Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half

People vs. Odilao
Facts: Herein respondent David S.
Odilao, Jr. together with Enrique
Samonte and Mario Yares, was charged
with Estafa in an Information[2] filed by
the Asst. City Prosecutor Feliciano with
the RTC of Cebu City.
the said accused, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with
one another, having received in trust
from Trans Eagle Corporation a luxury
car known as Jeep Cherokee Sport
4wd valued at P1,199,520.00 with the
agreement that they would sign the
document of sale if they are interested
to buy the same and with the obligation
the Court enunciated the following
ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul,[23] to wit:
The preliminary investigation conducted
by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case
exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. In
turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused in Court.
Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the fiscal has
the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court or not,

to return the said car to Trans Eagle

Corporation if they are not interested,
the said accused, once in possession of
the said luxury car, far from complying
with their obligation, with deliberate
intent, with intent to gain, with
unfaithfulness and grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there
misappropriate, misapply and convert
into their own personal use and benefit
the same or the amount of
P1,199,520.00 which is the equivalent
value thereof, and inspite of repeated
demands made upon them to let them
comply with their obligation to return
the luxury car, they have failed and
refused and instead denied to have
received the luxury car known as Jeep
once the case had already been brought
to Court whatever disposition the fiscal
may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the
Court must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been
arraigned or not and whether it was due
to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice
whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the
motion or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial
court refuses to grant the motion
to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon

Cherokee Sport 4WD and up to the

present time still fail and refuse to do
so, to the damage and prejudice of
Trans Eagle Corporation in the amount
aforestated.
Issue: W/N the court of appeals
committed reversible error in granting
the injunction sought by the respondent
which enjoined the trial court from
implementing the warrant of arrest and
from further conducting proceedings in
the case until the petition for review of
the reinvestigation report of the city
prosecutor is resolved by the
department of justice?
Held:
the directive of the Secretary of
Justice will there not be a vacuum
in the prosecution? . . .
The answer is simple. The role of the
fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to
see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of
the person accused before the Courts.
Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to
proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court
to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent
Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as
its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was
filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.
Thus, in Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank,
Inc.,[24] the Court held that the trial
court judges reliance on the
prosecutors averment that the
Secretary of Justice had recommended
the dismissal of the case against the
petitioner was, to say the least, an
abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie
case, in blatant violation of this Courts
pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul .
IT BEARS STRESSING THAT THE COURT
IS HOWEVER NOT BOUND TO ADOPT
THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE SINCE THE COURT IS
MANDATED TO INDEPENDENTLY
EVALUATE OR ASSESS THE MERITS OF
THE CASE, AND MAY EITHER AGREE OR
DISAGREE WITH THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE. RELIANCE ALONE ON THE
RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE WOULD BE AN ABDICATION OF

THE TRIAL COURTS DUTY AND

JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE PRIMA
FACIE CASE.
Verily, the proceedings in the criminal
case pending in the trial court had been
held in abeyance long enough. Under
Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
suspension of arraignment of an
accused in cases where a petition
for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice or the Office
of the President shall not exceed
sixty days counted from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing
office. Although in this case, at the
time that the trial court deferred the
arraignment in its Order dated October
30, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure had not yet taken effect and
there was as yet no prescribed period of
time for the suspension of arraignment,
we believe that the period of one and a
half years from October 30, 2000 to
June 13, 2002, when the trial court
ordered the implementation of the
warrant of arrest, was more than ample
time to give private complainant the
opportunity to obtain a resolution of her
petition for review from the DOJ. Indeed,
with more than three years having
elapsed, it is now high time for the
continuation of the trial on the merits in
the criminal case below as the sixty-day
period counted from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ,
provided for in Section 11, Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

now applicable to the case at bar, had

long lapsed.
People vs. Oden
Facts: The Court is confronted with yet
another case where a home ceases
being an abode of safety and
protection, this time to a motherless
daughter who has accused her own
father, herein appellant, of having
repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her
"by means of force and intimidation."
Appellant Mario Oden was charged with
twelve (12) counts of "rape,".
"Due to fear, Anna Liza did not report to
anyone all the twelve (12) incidents of
sexual molestation.
"However, unknown to Anna Liza, her
Ate Mercy (wife of the complainants
brother Arnold Oden) witnessed the
rape that took place on 08 January
2001. Ate Mercy saw through a small
hole on the wall inside the house separating her bedroom from that of
Anna Lizas what accused had done to
her (Anna Liza). And it was not only Ate
Mercy who witnessed the rape. Arnold
Oden (brother of Anna Liza) also saw
what the accused had done to Anna
Liza. Arnold was mad at accused;
however he was not able to do anything
because he, together with the rest of
the siblings, were afraid of their father
(accused) - the reason being that
everytime accused would get angry, he
would beat all of them.
"Nonetheless, Ate Mercy reported to a
neighbor, Nanay Ludy, Anna Lizas
harrowing experience on 08 January

