Professional Documents
Culture Documents
law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons wit
hin legal limits.
8|Page
liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]). Under the circumstances, responden
t judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer,
ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal. In overtaking ano
ther vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually committe
d a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the case, the warrantl
ess arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at
bar, it was duly proved that petitioner was indeed deprived of his liberty for t
hree days on the ground of mere personal vengeance and the abusive attitude of r
espondent contrary to the law.
10 | P a g e
afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of i
nvestigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law. i.e., 36 hours from the
time of his arrest.
14 | P a g e
has been duly served with the MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the MC
TC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
16 | P a g e
and Government agencies regarding the presence of the Huks in that region, we fi
nd Federico Agarin alias Commander "Smith" guilty of the crime of simple rebelli
on only (People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515; 52 Off. Gaz. [12] 5506; Sec
s. 4 and 5, Rule 116; People vs. Melecio Aquino, et al., 108 Phil 814; 57 Off. G
az [51] 91 80)'" [People vs. Agarin, 109 Phil. 430, 436]"
The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the crime he
committed is not murder but the crime of rebellion punishable under Articles 13
4 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
20 | P a g e
accused had the intent to use the fake dollar notes. In the course of the entrap
ment, petitioners natural reaction from the seeming interest of the of the poseur
-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly shows
his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note
that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement wit
h the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actual
ly the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer di
d was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly
therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the inte
ntion to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that
he was only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overc
ome the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official
duties.
22 | P a g e
not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was
prejudiced by the alteration or error."
In the instant case, It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming pay
ment under the pakyaw contract was for Murillo to simply bill the town for so ma
ny cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled at the municipal
wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll system which
is not only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The reason could only be
that they were ignorant and ill-advised as claimed.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no
damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders actually delive
red was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the additional fac
t that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations suffered no
damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the
falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith.
The petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals which adjud
ged the petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby reversed and the petitione
rs are acquitted.
24 | P a g e
Decision:
Petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
As Justice Albert says: "in the falsification of public or official document und
er Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is not enough that the falsification b
e committed by a public officer; it is also necessary that it should be committe
d by a public officer with abuse of his office, that is, in deeds, instrument, i
ndentures, certificates, etc., in the execution of which he participates by reas
on of his office."
In the instant case, the deed of absolute sale executed by Ablat was adjudged to
be a falsified document because it conveyed the impression that Ablat was the o
wner of the motorcycle, subject matter of the transaction, when such was not the
case, as the petitioner Fajelga is the true and registered owner of the said mo
torcycle, thereby making an untruthful narration of facts.
It should be noted, however, that the statement that Ablat was the owner of the
motorcycle in question is not altogether untruthful since the petitioner Fajelga
had previously sold the motorcycle to him. While the deed of sale may not have
been registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation, Ablat nevertheless becam
e the owner thereof before its aborted sale to the provincial government of Bata
nes.
Besides, malicious intent to injure a third person is absent. In fact, neither t
he government nor any third person incurred any loss by reason of the "untruthfu
l" narration.
26 | P a g e
This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any
direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly obser
ved by the Solicitor General, "the questioned document was submitted by petition
er himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in po
ssession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who
merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor's Office of Sor
sogon. In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sal
e which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. G
iven this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the f
orged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship
of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by
the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that
he is the material author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore, we are
unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appe
als.
28 | P a g e
statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articl
es, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter befor
e a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law
so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall c
ommit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles o
f this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest co
ncerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the fals
e statement is made.
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The asse
rtion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must
be malice on the part of the accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil
intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious stat
ement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what
was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately implies meditated as
distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows his s
tatement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as
to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in
the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. A false statement which is obv
iously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by
the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defenda
nt did not believe those statements to be true.
30 | P a g e
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent h
ere in that private respondents statements were not material to that case nor do
they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
32 | P a g e
from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the Philip
pine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the petition f
or naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence of his
unlawful act.
34 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the requirements of Act. No. 3135, the governing law for extra-ju
dicial foreclosures were complied with?
Decision:
No, the republication and reposting of notice were not complied with. The waiver
by the parties only authorized the adjournment of the execution sale. There is
nothing in the statute that states that republication and reposting may be waive
d.
36 | P a g e
Decision:
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any rel
igion" as a ground allegedly because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which ar
e contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully
disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be
invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religio
n. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be empha
sized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any reli
gion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by P
D 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.
38 | P a g e
rules: (a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the Gove
rnment to be destroyed. (b) Where the criminal case against any violator of this
decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in th
e violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevert
heless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. (c) The person aggrieved by
the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) day
s after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretar
y of National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defe
nse shall be final and unappealable.
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 re
v.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant of per
son arrested. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous wea
pons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Bu
t as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a l
awful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no p
arty has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, und
er Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. To say that the responden
t Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaig
n) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal
laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and execu
tioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitio
ner.
40 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene ma
terials?
Decision:
The Supreme Court emphasizes that mere possession of obscene materials, without
intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 2
01, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obsce
ne materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is
committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person
be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to
be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or
exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engag
ed in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
42 | P a g e
firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for k
nowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unj
ust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the s
ame was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in
a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew th
at said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge
liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with c
onscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense
to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.
As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an
accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge
in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of
the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative c
omplaint.
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust ju
dgment.
44 | P a g e
sequestered by the accused to prevent her from disowning the letter she supposed
ly signed in defense of the accused (Annex B, p. 24, Rollo) and her affidavit of
desistance (Annex B-2, p. 17, Rollo).
For
ous
der
ode
all the foregoing, we find respondent Judge Marcelo G. Garcia guilty of seri
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust or
or judgment. The last is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal C
as follows:
Art. 204. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a case subm
itted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual disqu
alification.
49 | P a g e
the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of undue benefit or advantage gi
ven to the adverse party under the orders complained of.
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in conne
ction with the denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration of t
he order granting the petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to tak
e custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found such a charge to be unfounded.
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) tha
t the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he
knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a manif
estly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or ign
orance.
The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned or
der knowing it to be unjust, and neither is there any proof of conscious and del
iberate intent to do an injustice.
Thus, the OCA recommended: 1. x x x 2. That the charges of violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and issuance of an unj
ust interlocutory order be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. is liable for issuance of u
njust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code notwithsta
nding the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the same
be dismissed for lack of merit?
Decision:
The Supreme Court sustained the recommendation of the Office of the Court Admini
strator, thus:
51 | P a g e
It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly render
ing an unjust judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the judgment ad
verted to is unjust, contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence, and that th
e same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In
other words, the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge guilty for a
lleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised P
enal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, o
ne of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consis
tent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral c
ertainty and does not suffice to convict. Here, the allegations of the complaint
-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounce
d guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which con
viction can be anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Supreme Court found Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. guilty of gross igno
rance of the law.
52 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was properly convicted of the crime of indirect briber
y?
Decision:
No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of th
e Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the
gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of
the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own
property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketin
g the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance
or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude t
hat the crime of indirect bribery has been committed.
An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately af
ter the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the
PC agents apprehended her. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated
which should be her position immediately after the money was handed to her under
the table. None of the photographs show the petitioner in the process of approp
riating or keeping the money after it was handed to her.
54 | P a g e
terminal leave and other benefits through the following summary of vouchers whic
h he personally prepared, but were then disapproved.
Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate his P18,000
.00 cash advance, petitioner nonetheless settled his account. Petitioner brushed
aside the charge of malversation and declared that he had already been relieved
of his accountabilities by the Commission on Audit. He, however, admitted recei
ving from the provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier adverted to da
ted May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988 requiring him to submit his liquidation of the
P18,000.00 cash advance on the dates respectively indicated therein.
On June 30, 2000, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding petitioner gu
ilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds and se
ntencing him accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner constitute the crime charge?
Decision:
The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above penal pr
ovision are; that the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or c
ontrol of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the fund
s or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and that
he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or n
egligence, permitted another person to take them.
The Supreme court ruled that there can hardly be no dispute about the presence o
f the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the positio
n of a supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque. In
that capacity, he receives money or property belonging to the provincial govern
ment for which he is bound to account.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient
proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did
57 | P a g e
not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made, and that he coul
d not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal m
isappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot
explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or pro
perty with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, i
s prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal
uses. When the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the a
ccused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is nev
er deemed to have existed at all. The petitioner failed to overcome this prima f
acie evidence of guilt.
Petitioner does not at all dispute the fact that he did receive a cash advance.
He also admitted receiving the demand letters of the provincial treasurer for hi
m to submit a liquidation of the cash advance on two occasions, which he failed
to do. He harps on Memorandum No. 88-63 issued by then Marinduque Governor Reyes
that he can offset his unliquidated cash advance of from the commutation of his
unused vacation and sick leave credits to justify his failure to liquidate his
cash advance. He also invites attention to the fact that, even before the approv
al of his application for the commutation of his leave credits, he already paid
his cash advance on January 27, 1995. Petitioners attempt at rationalization for
his failure to liquidate is unacceptable. Memorandum No. 88-63 merely informed p
etitioner that his application for commutation may be granted provided that the
commutated amount is first applied to his unliquidated cash advance. Nowhere in
the said memorandum did it state that he is exempted from submitting his liquida
tion of the same cash advance. As it is, petitioner failed to liquidate and retu
rn his cash advance despite repeated demands. He was able to return the said amo
unt only on January 27, 1995, that is, after almost seven (7) years from the las
t demand. The return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circum
stance analogous to voluntary surrender considering that it took petitioner almo
st seven (7) years to return the amount.
In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of f
unds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the
criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely
58 | P a g e
managers/cashiers checks for such purpose, did not make the agreed remittance to C
redit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it had remi
tted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered ex
planations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equiva
lent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were d
iametrically opposed.
