent of the worker himself. Petitioners
assail the voluntariness of their consent by stating
that had they known of PEPSI's bad, faith they would
not have agreed to their termination, nor would they
have signed the corresponding releases and
quitclaims.26 Having
established
private
respondent's good faith in undertaking the assailed
redundancy program, there is no need to rule on this
contention.
Finally, in a last ditch effort to plead their case,
petitioners would want us to believe that their
termination was illegal since PEPSI did not employ
fair and reasonable criteria in implementing its
redundancy program. This issue was not raised
before the Labor Arbiter nor with the NLRC. As it
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and
justice to allow a party to raise a question which has
not been passed upon by both administrative
tribunals,27 it is now too late to entertain
it.1wphi1.nt

HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO VS PORFERIO

SOLIMAN

The general rule is that the certificate of nonforum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one
of them is insufficient. However, the Court has
also stressed that the rules on forum shopping
were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and thus
should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective. The rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of with respect to
the contents of the certification. This is because
the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of nonforum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification
cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. Thus,
under justifiable circumstances, the Court has
relaxed the rule requiring the submission of
such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. In HLC
Construction and Development Corporation v.
Emily
Homes
Subdivision
Homeowners
Association, it was held that the signature of
only one of the petitioners in the certification
against forum shopping substantially complied
with rules because all the petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense. The same leniency was
applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile,
because the lone petitioner who executed the
certification of non-forum shopping was a
relative and co-owner of the other petitioners
with whom he shares a common interest. x x x
x x x In the instant case, petitioners share a
common interest and defense inasmuch as they
collectively claim a right not to be dispossessed
of the subject lot by virtue of their and their
deceased parents construction of a family
home and occupation thereof for more than 10
years. The commonality of their stance to
defend their alleged right over the controverted
lot thus gave petitioners x x x authority to
inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the
other
petitioners
that
they
have
not
commenced any action or claim involving the
same issues in another court or tribunal, and
that there is no other pending action or claim in
another court or tribunal involving the same
issues.

SPOUSES DAISY and SOCRATES

M.
AREVALO
VS
PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK
We rule that petitioners were guilty of willful and
deliberate forum-shopping when they filed their
Second Complaint with the trial court insofar as they
undertook to obtain similar reliefs as those sought in
the instant Petition.

regardless of which party is successful, would

amount to res judicata in the other case.[55]
What is essential in determining the existence of
forum-shopping is the vexation caused the courts
and litigants by a party who asks different courts
and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or
related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating
the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered upon the same issues.[56]

Respondent Bank argues that the rights asserted by

petitioners, as well as the reliefs petitioners seek in A comparison of the reliefs sought by petitioners in
the instant Petition, are identical to those raised in the instant Petition and in their Second Complaint
their Second Complaint.[50]
confirms that they are substantially similar on two
points: (1) revocation and cancellation of the
Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that the Certificate of Sale and (2) permanent injunction on
disparity between the two cases lies in the issue to any transfer and/or consolidation of title in favor of
be resolved. More particularly, they allege that the respondent Bank. These similarities undoubtedly
issue in this Petition is the summary application of create the possibility of conflicting decisions from
the payment of 12% interest per annum as a different courts:
precondition for the issuance of a writ, as opposed
to the issue in the Second Complaint involving the Instant Petition
validity of the real estate mortgage and compliance Second Complaint
with the rules on the holding of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale.[51]
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that
immediately upon filing of this petition, the same be
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who given due course, and an order issue, ex parte:
repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial
remedies in different fora, simultaneously or (1) A Resolution be issued directing the Ex-Officio
successively, all substantially founded on the same Sheriff and his Assisting Sheriff to undo, cancel,
transactions and the same essential facts and revoke the Certificate of Sale they issued;
circumstances; and raising substantially similar (2) Enjoining the Register of Deeds of Paranaque (or
issues either pending in or already resolved any of her subordinates, agents, representatives and
adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of persons acting in their behalf to cease and desist
increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable from allowing any transfer and/or consolidation of
decision, if not in one court, then in another.[52] The respondents banks title to the property in question
rationale against forum-shopping is that a party and an order be issued directing the Register of
should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous Deeds to undo, cancel and revoke the registration of
remedies in two different courts, for to do so would the Certificate of Sale on November 13, 2009 and
constitute abuse of court processes which tends to other proceedings had thereafter, the petition be
degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc given due course and judgment be rendered as
upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the follows:
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.[53]
1. Making the injunction permanent.
2. Issuing a writ of mandatory injunction for the
In Yu v. Lim,[54] this Court enumerated the respondent Ex-Officio Sheriff to undo, revoke and
requisites of forum-shopping, as follows:
cancel the Certificate of Sale issued and/or directing
the Register of Deeds to undo, revoke and cancel
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis the registration of the Certificate of Sale and/or
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in defer any consolidation of title in favor of
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis respondent bank pending final resolution of this
pendentia requires the concurrence of the following petition.
requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such 3.Reversing and setting aside the Decision of the
parties as those representing the same interests in Court of Appeals dated March 24, 2010 and
both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and Resolution dated August 5, 2010.[57] (Emphasis
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the supplied.)
same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, Honorable Court that pending consideration and
hearing on the principal reliefs herein prayed for, a