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
2001. In turn, Nanay Ludy talked to
Anna Liza and directed her to report the
incident to the barangay. Anna Liza
heeded Nanay Ludys directive. She
proceeded to the barangay - together
with her Ate Mercy and Ate Marilou
(wives of Anna Lizas older brothers) and reported her fathers outrageous
wrongdoings. On 28 January 2001,
based on Anna Lizas sworn statement,
the barangay officials, together with the
police, arrested accused-appellant."2
After the prosecution had rested its case
with the testimony of its lone witness
(the private complainant), Atty. Harley
Padolina (PAO) manifested that the
defense would not present any
evidence.
Issue: W/N the accused plea has been
improvidently made? YES
Held: In the review of his various cases
by this Court, appellant asserts that his
plea of guilty has been improvidently
made on the mistaken belief that he
would be given a lighter penalty with his
plea of guilt.4 On this particular score,
the Solicitor General agrees.
THERE IS MERIT IN THE OBSERVATION.
Section 3, Rule 116, of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure is explicit on the
procedure to be taken when an accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence. - When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the

consequences of his plea and shall

require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf."
The trial court is mandated (1) to
conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still
prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability, and (3)
to inquire whether or not the accused
wishes to present evidence on his
behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. The records must show the
events that have actually taken place
during the inquiry, the words spoken
and the warnings given, with special
attention to the age of the accused, his
educational attainment and socioeconomic status, the manner of his
arrest and detention, the attendance of
counsel in his behalf during the
custodial and preliminary investigations,
and the opportunity of his defense
counsel to confer with him. All these
matters should be able to provide
trustworthy indices of his competence
to give a free and informed plea of guilt.
The trial court must describe the
essential elements of the crimes the
accused is charged with and their
respective penalties and civil liabilities.
It should also direct a series of
questions to defense counsel to
determine whether or not he has
conferred with the accused and has
completely explained to him the legal
implications of a plea of guilt.5

The process is mandatory and absent

any showing that it has been duly
observed, a searching inquiry cannot be
said to have been aptly undertaken.6
The trial court must be extra solicitous
to see to it that the accused fully
understands the meaning and
importance of his plea. In capital
offenses7 particularly, life being at
stake, one cannot just lean on the
presumption that the accused has
understood his plea.8
While the records of the case are indeed
bereft of any indication that the rule has
sufficiently been complied with, the
evidence for the prosecution outside of
the plea of guilt, nevertheless, would
adequately establish the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.9
THE MANNER BY WHICH THE PLEA OF
GUILT IS MADE, WHETHER
IMPROVIDENTLY OR NOT, LOSES MUCH
OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE WHERE THE
CONVICTION CAN BE BASED ON
INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE PROVING THE
COMMISSION BY THE PERSON ACCUSED
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.10
THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED AT THE
WITNESS STAND ANNA LIZA. SHE
RECOUNTED STRAIGHTFORWARDLY AND
IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL THE TWELVE
HARROWING AND HUMILIATING
INCIDENTS OF RAPE SHE HAD
SUFFERED IN THE HANDS OF HER OWN
FATHER.

Soriano vs. People, BSP and PDIC

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
Facts: A bank officer violates the DOSRI
2 law when he acquires bank funds for
his personal benefit, even if such
acquisition was facilitated by a
fraudulent loan application. Directors,
officers, stockholders, and their related
interests cannot be allowed to interpose
the fraudulent nature of the loan as a
defense to escape culpability for their
circumvention of Section 83 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 337. HILARIO P. SORIANO
and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals
by direct participation, with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
and taking advantage of their position
as President of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Branch
Manager of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel-San Miguel Branch [sic], a duly
organized banking institution under
Philippine Laws, conspiring
confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully
and feloniously by making it appear that
one Enrico Carlos filled up the
application/information sheet and filed
the aforementioned loan documents
when in truth and in fact Enrico Carlos
did not participate in the execution of
said loan documents and that by virtue
of said falsification and with deceit and
intent to cause damage, the accused
succeeded in securing a loan in the
amount of eight million pesos
(PhP8,000,000.00) from the Rural Bank
of San Miguel-San Ildefonso branch in
the name of Enrico Carlos which amount
of PhP8 million representing the loan
proceeds the accused thereafter
converted the same amount to their

own personal gain and benefit, to the

damage and prejudice of the Rural Bank
of San Miguel-San Ildefonso branch, its
creditors, the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, and the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
The other Information 17 dated
November 10, 2000 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001, was for
violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as
amended by PD 1795. The said
provision refers to the prohibition
against the so-called DOSRI loans.
NOTE: 2 INFORMATION WAS FILED
ESTAFA and VIOLATION OF DOSRI LAWS
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The CA denied the petition on both
issues presented by petitioner. On the
first issue, the CA determined that the
BSP letter, which petitioner
characterized to be a fatally infirm
complaint, was not actually a complaint,
but a transmittal or cover letter only.
This transmittal letter merely contained
a summary of the affidavits which were
attached to it. It did not contain any
averment of personal knowledge of the
events and transactions that constitute
the elements of the offenses charged.
Being a mere transmittal letter, it need
not comply with the requirements of
Section 3 (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. 30
The CA further determined that the five
affidavits attached to the transmittal
letter should be considered as the
complaint-affidavits that charged
petitioner with violation of Section 83 of
RA 337 and for Estafa thru Falsification
of Commercial Documents. These

complaint-affidavits complied with the

mandatory requirements set out in the
Rules of Court they were subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public and
subsequently certified by State
Prosecutor Fonacier, who personally
examined the affiants and was
convinced that the affiants fully
understood their sworn statements. 31
AEScHa
ANENT THE SECOND GROUND, THE CA
FOUND NO MERIT IN PETITIONER'S
ARGUMENT THAT THE VIOLATION OF
THE DOSRI LAW AND THE COMMISSION
OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF
COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS ARE
INHERENTLY INCONSISTENT WITH EACH
OTHER. It explained that the test in
considering a motion to quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, is whether the
facts alleged, when hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense charged. The appellate court
held that this test was sufficiently met
because the allegations in the assailed
informations, when hypothetically
admitted, clearly constitute the
elements of Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents and Violation of
DOSRI law. 32
On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to
quash 21 these informations on two
grounds: that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged,
and that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
1. Is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 the proper remedy
against an Order denying a
Motion to Quash?
2. Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari
the proper remedy against an
Order denying a Motion to
Quash?
1st Issued Held:
The second issue was raised by
petitioner in the context of his Motion to
Quash Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. 43 It is settled that in
considering a motion to quash on such
ground, the test is "whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements
of the offense charged as defined by
law. The trial court may not consider a
situation contrary to that set forth in the
criminal complaint or information. Facts
that constitute the defense of the
petitioner[s] against the charge under
the information must be proved by
[him] during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper
grounds for a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute
the offense". 44 SaITHC
We have examined the two informations
against petitioner and we find that they
contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish

the essential elements of the crime of

DOSRI violation and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for
violation of DOSRI rules, the information
alleged that petitioner Soriano was the
president of RBSM; that he was able to
indirectly obtain a loan from RBSM by
putting the loan in the name of
depositor Enrico Carlos; and that he did
this without complying with the
requisite board approval, reportorial,
and ceiling requirements.
In Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001 for
estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents, the information alleged that
petitioner, by taking advantage of his
position as president of RBSM, falsified
various loan documents to make it
appear that an Enrico Carlos secured a
loan of P8 million from RBSM; that
petitioner succeeded in obtaining the
loan proceeds; that he later converted
the loan proceeds to his own personal
gain and benefit; and that his action
caused damage and prejudice to RBSM,
its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC.
TEHIaD
Significantly, this is not the first
occasion that we adjudge the
sufficiency of similarly worded
informations. In Soriano v. People, 45
involving the same petitioner in this
case (but different transactions), we
also reviewed the sufficiency of
informations for DOSRI violation and
estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents, which were almost
identical, mutatis mutandis, with the

subject informations herein. We held in

Soriano v. People
that there is no basis for the quashal of
the informations as "they contain
material allegations charging Soriano
with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa
thru falsification of commercial
documents".
Petitioner raises the theory that he
could not possibly be held liable for
estafa in concurrence with the charge
for DOSRI violation. According to him,
the DOSRI charge presupposes that he
acquired a loan, which would make the
loan proceeds his own money and which
he could neither possibly
misappropriate nor convert to the
prejudice of another, as required by the
statutory definition of estafa. 46 On the
other hand, if petitioner did not acquire
any loan, there can be no DOSRI
violation to speak of. Thus, petitioner
posits that the two offenses cannot coexist. This theory does not persuade us.
Petitioner's theory is based on the false
premises that the loan was extended to
him by the bank in his own name, and
that he became the owner of the loan
proceeds. Both premises are wrong.
ACTISE
The bank money (amounting to P8
million) which came to the possession of
petitioner was money held in trust or
administration by him for the bank, in
his fiduciary capacity as the President of
said bank. 47 It is not accurate to say
that petitioner became the owner of the
P8 million because it was the proceeds
of a loan. That would have been correct
if the bank knowingly extended the loan

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
to petitioner himself. But that is not the
case here. According to the information
for estafa, the loan was supposed to be
for another person, a certain "Enrico
Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification,
made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos"
applied for the loan when in fact he
("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such
fraudulent device, petitioner obtained
the loan proceeds and converted the
same. Under these circumstances, it
cannot be said that petitioner became
the legal owner of the P8 million. Thus,
petitioner remained the bank's fiduciary
with respect to that money, which
makes it capable of misappropriation or
conversion in his hands.
The next question is whether there can
also be, at the same time, a charge for
DOSRI violation in such a situation
wherein the accused bank officer did
not secure a loan in his own name, but
was alleged to have used the name of
another person in order to indirectly
secure a loan from the bank. We answer
this in the affirmative. In sum, the
informations filed against petitioner do
not negate each other.
2nd Issue Held:
In fine, the Court has consistently held
that a special civil action for certiorari is
not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash an
information. The proper procedure in
such a case is for the accused to enter a
plea, go to trial without prejudice on his
part to present the special defenses he
had invoked in his motion to quash and
if after trial on the merits, an adverse

decision is rendered, to appeal

therefrom in the manner authorized by
law. Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA and instead, they
should have gone to trial and reiterated
the special defenses contained in their
motion to quash. There are no special or
exceptional circumstances in the
present case that would justify
immediate resort to a filing of a petition
for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not
commit any reversible error, much less,
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition.
People vs. Elarcosa and Orias

kitchen to prepare food, while Jose and

Jorge stayed in the living room with
Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias. 3
Since the rice was not cooked yet,
Rosemarie first served a plate of suman
to Elarcosa and accused-appellant
Orias, who were then engaged in a
conversation with her father, Jorge, and
her brother, Jose. She heard accusedappellant Orias asked her brother
why the latter did not attend the
dance at Sitio Nalibog. Her brother
replied that he was tired. Suddenly
thereafter, Elarcosa and accusedappellant Orias stood up and fired
their guns at Jose and Jorge.

Facts: Jorge, Segundina, Jose and

Rosemarie, all surnamed dela Cruz,
heard some persons calling out to them
from outside their house, which is
located Negros Occidental. Since the
voices of these persons were not
familiar to them, they did not open their
door immediately, and instead, they
waited for a few minutes in order to
observe and recognize these persons
first. It was only when one of them
identified himself as Mitsuel L. Elarcosa
(Elarcosa), an acquaintance of the
family, that Segundina lighted the
lamps, while Jose opened the door. 1
Elarcosa and his companion, accusedappellant Orias, then entered the house
and requested that supper be prepared
for them as they were roving. Both
Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias
were Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) members. 2 Segundina
and Rosemarie immediately went to the

Segundina, who was busy preparing

supper in the kitchen, ran towards the
living room and embraced her son, Jose,
who was already lying on the floor.
Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias
then immediately searched the wooden
chest containing clothes, money in the
amount of forty thousand pesos
(PhP40,000) intended for the
forthcoming wedding of Jose in October,
and a registration certificate of large
cattle. During this time, Rosemarie
escaped through the kitchen and hid in
the shrubs, which was about six (6)
extended arms length from their house.
She heard her mother crying loudly, and
after a series of gunshots, silence
ensued. 5
Shortly thereafter, Rosemarie
proceeded to the house of her cousin,
Gualberto Mechabe, who advised her to
stay in the house until the morning
since it was already dark and he had no

