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INDEPENDENCEOFJUDICIARYININDIA:ACRITICALANALYSIS|MULNIVASIORGANISER

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LESTWEFORGET
NEWSREPORT

INDEPENDENCEOFJUDICIARYININDIA:A
CRITICALANALYSIS

ATINKUMARDASLL.MIstYEAR.NATIONALLAWINSTITUTE
UNIVERSITYBHOPAL
INTRODUCTION
TheframersoftheIndianConstitutionatthetimeofframingofourconstitutionwereconcernedaboutthekindof
judiciaryourcountryshouldhave.ThisconcernofthemembersoftheconstituentassemblywasrespondedbyDr.B.R.
Ambedkarinthefollowingwords:
TherecanbenodifferenceofopinionintheHousethatourjudiciarymustbebothindependentoftheexecutiveand
mustalsobecompetentinitself.Andthequestionishowthesetwoobjectscanbesecured.
Thequestionthatarisesatfirstinstanceinourmindsisthatwhatmadetheframersofourconstitutiontobesomuch
concernedaboutprovidingtheseparateentitytothejudiciaryandmakingitselfcompetent.
Theanswertothisquestionliesintheverybasicunderstandingthatsoastosecurethestabilityandprosperityofthe
society,theframersatthattimeunderstoodthatsuchasocietycouldbecreatedonlybyguaranteeingthefundamental
rightsandtheindependenceofthejudiciarytoguardandenforcethosefundamentalrights.AlsoinacountrylikeIndia,
theindependenceofthejudiciaryisofutmostimportanceinupholdingthepillarsofthedemocraticsystemhence
ensuringafreesociety.
Itisawellknownfactthattheindependenceofthejudiciaryisthebasicrequisiteforensuringafreeandfairsociety
undertheruleoflaw.Ruleoflawthatisresponsibleforgoodgovernanceofthecountrycanbesecuredthroughunbiased
judiciary.
ThedoctrineofSeparationofPowerswhichwasbroughtintoexistencetodrawupontheboundariesforthefunctioning
ofallthethreeorgansofthestate:Legislature,ExecutiveandtheJudiciary,providesforaresponsibilitytothejudiciary
toactasawatchdogandtocheckwhethertheexecutiveandthelegislaturearefunctioningwithintheirlimitsunderthe
constitutionandnotinterferingineachothersfunctioning.Thistaskgiventothejudiciarytosupervisethedoctrineof
separationofpowerscannotbecarriedonintruespiritifthejudiciaryisnotindependentinitself.Anindependent
judiciarysupportsthebaseofdoctrineofseparationofpowerstoalargeextent.
Itistheoreticallyveryeasytotalkabouttheindependenceofthejudiciaryasforwhichtheprovisionsareprovidedforin
ourconstitutionbuttheseprovisionsintroducedbytheframersofourconstitutioncanonlyinitiatetowardsthe
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independenceofthejudiciary.Themajortaskliesincreatingafavorableenvironmentforthefunctioningofthejudiciary
inwhichalltheotherstateorgansfunctionsincooperationsothattheindependenceofthejudiciarycanbeachieved
practically.Theindependenceofthejudiciaryhasalsotobeguardedagainstthechangingeconomic,politicalandsocial
scenario.
Wheneverthereisatalkregardingtheindependenceofthejudiciary,thereisalsoatalkoftherestrictionsthatmustbe
imposedonthejudiciaryasaninstitutionandontheindividualjudgesthatformsapartofthejudiciary.Inorderto
ensuresmoothfunctioningofthesystemtheremustbearightblendofthetwo.
MEANINGTHEINDEPENDENCEOFTHEJUDICIARY
Themeaningoftheindependenceofthejudiciaryisstillnotclearafteryearsofitsexistence.Ourconstitutionbytheway
oftheprovisionsjusttalksoftheindependenceofthejudiciarybutitisnowheredefinedwhatactuallyisthe
independenceofthejudiciary.
Theprimarytalkontheindependenceofthejudiciaryisbasedonthedoctrineofseparationofpowerswhichholdsits
existencefromseveralyears.Thedoctrineofseparationofpowerstalksoftheindependenceofthejudiciaryasan
institutionfromtheexecutiveandthelegislature.
Theothermeaningofthejudicialindependencecanbefoundoutbylookingatthewritingsofthescholarswhohave
researchedonthetopic.Scholarshavefollowedtheconstituentmechanism(i.e.whatconstitutesthejudiciary)to
definetheindependenceofthejudiciary.Scholarstrytodefinejudiciarybytalkingabouttheindependenceofthejudges
whichconstitutesjudiciary.Thereforetheindependenceofthejudiciaryistheindependenceoftheexerciseofthe
functionsbythejudgesinanunbiasedmanneri.e.freefromanyexternalfactor.