The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered by the two PNB Managers checks b
y falsifying a commercial document called an Application for Cashiers Check (ACC) b
y inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after t
he name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not author
ize the insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC in
structing PNB to prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs savings account di
d not contain any account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly s
ucceeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Rau
l Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas, George Aonuevo and Mara Aonuevo.
On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding the accused Ja
ime B. Ochoa guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds thru falsificat
ion of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable doubt accused Jose Ting
Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias warrant of arrest was issued against Raul Gutie
rrez.
Issue:
Whether or not the herein accused is guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that to be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution
must prove the the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or con
trol of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds
or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; a
nd that he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or t
hrough abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, suc
h funds or property.
61 | P a g e
The Supreme Court further ruled that Malversation may be committed either throug
h a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively th
rough negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be crim
inal intent or criminal negligence and while the prevailing facts of a case may
not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclud
e the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both ar
e equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is co
mmitted through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes
a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversat
ion, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the
evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that even on the putative assumption that th
e evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but t
he information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this
case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo
or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of t
he felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense o
f malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. The question of whe
ther or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of dece
it will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of
first impression. An accused charged with willful or intentional falsification
can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence.
62 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner herein is guilty of the crime of Malversation of P
ublic Funds?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit and guilty of te crime cha
rge. In affirming the courts below the Supreme Court pointed out the following r
easons, that the fact that Bas was given official designation during all the tim
es that she acted as collection officer, petitioner's liability is not, by that
fact alone, mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unre
mitted by Bas if it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. The
questioned amount on time because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the stric
test supervision on the person he designated, otherwise, he would suffer the con
sequences of the acts of his designated employee through negligence. In short, b
y failing to exercise strict supervision he could be liable for malversation thr
ough negligence. The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitio
ner's account the shortage in the collections actually done by Bas. The failure
of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with w
hich he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prim
a facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The petitioner not only did omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper a
uthority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having ass
isted Bas in covering up such shortages. Petitioner did not only lend Bas those
amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly extended 'vales to
her and to others, also out of public funds.
The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an accountable o
fficer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other p
ersons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a l
icense to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use o
f public funds. The Supreme Court further ruled that the alleged acquiescence of
petitioner's superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. The fact that peti
tioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will
not exculpate him from his criminal liability.
64 | P a g e
Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was neit
her authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cit
e any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount
used for the financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appro
priation it was intended for.
The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the
offender is an accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or proper
ty under his administration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which
the public funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for whi
ch they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for t
echnical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties
had been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or ordin
ance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the p
urpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Pate
ntly, the third element is not present in this case.
66 | P a g e
by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illeg
public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Pe
or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. A
now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Inform
ation, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively,
of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties
are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the perfor
mance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with Darkis, also a publi
c officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of Php 40,000, which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school te
achers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service. Appell
ants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appell
ant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon mo
tion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleti
ng the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of technical malversation?
Decision:
The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges o
f technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
67 | P a g e
public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State Colleg
e to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were en
titled to under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money
was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of laborers working on vario
us projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which
laborers wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of t
he prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quan
tum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayans
improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecu
tions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever ti
lt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentia
ls of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third
element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fu
nd used should have been appropriated by law is therefore absent. The authorizat
ion given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the Php 40,0
00.00 allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teach
ers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the Php 40,000 released by the DBM f
or salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other
school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical m
alversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically ap
propriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the t
hird and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Pena
l Code are lacking in this case.
68 | P a g e
A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distin
ct and different from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender m
isappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person
to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversati
on, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his
or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fu
nd was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily in
clude the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Sinc
e the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in
the information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not in
cluded in the crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be co
nvicted of technical malversation.
Considering however that all the evidence given during the trial in the malversa
tion case is the same evidence that will be presented and evaluated to determine
his guilt or innocence in the technical malversation case in the event that one
is filed and in order to spare the petitioner from the rigors and harshness com
pounded by another trial, not to mention the unnecessary burden on our overloade
d judicial system, the Court deems it best to pass upon the issue of whether or
not the petitioner indeed is guilty of illegal use of public funds.
Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the utiliz
ation of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road w
as merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public Works and Hig
hways and the barangay captain and was not particularly provided for by law or o
rdinance. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purposepaymen
t of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It i
s pertinent to note the high priority which laborers' wages enjoy as claims agai
nst the employers' funds and resources. In the absence of a law or ordinance app
ropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the pet
itioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of public funds.
70 | P a g e
In order to appreciate Art. 247 of the RPC, the accused must be able to prove th
at: lover; 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise having sex with a
2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts physical injuries to
the spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused never consented to the carnal ac
ts done by the spouse. Unfortunately for Eduardo, he wasnt able to establish the
existence of the aforesaid circumstances. His version of how things went down we
re too full of inconsistencies. First off, he stabbed his wife several times whi
ch is not consistent with an accidental killing (because he claimed he was aimin
g for the lover). Another was that he claimed that the paramour was able to GET
DRESSED while under attack. And another was that even his daughter testified tha
t she did not tell her father anything about her mothers residence or whereabouts
as even she did not know where her mother was staying.
So the guilty verdict is sustained.
72 | P a g e
Add to this the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw the accused str
ike the victim with a scythe on the first floor, as well as the forensic evidenc
e pointing to the fact that the body of the victim could have been just carried
on the second floor to make it seem like the victim was attempting to have inter
course, then the Court has no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court t
hat Art 11 and 247 of the RPC can not be appreciated in the case at bar.
74 | P a g e
Decision:
In order for Art. 247 to apply, the accused or the defense must be able to show
the following elements: 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise having s
ex with a lover; 2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts 3) th
e accused never
physical injuries to the spouse and/or the lover; and consented to the carnal ac
ts done by the spouse.
The evidence show that all three elements are present in this case. Michael was
still married to Tita (albeit living separately), he caught his wife and Jesus b
y surprise having sex, and Michael certainly did not approve of their relationsh
ip, much less their carnal act.
The fact that Mike brought with him a hunting knife is consistent with his excus
e that he was fearful of an attack by either Jesus or Tita because of past event
s.
So the decision of the RTC is modified. Mike is found guilty only under Art. 247
of the RPC.
76 | P a g e
qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mi
tigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to b
e imposed on Rufino.
78 | P a g e
his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercati
on with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son
was in imminent danger.
There is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers w
hen he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a
conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue
advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive evidenc
e to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is h
omicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime com
mitted are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines
whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is
made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill
the victim. In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding
behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requi
ring treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries.
In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convict
ed of the lesser offense of physical injuries.
80 | P a g e
pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufac
ture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rim
fire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firear
m, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in t
he manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no other crime was c
ommitted.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such u
se of an unlicensed firearm such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considere
d as an aggravating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the us
e of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession,
but murder or homicide, as the case may be.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed onl
y where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder
, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Otherwis
e, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential in
gredient in the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'
etat; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.
82 | P a g e
The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that c
riminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although t
he wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In People v. Cast
ro, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty
of homicide.
84 | P a g e
Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under
the circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police
officers who may be called upon to discharge official functions under similar or
identical conditions. We would then have a dispirited police force who may be h
alf-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear
that they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.
86 | P a g e
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a
heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to fac
e with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.
Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal code.
88 | P a g e
Decision:
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity
of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitnes
s because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification . A tumultuous a
ffray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a
confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wou
nded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant ca
se is between a distinct group of individuals , one of whom was sufficiently ide
ntified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular
victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a tumultuous affray within the meaning
of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free- for- all, wher
e several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one anot
her in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of o
ne or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himsel
f, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked pa
st witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There
was hardly any risk at all to accused- appellant; the attack was completely wit
hout warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up a
ny defense.
Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.
90 | P a g e
The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, R
ichard De Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of mu
rder qualified by treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferr
er but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The
court convicts Tamayo of homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is
murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray?
Decision:
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that:
(1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized fo
r the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) th
ese several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumult
uous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or person
s who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be identif
ied.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons an
d they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some p
erson is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one
distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the po
lice dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after th
e loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dis
persal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless
individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kic
ks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, no
r was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
92 | P a g e
As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as fift
y in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took
advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any att
empt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they i
gnored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolo
nged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of m
urder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.
93 | P a g e
Held: There is no merit in the accused- appellants position that he should be hel
d liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the R
evised Penal Code. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene and j
oined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked hi
m causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body- two on the stomac
h, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused- appellant with
his hand- gun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance,
Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness R
icardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelitos
killer.
While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first b
lush, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelit
o inflicted upon him these wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as
a mitigating circumstance because the defenses version stands discredited in ligh
t of the more credible version of the prosecution as to the circumstances surrou
nding Miguelitos death.
Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court finds Cresen
ciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
95 | P a g e
It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (
8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerte
d upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence,
Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion was caused
by the same violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana Abuyo, such vi
olence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However, the intent to ca
use the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stoma
ch, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is no
t sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact, Filomeno must h
ave merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
100 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical i
njury instead of homicide?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury attrib
utable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li stri
king Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from in
juries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of
the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm
of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended p
arty for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight
physical injuries.
What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street figh
t devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any lo
ng-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actor
s were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless thi
s lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must be made
to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that th
e criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond r
easonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death appa
rently remains at large.
103 | P a g e
Decision:
The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant inserted his fingers int
o Ms vagina likewise constitute rape through sexual assault. In People v. Palma,
we held that the insertion of the appellants finger into the victims vagina consti
tuted the crime of rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No. 8252 or th
e Anti-Rape Law of 1997 .
Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if committed with any
aggravating or qualifying circumstances. year old minor. The Information in Fam
ily Case No. A-436 mentioned the victim as appellants stepdaughter and an 11A ste
pdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather i
s the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which
the person spoken of is the offspring. In the instant case, appellant and Ms moth
er were never married. Appellant is the common law spouse of Ms mother. Hence, ap
pellant is not Ms stepfather; vice-versa, M is not appellants stepdaughter. Howeve
r, since the
relationship was not specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be consi
dered in the imposition of the proper penalty.
105 | P a g e
telephone number, as well as that of their house and their store. Ed Henderson d
id as he was told, and wrote down the telephone number of his father, Eddie Tan.
At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing him that
his son had been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000.00 for the safe rele
ase of his son which was reduce to P5,000,000.00. Thereafter, Eddie received sev
eral calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom they demanded, t
he kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and thereafter kill the boy
and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for mercy but the caller
would simply hang up the telephone.
At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers came
through, and Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional amoun
t. The caller hung up, but called again and informed Eddie that the kidnappers h
ad agreed to accept a ransom of P548,000.00. At about noon, the caller contacted
Eddie and instructed him to place the money in a newspaper and to bring the mon
ey to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo Church in Quezon City within
ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the doors and windows o
f his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was also told that a man w
ould approach him and call him "Eddie."
Eddie did as he was told. Suddenly, a man approached him and called him Eddie, so
he immdiately he handed over the plastic bag which contained the money. He asked
her how his son was, she told him not to worry because she would bring the boy
home. Shortly after his arrival at their house, Eddie received two telephone cal
ls from a male and a female, respectively, who informed him of his sons impending
release.
Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he would b
e brought back home. The boy then called up his mother and told her that he woul
d be back soon. Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a taxi. Calunod order
ed the boy to pretend that she was his aunt. The taxi
stopped near the Imperial Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod instru
cted Ed Henderson to get down. She gave the boy P50.00 for his fare back home. T
he boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family.
110 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the accused could be held liable for the crime of kidnapping?
Decision:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manne
r deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death; (1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days
; (2) If it shall have committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious
physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detain
ed, or if threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapp
ed or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from t
he victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned
were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies
as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture dehum
anizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the
prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or deta
ins another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act o
f detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offe
nse any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detenti
on lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public auth
ority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and se
rious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and se
rious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following bey
ond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
111 | P a g e
victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and,
(c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for t
he release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before,
during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual
demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committ
ed. Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; me
aning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or d
emanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that release
s from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may ac
crue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release.
In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the
release of the victim.
112 | P a g e
deceased relative. Secondly, Americo testified that when they stopped over at Ma
capagal's house, he heard the wife of Macapagal utter the words "kawawa naman si
la" as they were leaving. Thirdly, it was established that Macapagal ordered the
driver to proceed slowly towards the highway. During this time, he was busy tal
king on his handheld radio with someone and the victims heard him say "ok." When
they were near the highway, he ordered the driver to stop whereupon 15 armed me
n appeared and blocked their vehicle. Finally, while the 15 men took away Alexan
der Saldaa and his three companions, nothing was done to Macapagal or to Teddy Si
longan. By their own admission, they were just left behind after being hogtied.
How they managed to escape was not explained. All these taken together give rise
to the reasonable inference that Macapagal had concocted the funeral for a supp
osed recently deceased relative purposely to afford his co-conspirators time to
stage the kidnapping. Then, also, it was through Macapagal's indispensable contr
ibution that the armed men were able to stop the vehicle at a precise location n
ear the highway.
Likewise, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidna
pping was committed "for the purpose of extorting ransom" from Alexander, as to
warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. For the crime to be commi
tted, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessa
ry that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merel
y the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records ar
e replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At
the mountain hideout in Maganoy where Alexander was first taken, he was made to
write a letter to his wife asking her to pay the ransom of twelve million pesos
. Among those who demanded ransom were the appellants Ramon Pasawilan, Sacaria A
lon, and Jumbrah Manap. Then, when Alexander was in the custody of Mayangkang Sa
guile, not only was he made to write more letters to his family, Mayangkang hims
elf wrote ransom notes. In those letters, Mayangkang even threatened to kill Ale
xander if the ransom was not paid.
115 | P a g e
Decision: Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his li
berty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; (1) If the kidna
pping or detention shall have lasted more than three days; (2) If it shall have
been committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical injuries
shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats
to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapped or detained sha
ll be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public
officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was commi
tted for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, ev
en if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of
the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detentio
n or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum pena
lty shall be imposed."
The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an ind
ividual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extort
ing ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is act
ually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.
In People vs. Salimbago, the Court stressed: "x x x No specific form of ransom i
s required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it was i
ntended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. In municipal
criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demande
d for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from c
aptivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary fo
r the crime to be committed."
117 | P a g e
proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records in
disputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention.
121 | P a g e
find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of t
he Revised Penal Code.
123 | P a g e
the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offend
er deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. Wha
t is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the d
eliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his par
ents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply somethi
ng more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly da
ring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As
consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlook
ed or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual findings of the
trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great wei
ght and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observi
ng the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.
In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial courts find
ing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith
and credit.
125 | P a g e
Decision:
No, the Court ruled that a person whose only intention is to look for the childs
mother would generally return the child to the person who entrusted the child to
her. This did not happen in the present case. The only logical conclusion we ca
n derive from appellants actions is that her intention was really to kidnap the c
hild not to look for the childs mother.
The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor i
s that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actu
ally being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate
failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or g
uardians. It has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted w
ith the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to re
store the said minor to his parents or guardians (People vs. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 47
8 [1997]). In People vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), we stated that the essential
element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the off
ender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being pun
ished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of th
e custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Inde
ed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must im
ply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong, foo
lishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
127 | P a g e
Decision:
No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to retur
n a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements m
ust concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the
minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his pare
nts or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted
with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnap
ping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the
deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latt
er to his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only
be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardi
ans of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something mor
e than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishl
y daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evide
nt that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-ap
pellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her.
129 | P a g e
Trial Court convicted Chito of attempted rape. Petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision. The case was elevated to t
he Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether or not the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth while on top of the vic
tim constitutes the crime of attempted rape?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held the acquittal of Chito from the crime of attempted rape.
There was no overt act of rape in this case. Overt act is some physical activity
or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime. It is more than
a mere planning or preparation. Considering the facts of the case, it cannot be
construed that the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth on the face of Malou co
nstitutes an overt act of rape when there was no commencement of any act indicat
ing the intent to rape the victim.
The acts committed by Chito are not indicative of rape but rather of unjust vexa
tion under Article 287, second paragraph. Unjust vexation exists when an act cau
ses annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the o
ffended. Unjust vexation includes any conduct which would unjustly annoy or irri
tate a person.
131 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of robbery with homicide were
proven by the prosecution? Decision: Yes, the essential elements of the crime o
f robbery with homicide was proven by the prosecution. Add to that that the homi
cide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, appellants are g
uilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code. The element of taking or asportation was completed when
the apellants took the personal property of spouses Hibaler. The wife Restituta
testified that after the incident, she made an inventory and found out that som
e of their personal belongings were missing. It is of no moment that the propert
y taken was not disposed of in so far as the characterization of the crime as ro
bbery is concerned.
134 | P a g e
Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not
be subject of theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the international calls as well as the business of providing tele
communication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriat
ion and can be objects of theft.
Held: The court granted PLDTs petition but remanded the case to the trial court w
ith direction to the Public Prosecutor of Makati City to amend the Amended Infor
mation to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business
of the private offended party because the international calls, although conside
red as personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner cannot be lia
ble for theft on that matter; but the business of providing telecommunication is
a personal property which is capable of being appropriated hence subject to the
ft.
This Court adhering the decisions in United States v. Genato, United States v. C
arlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal pro
perty, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriatio
n can be the object of theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the t
erm "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In
Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anyt
hing susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not
real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code s
hould be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in accordance w
ith the rule on statutory construction that where words have been long used in a
technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, a
nd have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a p
articular statute, in which they are used, the words used in such statute should
be construed according to the sense in which they have been previously used. In
fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of
140 | P a g e
"personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in Uni
ted States v. Carlos.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the
penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "a
sportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that
to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportati
on or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" i
n the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which,
as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the offen
ders own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or car
d as in the instant case. This includes controlling the destination of the prope
rty stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tamp
ering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of a device to fraudulent
ly obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper t
o divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United St
ates v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which are b
rought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tam
pering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature
, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any
device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case, petit
ioner was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unau
thorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines
, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directl
y to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.
The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by Articles 517 and 51
8 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of subtraction o
f gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects resembling electricity, i
s confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain
of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing the provisions
of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of that country, articles 517 and 518
of the code in force in these islands.
141 | P a g e
The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other
apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring
electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfull
y deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other appa
ratus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which on
e may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telepho
ne service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connectin
g various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, th
rough which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance
calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtractio
n mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise per
sonal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk
Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. Interest in business was not specif
ically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time th
e above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be pers
onal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enume
ration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all thing
s which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real pro
perty or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal prop
erty under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be ap
propriated.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice is
converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to
the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was als
o held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical ener
gy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electri
city is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumera
tes "forces of nature which are brought under control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the m
atter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical ener
gy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal
142 | P a g e
properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership
over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits
said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT
not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim tha
t such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these co
mmunications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime o
f theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
143 | P a g e
Decision:
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed
was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offen
se but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as described t
herein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of the
ft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said prope
rty belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) tha
t the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking b
e accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or fo
rce upon things.
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aq
uino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between t
he two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused re
ceives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there ma
y be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrust
ed only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the th
ing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the jurid
ical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlemen
t or estafa."
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking
of the vehicle and so no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, we held that
the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to hi
m supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa.
