OHTA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ] vs.

STEAMSHIP POMPEY, ALFREDO GALVEZ and

NATIONAL COAL COMPANY,
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. Plaintiff, Ohta Development Company, is the owner of a pier in Talomo Bay,
Davao. On the western side of the pier were groups of posts (3 to a group) about 20
feet apart, 2 feet away from the pier which served as a protection to the pier
against the impact of the vessel.
2. One morning of June 23, at around 7:00 AM, the Steamship Pompey in command
of Captain Alfredo Galvez, possessing a certificate of public convenience issued by
the Commissioner of Public Utility in the name of the National Coal Company,
carrying cargo of flour and rice for the plaintiff, docked along the side of the pier.
3. The Pompey docked with her bow (anchor) facing towards the land and fastened
her ropes to the posts on the pier. She did not stretch a rope to the tree to on the
shore, neither did she drop her bow anchors. Other ships docking at the pier has
always observed that the bow facing towards the land and fastened a rope to a tree
situated faster west on the beach as a precaution taken to avoid the ship from
getting too close to the pier.
4. After being docked, they proceeded to unload the flour and rice which as first
deposited on the pier and later transported to the plaintiffs warehouse on land
where it was officially received. The unloading of the cargo was done without any
infererence of the part of the plaintiff and exclusively by laborers and the crew of
the ship.
5. The unloading was done in a hurry and their being 15 or 20 laborers engaged in
the hauling of the same to the plaintiffs warehouse, a large amount of cargo
accumulated on the dock. Within 10 minutes past 11 on the same morning, the pier
sank with all of its merchandise.
6. COURT FINDINGS: The current forced the ship towards the pier. The impact
caused the pier to sink. When the pier sank, there was a current from west to
east. The flour which floated after the sinking of the dock drifted from west to east.
The pier when it sank, leaned towards the west, going beyond the western line
formerly occupied by the pier. The hull of the ship came to a stop at a point where
the piles of defense formerly stood. Based on the photograph taken after the
incident admitted by the court as Exhibit B.
7. DEFENSE CONTENDS: the pier sank because of the weight of the cargo and the
poor condition of the dock. Captain Razon, the first mate of Pompey on that trip
the sole witness presented by the defense, claims that the defense piles fell without
coming into contact with the ship. COURT RULED: The pier underwent repairs in
1921 and 1922 wherein materials not in good condition were replaced. The
testimony of the Captain Razon is inconceivable because the piles were not
attached to the pier but were 2 feet away from it. The sinking of the dock should not
affect the defense piles.

8. CONCLUSION OF THE COURT: dock on the account of the impact of the ship as a
result of a strong current at the time; that the ship was not fastened with the rope
to a tree on shore and that bow anchors had not been dropped.
ISSUE(S): Whether the defendant National Coal Companys liability ceased when the
merchandise was unload and placed on the dock based on the bills of lading of the
lost merchandise.
HELD: No. Under article 619 of the Code of Commerce, it is the delivery of the cargo
at the port of discharge that determines the cessation of the liability of the captain
for the cargo. In the instant case, when the merchandise was lost by the sinking of
the pier, it had not yet been delivered, and therefore still under the responsibility of
the captain. The defendant company, as agent, is liable for the indemnities arising
from the lack of skill or negligence of the captain. On the liability of ship agents
provision of the Article 587 of the Code of Commerce, limiting the liability of the
agent to the value of the ship, its appurtenances and freight, is not applicable when
no abandonment of the vessel is made.

YU BIAO SONTUA & CO vs.MIGUEL J. OSSORIO

G.R. No. L-17690 June 14, 1922
Doctrine: The general liability of a vessel owner extends to losses by fire arising from other than a
natural or other excepted cause, whether occurring on the ship accidentally, or communicated from
another vessel, or from the shore; and the fact that fire produces the motive power of a boat does
not affect the case. Such losses are not within the exceptions either of act of God, or peril of the sea,
except by local custom, unless proximately caused by one of these events. In jurisdictions where the
civil law obtains, however, it has been held that if property on a steamboat is destroyed by fire, the
owners of the boat are not responsible, if it was being navigated with proper diligence, although the
accident occurred at night. The common law liability extends even to loss by fires caused entirely by
spontaneous combustion of the cargo, without any negligence on the part of master or crew. (R.C.L.,
vol. 24, pp. 1324-1325.)

FACTS: On March 12, 1920, 2,000 cases of petroleum and 8,473 cases of gasoline were
loaded in the motor boat Alfonso. The loading was done without the permission from the
customs authorities. The cases were loaded by means of straps supporting 10-12 cases at a
time. The cases were placed in the hold of the ship, which is 14ft from the boiler of the main
engine and 4ft from the boiler of the smaller engine On March 13, the smaller engine was in
operation preparatory to the departure Subsequently, a fire broke out with an explosion on
board Alfonso followed by a violent expulsion of gasoline and petroleum Due to the magnitude
of the fire and the inflammability of the materials and the proximity of the steamer Y. Sontua, the
fire spread to the said steamer Sontua brought this action to recover from Ossorio, the owner of
Alfonso, alleging that the damages were due to the negligence of the agents and employees of
Ossorio Ossorio contended that the damages were caused by a fortuitous event and are not
imputable to his or any of his agents/employees/mandataries negligence CFI ruled in favor of
Sontua and held that the explosion was due to the negligence of the persons in charge of
Alfonso. Ossorio is liable for the negligence of his agents and employees
ISSUES: Whether the owner of the motorboat, was liable for the negligence of his agents and
employees?