Temporary Restraining order (TRO) and/or Writ of

Preliminary Injunction be issued immediately
restraining and/or stopping the defendants ExOfficio Sheriff Atty. Jerry R. Toledo and Deputy Sheriff
Paulo Jose N. Cusi from executing and issuing a final
deed of sale in favor of the defendant bank and
further ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds of
Paranaque City to hold in abeyance the registration
of the final deed of sale and other documents of
consolidation pending resolution of this Honorable
Court. Plaintiffs pray for the following additional
reliefs:
1. After hearing on the merits, the Real Estate
Mortgage be declared and rescinded and/or null and
void;
2. The Certificate of Sale [dated November 4, 2009]
issued by the defendant Sheriffs and its subsequent
registration on November 13, 2009 with the Registry
of Deeds be declared null and void;
3. After due hearing, the preliminary injunction be
declared permanent. x x x[58] (Emphases supplied.)
As illustrated above, there is a clear violation of the
rules on forum-shopping, as the Court is being asked
to grant substantially similar reliefs as those that
may also be granted by the trial court, in the
process creating a possibility of conflicting decisions.
We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be
avoided by the rule against forum-shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions.[59] To avoid
any confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules
against forum shopping, and any violation of these
rules results in the dismissal of a case.[60] The acts
committed and described herein can possibly
constitute direct contempt
CLEOFE NORRIS, represented by her Attorneyin-fact, LUIS T. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs.
HON. JOSE J. PARENTELA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Judge, RTC of Trece Martirez City,
Branch 23, and the HEIRS OF THE LATE
ALEJANDRO CUBOL, represented by CARMELA,
EUTEQIO,1[1] DIONISIO and MARIANO, all
surnamed CUBOL, respondents.
We find for private respondents. Procedural rules
should not be ignored, particularly in this case
where petitioner had all the opportunity to have her
case determined on the merits but lost it several
times due to procedural incompetence. First,
petitioner failed to accompany her petition for relief
from judgment before the trial court with
certification against forum shopping in violation of
this courts Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which

requires that complaints and other initiatory

pleadings filed in all courts and agencies other than
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals be
accompanied by such certification.[6] Second
paragraph of Section 1 of the said circular clearly
includes in its enumeration of initiatory pleadings a
petition where the party asserts his claim for relief.
Petitioners petition for relief from judgment filed
before the trial court is included in said enumeration
because it is a new petition where a party seeks
relief based on grounds different from those in the
original case, namely, fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence.[7] Undoubtedly, said petition
was covered by the circular. Secondly, petitioner
failed to put a notice of hearing addressed to the
parties in her motion for reconsideration of the order
denying her petition for relief. This is again
procedurally flawed because Section 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court clearly provides that notice of
hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned.
[8] Notice addressed to the clerk of court and not to
the parties does not suffice as notice to all. A motion
that does not contain a notice of hearing to the
adverse party is nothing but a mere scrap of paper
and the clerk of court does not have the duty to
accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of
the presiding judge.[9] Lastly, the petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, as stated
earlier, was defective. Aside from the fact that
petitioner did not attach a certified true copy of the
orders subject of the appeal, she also did not show
the material dates when her attorney-in-fact
received the copy of the order, thus preventing the
Court of Appeals from determining whether the
petition was filed on time. Upon motion, it was
revealed that the petition was filed late. Obviously,
the reason why petitioner did not state the material
dates was to confuse or even mislead the appellate
court into accepting her appeal despite the fatal
delay in its filing. This could result in a mockery of
our judicial system, which cannot be ignored.
Clearly from the abovecited circumstances, the
Court of Appeals could not be faulted for dismissing
the petition for certiorari. At this point, it should be
stressed that procedural rules are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the
rules. While in certain instances, we allow a
relaxation in the application of the rules, we never
intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberal
interpretation and application of rules apply only in
proper cases of demonstrable merit and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice.[10]
Party litigants and their counsels are well advised to
abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for

these rules illumine the path of the law and accompanied by a Certification against Forumrationalize the pursuit of justice.
Shopping.[36]

MARIA
REMEDIOS
ARGANA,
DONATA
ALMENDRALA VDA. DE ARGANA, LUIS
ARGANA, JR., PEREGRINO ARGANA, ESTATE
OF
GELACIO
ARGANA,
EUFROCINIO
NOFUENTE, AMPARO ARGANA NOFUENTE,
JUANITO ROGELIO, MILAGROS ARGANA
ROGELIO, MARIA FELICIDAD ARGANA,
MARIA
DOROTEA
ARGANA,
REFEDOR
SOUTH GOLD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Respondent disagrees with the contention of

petitioners that the Sandiganbayan already lost
jurisdiction over the case when it rendered its
Decision on the Compromise Agreement on July
31, 1998 considering that the decision is
immediately executory since there is no appeal
from such judgment. According to respondent,
the Rules of Court does recognize the
jurisdiction of the court which rendered a
decision over a petition for relief from the same
decision, and does not distinguish whether the
judgment is based on the evidence presented
or on a compromise agreement. Moreover, as
an exception to the general rule that the court
which rendered judgment on the compromise
cannot modify such compromise, the court may
order modifications thereon when the parties
consent to such modification or when there is a
hearing to determine the presence or absence
of vitiated consent

