Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G. R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 FULL TEXT TILL PAGE 35

G.R.No.212426,January12,2016RENEA.V.SAGUISAG,WIGBERTOE.TAADA,FRANCISCO"DODONG"NEMENZO,JR.,SR.
MARYJOHNMANANZAN,
PACIFICOA.AGABIN,ESTEBAN"STEVE"SALONGA,H.HARRYL.ROQUE,JR.,EVALYNG.URSUA,EDREU.OLALIA,DR.CAROLPAGADUANARAULLO,DR.
ROLANDSIMBULAN,ANDTEDDYCASINO,Petitioners,v.EXECUTIVEPAQUITON.DEPARTMENTDEFENSEVOLTAIREDEPARTMENTSECRETARYOCHOA,JR.,OF
NATIONALSECRETARYGAZMIN,OFFOREIGNAFFAIRSSECRETARYALBERTDELROSARIO,JR.,DEPARTMENTOFBUDGETANDMANAGEMENTSECRETARY
FLORENCIOABAD,ANDARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESCHIEFOFSTAFFGENERALEMMANUELT.BAUTISTA,Respondents.G.R.No.212444BAGONG
ALYANSANGMAKABAYAN(BAYAN),REPRESENTEDBYITSSECRETARYGENERALRENATOM.REYES,JR.,BAYANMUNAPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVESNERIJ.
COLMENARESANDCARLOSZARATE,GABRIELAWOMEN'SPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVESLUZILAGANANDEMERENCIANADEJESUS,ACTTEACHERSPARTY
LISTREPRESENTATIVEANTONIOL.TINIO,ANAKPAWISPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVEFERNANDOHICAP,KABATAANPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVETERRY
RIDON,MAKABAYANGKOALISYONNGMAMAMAYAN(MAKABAYAN),REPRESENTEDBYSATURNINOOCAMPOANDLIZAMAZA,BIENVENIDOLUMBERA,JOELC.
LAMANGAN,RAFAELMARIANO,SALVADORFRANCE,ROGELIOM.SOLUTA,ANDCLEMENTEG.BAUTISTA,Petitioners,v.DEPARTMENTOFNATIONALDEFENSE
(DND)SECRETARYVOLTAIREGAZMIN,DEPARTMENTOFFOREIGNAFFAIRSSECRETARYALBERTDELROSARIO,EXECUTIVESECRETARYPAQUITON.OCHOA,
JR.,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESCHIEFOFSTAFFGENERALEMMANUELT.BAUTISTA,DEFENSEUNDERSECRETARYPIOLORENZOBATINO,
AMBASSADORLOURDESYPARRAGUIRRE,AMBASSADORJ.EDUARDOMALAYA,DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICEUNDERSECRETARYFRANCISCOBARAANIII,AND
DNDASSISTANTSECRETARYFORSTRATEGICASSESSMENTSRAYMUNDJOSEQUILOPASCHAIRPERSONANDMEMBERS,RESPECTIVELY,OFTHE
NEGOTIATINGPANELFORTHEPHILIPPINESONEDCA,Respondents.KILUSANGMAYOUNO,REPRESENTEDBYITSCHAIRPERSON,ELMERLABOG,
CONFEDERATIONFORUNITY,RECOGNITIONANDADVANCEMENTOFGOVERNMENTEMPLOYEES(COURAGE),REPRESENTEDBYITSNATIONALPRESIDENT
FERDINANDGAITE,NATIONALFEDERATIONOFLABORUNIONSKILUSANGMAYOUNO,REPRESENTEDBYITSNATIONALPRESIDENTJOSELITOUSTAREZ,
NENITAGONZAGA,VIOLETAESPIRITU,VIRGINIAFLORES,ANDARMANDOTEODORO,JR.,PetitionersinInterventionRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,JR.,Petitioners
inIntervention.
ENBANC
G.R.No.212426,January12,2016
RENEA.V.SAGUISAG,WIGBERTOE.TAADA,FRANCISCO"DODONG"NEMENZO,JR.,SR.MARYJOHNMANANZAN,PACIFICOA.AGABIN,
ESTEBAN"STEVE"SALONGA,H.HARRYL.ROQUE,JR.,EVALYNG.URSUA,EDREU.OLALIA,DR.CAROLPAGADUANARAULLO,DR.ROLAND
SIMBULAN,ANDTEDDYCASINO,Petitioners,v.EXECUTIVEPAQUITON.DEPARTMENTDEFENSEVOLTAIREDEPARTMENTSECRETARYOCHOA,JR.,
OFNATIONALSECRETARYGAZMIN,OFFOREIGNAFFAIRSSECRETARYALBERTDELROSARIO,JR.,DEPARTMENTOFBUDGETANDMANAGEMENT
SECRETARYFLORENCIOABAD,ANDARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESCHIEFOFSTAFFGENERALEMMANUELT.BAUTISTA,Respondents
G.R.No.212444
BAGONGALYANSANGMAKABAYAN(BAYAN),REPRESENTEDBYITSSECRETARYGENERALRENATOM.REYES,JR.,BAYANMUNAPARTYLIST
REPRESENTATIVESNERIJ.COLMENARESANDCARLOSZARATE,GABRIELAWOMEN'SPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVESLUZILAGANAND
EMERENCIANADEJESUS,ACTTEACHERSPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVEANTONIOL.TINIO,ANAKPAWISPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVE
FERNANDOHICAP,KABATAANPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVETERRYRIDON,MAKABAYANGKOALISYONNGMAMAMAYAN(MAKABAYAN),
REPRESENTEDBYSATURNINOOCAMPOANDLIZAMAZA,BIENVENIDOLUMBERA,JOELC.LAMANGAN,RAFAELMARIANO,SALVADORFRANCE,
ROGELIOM.SOLUTA,ANDCLEMENTEG.BAUTISTA,Petitioners,v.DEPARTMENTOFNATIONALDEFENSE(DND)SECRETARYVOLTAIREGAZMIN,
DEPARTMENTOFFOREIGNAFFAIRSSECRETARYALBERTDELROSARIO,EXECUTIVESECRETARYPAQUITON.OCHOA,JR.,ARMEDFORCESOF
THEPHILIPPINESCHIEFOFSTAFFGENERALEMMANUELT.BAUTISTA,DEFENSEUNDERSECRETARYPIOLORENZOBATINO,AMBASSADOR
LOURDESYPARRAGUIRRE,AMBASSADORJ.EDUARDOMALAYA,DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICEUNDERSECRETARYFRANCISCOBARAANIII,AND
DNDASSISTANTSECRETARYFORSTRATEGICASSESSMENTSRAYMUNDJOSEQUILOPASCHAIRPERSONANDMEMBERS,RESPECTIVELY,OFTHE
NEGOTIATINGPANELFORTHEPHILIPPINESONEDCA,Respondents.
KILUSANGMAYOUNO,REPRESENTEDBYITSCHAIRPERSON,ELMERLABOG,CONFEDERATIONFORUNITY,RECOGNITIONANDADVANCEMENT
OFGOVERNMENTEMPLOYEES(COURAGE),REPRESENTEDBYITSNATIONALPRESIDENTFERDINANDGAITE,NATIONALFEDERATIONOFLABOR
UNIONSKILUSANGMAYOUNO,REPRESENTEDBYITSNATIONALPRESIDENTJOSELITOUSTAREZ,NENITAGONZAGA,VIOLETAESPIRITU,
VIRGINIAFLORES,ANDARMANDOTEODORO,JR.,PetitionersinIntervention,
RENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,JR.,PetitionersinIntervention.
DECISION
SERENO,C.J.:
Thepetitions1beforethisCourtquestiontheconstitutionalityoftheEnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement(EDCA)betweentheRepublicofthePhilippines
and the United States of America (U.S.). Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when they entered into EDCA with the U.S.,2 claiming that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.3 In reply, respondents argue that
petitionerslackstandingtobringthesuit.Tosupportthelegalityoftheiractions,respondentsinvokethe1987Constitution,treaties,andjudicialprecedents.4
AproperanalysisoftheissuesrequiresthisCourttolaydownattheoutsetthebasicparametersoftheconstitutionalpowersandrolesofthePresidentandthe
Senateinrespectoftheaboveissues.Amoredetaileddiscussionofthesepowersandroleswillbemadeinthelatterportions.
I.BROADCONSTITUTIONALCONTEXTOFTHEPOWERSOFTHEPRESIDENT:DEFENSE,FOREIGNRELATIONS,ANDEDCA
A.TheprimeDutyoftheSenateandthe
ConsolidationofExecutivePowerinthe
President
Mataimtimkongpinanunumpaan(opinatotohanan)natutuparinkonangbuongkatapatanatsigasigangakingmgatungkulinbilangPangulo(o
PangalawangPangulooNanunungkulangPangulo)ngPilipinas,pangangalagaanatipagtatanggolangkanyangKonstitusyon,ipatutupadangmga
batasnito,magigingmakatarungansabawattao,atitatalagaangakingsarilisapaglilingkodsaBansa.KasihannawaakongDiyos.
PanunumpasaKatungkulanngPangulongPilipinasayonsaSaligangBatas5
cralawlawlibrary
The1987Constitutionhas"vestedtheexecutivepowerinthePresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines."6Whilethevastnessoftheexecutivepowerthathas
beenconsolidatedinthepersonofthePresidentcannotbeexpressedfullyinoneprovision,theConstitutionhasstatedtheprimedutyofthegovernment,of
whichthePresidentisthehead:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TheprimedutyoftheGovernmentistoserveandprotectthepeople.TheGovernmentmaycalluponthepeopletodefendtheStateand,
inthefulfillmentthereof,allcitizensmayberequired,underconditionsprovidedbylaw,torenderpersonalmilitaryorcivilservice.(Emphases
supplied)
B.Thedutytoprotecttheterritoryandthe
citizensofthePhilippines,thepowerto
calluponthepeopletodefendtheState,
andthePresidentasCommanderinChief
cralawlawlibrary
ThedutytoprotecttheStateanditspeoplemustbecarriedoutearnestlyandeffectivelythroughoutthewholeterritoryofthePhilippinesinaccordancewith
the constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the
Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or jurisdiction. These
territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine
areasandthewatersaround,between,andconnectingtheislandsofthearchipelago,regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions.8
Tocarryoutthisimportantduty,thePresidentisequippedwithauthorityovertheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP),9whichistheprotectorofthepeople
andthestate.TheAFP'sroleistosecurethesovereigntyoftheStateandtheintegrityofthenationalterritory.10Inaddition,theExecutiveisconstitutionally
empoweredtomaintainpeaceandorderprotectlife,liberty,andpropertyandpromotethegeneralwelfare.11Inrecognitionofthesepowers,Congresshas
specifiedthatthePresidentmustoversee,ensure,andreinforceourdefensivecapabilitiesagainstexternalandinternalthreats12and,inthesamevein,ensure
thatthecountryisadequatelypreparedforallnationalandlocalemergenciesarisingfromnaturalandmanmadedisasters.13
Tobesure,thispowerislimitedbytheConstitutionitself.Toillustrate,thePresidentmaycallouttheAFPtopreventorsuppressinstancesoflawlessviolence,
invasionorrebellion,14butnotsuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusforaperiodexceeding60days,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereof
undermartiallawexceedingthatsamespan.Intheexerciseofthesepowers,thePresidentisalsodutyboundtosubmitareporttoCongress,inpersonorin
writing,within48hoursfromtheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusandCongressmayinturnrevoke
theproclamationorsuspension.ThesameprovisionprovidesfortheSupremeCourt'sreviewofthefactualbasisfortheproclamationorsuspension,aswellas
thepromulgationofthedecisionwithin30daysfromfiling.
Thepoweranddutytoconduct
foreignrelations
The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations.15Since every state has the capacity to interact with and
engageinrelationswithothersovereignstates,16itisbutlogicalthateverystatemustvestinanagenttheauthoritytorepresentitsintereststothoseother
sovereignstates.
Theconductofforeignrelationsisfullofcomplexitiesandconsequences,sometimeswithlifeanddeathsignificancetothenationespeciallyin
timesofwar.Itcanonlybeentrustedtothatdepartmentofgovernmentwhichcanactonthebasisofthebestavailableinformationandcan
decide with decisiveness, x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about
foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited
access to ultrasensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally
accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less
stringentstandards,lesttheirjudicialrepudiationleadtobreachofaninternationalobligation,ruptureofstaterelations,forfeitureofconfidence,
nationalembarrassmentandaplethoraofotherproblemswithequallyundesirableconsequences.17
cralawlawlibrary
TheroleofthePresidentinforeignaffairsisqualifiedbytheConstitutioninthattheChiefExecutivemustgiveparamountimportancetothesovereigntyofthe
nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to selfdetermination.18In specific provisions, the President's
powerisalsolimited,oratleastshared,asinSection2ofArticleIIontheconductofwarSections20and21ofArticleVIIonforeignloans,treaties,and
internationalagreementsSections4(2)and5(2)(a)ofArticleVIIIonthejudicialreviewofexecutiveactsSections4and25ofArticleXVIIIontreatiesand
internationalagreementsenteredintopriortotheConstitutionandonthepresenceofforeignmilitarytroops,bases,orfacilities.
D.Therelationshipbetweenthe
twomajorpresidentialfunctions
andtheroleoftheSenate
Clearly,thepowertodefendtheStateandtoactasitsrepresentativeintheinternationalsphereinheresinthepersonofthePresident.Thispower,however,
does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As previously mentioned, the Senate has a role in
ensuringthattreatiesorinternationalagreementsthePresidententersinto,ascontemplatedinSection21ofArticleVIIoftheConstitution,obtaintheapproval
oftwothirdsofitsmembers.
Previously,treatiesunderthe1973ConstitutionrequiredratificationbyamajorityoftheBatasangPambansa,19exceptininstanceswhereinthePresident"may
enterintointernationaltreatiesoragreementsasthenationalwelfareandinterestmayrequire."20ThisleftalargemarginofdiscretionthatthePresidentcould
usetobypasstheLegislaturealtogether.Thiswasadeparturefromthe1935Constitution,whichexplicitlygavethePresidentthepowertoenterintotreaties
onlywiththeconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate.21The1987ConstitutionreturnedtheSenate'spower22and,withit,thelegislative's
traditionalroleinforeignaffairs.23
TheresponsibilityofthePresidentwhenitcomestotreatiesandinternationalagreementsunderthepresentConstitutionisthereforesharedwiththeSenate.
Thissharedrole,petitionersclaim,isbypassedbyEDCA.
II.HistoricalAntecedentsofEDCA
U.S.takeoverofSpanishcolonization
anditsmilitarybases,andthetransition
toPhilippineindependence
The presence of the U.S. military forces in the country can be traced to their pivotal victory in the 1898 Battle of Manila Bay during the SpanishAmerican
War.24 Spain relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands in favor of the U.S. upon its formal surrender a few months later.25 By 1899, the
Americanshadconsolidatedamilitaryadministrationinthearchipelago.26
WhenitbecameclearthattheAmericanforcesintendedtoimposecolonialcontroloverthePhilippineIslands,GeneralEmilioAguinaldoimmediatelyledthe
Filipinos into an allout war against the U.S.27The Filipinos were ultimately defeated in the PhilippineAmerican War, which lasted until 1902 and led to the
downfall of the first Philippine Republic.28The Americans henceforth began to strengthen their foothold in the country.29They took over and expanded the
formerSpanishNavalBaseinSubicBay,Zambales,andputupacavalrypostcalledFortStotsenberginPampanga,nowknownasClarkAirBase.30
WhentalksoftheeventualindependenceofthePhilippineIslandsgainedground,theU.S.manifestedthedesiretomaintainmilitarybasesandarmedforcesin
thecountry.31TheU.S.CongresslaterenactedtheHareHawesCuttingActof1933,whichrequiredthattheproposedconstitutionofanindependentPhilippines
recognizetherightoftheU.S.tomaintainthelatter'sarmedforcesandmilitarybases.32ThePhilippineLegislaturerejectedthatlaw,asitalsogavetheU.S.
the power to unilaterally designate any part of Philippine territory as a permanent military or naval base of the U.S. within two years from complete
independence.33
TheU.S.LegislaturesubsequentlycraftedanotherlawcalledtheTydingsMcDuffieActorthePhilippineIndependenceActof1934.ComparedtotheoldHare
HawesCuttingAct,thenewlawprovidedforthesurrendertotheCommonwealthGovernmentof"allmilitaryandotherreservations"oftheU.S.governmentin
the Philippines, except "naval reservations and refueling stations."34 Furthermore, the law authorized the U.S. President to enter into negotiations for the
adjustment and settlement of all questions relating to naval reservations and fueling stations within two years after the Philippines would have gained
independence.35UndertheTydingsMcDuffieAct,theU.S.PresidentwouldproclaimtheAmericanwithdrawalandsurrenderofsovereigntyovertheislands10
yearsaftertheinaugurationofthenewgovernmentinthePhilippines.36Thislaweventuallyledtothepromulgationofthe1935PhilippineConstitution.
The original plan to surrender the military bases changed.37At the height of the Second World War, the Philippine and the U.S. Legislatures each passed
resolutions authorizing their respective Presidents to negotiate the matter of retaining military bases in the country after the planned withdrawal of the
U.S.38Subsequently,in1946,thecountriesenteredintotheTreatyofGeneralRelations,inwhichtheU.S.relinquishedallcontrolandsovereigntyoverthe
PhilippineIslands,exceptthe areas that would be covered by the American military bases in the country.39This treaty eventually led to the creation of the
postcolonial legal regime on which would hinge the continued presence of U.S. military forces until 1991: the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, the
MilitaryAssistanceAgreementof1947,andtheMutualDefenseTreaty(MDT)of1951.40
B.Formerlegalregimeonthe
presenceofU.S.armed
forcesintheterritoryofan
independentPhilippines
(19461991)
SoonafterthePhilippineswasgrantedindependence,thetwocountriesenteredintotheirfirstmilitaryarrangementpursuanttotheTreatyofGeneralRelations
the1947MBA.41TheSenateconcurredonthepremiseof"mutualityofsecurityinterest,"42whichprovidedforthepresenceandoperationof23U.S.military
basesinthePhilippinesfor99yearsoruntiltheyear2046.43ThetreatyalsoobligedthePhilippinestonegotiatewiththeU.S.toallowthelattertoexpandthe
existingbasesortoacquirenewonesasmilitarynecessitymightrequire.44
Anumberofsignificantamendmentstothe1947MBAweremade.45Withrespecttoitsduration,thepartiesenteredintotheRamosRuskAgreementof1966,
whichreducedthetermofthetreatyfrom99yearstoatotalof44yearsoruntil1991.46Concerningthe numberof U.S.military bases inthecountry, the
BohlenSerrano Memorandum of Agreement provided for the return to the Philippines of 17 U.S. military bases covering a total area of 117,075
hectares.47Twelveyearslater,theU.S.returnedSangleyPointinCaviteCitythroughanexchangeofnotes.48Then,throughtheRomuloMurphyExchangeof
Notesof1979,thepartiesagreedtotherecognitionofPhilippinesovereigntyoverClarkandSubicBasesandthereductionoftheareasthatcouldbeusedby
theU.S.military.49Theagreementalsoprovidedforthemandatoryreviewofthetreatyeveryfiveyears.50In1983,thepartiesrevisedthe1947MBAthrough
the RomualdezArmacost Agreement.51 The revision pertained to the operational use of the military bases by the U.S. government within the context of
Philippine sovereignty,52 including the need for prior consultation with the Philippine government on the former's use of the bases for military combat
operationsortheestablishmentoflongrangemissiles.53
PursuanttothelegislativeauthorizationgrantedunderRepublicActNo.9,54thePresidentalsoenteredintothe1947MilitaryAssistanceAgreement55withthe
U.S.ThisexecutiveagreementestablishedtheconditionsunderwhichU.S.militaryassistancewouldbegrantedtothePhilippines,56particularlytheprovision
ofmilitaryarms,ammunitions,supplies,equipment,vessels,services,andtrainingforthelatter'sdefenseforces.57Anexchangeofnotesin1953madeitclear
thattheagreementwouldremaininforceuntilterminatedbyanyoftheparties.58
To further strengthen their defense and security relationship,59the Philippines and the U.S. next entered into the MDT in 1951. Concurred in by both the
Philippine60andtheU.S.61Senates,thetreatyhastwomainfeatures:first,itallowedformutualassistanceinmaintaininganddevelopingtheirindividualand
collectivecapacitiestoresistanarmedattack62andsecond,itprovidedfortheirmutualselfdefenseintheeventofanarmedattackagainsttheterritoryof
eitherparty.63Thetreatywaspremisedontheirrecognitionthatanarmedattackoneitherofthemwouldequallybeathreattothesecurityoftheother.
Currentlegalregimeonthe
presenceofU.S.armedforces
inthecountry
In view of the impending expiration of the 1947 MBA in 1991, the Philippines and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of their defense and security
relationship.65TermedastheTreatyofFriendship,CooperationandSecurity,thecountriessoughttorecasttheirmilitarytiesbyprovidinganewframeworkfor
their defense cooperation and the use of Philippine installations.66One of the proposed provisions included an arrangement in which U.S. forces would be
grantedtheuseofcertaininstallationswithinthePhilippinenavalbaseinSubic.67On16September1991,theSenaterejectedtheproposedtreaty.68
Theconsequentexpirationofthe1947MBAandtheresultingpaucityofanyformalagreementdealingwiththetreatmentofU.S.personnelinthePhilippines
ledtothesuspensionin1995oflargescalejointmilitaryexercises.69Inthemeantime,therespectivegovernmentsofthetwocountriesagreed70toholdjoint
exercisesatasubstantiallyreducedlevel.71
Themilitaryarrangementsbetweenthemwererevivedin1999whentheyconcludedthefirstVisitingForcesAgreement(VFA).72
As a "reaffirm[ation] [of the] obligations under the MDT,"73the VFA has laid down the regulatory mechanism for the treatment of U.S. military and civilian
personnelvisitingthecountry.74It contains provisions on the entry and departure of U.S. personnel the purpose, extent, and limitations of their activities
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction the waiver of certain claims the importation and exportation of equipment, materials, supplies, and other pieces of
propertyownedbytheU.S.governmentandthemovementofU.S.militaryvehicles,vessels,andaircraftintoandwithinthecountry.75ThePhilippinesand
theU.S.alsoenteredintoasecondcounterpartagreement(VFAII),whichinturnregulatedthetreatmentofPhilippinemilitaryandcivilianpersonnelvisiting
theU.S.76ThePhilippineSenateconcurredinthefirstVFAon27May1999.77
Beginning in January 2002, U.S. military and civilian personnel started arriving in Mindanao to take part in joint military exercises with their Filipino
counterparts.78CalledBalikatan,theseexercisesinvolvedtrainingsaimedatsimulatingjointmilitarymaneuverspursuanttotheMDT.79
Inthesameyear,thePhilippinesandtheU.S.enteredintotheMutualLogisticsSupportAgreementto"furthertheinteroperability,readiness,andeffectiveness
oftheirrespectivemilitaryforces"80inaccordancewiththeMDT,theMilitaryAssistanceAgreementof1953,andtheVFA.81Thenewagreementoutlinedthe
basicterms,conditions,andproceduresforfacilitatingthereciprocalprovisionoflogisticssupport,supplies,andservicesbetweenthemilitaryforcesofthetwo
countries.Thephrase"logisticssupportandservices"includesbilleting,operationssupport,constructionanduseoftemporarystructures,andstorageservices
duringanapprovedactivityundertheexistingmilitaryarrangements.Alreadyextendedtwice,theagreementwilllastuntil2017.
D.TheEnhancedDefense
CooperationAgreement
EDCAauthorizestheU.S.militaryforcestohaveaccesstoandconductactivitieswithincertain"AgreedLocations"inthecountry.Itwasnottransmittedtothe
Senateontheexecutive'sunderstandingthattodosowasnolongernecessary.85Accordingly,inJune2014,theDepartmentofForeignAffairs(DFA)andthe
U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the completion ofallnecessary internal requirements for the agreement to enter into force in the two
U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the completion ofallnecessary internal requirements for the agreement to enter into force in the two
countries.86
According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EDCA was the result of intensive and comprehensive negotiations in the course of almost two
years.87After eight rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April
2014.88 President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014.89 The OSG clarified during the oral arguments90 that the Philippine and the U.S.
governmentshadyettoagreeformallyonthespecificsitesoftheAgreedLocationsmentionedintheagreement.
TwopetitionsforcertiorariwerethereafterfiledbeforeusassailingtheconstitutionalityofEDCA.Theyprimarilyarguethatitshouldhavebeenintheformofa
treatyconcurredinbytheSenate,notanexecutiveagreement.
On 10 November 2015, months after the oral arguments were concluded and the parties ordered to file their respective memoranda, the Senators adopted
SenateResolutionNo.(SR)105.91Theresolutionexpressesthe"strongsense"92oftheSenatorsthatforEDCAtobecomevalidandeffective,itmustfirstbe
transmittedtotheSenatefordeliberationandconcurrence.
III.Issues
Petitioners mainly seek a declaration that the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in entering into EDCA in the form of an executive
agreement.Forthisreason,weculltheissuesbeforeus:
Whethertheessentialrequisitesforjudicialreviewarepresent
WhetherthePresidentmayenterintoanexecutiveagreementonforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities
WhethertheprovisionsunderEDCAareconsistentwiththeConstitution,aswellaswithexistinglawsandtreaties
IV.Discussion
Whethertheessential
requisitesforjudicial
reviewhavebeensatisfied
PetitionersarehailingthisCourt'spowerofjudicialreviewinordertostrikedownEDCAforviolatingtheConstitution.Theystressthatourfundamentallawis
explicitinprohibitingthepresenceofforeignmilitaryforcesinthecountry,exceptunderatreatyconcurredinbytheSenate.BeforethisCourtmaybeginto
analyze the constitutionality or validity of an official act of a coequal branch of government, however, petitioners must show that they have satisfied all the
essentialrequisitesforjudicialreview.
Distinguished from the general notion of judicial power, the power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of this Court to
determinewhetherabranchoraninstrumentalityofgovernmenthasactedbeyondthescopeofthelatter'sconstitutionalpowers.AsarticulatedinSection1,
ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,thepowerofjudicialreviewinvolvesthepowertoresolvecasesinwhichthequestionsconcerntheconstitutionalityorvalidityof
anytreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,law,presidentialdecree,proclamation,order,instruction,ordinance,orregulation.95InAngarav.Electoral
Commission, this Court exhaustively discussed this "moderating power" as part of the system of checks and balances under the Constitution. In our
fundamentallaw,theroleoftheCourtistodeterminewhetherabranchofgovernmenthasadheredtothespecificrestrictionsandlimitationsofthelatter's
power:
Theseparationofpowersisafundamentalprincipleinoursystemofgovernment.Itobtainsnotthroughexpressprovisionbutbyactualdivision
inourConstitution.Eachdepartmentofthegovernmenthasexclusivecognizanceofmatterswithinitsjurisdiction,andissupreme
withinitsownsphere.But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checksandbalancestosecurecoordinationintheworkingsofthevariousdepartmentsofthegovernment,xxx.Andthejudiciaryinturn,
withtheSupremeCourtasthefinalarbiter,effectivelycheckstheotherdepartmentsintheexerciseofitspowertodeterminethelaw,
andhencetodeclareexecutiveandlegislativeactsvoidifviolativeoftheConstitution.
xxxx
As any human production,ourConstitutionis of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrumentwhich is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertainlanguagetherestrictionsandlimitationsupongovernmentalpowersandagencies.Iftheserestrictionsandlimitations
aretranscendeditwouldbeinconceivableiftheConstitutionhadnotprovidedforamechanismbywhichtodirectthecourseof
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressionsofsentiment,andtheprinciplesofgoodgovernmentmerepoliticalapothegms.Certainly,thelimitationsandrestrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution, x x x. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly,byclearimplicationfromsection2ofarticleVIIIof[the1935]Constitution.
TheConstitutionisadefinitionofthepowersofgovernment.Whoistodeterminethenature,scopeandextentofsuchpowers?TheConstitution
itselfhasprovidedfortheinstrumentalityofthejudiciaryastherationalway.Andwhenthejudiciarymediatestoallocateconstitutional
boundaries,itdoesnotassertanysuperiorityovertheotherdepartmentsitdoesnotinrealitynullifyorinvalidateanactofthe
legislature,butonlyassertsthesolemnandsacredobligationassignedtoitbytheConstitutiontodetermineconflictingclaimsof
authorityundertheConstitutionandtoestablishforthepartiesinanactualcontroversytherightswhichthatinstrumentsecures
andguaranteestothem.Thisisintruthallthatisinvolvedinwhatistermed"judicialsupremacy"whichproperlyisthepowerofjudicial
reviewundertheConstitution,xxxx.(Emphasessupplied)
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Thepowerofjudicialreviewhassincebeenstrengthenedinthe1987Constitution.Thescopeofthatpowerhasbeenextendedtothedeterminationofwhether
inmatterstraditionallyconsideredtobewithinthesphereofappreciationofanotherbranchofgovernment,anexerciseofdiscretionhasbeenattendedwith
graveabuse.97Theexpansionofthispowerhasmadethepoliticalquestiondoctrine"nolongertheinsurmountableobstacletotheexerciseofjudicialpoweror
theimpenetrableshieldthatprotectsexecutiveandlegislativeactionsfromjudicialinquiryorreview."98
This moderating power, however, must be exercised carefully and only if it cannot be completely avoided. We stress that our Constitution is so incisively
designedthatitidentifiesthespheresofexpertisewithinwhichthedifferentbranchesofgovernmentshallfunctionandthequestionsofpolicythattheyshall
resolve.99 Since the power of judicial review involves the delicate exercise of examining the validity or constitutionality of an act of a coequal branch of
government,thisCourtmustcontinuallyexerciserestrainttoavoidtheriskofsupplantingthewisdomoftheconstitutionallyappointedactorwiththatofits
own.100
Evenasweareleftwithnorecoursebuttobareourpowertocheckanactofacoequalbranchofgovernmentinthiscasetheexecutivewemustabideby
thestringentrequirementsfortheexerciseofthatpowerundertheConstitution.Demetriav.Albam101andFranciscov.HouseofRepresentatives102citethe
"pillars" of the limitations on the power of judicial review as enunciated in the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TennesseeValleyAuthority.Francisco104redressedthese"pillars"underthefollowingcategories:
1. Thattherebeabsolutenecessityofdecidingacase
2. Thatrulesofconstitutionallawshallbeformulatedonlyasrequiredbythefactsofthecase
3. Thatjudgmentmaynotbesustainedonsomeotherground
4. Thattherebeactualinjurysustainedbythepartybyreasonoftheoperationofthestatute
5. Thatthepartiesarenotinestoppel
6. ThattheCourtupholdsthepresumptionofconstitutionality(Emphasessupplied)
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ThesearethespecificsafeguardslaiddownbytheCourtwhenitexercisesitspowerofjudicialreview.105Guidedbythesepillars,itmayinvokethepoweronly
whenthefollowingfourstringentrequirementsaresatisfied:(a)thereisanactualcaseorcontroversy(b)petitionerspossesslocusstandi(c)thequestionof
constitutionalityisraisedattheearliestopportunityand(d)theissueofconstitutionalityisthelismotaofthecase.106Ofthesefour,thefirsttwoconditions
willbethefocusofourdiscussion.
1. Petitionershaveshownthe
presenceofanactualcase
orcontroversy.
The OSG maintains107that there is no actual case or controversy that exists, since the Senators have not been deprived of the opportunity to invoke the
privilegesoftheinstitutiontheyarerepresenting.ItcontendsthatthenonparticipationoftheSenatorsinthepresentpetitionsonlyconfirmsthateventhey
believethatEDCAisabindingexecutiveagreementthatdoesnotrequiretheirconcurrence.
ItmustbeemphasizedthattheSenatehasalreadyexpresseditspositionthroughSR105.108ThroughtheResolution,theSenatehastakenapositioncontrary
tothatoftheOSG.Asthebodytaskedtoparticipateinforeignaffairsbyratifyingtreaties,itsbeliefthatEDCAinfringesuponitsconstitutionalroleindicates
thatanactualcontroversyalbeitbroughttotheCourtbynonSenators,exists.
Moreover,wecannotconsiderthesheerabstentionoftheSenatorsfromthepresentproceedingsasbasisforfindingthatthereisnoactualcaseorcontroversy
beforeus.Wepointoutthatthefocusofthisrequirementistheripenessforadjudicationofthematterathand,asopposedtoitsbeingmerelyconjecturalor
anticipatory.109Thecasemustinvolveadefiniteandconcreteissueinvolvingrealpartieswithconflictinglegalrightsandlegalclaimsadmittingofspecificrelief
through a decree conclusive in nature.110It should not equate with a mere request for an opinion or advice on what the law would be upon an abstract,
hypothetical,orcontingentstateoffacts.111AsexplainedinAngarav.ElectoralCommission:112
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[The]powerofjudicialreviewislimitedtoactualcasesandcontroversiestobeexercisedafterfullopportunityofargumentbythe
parties,andlimitedfurthertotheconstitutionalquestionraisedortheverylismotapresented.Anyattemptatabstractioncouldonlylead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.Morethanthat,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitutionbutalsobecausethejudiciaryinthedeterminationofactualcasesandcontroversiesmustreflectthewisdomandjustice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.(Emphasessupplied)
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Wefindthatthematterbeforeusinvolvesanactualcaseorcontroversythatisalreadyripeforadjudication.TheExecutiveDepartmenthasalreadysentan
official confirmation to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been complied with."113By this exchange of
diplomaticnotes,theExecutiveDepartmenteffectivelyperformedthelastactrequiredunderArticleXII(l)ofEDCAbeforetheagreemententeredintoforce.
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, is clear that the presence of foreign military forces in the country shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty
concurredinbytheSenate.Hence,theperformanceofanofficialactbytheExecutiveDepartmentthatledtotheentryintoforceofanexecutiveagreement
wassufficienttosatisfytheactualcaseorcontroversyrequirement.
WhilepetitionersSaguisaget.al,
donothavelegalstanding,
theynonethelessraiseissues
involvingmattersof
transcendentalimportance.
Thequestionoflocusstandiorlegalstandingfocusesonthedeterminationofwhetherthoseassailingthegovernmentalacthavetherightofappearanceto
bringthemattertothecourtforadjudication.Theymustshowthattheyhaveapersonalandsubstantialinterestinthecase,suchthattheyhavesustainedor
areinimmediatedangerofsustaining,somedirectinjuryasaconsequenceoftheenforcementofthechallengedgovernmentalact.115Here,"interest"inthe
question involved must be material an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act as distinguished from being merely incidental or
general.116Clearly, it would be insufficient to show that the law or any governmental act is invalid, and that petitioners stand to suffer in some indefinite
way.117Theymustshowthattheyhaveaparticularinterestinbringingthesuit,andthattheyhavebeenorareabouttobedeniedsomerightorprivilegeto
whichtheyarelawfullyentitled,orthattheyareabouttobesubjectedtosomeburdenorpenaltybyreasonoftheactcomplainedof.118Thereasonwhythose
whochallengethevalidityofalaworaninternationalagreementarerequiredtoallegetheexistenceofapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversyis
"toassuretheconcreteadversenesswhichsharpensthepresentationofissuesuponwhichthecourtsolargelydependsforilluminationofdifficultconstitutional
questions."119
Thepresentpetitionscannotqualify
ascitizens',taxpayers',orlegislators'
suitstheSenateasabodyhasthe
requisitestanding,butconsideringthat
ithasnotformallyfiledapleadingto
jointhesuit,asitmerelyconveyed
totheSupremeCourtitssensethat
EDCAneedstheSenate'sconcurrence
tobevalid,petitionerscontinueto
sufferfromlackofstanding.
Inassailingtheconstitutionalityofagovernmentalact,petitionerssuingascitizensmaydodgetherequirementofhavingtoestablishadirectandpersonal
interestiftheyshowthattheactaffectsapublicright.120Inarguingthattheyhavelegalstanding,theyclaim121thatthecasetheyhavefiledisaconcerned
citizen'ssuit.Butasidefromgeneralstatementsthatthepetitionsinvolvetheprotectionofapublicright,andthattheirconstitutionalrightsascitizenswould
beviolated,theyfailtomakeanyspecificassertionofaparticularpublicrightthatwouldbeviolatedbytheenforcementofEDCA.Fortheirfailuretodoso,
thepresentpetitionscannotbeconsideredbytheCourtascitizens'suitsthatwouldjustifyadisregardoftheaforementionedrequirements.
Inclaimingthattheyhavelegalstandingastaxpayers,petitioners122averthattheimplementationofEDCAwouldresultintheunlawfuluseofpublicfunds.
TheyemphasizethatArticleX(l)referstoanappropriationoffundsandthattheagreemententailsawaiverofthepaymentoftaxes,fees,andrentals.During
theoralarguments,however,theyadmittedthatthegovernmenthadnotyetappropriatedoractuallydisbursedpublicfundsforthepurposeofimplementing
theagreement.123TheOSG,ontheotherhand,maintainsthatpetitionerscannotsueastaxpayers.124RespondentexplainsthatEDCAisneithermeanttobea
taxmeasure,norisitdirectedatthedisbursementofpublicfunds.
Ataxpayer'ssuitconcernsacaseinwhichtheofficialactcomplainedofdirectlyinvolvestheillegaldisbursementofpublicfundsderivedfromtaxation.125Here,
those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act.126Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercisebyCongressofitstaxingorspendingpowers.127
We agree with the OSG that the petitions cannot qualify as taxpayers' suits. We emphasize that a taxpayers' suit contemplates a situation in which there is
alreadyanappropriationoradisbursementofpublicfunds.128AreadingofArticleX(l)ofEDCAwouldshowthattherehasbeenneitheranappropriationnoran
authorizationofdisbursementoffunds.Thecitedprovisionreads:
All obligations under this Agreement are subject to the availability of appropriated funds authorized for these purposes. (Emphases
supplied)
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ThisprovisionmeansthatiftheimplementationofEDCAwouldrequirethedisbursementofpublicfunds,themoneymustcomefromappropriatedfundsthat
arespecificallyauthorizedfor this purpose. Under the agreement, before there can even be a disbursement of public funds, there must first be a legislative
action.UntilandunlesstheLegislatureappropriatesfundsforEDCA,orunlesspetitionerscanpinpointaspecificiteminthecurrentbudgetthat
allows expenditure under the agreement, we cannot at this time rule that there is in fact an appropriation or a disbursement of funds that
wouldjustifythefilingofataxpayers'suit.
Petitioners Bayan et al. also claim129 that their copetitioners who are partylist representatives have the standing to challenge the act of the Executive
Department,especiallyifitimpairstheconstitutionalprerogatives,powers,andprivilegesoftheiroffice.WhiletheyadmitthatthereisnoincumbentSenator
whohastakenpartinthepresentpetition,theynonethelessassertthattheyalsostandtosustainaderivativebutsubstantialinjuryaslegislators.Theyargue
that under the Constitution, legislative power is vested in both the Senate and the House of Representatives consequently, it is the entire Legislative
Department that has a voice in determining whether or not the presence of foreign military should be allowed. They maintain that as members of the
Legislature,theyhavetherequisitepersonalitytobringasuit,especiallywhenaconstitutionalissueisraised.
The OSG counters130 that petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the suits concerning the lack of Senate concurrence in EDCA. Respondent
emphasizes that the power to concur in treaties and international agreements is an "institutional prerogative" granted by the Constitution to the Senate.
Accordingly, the OSG argues that in case of an allegation of impairment of that power, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its
incumbentmembers,asitistheSenate'sconstitutionalfunctionthatisallegedlybeingviolated.
ThelegalstandingofaninstitutionoftheLegislatureorofanyofitsMembershasalreadybeenrecognizedbythisCourtinanumberofcases.131Whatisin
questionhereistheallegedimpairmentoftheconstitutionaldutiesandpowersgrantedto,ortheimpermissibleintrusionuponthedomainof,theLegislature
oraninstitutionthereof.132Inthecaseofsuitsinitiatedbythelegislatorsthemselves,thisCourthasrecognizedtheirstandingtoquestionthevalidityofany
official action that they claim infringes the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office.133As aptly explained by Justice
PerfectoinMabanagv.LopezVito:134
Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution which, as
representativesofthepeople,theyshoulduphold,unlesstheyaretocommitaflagrantbetrayalofpublictrust.Theyarerepresentativesof
thesovereignpeopleanditistheirsacreddutytoseetoitthatthefundamentallawembodyingthewillofthesovereignpeopleis
nottrampledupon.(Emphasessupplied)
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We emphasize that in a legislators' suit, those Members of Congress who are challenging the official act have standing only to the extent that the alleged
violationimpingesontheirrighttoparticipateintheexerciseofthepowersoftheinstitutionofwhichtheyaremembers.135Legislatorshavethestanding"to
maintaininviolatetheprerogatives,powers,andprivilegesvestedbytheConstitutionintheirofficeandareallowedtosuetoquestionthevalidityofanyofficial
action,whichtheyclaiminfringestheirprerogativesaslegislators."136Aslegislators,theymustclearlyshowthattherewasadirectinjurytotheirpersonsor
theinstitutiontowhichtheybelong.137
Ascorrectlyarguedbyrespondent,thepowertoconcurinatreatyoraninternationalagreementisaninstitutionalprerogativegrantedbytheConstitutionto
theSenate,nottotheentireLegislature.InPimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,thisCourtdidnotrecognizethestandingofoneofthepetitioners
thereinwhowasamemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.ThepetitioninthatcasesoughttocompelthetransmissiontotheSenateforconcurrenceofthe
signed text of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since that petition invoked the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence in a
treatyenteredintobytheExecutiveDepartment,onlythenincumbentSenatorPimentelwasallowedtoassertthatauthorityoftheSenateofwhichhewasa
member.
Therefore,noneoftheinitialpetitionersinthepresentcontroversyhasthestandingtomaintainthesuitsaslegislators.
Nevertheless,thisCourtfindsthatthereisbasisforittoreviewtheactoftheExecutiveforthefollowingreasons.
Inanycase,petitionersraiseissues
involvingmattersoftranscendental
importance.
Petitioners138arguethattheCourtmaysetasideproceduraltechnicalities,asthepresentpetitiontacklesissuesthatareoftranscendentalimportance.They
pointoutthatthematterbeforeusisabouttheproperexerciseoftheExecutiveDepartment'spowertoenterintointernationalagreementsinrelationtothat
oftheSenatetoconcurinthoseagreements.TheyalsoassertthatEDCAwouldcausegraveinjustice,aswellasirreparableviolationoftheConstitutionandof
theFilipinopeople'srights.
TheOSG,ontheotherhand,insists139thatpetitionerscannotraisethemerefactthatthepresentpetitionsinvolvemattersoftranscendentalimportancein
ordertocuretheirinabilitytocomplywiththeconstitutionalrequirementofstanding.Respondentbewailstheoveruseof"transcendentalimportance"asan
exceptiontothetraditionalrequirementsofconstitutionallitigation.ItstressesthatoneofthepurposesoftheserequirementsistoprotecttheSupremeCourt
fromunnecessarylitigationofconstitutionalquestions.
Inanumberofcases,140thisCourthasindeedtakenaliberalstancetowardstherequirementoflegalstanding,especiallywhenparamountinterestisinvolved.
Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the
operationofalaworanyothergovernmentact.
WhilethisCourthasyettothoroughlydelineatetheouterlimitsofthisdoctrine,weemphasizethatnoteveryothercase,howeverstrongpublicinterestmay
be, can qualify as an issue of transcendental importance. Before it can be impelled to brush aside the essential requisites for exercising its power of judicial
review,itmustattheveryleastconsideranumberoffactors:(1)thecharacterofthefundsorotherassetsinvolvedinthecase(2)thepresenceofaclear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government and (3) the lack of any
otherpartythathasamoredirectandspecificinterestinraisingthepresentquestions.141
An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with the oral arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional
issuesthatprovideamplejustificationfortheCourttosetasidetheruleonstanding.Thetranscendentalimportanceoftheissuespresentedhereisrootedin
the Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much stricter mechanism required before foreign military troops,
facilities,orbasesmaybeallowedinthecountry.TheDFAhasalreadyconfirmedtotheU.S.Embassythat"allinternalrequirementsofthePhilippinesxxx
havealreadybeencompliedwith."142ItbehoovestheCourtinthisinstancetotakealiberalstancetowardstheruleonstandingandtodetermineforthwith
whethertherewasgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheExecutiveDepartment.
Wethereforerulethatthiscaseisapropersubjectforjudicialreview.
WhetherthePresidentmayenterintoanexecutiveagreementonforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities
WhethertheprovisionsunderEDCAareconsistentwiththeConstitution,aswellaswithexistinglawsandtreaties
IssuesBandCshallbediscussedtogetherinfra.
1. TheroleofthePresidentasthe
executorofthelawincludesthe
dutytodefendtheState,for
whichpurposehemayusethat
powerintheconductofforeign
relations
Historically,thePhilippineshasmirroredthedivisionofpowersintheU.S.government.WhenthePhilippinegovernmentwasstillanagencyoftheCongressof
theU.S.,itwasasanagententrustedwithpowerscategorizedasexecutive,legislative,andjudicial,anddividedamongthesethreegreatbranches.143Bythis
division,thelawimpliedthatthedividedpowerscannotbeexercisedexceptbythedepartmentgiventhepower.144
This divide continued throughout the different versions of the Philippine Constitution and specifically vested the supreme executive power in the Governor
GeneralofthePhilippines,145apositioninheritedbythePresidentofthePhilippineswhenthecountryattainedindependence.Oneoftheprincipalfunctionsof
thesupremeexecutiveistheresponsibilityforthefaithfulexecutionofthelawsasembodiedbytheoathofoffice.146TheoathofthePresidentprescribedby
the1987Constitutionreadsthus:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or VicePresident or Acting
President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution,execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the
serviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod.(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewillbeomitted.)147(Emphasessupplied)
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ThisCourthasinterpretedthefaithfulexecutionclauseasanobligationimposedonthePresident,andnotaseparategrantofpower.148Section17,ArticleVII
of the Constitution, expresses this duty in no uncertain terms and includes it in the provision regarding the President's power of control over the executive
department,viz:
ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,andoffices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.
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TheequivalentprovisionsinthenextprecedingConstitutiondidnotexplicitlyrequirethisoathfromthePresident.Inthe1973Constitution,forinstance,the
provision simply gives the President control over the ministries.149 A similar language, not in the form of the President's oath, was present in the 1935
Constitution, particularly in the enumeration of executive functions.150By 1987, executive power was codified not only in the Constitution, but also in the
AdministrativeCode:151
SECTION1.PowerofControl.ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,andoffices.Heshallensurethat
thelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.(Emphasissupplied)
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Hence, the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions. These
functions include the faithful execution of the law in autonomous regions152 the right to prosecute crimes153 the implementation of transportation
projects154the duty to ensure compliance with treaties, executive agreements and executive orders155the authority to deport undesirable aliens156 the
confermentofnationalawardsunderthePresident'sjurisdiction157andtheoveralladministrationandcontroloftheexecutivedepartment.158
Theseobligationsareasbroadastheysound,foraPresidentcannotfunctionwithcrippledhands,butmustbecapableofsecuringtheruleoflawwithinall
territories of the Philippine Islands and be empowered to do so within constitutional limits. Congress cannot, for instance, limit or take over the President's
powertoadoptimplementingrulesandregulationsforalawithasenacted.159
Moreimportant,thismandateisselfexecutorybyvirtueofitsbeinginherentlyexecutiveinnature.160AsJusticeAntonioT.Carpiopreviouslywrote,161
[i]ftherulesareissuedbythePresidentinimplementationorexecutionofselfexecutoryconstitutionalpowersvestedinthePresident,therule
makingpowerofthePresidentisnotadelegatedlegislativepower.ThemostimportantselfexecutoryconstitutionalpowerofthePresidentisthe
President'sconstitutionaldutyandmandateto"ensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted."TheruleisthatthePresidentcanexecutethelaw