HELD: YES. Expert testimony introduced by Sontua shows the explosion and fire, which caused
the damages, are imputable to the negligence of the persons having charge of Alfonso at that
time. It was shown that due to the manner by which the cases were loaded, the cases would
receive bumps resulting in damage to the cans and consequent leakage (use of straps). The
gases formed by the volatilization are apt to accumulate in a compartment without sufficient
ventilation (hold of a ship). This accumulation will cause the gases to ignite upon coming in
contact with a spark or upon temperature being sufficiently raised (smaller engine was in
operation). The rule is that where the vessel is one of freight, a public concern or public utility, it
owner or agent is liable for the tortuous acts of his agents The Code of Commerce further
provides that the general liability of a vessel owner extends to losses by fire arising from other
than a natural or other excepted cause, whether occurring on the ship, or communicated from
other vessel, or from the shore. This means that losses by fire are not within the exceptions (act
of God or peril of the sea except by local custom) UNLESS proximately caused by one of the
exceptions Re: allegation that obligations under Art. 612 of the Code of Commerce are inherent
duties do not limit to the latter the civil liability arising from their nonfulfillment, but while the master is
responsible to the ship agent, the ship agent, in turn, is responsible to third persons, as is clearly
provided in article 618 of said Code, in which express mention is made, is subsections 5 and 7, of
the duties enumerated in the said article 612.
MACONDRAY & CO., INC. VS. PROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION February, 2005
Facts: CANPOTEX SHIPPING SERVICES LIMITED INC., shipped on board the vessel M/V Trade carrier
certain goods in favor of ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION. Subject shipments were insured with
Provident Insurance Corp. against all risks.
When the shipment arrived, consignee discovered that the shipment sustained losses. Provident paid for
said losses. Formal claims were then filed with Trade & Transport but MACONDRAY refused and failed to
settle the same. MACONDRAY denies liability over the losses, it, having no absolute relation with Trade &
Transport, the alleged operator of the vessel who transported the shipment; that accordingly,
MACONDRAY is the local representative of the shipper; the charterer of M/V Trade Carrier and not party
to this case; that it has no control over the acts of the captain and crew of the carrier and cannot be held
responsible for any damage arising from the fault or negligence of said captain and crew; that upon arrival
at the port, M/V Trade Carrier discharged the full amount of shipment as shown by the draft survey.
Issue: Whether or not MACONDRAY & CO. INC., as an agent, is responsible for any loss sustained by any
party from the vessel owned by Trade & Transport.
Held: Although petitioner is not an agent of Trade & Transport, it can still be the ship agent of the vessel
M/V Trade Carrier. A ship agent is the person entrusted with provisioning or representing the vessel in
the port in which it may be found. Hence, whether acting as agent of the owner of the vessel or as agent of
the charterer, petitioner will be considered as the ship agent and may be held liable as such, as long as the
latter is the one that provisions or represents the vessel.
The trial court found that petitioner was appointed as local agent of the vessel, which duty includes
arrangement for the entrance and clearance of the vessel. Further, the CA found that the evidence shows
that petitioner represented the vessel. The latter prepared the Notice of Readiness, the Statement of Facts,
the Completion Notice, the Sailing Notice and Customs Clearance. Petitioners employees were present at
the port of destination one day before the arrival of the vessel, where they stayed until it departed. They
were also present during the actual discharging of the cargo. Moreover, Mr. de la Cruz, the representative
of petitioner, also prepared for the needs of the vessel. These acts all point to the conclusion that it was the
entity that represented the vessel at the port of destination and was the ship agent within the meaning and
context of Article 586 of the Code of Commerce.