Illustrating, the Court declared: ... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Pro
vince of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a certain quantity of rice at a certain price
per picul. A ships several sacks of the grain which B receives in his warehouse
. If, prior to the measuring required before the payment of the agreed price, B
takes a certain quantity of rice from the different sacks, there can be no doubt
that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now, it may be asked: Did not B receiv
e the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes. And did A voluntarily deliver the
sacks of rice which he owned by shipping them to B?-Yes Was the taking of the ri
ce by B from the different sacks done with A's consent?- No.
147 | P a g e
This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable, according
to which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or converted to one's
own use without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is not that of th
eft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of quali
fied theft because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not alleg
ed in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Santos would have had reason
to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance
may be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial. Hence the impos
able penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying circumstances, should
be in the maximum degree.
148 | P a g e
Issues:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft?
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper?
Decsion:
The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accused
-appellant in the crime charged.
It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank Metroba
nk cashiers check which was processed and encashed.
Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of acco
unts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally
with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued witho
ut any transaction.
Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of
bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other specimens
he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing therein w
as not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appear
ing in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a let
ter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accused-a
ppellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered t
o return the amount of P8,500.00.
The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Documen
t. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the fel
ony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year of ea
ch additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the R
PC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified
theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specifi
ed in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision may
or in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and max
imum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank
150 | P a g e
officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order
to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused.
Falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the
crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 4
8 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, where an offense is a necessar
y means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its
maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft is more seriou
s than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under Artic
le 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum period, t
he correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maxi
mum.
151 | P a g e
Decision:
When the defendant, with a grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appr
opriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking
or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft.
In the case of the United States vs. De Vera (43 Phil., 1000, 1003), Justice Vil
lamor enumerated the essential elements of the crime of theft, which are as foll
ows:
The taking of personal property;
The property belongs to another; The takin
g away be done with intent of gain;
The taking away be done without the consent
of the owner; and The taking away be accomplished without violence or intimidati
on against persons or force upon things.
In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity
of a bank teller.
In People v. Locson, this Court considered deposits received by a teller in beha
lf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interp
retation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the begi
nning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only m
aterial possession. Juridical possession remains with the bank.
If the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed
is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confi
dence, and the bank places money in the tellers possession due to the confidence
reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed. The ele
ments of qualified theft include the elements of theft and any of the circumstan
ces enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC. The elements of theft, which is define
d in Article 308 of the RPC, are the following:
1. Taking of personal property; 2. That said property belongs to another;
153 | P a g e
3. That said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the
owners consent; and 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or int
imidation against persons, nor of force upon things.
The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the informa
tion indicated was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Hence, to warrant a conviction, the prosecution should have also proven the fac
t that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In the case at bar, regarding the first element, the taking of personal property
, the prosecution was not able to present direct evidence that petitioner took t
he PHP 10,000 on November 16, 1989. The prosecution attempted to prove the takin
g through circumstantial evidence. One of the pieces of evidence that the prosec
ution adduced was the withdrawal slip for PHP 10,000 dated November 16, 1989.
Antonio Salazar disowned the signature on the withdrawal slip. However, he also
indicated that he did not know who made the withdrawal. Rosalina de Lazo testifi
ed that the initial on the withdrawal slip, written after the figure 11-17-89, w
as the customary signature of petitioner. She, however, did not intimate the sig
nificance of petitioners initial on the withdrawal slip.
A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips including the withdrawal slip s
tated above shows that the date and the initial of petitioner were written acros
s the stamped word paid. This indicates that petitioners initial was placed in her
capacity as a teller which, therefore, only proves that this transaction passed
through her hands in such capacity. It does not in any manner show that petition
er prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the withdrawal increased
her patrimony.
The presumption that being in possession of said withdrawal slip before its deli
very to Reynaldo Manlulu, the accused is the one who prepared the said withdrawa
l slip is without basis in law. The presumption under paragraph (j), Section 3 o
f Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which reads: That a person found in possession
of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act; otherwise, that things
154 | P a g e
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
Thas always applied to a situation where property has been stolen and the stolen
property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases the possessi
on of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the taker of
the stolen property.
In the case at bar, the withdrawal slip, is not stolen property.
The presumption used by the lower court and the one found in paragraph (j), Sect
ion 3 of Rule 131 are different. The lower court presumed that the petitioner wa
s the maker of the withdrawal slip and not that the petitioner stole anything. I
t is plain that there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was p
repared by the petitioner. Another piece of evidence offered to prove petitioners
taking is her extrajudicial confession that she allegedly admitted taking money
from the accounts of several members of the BABSLA and the list of people from
whose accounts she took money.
However, it cannot be deduced from the alleged verbal confession of petitioner t
hat she was confessing a specific taking of P10,000 from the account of Sgt. Sal
azar on November 16, 1989. And a perusal of the handwritten list allegedly prepa
red by petitioner does not disclose any relation to the specific taking alleged
in the information. All that was written on the list, among other names and figu
res, was the name Salazar, Antonio and the number fifteen (15) to the right of t
he name. The list does not mention the date on which the money was taken. Neithe
r does it disclose the precise amount that was taken. The other pieces of eviden
ce such as the Tellers Daily Report and Abstract of Payment merely reveal that on
16 November 1989, a withdrawal was made on the account of Sgt. Antonio Salazar
and that this withdrawal passed through the hands of petitioner in her capacity
as a teller of the BABSLA. Again, they prove neither that petitioner prepared th
e subject withdrawal slip nor that she took the P10,000 on that date.
155 | P a g e
However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Rep
ublic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALI
ZING CARNAPPING.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the RPC are
:
1.that there be taking of personal property; 2.that said property belongs to ano
ther; 3.that the taking be done with intent to gain; 4.that the taking be done w
ithout the consent of the owner; and, 5.that the taking be accomplished without
the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:
the theft
is committed by a domestic servant; the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence;
the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a pl
antation; the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
the
property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erupti
on, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which bel
ongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; an
d (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.
158 | P a g e
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important conside
ration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary ben
efit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or ex
pected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which wa
s taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
161 | P a g e
In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (
1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging
to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessin
g the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be
animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for
this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
163 | P a g e
From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is
determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued t
he questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fu
nd them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations clearly cons
titute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under p
aragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph
2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false pretenses or fraudulent acts the
law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bounc
ing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check des
pite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of par
agraph 2(a).
Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of i
nsufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, w
hich is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply wi
th a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor being then an
element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charge
d, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder.
In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(
d), but there is no evidence that petitioner received notice of dishonor of all,
except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the questioned check
s. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima facie presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This leaves it unnecessar
y to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioners d
efenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se lik
e Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient
funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to
pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the amount covered
by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution s
tipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which amount is
almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount c
overed by the P76,654 Allied Bank check.
165 | P a g e
In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa u
nder Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her
acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, howe
ver.
166 | P a g e
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as amended
by RA 4885, are:
(1) that the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation co
ntracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) that the at the time of
the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in the bank or the funds de
posited were insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and, (3) that the pa
yee has been defrauded.
All the elements of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d) of Art. 315, RPC are pre
sent in this case. The evidence showed and petitioner Chua admitted issuing the
questioned checks in favor of private respondent in exchange for the imported go
ods she obtained from the latter. It is likewise not disputed that the checks sh
e issued bounced or were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and/or because
her bank account had already been closed by the bank due to lack of funds. As a
result, private respondent suffered damage. She had to close down her business
because she could not recoup her losses due to the huge amount petitioner owed h
er. Petitioners defense that she issued the unfunded checks as collateral or secu
rity for the goods she got from private respondent was not worthy of credence. t
he amounts of the checks issued by petitioner clearly showed that they were inte
nded as payments for the items she obtained from private respondent. Private res
pondent would not have parted with her goods in exchange for bum checks. It was
likewise contrary to ordinary human experience and to sound business practice fo
r petitioner to issue so many unfunded checks as "collateral" or "by way of acco
mmodation." As an experienced
businesswoman, petitioner could not have been so nave as not to know that she cou
ld be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks.
Ergo, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
168 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru Falsifi
cation of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article
315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estaf
a is not present?
Decision:
The petition is partly impressed with merit.
For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsificat
ion of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsifi
cation of public document must exist.
There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are present: the
re was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo when she used t
he fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false pretense was m
ade prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and private compl
ainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the ve
ry least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioners the
sis, however, that there is here an absence of the third element contending that
private complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case, w
as never induced to part with any money or property by means of fraud, committed
simultaneously with the false pretense or fraudulent representation by Rosemari
e. The Court find merit in petitioners submission.
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that the d
eceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of defrau
dation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the o
ffended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the pre
sent case.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in th
is case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authorit
y to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit
170 | P a g e
was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their mon
ey when they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of es
tafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses,
but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not
the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her propert
y in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more re
ason must this be for herein petitioner.
The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve
petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of
public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses
included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the fail
ure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As
correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsi
fy, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the dee
d of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such s
ale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gel
ogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evide
nce beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification
of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduce
d to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in
-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case.
Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Docume
nt.
171 | P a g e
Spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo purchased a, what would seem as a brand new Mit
subishi L-300 Versa Van that was displayed in the show room of the petitioner. T
hey were not informed that said van was damaged due to a vehicular accident that
occurred when Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, suffered a heart attack while t
raveling from Manila to Naga City On March 17, 1995 when said van was initially
purchased by petitioner from Union Motors Corporation in Paco, Manila. A day aft
er Spouses Silos purchase of the van, they heard a squeaking sound which seemed t
o be coming from underneath the van. Believing that the van merely needed grease
, they stopped at a Shell gasoline station where it was examined. The mechanic d
iscovered that some parts underneath the van had been welded. When they complain
ed to Guinhawa, the latter told them that the defects were mere factory defects.
As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo requested that Guinhawa change the v
an with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles. Guinhawa initially agreed to the couples p
roposal, but later changed his mind and told them that he had to sell the van fi
rst. The spouses then brought the vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for
examination. The mechanic discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that
was producing the annoying sound, and that it had been repaired.