withoutanydelegationofpowerfromthelegislature.
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TheimportofthischaracteristicisthatthemannerofthePresident'sexecutionofthelaw,evenifnotexpresslygrantedbythelaw,isjustified
by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law."162 Justice
GeorgeMalcolmstatesthisprincipleinagrandmanner:163
The executive should be clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have complete control of the
instrumentalities through whom his responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton, that "A feeble executive implies a feeble
executionofthegovernment.Afeebleexecutionisbutanotherphraseforabadexecutionandagovernmentillexecuted,whateveritmaybein
theory,mustbeinpracticeabadgovernment."ThemistakesofStategovernmentsneednotberepeatedhere.
xxxx
Every other consideration to one side, this remains certain The Congress of the United States clearly intended that the GovernorGeneral's
power should be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never intended that the GovernorGeneral should be saddled with the
responsibilityofadministeringthegovernmentandofexecutingthelawsbutshornofthepowertodoso.TheinterestsofthePhilippineswillbe
bestservedbystrictadherencetothebasicprinciplesofconstitutionalgovernment.
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Inlightofthisconstitutionalduty,itisthePresident'sprerogativetodowhateverislegalandnecessaryforPhilippinedefenseinterests.Itisnocoincidence
thattheconstitutionalprovisiononthefaithfulexecutionclausewasfollowedbythatonthePresident'scommanderinchiefpowers,164whicharespecifically
grantedduringextraordinaryeventsoflawlessviolence,invasion,orrebellion.Andthisdutyofdefendingthecountryisunceasing,evenintimeswhenthereis
nostateoflawlesssviolence,invasion,orrebellion.Atsuchtimes,thePresidenthasfullpowerstoensurethefaithfulexecutionofthelaws.
It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithfulexecution clause of the Constitution to do nothing when the call of the moment
requires increasing the military's defensive capabilities, which could include forging alliances with states that hold a common interest with the Philippines or
bringinganinternationalsuitagainstanoffendingstate.
ThecontextdrawnintheanalysisabovehasbeentermedbyJusticeArturoD.Brion'sDissentingOpinionasthebeginningofa"patentmisconception."165His
dissent argues that this approach taken in analyzing the President's role as executor of the laws is preceded by the duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution,whichwasallegedlyoverlooked.166
Inarguingagainsttheapproach,however,thedissentgrosslyfailedtoappreciatethenuancesoftheanalysis,ifreadholisticallyandincontext.Theconcept
that the President cannot function with crippled hands and therefore can disregard the need for Senate concurrence in treaties167was never expressed or
implied.Rather,theappropriatereadingoftheprecedinganalysisshowsthatthepointbeingelucidatedistherealitythatthePresident'sdutytoexecutethe
lawsandprotectthePhilippinesisinextricablyinterwovenwithhisforeignaffairspowers,suchthathemustresolveissuesimbuedwithbothconcernstothe
full extent of his powers, subject only to the limits supplied by law. In other words, apart from an expressly mandated limit, or an implied limit by virtue of
incompatibility, the manner of execution by the President must be given utmost deference. This approach is not different from that taken by the Court in
situationswithfairlysimilarcontexts.
Thus,theanalysisportrayedbythedissentdoesnotgivethePresidentauthoritytobypassconstitutionalsafeguardsandlimits.Infact,itspecifieswhatthese
limitations are, how these limitations are triggered, how these limitations function, and what can be done within the sphere of constitutional duties and
limitationsofthePresident.
JusticeBrion'sdissentlikewisemisinterpretstheanalysisprofferedwhenitclaimsthattheforeignrelationspowerofthePresidentshouldnotbeinterpretedin
isolation.168Theanalysisitselfdemonstrateshowtheforeignaffairsfunction,whilemostlythePresident's,issharedinseveralinstances,namelyinSection2
of Article II on the conduct of war Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of
Article VIII on the judicial review of executive acts Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into prior to the
Constitutionandonthepresenceofforeignmilitarytroops,bases,orfacilities.
Infact,theanalysisdevotesawholesubheadingtotherelationshipbetweenthetwomajorpresidentialfunctionsandtheroleoftheSenateinit.
ThisapproachofgivingutmostdeferencetopresidentialinitiativesinrespectofforeignaffairsisnotnoveltotheCourt.ThePresident'sactoftreatingEDCAas
anexecutiveagreementisnottheprincipalpowerbeinganalyzedastheDissentingOpinionseemstosuggest.Rather,thepreliminaryanalysisisinreference
totheexpansivepowerofforeignaffairs.WehavelongtreatedthispowerassomethingtheCourtsmustnotundulyrestrict.AswestatedrecentlyinVinuyav.
Romulo:
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or
invalidatetreatiesandexecutiveagreements.However,thequestionwhetherthePhilippinegovernmentshouldespouseclaimsofitsnationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the
courtsbuttothepoliticalbranches.Inthiscase,theExecutiveDepartmenthasalreadydecidedthatitistothebestinterestofthecountryto
waiveallclaimsofitsnationalsforreparationsagainstJapanintheTreatyofPeaceof1951.Thewisdomofsuchdecisionisnotforthecourtsto
question.NeithercouldpetitionershereinassailthesaiddeterminationbytheExecutiveDepartmentviatheinstantpetitionforcertiorari.
IntheseminalcaseofUSv.CurtissWrightExportCorp.,theUSSupremeCourtheldthat"[t]hePresidentisthesoleorganofthenationinits
externalrelations,anditssolerepresentativewithforeignrelations."
Itisquiteapparentthatif,inthemaintenanceofourinternationalrelations,embarrassmentperhapsseriousembarrassment
istobeavoidedandsuccessforouraimsachieved,congressionallegislationwhichistobemadeeffectivethroughnegotiationand
inquirywithintheinternationalfieldmustoftenaccordtothePresidentadegreeofdiscretionandfreedomfromstatutory
restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the
betteropportunityofknowingtheconditionswhichprevailinforeigncountries,andespeciallyisthistrueintimeofwar.Hehashis
confidentialsourcesofinformation.Hehashisagentsintheformofdiplomatic,consularandotherofficials....
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ThisrulinghasbeenincorporatedinourjurisprudencethroughBayanv.ExecutiveSecretaryandPimentelv.ExecutiveSecretary,
itsoverreachingprinciplewas,perhaps,bestarticulatedin(nowChief)JusticePuno'sdissentinSecretaryofJusticev.Lantion:
. . . The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the
nationespeciallyintimesofwar.Itcanonlybeentrustedtothatdepartmentofgovernmentwhichcanactonthebasisofthebest
availableinformationandcandecidewithdecisiveness....ItisalsothePresidentwhopossessesthemostcomprehensiveandthe
most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful
eventsallovertheworld.Hehasalsounlimitedaccesstoultrasensitivemilitaryintelligencedata.Infine,thepresidentialrole
inforeignaffairsisdominantandthePresidentistraditionallyaccordedawiderdegreeofdiscretionintheconductof
foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their
judicialrepudiationleadtobreachofaninternationalobligation,ruptureofstaterelations,forfeitureofconfidence,
national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.169 (Emphases
supplied)
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Understandably, this Court must view the instant case with the same perspective and understanding, knowing full well the constitutional and legal
repercussionsofanyjudicialoverreach.
TheplainmeaningoftheConstitution
prohibitstheentryofforeignmilitary
bases,troopsorfacilities,exceptby
wayofatreatyconcurredinbythe
Senateaclearlimitationonthe
President'sdualroleasdefender
oftheStateandassoleauthorityin
foreignrelations.
DespitethePresident'srolesasdefenderoftheStateandsoleauthorityinforeignrelations,the1987Constitutionexpresslylimitshisabilityininstanceswhen
itinvolvestheentryofforeignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilities.TheinitiallimitationisfoundinSection21oftheprovisionsontheExecutiveDepartment:"No
treatyorinternationalagreementshallbevalidandeffectiveunlessconcurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate."Thespecificlimitation
isgivenbySection25oftheTransitoryProvisions,thefulltextofwhichreadsasfollows:
SECTION25.Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerning
MilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbythe
Senateand,whentheCongresssorequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,
andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.
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ItisquiteplainthattheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1987ConstitutionintendedtoaddtothebasicrequirementsofatreatyunderSection21ofArticleVII.This
meansthatbothprovisionsmustbereadasadditionallimitationstothePresident'soverarchingexecutivefunctioninmattersofdefenseandforeignrelations.
ThePresident,however,may
enterintoanexecutiveagreement
onforeignmilitarybases,troops,
orfacilities,if(a)itisnotthe
instrumentthatallowsthepresence
offoreignmilitarybases,troops,or
facilitiesor(b)itmerelyaimsto
implementanexistinglawortreaty.
AgainwerefertoSection25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution:
SECTION25.Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerning
MilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurred
inbytheSenateand,whentheCongresssorequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumheldfor
thatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.(Emphasessupplied)
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Inviewofthisprovision,petitionersargue170thatEDCAmustbeintheformofa"treaty"dulyconcurredinbytheSenate.TheystressthattheConstitutionis
unambigousinmandatingthetransmissiontotheSenateofallinternationalagreementsconcludedaftertheexpirationoftheMBAin1991_agreementsthat
concernthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinthecountry.Accordingly,petitionersmaintainthattheExecutiveDepartmentisnotgiven
thechoicetoconcludeagreementslikeEDCAintheformofanexecutiveagreement.
ThisisalsotheviewoftheSenate,which,throughamajorityvoteof15ofitsmemberswith1againstand2abstainingsaysinSR105171thatEDCAmust
besubmittedtotheSenateintheformofatreatyforconcurrencebyatleasttwothirdsofallitsmembers.
TheSenatecitestwoconstitutionalprovisions(ArticleVI,Section21andArticleXVIII,Section25)tosupportitsposition.Comparedwiththeloneconstitutional
provision that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites, which is Article XVIII, Section 4(2), which includes the constitutionality of "executive
agreement(s)"amongthecasessubjecttotheSupremeCourt'spowerofjudicialreview,theConstitutionclearlyrequiressubmissionofEDCAtotheSenate.
Twospecificprovisionsversusonegeneralprovisionmeansthatthespecificprovisionsprevail.Theterm"executiveagreement"is"atermwanderingalonein
theConstitution,bereftofprovenanceandanunidentifiedconstitutionalmystery."
TheauthorofSR105,SenatorMiriamDefensorSantiago,uponinterpellationevenaddedthattheMDT,whichtheExecutiveclaimstobepartlyimplemented
throughEDCA,isalreadyobsolete.
TherearetwoinsurmountableobstaclestothisCourt'sagreementwithSR105,aswellaswiththecommentoninterpellationmadebySenatorSantiago.
First,theconceptof"executiveagreement"issowellentrenchedinthisCourt'spronouncementsonthepowersofthePresident.WhentheCourtvalidatedthe
conceptof"executiveagreement,"itdidsowithfullknowledgeoftheSenate'sroleinconcurringintreaties.Itwasawareoftheproblematiqueofdistinguishing
whenaninternationalagreementneededSenateconcurrenceforvalidity,andwhenitdidnotandtheCourtcontinuedtovalidatetheexistenceof"executive
agreements"evenafterthe1987Constitution.172ThisfollowsalonglineofsimilardecisionsupholdingthepowerofthePresidenttoenterintoanexecutive
agreement.173
Second,theMDThasnotbeenrenderedobsolescent,consideringthataslateas2009,174thisCourtcontinuedtorecognizeitsvalidity.
Third,tothisCourt,aplaintextualreadingofArticleXIII,Section25,inevitablyleadstotheconclusionthatitappliesonlytoaproposedagreementbetween
ourgovernmentandaforeigngovernment,wherebymilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesofsuchforeigngovernmentwouldbe"allowed"orwould"gainentry"
Philippineterritory.
Notethattheprovision"shallnotbeallowed"isanegativeinjunction.ThiswordingsignifiesthatthePresidentisnotauthorizedbylawtoallowforeignmilitary
bases,troops,orfacilitiestoenterthePhilippines,exceptunderatreatyconcurredinbytheSenate.Hence,theconstitutionallyrestrictedauthoritypertainsto
theentryofthebases,troops,orfacilities,andnottotheactivitiestobedoneafterentry.
Undertheprinciplesofconstitutionalconstruction,ofparamountconsiderationistheplainmeaningofthelanguageexpressedintheConstitution,ortheverba
legisrule.175It is presumed that the provisions have been carefully crafted in order to express the objective it seeks to attain.176It is incumbent upon the
CourttorefrainfromgoingbeyondtheplainmeaningofthewordsusedintheConstitution.Itispresumedthattheframersandthepeoplemeantwhatthey
saidwhentheysaidit,andthatthisunderstandingwasreflectedintheConstitutionandunderstoodbythepeopleinthewayitwasmeanttobeunderstood
whenthefundamentallawwasordainedandpromulgated.177AsthisCourthasoftensaid:
Welooktothelanguageofthedocumentitselfinoursearchforitsmeaning.Wedonotofcoursestopthere,butthatiswherewebegin.Itisto
beassumedthatthewordsinwhichconstitutionalprovisionsarecouchedexpresstheobjectivesoughttobeattained.Theyaretobegiven
theirordinarymeaningexceptwheretechnicaltermsareemployedinwhichcasethesignificancethusattachedtothemprevails.Asthe
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people'sconsciousness,itslanguageasmuchaspossibleshouldbeunderstoodinthesensetheyhaveincommonuse.Whatitsays
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is
reducedtoaminimum.178(Emphasessupplied)
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It is only in those instances in which the constitutional provision is unclear, ambiguous, or silent that further construction must be done to elicit its
meaning.179InAngBagongBayaniOFWv.CommissiononElections,180wereiteratedthisguidingprinciple:
it[is]safertoconstruetheConstitutionfromwhatappearsuponitsface.Theproperinterpretationthereforedependsmoreonhowit
wasunderstoodbythepeopleadoptingitthanintheframers'understandingthereof.(Emphasessupplied)
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The effect of this statement is surprisingly profound, for, if taken literally, the phrase "shall not be allowed in the Philippines" plainly refers to the entry of
bases,troops,orfacilitiesinthecountry.TheOxfordEnglishDictionarydefinestheword"allow"asatransitiveverbthatmeans"topermit,enable""togive
consenttotheoccurrenceoforrelaxrestrainton(anaction,event,oractivity)""toconsenttothepresenceorattendanceof(aperson)"and,whenwithan
adverbialofplace,"topermit(apersonoranimal)togo,come,orbein,out,near,etc."181Black'sLawDictionarydefinesthetermasonethatmeans"[t]o
grant,approve,orpermit."182
Theverb"allow"isfollowedbytheword"in,"whichisaprepositionusedtoindicate"placeorpositioninspaceoranythinghavingmaterialextension:Within
thelimitsorboundsof,within(anyplaceorthing)."183ThatsomethingisthePhilippines,whichisthenounthatfollows.
Itisevidentthattheconstitutionalrestrictionreferssolelytotheinitialentryoftheforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities.Onceentryisauthorized,the
subsequentactsarethereaftersubjectonlytothelimitationsprovidedbytherestoftheConstitutionandPhilippinelaw,andnottotheSection25requirement
ofvaliditythroughatreaty.
TheVFAhasalreadyallowedtheentryoftroopsinthePhilippines.ThisCourtstatedinLimv.ExecutiveSecretary:
Afterstudiedreflection,itappearedfarfetchedthattheambiguitysurroundingthemeaningoftheword"activities"arosefromaccident.Inour
view,itwasdeliberatelymadethatwaytogivebothpartiesacertainleewayinnegotiation.Inthismanner,visitingUSforcesmaysojourn
inPhilippineterritoryforpurposesotherthanmilitary.Asconceived,thejointexercisesmayincludetrainingonnewtechniquesofpatrol
and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea searchandrescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief
operations,civicactionprojectssuchasthebuildingofschoolhouses,medicalandhumanitarianmissions,andthelike.
Undertheseauspices,theVFAgiveslegitimacytothecurrentBalikatanexercises.Itisonlylogicaltoassumethat"Balikatan021,"a"mutual
anti terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the
agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combatrelated activities as
opposedtocombatitselfsuchastheonesubjectoftheinstantpetition,areindeedauthorized.184(Emphasissupplied)
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Moreover,theCourtindicatedthattheConstitutioncontinuestogoverntheconductofforeignmilitarytroopsinthePhilippines,185readilyimplyingthelegality
oftheirinitialentryintothecountry.
TheOSGemphasizesthatEDCAcanbeintheformofanexecutiveagreement,sinceitmerelyinvolves"adjustmentsindetail"intheimplementationofthe
MDTandtheVFA.186ItpointsoutthatthereareexistingtreatiesbetweenthePhilippinesandtheU.S.thathavealreadybeenconcurredinbythePhilippine
SenateandhavetherebymettherequirementsoftheConstitutionunderSection25.Becauseofthestatusoftheseprioragreements,respondentemphasizes
thatEDCAneednotbetransmittedtotheSenate.
The aforecited Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brion disagrees with theponencia'sapplicationofverbalegisconstruction to the words of Article XVIII, Section
25.187Itclaimsthattheprovisionis"neitherplain,northatsimple."188Tobuttressitsdisagreement,thedissentstatesthattheprovisionreferstoahistorical
incident,whichistheexpirationofthe1947MBA.189Accordingly,thispositionrequiresquestioningthecircumstancesthatledtothehistoricalevent,andthe
meaningofthetermsunderArticleXVIII,Section25.
Thisobjectionisquitestrange.Theconstructiontechniqueofverbalegisisnotinapplicablejustbecauseaprovisionhasaspecifichistoricalcontext.Infact,
everyprovisionoftheConstitutionhasaspecifichistoricalcontext.Thepurposeofconstitutionalandstatutoryconstructionistosettiersofinterpretationto
guidetheCourtastohowaparticularprovisionfunctions.Verbalegisisofparamountconsideration,butitisnottheonlyconsideration.AsthisCourthasoften
said:
Welooktothelanguageofthedocumentitselfinoursearchforitsmeaning.Wedonotofcoursestopthere,butthatiswherewebegin.
Itistobeassumedthatthewordsinwhichconstitutionalprovisionsarecouchedexpresstheobjectivesoughttobeattained.Theyaretobe
giventheirordinarymeaningexceptwheretechnicaltermsareemployedinwhichcasethesignificancethusattachedtothemprevails.
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people'sconsciousness,itslanguageasmuchaspossibleshouldbeunderstoodinthesensetheyhaveincommonuse.Whatitsays
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is
reducedtoaminimum.190(Emphasessupplied)
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Asapplied,verbalegisaidsinconstruingtheordinarymeaningofterms.Inthiscase,thephrasebeingconstruedis"shallnotbeallowedinthePhilippines"and
not the preceding one referring to "the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities."Itisexplicitinthewordingoftheprovisionitselfthatanyinterpretationgoesbeyondthe
text itself and into the discussion of the framers, the context of the Constitutional Commission's time of drafting, and the history of the 1947 MBA. Without
referencetothesefactors,areaderwouldnotunderstandthoseterms.However,forthephrase"shallnotbeallowedinthePhilippines,"thereisnoneedfor
suchreference.Thelawisclear.NolessthantheSenateunderstoodthiswhenitratifiedtheVFA.
ThePresidentmaygenerallyenter
intoexecutiveagreementssubject
tolimitationsdefinedbythe
Constitutionandmaybein
furtheranceofatreatyalready
concurredinbytheSenate.
WediscussinthissectionwhythePresidentcanenterintoexecutiveagreements.
ItwouldbehelpfultoputintocontextthecontestedlanguagefoundinArticleXVIII,Section25.Itsmoreexactingrequirementwasintroducedbecauseofthe
previousexperienceofthecountrywhenitsrepresentativesfeltcompelledtoconsenttotheoldMBA.191TheyfeltconstrainedtoagreetotheMBAinfulfilment
ofoneofthemajorconditionsforthecountrytogainindependencefromtheU.S.192Asaresultofthatexperience,asecondlayerofconsentforagreements
thatallowmilitarybases,troopsandfacilitiesinthecountryisnowarticulatedinArticleXVIIIofourpresentConstitution.
This second layer of consent, however, cannot be interpreted in such a way that we completely ignore the intent of our constitutional framers when they
providedforthatadditionallayer,northevigorousstatementsofthisCourtthataffirmthecontinuedexistenceofthatclassofinternationalagreementscalled
"executiveagreements."
ThepowerofthePresidenttoenterintobindingexecutiveagreementswithoutSenateconcurrenceisalreadywellestablishedinthisjurisdiction.193Thatpower
has been alluded to in our present and past Constitutions,194 in various statutes,195 in Supreme Court decisions,196 and during the deliberations of the
ConstitutionalCommission.197They cover a wide array of subjects with varying scopes and purposes,198including those that involve the presence of foreign
militaryforcesinthecountry.199
Asthesoleorganofourforeignrelations200andtheconstitutionallyassignedchiefarchitectofourforeignpolicy,201thePresidentisvestedwiththeexclusive
power to conduct and manage the country's interface with other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief
Executivespeaksandlistensforthenationinitiates,maintains,anddevelopsdiplomaticrelationswithotherstatesandgovernmentsnegotiatesandenters
intointernationalagreementspromotestrade,investments,tourismandothereconomicrelationsandsettlesinternationaldisputeswithotherstates.202
Aspreviouslydiscussed,thisconstitutionalmandateemanatesfromtheinherentpowerofthePresidenttoenterintoagreementswithotherstates,including
theprerogativetoconcludebindingexecutiveagreementsthatdonotrequirefurtherSenateconcurrence.Theexistenceofthispresidentialpower203issowell
entrenched that Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check on its exercise. As expressed below, executive agreements are
amongthoseofficialgovernmentalactsthatcanbethesubjectofthisCourt'spowerofjudicialreview:
(2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorari,asthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsand
ordersoflowercourtsin:
(a)Allcases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation,order,instruction,ordinance,orregulationisinquestion.(Emphasessupplied)
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InCommissionerofCustomsv.EasternSeaTrading,executiveagreementsaredefinedas"internationalagreementsembodyingadjustmentsofdetailcarrying
outwellestablishednationalpoliciesandtraditionsandthoseinvolvingarrangementsofamoreorlesstemporarynature."204InBayanMunav.Romulo,this
Courtfurtherclarifiedthatexecutiveagreementscancoverawidearrayofsubjectsthathavevariousscopesandpurposes.205Theyarenolongerlimitedto
thetraditionalsubjectsthatareusuallycoveredbyexecutiveagreementsasidentifiedinEasternSeaTrading.TheCourtthoroughlydiscussedthismatterin
thefollowingmanner:
ThecategorizationofsubjectmattersthatmaybecoveredbyinternationalagreementsmentionedinEasternSeaTradingisnotcast
instone,xxx.
Asmaybenoted,almosthalfacenturyhaselapsedsincetheCourtrendereditsdecisioninEasternSeaTrading.Sincethen,theconductof
foreignaffairshasbecomemorecomplexandthedomainofinternationallawwider,astoincludesuchsubjectsashumanrights,the
environment,andthesea.Infact,intheUSalone,theexecutiveagreementsexecutedbyitsPresidentfrom1980to2000coveredsubjectssuch
asdefense, trade, scientific cooperation, aviation, atomic energy, environmental cooperation, peace corps, arms limitation, and
nuclearsafety,amongothers.Surely,theenumerationinEasternSeaTradingcannot circumscribe the option of each stateon the
matterofwhichtheinternational agreement format would be convenient to serve its best interest.As Francis Sayre said in his work
referredtoearlier:
...Itwouldbeuselesstoundertaketodiscussherethelargevarietyofexecutiveagreementsassuchconcludedfrom
time to time.Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the tradeagreement act, have been
negotiatedwithforeigngovernments....Theycoversuchsubjectsastheinspectionofvessels,navigationdues,incometaxon
shipping profits, the admission of civil air craft, custom matters and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal
matters,theregistrationoftrademarksandcopyrights,etc....(EmphasesSupplied)
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One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence.206 This
distinctivefeaturewasrecognizedasearlyasinEasternSeaTrading(1961),viz:
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of twothirds of the Senate. Executive
agreementsbecomebindingthroughexecutiveactionwithouttheneedofavotebytheSenateorbyCongress.
xxxx
[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
beenconfirmedbylongusage.Fromtheearliestdaysofourhistorywehaveenteredintoexecutiveagreementscoveringsuchsubjectsas
commercial and consular relations, mostfavorednation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. (Emphases
Supplied)
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That notion was carried over to the present Constitution. In fact, the framers specifically deliberated on whether the general term "international agreement"
includedexecutiveagreements,andwhetheritwasnecessarytoincludeanexpressprovisothatwouldexcludeexecutiveagreementsfromtherequirementof
Senateconcurrence.AfternotedconstitutionalistFr.JoaquinBernasquotedtheCourt'srulinginEasternSeaTrading,theConstitutionalCommissionmembers
ultimately decided that the term "international agreements" as contemplated in Section 21, Article VII, does not include executive agreements, and that a
provisoisnolongerneeded.Theirdiscussionisreproducedbelow:207
MS. AQUINO: Madam President, first I would like a clarification from the Committee. We have retained the words "international agreement"
whichIthinkisthecorrectjudgmentonthematterbecauseaninternationalagreementisdifferentfromatreaty.Atreatyisacontractbetween
parties which is in the nature of international agreement and also a municipal law in the sense that the people are bound. So there is a
conceptualdifference.However,Iwouldliketobeclarifiediftheinternationalagreementsincludeexecutiveagreements.
MR.CONCEPCION:Thatdependsupontheparties.Allpartiestotheseinternationalnegotiationsstipulatetheconditionswhicharenecessaryfor
theagreementorwhateveritmaybetobecomevalidoreffectiveasregardstheparties.
MS.AQUINO:Wouldthatdependonthepartiesorwouldthatdependonthenatureoftheexecutiveagreement?Accordingtocommonusage,
there are two types of executive agreement: one is purely proceeding from an executive act which affects external relations
independentofthelegislativeandtheotherisanexecutiveactinpursuanceoflegislativeauthorization.Thefirstkindmighttakethe
formofjustconventionsorexchangesofnotesorprotocolwhiletheother,whichwouldbepursuanttothelegislativeauthorization,
maybeinthenatureofcommercialagreements.
MR.CONCEPCION:Executiveagreementsaregenerallymadetoimplementatreatyalreadyenforcedortodeterminethedetailsfor
theimplementationofthetreaty.Wearespeakingofexecutiveagreements,notinternationalagreements.
MS.AQUINO:Iaminfullagreementwiththat,exceptthatitdoesnotcoverthefirstkindofexecutiveagreementwhichisjustprotocoloran
exchangeofnotesandthiswouldbeinthenatureofreinforcementofclaimsofacitizenagainstacountry,forexample.
MR.CONCEPCION:TheCommissionerisfreetorequireratificationforvalidityinsofarasthePhilippinesisconcerned.
MS.AQUINO:Itismyhumblesubmissionthatweshouldprovide,unlesstheCommitteeexplainstousotherwise,anexplicitprovisowhich
wouldexceptexecutiveagreementsfromtherequirement of concurrence of twothirds of the Members of the Senate.UnlessIam
enlightened by the Committee I propose that tentatively, the sentence should read. "No treaty or international agreement EXCEPT EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTSshallbevalidandeffective."
FR.BERNAS:IwonderifaquotationfromtheSupremeCourtdecision[inEasternSeaTrading]mighthelpclarifythis:
The right of the executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional
approvalhasbeenconfirmedbylongusage.Fromtheearliestdaysofourhistory,wehaveenteredintoexecutiveagreements
coveringsuchsubjectsascommercialandconsularrelations,mostfavorednationrights,patentrights,trademarkandcopyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of this has never been seriously
questionedbyourCourts.
AgreementswithrespecttotheregistrationoftrademarkshavebeenconcludedbytheexecutiveofvariouscountriesundertheAct
ofCongressofMarch3,1881(21Stat.502)...Internationalagreementsinvolvingpoliticalissuesorchangesofnational
policy and those involving international agreements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But
international agreements embodying adjustments of detail, carrying out well established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive
agreements.
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MR.ROMULO:IstheCommissioner,therefore,excludingtheexecutiveagreements?
FR.BERNAS:Whatwearereferringto,therefore,whenwesayinternationalagreementswhichneedconcurrencebyatleasttwothirds
arethosewhicharepermanentinnature.
MS. AQUINO: And it may include commercial agreements which are executive agreements essentially but which are proceeding from the
authorizationofCongress.Ifthatisourunderstanding,thenIamwillingtowithdrawthatamendment.
FR.BERNAS:IfitiswithpriorauthorizationofCongress,thenitdoesnotneedsubsequentconcurrencebyCongress.
MS.AQUINO:Inthatcase,Iamwithdrawingmyamendment.
MR.TINGSON:MadamPresident.
THEPRESIDENT:IsCommissionerAquinosatisfied?
MS. AQUINO: Yes. There is already an agreement among us on the definition of "executive agreements" and that would make
unnecessaryanyexplicitprovisoonthematter.
xxx
MR. GUINGONA: I am not clear as to the meaning of "executive agreements" because I heard that these executive agreements must rely on
treaties.Inotherwords,theremustfirstbetreaties.
MR.CONCEPCION:No,Iwasspeakingaboutthecommonuse,asexecutiveagreementsbeingtheimplementationoftreaties,detailsofwhichdo
notaffectthesovereigntyoftheState.
MR. GUINGONA: But what about the matter of permanence, Madam President? Would 99 years be considered permanent? What would be the
measureofpermanency?Idonotconceiveofatreatythatisgoingtobeforever,sotheremustbesomekindofatimelimit.
MR.CONCEPCION:IsupposetheCommissioner'squestioniswhetherthistypeofagreementshouldbeincludedinaprovisionoftheConstitution
requiringtheconcurrenceofCongress.
MR.GUINGONA:ItdependsontheconceptoftheexecutiveagreementofwhichIamnotclear.Iftheexecutiveagreementpartakesofthe
natureofatreaty,thenitshouldalsobeincluded.
MR.CONCEPCION:Whetheritpartakesornotofthenatureofatreaty,itiswithinthepoweroftheConstitutionalCommissiontorequirethat.
MR. GUINGONA: Yes. That is why I am trying to clarify whether the words "international agreements" would include executive
agreements.
MR.CONCEPCION:No,notnecessarilygenerallyno.
xxx
MR.ROMULO:Iwishtoberecognizedfirst.Ihaveonlyonequestion.Dowetakeit,therefore,thatasfarastheCommitteeisconcerned,
theterm"internationalagreements"doesnotincludetheterm"executiveagreements"asreadbytheCommissionerinthattext?
FR.BERNAS:Yes.(EmphasesSupplied)
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The inapplicability to executive agreements of the requirements under Section 21 was again recognized inBayanv.ZamoraandinBayan Muna v. Romulo.
These cases, both decided under the aegis of the present Constitution, quotedEastern Sea Tradingin reiterating that executive agreements are valid and
bindingevenwithouttheconcurrenceoftheSenate.
ExecutiveagreementsmaydispensewiththerequirementofSenateconcurrencebecauseofthelegalmandatewithwhichtheyareconcluded.Asculledfrom
theaforequoteddeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission,pastSupremeCourtDecisions,andworksofnotedscholars,208executiveagreementsmerely
involvearrangementsontheimplementationofexistingpolicies,rules,laws,oragreements.Theyareconcluded(1)toadjustthedetailsofatreaty209(2)
pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature210 or (3) in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the
Constitution.211Theraisond'etreofexecutiveagreementshingesonpriorconstitutionalorlegislativeauthorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements. International practice has accepted the use of
variousformsanddesignationsofinternationalagreements,rangingfromthetraditionalnotionofatreatywhichconnotesaformal,solemninstrumentto
engagementsconcludedinmodern,simplifiedformsthatnolongernecessitateratification.212Aninternationalagreementmaytakedifferentforms:treaty,act,
protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute,
memorandumofagreement,modusvivendi,orsomeotherform.213Consequently,underinternationallaw,thedistinctionbetweenatreatyandaninternational
agreementorevenanexecutiveagreementisirrelevantforpurposesofdetermininginternationalrightsandobligations.
However,thisprincipledoesnotmeanthatthedomesticlawdistinguishingtreaties,internationalagreements,andexecutiveagreementsisrelegatedtoamere
variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very
importantfeaturesthatdistinguishtreatiesfromexecutiveagreementsandtranslatethemintotermsofartinthedomesticsetting.
First,executiveagreementsmustremaintraceabletoanexpressorimpliedauthorizationundertheConstitution,statutes,ortreaties.Theabsenceofthese
precedentsputsthevalidityandeffectivityofexecutiveagreementsunderseriousquestionforthemainfunctionoftheExecutiveistoenforcetheConstitution
and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules.214In turn, executive agreements cannot create new
internationalobligationsthatarenotexpresslyallowedorreasonablyimpliedinthelawtheypurporttoimplement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the
Senate215unlikeexecutiveagreements,whicharesolelyexecutiveactions.216BecauseoflegislativeparticipationthroughtheSenate,atreatyisregardedas
being on the same level as a statute.217If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior.218An executive
agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective.219 Both types of
internationalagreementareneverthelesssubjecttothesupremacyoftheConstitution.220
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive
authority to conduct our foreign relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by
existing domestic and international laws. There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the President's prerogative in concluding international
existing domestic and international laws. There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the President's prerogative in concluding international
agreements,suchasthosethatinvolvethefollowing:
a.ThepolicyoffreedomfromnuclearweaponswithinPhilippineterritory221
b. Thefixingoftariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageandwharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimposts,whichmustbepursuanttotheauthority
grantedbyCongress222
c. Thegrantofanytaxexemption,whichmustbepursuanttoalawconcurredinbyamajorityofalltheMembersofCongress223
d. Thecontractingorguaranteeing,onbehalfofthePhilippines,offoreignloansthatmustbepreviouslyconcurredinbytheMonetaryBoard224
e.Theauthorizationofthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinthecountrymustbeintheformofatreatydulyconcurredinbythe
Senate.225]
f. Foragreementsthatdonotfallunderparagraph5,theconcurrenceoftheSenateisrequired,shouldtheformofthegovernmentchosenbeatreaty.
5. ThePresidenthadthechoice
toenterintoEDCAbywayof
anexecutiveagreementora
treaty.
No court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls
squarelywithinArticleVIII,Section25.
AscanbegleanedfromthedebatesamongthemembersoftheConstitutionalCommission,theywereawarethatlegallybindinginternationalagreementswere
being entered into by countries in forms other than a treaty. At the same time, it is clear that they were also keen to preserve the concept of "executive
agreements"andtherightofthePresidenttoenterintosuchagreements.
WhatwecangleanfromthediscussionsoftheConstitutionalCommissionersisthattheyunderstoodthefollowingrealities:
1. Treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements are all constitutional manifestations of the conduct of foreign affairs with their distinct
legalcharacteristics.
a.TreatiesareformalcontractsbetweenthePhilippinesandotherStatesparties,whichareinthenatureofinternationalagreements,andalsoof
municipallawsinthesenseoftheirbindingnature.226
b. Internationalagreementsaresimilarinstruments,theprovisionsofwhichmayrequiretheratificationofadesignatednumberofpartiesthereto.
These agreements involving political issues or changes in national policy, as well as those involving international agreements of a permanent
character, usually take the form of treaties. They may also include commercial agreements, which are executive agreements essentially, but
whichproceedfrompreviousauthorizationbyCongress,thusdispensingwiththerequirementofconcurrencebytheSenate.227
c. Executiveagreementsaregenerallyintendedtoimplementatreatyalreadyenforcedortodeterminethedetailsoftheimplementationthereof
thatdonotaffectthesovereigntyoftheState.228
2. Treatiesandinternationalagreementsthatcannotbemereexecutiveagreementsmust,byconstitutionaldecree,beconcurredinbyatleasttwothirds
oftheSenate.
3. However,anagreementthesubjectofwhichistheentryofforeignmilitarytroops,bases,orfacilitiesisparticularlyrestricted.Therequirementsare
thatitbeintheformofatreatyconcurredinbytheSenatethatwhenCongresssorequires,itberatifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeople
inanationalreferendumheldforthatpurposeandthatitberecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.
4. Thus,executiveagreementscancontinuetoexistasaspeciesofinternationalagreements.
ThatiswhyourCourthasruledthewayithasinseveralcases.
InBayanMunav.Romulo,weruledthatthePresidentactedwithinthescopeofherconstitutionalauthorityanddiscretionwhenshechosetoenterintotheRP
U.S. NonSurrender Agreement in the form of an executive agreement, instead of a treaty, and in ratifying the agreement without Senate concurrence. The
Courtenbancdiscussedthisintrinsicpresidentialprerogativeasfollows:
Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty hence, it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate, x x x x. Pressing its point, petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the
subjectcategories that x x x may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, mostfavored nation rights,
patentrights,trademarkandcopyrightprotection,postalandnavigationarrangementsandsettlementofclaims.
ThecategorizationofsubjectmattersthatmaybecoveredbyinternationalagreementsmentionedinEasternSeaTradingisnotcastinstone.
Thereareno hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an
instrumentofinternationalrelations.Theprimaryconsiderationinthechoiceoftheformofagreementistheparties'intentanddesireto
craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests.Verily,thematter of form takes a
backseatwhenitcomestoeffectivenessandbindingeffectoftheenforcementofatreatyoranexecutiveagreement,asthepartiesineither
internationalagreementeachlaborunderthepactasuntservandaprinciple.
xxxx
ButoverandabovetheforegoingconsiderationsisthefactthatsaveforthesituationandmatterscontemplatedinSec.25,Art.XVIIIofthe
Constitutionwhenatreatyisrequired,theConstitutiondoesnotclassifyanysubject,likethatinvolvingpoliticalissues,tobeinthe
form of, and ratified as, a treaty.What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote
definedthereintocompletetheratificationprocess.
xxxx
xxx.AsthePresidentwieldsvastpowersandinfluence,herconductintheexternalaffairsofthenationis,asBayanwouldputit,"executive
altogether."TherightofthePresidenttoenterintoorratifybindingexecutiveagreementshasbeenconfirmedbylongpractice.
InthusagreeingtoconcludetheAgreementthruE/NBFO02803,thenPresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo,representedbytheSecretaryof
ForeignAffairs,acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution.At the end of the day, the
Presidentbyratifying,thruherdeputies,thenonsurrenderagreementdidnothingmorethandischargeaconstitutionalduty
andexerciseaprerogativethatpertainstoheroffice.(Emphasessupplied)
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Indeed, in the field of external affairs, the President must be given a larger measure of authority and wider discretion, subject only to the least amount of
checks and restrictions under the Constitution.229 The rationale behind this power and discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary,citedearlier.230
Section9ofExecutiveOrderNo.459,ortheGuidelinesintheNegotiationofInternationalAgreementsanditsRatification,thus,correctlyreflectedtheinherent
powersofthePresidentwhenitstatedthattheDFA"shalldeterminewhetheranagreementisanexecutiveagreementoratreaty."
Accordingly,intheexerciseofitspowerofjudicialreview,theCourtdoesnotlookintowhetheraninternationalagreementshouldbeintheformofatreatyor
an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and
prerogativesgrantedtothePresidentinthefieldofforeignaffairs,thetaskoftheCourtistodeterminewhethertheinternationalagreementisconsistentwith
theapplicablelimitations.
Executiveagreementsmaycover
thematterofforeignmilitary
forcesifitmerelyinvolvesdetail
adjustments.
Thepracticeofresortingtoexecutiveagreementsinadjustingthedetailsofalaworatreatythatalreadydealswiththepresenceofforeignmilitaryforcesis
not at all unusual in this jurisdiction. In fact, the Court has already implicitly acknowledged this practice inLim v. Executive Secretary.231In that case, the
CourtwasaskedtoscrutinizetheconstitutionalityoftheTermsofReferenceoftheBalikatan021jointmilitaryexercises,whichsoughttoimplementtheVFA.
Concludedintheformofanexecutiveagreement,theTermsofReferencedetailedthecoverageoftheterm"activities"mentionedinthetreatyandsettledthe
matterspertainingtotheconstructionoftemporarystructuresfortheU.S.troopsduringtheactivitiesthedurationandlocationoftheexercisesthenumber
ofparticipantsandtheextentofandlimitationsontheactivitiesoftheU.S.forces.TheCourtupheldtheTermsofReferenceasbeingconsistentwiththeVFA.
ItnolongertookissuewiththefactthattheBalikatanTermsofReferencewasnotintheformofatreatyconcurredinbytheSenate,evenifitdealtwiththe
regulationoftheactivitiesofforeignmilitaryforcesonPhilippineterritory.
InNicolasv.Romulo,232theCourtagainimpliedlyaffirmedtheuseofanexecutiveagreementinanattempttoadjustthedetailsofaprovisionoftheVFA.The
PhilippinesandtheU.S.enteredintotheRomuloKenneyAgreement,whichundertooktoclarifythedetentionofaU.S.ArmedForcesmember,whosecasewas
pendingappealafterhisconvictionbyatrialcourtforthecrimeofrape.Intestingthevalidityofthelatteragreement,theCourtpreciselyalludedtooneofthe
inherentlimitationsofanexecutiveagreement:itcannotgobeyondthetermsofthetreatyitpurportstoimplement.ItwaseventuallyruledthattheRomulo
KenneyAgreementwas"notinaccord"withtheVFA,sincetheformerwassquarelyinconsistentwithaprovisioninthetreatyrequiringthatthedetentionbe
"byPhilippineauthorities."Consequently,theCourtorderedtheSecretaryofForeignAffairstocomplywiththeVFAand"forthwithnegotiatewiththeUnited
StatesrepresentativesfortheappropriateagreementondetentionfacilitiesunderPhilippineauthoritiesasprovidedinArt.V,Sec.10oftheVFA."233
Cullingfromtheforegoingdiscussions,wereiteratethefollowingpronouncementstoguideusinresolvingthepresentcontroversy:
1. Section25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution,containsstringentrequirementsthatmustbefulfilledbytheinternationalagreementallowingthepresence
offoreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinthePhilippines:(a)theagreementmustbeintheformofatreaty,and(b)itmustbedulyconcurredin
bytheSenate.
2. Iftheagreementisnotcoveredbytheabovesituation,thenthePresidentmaychoosetheformoftheagreement(i.e.,eitheranexecutiveagreement
or a treaty), provided that the agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal agreement that first allows their
entryorpresenceinthePhilippines.
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set by the law and/or treaty that the former purports to
implementandmustnotundulyexpandtheinternationalobligationexpresslymentionedornecessarilyimpliedinthelawortreaty.
4. TheexecutiveagreementmustbeconsistentwiththeConstitution,aswellaswithexistinglawsandtreaties.
In light of the President's choice to enter into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement, respondents carry the burden of proving that it is a mere
implementation of existing laws and treaties concurred in by the Senate. EDCA must thus be carefully dissected to ascertain if it remains within the legal
parametersofavalidexecutiveagreement.
EDCAisconsistentwith
thecontent,purpose,and
frameworkoftheMDT
andtheVFAThe starting point of our analysis is the rule that "an executive agreement x x x may not be used to amend a treaty."234InLim v. Executive
SecretaryandinNicolasv.Romulo,theCourtapproachedthequestionofthevalidityofexecutiveagreementsbycomparingthemwiththegeneralframework
andthespecificprovisionsofthetreatiestheyseektoimplement.
InLim, the Terms of Reference of the joint military exercises was scrutinized by studying "the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines
bounditself,"235i.e.,theMDTandtheVFA.TheCourtproceededtoexaminetheextentoftheterm"activities"ascontemplatedinArticlesI236andII237ofthe
VFA.Itlateronfoundthattheterm"activities"wasdeliberatelyleftundefinedandambiguousinordertopermit"awidescopeofundertakingssubjectonlyto
theapprovalofthePhilippinegovernment"238andtherebyallowtheparties"acertainleewayinnegotiation."239TheCourteventuallyruledthattheTermsof
Referencefellwithinthesanctionedorallowableactivities,especiallyinthecontextoftheVFAandtheMDT.
The Court applied the same approach toNicolas v. Romulo.It studied the provisions of the VFA on custody and detention to ascertain the validity of the
RomuloKenney Agreement.240 It eventually found that the two international agreements were not in accord, since the RomuloKenney Agreement had
stipulated that U.S. military personnel shall be detained at the U.S. Embassy Compound and guarded by U.S. military personnel, instead of by Philippine
authorities. According to the Court, the parties "recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction."241 Pursuant to
ArticleV(6)oftheVFA,thecustodyofaU.S.militarypersonnelresideswithU.S.militaryauthoritiesduringtrial.Oncethereisafindingofguilt,ArticleV(10)
requiresthattheconfinementordetentionbe"byPhilippineauthorities."
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen's Dissenting Opinion posits that EDCA "substantially modifies or amends the VFA"242and follows with an enumeration of the
