Lechugas v.

CA
August 6, 1986 | Gutierrez Jr., J. | Parol Evidence Rule
PETITIONER: Victoria Lechugas
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and the Lozas

4.
5.

SUMMARY: Lechugas filed an action for forcible entry and damages and an
action for recovery and possession of the same property (disputed land) against
the Lozas. Leoncia, the vendor of Lechugas, testified during trial that when the
deed of sale was executed between her and Lechugas, the vendors intention was
to sell Lot 5522 (located south of the disputed land) because the disputed land
was already sold to the Lozas by her father. Lechugas contends that it was
improper to subject the true intent of the deed of sale she executed with Leoncia
to parol evidence. SC held that parol evidence rule does not apply and that
Leoncia did not intend to sell the disputed land to Lechugas.
DOCTRINE: See ratio #1 under Parol evidence rule does not apply

FACTS:
1. LEONCIA Lansague sold a parcel of land to her cousin, Victoria
LECHUGAS. The sale is evidenced by a deed of sale. LECHUGAS took
possession through her tenants Jesus Leoncia, Roberta Losarita, and Simeon
Guinta.
2. While Simeon Gunita was plowing a portion of the land, DEFENDANTS
(all surnamed LOZA) entered and forced him to stop working
a. DEFENDANTS told Gunita that he will be allowed to continue
plowing if he signed an affidavit recognizing the DEFENDANTS
as his landlords.
b. Gunita reported the incident to LECHUGAS who sought the help
of the police. DEFENDANTS did not vacate the lot despite
demands by the police.
c. DEFENDANTS entered another portion of the land and continued
to cut bamboo poles growing thereon despite warnings.
d. Eventually, the whole parcel of land was occupied by the
DEFENDANTS.
3. LECHUGAS filed an action for forcible entry and damages with the
Justice of the Peace against DEFENDANTS (case dismissed). The forcible
entry case was appealed to the CFI. While the appeal was pending,
LECHUGAS filed an action for recovery and possession of the same
property. The two cases were tried jointly.
a. LEONCIA, as witness for the DEFENDANTS in the proceedings
in the trial court, testified that the land she sold to LECHUGAS
did not include the disputed land. What she intended to sell was
the land situated south of the disputed land (referred to as Lot
5522 in the case).

6.

The CFI dismissed the two actions and declared DEFENDANTS owners
and lawful possessors of the land. LECHUGAS appealed to the CA
(affirmed CFI). A petition for review was filed before the SC.
DEFENDANTS claim that the land that LECHUGAS purchased from
LEONCIA is different from the disputed land.
a. HUGO Loza, predecessor-in-interest of DEFENDANTS (except as
to Jose and Salvador Loza) purchased the land from Victorina
Limor. Immediately after the sale, HUGO took possession of the
property. This sale was evidenced by a Venta Definitiva. HUGO
purchased from EMETRIO Lansague (LEONCIAs father) another
parcel of land which adjoins the land he had earlier bought from
Victorina Limor. This sale was evidenced by a public instrument.
It would appear that the land sold by EMETRIO covered the
disputed land allegedly sold by LEONCIA to LECHUGAS.
b. DEFENDANTS claim that the land bought by LECHUGAS is the
one situated Lot 5522.
LECHUGAS claims that it was improper to subject the true intent of the
deed of sale she executed with LEONCIA to parol evidence.

ISSUE:
WON the parol evidence rule applies NO
WON LEONCIA intended to sell the disputed land NO. The intention was to sell
Lot 5522 (located south of the disputed land)
RULING: Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
Parol evidence rule does not apply
1.

2.

Parol evidence rule does not apply and cannot be invoked by party-litigants
against the other, where at least one of them is (1) not a party or a privy of
a party to the written instrument in question and (2) does not base a
claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument
or the relation that it establishes. Strangers to a contract are not bound by
its terms.
While the deed of sale was executed between LECHUGAS and LEONCIA,
the litigation was between LECHUGAS and DEFENDANTS. Thus,
LEONCIA is a stranger to the litigation and is not bound by the rule.

LEONCIA did not intend to sell the disputed land

1.

It was shown through the testimony of LEONCIA as witness for the

DEFENDANTS that she intended to sell Lot 5422 and not the disputed
land. She testified that what she sold to LECHUGAS was south of the land
in litigation and it did not include the disputed land.

2.

It appeared that LEONCIA was illiterate and she merely relied on the good
faith of LECHUGAS, her first cousin, that the deed of sale in which she
placed her thumbmark on described the land she intended to sell. However,
the deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.

3.

LEONCIA could not have sold land which was already sold by EMETRIO,
her father, to HUGO Loza, predecessor-in-interest of the DEFENDANTS.