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Olimpio Pangonorom v.

People
Facts: Olimpio Pangonorom (Olimpio) is charged with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple slight
physical injuries. That on or about the 10 th day of July, 1989, in Quezon City the abovenamed accused, being then the driver
and person in charge of a motor vehicle, striked and collided with a car, belonging to Mary Berba and driven by Carlos Berba y
Remulla.
That because of the rainy weather, the bus that Olimpio was driving swerved to avoid a vehicle however bumped to the car of
Berba that caused collision to the other car in front of them.
Olimpio entered into a plea of not guilty. But the RTC finds accused Olimpio guilty which is also affirmed by the CA. Motion for
reconsideration is further denied.
Ruling: The Court finds the petition w/o merit.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Olimpio is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the MMTC since 1984. [17] As a public utility driver, Olimpio
should have as his primary concern the safety not only of himself or of his passengers, but, also the safety of his fellow
motorists. Considering that it had just rained, it was still drizzling and the road was slippery when the subject incident took
place,[18] Olimpio should have been more cautious and prudent in driving his passenger bus.
Subsidiary liability of the Metro Manila Transit Corporation
Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in a criminal action when there
is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in
some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution
against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into the
judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. [32]
The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. [33] In the
present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation
industry,[34] and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties.[35] However, there is no proof here of Olimpios insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not
attained finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the
accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced.
Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against
him is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC
after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee
considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.
Evelyn Yonaha v. CA
Facts: Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. That on April 14, 1990, at or
about 11:45 A.M, the aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw egistered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned
by EK SEA Products bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the latters instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe
traumatic injuries at different parts of his body.
When arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and RTC pronounced its judgement finding the accused guilty. A writ of execution
was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of Service, dated 07 May 1992, the MTCC Deputy City
Sheriff stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his inability to pay the
money obligation.
Forthwith, private respondents presented a motion for subsidiary execution with neither a notice of hearing nor notice to
petitioner. Acting on the motion, nevertheless, the trial court issued an order, dated29 May 1992, directing the issuance of a

writ of subsidiary execution. The sheriff went to petitioners residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first
time, that petitioner was informed of Ouanos conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of
execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employers liability had yet to be
established. Private respondents opposed the motion.
Petitioner appealed but was dismissed by the CA.
Ruling: The court finds the petition meritorious.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. [5] This Court has
since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty,[6] on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But,
execution against the employer mustnot issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due
process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and
propriety of the employers liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the
convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ
of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which
civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful
by reason of insolvency.
Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines v. Heirs of Mangawang et al.
Facts: Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of one of its passenger
buses. On July 1993, he was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to Homicide.
That on November 23, 1992 at around 11:50 am the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine
Rabbit Bus, registered in the name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. , while cruising the MacArthur Highway towards the
south direction, bumped the left rear side of a Toyota jeep owned by Zenaida B. Dizon and driven by Eduardo Mangawang
towards the north direction, and as a result thereof said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he was then driving
sustained damages of an undetermined amount, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased and the owner thereof.
RTC convicted the accused guilty. CA likewise dismissed his appeal. The resolution of the CA dismissing the appeal became
final and executory.
On June 29, 2001, the PRBLI, as Anchetas employer, filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision of the RTC. On July 18, 2001, the
RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal, on its finding that the notice was filed long after the judgment
of the RTC had become final and executory. [7]The PRBLI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, claiming that it was
not served with a copy of the decision of the RTC convicting the accused of the crime charged; hence, could not have appealed
the same. On August 1, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying the said motion. The PRBLI filed an urgent motion, this
time for clarification of the said order, which the trial court denied.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the RTC had long become final and executory
when the PRBLI appealed the decision. It ruled that the PRBLI was bound by the said decision against the accused therein.
[11]
Nevertheless, the appellate court resolved the appeal on its merits and affirmed the decision of the RTC, but with
modification. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from
the said decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by
Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this
reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.
Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual participation in the defense of its employee, Ancheta,
by providing him with counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fate because his failure is its failure. [17] The petitioner,
as the employer of the accused, would thereby be apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to
time through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner of the progress of the case is thus not
equivalent to lack of due process.
To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a quo cannot be gainsaid. A person criminally liable is also
civilly liable; and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
crime is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is reserved. The employer is
subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil liability ex delicto of his employee in the event of the latters insolvency; and
the judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as
to the actuality of that liability but also as to its amount.
Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal of its employee (Ancheta), the petitioner
cannot justifiably claim that it was deprived of its right to due process.

LG Foods Corp. & Victorino Gabor v. Hon. Philadelfa Agraviador


Facts: Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of
the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial
Court. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by
conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
In the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint 3 for damages against the petitioners as employers of the
deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
The petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised
the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed
in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally
arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the provision of Article
1035 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against
their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part
of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for
damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action.
which was already dismissed.
Ruling: The court denied the petition.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action in Civil Case No. 99-10845
is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee,
the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have
alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is
the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based
on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 23Since there was no conviction in the criminal case
against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses'
recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 9910845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained by them against the petitioners with the
dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal case was
filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been
made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to
insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

People v. Morecarlos
Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montecarlos, defendants

Facts: The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus
(Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC 4 on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L
charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.
1st criminal case: April 1, 1995, at about 4:30 oclock [sic] in the afternoon, the accused took advantage with ABC while she
was in sleeping, and due to his drunkenness, he raped ABC in conspiracy with Ida Montecarlos who gave permission to
Bartolome to rape ABC.
2nd criminal case: April 3, 1995, 1 pm, by means of threat and intimidation using a wooden club, had a carnal knowledge on
ABC who was 13 years old at that time.
Ida and ABC rented a room owned by Tampus. Ida and Tampus were drinking beer and they are forcing ABC to drink as well
and after 3 glasses, ABC felt very sleepy. While she was lying on the floor of their room, Tampus asked permission to Ida if
he could have remedyo with ABC. Then Ida was okay with it, and saying that Tampus would leave after the sexual
intercourse. Consequently, Ida ignored the claims of ABC about being raped by Tampus.
ABC then filed a complaint. Both Tampus and Ida denied the accusations.
RTC convicted Tampus of two counts of rape as principal and Ida as an accomplice.
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16, 2000 35and his appeal was
dismissed by the Third Division of this Court. Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of appellant Ida.
The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. It
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely
deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Idas
schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her willpower though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
Ruling: The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal
accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that the
testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same
criminal case.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liabilityin which the Revised Penal
Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessorythe share of each
accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the
apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without
guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts
shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the
principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of
civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices,
and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas,
and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable."
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among the
persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective responsibilities
and actual participation in the criminal act.
The courts have the competence to determine the exact participation of the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the
commission of the crime relative to the other classes because they are able to directly consider the evidence presented and
the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle behind
differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the
commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a minor role in the crime or
those who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share
in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater
amount as against every accessory. Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of
accomplices and accessories.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into
account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida.
Idas previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by

direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil
liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for
every class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily
liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different
classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.lavvphi1
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be
liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to
pay one-third (1/3) of the amount.
However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity
ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment. 108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages
cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus share of the civil liability has been extinguished.
Further, since Tampus civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also
eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal.

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