Sotheindependenceofthejudiciarycanbeunderstoodastheindependenceoftheinstitutionofthejudiciaryandalso
theindependenceofthejudgeswhichformsapartofthejudiciary.
ShetreetinhisworktriestoexplainthewordsIndependenceandJudiciaryseparately,andsaysthatthejudiciaryis
theorganofthegovernmentnotformingapartoftheexecutiveorthelegislative,whichisnotsubjecttopersonal,
substantiveandcollectivecontrol,andwhichperformstheprimaryfunctionofadjudication.
ThefinaloutcomethatcanbederivedfromShetreetswritingsisthattheindependenceofthejudiciaryasaninstitution
andtheindependenceoftheindividualjudgesbothhavetogohandinhandastheindependenceofthejudiciaryasan
institutionisnotpossiblewithouttheindependenceoftheindividualjudgesandistheinstitutionofthejudiciaryisnot
independent,thereisnoquestionoftheindependenceoftheindividualjudges.
NEEDFORTHEINDEPENDENCEOFTHEJUDICIARY
Thebasicneedfortheindependenceofthejudiciaryrestsuponthefollowingpoints:
1.Tocheckthefunctioningoftheorgans:Judiciaryactsasawatchdogbyensuringthatalltheorgansofthestate
functionwithintheirrespectiveareasandaccordingtotheprovisionsoftheconstitution.Judiciaryactsasa
guardianoftheconstitutionandalsoaidsinsecuringthedoctrineofseparationofpowers.
1.Interpretingtheprovisionsoftheconstitution:Itwaswellknowntotheframersoftheconstitutionthatinfuture
theambiguitywillarisewiththeprovisionsoftheconstitutionsotheyensuredthatthejudiciarymustbe
independentandselfcompetenttointerprettheprovisionoftheconstitutioninsuchawaytocleartheambiguity
butsuchaninterpretationmustbeunbiasedi.e.freefromanypressurefromanyorganslikeexecutive.Ifthe
judiciaryisnotindependent,theotherorgansmaypressurizethejudiciarytointerprettheprovisionofthe
constitutionaccordingtothem.Judiciaryisgiventhejobtointerprettheconstitutionaccordingtothe
constitutionalphilosophyandtheconstitutionalnorms.
1.Disputesreferredtothejudiciary:ItisexpectedoftheJudiciarytodeliverjudicialjusticeandnotpartialor
committedjustice.Bycommittedjusticewemeantosaythatwhenajudgeemphasizesonaparticularaspectwhile
givingjusticeandnotconsideringalltheaspectsinvolvedinaparticularsituation.Similarlyjudiciarymustactin
anunbiasedmanner.
COMPONENTSTHEINDEPENDENCEOFTHEJUDICIARY
Thecomponentsoftheindependenceofthejudiciaryastalkedofherereferstosomeoftherequisitetermsand
conditionswhicharesonecessarythatiftheyareabsent,theindependenceofthejudiciaryalsocannotexist.
Itisverydifficulttolaydowncertainsetconditionsaslawisdynamicinitselfandofthechangingeconomic,political
andsocialscenario.
CONSTITUTIONALPROVISIONS
THEINDEPENDENCEOFTHEJUDICIARY
Manyprovisionsareprovidedinourconstitutiontoensuretheindependenceofthejudiciary.Theconstitutional
provisionsarediscussedbelow:
1.SecurityofTenure:ThejudgesoftheSupremeCourtandHighCourtshavebeengiventhesecurityofthetenure.
Onceappointed,theycontinuetoremaininofficetilltheyreachtheageofretirementwhichis65yearsinthecase
ofjudgesofSupremeCourt(Art.124(2))and62yearsinthecaseofjudgesoftheHighCourts(Art.217(1)).They
cannotberemovedfromtheofficeexceptbyanorderofthePresidentandthattooonthegroundofproven
misbehaviorandincapacity.Aresolutionhasalsotobeacceptedtothateffectbyamajorityoftotalmembershipof
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eachHouseofParliamentandalsobyamajorityofnolessthantwothirdofthemembersofthehousepresentand
voting.ProcedureissocomplicatedthattherehasbeennocaseoftheremovalofaJudgeofSupremeCourtor
HighCourtunderthisprovision.
1.SalariesandAllowances:Thesalariesandallowancesofthejudgesisalsoafactorwhichmakesthejudges
independentastheirsalariesandallowancesarefixedandarenotsubjecttoavoteofthelegislature.Theyare
chargedontheConsolidatedFundofIndiaincaseofSupremeCourtjudgesandtheConsolidatedFundofstatein
thecaseofHighCourtjudges.Theiremolumentscannotbealteredtotheirdisadvantage(Art.125(2))exceptinthe
eventofgravefinancialemergency.
