1. ANTONIO GELUZ vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. No. L-16439 July 20,
1961
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita
Villanueva before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the
parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner
Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again
became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less
than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third
abortion of a two-month old fetus, in
consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her
husband did not know of, nor consented to
the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private
respondent, sued petitioner for damages
based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering
Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorneys fee and the cost of the
suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality
so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones
who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This
personality is called presumptive personality.
It is, of course, essential that birth should
occur later, otherwise the fetus will be
considered as never having possessed legal
personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of
injuries it received, no such right of action

could derivatively accrue to its parents or

heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from one that lacked juridical
personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive
personality of a conceived child under Article
40 of the Civil Code because that same
article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently born alive.
In the present case, the child was dead when
separated from its mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not
entitled to damages. However, such
damages must be those inflicted directly
upon them, as distinguished from injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased child.
Decision:
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act
in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife,
without medical necessity to warrant it, was
a criminal and morally reprehensible act,
that can not be too severely condemned; and
the consent of the woman or that of her
husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not
justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or
legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and
the complaint ordered dismissed. Without
costs.
2. Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA
210 September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The

1987 constitution provides in Section 1,

Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

past work experience as a lawyer-economist,

a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the
poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of
COMELEC chairman.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not

posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

3. Taada, L. M. et al vs. Hon. J.C.

Tuvera et al
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
En Banc

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers

Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding,
the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out
court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not
posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods

Decision:
The respondent has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years does In
the view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED.

Facts:
Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ
of mandamus to compel the respondents to
publish
in
the
Official
Gazette
the
unpublished Executive Issuances such as;
Presidential
Decrees,
Proclamations,
Executive Orders, general orders, letters of
implementation, and administrative orders.
In defense, respondents stated that the
petitioners have no legal personality in the
case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which lays-out the requirement for
filing for a Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners
contended that the issue touches the public
and thereby does not require any special
circumstance to institute an action. On the
other hand, respondents
stated that
publication of the mentioned issuances is not
asine qua non requirement as the Law
provides its own affectivity date as stated in
Art.
2
of
the
Civil
Code.

Issue:

Whether
validity

or
of

not publication affects the

the
Executive
Issuances.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered
the respondents to publish the Executive
Issuances of general application, and further
stated that failure for publication would
render the Issuances no binding force and
effect.
It was explained that such publication is
essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim
known as ignorantia legis non excusat. Thus,
failure to publish would make create injustice
as would it would punish the citizen for
transgression of the law which he had no
notice.
Decision:
The
court
declared
that
Presidential
issuances with general application without
publication would be inoperative and null
and void. However, some justices in their
concurring opinions made a qualification
stating that publication is not an absolute
requirement for the publication. As Justice
Fernando stated that, publication is needed
but it must not only confined in the Official
Gazette because it would make those other
laws not published in the Official Gazette
bereft of any binding force or effect.
4. Quimiguing vs. Icao
Quimiguing vs. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795. 31 July 1970.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the
CFI of Zamboanga del Norte.
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors
and had close and confidential relations.
Defendant, although married, succeeded in
having carnal intercourse with the plaintiff
several times by force and intimidation and
without her consent. As a result she became
pregnant and had to stop studying. Later she

gave birth to a baby girl. She instituted an

action to recover damages from the
defendant. The lower court dismissed the
case on the ground that the original
complaint averred no cause of action.
Plaintiff appealed.
Issue: W/N defendant is liable for damages.
Held: The orders under appeal are reversed
and set aside.
Ratio: A second reason for reversing the
orders appealed from is that for a married
man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust (as averred in the original complaint
in this case) constitutes a clear violation of
the rights of his victim that entitles her to
claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of Civil Code of the
Philippines: Art. 21. Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
Decision:
Thus, independently of the right to Support
of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself
had a cause of action for damages under the
terms of the complaint; and the order
dismissing it for failure to state a cause of
action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are
reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
5. In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712
July 13, 1995
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the
bar and oath taking of a successful bar
applicant. Argosino was previously involved
with hazing that caused the death of Raul
Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide

through reckless imprudence after he

pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2
years imprisonment where he applied for a
probation thereafter which was granted by
the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the
bar exam and passed but was not allowed to
take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to
take the attorneys oath of office averring
that his probation was already terminated.
The court note that he spent only 10 months
of the probation period before it was
terminated.
ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath
of office.
RULING: The court upheld the principle
of maintaining the good morals of all Bar
members, keeping inmind that such is of
greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration
of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Hence he was
asked by the court to produceevidence that
would certify that he has reformed and have
become a responsible member of
thecommunity through sworn statements of
individuals who have a good reputation for
truth and who haveactually known Mr.
Argosino for a significant period of time to
certify he is morally fit to the admission
of the law profession. The court also ordered
that said a copy of the proceeding be
furnished to thefamily/relatives of Raul
Camaligan.
DECISION: Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby
DIRECTED to inform this Court, by
appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and
mother (in default thereof, brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of
this Resolution be furnished to the parents or
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.

6. Victoria Legarda vs.Court of Ap

peals Canon15G.R. No. 94457
March 18, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner engaged the services of
counsel to handle her case. Said counsel
filed his appearance with an urgent motion
for extension of time to file the answer within
10 days from February 26, 1985.However,
said counsel failed to file the answer within
the extended period prayed for. Counsel for
private respondent, New Cathay House
Inc. filed an
ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in
default. This was granted by the trial court
on March 25, 1985 and private respondent
was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of private
respondent. Copy of said decision was duly
served on counsel for the petitioner but he
did not take any action. Thus, the judgment
became final and executory. On May 8, 1985,
upon motion of private respondent, a writ of
execution of the judgment was issued by the
trial court. At public auction, the sheriff
sold the a fore stated property of petitioner
to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. After the one year
redemption period expired without the
petitioner redeeming the property,
ownership was consolidated in the name of
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. The sheriff issued a
final deed of sale on July 8, 1986 in his favor.
Upon learning of this, petitioner prevailed
upon her counsel, to seek the appropriate
relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel
filed in the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment calling attention to the unjust
enrichment of private respondent in securing
the transfer in its name of the property
valued at P 2.5 million without justification;
that when the complaint was filed in court by
private respondent against the petitioner,
the parties came to an agreement to settle
their differences, the private respondent
assuring petitioner that the complaint it filed

shall be withdrawn so petitioner advised her

lawyer that there was no longer any need to
file an answer to the complaint. On February
22, 1985, private respondent nevertheless
filed an
ex-parte motion to declare the petitioner in
default. The documentary evidence
presented by private respondent, which
served as the basis of the decision, is
falsified and tampered with, giving rise to
a presumption of fraud. An amended petition
was filed by counsel for petitioner in the
Court of Appeals raising the additional issue
that the decision is not supported by the
allegations in the pleadings or by
the evidence submitted. The CA rendered its
decision and made the ff. observations: xxx
Thus, it
is our belief that this case is one of-pure and
simple negligence on the part of defendant's
counsel who simply failed to file the answer
in behalf of defendant, But counsel's
negligence does not stop here
.
For after it had been furnished with copy of
the decision by default against defendant, it
should then have appealed therefrom or file
a petition from relief from theorder declaring
their client in default or from the judgment
by default
.
[sic]
Again, counsel negligently failed to
do either
. xxx. It was only in March 1990 when the
secretary of counsel for petitioner informed
the latter of the adverse decision against her
only after persistent telephone inquiries of
the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether counsel committed gross
negligence.
Held/Ruling:

Petitioner's counsel is a well-known

practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It
is to be expected that he would extend the
highest quality of service as a lawyer to the
petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to
have abandoned the cause of petitioner.
After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the
civil case filed against her by private
respondent, said counsel did nothing more
than enter his appearance and seek for an
extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer.
Hence, petitioner was declared in default on
motion of private respondent's counsel. After
the evidence of private respondent was
received
ex-parte, a judgment was rendered by the
trial court. Said counsel for petitioner
received a copy of the judgment but took no
steps to have the same set aside or to
appeal there from. Thus, the judgment
became final and executory. The property
of petitioner was sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment in favor of private
respondent. The property was sold
to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of
private respondent, and a certificate of sale
was issued in his favor. The redemption
period expired after one year so a final deed
of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of
Cabrera, who in turn appears to have
transferred the same to private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was
abroad. When, upon her return, she learned,
to her great shock, what happened to
her case and property, she nevertheless did
not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked
Atty.Coronel to take such appropriate
action possible under the circumstances. As
above related, said counsel filed a petition
for annulment of judgment and its
amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that
was all he did. After an adverse judgment
was rendered against petitioner, of which
counsel was duly notified, said counsel
did not inform the petitioner about it. He did

not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or

file a petition for review before this Court.
Thus, the judgment became final. It
was only upon repeated telephone inquiries
of petitioner that she learned from the
secretary of her counsel of the judgment that
had unfortunately become final. A lawyer
owes entire devotion to the interest of his
client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, to the
end that nothing can be taken or withheld
from his client except in accordance with the
law. He should present every remedy or
defense authorized by the law in support of
his client's cause, regardless of his own
personal views. In the full discharge of his
duties to his client, the lawyer should not be
afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public.