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund o
f their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the conf
rontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought t
he van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in
172 | P a g e
the vehicular accident. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint
from the DTI.
On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318 of the RPC covering other dec
eits?
Decision:
Yes, Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318.
Petitioner insists that the private complainant merely assumed that the van was
brand new, and that he did not make any misrepresentation to that effect. He ave
rs that deceit cannot be committed by concealment, the absence of any notice to
the public that the van was not brand new does not amount to deceit.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that he made
no personal representation that the herein subject van was brand new for the si
mple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the allegation in the
complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It has thus become
admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new vehicles a fact which,
up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied. Therefore, when private comp
lainant went to petitioners showroom, the former had every right to assume that s
he was being sold brand new vehicles there being nothing to indicate otherwise.
But as it turned out, not only did private complainant get a defective and used
van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in a road accident when driven by no l
ess than petitioners own driver.
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which the
law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the
other party sought to know. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in go
od faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due t
o its inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party
is
173 | P a g e
Decision:
The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in
Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil C
ode relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does n
ot involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now s
eeking to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining hu
sband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to liv
e separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a
year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced
in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore,
not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings." In fine,
the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent as a b
ar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such
acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with D
r. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides
that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's c
omplaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to t
he public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor
even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended
spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such en
forcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social instituti
ons of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the st
rongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kin
d.
178 | P a g e
satisfaction. He further argued that if any, he would, be only held liable for s
imple seduction.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant may be held liable for the crime of rape even i
f allegedly he did not employ force in order to have sexual intercourse with the
twins?
Whether or not he is liable for simple seduction?
Decision:
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to
scream but the appellant prevented them by threatening to kill them. Also, afte
r each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the appellant not to t
ell their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not
required to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need n
ot be irresistible; it need only be present and so long as it brings about the d
esired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is
beside the point. Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape w
hen, as in this case, intimidation was used on the victim and she submitted to t
he rapists lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds
that even though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical
forces, he so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resista
nce through fear of greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by th
e man is rape. Without question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or
intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satis
fy his lust.
No. Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all lia
ble for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of t
he Revised Penal Code, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some
deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this p
romise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of sexual
intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He declar
ed that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would promise
them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant
180 | P a g e
presented no proof that private complainants consent was secured by means of such
promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the appellant t
o private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him. Rathe
r, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody discover
ed his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than enough to
show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private complainants was t
otally absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies established that the appella
nt had sexual intercourse with them without their consent and against their will
. Considering that the victims accounts of what the appellant did to them were ab
solutely credible and believable, the trial court correctly convicted the appell
ant of several crimes of rape against the 12-yearold twins, Liza and Anna Paraga
s.
181 | P a g e
The trial court rendered a decision convicting accused of the offense charged. O
n appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision and imposed upon d
efendant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The case was brought to the Supreme
court through an automatic review.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court had proven the guilt of defendant for the crime o
f rape beyond reasonable doubt?
Whether or not defendant may be held liable for the crime of simple seduction?
Decision:
NO. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to prove t
hat their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the prosecutio
n, served to demolish the same.
Firstly, while Elaine claimed she was dragged to the hotel, her medical examinat
ion did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any force on her. I
ndeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped during the
many hours they were together going from one place to another, but she did not.
She was enjoying their tryst.
Secondly, if she was really drugged she should have been given at least a blood
and urine test to determine if there were any remaining chemicals in her system.
This was not done.
Thirdly, after the incident, Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all. S
he did not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience. It was only when
her mother scolded her that she contrived her story.
Fourthly, in one part of her Sagot Salaysay submitted to the fiscal's office, sh
e said she did not accept the invitation of appellant for them to go to the Lune
ta. In another part thereof, she said she accepted the same. 6 In court, she sai
d she agreed to go to the Luneta and thereafter she said she was forced.
183 | P a g e
She also stated in her Sagot Salaysay that she was only persuaded to give appell
ant her photograph and appellant dictated what she wrote thereon. In court she a
dmitted she gave the photograph to appellant and that appellant did not ask her
to write the dedication thereon.
Verily, the foregoing circumstances effectively disprove the theory of force and
involuntariness in the sexual interlude of the two.
What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their mutua
l desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus co
nsummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liab
le for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair.
NO. Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Simple seduction. The seduct
ion of a woman who is
Art. 338.
single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of ag
e, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor. All the ele
ments of the offense are present. Frankly 1. 2. 3. 4. Elaine was over 12 and und
er 18 years of age. She is single and of good reputation. The offender had sexua
l intercourse with her. It was committed by deceit.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully pe
rsuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law tha
t attended the commission of the offense.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 4. Ju
dgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necess
arily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in
that which is proved.
184 | P a g e
Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged nor
necessarily included in the offense charged in the information. The only elemen
ts of the offense alleged in the sworn complaint of the offended party are that
she is over 12 years of age when appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Thus, ap
pellant cannot be convicted even for simple seduction either.
185 | P a g e
concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final j
udgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal c
ase of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declarin
g his marriage void.
A subsequent pronouncement that marriage is void from the beginning is not a def
ense in a concubinage case. He who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prose
cuted for concubinage.
187 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance filed by the offended party extinguis
hed the criminal liability of the accused?
Decision:
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the socalled "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case
once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so ear
lier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, li
ke any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation.
Paragraph 3 of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for
seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint
made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in an
y case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons,
as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the
offended party pardons the offender after the case has been instituted, nor doe
s it order the dismissal of said case.
191 | P a g e
Isue:
Whether or not Jessie should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness and statu
tory rape?
Decision:
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) cou
nts of acts of lasciviousness. However, RTC erred in sentencing him guilty for s
tatutory rape because he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.
While Jessie succeeded in touching her genitalia with his private parts there wa
s no indication that it successfully penetrated at least the labia of the victim
.
We recall that during the first incident of 27 April 1993, accused-appellant tri
ed forcing his penis into her vagina, but when he failed in his first attempt, h
e inserted it into her anus instead. This could have been attempted rape, or eve
n consummated rape but the Complaint filed was only for acts of lasciviousness.
By then he must have realized that it was difficult to penetrate his victims sex
organ. Touching of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the penis s
lid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will on
ly result in either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
195 | P a g e
What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape in Cri
minal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-148, if indeed, in its opinion, the prosecution fa
iled to sufficiently establish the existence of force and intimidation, and orde
r instead the filing of the appropriate information. Be that as it may, this Cou
rt believes otherwise and is fully convinced that accused-appellant is guilty as
well of these two other counts of rape.
198 | P a g e
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categor
ical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribu
tion for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, bein
g interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape
charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and cir
cumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprote
ctive of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding pun
ishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humi
liation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equal
ly bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and cont
radictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1,
1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on Nove
mber 2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to ha
ve gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the follow
ing day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed with him. It is true th
e medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991 showed that she was no
longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact th
at she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime wa
s not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of compl
ainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is especially true because she said s
he had been given money by her father everytime they had an intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that
it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected t
o sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What
is clear from complainants testimony is that although accusedappellant had had se
xual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or intimidation. Nor was the
rape made possible because of accused-appellants moral ascendancy over her, for
the fact is that accused-appellant was not living with them, having separated fr
om complainants mother in 1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was comm
itted by means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant
200 | P a g e
Our criminal law is not susceptible to such a reproach, it being clear from the
information that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were included
in the facts alleged. He cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is entit
led to complete acquittal. As a matter of fact, in his defense, rightfully given
credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage of an inexperienced ado
lescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have been bound by
the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to by him, how clos
e she felt towards him. In the case of People v. Fontanilla, it is said that when
the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tu
tor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the
offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or
deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seducti
on of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of
the persons enumerated in art. 337 is constitutive of the crime of qualified sed
uction, even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were
voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for
granted the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and
punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction, taking int
o account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse o
f confidence which implies deceit or fraud.
As early as 1908, in the leading case of United States v. Arlante, the penalty f
or qualified seduction was rightfully visited on an accused whose conduct was si
milar to the appellant. The facts, as set forth in the very able opinion of no l
ess than Chief Justice Arellano, reads as follows: "That the accused had carnall
y abused two orphan girls, relatives of his wife, who were sheltered in his hous
e; that they respectively gave birth to a boy and a girl, one of them on the 5th
of November, 1905, this being the one who files the complaint for seduction, an
d the other on the 15th of October of the same year, the latter appearing in the
case as a witness for the prosecution x x x x And even though the accused were
not, as a matter of fact, in charge of the keeping of the offended girl, it is b
eyond doubt that, as she was a domestic, the crime is included within paragraph
1 of said article. 'Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provisio
n segregating it from that of a servant, the term is applied to persons usually
living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in t
his sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the
203 | P a g e
latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded tha
t because he failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed again
st him.
The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of forcib
le abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Between the accused and the victim, whose version is more credible, more plausib
le and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime charged?
Decision:
All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim who
is a young girl was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knifepoi
nt, she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her abode
. At her tender age, she could not be expected to physically resist considering
the fact that even her companion, Jessica, had to run home to escape accusedappe
llants wrath as he brandished a haunting knife.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will
was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs.