Petitioners likewise assert that the property

value of a property offered for the amicable
settlement of a case is not always material in
determining the validity of a compromise
agreement. They point out that what impelled
the PCGG to enter into a compromise
agreement with them was PCGGs perception
that its evidence against petitioners was weak
and might not be sufficient to justify The Court also finds that there was no grave
maintaining the case against them.
abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan in granting the Motion to
In addition, petitioners insist that the Motion to Rescind, which it treated as a petition for relief
Rescind
which
was
treated
by
the from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
Sandiganbayan as a petition for relief from on Civil Procedure. Section 3 thereof prescribes
judgment under Rule 38 is fatally defective for the periods within which the petition for relief
(i) lack of authority of respondents lawyers to must be filed:
file the same; (ii) having been filed out of time;
(iii) non-submission of an Affidavit of Merit; and Time
for
filing
petition;
contents
and
(iv) non-submission of a Certification against verification. A petition provided for in either of
Forum-Shopping.
the preceding sections of this Rule must be
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
It is argued by petitioners that the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or
Sandiganbayan
should
have
denied other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
respondents Motion to Rescind outright for than six (6) months after such judgment or final
having been filed without authority from the order was entered, or such proceeding was
PCGG En Banc and the President of the taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits
Republic, both of whom earlier approved and showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
authorized the execution of the Compromise excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
Agreement. According to petitioners, after final constituting
the
petitioners
good
and
judgment has been rendered in a case, an substantial cause of action or defense, as the
attorney has no implied authority from his case may be.
client to seek material or substantial alterations
or modifications in such judgment
The Court has previously held that as applied to
a judgment based on compromise, both the
anent the alleged procedural infirmities in the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month reglementary
filing of the Motion to Rescind, respondent periods within which to file a petition for relief
asserts that it complied with the reglementary should be reckoned from the date when the
period for the filing of a petition for relief from decision approving the compromise agreement
judgment under Rule 38 and that it is not an was rendered because such judgment is
initiatory pleading which is required to be

considered immediately executory and entered particular matter therein when declared by
on the date that it was approved by the court.
these Rules to be appealable.
Applying the foregoing rule to the present case,
the sixty (60)-day period should be counted
from July 31, 1998, the date of the
Sandiganbayan Decision granting the Motion to
Approve Compromise Agreement. The sixtieth
day from July 31, 1998 is September 29, 1998.
The Motion to Rescind was filed by the OSG
only on October 5, 1998, clearly several days
after the sixtieth day from the rendition of the
July 31, 1998 Decision.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that no appeal;
grave abuse can be ascribed to the
Sandiganbayan in admitting the Motion to (e) An order denying a motion to set aside a
Rescind as a petition for relief was timely filed. judgment
by
consent,
confession
or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or
Although as a general rule, the party filing a duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
petition for relief must strictly comply with the
sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month reglementary (f) An order of execution;
periods under Section 3, Rule 38,[48] it is not
without exceptions. The Court relaxed the rule (g) A judgment or final order for or against one
in several cases[49] and held that the filing of a or more of several parties or in separate claims,
petition for relief beyond the sixty 60-day counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
period is not fatal so long as it is filed within the complaints, while the main case is pending,
six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.
unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
and
The Court notes that the filing of the Motion to
Rescind on October 5, 1998 was indeed seven (h) An order dismissing an action without
days beyond the sixty 60-day period but still prejudice.
well within the six (6)-month period from entry In all the above instances where the judgment
of judgment. Moreover, the case involves an or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
alleged fraud committed against the Republic, party may file an appropriate special civil action
and thus justifies the liberal interpretation of under Rule 65.
procedural laws by the Sandiganbayan.

SIMEON
M.
VALDEZ
FINANCIERA MANILA, INC
The petition is meritorious.

VS

G.R. No. 163735

November 24, 2006

GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND SPS.
RENATO AND DELIA LEGASPI, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., Respondents.