1.PowersandJurisdictionofSupremeCourt:Parliamentcanonlyaddtothepowersandjurisdictionofthe
SupremeCourtbutcannotcurtailthem.Inthecivilcases,Parliamentmaychangethepecuniarylimitforthe
appealstotheSupremeCourt.ParliamentmayenhancetheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.Itmay
conferthesupplementarypowersontheSupremeCourttoenableitworkmoreeffectively.Itmayconferpowerto
issuedirections,ordersorwritsforanypurposeotherthanthosementionedinArt.32.PowersoftheSupreme
Courtcannotbetakenaway.Makingjudiciaryindependent.
1.NodiscussiononconductofJudgeinStateLegislature/Parliament:Art.211providesthatthereshallbeno
discussioninthelegislatureofthestatewithrespecttotheconductofanyjudgeofSupremeCourtorofaHigh
Courtinthedischargeofhisduties.AsimilarprovisionismadeinArt.121whichlaysdownthatnodiscussion
shalltakeplaceinParliamentwithrespecttotheconductofthejudgeofSupremeCourtorHighCourtinthe
dischargeofhisdutiesexceptuponamotionforpresentinganaddresstothePresidentprayingfortheremovalof
thejudge.
1.Powertopunishforcontempt:BoththeSupremeCourtandtheHighCourthavethepowertopunishanyperson
fortheircontempt.Art.129providesthattheSupremeCourtshallhavethepowertopunishforcontemptofitself.
Likewise,Art.215laysdownthateveryHighCourtshallhavethepowertopunishforcontemptofitself.
1.SeparationoftheJudiciaryfromtheExecutive:Art.50containsoneoftheDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicy
andlaysdownthatthestateshalltakestepstoseparatethejudiciaryfromtheexecutiveinthepublicservicesof
thestate.TheobjectbehindtheDirectivePrincipleistosecuretheindependenceofthejudiciaryfromthe
executive.Art.50saysthatthereshallbeaseparatejudicialservicefreefromexecutivecontrol.
CONCLUSION
Theindependenceofthejudiciaryasisclearfromtheabovediscussionholdaprominentpositionasfarastheinstitution
ofjudiciaryisconcerned.Itisclearfromthehistoricaloverviewthatjudicialindependencehasfacedmanyobstaclesin
thepastspeciallyinrelationtotheappointmentandthetransferofjudges.Courtshavealwaystriedtoupholdthe
independenceofjudiciaryandhavealwayssaidthattheindependenceofthejudiciaryisabasicfeatureofthe
Constitution.Courtshavesaidsobecausetheindependenceofjudiciaryistheprerequisiteforthesmoothfunctioningof
theConstitutionandforarealizationofademocraticsocietybasedontheruleoflaw.TheinterpretationintheJudges
Casegivingprimacytotheexecutive,aswehavediscussedhasledtotheappointmentofatleastsomeJudgesagainst
theopinionoftheChiefJusticeofIndia.ThedecisionoftheJudgesCasewascouldneverhavebeenintendedbythe
framersoftheConstitutionastheyalwayssetthetaskofkeepingjudiciaryfreefromexecutiveandmakingitself
competent.ThedecisionoftheSecondJudgesCaseandtheThirdJudgesCaseisapraiseworthystepbytheCourtinthis
regard.
ThereisasayingthatPowertendstocorrupt,andabsolutepowercorruptsabsolutely
LordActon
Wheneverthereisamentionoftheindependenceofthejudiciary,thereisalwaysaconcernaboutthelatentdangersof
thejudicialindependenceandtherearisestheimportanceofJudicialAccountability.Therecentdevelopmentinthis
regardistherecommendationoftheLawCommissionfortheinclusionofawhistleblowerprovision,aimedatprotecting
thosemakingcomplaintsagainstjudges,inadraftbilldealingwiththeremovalofjudgesoftheSupremeCourtandHigh
Courts.IntroductionofsuchabillbytheLawCommissionisamajorstepinthedirectionofmakingchangestotherigid
procedureinourconstitutionfortheremovingofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtandtheHighCourts.
Thefinaloutcomeoftheabovediscussionisthattheimportanceoftheindependenceofthejudiciarywaslongago
realizedbytheframersoftheconstitutionwhichhasbeenacceptedbythecourtsbymarkingitasthebasicfeatureofthe
constitution.Itiswellknownlawhastochangesoastomeettotheneedsofthechangingsociety.Similarlyjudicial
independencehastobeseenwiththechangingdimensionofthesociety.JudicialAccountabilityandJudicial
Independencehavetoworkhandinhandtoensuretherealpurposeofsettingupoftheinstitutionofjudiciary.

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