7. Tan vs Sabandal B.M. No. 44 February

24, 1992
Facts: Petitioner files a motion for
reconsideration after the court allows
respondent to finally take oath and practice
the law profession after considering his plea
for forgiveness and showing willingness to
reform along with testimonials attesting to
his good moral character among which is a
testimonial by the IBP Zamboanga.
Petitioners contend that such testimonial was
only signed by its President, a counsel for the
in-laws of Sabandal, without the
authorization of the IBP Board members. The
court allowed the IBP to manifest testimony
to certify as to the good moral character of
the respondent and asked for a comment
from the RTC Judge in Zamboanga. Members
of the IBP manifested that they see no
impediments as to the moral character of
Sabandal while the RTC Judge informed the
court of the civil case against the respondent

concerning the mortgaged land which he

secured for a free patent which turned out to
be a swampland and not susceptible for
acquisition for a free patent. The civil case
however was settled amicably and the
respondent was not charged of any crime.
Subsequently, Tan already forgave the
respondent and withdrew her opposition for
the taking of oath of office of the respondent
while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the
court to decide.
ISSUE: WON Sabandal should be allowed to
take oath of office
RULING: The court ruled that in the
development of the case, they find Sabandal
to have concealed the civil case brought
against him in the course of his series of
petitions to be allowed to take oath together
with the testimonies attesting to his good
moral character without any mention of the
pending case against him. The court finds
this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on
the part of the respondent. Although there
were testimonials on his good moral
characters those were made without any
knowledge of the case against him. The
commission of his offense itself is devoid of
honesty. With the practice of law a matter of
privilege and not as a right, they find
respondent unfit to be a member of the law
profession therefore it recalled the court
resolution of allowing the respondent to take
oath.

8. G.R. No. L-42050-66

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (1978)
DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE, SEC. 8,
RULE 110

FACTS OF THE CASE:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review
filed by the People of the Philippines

represented,respectively, by the Office of the

City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the
Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one
Decision as they involve one basic questionof
law.Before those courts, Informations were
filed charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused,
thethree Judges mentioned above issued in
the respective cases filed before them

the details of whichwill be recounted below

an Order quashing or dismissing the

Informations, on a common ground, viz,that
the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by
Presidential DecreeNo. 9 because it failed to
state one essential element of the crime.

DECISIONS MADE BY THERESPONDENT

JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
The problem of determining what acts fall
within the purview of a statute, it becomes
necessary toinquire into the intent and spirit
of the decree and this can be found among
others in the preamble or,whereas" clauses
which enumerate the facts or events which
justify the promulgation of the decree andthe
stiff sanctions stated therein.It is a salutary
principle in statutory construction that there
exists a valid presumption that
undesirableconsequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which thestatute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible,wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequence.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Are the Informations filed by the People
sufficient in form and substance to constitute
the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree
(PD for short) No. 9?There are two elements
to the the offense: first, the carrying outside
one's residence of any bladed,blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a
necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and second,that the act of carrying the
weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection withsubversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.The
petitioner by having one particular stand of
the carrying of any dangerous weapon
outside of theresidence w/o regard to motive
or intent makes this a case of statutory
construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY
THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL

9. People of the Philippines v. Salas

G. R. No. L- 66469 July 29, 1986
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Cebu originally
charged Mario Abong of homicide but before
he could be arraigned the case was
reinvestigated on motion of prosecution and
as a result of this an amended information
was filed, with no bail recommended, to
which Abong pleaded not guilty. While the
trial was in progress, Abong took advantage
of the situation and deceived the courts into
granting him bail after which he was
released and escaped. When the respondent
judge learned of this he cancelled the bail
and ordered the re-arrest of Abong but he
already fled. Regardless of the absence of

Abong the prosecution moved the hearing to

continue and observed the constitutional
provision of trial in absentia but the
respondent judge denied the motion and
instead suspended all the proceedings until
the return of the Mario Abong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge erred in
suspending the proceedings of the accused
due to the principle of trial on absentia.