differences between EDCA and the VFA. While these arguments will be rebutted more fully further on, an initial answer can already be given to each of the
concernsraisedbyhisdissent.
ThefirstdifferenceemphasizedisthatEDCAdoesnotonlyregulatevisitsastheVFAdoes,butallowstemporarystationingonarotationalbasisofU.S.military
personnelandtheircontractorsinphysicallocationswithpermanentfacilitiesandprepositionedmilitarymateriel.
This argument does not take into account that these permanent facilities, while built by U.S. forces, are to be owned by the Philippines once
constructed.243EventheVFAallowedconstructionforthebenefitofU.S.forcesduringtheirtemporaryvisits.
The second difference stated by the dissent is that EDCA allows the prepositioning of military materiel, which can include various types of warships, fighter
planes,bombers,andvessels,aswellaslandandamphibiousvehiclesandtheircorrespondingammunition.244
However, the VFA clearly allows the same kind of equipment, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft to be brought into the country. Articles VII and VIII of the VFA
contemplatesthatU.S.equipment,materials,supplies,andotherpropertyareimportedintooracquiredinthePhilippinesbyoronbehalfoftheU.S.Armed
Forcesasarevehicles,vessels,andaircraftoperatedbyorforU.S.forcesinconnectionwithactivitiesundertheVFA.Theseprovisionslikewiseprovideforthe
waiverofthespecificduties,taxes,charges,andfeesthatcorrespondtotheseequipment.
ThethirddifferenceadvertedtobytheJusticeLeonen'sdissentisthattheVFAcontemplatestheentryoftroopsfortrainingexercises,whereasEDCAallowsthe
useofterritoryforlaunchingmilitaryandparamilitaryoperationsconductedinotherstates.245ThedissentofJusticeTeresitaJ.LeonardoDeCastroalsonotes
thatVFAwasintendedfornoncombatactivitiesonly,whereastheentryandactivitiesofU.S.forcesintoAgreedLocationswereborneofmilitarynecessityor
hadamartialcharacter,andwerethereforenotcontemplatedbytheVFA.246
ThisCourt'sjurisprudencehoweverestablishedinnouncertaintermsthatcombatrelatedactivities,asopposedtoactualcombat,wereallowedundertheMDT
andVFA,viz:
BoththehistoryandintentoftheMutualDefenseTreatyandtheVFAsupporttheconclusionthatcombatrelatedactivitiesasopposedtocombat
itselfsuchastheonesubjectoftheinstantpetition,areindeedauthorized.247
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Hence,evenifEDCAwasborneofmilitarynecessity,itcannotbesaidtohavestrayedfromtheintentoftheVFAsinceEDCA'scombatrelatedcomponentsare
allowedunderthetreaty.
Moreover, both the VFA and EDCA are silent on what these activities actually are. Both the VFA and EDCA deal with the presence of U.S. forces within the
Philippines,butmakenomentionofbeingplatformsforactivitybeyondPhilippineterritory.Whileitmaybethat,asapplied,militaryoperationsundereither
theVFAorEDCAwouldbecarriedoutinthefuture,thescopeofjudicialreviewdoesnotcoverpotentialbreachesofdiscretionbutonlyactualoccurrencesor
blatantlyillegalprovisions.Hence,wecannotinvalidateEDCAonthebasisofthepotentiallyabusiveuseofitsprovisions.
The fourth difference is that EDCA supposedly introduces a new concept not contemplated in the VFA or the MDT: Agreed Locations, Contractors, Pre
positioning,andOperationalControl.248
Aspreviouslymentioned,thesepointsshallbeaddressedfullyandindividuallyinthelatteranalysisofEDCA'sprovisions.However,itmustalreadybeclarified
thatthetermsanddetailsusedbyanimplementingagreementneednotbefoundinthemothertreaty.Theymustbesourcedfromtheauthorityderivedfrom
thetreaty,butarenotnecessarilyexpressedwordforwordinthemothertreaty.ThisconcernshallbefurtherelucidatedinthisDecision.
ThefifthdifferencehighlightedbytheDissentingOpinionisthattheVFAdoesnothaveprovisionsthatmaybeconstruedasarestrictiononormodificationof
obligations found in existing statues, including the jurisdiction of courts, local autonomy, and taxation. Implied in this argument is that EDCA contains such
restrictionsormodifications.249
This last argument cannot be accepted in view of the clear provisions of EDCA. Both the VFA and EDCA ensure Philippine jurisdiction in all instances
contemplatedbybothagreements,withtheexceptionofthoseoutlinedbytheVFAinArticlesIIIVI.IntheVFA,taxesareclearlywaivedwhereasinEDCA,
taxes are assumed by the government as will be discussed later on. This fact does not, therefore, produce a diminution of jurisdiction on the part of the
Philippines,butratherarecognitionofsovereigntyandtherightsthatattendit,someofwhichmaybewaivedasinthecasesunderArticlesIIIVIoftheVFA.
Takingofffromtheseconcerns,theprovisionsofEDCAmustbecomparedwiththoseoftheMDTandtheVFA,whicharethetwotreatiesfromwhichEDCA
allegedlydrawsitsvalidity.
"Authorizedpresence"underthe
VFAversus"authorizedactivities"
underEDCA:(1)U.S.personnel
and(2)U.S.contractors
The OSG argues250 that EDCA merely details existing policies under the MDT and the VFA. It explains that EDCA articulates the principle of defensive
preparationembodied in Article II of the MDT and seeks to enhance the defensive, strategic, and technological capabilities of both parties pursuant to the
objectiveofthetreatytostrengthenthosecapabilitiestopreventorresistapossiblearmedattack.RespondentalsopointsoutthatEDCAsimplyimplements
Article I of the VFA, which already allows the entry of U.S. troops and personnel into the country. Respondent stresses this Court's recognition in Lim v.
ExecutiveSecretarythat U.S. troops and personnel are authorized to conduct activities that promote the goal of maintaining and developing their defense
capability.
Petitionerscontest251theassertionthattheprovisionsofEDCAmerelyimplementtheMDT.Accordingtothem,thetreatydoesnotspecificallyauthorizethe
entry of U.S. troops in the country in order to maintain and develop the individual and collective capacities of both the Philippines and the U.S. to resist an
armedattack.Theyemphasizethatthetreatywasconcludedatatimewhentherewasasyetnospecificconstitutionalprohibitiononthepresenceofforeign
militaryforcesinthecountry.
PetitionersalsochallengetheargumentthatEDCAsimplyimplementstheVFA.Theyassertthattheagreementcoversonlyshorttermortemporaryvisitsof
U.S.troops"fromtimetotime"forthespecificpurposeofcombinedmilitaryexerciseswiththeirFilipinocounterparts.Theystressthat,incontrast,U.S.troops
areallowedunderEDCAtoperformactivitiesbeyondcombinedmilitaryexercises,suchasthoseenumeratedinArticles111(1)andIV(4)thereof.Furthermore,
thereissomedegreeofpermanenceinthepresenceofU.S.troopsinthecountry,sincetheeffectivityofEDCAiscontinuousuntilterminated.Theyproceedto
arguethatwhiletroopshavea"rotational"presence,thisschemeinfactfosterstheirpermanentpresence.
AdmissionofU.S.militaryand
civilianpersonnelintoPhilippine
territoryisalreadyallowedunder
theVFA
WeshallfirstdealwiththerecognitionunderEDCAofthepresenceinthecountryofthreedistinctclassesofindividualswhowillbeconductingdifferenttypes
of activities within the Agreed Locations: (1) U.S. military personnel (2) U.S. civilian personnel and (3) U.S. contractors. The agreement refers to them as
follows:
"United States personnel" means United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the territory of the Philippines in
connectionwithactivitiesapprovedbythePhilippines,asthosetermsaredefinedintheVFA.252
"United States forces" means the entity comprising United States personnel and all property, equipment, and materiel of the United
StatesArmedForcespresentintheterritoryofthePhilippines.253
"UnitedStatescontractors"meanscompaniesandfirms,andtheir employees, under contract or subcontractto or on behalf of the
United States Department of Defense. United States contractors are not included as part of the definition ofUnitedStatespersonnelin this
Agreement,includingwithinthecontextoftheVFA.254
United States forces may contract for any materiel, supplies, equipment, and services (including construction) to be furnished or
undertaken in the territory of the Philippines without restriction as to choice of contractor, supplier, or personwhoprovides such materiel,
supplies,equipment,orservices.Suchcontractsshallbesolicited,awarded,andadministeredinaccordancewiththelawsandregulationsof
theUnitedStates.255(EmphasesSupplied)
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Athoroughevaluationofhow EDCAisphrased clarifies that the agreement does notdeal with theentryintothecountryofU.S.personneland
contractors per se. While Articles 1(1 )(b)256 and II(4)257 speak of "the right to access and use" the Agreed Locations, their wordings indicate the
presumption that these groups have already been allowed entry into Philippine territory, for which, unlike the VFA, EDCA has no specific provision. Instead,
ArticleIIofthelattersimplyalludestotheVFAindescribingU.S.personnel,atermdefinedunderArticleIofthetreatyasfollows:
As used in this Agreement, "United States personnel" means United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in
connectionwithactivitiesapprovedbythePhilippineGovernment.Withinthisdefinition:
1. Theterm"militarypersonnel"referstomilitarymembersoftheUnitedStatesArmy,Navy,MarineCorps,AirForce,andCoast
Guard.
2. Theterm"civilianpersonnel"referstoindividualswhoareneithernationalsofnorordinarilyresidentinthePhilippinesandwho
areemployedbytheUnitedStatesarmedforcesorwhoareaccompanyingtheUnitedStatesarmedforces,suchasemployees
oftheAmericanRedCrossandtheUnitedServicesOrganization.258
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Article II of EDCA must then be read with Article III of the VFA, which provides for the entry accommodations to be accorded to U.S. military and civilian
personnel:
1.TheGovernmentofthePhilippinesshallfacilitatetheadmissionofUnitedStatespersonnelandtheirdeparturefromthePhilippinesin
connectionwithactivitiescoveredbythisagreement.
2.UnitedStatesmilitarypersonnelshallbeexemptfrompassportandvisaregulationsuponenteringanddepartingthePhilippines.
3.Thefollowingdocumentsonly,whichshallberequiredinrespectofUnitedStatesmilitarypersonnelwhoenterthePhilippinesxxxx.
4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall present, upon demand, valid passports upon
entryanddepartureofthePhilippines.(EmphasesSupplied)
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ByvirtueofArticlesIandIIIoftheVFA,thePhilippinesalreadyallowsU.S.militaryandcivilianpersonneltobe"temporarilyinthePhilippines,"solongastheir
presenceis"inconnectionwithactivitiesapprovedbythePhilippineGovernment."ThePhilippines,throughArticleIII,evenguaranteesthatitshallfacilitatethe
admissionofU.S.personnelintothecountryandgrantexemptionsfrompassportandvisaregulations.TheVFAdoesnotevenlimittheirtemporarypresenceto
specificlocations.
Basedontheaboveprovisions,theadmissionandpresenceofU.S.militaryandcivilianpersonnelinPhilippineterritoryarealreadyallowedunder
theVFA,thetreatysupposedlybeingimplementedbyEDCA.WhatEDCAhaseffectivelydone,infact,ismerelyprovidethemechanismtoidentifythe
locationsinwhichU.S.personnelmayperformallowedactivitiespursuanttotheVFA.Astheimplementingagreement,itregulatesandlimitsthepresenceof
U.S.personnelinthecountry.
EDCAdoesnotprovidethe
legalbasisforadmissionof
U.S.contractorsintoPhilippine
territorytheirentrymustbe
sourcedfromextraneous
Philippinestatutesandregulations
fortheadmissionofalienemployees
orbusinesspersons.
OfthethreeaforementionedclassesofindividualswhowillbeconductingcertainactivitieswithintheAgreedLocations,wenotethatonlyU.S.contractorsare
notexplicitlymentionedintheVFA.Thisdoesnotmean,though,thattherecognitionoftheirpresenceunderEDCAisipsofactoanamendmentofthetreaty,
andthattheremustbeSenateconcurrencebeforetheyareallowedtoenterthecountry.
NowhereinEDCAareU.S.contractorsguaranteedimmediateadmissionintothePhilippines.ArticlesIIIandIV,infact,merelygrantthemtherightofaccess
to, and the authority to conduct certain activities within the Agreed Locations. Since Article 11(3) of EDCA specifically leaves outU.S.contractors from the
coverageoftheVFA,theyshallnotbegrantedthesameentryaccommodationsandprivilegesasthoseenjoyedbyU.S.militaryandcivilianpersonnelunder
theVFA.
Consequently, it is neither mandatory nor obligatory on the part of the Philippines to admit U.S. contractors into the country.259 We emphasize that the
admissionofaliensintoPhilippineterritoryis"amatterofpurepermissionandsimpletolerancewhichcreatesnoobligationonthepartofthegovernmentto
permitthemtostay."260UnlikeU.S.personnelwhoareaccordedentryaccommodations,U.S.contractorsaresubjecttoPhilippineimmigrationlaws.261The
latter must comply with our visa and passport regulations262and prove that they are not subject to exclusion under any provision of Philippine immigration
laws.263ThePresidentmayalsodenythementrypursuanttohisabsoluteandunqualifiedpowertoprohibitorpreventtheadmissionofalienswhosepresence
inthecountrywouldbeinimicaltopublicinterest.264
In the same vein, the President may exercise the plenary power to expel or deport U.S. contractors265as may be necessitated by national security, public
safety,publichealth,publicmorals,andnationalinterest.266They may also be deported if they are found to be illegal or undesirable aliens pursuant to the
PhilippineImmigrationAct267andtheDataPrivacyAct.268Incontrast,Article111(5)oftheVFArequiresarequestforremovalfromthePhilippinegovernment
beforeamemberoftheU.S.personnelmaybe"disposed]xxxoutsideofthePhilippines."
AuthorizedactivitiesofU.S.
militaryandcivilianpersonnel
withinPhilippineterritoryare
infurtheranceoftheMDTandtheVFA
WebeginouranalysisbyquotingtherelevantsectionsoftheMDTandtheVFAthatpertaintotheactivitiesinwhichU.S.militaryandcivilianpersonnelmay
engage:
MUTUALDEFENSETREATY
ArticleII
InordermoreeffectivelytoachievetheobjectiveofthisTreaty,thePartiesseparatelyandjointlybyselfhelpandmutualaidwillmaintain
anddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack.
ArticleIII
TheParties,throughtheirForeignMinistersortheirdeputies,willconsulttogetherfromtimetotimeregardingtheimplementationof
thisTreatyandwheneverintheopinionofeitherofthemtheterritorialintegrity,politicalindependenceorsecurityofeitherofthePartiesis
threatenedbyexternalarmedattackinthePacific.
VISITINGFORCESAGREEMENT
Preamble
xxx
ReaffirmingtheirobligationsundertheMutualDefenseTreatyofAugust30,1951
NotingthatfromtimetotimeelementsoftheUnitedStatesarmedforcesmayvisittheRepublicofthePhilippines
ConsideringthatcooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheRepublicofthePhilippinespromotestheircommonsecurityinterests
xxx
ArticleIDefinitions
As used in this Agreement, "United States personnel" means United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in
connectionwithactivitiesapprovedbythePhilippineGovernment.Withinthisdefinition:xxx
ArticleIIRespectforLaw
It is theduty of United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippinesand to abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, fromany political activityin the Philippines. The Government of the
UnitedStatesshalltakeallmeasureswithinitsauthoritytoensurethatthisisdone.
ArticleVIIImportationandExportation
1.UnitedStatesGovernmentequipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported into or acquiredinthePhilippinesbyoron
behalfoftheUnitedStatesarmedforcesinconnectionwithactivitiestowhichthisagreementapplies,shallbefreeofallPhilippineduties,
taxesandothersimilarcharges.TitletosuchpropertyshallremainwiththeUnitedStates,whichmayremovesuchpropertyfromthePhilippines
atanytime,freefromexportduties,taxes,andothersimilarcharges,xxx.
ArticleVIIIMovementofVesselsandAircraft
1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government of the
Philippinesinaccordancewithproceduresstipulatedinimplementingarrangements.
2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government of the
Philippines.Themovementofvesselsshallbeinaccordancewithinternationalcustomandpracticegoverningsuchvessels,andsuch
agreedimplementingarrangementsasnecessary,xxx(EmphasesSupplied)
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Manifestintheseprovisionsistheabundanceofreferencestothecreationoffurther"implementingarrangements"includingtheidentificationof"activities[to
be] approved by the Philippine Government." To determine the parameters of these implementing arrangements and activities, we referred to the content,
purpose,andframeworkoftheMDTandtheVFA.
By its very language, the MDT contemplates a situation in which both countries shall engage injointactivities, so that they can maintain and develop their
defensecapabilities.Thewordingitselfevidentlyinvitesareasonableconstructionthatthejointactivitiesshallinvolvejointmilitarytrainings,maneuvers,and
exercises. Both the interpretation269and the subsequent practice270 of the parties show that the MDT independently allows joint military exercises in the
country,Limv.ExecutiveSecretary271andNicolasv.Romulo272recognizedthatBalikatanexercises,whichareactivitiesthatseektoenhanceanddevelopthe
strategic and technological capabilities of the parties to resist an armed attack, "fall squarely under the provisions of the RPUS MDT."273InLim, the Court
especially noted that the Philippines and the U.S. continued to conduct joint military exercises even after the expiration of the MBA and even before the
conclusionoftheVFA.274TheseactivitiespresumablyrelatedtotheStatusofForcesAgreement,inwhichthepartiesagreedonthestatustobeaccordedto
U.S.militaryandcivilianpersonnelwhileconductingactivitiesinthePhilippinesinrelationtotheMDT.275
Further,itcanbelogicallyinferredfromArticleVoftheMDTthatthesejointactivities may be conducted on Philippine or on U.S. soil. The article expressly
providesthatthetermarmedattackincludes"anarmedattackonthemetropolitanterritoryofeitheroftheParties,orontheislandterritoriesunderits
jurisdictioninthePacificoronitsarmedforces,publicvesselsoraircraftinthePacific."Surely,inmaintaininganddevelopingourdefensecapabilities,an
assessmentortrainingwillneedtobeperformed,separatelyandjointlybyselfhelpandmutualaid,intheterritoriesofthecontractingparties.Itisreasonable
toconcludethattheassessmentofdefensecapabilitieswouldentailunderstandingtheterrain,windflowpatterns,andotherenvironmentalfactorsuniqueto
thePhilippines.
It would also be reasonable to conclude that a simulation of how to respond to attacks in vulnerable areas would be part of the training of the parties to
maintainanddeveloptheircapacitytoresistanactualarmedattackandtotestandvalidatethedefenseplanofthePhilippines.Itislikewisereasonableto
imaginethatpartofthetrainingwouldinvolveananalysisoftheeffectoftheweaponsthatmaybeusedandhowtobepreparedfortheeventuality.ThisCourt
recognizesthatallofthismayrequiretrainingintheareawhereanarmedattackmightbedirectedatthePhilippineterritory.
TheprovisionsoftheMDTmustthenbereadinconjunctionwiththoseoftheVFA.
Article I of the VFA indicates that the presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in the Philippines is "in connection with activities approved by the
Philippine Government." While the treaty does not expressly enumerate or detail the nature of activities of U.S. troops in the country, its Preamble makes
explicit references to the reaffirmation of the obligations of both countries under the MDT. These obligations include the strengthening of international and
regionalsecurityinthePacificareaandthepromotionofcommonsecurityinterests.
TheCourthasalreadysettledinLimv.ExecutiveSecretarythatthephrase"activitiesapprovedbythePhilippineGovernment"underArticleIoftheVFAwas
intendedtobeambiguousinordertoaffordthepartiesflexibilitytoadjustthedetailsofthepurposeofthevisitofU.S.personnel.276InrulingthattheTerms
ofReferencefortheBalikatanExercisesin2002fellwithinthecontextofthetreaty,thisCourtexplained:
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word "activities" arose from
accident.Inourview,itwasdeliberatelymadethatwaytogivebothpartiesacertainleewayinnegotiation.Inthismanner,visiting
USforcesmaysojourninPhilippineterritoryforpurposesotherthanmilitary.Asconceived,thejointexercisesmayincludetrainingon
newtechniquesofpatrolandsurveillancetoprotectthenation'smarineresources,seasearchandrescueoperationstoassistvesselsindistress,
disasterreliefoperations,civicactionprojectssuchasthebuildingofschoolhouses,medicalandhumanitarianmissions,andthelike.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises.It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 021," a
"mutualantiterrorismadvising,assistingandtrainingexercise,"fallsundertheumbrellaofsanctionedorallowableactivitiesin
the context of the agreement.Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat
relatedactivitiesasopposedtocombatitselfsuchastheonesubjectoftheinstantpetition,areindeedauthorized.(EmphasesSupplied)
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The joint report of the Senate committees on foreign relations and on national defense and security further explains the wide range and variety of activities
contemplatedintheVFA,andhowtheseactivitiesshallbeidentified:277
Thesejoint exercises envisioned in the VFA are not limited to combatrelated activities they have a wide range and variety. They
includeexercisesthatwillreinforcetheAFP'sabilitytoacquirenewtechniquesofpatrolandsurveillancetoprotectthecountry'smaritime
resourcesseasearchandrescueoperationstoassistshipsindistressanddisasterreliefoperationstoaidthecivilianvictimsofnatural
calamities,suchasearthquakes,typhoonsandtidalwaves.
xxxx
Joint activities under the VFA will include combat maneuvers training in aircraft maintenance and equipment repair civicaction projects and
consultations and meetings of the PhilippineU.S. Mutual Defense Board.It is at the level of the Mutual Defense Boardwhich is headed
jointlybytheChiefofStaffoftheAFPandtheCommanderinChiefoftheU.S.PacificCommandthattheVFAexercisesareplanned.Final
approvalofanyactivityinvolvingU.S.forcesis,however,invariablygivenbythePhilippineGovernment.
xxxx
SiazonclarifiedthatitisnottheVFAbyitselfthatdetermineswhatactivitieswillbeconductedbetweenthearmedforcesoftheU.S.and
the Philippines. The VFA regulates and provides the legal framework for the presence, conduct and legal status of U.S.
personnelwhiletheyareinthecountryforvisits,jointexercisesandotherrelatedactivities.(EmphasesSupplied)
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WhatcanbegleanedfromtheprovisionsoftheVFA,thejointreportoftheSenatecommitteesonforeignrelationsandonnationaldefenseand
security, and the ruling of this Court in Lim is that the "activities" referred to in the treaty are meant to be specified and identified
infurtheragreements.EDCAisonesuchagreement.
EDCA seeks to be an instrument that enumerates the Philippineapproved activities of U.S. personnel referred to in the VFA. EDCA allows U.S. military and
civilianpersonneltoperform"activitiesapprovedbythePhilippines,asthosetermsaredefinedintheVFA"278andclarifiesthattheseactivitiesincludethose
conductedwithintheAgreedLocations:
1. Security cooperation exercises joint and combined training activities humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities and such
otheractivitiesasmaybeagreeduponbytheParties279
2. Training transit support and related activities refueling of aircraft bunkering of vessels temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels,
andaircrafttemporaryaccommodationofpersonnelcommunicationsprepositioningofequipment,supplies,andmaterieldeployment
offorcesandmaterielandsuchotheractivitiesasthePartiesmayagree280
3. ExerciseofoperationalcontrolovertheAgreedLocationsforconstructionactivitiesandothertypesofactivity,includingalterationsand
improvementsthereof281
4. ExerciseofallrightsandauthoritieswithintheAgreedLocationsthatarenecessaryfortheiroperationalcontrolordefense,includingthe
adoptionofappropriatemeasurestoprotectU.S.forcesandcontractors282
5. Useofwater,electricity,andotherpublicutilities283
6. Operationoftheirowntelecommunicationsystems,includingtheutilizationofsuchmeansandservicesasarerequiredtoensurethefull
abilitytooperatetelecommunicationsystems,aswellastheuseofthenecessaryradiospectrumallocatedforthispurpose284
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According to Article I of EDCA, one of the purposes of these activities is to maintain and develop, jointly and by mutual aid, the individual and collective
capacitiesofbothcountriestoresistanarmedattack.ItfurtherstatesthattheactivitiesareinfurtheranceoftheMDTandwithinthecontextoftheVFA.
We note that these planned activities are very similar to those under the Terms of Reference285mentionedinLim.Both EDCA and the Terms of Reference
authorizetheU.S.toperformthefollowing:(a)participateintrainingexercises(b)retaincommandovertheirforces(c)establishtemporarystructuresinthe
country (d) share in the use of their respective resources, equipment and other assets and (e) exercise their right to selfdefense. We quote the relevant
portionoftheTermsandConditionsasfollows:286
I.POLICYLEVEL
xxxx
NopermanentUSbasingandsupportfacilitiesshallbeestablished.Temporarystructuressuchasthosefortroopbilleting,classroom
instructionandmessingmaybesetupforusebyRPandUSForcesduringtheExercise.
TheExerciseshallbeimplementedjointlybyRPandUSExerciseCoDirectorsundertheauthorityoftheChiefofStaff,AFP.Innoinstance
willUSForcesoperateindependentlyduringfieldtrainingexercises(FTX).AFPandUSUnitCommanderswillretaincommandover
their respective forces under the overall authority of the Exercise CoDirectors. RP and US participants shall comply with
operationalinstructionsoftheAFPduringtheFTX.
Theexerciseshallbeconductedandcompletedwithinaperiodofnotmorethansixmonths,withtheprojectedparticipationof660US
personneland3,800RPForces.TheChiefofStaff,AFPshalldirecttheExerciseCoDirectorstowindupandterminatetheExerciseand
otheractivitieswithinthesixmonthExerciseperiod.
TheExerciseisamutualcounterterrorismadvising,assistingandtrainingExerciserelativetoPhilippineeffortsagainsttheASG,
andwillbeconductedontheIslandofBasilan.Furtheradvising,assistingandtrainingexercisesshallbeconductedinMalagutayandthe
Zamboangaarea.RelatedactivitiesinCebuwillbeforsupportoftheExercise.
xxxx.
USexerciseparticipantsshallnotengageincombat,withoutprejudicetotheirrightofselfdefense.
ThesetermsofReferenceareforpurposesofthisExerciseonlyanddonotcreateadditionallegalobligationsbetweentheUSGovernment
andtheRepublicofthePhilippines.
II.EXERCISELEVEL
1.TRAINING
a.TheExerciseshallinvolvetheconductofmutualmilitaryassisting,advisingandtrainingof RP and US Forces with the primary
objectiveofenhancingtheoperationalcapabilitiesofbothforcestocombatterrorism.
b.AtnotimeshallUSForcesoperateindependentlywithinRPterritory.
c.Flightplansofallaircraftinvolvedintheexercisewillcomplywiththelocalairtrafficregulations.
2.ADMINISTRATION&LOGISTICS
xxxx
a.RPandUSparticipatingforcesmayshare,inaccordancewiththeirrespectivelawsandregulations,intheuseoftheirresources,
equipmentandotherassets.Theywillusetheirrespectivelogisticschannels,xxx.(EmphasesSupplied)
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Afterathoroughexaminationofthecontent,purpose,andframeworkoftheMDTandtheVFA,wefindthatEDCAhasremainedwithintheparameterssetin
thesetwotreaties.JustliketheTermsofReferencementionedinLim, mere adjustments in detail to implement the MDT and the VFA can be in the form of
executiveagreements.
Petitionersassert287thatthedurationoftheactivitiesmentionedinEDCAisnolongerconsistentwiththetemporarynatureofthevisitsascontemplatedinthe
VFA.TheypointoutthatArticleXII(4)ofEDCAhasaninitialtermof10years,atermautomaticallyrenewedunlessthePhilippinesortheU.S.terminatesthe
agreement.Accordingtopetitioners,suchlengthoftimealreadyhasabadgeofpermanency.
In connection with this, Justice Teresita J. LeonardoDe Castro likewise argues in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that the VFA contemplated mere
temporaryvisitsfromU.S.forces,whereasJEDCAallowsanunlimitedperiodforU.S.forcestostayinthePhilippines.288
However,theprovisionsofEDCAdirectlycontradictthisargumentbylimitingitselfto10yearsofeffectivity.Althoughthistermisautomaticallyrenewed,the
processforterminatingtheagreementisunilateralandtherighttodosoautomaticallyaccruesattheendofthe10yearperiod.Clearly,thismethoddoesnot
createapermanentobligation.
DrawingonthereasoninginLim,wealsobelievethatitcouldnothavebeenbychancethattheVFAdoesnotincludeamaximumtimelimitwithrespecttothe
presenceofU.S.personnelinthecountry.WeconstruethislackofspecificityasadeliberateeffortonthepartofthePhilippineandtheU.S.governmentsto
leave out this aspect and reserve it for the "adjustment in detail" stage of the implementation of the treaty. We interpret the subsequent, unconditional
concurrence of the Senate in the entire text of the VFA as an implicit grant to the President of a margin of appreciation in determining the duration of the
"temporary"presenceofU.S.personnelinthecountry.
JusticeBrion'sdissentarguesthatthepresenceofU.S.forcesunderEDCAis"morepermanent"innature.289However,thisargumenthasnottakenrootby
virtueofasimpleglanceatitsprovisionsontheeffectivityperiod.EDCAdoesnotgrantpermanentbases,butrathertemporaryrotationalaccesstofacilitiesfor
efficiency.AsProfessorAileenS.P.Bavieranotes:
The new EDCA would grant American troops, ships and planes rotational access to facilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines but not
permanent bases which are prohibited under the Philippine Constitution with the result of reducing response time should an external threat
fromacommonadversarycrystallize.290
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EDCAisfarfrombeingpermanentinnaturecomparedtothepracticeofstatesasshowninotherdefensecooperationagreements.Forexample,ArticleXIV(l)
oftheU.S.Romaniadefenseagreementprovidesthefollowing:
This Agreement isconcluded for an indefinite periodand shall enter into force in accordance with the internal laws of each Party x x x.
(Emphasissupplied)
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Likewise,Article36(2)oftheUSPolandStatusofForcesAgreementreads:
ThisAgreementhasbeenconcludedforanindefiniteperiodoftime.ItmaybeterminatedbywrittennotificationbyeitherPartyandinthat
eventitterminates2yearsafterthereceiptofthenotification,(Emphasissupplied)
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SectionVIIIofU.S.DenmarkMutualSupportAgreementsimilarlyprovides:
8.1 This Agreement, which consists of a Preamble, SECTIONS IVIII, and Annexes A and B, shall become effective on the date of the last
signatureaffixedbelowandshallremaininforceuntilterminatedbytheParties,providedthatitmaybeterminatedbyeitherPartyupon
180dayswrittennoticeofitsintentiontodosototheotherParty,(Emphasissupplied)
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Ontheotherhand,ArticleXXI(3)oftheU.S.AustraliaForcePostureAgreementprovidesalongerinitialterm:
3.ThisAgreementshallhaveaninitialtermof25yearsandthereaftershallcontinueinforce,butmaybeterminatedbyeitherPartyat
anytimeupononeyear'swrittennoticetotheotherPartythroughdiplomaticchannels,(Emphasissupplied)
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ThephrasinginEDCAissimilartothatintheU.S.Australiatreatybutwithatermlessthanhalfofthatisprovidedinthelatteragreement.Thismeansthat
EDCA merely follows the practice of other states in not specifying a nonextendible maximum term. This practice, however, does not automatically grant a
badgeofpermanencytoitsterms.ArticleXII(4)ofEDCAprovidesveryclearly,infact,thatitseffectivityisforaninitialtermof10years,whichisfarshorter
than the terms of effectivity between the U.S. and other states. It is simply illogical to conclude that the initial, extendible term of 10 years somehow gives
EDCAprovisionsapermanentcharacter.
ThereasoningbehindthisinterpretationisrootedintheconstitutionalroleofthePresidentwho,asCommanderinChiefofourarmedforces,istheprincipal
strategistofthenationand,assuch,dutyboundtodefendournationalsovereigntyandterritorialintegrity291who,aschiefarchitectofourforeignrelations,
istheheadpolicymakertaskedtoassess,ensure,andprotectournationalsecurityandinterests292whoholdsthemostcomprehensiveandmostconfidential
information about foreign countries293 that may affect how we conduct our external affairs and who has unrestricted access to highly classified military
intelligencedata294thatmaythreatenthelifeofthenation.Thus,ifafterageopoliticalprognosisofsituationsaffectingthecountry,abeliefisengenderedthat
amuchlongerperiodofmilitarytrainingisneeded,thePresidentmustbegivenamplediscretiontoadoptnecessarymeasuresincludingtheflexibilitytosetan
extendedtimetable.
Due to the sensitivity and often strict confidentiality of these concerns, we acknowledge that the President may not always be able to candidly and openly
discuss the complete situation being faced by the nation. The Chief Executive's hands must not be unduly tied, especially if the situation calls for crafting
programsandsettingtimelinesforapprovedactivities.Theseactivitiesmaybenecessaryformaintaininganddevelopingourcapacitytoresistanarmedattack,
ensuringournationalsovereigntyandterritorialintegrity,andsecuringournationalinterests.IftheSenatedecidesthatthePresidentisinthebestpositionto
define in operational terms the meaning oftemporaryin relation to the visits, considered individually or in their totality, the Court must respect that policy
decision.IftheSenatefeelsthatthereisnoneedtosetatimelimittothesevisits,neithershouldwe.
Evidently,thefactthattheVFAdoesnotprovidespecificityinregardtotheextentofthe"temporary"natureofthevisitsofU.S.personneldoesnotsuggest
thatthedurationtowhichthePresidentmayagreeisunlimited.Instead,theboundariesofthemeaningofthetermtemporaryinArticleIofthetreatymustbe
measured depending on the purpose of each visit or activity.295 That purpose must be analyzed on a casebycase basis depending on the factual
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the implementing agreement. While the validity of the President's actions will be judged under less stringent
standards,thepowerofthisCourttodeterminewhethertherewasgraveabuseofdiscretionremainsunimpaired.
AuthorizedactivitiesperformedbyU.S.contractorswithinPhilippineterritorywhowerelegitimatelypermittedtoenterthecountryindependentofEDCAare
subjecttorelevantPhilippinestatutesandregulationsandmustbeconsistentwiththeMDTandtheVFA
Petitionersalsoraise296concernsabouttheU.S.government'spurportedpracticeofhiringprivatesecuritycontractorsinothercountries.Theyclaimthatthese
contractors one of which has already been operating in Mindanao since 2004 have been implicated in incidents or scandals in other parts of the globe
involvingrendition,tortureandotherhumanrightsviolations.Theyalsoassertthatthesecontractorsemployparamilitaryforcesinothercountrieswherethey
areoperating.
UnderArticlesIIIandIVofEDCA,U.S.contractorsareauthorizedtoperformonlythefollowingactivities:
1. Training transit support and related activities refueling of aircraft bunkering of vessels temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
temporaryaccommodationofpersonnelcommunicationsprepositioningofequipment,supplies,andmaterieldeploymentofforcesandmaterieland
suchotheractivitiesasthePartiesmayagree297
2. Prepositioningandstorageofdefenseequipment,supplies,andmateriel,includingdelivery,management,inspection,use,maintenance,andremovalof
suchequipment,suppliesandmateriel298
3. Carryingoutofmattersinaccordancewith,andtotheextentpermissibleunder,U.S.laws,regulations,andpolicies299
EDCArequiresthatallactivitieswithinPhilippineterritorybeinaccordancewithPhilippinelaw.Thismeansthatcertainprivilegesdeniedtoaliensarelikewise
deniedtoforeignmilitarycontractors.Relevantly,providingsecurity300andcarrying,owning,andpossessingfirearms301areillegalforforeigncivilians.
Thelawsinplacealreadyaddressissuesregardingtheregulationofcontractors.Inthe2015ForeignInvestmentNegativelist,302theExecutiveDepartment
hasalreadyidentifiedcorporationsthathaveequityrestrictionsinPhilippinejurisdiction.OfnoteisNo.5onthelistprivatesecurityagenciesthatcannothave
anyforeignequitybyvirtueofSection4ofRepublicActNo.5487303andNo.15,whichregulatescontractsfortheconstructionofdefenserelatedstructures
basedonCommonwealthActNo.541.
Hence,anyotherentitybroughtintothePhilippinesbyvirtueofEDCAmustsubscribetocorporateandcivilrequirementsimposedbythelaw,dependingonthe
entity'scorporatestructureandthenatureofitsbusiness.
ThatPhilippinelawsextraneoustoEDCAshallgoverntheregulationoftheactivitiesofU.S.contractorshasbeencleareventosomeofthepresentmembersof
theSenate.
Forinstance,in2012,aU.S.Navycontractor,theGlennMarine,wasaccusedofspillingfuelinthewatersoffManilaBay.304TheSenateCommitteeonForeign
Relations and the Senate Committee on Environment and Natural Resources chairperson claimed environmental and procedural violations by the
contractor.305TheU.S.Navyinvestigatedthecontractorandpromisedstricterguidelinestobeimposeduponitscontractors.306Thestatementattributedto
Commander Ron Steiner of the public affairs office of the U.S. Navy's 7thFleet that U.S. Navy contractors are bound by Philippine laws is of particular
relevance.Thestatementacknowledgesnotjustthepresenceofthecontractors,butalsotheU.S.positionthatthesecontractorsareboundbythelocallawsof
theirhoststate.ThisstancewasechoedbyotherU.S.Navyrepresentatives.307
ThisincidentsimplyshowsthattheSenatewaswellawareofthepresenceofU.S.contractorsforthepurposeoffulfillingthetermsoftheVFA.Thattheyare
boundbyPhilippinelawiscleartoall,eventotheU.S.
As applied to EDCA, even when U.S. contractors are granted access to the Agreed Locations, all their activities must be consistent with Philippine laws and
regulationsandpursuanttotheMDTandtheVFA.
Whilewerecognizetheconcernsofpetitioners,theydonotgivetheCourtenoughjustificationtostrikedownEDCA.InLimv.ExecutiveSecretary,wehave
alreadyexplainedthatwecannottakejudicialnoticeofclaimsairedinnewsreports,"notbecauseofanyissueastotheirtruth,accuracy,orimpartiality,but
forthesimplereasonthatfactsmustbeestablishedinaccordancewiththerulesofevidence."308Whatismore,wecannotmoveonestepaheadandspeculate
that the alleged illegal activities of these contractors in other countries would take place in the Philippines with certainty. As can be seen from the above
discussion,makingsurethatU.S.contractorscomplywithPhilippinelawsisafunctionoflawenforcement.EDCAdoesnotstandinthewayoflawenforcement.
Nevertheless,weemphasizethatU.S.contractorsareexplicitlyexcludedfromthecoverageoftheVFA.Asvisitingaliens,theirentry,presence,andactivities
aresubjecttoalllawsandtreatiesapplicablewithinthePhilippineterritory.Theymayberefusedentryorexpelledfromthecountryiftheyengageinillegalor
undesirable activities. There is nothing that prevents them from being detained in the country or being subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. Our penal
laws,309laborlaws,310and immigrations laws311apply to them and therefore limit their activities here. Until and unless there is another law or treaty that
specificallydealswiththeirentryandactivities,theirpresenceinthecountryissubjecttounqualifiedPhilippinejurisdiction.
EDCAdoesnotallowthepresenceofU.S.ownedorcontrolledmilitaryfacilitiesandbasesinthePhilippines
Petitioners Saguisag et al claim that EDCA permits the establishment of U.S. military bases through the "euphemistically" termed "Agreed
Locations."312AlludingtothedefinitionofthisterminArticle11(4)ofEDCA,theypointoutthattheselocationsareactuallymilitarybases,asthedefinition
referstofacilitiesandareastowhichU.S.militaryforceshaveaccessforavarietyofpurposes.Petitionersclaimthatthereareseveralbadgesofexclusivityin
theuseoftheAgreedLocationsbyU.S.forces.First,ArticleV(2)ofEDCAalludestoa"return"oftheseareasoncetheyarenolongerneededbyU.S.forces,
indicatingthattherewouldbesometransferofuse.Second,ArticleIV(4)ofEDCAtalksaboutAmericanforces'unimpededaccesstotheAgreedLocationsfor
allmattersrelatingtotheprepositioningandstorageofU.S.militaryequipment,supplies,andmateriel.Third,ArticleVIIofEDCAauthorizesU.S.forcestouse
publicutilitiesandtooperatetheirowntelecommunicationssystem.
Preliminarypointonbadgesofexclusivity
As a preliminary observation, petitioners have cherrypicked provisions of EDCA by presenting socalled "badges of exclusivity," despite the presence of
contraryprovisionswithinthetextoftheagreementitself.
First,theyclarifytheword"return"inArticleV(2)ofEDCA.However,theuseoftheword"return"iswithinthecontextofalengthyprovision.Theprovisionas
awholereadsasfollows:
The United States shall return to the Philippines any Agreed Locations, or any portion thereof, including nonrelocatable structures and
assemblies constructed, modified, or improved by the United States, once no longer required by United States forces for activities under this
Agreement. The Parties or the Designated Authorities shall consult regarding the terms of return of any Agreed Locations, including possible
compensationforimprovementsorconstruction.
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Thecontextofuseis"requiredbyUnitedStatesforcesforactivitiesunderthisAgreement."Therefore,thereturnofanAgreedLocationwouldbewithinthe
parametersofanactivitythattheMutualDefenseBoard(MDB)andtheSecurityEngagementBoard(SEB)wouldauthorize.Thus,possessionbytheU.S.prior
to its return of the Agreed Location would be based on the authority given to it by a joint body cochaired by the "AFP Chief of Staff and Commander, U.S.
PACOMwithrepresentativesfromthePhilippines'DepartmentofNationalDefenseandDepartmentofForeignAffairssittingasmembers."313Thetermsshallbe
negotiatedbyboththePhilippinesandtheU.S.,orthroughtheirDesignatedAuthorities.Thisprovision,seenasawhole,contradictspetitioners'interpretation
ofthereturnasa"badgeofexclusivity."Infact,itshowsthecooperationandpartnershipaspectofEDCAinfullbloom.
Second,theterm"unimpededaccess"mustlikewisebeviewedfromacontextualperspective.ArticleIV(4)statesthatU.S.forcesandU.S.contractorsshall
have"unimpededaccesstoAgreedLocationsforallmattersrelatingtotheprepositioningandstorageofdefenseequipment,supplies,andmateriel,including
delivery,management,inspection,use,maintenance,andremovalofsuchequipment,suppliesandmateriel."
AtthebeginningofArticleIV,EDCAstatesthatthePhilippinesgivestheU.S.theauthoritytobringintheseequipment,supplies,andmaterielthroughtheMDB
and SEB security mechanism. These items are owned by the U.S.,314are exclusively for the use of the U.S.315and, after going through the joint consent
mechanismsoftheMDBandtheSEB,arewithinthecontroloftheU.S.316Moreimportantly,beforetheseitemsareconsideredprepositioned,theymusthave
gonethroughtheprocessofpriorauthorizationbytheMDBandtheSEBandgivenpropernotificationtotheAFP.317
Therefore, this "unimpeded access" to the Agreed Locations is a necessary adjunct to the ownership, use, and control of the U.S. over its own equipment,
supplies,andmaterielandmusthavefirstbeenallowedbythejointmechanismsinplaybetweenthetwostatessincethetimeoftheMDTandtheVFA.Itis
not the use of the Agreed Locations that is exclusiveperse it is mere access to items in order to exercise the rights of ownership granted by virtue of the
PhilippineCivilCode.318
As for the view that EDCA authorizes U.S. forces to use public utilities and to operate their own telecommunications system, it will be met and answered in
partD,infra.
Petitionersalsopointout319that EDCA is strongly reminiscent of and in fact bears a onetoone correspondence with the provisions of the 1947 MBA. They
assertthatbothagreements(a)allowsimilaractivitieswithinthearea(b)provideforthesame"speciesofownership"overfacilitiesand(c)grantoperational
controlovertheentirearea.Finally,theyargue320thatEDCAisinfactanimplementationofthenewdefensepolicyoftheU.S.Accordingtothem,thispolicy
wasnotwhatwasoriginallyintendedeitherbytheMDTorbytheVFA.
Onthesepoints,theCourtisnotpersuaded.
Thesimilaractivitiescitedbypetitioners321simplyshowthatundertheMBA,theU.S.hadtherighttoconstruct,operate,maintain,utilize,occupy,garrison,
andcontrolthebases.ThesocalledparallelprovisionsofEDCAallowonlyoperationalcontrolovertheAgreedLocationsspecificallyforconstructionactivities.
Theydonotallowtheoverarchingpowertooperate,maintain,utilize,occupy,garrison,andcontrolabasewithfulldiscretion.EDCAinfactlimitstherightsof
theU.S.inrespectofeveryactivity,includingconstruction,bygivingtheMDBandtheSEBthepowertodeterminethedetailsofallactivitiessuchas,butnot
limitedto,operation,maintenance,utility,occupancy,garrisoning,andcontrol.322
The"speciesofownership"ontheotherhand,isdistinguishedbythenatureoftheproperty.ForimmovablepropertyconstructedordevelopedbytheU.S.,
EDCAexpressesthatownershipwillautomaticallybevestedtothePhilippines.323Ontheotherhand,formovablepropertiesbroughtintothePhilippinesbythe
U.S., EDCA provides that ownership is retained by the latter. In contrast, the MBA dictates that the U.S. retains ownership over immovable and movable
properties.
To our mind, both EDCA and the MBA simply incorporate what is already the law of the land in the Philippines. The Civil Code's provisions on ownership, as
applied,granttheownerofamovablepropertyfullrightsoverthatproperty,eveniflocatedinanotherperson'sproperty.324
Theparallelism,however,endswhenthesituationinvolvesfacilitiesthatcanbeconsideredimmovable.UndertheMBA,theU.S.retainsownershipifitpaidfor
thefacility.325Under EDCA, an immovable is owned by the Philippines, even if built completely on the back of U.S. funding.326This is consistent with the
constitutionalprohibitiononforeignlandownership.327
Despite the apparent similarity, the ownership of property is but a part of a larger whole that must be considered before the constitutional restriction is
violated.Thus,petitioners'pointsonoperationalcontrolwillbegivenmoreattentioninthediscussionbelow.Theargumentsonpolicyare,however,outsidethe
scopeofjudicialreviewandwillnotbediscussed
Moreover,adirectcomparisonoftheMBAandEDCAwillresultinseveralimportantdistinctionsthatwouldallaysuspicionthatEDCAisbutadisguisedversion
oftheMBA.
TherearesubstantialmattersthattheU.S.cannotdounderEDCA,butwhichitwasauthorizedtodounderthe1947MBA
ThePhilippineexperiencewithU.S.militarybasesunderthe1947MBAissimplynotpossibleunderEDCAforanumberofimportantreasons.
First,inthe1947MBA,theU.S.retainedallrightsofjurisdictioninandoverPhilippineterritoryoccupiedbyAmericanbases.Incontrast,theU.S.underEDCA
doesnotenjoyanysuchrightoveranypartofthePhilippinesinwhichitsforcesorequipmentmaybefound.Belowisacomparativetablebetweentheold
treatyandEDCA:
1947MBA/1946TreatyofGeneralRelations
1947MBA,Art.1(1):
The
Government
of
the
Republic
of
the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the
Philippines)grantsto the Government of the United
States of America (hereinafter referred to as the
United States) the right to retain the use of the
basesinthePhilippineslistedinAnnexAattached
hereto.
EDCA
EDCA,preamble:
AffirmingthatthePartiesshareanunderstandingfor
the United States not to establish a permanent
military presence or base in the territory of the
Philippines
xxxx
1947MBA,Art.XVII(2):
Recognizing that all United States access to and