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
other companion who could help them.
The following morning, Rosemarie
returned to their house where she found
the dead bodies of her parents and her
brother. 6 The money in the amount of
PhP40,000, as well as the certificate of
registration of large cattle, were also
gone. 7
Eventually, Elarcosa and accusedappellant Orias, as well as a certain
Antonio David, Jr., were charged with
robbery with multiple homicide.
Issues:
1. W/N alibi of accused-appellant
Orias should be given wheight.
NO
2. W/N there is duplicity of offense?
(ground for a MTQ) YES
Held:
1st Issue:
Although the alibi of accused-appellant
Orias appears to have been
corroborated by a CAFGU member by
the name of Robert Arellano and by a
vendor present during the dance, said
defense is unworthy of belief not only
because of its inherent weakness and
the fact that accused-appellant Orias
was positively identified by Rosemarie,
but also because it has been held that
alibi becomes more unworthy of merit
where it is established mainly by the
accused himself, his relatives, friends,
and comrades-in-arms, 37 and not by
credible persons.

2nd Issue:
In the instant case, conspiracy is
manifested by the fact that the acts of
accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa
were coordinated. They were
synchronized in their approach to shoot
Jose and Jorge, and they were motivated
by a single criminal impulse, that is, to
kill the victims. Verily, conspiracy is
implied when the accused persons had
a common purpose and were united in
its execution. Spontaneous agreement
or active cooperation by all perpetrators
at the moment of the commission of the
crime is sufficient to create joint
criminal responsibility. 49
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ORIAS
SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF THREE
(3) COUNTS OF MURDER AND NOT
OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
MURDER
We, however, disagree with the findings
of the CA that accused-appellant Orias
committed the complex crime of
multiple murder. Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, which defines the
concept of complex crime, states:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies or
when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. (As amended by Act
No. 4000.)
In a complex crime, although two or
more crimes are actually committed,
they constitute only one crime in the
eyes of the law, as well as in the

conscience of the offender. Hence, there

is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime.
Complex crime has two (2) kinds. The
first is known as compound crime,
or when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave
felonies. The second is known as
complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.
CONSIDERING OUR HOLDING ABOVE,
WE RULE THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ORIAS IS GUILTY, NOT OF A COMPLEX
CRIME OF MULTIPLE MURDER, BUT OF
THREE (3) COUNTS OF MURDER FOR
THE DEATH OF THE THREE (3) VICTIMS.
Since there was only one
information filed against accusedappellant Orias and Elarcosa, the
Court observes that there is
duplicity of the offenses charged in
the said information. This is a
ground for a motion to quash as
three (3) separate acts of murder
were charged in the information.
Nonetheless, the failure of
accused-appellant Orias to
interpose an objection on this
ground constitutes waiver. 55

Albert vs. Sandiganbayan and

People

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
Facts: That in (sic) or about May 1990
and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused RAMON A.
ALBERT, a public officer, being then THE
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL HOME
MORTGAGE AND FINANCE
CORPORATION (NHMFC), occupying the
said position with a salary grade above
27, while in the performance of his
official function, committing the offense
in relation to his office, taking
advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with
accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the
Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc.
and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO,
then the President of the Buhangin
Residents and Employees Association
for Development, Inc., acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality
and or gross neglect of duty, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause undue injury to the
government and public interest,
enter and make it appear in Tax
Declarations that two parcels of
real property particularly described
in the Certificate of Titles are
residential lands which Tax
Declarations accused submitted to
the NHMFC when in truth and in
fact, as accused well knew, the two
pieces of real property covered by
Certificate of Titles are agricultural
land, and by reason of accused's
misrepresentation, the NHMFC
released the amount of
P4,535,400.00 which is higher than

the loanable amount the land could

command being agricultural, thus
causing undue injury to the
government. On 18 December 2000,
pending the resolution of the Motion to
Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift
Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed
to Travel. The prosecution did not
object to the latter motion on the
condition that petitioner would be
"provisionally" arraigned. 6 On 12
March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold
Departure Order and to be Allowed to
Travel. The following day, or on 13
March 2001, the Sandiganbayan
arraigned petitioner who entered a
plea of "not guilty". In the Resolution
dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan
granted petitioner's Urgent Motion to
Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure
Order and to be Allowed to Travel. On
26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
and ordered the prosecution to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case with
respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum
dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who
conducted the reinvestigation
recommended to the Ombudsman that
the indictment against petitioner be
reversed for lack of probable cause.
However, the Ombudsman, in an Order
dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the
Memorandum and directed the Office of
the Special Prosecutor to proceed with
the prosecution of the criminal case.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the
Ombudsman.