The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. I
t signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or tha
t which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by
the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the vict
im after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that
while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirtysix (36) years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the worl
d than she
Given the straightforward and candid testimony of Lenie and her father Palmones
as well as the absence of any motive to testify falsely against accusedappellant
, the logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part, and
their respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy
of full faith and credit
206 | P a g e
Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under
Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and vo
luntary. Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2)
pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild horses forthcom
ing, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in marriage. In moving fro
m one place to another to look for the horses which the old man Palmones had dem
anded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his matrimonial aspiration
with Lenie. The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accus
edappellant which in reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If
they were, surely, Lenie would not have jeopardized their relationship by accus
ing him of having held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it
all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could hav
e easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabo
uts that nothing untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal r
eaction would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with wh
om she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in deno
uncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the disg
race that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would
not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the
couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and
seeking the intervention of the datus in resolving the matter. Under the circum
stances, the criminal liability of accused-appellant is only for forcible abduct
ion under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse which accused-app
ellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduct
ion and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other
half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the principal purpo
se of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity and that her
abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same. Surely it would no
t have been the case that accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during h
er four (4)-month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his chief or primordial
intention had been to lay with her. Instead, what we discern from the evidence
is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and parcel of her forcible abdu
ction and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime which was
to remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be an
d to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of
207 | P a g e
accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but al
so to separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly
tell-tale signs of forcible abduction
208 | P a g e
accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical res
istance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. T
he employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especiall
y since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was rainin
g, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to
seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the takin
g advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds.
Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her wil
l was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim In the case
at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant inserted his pe
nis into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by th
e medical findings wherein it was found that the victim suffered from complete h
ymenal laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual contact is immater
ial considering that at the time thereof, she was below twelve years of age. Sex
with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she consented thereto or
not, constitutes statutory rape.
The findings of facts of the trial court, when supported by evidence on record,
are binding on this Court. No significant facts or circumstances were shown to h
ave been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, might substantially aff
ect the outcome of this case. Consequently, the trial courts conclusions and asse
ssments on the credibility of witness must be accorded respect on appeal The imp
osition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the crime of forcible abductio
n with rape committed in 1993, was correct. No qualifying or aggravating circums
tance was proven in this case and there was none alleged in the information.
However, the trial court erred in failing to award civil indemnity to the victim
. Whenever the crime of rape is committed, a civil indemnity is awarded to the v
ictim without necessity of proof or pleading, and the same is automatically gran
ted together with moral damages, generally in the amount of P50,000.00 each. In
this connection, the prayer of the Solicitor General that the civil indemnity be
increased to P75,000.00 cannot be granted, the same being contrary to jurisprud
ence In cases where the death penalty cannot be imposed, the civil indemnity is
reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00
210 | P a g e
revealed to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived t
ogether as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her but claimed
that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his niece, contra
ry to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted having pinched the victim'
s vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship. He claim
ed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment she receiv
ed. Pedsc The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous
and his defense untenable. |The trial Court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape under Arti
cle 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code and is me
ted the extreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in its evaluation of the honesty of p
rivate complainant, in effect giving full weight and credence to the evidence of
the prosecution than that of the defense?
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in finding the accused appellant guil
ty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?
Decision:
There is no no reason to overturn the trial court's detailed evaluation of the e
vidence for both the prosecution and the defense. Complainant Judeliza's testimo
ny was given in a straightforward, clear, and convincing manner, which remained
consistent even under cross-examination. The trial court found her testimony bel
ievable and convincing, while appellant's version of events incredible and outra
geous. Moreover, as testified by the medico-legal officer, he found that her bod
y bore evidences of physical and sexual assault. Appellant's bare denial could n
ot prevail over said positive evidence
Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was consens
ual, since they were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense" should be substantiated
by some documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship .In this case, th
ere is no showing of mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete
212 | P a g e
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was his
niece, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1)
of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18 yea
rs of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relati
ve by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw
spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made to app
ly in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was committe
d, private complainant was already more than eighteen years of age. Second, the
information did not allege that offender and offended party were relatives withi
n the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven circumstances i
n R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the death penalty part
ake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such should be alleged in t
he information to be appreciated as such. In view of the failure of the informat
ion to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation could not be taken
into account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For these reasons, the se
ntence on appellant should only be reclusion perpetua
214 | P a g e
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element
of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense can
not be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing offic
er. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
Under the aforementioned circumstance, the Court held that petitioner has not co
mmitted bigamy.
218 | P a g e
ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHAN
AP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTO
S AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely
false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose sai
d ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be
a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and
contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of t
he said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ. CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas both pleaded not guilt
y.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint Deci
sions dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.
Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its Decision da
ted September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tuga
s on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Re
solution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.
220 | P a g e
Issues:
Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for liable?
Decision: The Supreme Court noted that, in the first issue, the CA erred in acqu
itting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the publi
cation of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint C
ounter-Affidavit and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to wi
t: WITNESS: As editor-in-chief, I have no participation
in the writing of the questioned article and my only participation in the public
ation is the handling of the physical lay-outing, indication and allocation of t
ypesize of the body of the article, before the same was printed and published in
GOSSIP Tabloid
Q:
You do not deny the statements in this publication as executed by you in the cou
nteraffidavit and sworn in before the City
Prosecutor, is this correct? A: Yes, that is correct.
ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
That is all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT:
Do we get it right from you, if you were acting as you were, you will not allow
the said publication of this same article or same stories?
A:
If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I will because if you can see t
he article, your Honor, it is according to our source, it is not a direct commen
t.
221 | P a g e
COURT:
So whether you are there or not, [the] same article leading to them (sic) will s
till find its way to come out?
A:
Yes, your honor.
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which
provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or se
rial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in an
y part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were
the author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that acc
used was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that,
as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of
the matter contained in the said libelous article. In People v. Topacio and San
tiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Pena
l Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article 360 incl
udes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be publ
ished, but also the person who prints or publishes it. Based on these cases, the
refore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offend
ing article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as
author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petiti
oner and Tugas are in this case. Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual p
articipation in the preparation and publication of the controversial article and
his approval thereof as it was written. Moreover, his alibi, which was consider
ed meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help C
linic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending
physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him from performing his w
ork. However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the
appellate court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of
the Supreme Court, But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial co
urt convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afo
ul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy .
222 | P a g e
As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject articl
e in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by th
e mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comm
ent. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the libelous arti
cles, to wit: The banner headlines of the offending article read: KUNG TOTOONG NA
KATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA
NAGPUNTA!
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DU
N SI ANNABELLE! On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in
smaller but bold letters, are: HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAM
I RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG H
INDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON
NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR
ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA
NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, SA PILIPINAS NOON. MILYON-MILYON ANG
INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circu
mstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or ju
ridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whet
her the statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
223 | P a g e
entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would n
aturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense. To say that the article, in its entirety,
is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones cons
cience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation (that the compl
ainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipi
nos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or
defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family re
turned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastr
el (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through
irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, consideri
ng that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified
and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants. Neither can pet
itioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of
the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against
public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public
figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fa
ll within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are
false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or
irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may
give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered pub
lic figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people,
including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do n
ot have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminat
ely airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in p
rint, about their personal lives.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel
should be upheld.
224 | P a g e
Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito, Dolore
s, in the morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver her
3-page letter-answer written in yellow pad and addressed to the station subcomma
nder.
At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to and inst
ructed Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white, long,
ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the house
at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who immediately re
ad the three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn followed sui
t afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching home late in th
e afternoon of March 15, 1991.
The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was addressed
to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the information in Cri
minal Case No. 8806-R, this unsigned letter reads: If your husband can't show any
proof of his makating dila then comply & if your husband can't understand this
simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig isang tukang pa
milya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya
kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa
Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa
siyang marumi at putang ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng
tao.Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin.Siya ang
magnanakaw at
mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas ka
yo sa lote ninyo.Pinalakad ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo
magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna ang sarili ninyo. Ma
s mukha pang magnanakaw ang asawa mo para malinaw.
The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following addendum
written in ink at the back page thereof which reads:
226 | P a g e
Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang mukha mo at ikaw pa ang mag
papablotter sa akin para pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo masasabi
na pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa inyo. Tanga. The third letter, a pho
tocopy of Dolores signed letter dated March 15, 1991, to the Sub-Station 5 Comman
der of BCP purportedly in reply to the statement given by Fe Alejandro to the po
lice station on March 3, 1991, reads, in part, as follows:
The Sub Station Commander Sub-Station 5 Marcos Highway, B.C.
Dear sir:
cralawxxxxxxxxx
Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a maniac.Pumasok
siya sa lote ko sa garahe na naging shelter (temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagk
atapos ng lindol (3 weeks after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas a
ng zipper ng pantaloon nakayapak na walang sapin sa paa.Tulog na kami.We were aw
akened by the constant barking of my dogs.I have 3 native dogs but 1 was slaught
ered by Mr. Cerelito Alejandro '.He is even a dognapper. My Manang Louie can rel
ate the incident since we were out of the country x x x.I don't trust him as my
kapitbahay na bantay salakay.In simple tagalog
magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon dahil takaw na takaw at walang maibili.
It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged with libel un
der four (4) separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804-R, 8805-R and 8806-R and raff
led to Branch 6 of the court.
227 | P a g e
latter turned it over to Cerelito, no one opened or read the offending letter co
ntained therein. Prescinding therefrom, Dolores argues against the existence of
libel, citing, for the purpose, American jurisprudence holding that "where libel
ous matter is communicated only to a person defamed and he voluntarily discloses
the contents of the libelous communication to others, the originator of the lib
el is not responsible for the
publication."Dolores argues that since the obnoxious letter was addressed to spo
uses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro, Fe was, insofar as Cerelito is concerned, not a
third person for purposes of publication. She further declares that to call the
husband (Cerelito) a thief in connection with a charge that he and his wife had
stolen goods, is not to speak words of defamation of him alone so as to make the
utterance in the presence of his wife a publication.
Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter, aft
er it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has be
en written. If the statement is sent straight to a person for whom it is written
there is no publication of it. The reason for this is that 'a communication of
the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though
it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has
of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him.
In People vs. Silvela, the Court ruled that sending an unsealed libelous letter
to the offended party constitutes publication. In the present case, there is no
dispute that the unsealed envelope containing the libelous letter was handed by
Dolores to Evelyn Arcartado. Contextually, there was a reasonable probability th
at the contents of the unsealed envelope, particularly the libelous letter, coul
d have been exposed to be read by Evelyn before delivering the same to Cerelito.