COMPAGNIE DE COMMERCE ET DE NAVIGATION D'EXTREME ORIENT,

plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE HAMBURG AMERIKA PACKETFACHT ACTIEN GESELLSCHAFT, defendantappellant.
FACTS:
1. COMPAGNIE DE COMMERCE ET DE NAVIGATION D'EXTREME ORIENT (Compagnie)
is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
France, with its principal office in Paris and a branch office in Saigon, Vietnam. THE
HAMBURG AMERIKA PACKETFACHT ACTIEN GESELLSCHAFT(Hamburg) is a
corporation organized under the laws of Germany with its principal office in
Hamburg and represented in Manila by Behn, Meyer & Company (Limited), a
corporation.
2. HAMBURG owned a steamship named SAMBIA, which proceeded to the port of
Saigon and on board was the cargo belonging to COMPAGNIE. There were rumors
of impending war between Germany and France and other nations of Europe. The
master of the steamship was told to take refuge at a neutral port (because Saigon
was a French port).
3. COMPAGNIE asked for compulsory detention of its vessel to prevent its property
from leaving Saigon. However, the Governor of Saigon refused to issue an order
because he had not been officially notified of the declaration of the war.
4. The steamship sailed from Saigon, and was bound for Manila, because it was
issued a bill of health by the US consul in Saigon. The steamship stayed
continuously in Manila and where it contends it will be compelled to stay until the
war ceases. No attempt was made on the part of the defendants to transfer and
deliver the cargo to the destinations as stipulated in the charter party.
5. BEHN, MEYER and COMPANY (agent of HAMBURG in Manila) offered to purchase
the cargo from COMPAGNIE, but the latter never received the cable messages so
they never answered. When a survey was done on the ship, it was found that the
cargo was infested with beetles, so BEHN asked for court authority to sell the cargo
and the balance to be dumped at sea. The proceeds of the sale were deposited in
the court, waiting for orders as to what to do with it.
6. BEHN wrote COMPAGNIE again informing the latter of the disposition which it
made upon the cargo. COMPAGNIE answered that it was still waiting for orders as to
what to do. COMPAGNIE wanted all the proceeds of the sale to be given to them
(damages, for the defendants failure to deliver the cargo to the destinations
Dunkirk and Hamburg), while defendants contended that they have a lien on the
proceeds of the sale (amount due to them because of the upkeep and maintenance
of the ship crew and for commissions for the sale of the cargo).
6. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the defendants made
the following assignments on appeal (that the court had no jurisdiction, that the fear

of capture was not force majeure, that the court erred in concluding that defendant
is liable for damages for non-delivery of cargo, and the value of the award of
damages). On appeal, the plaintiffs also contended that the court erred in not
giving the full value of damages

ISSUE: WONthe master of the steamship was justified in taking refuge in Manila
(therefore being the cause of the non-delivery of the cargo belonging to the
plaintiffs)
COMPAGNIE contends that the master should have in mind the accepted principles
of public international law, the established practice of nations, and the express
terms of the Sixth Hague Convention (1907). The master should have confidently
relied upon the French authorities at Saigon to permit him to sail to his port of
destination under a laissez-passer or safe-conduct, which would have secured both
the vessel and her cargo from all danger of capture by any of the belligerents. The
SHIPOWNER contends that the master was justified in declining to leave his vessel
in a situation in which it would be exposed to danger of seizure by the French
authorities, should they refuse to be bound by the alleged rule of international law.
HELD: A shipmaster must be allowed a reasonable time in which to decide what
course he will adopt as to the disposition of his cargo, after entering a port of
refuge; and though he must act promptly thereafter, when the cargo is a perishable
one, neither he nor the shipowner is responsible for loss or damage suffered by the
cargo as a result of its detention aboard the vessel during such time as may
reasonably necessary to come to a decision in this regard.
Under the circumstances set out in the opinion, the master of the Sambia
proceeded with all reasonable dispatch and did all that could be required of a
prudent man to protect the interests of the owner of the cargo aboard is vessel; so
that any losses which resulted from the detention of the cargo aboard the Sambia
must be attributed to the act of the Enemy of the King which compelled the
Sambia to flee to a port of refuge, and made necessary the retention of the cargo
aboard the vessel at anchor under a tropical sun and without proper ventilation until
it could be ascertained that the interests of the absent owner would be consulted by
the sale of this perishable cargo in the local market.
In fleeing from the port of Saigon, and taking refuge in Manila Bay the master of the
Sambia was not acting for the common safety of the vessel and her cargo. The
French cargo was absolutely secure from danger of seizure or confiscation so long
as it remained in the port in Saigon, and the flight of the vessel was a measure of
precaution adopted solely and exclusively for the preservation of the vessel from
the danger of seizure or capture.
Dispositive: So much of the judgment as provides for the delivery to the plaintiff of
the net proceeds of the sale of the cargo (P128,977.71) affirmed; but so much
thereof as allowed damages for a breach of the charter party (P60,841.32) reversed.

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998
FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company
(FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant
Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing,
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge,
with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of
Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted
anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International
Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the
vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the
vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However,
the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A
commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the
anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.
Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave
the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel. I
SSUES: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely
liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for
his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
HELD: (1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in
the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all
matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and
should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring,
towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage
is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to
decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take
entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who
retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is
compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory
pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their
ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law.
The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with
the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and

property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as compulsory
pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and
diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in
respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends
superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the
highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary
skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in
his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise
extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict
standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties.
As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly
followed. (2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt.
Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of
the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's
testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as
master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of
maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are
not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty
law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it
may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute
the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in
compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though
the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but
the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But
the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of
his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with
respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their
liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all
damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in
charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and
control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or
navigation.