One of the issues raised by petitioner Valdez is

jurisdiction. According to him, the CA had no
jurisdiction
over
respondent
Financiera's
petition for certiorari. The proper remedy was
an appeal, as the case had proceeded from a
denial of a motion for execution of a judgment. After serious consideration of the arguments
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal raised by the parties, we find the petition
without merit.
can be resorted to when:
SECTION 1. Subject of Appeal. - An appeal may Anent the first issue, it bears stressing that a
be taken from a judgment or final order that certification on non-forum shopping is required
completely disposes of the case, or of a only in a complaint or a petition which is an
initiatory pleading. In this case, the subject

petition for the issuance of a writ of possession

filed by private respondent is not an initiatory
pleading.
Although
private
respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is
more properly a motion. What distinguishes a
motion from a petition or other pleading is not
its form or the title given by the party executing
it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is
not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a
matter arising in the progress of the case where
the motion is filed.15

petition to set aside the sale and cancel the

writ of possession. Under the aforequoted
provision, the aggrieved party may thereafter
appeal from any disposition by the court on the
matter.16

We note, however, that what petitioners filed

with the trial court were an urgent omnibus
motion and a supplement to the urgent
omnibus motion to set aside the sale and
cancel the writ of possession. In the said
motions, petitioners alleged there was no basis
Indeed, an original action is not necessary to for the extrajudicial foreclosure because the
acquire possession in favor of the purchaser at mortgage was void.
an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property. The
right to possession is based simply on the Note that the nullity of the mortgage is not
purchasers ownership of the property. Thus, covered by the remedy outlined under Section
the mere filing of an ex parte motion for the 8 of Act No. 3135. The said provision
issuance of a writ of possession would suffice. specifically lists the following exclusive grounds
No verification and certification on non-forum for a petition to set aside the sale and cancel
shopping need be attached to the motion at all. the writ of possession: (1) that the mortgage
was not violated; and (2) that the sale was not
Hence, it is immaterial that the verification and made in accordance with the provisions of Act
certification on non-forum shopping in private No. 3135.
respondents questioned petition was signed by
its lawyer. Such insignificant lapse does not Any question regarding the validity of the
render the said petition defective in form.
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal
ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
As to the second issue, Section 8 of Act No. possession. Indeed, regardless of whether or
3135 states:
not there is a pending suit for annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the
SEC. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession.17
which possession was requested, but not later
than thirty days after the purchaser was given Petitioners should have filed a separate and
possession, petition that the sale be set aside independent action for annulment of the
and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying mortgage or the foreclosure.1wphi1 The
the damages suffered by him, because the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 is
mortgage was not violated or the sale was not inapplicable in this case. The trial court thus
made in accordance with the provisions hereof, correctly denied petitioners motions to set
and the court shall take cognizance of this aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession
petition in accordance with the summary on the ground of nullity of the mortgage.
procedure provided for in section one hundred
and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and Hence, in our view, the Court of Appeals did not
ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion
debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
all or part of the bond furnished by the person affirming the assailed Orders of the trial court.
who obtained possession. Either of the parties
may appeal from the order of the judge in
accordance with section fourteen of Act CONCEPCION
R.
ANCHETA
vs
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
order of possession shall continue in effect INC.
during the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis
A certificate of non-forum shopping is required
supplied.)
only in complaints or other initiatory pleadings,
Clearly, the remedy of petitioners from the and a petition for a writ of possession under
assailed Orders of the trial court was to file a Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not a complaint or

an initiatory pleading. Indeed, this Court in pointed out by petitioner, is a judicial

Spouses Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[15] held proceeding brought for the benefit of one party
that:
only, and without notice to, or consent by any
person adversely interested (Stella vs. Mosele,
The certification against forum shopping is
19 N.E., 2d. 433, 435, 299 III App. 53;
required only in a complaint or other initiatory
Imbrought v. Parker, 83 N.E. 2d 42, 43, 336 III
pleading. The ex parte petition for the issuance
App. 124; City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Aavis
of a writ of possession filed by the respondent
Hotel Corporation, 280 III App. 247), x x x or a
is not an initiatory pleading. Although the
proceeding wherein relief is granted without an
private respondent denominated its pleading as
opportunity for the person against whom the
a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. What
relief is sought to be heard (Restatement, Torts,
distinguishes a motion from a petition or other
S 674, p. 365, Rollo).
pleading is not its form or the title given by the
party executing it, but rather its purpose. The On the other hand, Rule 12, Sec. 2 of the
office of a motion is not to initiate new Revised Rules of Court on Intervention provides:
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
SEC. 2. Intervention. Any person may, before or
matter arising in the progress of the case in
during a trial be permitted by the court, in its
which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has
independent right or remedy, but is confined to
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It
the success of either of the parties, or an
relates to some question that is collateral to the
interest against both, or when he is so situated
main object of the action and is connected with as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
and dependent upon the principal remedy. An other disposition of property in the custody of
application for a writ of possession is a mere the court or of an officer thereof (italics
incident in the registration proceeding. Hence, supplied).
although it was denominated as a petition, it
Intervention is defined as a proceeding in a suit
was in substance merely a motion. Thus, the CA
or action by which a third person is permitted
correctly made the following observations:
by the court to make himself a party, either
Such petition for the issuance of a writ of joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by
possession is filed in the form of an ex parte the complaint, or uniting with defendant in
motion, inter alia, in the registration or resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding
cadastral proceedings if the property is something adversely to both of them; the act or
registered. Apropos, as an incident or proceeding by which a third person becomes a
consequence of the original registration or party in a suit pending between others; the
cadastral proceedings, the motion or petition admission, by leave of court, of a person not an
for the issuance of a writ of possession, not original party to pending legal proceedings, by
being an initiatory pleading, dispels the which such person becomes a party thereto for
requirement of a forum shopping certification. the protection of some right of interest alleged
Axiomatic is that the petitioner need not file a by him to be affected by such proceedings (33
certification of non-forum shopping since his C.J., 477, cited in Eulalio Garcia, et al. vs.
claims are not initiatory in character (Ponciano Sinforoso David, et al., 67 Phil. 279, at p. 282).
vs. Parentela, Jr., 331 SCRA 605 [2000]).
Action, under Rule 2, Sec. 1, is defined as an
The second issue raised by the petitioner is not ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one
novel. In GSIS v. Court of Appeals,[16] this party prosecutes another for the enforcement
Court discussed the inappropriateness of or protection of a right, or the prevention or
intervening in a summary proceeding under redress of a wrong.
Section 7 of Act No. 3135:
From the aforesaid definitions, it is clear that
The proceedings in which respondent Knecht intervention contemplates a suit, and is
sought to intervene is an ex parte proceeding therefore exercisable during a trial and, as
pursuant to Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, and, as pointed out by petitioner is one which envisions