useoffacilitiesandareaswillbeattheinvitationof
Allbuildingsandstructureswhichareerectedby the Philippines and with full respect for the
the United States in the bases shall be PhilippineConstitutionandPhilippinelaws
the property of the United States and may be
removed by it before the expiration of this xxxx
Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the base
on which the structures are situated. There shall be EDCA,Art.11(4):
no obligation on the part of the Philippines or of the
United States to rebuild or repair any destruction or "Agreed Locations" means facilities and
damage inflicted from any cause whatsoever on any areas that are provided by the Government of
of the said buildings or structures owned or used by the Philippines through the AFP and that United
States forces, United States contractors, and others
theUnitedStatesinthebases,xxxx.
asmutuallyagreed,shallhavetherighttoaccessand
use pursuant to this Agreement. Such Agreed
1946TreatyofGen.Relations.Art.I:
Locations may be listed in an annex to be appended
The United States of America agrees to to this Agreement, and may be further described in
withdrawand surrender, and does hereby withdraw implementingarrangements.
and surrender, all rights of possession,
supervision,
jurisdiction,
control
or EDCA,Art.V:
sovereignty existing and exercised by the United
States of America in and over the territory and 1. The Philippines shall retain ownership of and
the people of the Philippine Islands, except the titletoAgreedLocations.
use of such bases, necessary appurtenances to
xxxx
such bases, and the rights incident thereto, as
theUnitedStatesofAmerica,byagreementwiththe 4. All buildings, nonrelocatable structures, and
Republic of the Philippines may deem necessary to assemblies affixed to the land in the Agreed
retainforthemutualprotectionoftheRepublicofthe Locations, including ones altered or improved by
PhilippinesandoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,xxx. United States forces, remain the property of the
Philippines. Permanent buildings constructed by
United States forces become the property of the
Philippines, once constructed, but shall be used by
United States forces until no longer required by
UnitedStatesforces.
Second,inthebasesagreement,theU.S.andthePhilippineswerevisiblynotonequalfootingwhenitcametodecidingwhethertoexpandortoincreasethe
number of bases, as the Philippines may be compelled to negotiate with the U.S. the moment the latter requested an expansion of the existing bases or to
acquireadditionalbases.InEDCA,U.S.accessispurelyattheinvitationofthePhilippines.
1947MBA/
1946TreatyofGeneralRelations
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.I(3):
EDCA,preamble:
The
Philippines
agree
to
enter
into
negotiations with the United States at the
latter's request, to permit the United States to
expand such bases, to exchange such bases for
other bases, to acquire additional bases, or
relinquish rights to bases, as any of such exigencies
mayberequiredbymilitarynecessity.
Recognizing that all United States access to and