However, Evelyn categorically admitted not reading the letter at the first inst
ance, reading it only after securing Cerelito's permission.
Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute pu
blication, for the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in r
elation to its writer and the person defamed therein. Fe, the wife, is, in conte
xt, a third person to whom the publication was made. Finally, the Court cannot g
ive credence to Dolores' allegation that she is not the author of the unsigned l
ibelous letter. It cannot be overstressed that she herself handed the unsigned l
etter to Evelyn Arcartado with specific instructions
229 | P a g e
to give the same to Fe Alejandro. Likewise, the contents of the letters are basi
cally reiteration/elaborations of Dolores' previous writing on the wall and her
letter to the BCP Sub-Station commander. What the Court of Appeals said on this
point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance.
The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently esta
blished. Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA
and the trial court in adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two c
ounts of libel cannot be sustained.
230 | P a g e
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present c
ase. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of
Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind
these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in
any courts of justice, so as we can prove 'who is who once and for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name; (Signed) JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. Atty-in- Fact of the pre
sent Court Administrator of the entire Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodrig
uez Y. Reyes. Copy furnished: All concerned.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: 'Satan, senil
e, stupid, [E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against a
ccused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only
of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: 'G
inagawa ka lang gago dito.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to
him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization 'Nagkakaisang Sam
ahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that
he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-co
mplainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had sign
ed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither coul
d he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated
232 | P a g e
August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit
which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr.
could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had s
ent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pi
eraz.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 1997 fi
nding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA which, in its Dec
ision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial
court.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated Marc
h 13, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of libel?
Decision:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious im
putation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omis
sion, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredi
t, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it m
ust be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is pu
blication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
233 | P a g e
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person a
gainst whom it has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states
that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictate
d the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complai
ned of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when foun
d in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply w
as addressed to respondent himself.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be const
rued in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense. For the purpose of
determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down
the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had th
e following to say on this point:In determining whether the specified matter is
libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously
applicable:(1)That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter su
ch a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which
the public would naturally understand what was uttered.(2)The published matter a
lleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disr
egard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being call
ed to account.The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the m
inds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanatio
n in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the s
ting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.ry
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August
18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using
234 | P a g e
when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation
depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal re
lations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surroun
ding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamator
y words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, g
rammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately,
but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship
between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the inte
ntion of the offender at the time.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the positi
on of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against
the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vi
ce-Mayor. However, it should be noted that such scathing words were uttered by p
etitioner in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of A
ppeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the mon
etization of accrued leave credits of petitioner.
The rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken
in his favor. The slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight
slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of an
ger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a
light felony.
237 | P a g e
Decision:
The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provi
sions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one of
fense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no per
son shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established
is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac Ri
ver System without prior permit from the authorities concerned.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the
existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be establish
ed is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abid
e by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 o
f the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, neglig
ence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage t
o property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to s
ay that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) o
r negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.
241 | P a g e
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precauti
on on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking i
nto consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligen
ce; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, t
ime and place.
Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the bus
company for 18 years and has undergone training courses and seminars to improve
his skills as a driver. He is expected to be well aware of his responsibilities
to his passengers. Not only must he make sure that they reach their destination
s on time, he must also ensure their safety while they are boarding, during the
entire trip, and upon disembarking from the vehicle.
Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident, pe
titioners liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by th
e lower courts, must be sustained.
No, The records show that petitioner stated under oath that he alighted from the
bus and saw that several people were assisting the injured party and corroborat
ed by other witnesses.
The assistance required by Article 365, Revised Penal Code, is one which may be
in the hands of the offender to give. We must therefore take into consideration
the type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and place of th
e incident, is capable of giving.
Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is not a hit-and-run driver
. He exerted efforts to see to it that the victim had been attended to. There we
re several people assisting the victim, including his co-employees working for t
he bus company. The injured party was carried from the terminal, to a vehicle, t
hen to the hospital. Before petitioner was given clearance by the dispatcher to
leave, an hour later, he was assured that the victim was brought already to the
hospital. We note that petitioner had a bus full of passengers requiring also hi
s attention. He could only do so much, so that the burden of helping the injured
party was shared by the bus company personnel and other good Samaritans.
243 | P a g e
accused part. The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the accused intention
ally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that des
pite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of
applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along
the traffic scene. For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement
of accused vehicle to the confluence that the Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, w
as moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the truck would have still p
roceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and woul
d have stopped only after a certain distance.
It is
more
ty of
ity
d.
The court is convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the n
umber of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intent
ional felony.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where t
he assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in
determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to
be true.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby i
njury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a pr
udent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, fores
ee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course
or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failur
e to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before n
egligence can be held to exist. GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution a
nd liable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
245 | P a g e
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather
the result of a single act of reckless driving, accused should be held guilty o
f the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with s
erious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitut
es two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary m
eans for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be i
mposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since
No, The slight physical injuries caused by the accused to the ten other victims
through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted
light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they
should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations shoul
d have, therefore, been filed.
However, It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multip
le frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial cou
rt. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplici
ty of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is
deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are c
harged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to i
t before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are cha
rged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
246 | P a g e
the floor, blood flowing. He tried to get up, but Navarro gave him a fist blow o
n he forehead which floored him. Unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record
on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
The RTC of Lucena City rendered decision finding Petitioner Navarro guilty beyon
d reasonable doubt of homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of th
e RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the tape recorder recorded by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence
in view of R.A. No. 4200 which prohibits wire tapping?
Held: Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made
. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: x x
x Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was no
t private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is a
uthenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the c
onversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recor
ding; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speake
rs on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was t
hus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established : (1) that there was a heated e
xchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blott
er of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occu
rred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst
of it.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed.
250 | P a g e
The trial court ruled that Gaanan and Laconico violated Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. However the appellate court affi
rmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arr
angement under R.A. 4200?
Decision:
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, di
ctagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 as the use th
ereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of telephone line. The tel
ephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happen
ed to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction t
hat in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular cla
uses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated exp
ressions, but the whole and every part must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in Section 1 of RA 42
00, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to co
mprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use
of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of the telephone. It refe
rs to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party
or parties overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usag
e and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telep
hone conversation.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly
in favour of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whet
her or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase device or arrangement ,
the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly
be with the use of the enumerated devices in R.A. No. 4200 or others of
252 | P a g e
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such
devices or arrangements.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The petitioner is Acquitted of the crime of
violation of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- Wiretapping Act
.
253 | P a g e
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occ
asion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, ve
hicular accident or civil disturbance.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taki
ng, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the lat
ter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking o
f a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consen
t of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by
using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Carnapp
ing is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of u
nlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. From the foregoi
ng, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, i
t is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which wou
ld apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned
in the anti-carnapping law.
255 | P a g e
actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain from the taki
ng of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offend
er himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or t
hat the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of per
sons, or by using force upon things.
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of c
arnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that
the nature of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful.
Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the
vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an unlawful
one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Pol
ice Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately
admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join t
heir plan to sell the vehicle.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted t
he crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and no
t the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property
through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully
divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required
is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession o
f the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderam
iento of personal property from another against the latter's will through violen
ce or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging
to another is imputable to the offender.
257 | P a g e
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Under Section 9 (a
)
of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imp
risonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation. In the
case at bar, upon interposing an appeal petitioners should be precluded from se
eking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished
the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which i
s simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, al
though already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only a
fter failing in his appeal.
261 | P a g e
opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having
become final by the filing of an application for probation.
263 | P a g e
than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive an
d unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "pre
vious conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime which is entirely dif
ferent from that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime whi
ch arose out of a single act or transaction as petitioner would have the court t
o understand. As held in Rura vs. Lopea, the word previous" refers to conviction,
and not to commission of a crime.
It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore,
the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning i
s clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for con
struction or interpretation.
265 | P a g e
In the meantime, the trial court found Pacita and her mother guilty beyond reaso
nable doubt of the crime of theft and PD 1612 respectively.
Subsequently, the trial court also rendered judgment in the case of petitioner a
nd found him also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating PD 1612.
Wasting no time, petitioner appealed the adverse decision to the Court of Appeal
s alleging that the lower court erred in not finding that the testimony of prose
cution witnesses are all hearsay evidence and that because of said failure, his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not sufficiently established. The court of App
eals however affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence the present appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Pacita in the crime of theft is sufficient to e
stablish petitioners conviction for violation of PD 1612?
Whether or not the prosecution based on the pieces of evidence presented was abl
e to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
No. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered t
he requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that
Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of he
r then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss t
hereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces
of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Br
anch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not constitut
e proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. T
here is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already
final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the instant ca
se.
267 | P a g e
No. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime o
f robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal o
r accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accuse
d knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of v
alue has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (
4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for anoth
er. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presump
tion of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article,
item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thef
t, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The sto
len property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosec
ution to prove the crime of fencing.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that the
prosecution proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimony of J
ovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that Pacita had con
fessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner; the joint
affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of the comp
laint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said investigation
; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of Paci
ta and her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case
No. 92-13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts of the st
enographic notes taken during the proceedings; the supplemental sworn statement
of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and, the testimony of M
acario before the trial court. First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 19
92 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of j
ewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prov
e the truth of the said admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was no
t a party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only part
ies to a case are bound by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case ar
e not bound by the judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimo
ny in the said criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecuti
on did not present
268 | P a g e
two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; an
d, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crim
e, since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court
will fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People
v. Dator.
270 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution had sufficiently established the elements of fenc
ing as against the petitioner?