the introduction of evidence by the parties,

leading to the rendition of the decision in the
case (p. 363, Rollo). Very clearly, this concept is
not that contemplated by Sec. 7 of Act No.
3135, whereby, under settled jurisprudence,
the Judge has to order the immediate issuance
of a writ of possession 1) upon the filing of the
proper motion and 2) the approval of the
corresponding bond. The rationale for the
mandate is to allow the purchaser to have
possession of the foreclosed property without
delay, such possession being founded on his
right of ownership. A trial which entails delay is
obviously out of the question.
The fact that the RTC of Manila, Branch 32, has
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 98-88370
did not proscribe the RTC, Branch 4, from taking
cognizance of and granting the petition for a
writ of possession filed by respondent
Metrobank.
Contrary
to
the
petitioners
contention, the doctrine of judicial stability,
which states that a branch of a Regional Trial
Court of a province or city should not and
cannot interfere with the orders or other
judgments in cases pending in other branches
of the RTC in that city or province,[17] is not
applicable in this case. The reason for this is
that, the power to open, modify, or vacate a
judgment is not only possessed by, but is
restricted to the court in which the judgment
was rendered.
In taking cognizance of the petition for a writ of
possession and granting the same, the RTC did
not interfere with the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
69922, nor did it modify or vacate the decision
in Civil Case No. 98-88370. The only issue
therein was whether Metrobank, the registered
owner of the subject property, was entitled to
the possession thereof. The RTCs order granting
the petition and directing the Sheriff to place
the respondent in possession of the property,
conformably with the writ of possession it had
issued earlier, were mere incidents to the
transfer of the title over the property to the
respondent. The RTC did not delve into, much
less resolve, the issue of the validity or
invalidity of the real estate mortgage executed
in favor of the respondent, the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, and the
sale at public auction of the subject property.
Such issues were raised in Civil Case No. 98-

88370 and, thereafter, in CA-G.R. CV No.

69922, which issues have yet to be resolved
with finality in the said appeal. Thus, the
respondent was entitled to the possession of
the property, subject, however, to the final
outcome of the case on appeal. Indeed, this
Court ruled in Ong v. Court of Appeals[19] that:
As a rule, any question regarding the validity of
the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a
legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ
of possession. Regardless of whether or not
there is a pending suit for annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the
purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession,
without prejudice of course to the eventual
outcome of said case. Hence, an injunction to
prohibit the issuance of writ of possession is
entirely out of place.
THE
PARENTS-TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION
(PTA)
OF
ST.
MATHEW
CHRISTIAN
ACADEMY vs THE METROPOLITAN BANK
and TRUST CO
The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners are not Third Parties against whom

the writ of possession cannot be issued and
implemented.

As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to

issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure
sale and during the period of redemption.[8]
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes
the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for
a writ of possession during the redemption
period by filing an ex parte motion under oath
for that purpose in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or in
special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or place
where the real property or any part thereof is
situated, in the case of mortgages duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon
filing of such motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond, the law also directs in

express terms the said court to issue the order contractual in nature. As such, it would be
for a writ of possession.
specious to conclude that the teachers and
students
hold
the
subject
premises
independent of or adverse to SMCA. In fact,
their interest over the school premises is
However, this rule is not without exception. In necessarily inferior to that of the school.
Besides, their contracts are with the school and
Barican v. Intermediate
do not attach to the school premises. Moreover,
the foreclosure of the current school premises
does not prevent the SMCA from continuing its
Appellate Court, we held that the obligation of a operations elsewhere.
court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it
appears that there is a third party in possession At this point, it is relevant to note that in the
of the property who is claiming a right adverse Joint Decision dated August 16, 2005, the trial
to that of the debtor/mortgagor. This ruling was court found that SMCA was not a third party
reiterated in Policarpio v. Active Bank where we and was therefore bound by the said writ of
possession. Consequently, it affirmed the
held that:
issuance of the writ of possession.

Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an

extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to
possession of the property. Thus, whenever the
purchaser prays for a writ of possession, the
trial court has to issue it as a matter of course.
However, the obligation of the trial court to
issue a writ of possession ceases to be
ministerial once it appears that there is a third
party in possession of the property claiming a
right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.
Where such third party exists, the trial court
should conduct a hearing to determine the
nature of his adverse possession. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, we find that petitioners cannot be

considered as third parties because they are
not claiming a right adverse to the judgment
debtor. Petitioner-teachers and students did not
claim ownership of the properties, but merely
averred actual physical possession of the
subject school premises. Petitioner-teachers
possession of the said premises was based on
the employment contracts they have with the
school. As regards the petitioner-students,
Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business
Administration
and
Non
v.
Dames
II
characterized the school-student relationship as

MBTC thus correctly argued that petitioners did

not have superior rights to that of SMCA over
the subject property because their supposed
possession of the same emanated only from the
latter. Since petitioners possession of the
subject school premises stemmed from their
employment or enrollment contracts with the
school, as the case may be, necessarily, their
right to possess the subject school premises
cannot be adverse to that of the school and of
its owners. As such, the petitioners cannot be
deemed third parties as contemplated in Act
No. 3135, as amended.

The lack of authority to sign the certificate of

non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession was an
insignificant lapse.

Petitioners further claim that the lack of

authority to sign the certificate on non-forum
shopping attached to the Petition for the
Issuance of the Writ of Possession rendered the
same worthless and should be deemed as nonexistent.[16] MBTC asserts otherwise, citing

Spouses Arquiza v. Court of Appeals where we inconsequential oversight did not render the
held that an application for a writ of possession said petition defective in form.
is a mere incident in the registration proceeding
which is in substance merely a motion, and
G.R. No. 190814
October 9, 2013
therefore does not require such a certification.
MICHELLE LANA BROWN- ARANETA, for herself
and representing her minor daughters,
ARABELLA MARGARITA B. ARANET A and A V
Petitioners contention lacks basis. In Green Asia
ANGELINAMYKAELA B. ARANETA, Petitioners, vs.
Construction and Development Corporation v.
JUAN IGNACIO ARANETA, Respondent.

Court of Appeals, where the issue of validity of

the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was Was there forum shopping? Did petitioner forum
questioned in an application for the issuance of shop?
a Writ of Possession, we held that:

x x x it bears stressing that a certification on

non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or a petition which is an initiatory
pleading. In this case, the subject petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession filed by
private respondent is not an initiatory pleading.
Although private respondent denominated its
pleading as a petition, it is more properly a
motion. What distinguishes a motion from a
petition or other pleading is not its form or the
title given by the party executing it, but its
purpose. The purpose of a motion is not to
initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter
arising in the progress of the case where the
motion is filed. (Emphasis supplied)

It is not necessary to initiate an original action

in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property to acquire
possession. Even if the application for the writ
of possession was denominated as a petition, it
was in substance merely a motion. Indeed, any
insignificant lapse in the certification on nonforum shopping filed by the MBTC did not
render the writ irregular. After all, no
verification and certification on non-forum
shopping need be attached to the motion.

A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a

result or in anticipation of an adverse decision in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another
forum through means other than appeal or certiorari
by raising identical causes of action, subject matter
and issues. Stated a bit differently, forum shopping
is the institution of two or more actions involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition
that one or the other court would come out with a
favorable disposition.33 An indicium of the presence
of, or the test for determining whether a litigant
violated the rule against, forum shopping is where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other case.34

Litis pendentia,35 as a ground for the dismissal of a

civil suit, refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes vexatious and unnecessary.36 For the bar
of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring
requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or
at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata in the
other.37

Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on

non-forum shopping in the MBTCs petition was Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping
signed
by
its
branch
head.
Such (1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in

one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other

than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (2) if,
after he has filed a petition before the Supreme
Court, a party files another before the CA since in
such case said party deliberately splits appeals "in
the hope that even as one case in which a particular
remedy is sought is dismissed, another case(offering
a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (3) where
a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in
another court after failing to obtain it from the
original court.38

or decided, or settled by judgment. Its

requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) the judgment or order must
be one on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and (4) between the
first and second actions, there must be identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
[23] Thus, in First Philippine International Bank,
we explained further:

The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against

forum shopping is the rendition by two competent
tribunals of two separate and contradictory
decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may
repeatedly try their luck in several different fora
until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the
resultant confusion, the Court adheres to the rules
against forum shopping, and a breach of these rules
results in the dismissal of the case.39

Consequently, where a litigant (or one

representing the same interest or person) sues
the same party against whom another action or
actions for the alleged violation of the same
right and the enforcement of the same relief
is/are still pending, the defense of litis
pendencia in one case is a bar to the others;
and, a final judgment in one would constitute
res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal
of the rest. In either case, forum shopping could
be cited by the other party as a ground to ask
for summary dismissal of the two (or more)
complaints or petitions, and for the imposition
of the other sanctions, which are direct
contempt of court, criminal prosecution, and
disciplinary action against the erring lawyer.