useoffacilitiesandareaswillbeattheinvitationof
the Philippines and with full respect for the
PhilippineConstitutionandPhilippinelaws
1946TreatyofGen.Relations,Art.I:
The United States of America agrees to
withdrawand surrender, and does hereby withdraw
and surrender, all rights of possession,
supervision,
jurisdiction,
control
or
sovereignty existing and exercised by the United
States of America in and over the territory and
the people of the Philippine Islands, except the
useofsuchbases,necessaryappurtenancestosuch
bases,andtherightsincidentthereto,astheUnited
States of America, by agreement with the
xxxx
EDCA,Art.II(4):
"Agreed Locations" means facilities and
areas that are provided by the Government of
the Philippines through the AFP and that United
States forces, United States contractors, and
others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to
access and use pursuant to this Agreement. Such
Agreed Locations may be listed in an annex to be
appended to this Agreement, and may be further
describedinimplementingarrangements.
RepublicofthePhilippinesmaydeemnecessary
toretainforthemutualprotectionoftheRepublicof
the Philippines and of the United States of America,
xxx.
Third,inEDCA,thePhilippinesisguaranteedaccessovertheentireareaoftheAgreedLocations.Ontheotherhand,giventhattheU.S.hadcompletecontrol
overitsmilitarybasesunderthe1947MBA,thetreatydidnotprovideforanyexpressrecognitionoftherightofaccessofPhilippineauthorities.Withoutthat
provision and in light of the retention of U.S. sovereignty over the old military bases, the U.S. could effectively prevent Philippine authorities from entering
thosebases.
1947MBA
EDCA
Noequivalentprovision.
EDCA.Art.III(5):
The Philippine Designated Authority and its
authorized representative shallhave access to
the entire area of the Agreed Locations. Such
access shall be provided promptly consistent with
operational safety and security requirements in
accordancewithagreedproceduresdevelopedbythe
Parties.
Fourth, in the bases agreement, the U.S. retained the right, power, and authority over the establishment, use, operation, defense, and control of military
bases,includingthelimitsofterritorialwatersandairspaceadjacenttoorinthevicinityofthosebases.Theonlystandardusedindeterminingtheextentofits
controlwasmilitarynecessity.Ontheotherhand,thereisnosuchgrantofpowerorauthorityunderEDCA.ItmerelyallowstheU.S.toexerciseoperational
controlovertheconstructionofPhilippineownedstructuresandfacilities:
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA.Art.1(2):
EDCA,Art.111(4):
ThePhilippinesagreestopermittheUnitedStates,
uponnoticetothePhilippines,tousesuchofthose
bases listed in Annex B as the United States
determinestoberequiredbymilitarynecessity.
The Philippines hereby grants to the United