Decision: No. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or i
n any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he kno
ws, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the cri
me of robbery or theft. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have par
ticipated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved
in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecut
ed as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (
2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal. P. D. No. 1612 was enac
ted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes
of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft
could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612
. However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but bec
omes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robber
y and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distin
ct offenses. The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised
Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem
inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 cre
ates a presumption of fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the va
lue of the property.
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential eleme
nts of the crime of fencing as follows:
272 | P a g e
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a pr
incipal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and s
ells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows
or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value ha
s been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There i
s on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Conseque
ntly, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the exi
stence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the esse
ntial elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense. It is an
ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9)
.
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of
fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mende
z confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Ros
ita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that a
fter Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of
the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime.
It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private As complainant Rosita
Lim
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim.
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a cr
ime of robbery or theft has been committed. There was no sufficient proof of the
unlawful taking of anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an extrajudicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant
to petitioner.
273 | P a g e
However, an
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional pre
sumption of innocence.
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilt
y of fencing .
275 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the crime has been extinguished by prescription?
Decision:
Yes. The SC answered herein petitioners argument in the negative. First the Sc h
eld that Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of offen
ses defined and penalized by special laws. Wherein it provides that Prescription
should begin from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings. In other words if the commission of the crime is known, th
e prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was discovered, and th
e running of the prescriptive period is tolled by the institution of judicial pr
oceeding.
In the case at bar Pacificador allegedly committed the acts from Dec. of 1975 to
Jan. of 1976. The Highcourt stated that the provision on R.A. 3019 in which cri
mes prescribed in 15 years could not be appreciated in this case because it seem
s to show that prior to the amendment of Sec. 11 of 3019 by B.P. 195 which was a
pproved on March, 1982, the prescriptive period then was only 10 years, wherefor
e it could not be applied on the ground that such amendment is not favourable to
the accused. The SC also held that while petitioners herein allegation of havin
g no knowledge of the crime, well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that th
e registration of deeds in the public real registry is a notice thereof to the w
hole world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. Henc
e, even If the period of prescription is reckoned from Feb. 18, 1977, the crime
had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the Sand
iganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988.
277 | P a g e
negative. Petitioners contention that all heads of offices have to rely to a reas
onable extent on their subordinate and on the good faith of those who prepare bi
ds, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations When however, that infraction c
onsists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on
a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear sense o
f conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail. Petitioner cannot seek
refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when she relied on the recommendations
of her subordinates. Petitioner is an Assistant Regional Director, not the head
of office or the final approving authority whom the Arias doctrine is applicabl
e.
In relation to the second issue of sufficiency of evidence, the Supreme Court el
ucidated the main elements of the crime provided for in sec. 3 R.A. NO. 3019 cor
rupt practices of officers, these are 1. The accused are public officers or priv
ate persons charged in conspiracy with them 2. Said public officers commit the p
rohibited acts during the performance of their official duties as in relation to
their public position. 3. They caused undue injury to any party, whether the go
vernment or a private party 4. Such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benef
its, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officers have ac
ted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
These requisites being attendant in this case, the SC held that indeed Petition
er is guilty with the crime.
279 | P a g e
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and co
nsciously possessed the said drug.
It has been ruled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evi
dence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of e
vidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evide
nce to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex"
Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support h
is claim.
286 | P a g e
The recording of marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the ele
ments for the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. The recording or nonrecordin
g thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as lon
g as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven. In the case at bar, S
PO2 Patio, the poseur-buyer, testified on the circumstances regarding the sale of
the shabu for which petitioners were charged and convicted.
Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the
absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosec
ution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug s
ubject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurispr
udence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation Wha
t is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the instant case, both were suffi
ciently shown by the prosecution.
Petitioners deny that a buy-bust operation took place and claim that the evidenc
e against them is planted evidence. Denial is a weak form of defense, particular
ly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence just like in th
e case before us.
288 | P a g e
Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that appellant
s explanation of how she came into possession of the package without knowing tha
t it contained shabu is credible and sufficient to rebut the prima facie presump
tion of animus possidendi.
290 | P a g e
and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good faith as a defens
e against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms as this is a malum pr
ohibitum. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is t
he accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as posse
ssion itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the pros
ecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused w
ho owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to po
ssess or carry the same.
Sayco, a mere confidential civilian agent (as defined under Section 6(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866) is not authorized to receiv
e the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The
memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did not l
egitimize his possession thereof. Neither was Sayco authorized to bear the subje
ct firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order issued to
petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mer
e confidential civilian agent. Worse, he was not even acting as such confidentia
l civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm and ammunitions
. While this Court sustains the conviction for illegal possession of firearms, a
further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision i
n the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law
. RA 8294, amending PD 1866, lowered the penalty to be imposed provided no other
crime was committed.
There being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering
that Sayco accepted the subject firearm and ammunitions from the government und
er the erroneous notion that the memorandum receipt and mission order issued to
him legitimized the possession thereof, Sayco is sentenced to serve an indetermi
nate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correc
cional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days o
f prision correccional as maximum.
292 | P a g e
explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised
Penal Code. It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the
definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an
aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing any of the crimes define
d in the Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to do away with the use o
f explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating circ
umstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Cod
e. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the
aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Li
ke the aggravating circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12, evident premeditation
in paragraph 13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating c
ircumstance added by RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Art
icle 248.
Issue:
Whether or not the killing be qualified by explosion under Art. 248 of the Revis
ed Penal Code or by the use of an explosive under the provisions of RA 8294?
Decision:
R.A. 8294 is inapplicable in the instant case and thus what may be properly cons
idered, the accused-appellant having been sufficiently informed of the nature of
the accusation against them, the crime is Murder committed by means of explosion
in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.
R.A. No. 8294, even though favorable to the accused, cannot be made applicable i
n this case because before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be pro
perly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately establis
hed that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without th
e corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows the same requisites
in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, which is
a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not ob
tain in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, no evi
dence was also adduced by the prosecution to show that the possession by Comadre
of the explosive was unlawful. What the
294 | P a g e
law emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. What is per se aggravating is the u
se of unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The mere use of explosives
is not.
295 | P a g e
other crimes. These amendments obviously blur the distinctions between murder an
d homicide on one hand, and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in mur
der or homicide on the other. We have declared that the formulation in RA 8294,
i.e., "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firear
m, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circu
mstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single offense the illega
l possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the use o
f an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in com
mitting homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the
two (2) separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal Code an
d qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under PD 1
866; in other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for ill
egal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a spe
cial aggravating circumstance.
The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered however as a special aggra
vating circumstance in the Murder Case and Frustrated Murder Case. For one, it w
as not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in
the Informations for murder and frustrated murder, which is necessary under our
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, even if alleged, the circ
umstance cannot be retroactively applied to prejudice accused-appellant; it must
be stressed that RA 8294 took effect only on 6 July 1994 while the crimes invol
ved herein were committed on 4 November 1993. In any event there is no evidence
proving the illicit character of the .38 cal. revolver used by accusedappellant
in killing Mayolito Cabatu and in trying to kill Florencia Cabatu, as to which r
equisite of the crime the record is eerily silent.
297 | P a g e
and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to whom she
sold Jovitas jewelry. Thus, petitioner was invited for questioning in Camp Crame.
Nonetheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft and Adoracion was also cha
rged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612 was f
iled. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that th
ey sold pieces of jewelry to the petitioner at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
The court found probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for
his arrest. Thereafter, an Information was filed with the RTC charging the
petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612.
Judgment was rendered finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty of fen
cing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable doubt.
While the trial court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond rea
sonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612, which was affirmed by the Court of App
eals.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the pet
itioner guilty for violation of the Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise know
n as the Anti-Fencing Law?
Decision:
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of ro
bbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or ac
complice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, pos
sesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in a
ny manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has bee
n derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused kn
ew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) t
here is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
299 | P a g e
In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelr
y was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from
which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property s
old to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove
one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court
to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on
the value of the property.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption
of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, ite
m, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, a
nd prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The stolen pr
operty subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely
corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution
to prove the crime of fencing.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Decision of the trial cour
t is reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violati
ng P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonabl
e doubt.
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second element of the crime. The drawee or maker of the check may overcome the p
rima facie evidence, either by paying the amount of the check, or by making arra
ngements for its payment in full within five banking days after receipt of notic
e that such check was not paid by the drawee bank.
The ruling of the Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case. I
n acquitting the petitioner therein, the Court explained that this statute actua
lly offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act, which o
perates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action
is abated. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check w
ithin five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence
of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to precl
ude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on the peti
tioner. The petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairnes
s require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her
to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
Moreover, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not enou
gh. This is because while Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice of
dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the la
w, i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee b
ank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or re
fusal, a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for co
nviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter o
f the
Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only
that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accus
ed has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The
consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Thus, if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of disho
nor to the said corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew or
issued the check for and in its behalf. The Court explained in Lao v. Court of
Appeals, that there was no obligation to forward the notice addressed to it to t
he employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no crimi
nal liability under BP 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility u
nder B.P. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice
of
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Decision:
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense is com
mitted when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for va
lue (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the paym
ent of such check in full upon its presentment; and (4) the subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the ba
nk to stop payment.
In this case, the Court found that although the first element of the offense exi
sts, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer a
t the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit i
n the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presu
mption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first an
d third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted.
If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor
of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such k
nowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from th
e dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption canno
t hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the othe
r party has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosec
ution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merel
y rely on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means
that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not
that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this case w
ere issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. Bu
t we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, pet
itioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficie
nt to cover them when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there
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offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she depo
sited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received from t
he bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation drawn against insufficient fun
ds stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice
attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the complainant, and that petit
ioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make arrangements for
their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.
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were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. They first demanded guns, moneys an
d animals from Valentin Gabertan. Apparently, it was only when they entered the
house and saw his wife when they thought of raping her. The prosecution likewise
established that appellant and his co-accused took chickens, a watch and money
from complainants through violence.
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