In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May

2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
arraignment of petitioner on 24 July
2003. However, in view of the pending
motion for reconsideration of the order
of the Ombudsman, the arraignment
was reset to 2 October 2003. HAICTD
In a Manifestation dated 24 September
2003, the SPO informed the
Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsman's
denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. On even date, the
prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Information. During the
2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte
motion was withdrawn by the
prosecution with the intention of filing a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Information. The scheduled arraignment
of petitioner was reset to 1 December
2003. 7
On 7 October 2003, the prosecution
filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Information.
THE RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
In its Resolution of 10 February 2004, 9
the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecution's Motion to Admit Amended
Information. At the outset, the
Sandiganbayan explained that "gross
neglect of duty" which falls under
Section 3 (f) of RA 3019 is different from
"gross inexcusable negligence" under
Section 3 (e), and held thus:
In an information alleging gross neglect
of duty, it is not a requirement that such
neglect or refusal causes undue injury
compared to an information alleging
gross inexcusable negligence where

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
undue effect constitutes substantial
amendment considering that the
possible defense of the accused may
divert from the one originally intended.
ATDHSC
It may be considered however, that
there are three modes by which the
offense for Violation of Section 3(e) may
be committed in any of the following:
1. Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;
3. Through gross inexcusable
negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of these
modes in connection with the prohibited
acts under said section of the law
should suffice to warrant conviction. 10
However, the Sandiganbayan also held
that even granting that the amendment
of the information be formal or
substantial, the prosecution could still
effect the same in the event that the
accused had not yet undergone a
permanent arraignment. And since the
arraignment of petitioner on 13 March
2001 was merely "provisional", then the
prosecution may still amend the
information either in form or in
substance.
Issues:
1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE
AMENDED INFORMATION.

2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FURTHER
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE
DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL.
Held:
1st ISSUE: The original information filed
against petitioner alleged that he acted
with "evident bad faith and manifest
partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of
duty". The amended information, on the
other hand, alleges that petitioner acted
with "evident bad faith and manifest
partiality and/or gross inexcusable
negligence". Simply, the amendment
seeks to replace "gross neglect of
duty" with "gross inexcusable
negligence". Given that these two
phrases fall under different paragraphs
of RA 3019 specifically, "gross
neglect of duty" is under Section 3 (f)
while "gross inexcusable negligence" is
under Section 3 (e) of the statute the
question remains whether or not the
amendment is substantial and
prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.
The test as to when the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the

complaint or information as amended.

26 On the other hand, an amendment
which merely states with additional
precision something which is already
contained in the original information
and which, therefore, adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime
charged is an amendment to form that
can be made at anytime. 27 In this
case, the amendment entails the
deletion of the phrase "gross
neglect of duty" from the
Information. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY
BE CONSIDERED A SUBSTANTIAL
AMENDMENT, THE SAME IS
ALLOWABLE EVEN AFTER
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA BEING
BENEFICIAL TO THE ACCUSED. 28 As
a replacement, "gross inexcusable
negligence" would be included in the
Information as a modality in the
commission of the offense. This Court
believes that the same constitutes an
amendment only in form. The Court
held that a conviction for a criminal
negligent act can be had under an
information exclusively charging
the commission of a willful offense
upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense.
2nd Issue: Petitioner's contentions are
futile. This right, however, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party

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Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
having his case tried. 32 A simple
mathematical computation of the period
involved is not sufficient. We concede
that judicial proceedings do not exist in
a vacuum and must contend with the
realities of everyday life. After reviewing
the records of the case, we believe that
the right of petitioner to a speedy trial
was not infringed upon. The issue on
the inordinate delay in the resolution of
the complaint-affidavit filed against
petitioner and his co-accused and the
filing of the original Information against
petitioner was raised in petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss, and was duly
addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution denying the said motion. It
appears that the said delays were
caused by the numerous motions for
extension of time to file various
pleadings and to reproduce documents
filed by petitioner's co-accused, and
that no actual preliminary investigation
was conducted on petitioner.
Dino vs. OIlivarez
Petitioners instituted a complaint for
vote buying against respondent Pablo
Olivarez. Based on the finding of
probable cause in the Joint Resolution
issued by Assistant City Prosecutor
Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the
approval of the city prosecutor of
Paraaque, two Informations were filed
before the RTC on 29 September 2004
charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with
Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a,

b and k of Article XXII of the Omnibus

Election Code .
On 11 October 2004, respondent
filed a Motion to Quash the two
criminal informations on the
ground that more than one offense
was charged therein, in violation of
Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court, in relation to Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. This
caused the resetting of the scheduled
arraignment on 18 October 2004 to 13
December 2004.
Before Judge Madrona could act on the
motion to quash, Assistant Prosecutor
Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the
city prosecutor, filed on 28 October
2004 its "Opposition to the Motion to
Quash and Motion to Admit Amended
Informations." The Amended
Informations sought to be admitted
charged respondent with violation of
only paragraph a, in relation to
paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII
of the Omnibus Election Code. CEaDAc
On 1 December 2004, Judge Madrona
issued an Order resetting the hearing
scheduled on 13 December 2004 to 1
February 2005 on account of the
pending Motion to Quash of the
respondent and the Amended
Informations of the public prosecutor.
On 14 December 2004, respondent filed
an "Opposition to the Admission of the
Amended Informations," arguing that no
resolution was issued to explain the
changes therein, particularly the
deletion of paragraph k, Section 261,

Article XXII of the Omnibus Election

Code. Moreover, he averred that the city
prosecutor was no longer empowered to
amend the informations, since the
COMELEC had already directed it to
transmit the entire records of the case
and suspend the hearing of the cases
before the RTC until the resolution of the
appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona
issued an order denying respondent's
Motion to Quash dated 11 October
2004, and admitted the Amended
Informations dated 25 October 2004.
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration dated 20 January 2005
thereon.
On 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona
reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005,
with a warning that the arraignment
would proceed without any more delay,
unless the Supreme Court would issue
an injunctive writ. aCIHAD
On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to
appear before the RTC. Thereupon,
Judge Madrona, in open court, denied
the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order denying the Motion to Quash and
admitting the Amended Informations,
and ordered the arrest of respondent
and the confiscation of the cash bond.
On 11 March 2005, respondent filed an
"Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Lift the Order of Arrest of
Accused Dr. Pablo Olivarez," which was
denied in an Order dated 31 March
2005. The Order directed that a bench
warrant be issued for the arrest of
respondent to ensure his presence at
his arraignment.