States, through bilateral security mechanisms,
such as the MDB and SEB, operational
control of Agreed Locationsfor construction
activities and authority to undertake such
activities on, and make alterations and
improvementsto,AgreedLocations.United States
forces shall consult on issues regarding such
construction,
alterations,
and
improvements based on the Parties' shared intent
that the technical requirements and construction
standards of any such projects undertaken by or on
behalf of United States forces should be consistent
withtherequirementsandstandardsofbothParties.
1947MBA,Art.III(1)
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall
have the rights, power and authority within the
baseswhicharenecessaryfortheestablishment,
use, operation and defense thereof or
appropriate for the control thereof and all the
rights, power and authority within the limits of
territorialwatersandairspaceadjacentto,orin
the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to
provideaccesstothem,orappropriatefortheir
control.
Fifth,the U.S. under the bases agreement was given the authority to use Philippine territory for additional staging areas, bombing and gunnery ranges. No
suchrightisgivenunderEDCA,asseenbelow:
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.VI:
EDCA,Art.111(1):
TheUnitedStatesshall,subjecttoprevious
agreementwiththePhilippines,havetherighttouse
landandcoastalseaareasofappropriatesizeand
locationforperiodicmaneuvers,foradditional
stagingareas,bombingandgunneryranges,
andforsuchintermediateairfieldsasmaybe
requiredforsafeandefficientairoperations.
Operationsinsuchareasshallbecarriedonwithdue
regardandsafeguardsforthepublicsafety.
With consideration of the views of the Parties,