Considering the above doctrinal pronouncements on

forum shopping, We find all the badges of this We further held in First Philippine International
deplorable, docket-clogging practice present in this Bank that the filing by a party of two apparently
case.
different actions, but with the same objective,

constituted forum shopping.[25] The Court

discussed this species of forum shopping as
CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs follows:
MONDRAGON LEISURE AND RESORTS
CORPORATION
Very simply stated, the original complaint in the
court a quo which gave rise to the instant
The petition is meritorious.
petition was filed by the buyer (herein private
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest)
We defined forum shopping as the institution of against the seller (herein petitioners) to enforce
two (2) or more actions or proceedings the alleged perfected sale of real estate. On the
grounded on the same cause on the supposition other hand, the complaint in the Second Case
that one or the other court would make a seeks to declare such purported sale involving
favorable disposition or the act of a party the same real property as unenforceable as
against whom an adverse judgment has been against the Bank, which is the petitioner herein.
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and In other words, in the Second Case, the
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum majority stockholders, in representation of the
other than by appeal or the special civil action Bank, are seeking to accomplish what the Bank
of certiorari.[21] In First Philippine International itself failed to do in the original case in the trial
Bank v. Court of Appeals,[22] we held that the court. In brief, the objective or the relief being
test to determine whether forum shopping sought, though worded differently, is the same,
exists is whether the elements of litis namely, to enable the petitioner Bank to escape
pendencia are present or where a final from the obligation to sell the property to
judgment in one case will amount to res respondent (emphasis supplied).
judicata in the other. Res judicata means a
matter or thing adjudged, judicially acted upon

In Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on same, that is, to continue its lease over the
Audit, one of the bases of First Philippine Mimosa Leisure Estate.
International Bank, we ruled as follows:
Mondragon believes that Civil Case No. 9242
In the attempt to make the two actions appear (First Mondragon Case) covered a subject
to be different, petitioner impleaded different matter and cause of action distinct from Civil
respondents therein PNOC in the case before Case No. 9596 (Second Mondragon Case).
the lower court and the COA in the case before
this Court and sought what seems to be We disagree.
different reliefs. Petitioner asks this Court to set
aside the questioned letter-directive of the COA The Compromise Agreement between petitioner
dated October 10, 1988 and to direct said body and
Mondragon
supplanted
the
Lease
to approve the Memorandum of Agreement Agreement. By entering into a compromise, the
entered into by and between the PNOC and parties decided to set aside the Lease
petitioner, while in the complaint before the Agreement in favor of terms and conditions
lower court petitioner seeks to enjoin the PNOC more acceptable to both. They had also waived
from conducting a rebidding and from selling to any issues arising from the Lease Agreement.
other parties the vessel T/T Andres Bonifacio, Thus, in the July 15, 1999 Resolution, the Court
and for an extension of time for it to comply incorporated the Compromise Agreement and
with the paragraph 1 of the memorandum of stated:
agreement and damages. One can see that
although the relief prayed for in the two (2) [I]t is apparent that the parties have managed
actions are ostensibly different, the ultimate to resolve the dispute among themselves, the
objective in both actions is the same, that is, only thing left being to put our judicial
the approval of the sale of vessel in favor of imprimatur on the compromise agreement, in
petitioner, and to overturn the letter directive accordance with Article 2037 of the Civil Code.
of the COA of October 10, 1988 disapproving
the sale (emphasis supplied).
ACCORDINGLY, the Compromise Agreement
dated June 28, 1999 executed by Mondragon
In the case at bar, there is no question that the and CDC, not being contrary to law, morals,
first requirement of identity of parties was met. good customs, and public order and public
As regards the rights asserted and reliefs policy is hereby NOTED and the petition is
sought, we depart from the findings of the CA DISMISSED.
and hold that there existed an identity of
causes of action and reliefs based on the same SO ORDERED.
objective standard enunciated in the aforecited
cases.
This judgment by compromise already became
final and executory and should be complied
Mondragon had only one objective in filing the with any other judgment, as it stands as the
two cases, that is, the perpetuation of its lease. judgment in Civil Case No. 9242. Therefore,
In Civil Case No. 9242, Mondragon tried to Mondragon cannot seriously claim that Civil
prevent the termination of the Lease Case No. 9242 does not encompass the
Agreement, while in Civil Case No. 9596, it tried Compromise Agreement. Furthermore, since
to prevent the termination of the Compromise any issue regarding the lease of the Mimosa
Agreement. While they differ in nomenclature Leisure Estate was already amicably settled by
and specific provisions, the subject of the two the parties through the execution of the
agreements was the samethe lease over the Compromise Agreement, Civil Case No. 9596
Mimosa Leisure Estate. Mondragons cause of was already barred by prior judgment, that is,
action against petitioner CDC, in essence, was the judgment by compromise in Civil Case No.
the latters alleged premature termination of the 9242.
lease over the Mimosa Leisure Estate. The
ultimate relief sought by Mondragon from the Mondragon had the opportunity to oppose
courts, on the other hand, is to be allowed to petitioners Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
continue the lease. Without doubt, Mondragons Execution
of
Judgment by Compromise
objectives in filing the two civil cases were the Agreement in Civil Case No. 9242 pending
before the Angeles City RTC, Branch 58.