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
On 5 April 2005, the Law Department of
the COMELEC filed before the RTC a
Manifestation and Motion wherein it
alleged that pursuant to the COMELEC's
powers to investigate and prosecute
election offense cases, it had the power
to revoke the delegation of its authority
to the city prosecutor.
Issue:
1.

W/N court erred in ruling the

admission of the two amended
informations and in dismissing
his motion to quash. (YES the
court erred)
2. W/N the city prosecutor defied
the order or directive of the
COMELEC when it filed the
amended informations. (YES CP
acted in excess of his authority)
1. Held:
As it stands, since there are no
amended informations to speak of, the
trial court has no basis for denying
respondent's motion to quash.
Consequently, there can be no
arraignment on the amended
informations. In view of this, there can
be no basis for ordering the arrest of
respondent and the confiscation of his
cash bond.
For having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, the trial court's
orders dated 12 January 2005
denying the Motion to Quash and
admitting the amended information; 9

March 2005 denying the Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order denying
the Motion to Quash, admitting the
amended informations, and ordering the
arrest of the respondent and the
confiscation of his cash bond; and 31
March 2005 denying respondent's
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to lift the Order of Arrest are
declared void and of no effect. Motion
for Reconsideration is Granted/
2. Held:
It cannot also be disputed that the
COMELEC Law Department has the
authority to direct, nay, order the public
prosecutor to suspend further
implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of said
appeal, for it is speaking on behalf of
the COMELEC. The COMELEC Law
Department, without any doubt, is
authorized to do this as shown by the
pleadings it has filed before the trial
court. If the COMELEC Law Department
is not authorized to issue any
directive/order or to file the pleadings
on behalf of the COMELEC, the
COMELEC En Banc itself would have
said so. This, the COMELEC En Banc did
not do.
The records are likewise bereft of any
evidence showing that the City
Prosecutor of Paraaque doubted such
authority. It knew that the COMELEC
Law Department could make such an
order, but the public prosecutor opted
to disregard the same and still filed the
Amended Informations contrary to the
order to hold the proceedings in

abeyance until a final resolution of said

appeal was made by the COMELEC En
Banc.
Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
In June 1990, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) awarded the original
contract for the infrastructure works on
the Pahanocoy Sites and Services
Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C.
Cruz Construction. The project, with a
contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was
funded by the World Bank under the
Project Loan Agreement forged on 10
June 1983 between the Philippine
Government and the IBRD-World Bank.
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the
infrastructure works on 1 August 1990.
5 In April 1991, the complainant
Candido M. Fajutag, Jr. (Fajutag, Jr.) was
designated Project Engineer of the
project.
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was
approved for the excavation of
unsuitable materials and road filling
works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of
A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the
fourth billing and Report of Physical
Accomplishments on 6 May 1991.
Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain
deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work
Instruction No. 1 requiring some
supporting documents, such as: (1)
copy of approved concrete pouring; (2)
survey results of original ground and

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of
earth fill actually rendered on site; (4)
test results as to the quality of materials
and compaction; and (5) copy of work
instructions attesting to the demolished
concrete structures.
The contractor failed to comply with the
work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s
further verification, it was established
that there was no actual excavation and
road filling works undertaken by A.C.
Cruz Construction.
On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a
motion to quash the Information raising
the following grounds: (1) the facts
charged in the information do not
constitute an offense; (2) the
information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form; (3)
the constitutional rights of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusations against them have
been violated by the inadequacy of the
information; and (4) the prosecution
failed to determine the individual
participation of all the accused in the
information in disobedience with the
Resolution dated 27 March 2005. 18
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan
issued the first assailed resolution
denying petitioner's motion to quash.
We quote the said resolution in part:
Among the accused-movants, the public
officer whose participation in the
alleged offense is specifically mentioned
in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is

accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the

Chairman of the Inventory and
Acceptance Committee (IAC), which
undertook the inventory and final
quantification of the accomplishment of
A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations
of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain
constraints, allegedly had to rely on the
reports of the field engineers and/or the
Project Office as to which materials
were actually installed; and that he
supposedly affixed his signature to the
IAC Physical Inventory Report and
Memoranda dated August 12, 1991
despite his not being able to attend the
actual inspection because he allegedly
saw that all the members of the
Committee had already signed are
matters of defense which he can
address in the course of the trial.
Hence, the quashal of the information
with respect to accused Lazarte is
denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Court hereby resolves as follows:
(1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine
Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos' Motion to
Admit Motion to Quash dated October 4,
2006 is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash
dated October 4, 2006 attached thereto,
is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is
hereby DISMISSED insofar as the said
accused-movants are concerned.
(2) The Motion to Quash dated October
2, 2006 of accused Engr. Felicisimo F.
Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Let the arraignment of the
accused proceed as scheduled on March
13, 2007.

Issues:
1. W/N the Information filed before
the Sandiganbayan insufficiently
averred the essential elements
of the crime charged as it failed
to specify the individual
participation of all the accused.
NO
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the case. YES

Held: The Court is not persuaded.