the Philippines hereby authorizesand agrees that
United States forces, United States contractors, and
vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for
United States forces may conduct the following
activitieswithrespecttoAgreedLocations:training
transit support and related activities refueling of
aircraft
bunkering
of
vessels
temporary
maintenance of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
temporary
accommodation
of
personnel
communications prepositioning of equipment,
1947MBA,Art.1(2):
ThePhilippinesagreestopermittheUnitedStates, supplies,andmaterieldeployingforcesandmateriel
uponnoticetothePhilippines,tousesuchofthose andsuchotheractivitiesasthePartiesmayagree.
baseslistedinAnnexBastheUnitedStates
determinestoberequiredbymilitarynecessity.
Sixth,undertheMBA,theU.S.wasgiventheright,power,andauthoritytocontrolandprohibitthemovementandoperationofalltypesofvehicleswithinthe
vicinityofthebases.TheU.S.doesnothaveanyright,power,orauthoritytodosounderEDCA.
1947MBA
1947MBA.Art.III(2)(c)
EDCA
Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter

alia, the right, power and authority: x x x x to
control (including the right to prohibit) in so far as
mayberequiredfortheefficientoperationandsafety
of the bases, and within the limits of military
necessity, anchorages, moorings, landings,
takeoffs,movementsandoperationofshipsand
waterbornecraft,aircraftandothervehicleson
water,intheairoronlandcomprising
Seventh,underEDCA,theU.S.ismerelygiventemporaryaccesstolandandfacilities(includingroads,ports,andairfields).Ontheotherhand,theoldtreaty
gavetheU.S.therighttoimproveanddeepentheharbors,channels,entrances,andanchoragesandtoconstructormaintainnecessaryroadsandbridges
thatwouldafforditaccesstoitsmilitarybases.
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.III(2)(b):
EDCA,Art.111(2):

alia, the right, power and authority: x x x x to
improve and deepen the harbors, channels,
entrances and anchorages, and to construct or
maintain necessary roads and bridges affording
accesstothebases.
When requested, the Designated Authority of the

Philippines shall assist infacilitating transit or
temporaryaccessby United States forces to public
land and facilities (including roads, ports, and
airfields),includingthoseownedorcontrolledbylocal
governments, and to other land and facilities
(includingroads,ports,andairfields).
Eighth, in the 1947 MBA, the U.S. was granted the automatic right to use any and all public utilities, services and facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads,
highways,railroads,bridges,viaducts,canals,lakes,rivers,andstreamsinthePhilippinesinthesamemannerthatPhilippinemilitaryforcesenjoyedthatright.
NosucharrangementappearsinEDCA.Infact,itmerelyextendstoU.S.forcestemporaryaccesstopubliclandandfacilitieswhenrequested:
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.VII:
EDCA,Art.III(2):
It is mutually agreed that the United States may

employ and use for United States military
forces any and all public utilities, other services
and facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads,
highways, railroads, bridges, viaducts, canals, lakes,
rivers and streams in the Philippines under
conditionsnolessfavorablethanthosethatmay
be applicable from time to time to the military
forcesofthePhilippines.
When requested, the Designated Authority of the

Philippines shall assist infacilitating transit or
temporaryaccessby United States forces to public
land and facilities (including roads, ports, and
airfields),includingthoseownedorcontrolledbylocal
governments, and to other land and facilities
(includingroads,ports,andairfields).
Ninth,underEDCA,theU.S.nolongerhastheright,power,andauthoritytoconstruct,install,maintain,andemployanytypeoffacility,weapon,substance,
device,vesselorvehicle,orsystemunlikeintheoldtreaty.EDCAmerelygrantstheU.S.,throughbilateralsecuritymechanisms,theauthoritytoundertake
construction,alteration,orimprovementsonthePhilippineownedAgreedLocations.
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.III(2)(e):
EDCA.Art.III(4).

alia, the right, power and authority: x x x x
to construct, install, maintain, and employ on
any base any type of facilities, weapons,
The Philippines hereby grants to the United States,

through bilateral security mechanisms, such as
the MDB and SEB, ooperational control of Agreed
Locationsforconstructionactivitiesandauthority to
substance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under

the ground, in the air or on or under the water that
may be requisite or appropriate, including
meteorological systems, aerial and water navigation
lights, radio and radar apparatus and electronic
devices, of any desired power, type of emission and
frequency.
undertake such activities on, and make

alterations and improvements to, Agreed
Locations. United States forces shall consult on
issues regarding such construction, alterations, and
improvements based on the Parties' shared intent
that the technical requirements and construction
standards of any such projects undertaken by or on
behalf of United States forces should be consistent
withtherequirementsandstandardsofbothParties.
Tenth,EDCAdoesnotallowtheU.S.toacquire,bycondemnationorexpropriationproceedings,realpropertybelongingtoanyprivateperson.Theoldmilitary
basesagreementgavethisrighttotheU.S.asseenbelow:
1947MBA
1947MBA,Art.XXII(1):
EDCA
Whenever it is necessary to acquire by

condemnationorexpropriationproceedingsreal
property belonging to any private persons,
associations or corporations located in bases named
in Annex A and Annex B in order to carry out the
purposes of this Agreement, the Philippines will
institute and prosecute such condemnation or
expropriationproceedingsinaccordancewiththelaws
of the Philippines. The United States agrees to
reimburse the Philippines for all the reasonable
expenses, damages and costs thereby incurred,
including the value of the property as determined by
the Court. In addition, subject to the mutual
agreement of the two Governments, the United
States will reimburse the Philippines for the
reasonablecostsoftransportationandremovalofany
occupants displaced or ejected by reason of the
condemnationorexpropriation.
Eleventh,EDCAdoesnotallowtheU.S.tounilaterallybringintothecountrynonPhilippinenationalswhoareunderitsemploy,togetherwiththeirfamilies,in
connectionwiththeconstruction,maintenance,oroperationofthebases.EDCAstrictlyadherestothelimitsundertheVFA.
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.XI(1):
EDCA,Art.II:

have
the
right
to
bring
into
the
Philippines members of the United States military
forces and the United States nationals employed
by or under a contract with the United States
together with their families, and technical
personnel of other nationalities (not being
persons excluded by the laws of the Philippines) in
connection with the construction, maintenance, or
operationofthebases.TheUnitedStatesshallmake
suitable arrangements so that such persons may be
readily identified and their status established when
necessarybythePhilippineauthorities.Suchpersons,
other than members of the United States armed
forces in uniform, shall present their travel
documents to the appropriate Philippine authorities
for visas, it being understood thatno objection will
be made to their travel to the Philippines as
nonimmigrants.
1. "United States personnel" means United

States military and civilian personnel temporarily
in the territory of the Philippines in connection with
activities approved by the Philippines, as those
termsaredefinedintheVFA.
xxxx
3. "United States contractors" means companies
and firms, and their employees, under contract or
subcontract to or on behalf of the United States
Department of Defense. United States contractors
arenotincludedaspartofthedefinition ofUnited
States personnel in this Agreement, including
withinthecontextoftheVFA.
Twelfth, EDCA does not allow the U.S. to exercise jurisdiction over any offense committed by any person within the Agreed Locations, unlike in the former
militarybases:
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.XIII(1)(a):
ThePhilippinesconsentsthattheUnitedStatesshall
have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the
following offenses: (a) Any offense committed by
any personwithin any base except where the
offender and offended parties are both Philippine
citizens (not members of the armed forces of the
UnitedStatesonactiveduty)ortheoffenseisagainst
thesecurityofthePhilippines.
Thirteenth,EDCAdoesnotallowtheU.S.tooperatemilitarypostexchange(PX)facilities,whichisfreeofcustomsdutiesandtaxes,unlikewhattheexpired
MBAexpresslyallowed.Parenthetically,thePXstorehasbecometheculturaliconofU.S.militarypresenceinthecountry.
1947MBA
EDCA
1947MBA,Art.XVIII(1):