HELD.
YES. The judge erred in the suspension of all
the proceedings until the return of the
accused because he did not see the woods
for the trees and took the literal reading of
the rule when he should have viewed it in a
broader point of view of the true intention of
the rule. Contrary to Article IV, Sec. 19 of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, the doctrine of
in the case at bar has been modified by
Section 19, which now allows a trial in
absentia and because of this the prisoner
cannot simple escape to escape his
continued prosecution or even his later
conviction provided that: a) he has been
arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the
trial; and c) his failure to appear is
unjustified. The respondent judge was still
probably thinking of the old doctrine when he
ruled trial in absentia and he might have
forgotten that the fugitive already waived his
right to be duly notified due to his escape
and also it makes his failure to appear
unjustified. The present rule will operate to
his disadvantage rather that rewarding him
because his continual absence will most
likely result to conviction. The too-literal
reading of the law should be rebuked and
rather fulfill its purpose. The intention of the
law is what is of great importance when the
courts should apply it and it is usually found
not the letter that killeth but in the spirit
that vivifieth,. Judges should have looked in
a broader light rather than clinging to the
language of the law and seek by their own

lights the intention for its enactment and of

course apply it in the most proper way and
according to its ends.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the
lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing
bail from the city court of Cebu on the basis
of the withdrawn information for homicide
and to report to us the result of his
investigation within sixty days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court
dated December 22, 1983, denying the
motion for the trial in absentia of the
accused is set aside. The respondent judge is
directed to continue hearing the case against
the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as
long as he has not reappeared, until it is
terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
10. THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as
the Incumbent Secretary of Labor, and
THE CHARTERED BANK
.
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985Facts:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank
Employees Association, in representation
of its monthly paid
employees/members, instituted a
complaint with the Regional Offi ce No.
IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) against
Chartered Bank,
fort h e p a y m e n t o f t e n ( 1 0 ) u n w o r
ked legal holidays, as well as fo
r p r e m i u m a n d o v e r t i m e d i ff e r e n t i a l s
f o r w o r k e d l e g a l h o l i d a y s f r o m Novem
ber 1, 1974. The Minister of Labor
dismissed the Chartered Bank
Employees Associations claim for lack
of merit basing its decision on Section
2,Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated
Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, which
respectively provide: Sec. 2. Status of
employees paid by the month. Employees
who are uniformly paid by the month,
irrespective of the number of working days
therein, with a salary of not less than the

statutory or established minimum wage shall

be presumed to be paid for all days in the
month whether worked or not. POLICY
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All
Regional Directors SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL
HOLIDAYS The rules implementing PD 850
have clarified the policy in the
implementation of the ten (10) paid legal
holidays. Before PD 850, the number of
working days a year in a firm was considered
important in determining entitlement to the
benefit. Thus, where an employee was
working for at least 313 days, he
was considered definitely already paid. If he
was working for less than 313, there was no
certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal
holidays were already paid to him or not. The
ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with,
is intended to benefit principally daily
employees. In the case of monthly, only
those whose monthly salary did not yet
include payment for the ten (10) paid legal
holidays are entitled to the benefit. Under
the rules implementing PD 850, this policy
has been fully clarified to
eliminate controversies on the entitlement of
monthly paid employees. The
new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly
paid employee is receiving not less than
P240, the maximum monthly minimum

wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from

January to December, he is presumed to be
already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
However, if deductions are made from his
monthly salary on account of holidays in
months where they occur, then he is still
entitled to the ten (10) paid legal
holidays. These new interpretations must be
uniformly and consistently upheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred
and acted
contraryto law in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule I
V, Book III of the IntegratedRules and Policy I
nstruction No. 9.
Held:
Ye s . T h e S e c r e t a r y ( M i n i s t e r )
o f L a b o r h a d e x c e e d e d h i s statu
tory authority granted by Article 5 of
the Labor Code authorizing him to
promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. While it is true that the
Minister has the authority in the performance
of his duty to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement, construe and
clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited
by provisions of the statute sought to
be implemented, construed or clarified.