The Court affirms the resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan.
At the outset, it should be stressed that
the denial of a motion to quash is not
correctible by certiorari. Wellestablished is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is
denied, the remedy is not a petition for
certiorari but for petitioners to go to
trial without prejudice to reiterating the
special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash. Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a
motion to quash, are frowned upon and
often dismissed. The evident reason for
this rule is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single court. 31
This general rule, however, is subject to
certain exceptions. If the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
lies. 32 And in the case at bar, the Court
does not find the Sandiganbayan to
have committed grave abuse of
discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on
the viability of a motion to quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense is whether or not
the facts asseverated, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined in law. 33
Matters aliunde will not be considered.
Finally, the Court sustains the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to hear the
case. As correctly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that
petitioner does not occupy a position
with Salary Grade 27 as he was a
department manager of the NHA, a
government-owned or controlled
corporation, at the time of the
commission of the offense, which
position falls within the ambit of its
jurisdiction.
The instant petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions dated 2 March 2007 and 18
October 2007 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
ALAWIYA y ABDUL vs. CA
Facts: On 18 September 2001,
petitioners executed sworn statements4
before the General Assignment Section
of the Western Police District in United
Nations Avenue, Manila, charging
accused P/C Insp. Michael Angelo

Bernardo Martin, P/Insp. Allanjing

Estrada Medina, PO3 Arnold Ramos Asis,
PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez, PO2
Ignacio De Paz and PO2 Antonio
Sebastian Berida, Jr., who were all
policemen assigned at that time at the
Northern Police District, with kidnapping
for ransom. The sworn-statements of
petitioners commonly alleged that at
about 10:00 in the morning of 11
September 2001, while petitioners were
cruising on board a vehicle along United
Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan
bumped their vehicle from behind; that
when they went out of their vehicle to
assess the damage, several armed men
alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked
guns at, blindfolded, and forced them to
ride in the Toyota Sedan; that they were
brought to an office where P10,000,000
and two vehicles were demanded from
them in exchange for their freedom;
that, after haggling, the amount was
reduced to P700,000 plus the two
vehicles; that the money and vehicles
were delivered in the late evening of 11
September 2001; that they were
released in the early morning of 12
September 2001 in Quiapo after they
handed the Deed of Sale and
registration papers of the two vehicles.
On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor
Velasco filed with the RTC of Manila an
Information for Kidnapping for Ransom
against the accused with no bail
recommended.
On 28 January 2002, the trial court,
upon motion by the prosecution, issued

a Hold Departure Order against the

accused.9 On even date, the trial court
issued a Warrant of Arrest against all
the accused.10
Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the
accused filed a petition for review of the
Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco
with the Office of the Secretary of
Justice.
On 18 February 2002, the accused
moved for the quashal of the
Information on the ground that
"the officer who filed the
Information has no authority do
so."11
Issue: Whether the accused policemen
can seek any relief (via a motion to
quash the information) from the trial
court when they had not been arrested
yet.
Held: NO. At any rate, the accuseds
motion to quash, on the ground of lack
of authority of the filing officer, would
have never prospered because as
discussed earlier, the Ombudsmans
power to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the
government.
When the accused had not been
arrested yet
People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly
argued by the OSG, does not squarely
apply to the present case. In that

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
case, one of the accused, Rex
Magumnang, after arraignment and
during the trial, escaped from detention
and had not been apprehended since
then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in
absentia proceeded and thereafter the
judgment of conviction was
promulgated. The Court held that since
the accused remained at large, he
should not be afforded the right to
appeal from the judgment of conviction
unless he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise
arrested. While at large, the accused
cannot seek relief from the court as he
is deemed to have waived the same and
he has no standing in court.28 In
Mapalao, the accused escaped while the
trial of the case was on-going, whereas
here, the accused have not been served
the warrant of arrest and have not been
arraigned. Therefore, Mapalao is
definitely not on all fours with the
present case.lavvphil.net
Furthermore, there is nothing in the
Rules governing a motion to quash29
which requires that the accused should
be under the custody of the law prior to
the filing of a motion to quash on the
ground that the officer filing the
information had no authority to do so.
Custody of the law is not required for
the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.30 However, while
the accused are not yet under the
custody of the law, any question on the
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in

cases when the accused invokes the

special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his
person.
There is no clear showing that the
present case falls under any of the
recognized exceptions. Moreover, as
stated earlier, once the information is
filed with the trial court, any disposition
of the information rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The trial court is
mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the existence of probable cause
and it may either agree or disagree with
the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. The trial court is not bound to
adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice.34 Reliance alone on the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice
amounts to an abdication of the trial
courts duty and jurisdiction to
determine the existence of probable
cause.35
Considering that the Information has
already been filed with the trial court,
then the trial court, upon filing of the
appropriate motion by the prosecutor,
should be given the opportunity to
perform its duty of evaluating,
independently of the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice recommending the
withdrawal of the Information against
the accused, the merits of the case and
assess whether probable cause exists to
hold the accused for trial for kidnapping
for ransom.36
WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Manila, to independently evaluate or

assess the merits of the case to

determine whether probable cause
exists to hold the accused for trial.

Los Banos vs. Pedro

The petition seeks to revive the case
against respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro)
for election gun ban violation after the
CA declared the case permanently
dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court.
Pedro was charged in court for carrying
a loaded firearm without the required
written authorization from the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) a
day before the May 14, 2001 national
and local elections.
The accusation was based on Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code (Code) after the
Marinduque Philippine National Police
(PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his
firearm at a checkpoint at Boac,
Marinduque.
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation, which the RTC granted. 7
The preliminary investigation, however,
did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed
with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing
that the Information "contains
averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification
8 and/or that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense." 9 Pedro attached
to his motion a Comelec Certification
dated September 24, 2001 that he was

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Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
"exempted" from the gun ban. The
provincial prosecutor opposed the
motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and
ordered the police and the prosecutors
to return the seized articles to Pedro. 10
IHCSET
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel
Los Baos (Los Baos), representing the
checkpoint team, moved to reopen the
case, as Pedro's Comelec Certification
was a "falsification", and the
prosecution was "deprived of due
process" when the judge quashed the
information without a hearing. Attached
to Los Baos' motion were two Comelec
certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was
not exempted from the firearm ban; and
(2) the signatures in the Comelec
Certification of September 24, 2001
were forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further
proceedings, as Pedro did not object to
Los Baos' motion. 11 Pedro moved for
the reconsideration of the RTC's order
primarily based on Section 8 of Rule
117, 12 arguing that the dismissal had
become permanent. He likewise cited
the public prosecutor's lack of express
approval of the motion to reopen the
case.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedro's petition.
For accuracy, we quote the material
portions of its ruling: The petition lacks
merit.