However, without waiting for the trial courts

resolution on the motion and opposition,
Mondragon filed Civil Case No. 9596 before the
RTC Branch 60. This was clearly an attempt to
prevent the RTC Branch 58 in the First
Mondragon Case from ordering the execution of
the judgment on the Compromise Agreement
by obtaining a favorable judgment from the RTC
Branch 60. Moreover, Mondragons Petition for
Declaratory Relief and Specific Performance
(Civil Case No. 9596) merely reiterated the
grounds cited in its opposition to CDCs motion
for execution in the First Mondragon Case (Civil
Case No. 9242). In filing the second civil case,
Mondragons objective was the same as the first
civil actionto perpetuate its lease over the
Mimosa Leisure Estate. To achieve this
objective, and assuming that Mondragon had
meritorious grounds against the execution filed
by petitioner, Mondragon had sufficient
remedies in law to question the writ of
execution issued by the RTC Branch 58.
Mondragon indeed questioned the writ of
execution before the CA which was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 56079.

court has no authority to interfere with the

proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction,
much less to annul the final judgment of a coequal court.[30] In Paper Industries Corporation
of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, we declared that a court has no
jurisdiction
to
restrain
the
execution
proceedings in another court with concurrent
jurisdiction.
The consolidation of the two civil cases is also
not possible in line with the doctrine on noninterference. As observed by the CA:

In the matter of the consolidation of the two

cases, Mondragon should be reminded that the
same is addressed to the sound discretion of
the courts. Neither of the judges in the two
cases can impose upon the other the
consolidation of the cases. Additionally,
consolidation is no longer practicable because
Civil Case No. 9242 is already terminated and is
in the execution stage, while in Civil Case No.
9596, the issues have not even been joined.
Furthermore, if Civil Case No. 9596 was allowed
to continue, the basic purpose of compromise
In the end, the decisive test in forum shopping agreements would be defeated. As defined by
is the possible vexation caused to the courts the Civil Code:
and litigants by the filing of actions based on
the same or related issues in different fora. We Art. 2028. A compromise is a contract whereby
held that:
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
Ultimately, what is truly important to consider commenced.
in determining whether forum-shopping exists
or not is the vexation caused the courts and Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties
parties-litigant by a party who asks different the effect and authority of res judicata, but
courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on there shall be no execution except in
the same or related causes and/or to grant the compliance with a judicial compromise.
same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting Thus, in Genova v. De Castro, we held that:
decisions being rendered by the different fora
upon the same issue. x x x[29]
A compromise is an agreement between two or
more persons who, for preventing or putting an
The vexation to the courts in this case is end to a lawsuit, adjust their respective
evident. There is a high risk of conflict between positions by mutual consent in the way they
the decisions of the RTC Branches 58 and 60 feel they can live with. Reciprocal concessions
regarding their respective civil cases. A decision are the very heart and life of every compromise
by one branch of court will constitute res agreement, where each party approximates
judicata in the other case pending before the and concedes in the hope of gaining balance by
other branch of court. Alternatively, if the RTC the danger of losing. It is, in essence, a
Branch 60 exercised its jurisdiction over the contract.
petition for declaratory relief, then it would
have to restrain the execution proceedings in A compromise is binding and has the force of
the RTC Branch 58. Thus, interference with the law between the parties, unless the consent of
proceedings in another court would ensue. a party is vitiated such as by mistake, fraud,
Under the doctrine of non-interference, a trial violence, intimidation or undue influenceor

when there is forgery, or if the terms of the courts, as the case now exemplifies. The
settlement are so palpably unconscionable.[33] vexation to the courts is already apparent, and
the delay from litigating two civil cases is
Certainly, a compromise agreement becomes inevitable. Indeed, [p]rolonging a litigation is
the law between the parties and will not be set anathema to [the purpose of] a compromise
aside other than the grounds mentioned above. agreement.
In Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, we held that
the main purpose of a compromise agreement Forum shopping is contumacious, as well as an
is to put an end to litigation because of the act of malpractice that is proscribed and
uncertainty that may arise from it. Once the condemned as trifling with the courts and
compromise is perfected, the parties are bound abusive of their processes. It warrants
to abide by it in good faith.[34] Should a party prosecution for contempt of court and summary
fail or refuse to comply with the terms of a dismissal of the actions involved, without
compromise or amicable settlement, the other prejudice to appropriate administrative sanction
party could either enforce the compromise by a against the counsel.[37] In this case, only Civil
writ of execution or regard it as rescinded and Case No. 9596 is left to be dismissed
so insist upon his/her original demand.
considering that a judgment by compromise
was already rendered in Civil Case No. 9242
Instead of ending litigation, Mondragon had through the Courts July 15, 1999 Resolution.
effectively prolonged the legal battle by filing This judgment was already executory; and the
the second civil case. Considering the RTC Branch 58 had indeed issued a writ of
investments involved, it is also likely that the execution against Mondragon.
parties
would
unceasingly
appeal
any
judgment/s from the trial and even appellate