To summarize this ruling, the appellate

court, while initially saying that there
was an error of law but no grave abuse
of discretion that would call for the
issuance of a writ, reversed itself on
motion for reconsideration; it then ruled
that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion because it failed to apply
Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar
under this provision.
Issue: The issue is ultimately reduced
to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is
applicable to the case, as the CA found.
If it applies, then the CA ruling
effectively lays the matter to rest. If it
does not, then the revised RTC decision
reopening the case should prevail.
Held: We find the petition meritorious
and hold that the case should be
remanded to the trial court for
arraignment and trial.
In People v. Lacson, 21 we ruled that
there are sine qua non requirements in
the application of the time-bar rule
stated in the second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 117. We also
ruled that the time-bar under the
foregoing provision is a special
procedural limitation qualifying the
right of the State to prosecute,
making the time-bar an essence of
the given right or as an inherent
part thereof, so that the lapse of
the time-bar operates to extinguish
the right of the State to prosecute
the accused.

c. Their Comparison
An examination of the whole Rule tells
us that a dismissal based on a motion to
quash and a provisional dismissal are
far different from one another as
concepts, in their features, and legal
consequences. While the provision
on provisional dismissal is found
within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to
Quash), it does not follow that a
motion to quash results in a
provisional dismissal to which
Section 8, Rule 117 applies. A first
notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is
that it does not exactly state what a
provisional dismissal is. The modifier
"provisional" directly suggests that the
dismissals which Section 8 essentially
refers to are those that are temporary in
character (i.e., to dismissals that are
without prejudice to the re-filing of the
case), and not the dismissals that are
permanent (i.e., those that bar the refiling of the case). Based on the law,
rules, and jurisprudence, permanent
dismissals are those barred by the
principle of double jeopardy, 22 by the
previous extinction of criminal liability,
23 by the rule on speedy trial, 24 and
the dismissals after plea without the
express consent of the accused. 25
Section 8, by its own terms, cannot
cover these dismissals because they are
not provisional. A second feature is that
Section 8 does not state the grounds
that lead to a provisional dismissal. This
is in marked contrast with a motion to
quash whose grounds are specified
under Section 3. The delimitation of the

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Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
grounds available in a motion to quash
suggests that a motion to quash is a
class in itself, with specific and closelydefined characteristics under the Rules
of Court. A necessary consequence is
that where the grounds cited are those
listed under Section 3, then the
appropriate remedy is to file a motion to
quash, not any other remedy.
Conversely, where a ground does not
appear under Section 3, then a motion
to quash is not a proper remedy. A
motion for provisional dismissal may
then apply if the conditions required by
Section 8 obtain. AHCcET
A third feature, closely related to the
second, focuses on the consequences of
a meritorious motion to quash. This
feature also answers the question of
whether the quashal of an information
can be treated as a provisional
dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule
117 unmistakably provide for the
consequences of a meritorious motion
to quash. Section 4 speaks of an
amendment of the complaint or
information, if the motion to quash
relates to a defect curable by
amendment. Section 5 dwells on the
effect of sustaining the motion to quash
the complaint or information may be
re-filed, except for the instances
mentioned under Section 6. The latter
section, on the other hand, specifies the
limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows
it cannot be done where the
dismissal is based on extinction of
criminal liability or double jeopardy.
Section 7 defines double jeopardy and
complements the ground provided

under Section 3 (i) and the exception

stated in Section 6.
The failure of the Rules to state under
Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional
dismissal is a bar to further prosecution
shows that the framers did not intend a
dismissal based on a motion to quash
and a provisional dismissal to be
confused with one another; Section 8
operates in a world of its own separate
from motion to quash, and merely
provides a time-bar that uniquely
applies to dismissals other than those
grounded on Section 3Conversely, when
a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to
quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its
time-bar does not apply.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional
dismissal are different concepts whose
respective rules refer to different
situations that should not be confused
with one another. If the problem relates
to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of
the complaint or information, as shown
on its face, the remedy is a motion to
quash under the terms of Section 3,
Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking
the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and
under the circumstances outlined in
Section 8, fall under provisional
dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule
117 does not apply to the reopening of
the case that the RTC ordered and which
the CA reversed; the reversal of the
CA's order is legally proper.

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to

quash are that the Information contains
averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification
[Section 3 (h), Rule 117], and that the
facts charged do not constitute an
offense [Section 3 (a), Rule 117]. We
find from our examination of the records
that the Information duly charged a
specific offense and provides the details
on how the offense was committed. 28
Thus, the cited Section 3 (a) ground has
no merit. On the other hand, we do not
see on the face or from the averments
of the Information any legal excuse or
justification. The cited basis, in fact, for
Pedro's motion to quash was a Comelec
Certification (dated September 24,
2001, issued by Director Jose P.
Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department,
Committee on Firearms and Security
Personnel of the Comelec, granting him
an exemption from the ban and a permit
to carry firearms during the election
period) 29 that Pedro attached to his
motion to quash. This COMELEC
Certification is a matter aliunde that is
not an appropriate motion to raise in,
and cannot support, a motion to quash
grounded on legal excuse or justification
found on the face of the Information.
Significantly, no hearing was ever called
to allow the prosecution to contest the
genuineness of the COMELEC
certification. 30 aATEDS
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its
initial ruling that a quashal of the
Information was in order. Pedro, on
the other hand, also

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Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half
misappreciated the true nature,
function, and utility of a motion to
quash. As a consequence, a valid

Information still stands, on the

basis of which Pedro should now be
arraigned and stand trial.