have the right to establish on bases, free of all
licenses fees sales, excise or other taxes, or
imposts
Government
agencies,
including
concessions,suchassalescommissariesandpost
exchanges messes and social clubs, for the
exclusive use of the United States military
forces and authorized civilian personnel and
their families. The merchandise or services sold or
dispensed by such agencies shall be free of all
taxes, duties and inspection by the Philippine
authorities. Administrative measures shall be taken
bytheappropriateauthoritiesoftheUnitedStatesto
preventtheresaleofgoodswhicharesoldunderthe
provisionsofthisArticletopersonsnotentitledtobuy
goods at such agencies and, generally, to prevent
abuse of the privileges granted under this Article.
There shall be cooperation between such authorities
andthePhilippinestothisend.
Insum,EDCAisafarcryfromabasingagreementaswasunderstoodbythepeopleatthetimethatthe1987Constitutionwasadopted.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive review of what the Constitution means by "foreign military bases" and "facilities" is required before EDCA can be deemed to
havepassedjudicialscrutiny.
Themeaningofmilitary
facilitiesandbases
Anappreciationofwhatamilitarybaseis,asunderstoodbytheFilipinopeoplein1987,wouldbevitalindeterminingwhetherEDCAbreachedtheconstitutional
restriction.
Priortothedraftingofthe1987Constitution,thelastdefinitionof"militarybase"wasprovidedunderPresidentialDecreeNo.(PD)1227.328Unlawfulentryinto
amilitarybaseispunishableunderthedecreeassupportedbyArticle281oftheRevisedPenalCode,whichitselfprohibitstheactoftrespass.
Section2ofthelawdefinestheterminthismanner:"'[M]ilitarybase'asusedinthisdecreemeansanymilitary,air,naval,orcoastguardreservation,base,
fort,camp,arsenal,yard,station,orinstallationinthePhilippines."
Commissioner Tadeo, in presenting his objections to U.S. presence in the Philippines before the 1986 Constitutional Commission, listed the areas that he
consideredasmilitarybases:
1,000hectaresCampO'Donnel
20,000hectaresCrowValleyWeapon'sRange
55,000hectaresClarkAirBase
150hectaresWallaceAirStation
400hectaresJohnHayAirStation
15,000hectaresSubicNavalBase
1,000hectaresSanMiguelNavalCommunication
750hectaresRadioTransmitterinCapas,Tarlac
900hectaresRadioBigotAnnexatBamban,Tarlac329
cralawlawlibrary
TheBasesConversionandDevelopmentActof1992describeditscoverageinitsDeclarationofPolicies:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. It is hereby declared the policy of the Government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into
alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell
TransmitterStation,SanMiguelNavalCommunicationsStationandCapasRelayStation),toraisefundsbythesaleofportionsofMetroManila
militarycamps,andtoapplysaidfundsasprovidedhereinforthedevelopmentandconversiontoproductivecivilianuseofthelandscovered
underthe1947MilitaryBasesAgreementbetweenthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,asamended.330
cralawlawlibrary
The result of the debates and subsequent voting is Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which specifically restricts, among others, foreign military
facilitiesorbases.AtthetimeofitscraftingoftheConstitution,the1986ConstitutionalCommissionhadaclearideaofwhatexactlyitwasrestricting.While
theterm"facilitiesandbases"wasleftundefined,itspointofreferencewasclearlythoseareascoveredbythe1947MBAasamended.
Notably,nearly30yearshavepassedsincethen,andtheeverevolvingworldofmilitarytechnologyandgeopoliticshassurpassedtheunderstandingofthe
Philippinepeoplein1986.ThelastdirectmilitaryactionoftheU.S.intheregionwastheuseofSubicbaseasthestaginggroundforDesertShieldandDesert
StormduringtheGulfWar.331In1991,thePhilippineSenaterejectedthesuccessortreatyofthe1947MBAthatwouldhaveallowedthecontinuationofU.S.
basesinthePhilippines.
Henceforth, any proposed entry of U.S. forces into the Philippines had to evolve likewise, taking into consideration the subsisting agreements between both
parties, the rejection of the 1991 proposal, and a concrete understanding of what was constitutionally restricted. This trend birthed the VFA which, as
discussed,hasalreadybeenupheldbythisCourt.
ThelatestagreementisEDCA,whichproposesanovelconcepttermed"AgreedLocations."
Bydefinition,AgreedLocationsare
facilities and areas that are provided by the Government of the Philippines through the AFP and that United States forces, United States
contractors,andothersasmutuallyagreed,shallhavetherighttoaccessandusepursuanttothisAgreement.SuchAgreedLocationsmaybe
listedinanannextobeappendedtothisAgreement,andmaybefurtherdescribedinimplementingarrangements.332
cralawlawlibrary
Preliminarily, respondent already claims that the proviso that the Philippines shall retain ownership of and title to the Agreed Locations means that EDCA is
"consistentwithArticleIIoftheVFAwhichrecognizesPhilippinesovereigntyandjurisdictionoverlocationswithinPhilippineterritory."333
Bythisinterpretation,respondentacknowledgesthatthecontentionofpetitionersspringsfromanunderstandingthattheAgreedLocationsmerelycircumvent
theconstitutionalrestrictions.Frameddifferently,theboneofcontentioniswhethertheAgreedLocationsare,fromalegalperspective,foreignmilitaryfacilities
orbases.ThislegalframeworktriggersSection25,ArticleXVIII,andmakesSenateconcurrenceasinequanon.
Article III of EDCA provides for Agreed Locations, in which the U.S. is authorized by the Philippines to "conduct the following activities: "training transit
supportandrelatedactivitiesrefuelingofaircraftbunkeringofvesselstemporarymaintenanceofvehicles,vesselsandaircrafttemporaryaccommodationof
personnel communications prepositioning of equipment, supplies and materiel deploying forces and materiel and such other activities as the Parties may
agree."
ThiscreationofEDCAmustthenbetestedagainstaproperinterpretationoftheSection25restriction.
d.Reasonsfortheconstitutional
requirementsandlegalstandards
forconstitutionallycompatible
militarybasesandfacilities
cralawlawlibrary
Section 25 does not define what is meant by a "foreign military facility or base." While it specifically alludes to U.S. military facilities and bases that existed
duringtheframingoftheConstitution,theprovisionwasclearlymeanttoapplytothosebasesexistingatthetimeandtoanyfuturefacilityorbase.Thebasis
fortherestrictionmustfirstbededucedfromthespiritofthelaw,inordertosetastandardfortheapplicationofitstext,giventheparticularhistoricalevents
precedingtheagreement.
Oncemore,wemustlooktothe1986ConstitutionalCommissionerstoglean,fromtheircollectivewisdom,theintentofSection25.Theirspeechesarerich
withhistoryandwisdomandpresentaclearpictureofwhattheyconsideredinthecraftingtheprovision.
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERREGALADO334
xxxx
Wehavebeenregaledherebythosewhofavortheadoptionoftheantibasesprovisionswithwhatpurportstobeanobjectivepresentationof
thehistoricalbackgroundofthemilitarybasesinthePhilippines.Careappears,however,tohavebeentakentounderscoretheinequityintheir
inceptionaswellastheirimplementation,astoseriouslyreflectonthesupposedobjectivityofthereport.Pronouncementsofmilitaryand
civilian officials shortly after World War II are quoted in support of the proposition on neutrality regrettably, the implication is that the same
remainsvalidtoday,asiftheworldandinternationalactivitystoodstillforthelast40years.
Wehavebeengiveninspiredlecturesontheeffectofthepresenceofthemilitarybasesonoursovereigntywhetherinitslegal
or political sense is not clear and the theory that any country with foreign bases in its territory cannot claim to be fully
sovereignorcompletelyindependent.I was not aware that the concepts of sovereignty and independence have now assumed the totality
principle,suchthatawillingassumptionofsomedelimitationsintheexerciseofsomeaspectsthereofwouldputthatStateinalowerbracketof
nationhood.
xxxx
Wehavebeenreceivingacontinuousinfluxofmaterialsontheprosandconsontheadvisabilityofhavingmilitarybaseswithinourshores.Most
ofuswho,onlyaboutthreemonthsago,werejustmullingtheprospectsofthesevaryingcontentionsarenowexpected,likearmchairgenerals,
todecidenotonlyonthegeopoliticalaspectsandcontingentimplicationsofthemilitarybasesbutalsoontheirpolitical,social,economicand
culturalimpactonournationallife.Weareaskedtoansweraplethoraofquestions,suchas:1)whetherthebasesaremagnetsofnuclearattack
oraredeterrentstosuchattack2)whetheranallianceormutualdefensetreatyisaderogationofournationalsovereignty3)whethercriticism
ofusbyRussia,VietnamandNorthKoreaisoutweighedbythesupportforusoftheASEANcountries,theUnitedStates,SouthKorea,Taiwan,
Australia and New Zealand and 4) whether the social, moral and legal problems spawned by the military bases and their operations can be
compensatedbytheeconomicbenefitsoutlinedinpaperswhichhavebeenfurnishedrecentlytoallofus.335
xxxx
Ofcourse,onesideofpersuasionhassubmittedcategorical,unequivocalandforcefulassertionsoftheirpositions.Theyareentitledtotheluxury
oftheabsolutes.Weareurgednowtoadopttheproposeddeclarationasa"golden,""unique"and"last"opportunityforFilipinosto
asserttheirsovereignrights.Unfortunately,Ihaveneverbeenenchantedbysuperlatives,muchlessfortheapplauseofthemomentorthe
ovationofthehour.NordoIlookforwardtoanyglorioussummerafterawinterofpoliticaldiscontent.Hence,ifImayjoinCommissionerLaurel,
Ialsoinvokeacaveatnotonlyagainstthetyrannyoflabelsbutalsothetyrannyofslogans.336
xxxx
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERSUAREZ337
MR.SUAREZ:Thankyou,MadamPresident.
I am quite satisfied that the crucial issues involved in the resolution of the problem of the removal of foreign bases from the Philippines have
been adequately treated by previous speakers. Let me, therefore, just recapitulate the arguments adduced in favor of a foreign basesfree
Philippines:
1.Thateverynationshouldbefreetoshapeitsowndestinywithoutoutsideinterference
2.Thatnolastingpeaceandnotruesovereigntywouldeverbeachievedsolongasthereareforeignmilitaryforcesinourcountry
3.Thatthepresenceofforeignmilitarybasesdeprivesusoftheverysubstanceofnationalsovereigntyandthisisaconstantsourceof
nationalembarrassmentandaninsulttoournationaldignityandselfrespectasanation
4.Thattheseforeignmilitarybasesunnecessarilyexposeourcountrytodevastatingnuclearattacks
5. That these foreign military bases create social problems and are designed to perpetuate the stranglehold of United States interests in our
nationaleconomyanddevelopment
6.Thattheextraterritorialrightsenjoyedbytheseforeignbasesoperatetodepriveourcountryofjurisdictionovercivilandcriminal
offensescommittedwithinourownnationalterritoryandagainstFilipinos
7.Thatthebasesagreementsarecolonialimpositionsanddictationsuponourhelplesscountryand
8.Thatonthelegalviewpointandintheultimateanalysis,allthebasesagreementsarenullandvoidabinitio,especiallybecausetheydidnot
countthesovereignconsentandwilloftheFilipinopeople.338
xxxx
Intherealsense,MadamPresident,ifweintheCommissioncouldaccommodatetheprovisionsIhavecited,whatisourobjectiontoincludein
ourConstitutionamatteraspricelessasthenationalistvalueswecherish?Amatterofthegravestconcernforthesafetyandsurvivalof
thisnationindeeddeservesaplaceinourConstitution.
XXXX
xxx Why should we bargain away ourdignity and our selfrespectas a nation and the future of generations to come with thirty pieces of
silver?339
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERBENNAGEN340
xxxx
Theunderlyingprincipleofmilitarybasesandnuclearweaponswherevertheyarefoundandwhoeverownsthemisthatthoseareforkilling
peopleorforterrorizinghumanity.Thisobjectivebyitselfatanypointinhistoryismorallyrepugnant.Thisaloneisreasonenoughforusto
constitutionalizethebanonforeignmilitarybasesandonnuclearweapons.341
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERBACANI342
xxxx
xxxHence,theremedytoprostitutiondoesnotseemtobeprimarilytoremovethebasesbecauseevenifthebasesareremoved,the
girlsmiredinpovertywilllookfortheirclienteleelsewhere.Theremedytotheproblemofprostitutionliesprimarilyelsewhereinanalertand
concernedcitizenry,ahealthyeconomyandasoundeducationinvalues.343
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERJAMIR344
xxxx
One of the reasons advanced against the maintenance of foreign military bases here is that they impair portions of our
sovereignty.WhileIagreethatourcountry'ssovereigntyshouldnotbeimpaired,Ialsoholdtheviewthattherearetimeswhenitisnecessary
todosoaccordingtotheimperativesofnationalinterest.Thereareprecedentstothiseffect.Thus,duringWorldWarII,Englandleaseditsbases
in the West Indies and in Bermuda for 99 years to the United States for its use as naval and air bases. It was done in consideration of 50
overageddestroyerswhichtheUnitedStatesgavetoEnglandforitsuseintheBattleoftheAtlantic.
Afewyearsago,EnglandgavetheIslandofDiegoGarciatotheUnitedStatesforthelatter'suseasanavalbaseintheIndianOcean.Aboutthe
sametime,theUnitedStatesobtainedbasesinSpain,EgyptandIsrael.Indoingso,thesecountries,ineffect,contributedtothelaunchingofa
preventivedefensepostureagainstpossibletroubleintheMiddleEastandintheIndianOceanfortheirownprotection.345
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERTINGSON346
xxxx
InthecaseofthePhilippinesandtheotherSoutheastAsiannations,thepresenceofAmericantroopsinthecountryisaprojectionofAmerica's
securityinterest.Enrilesaidthatnonetheless,theyalsoserve,althoughinanincidentalandsecondaryway,thesecurityinterestoftheRepublic
ofthePhilippinesandtheregion.Yes,ofcourse,Mr.EnrilealsoechoesthesentimentsofmostofusinthisCommission,namely:Itisidealfor
usasanindependentandsovereignnationtoultimatelyabrogatetheRPUSmilitarytreatyand,attherighttime,buildourown
airandnavalmight.347
xxxx
Allow me to say in summation that I am for the retention of American military bases in the Philippines provided that such an
extensionfromoneperiod to another shall be concluded upon concurrence of theparties,andsuchextensionshallbebasedon
justice,thehistoricalamityofthepeopleofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesandtheircommondefenseinterest.348
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERALONTO349
xxxx
MadamPresident,sometimeagoafterthisCommissionstartedwiththistaskofframingaconstitution,IreadastatementofPresidentAquinoto
theeffectthatsheisfortheremovaloftheU.S.militarybasesinthiscountrybutthattheremovaloftheU.S.militarybasesshouldnotbedone
just to give way to other foreign bases. Today, there are two world superpowers, both vying to control any and all countries which have
importancetotheirstrategyforworlddomination.ThePhilippinesisonesuchcountry.
MadamPresident,I submit that I am one of those ready to completely remove any vestiges of the days of enslavement, but not
preparedtoerasethemiftodosowouldmerelyleaveavacuumtobeoccupiedbyafarworsetype.350
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERGASCON351
xxxx
Let us consider the situation of peace in our world today. Consider our brethren in the Middle East, in IndoChina, Central America, in South
Africatherehasbeenescalationofwarinsomeoftheseareasbecauseofforeigninterventionwhichviewstheseconflictsthroughthenarrow
prismoftheEastWestconflict.TheUnitedStatesbaseshavebeenusedasspringboardsforinterventioninsomeoftheseconflicts.
Weshouldnotallowourselvestobepartytothewarlikementalityoftheseforeigninterventionists.Wemustalwaysbeonthesideof
peacethismeansthatweshouldnotalwaysrelyonmilitarysolution.
xxxx
x x x The United States bases, therefore, are springboards for intervention in our own internal affairs and in the affairs of other
nationsinthisregion.
xxxx
Thus, I firmly believe that a selfrespecting nation should safeguard its fundamental freedoms which should logically be declared in black and
white in our fundamental law of the land the Constitution.Let us express our desire for national sovereignty so we may be able to
achievenationalselfdetermination.Letusexpressourdesireforneutralitysothatwemaybeabletofollowactivenonalignedindependent
foreignpolicies.Letusexpressourdesireforpeaceandanuclearfreezonesowemaybeabletopursueahealthyandtranquilexistence,to
havepeacethatisautonomousandnotimposed.353
xxxx
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERTADEO354
Parasamagbubukid,anobaangkahuluganngU.S.militarybases?Parasamagbubukid,angkahulugannitoaypagkaalipin.Parasa
magbubukid, ang pananatili ng U.S. military bases ay tinik sa dlbdib ng sambayanang Pilipinong patuloy na nakabaon. Para sa
sambayanangmagbubukid,angibigsabihinngU.S.militarybasesaybatongpabigatnapatuloynapinapasanngsambayanangPilipino.
Parasasambayanangmagbubukid,angpananatilingU.S.militarybasesayisangnagdudumilatnakatotohananngpatuloynapaggahasa
ngimperyalistangEstadosUnidossaatingInangBayaneconomically,politicallyandculturally.Parasasambayanangmagbubukid.
ang U.S. military bases ay kasingkahulugan ng nuclear weapon ang kahulugan ay magneto ng isang nuclear war. Para sa
sambayanangmagbubukid,angkahuluganngU.S.militarybasesayisangsalot.355
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERQUESADA356
xxxx
Thedriftinthevotingonissuesrelatedtofreeingourselvesfromtheinstrumentsofdominationandsubserviencehasclearlybeendefinedthese
pastweeks.
xxxx
So for the record, Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to declare my support for the committee's position to enshrine in the Constitution a
fundamental principle forbidding foreign military bases, troops or facilities in any part of the Philippine territory as a clear and concrete
manifestationofourinherentrighttonationalselfdetermination,independenceandsovereignty.
Mr.PresidingOfficer,Iwouldliketorelatenowtheseattributesofgenuinenationhoodtothesocialcostofallowingforeigncountriestomaintain
militarybasesinourcountry.Previousspeakershavedweltonthissubject,eithertohighlightitsimportanceinrelationtotheotherissuesorto
glossoveritssignificanceandmakethisapartoffuturenegotiations.357
xxxx
Mr. Presiding Officer, I feel that banning foreign military bases is one of the solutions and is the response of the Filipino people against this
conditionandotherconditionsthathavealreadybeenclearlyandemphaticallydiscussedinpastdeliberations.Thedeletion,therefore,ofSection
3intheConstitutionwearedraftingwillhavethefollowingimplications:
First, the failure of the Constitutional Commission to decisively respond to the continuing violation of our territorial integrity via the
militarybasesagreementwhichpermitstheretentionofU.S.facilitieswithinthePhilippinesoiloverwhichourauthoritieshaveno
exclusivejurisdictioncontrarytotheaccepteddefinitionoftheexerciseofsovereignty.
Second,consentbythisforum,thisConstitutionalCommission,toanexceptionintheapplicationofaprovisionintheBillofRightsthat
we have just drafted regarding equal application of the laws of the land to all inhabitants, permanent or otherwise, within its territorial
boundaries.
Third, the continued exercise by the United States of extraterritoriality despite the condemnations of such practice by the world
communityofnationsinthelightofoverwhelminginternationalapprovaloferadicatingallvestigesofcolonialism.358
xxxx
Sixth, the deification of a new concept called pragmatic sovereignty, in the hope that such can be wielded to force the United States
governmenttoconcedetobettertermsandconditionsconcerningthemilitarybasesagreement,includingthetransferofcompletecontrolto
thePhilippinegovernmentoftheU.S.facilities,whileinthemeantimewehavetosufferallexistingindignitiesanddisrespecttowardsour
rightsasasovereignnation.
xxxx
Eighth,theutterfailureofthisforumtoviewtheissueofforeignmilitarybasesasessentiallyaquestionofsovereigntywhichdoes
Eighth,theutterfailureofthisforumtoviewtheissueofforeignmilitarybasesasessentiallyaquestionofsovereigntywhichdoes
notrequireindepthstudiesoranalysesandwhichthisforumhas,asaconstituentassemblydraftingaconstitution,theexpertiseandcapacityto
decideonexceptthatitlacksthepoliticalwillthatbroughtittoexistenceandnowengagesinanelaborateschemeofbuckpassing.
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Without any doubt we can establish a new social order in our country, if we reclaim, restore, uphold and defend our national
sovereignty.National sovereignty is what the military bases issue is all about.It is only the sovereign people exercising their national
sovereigntywhocandesignanindependentcourseandtakefullcontroloftheirnationaldestiny.359
SPEECHOFCOMMISSIONERPADILLA360
xxxx
Mr. Presiding Officer, in advocating the majority committee report, specifically Sections 3 and 4 on neutrality, nuclear and basesfree country,
someviewsstresssovereigntyoftheRepublicandeveninvokesurvivaloftheFilipinonationandpeople.361
REBUTTALOFCOMMISSIONERNOLLEDO362
xxxx
The anachronistic and ephemeral arguments against the provisions of the committee report to dismantle the American bases after 1991 only
showtheurgentneedtofreeourcountryfromtheentanglingalliancewithanypowerbloc.363
xxxx
xxxMr.PresidingOfficer,itisnotnecessaryforustopossessexpertisetoknowthatthesocalledRPUSBasesAgreementwillexpirein1991,
thatitinfringesonoursovereigntyandjurisdictionaswellasnationaldignityandhonor,thatitgoesagainsttheUNpolicyofdisarmament
andthatitconstitutesunjustinterventioninourinternalaffairs.364(EmphasesSupplied)
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The Constitutional Commission eventually agreed to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, subject to the provisions of Section 25. It is thus
importanttoreaditsdiscussionscarefully.Fromthesediscussions,wecandeducethreelegalstandardsthatwerearticulatedbytheConstitutionalCommission
Members. These are characteristics of any agreement that the country, and by extension this Court, must ensure are observed. We can thereby determine
whetheramilitarybaseorfacilityinthePhilippines,whichhousesorisaccessedbyforeignmilitarytroops,isforeignorremainsaPhilippinemilitarybaseor
facility. The legal standards we find applicable are: independence from foreign control, sovereignty and applicable law, and national security and territorial
integrity.
i.Firststandard:independence
fromforeigncontrol
Veryclearly,muchoftheoppositiontotheU.S.basesatthetimeoftheConstitution'sdraftingwasaimedatassertingPhilippineindependencefromtheU.S.,
aswellascontroloverourcountry'sterritoryandmilitary.
UndertheCivilCode,thereareseveralaspectsofcontrolexercisedoverproperty.
Propertyisclassifiedasprivateorpublic.365Itispublicif"intendedforpublicuse,suchasroads,canals,rivers,torrents,portsandbridgesconstructedbythe
State,banks,shores,roadsteads,andothersofsimilarcharacter[,]"or"[t]hosewhichbelongtotheState,withoutbeingforpublicuse,andareintendedfor
somepublicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth."366
Quite clearly, the Agreed Locations are contained within a property for public use, be it within a government military camp or property that belongs to the
Philippines.
Once ownership is established, then the rights of ownership flow freely. Article 428 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he owner has the right to enjoy and
disposeofathing,withoutotherlimitationsthanthoseestablishedbylaw."Moreover,theowner"hasalsoarightofactionagainsttheholderandpossessorof
thethinginordertorecoverit."
Philippinecivillawthereforeaccordsverystrongrightstotheownerofproperty,evenagainstthosewhoholdtheproperty.Possession,afterall,merelyraises
adisputablepresumptionofownership,whichcanbecontestedthroughnormaljudicialprocesses.367
Inthiscase,EDCAexplicitlyprovidesthatownershipoftheAgreedLocationsremainswiththePhilippinegovernment.368WhatU.S.personnelhavearightto,
pendingmutualagreement,isaccesstoanduseoftheselocations.369
TherightoftheownerofthepropertytoallowaccessanduseisconsistentwiththeCivilCode,sincetheownermaydisposeofthepropertyinwhateverway
deemedfit,subjecttothelimitsofthelaw.Solongastherightofownershipitselfisnottransferred,thenwhateverrightsaretransmittedbyagreementdoes
notcompletelydivesttheowneroftherightsovertheproperty,butmayonlylimittheminaccordancewithlaw.
Hence,evencontroloverthepropertyissomethingthatanownermaytransmitfreely.Thisactdoesnottranslateintothefulltransferofownership,butonlyof
certain rights. InRoman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission, we stated that the constitutional proscription on
propertyownershipisnotviolateddespitetheforeignnational'scontrolovertheproperty.370
EDCA,inrespectofitsprovisionsonAgreedLocations,isessentiallyacontractofuseandaccess.Underitspertinentprovisions,itistheDesignatedAuthority
of the Philippines that shall, when requested, assist in facilitating transit or access to public land and facilities.371 The activities carried out within these
locationsaresubjecttoagreementasauthorizedbythePhilippinegovernment.372GrantingtheU.S.operationalcontrolovertheselocationsislikewisesubject
toEDCA'ssecuritymechanisms,whicharebilateralproceduresinvolvingPhilippineconsentandcooperation.373Finally,thePhilippineDesignatedAuthorityora
dulydesignatedrepresentativeisgivenaccesstotheAgreedLocations.374
Toourmind,theseprovisionsdonotraisethespectreofU.S.control,whichwassofearedbytheConstitutionalCommission.Infact,theyseemtohavebeen
theproductofdeliberatenegotiationfromthepointofviewofthePhilippinegovernment,whichbalancedconstitutionalrestrictionsonforeignmilitarybases
and facilities against the security needs of the country. In the 1947 MBA, the U.S. forces had "the right, power and authority x x x to construct (including
dredgingandfilling),operate,maintain,utilize,occupy,garrisonandcontrolthebases."375NosimilarlyexplicitprovisionispresentinEDCA.
Nevertheless,thethresholdforallowingthepresenceofforeignmilitaryfacilitiesandbaseshasbeenraisedbythepresentConstitution.Section25isexplicit
thatforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippines,exceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenate.Merelystatingthat
the Philippines would retain ownership would do violence to the constitutional requirement if the Agreed Locations were simply to become a less obvious
manifestationoftheU.S.basesthatwererejectedin1991.
WhendebatestookplaceoverthemilitaryprovisionsoftheConstitution,thecommitteerejectedaspecificprovisionproposedbyCommissionerSarmiento.The
discussionilluminatesandprovidescontexttothe1986ConstitutionalCommission'svisionofcontrolandindependencefromtheU.S.,towit:
MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, my proposed amendment reads as follows: "THE STATE SHALL ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN AN
INDEPENDENTANDSELFRELIANTARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINES."Allowmetobrieflyexplain,MadamPresident.TheArmedForcesofthe
PhilippinesisavitalcomponentofPhilippinesocietydependinguponitstraining,orientationandsupport.Itwilleitherbethepeople'sprotector
orastaunchsupporterofausurperortyrant,localandforeigninterest.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippines'pastandrecentexperience
showsithasneverbeenindependentandselfreliant.Facts,dataandstatisticswillshowthatithasbeensubstantiallydependentupona
foreignpower.InMarch1968,CongressmanBarbero,himselfamemberoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,revealedtopsecretdocuments
showing what he described as U.S. dictation over the affairs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He showed that under existing
arrangements,theUnitedStatesunilaterallydeterminesnotonlythetypesandquantityofarmsandequipmentsthatourarmed
forces would have, but also the time when these items are to be made available to us. It is clear, as he pointed out, that the
composition, capability and schedule of development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is under the effective control of the
U.S.government.376(Emphasessupplied)
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Commissioner Sarmiento proposed a motherhood statement in the 1987 Constitution that would assert "independent" and "selfreliant" armed forces.This
proposal was rejected by the committee, however. As Commissioner De Castro asserted, the involvement of the Philippine military with the
U.S. did not, by itself, rob the Philippines of its real independence.He made reference to the context of the times: that the limited resources of the
PhilippinesandthecurrentinsurgencyatthattimenecessitatedastrongmilitaryrelationshipwiththeU.S.HesaidthattheU.S.wouldnotinanywaycontrol
thePhilippinemilitarydespitethisrelationshipandthefactthattheformerwouldfurnishmilitaryhardwareorextendmilitaryassistanceandtrainingtoour
military.Rather,heclaimedthattheproposalwasincompliancewiththetreatiesbetweenthetwostates.
MR. DE CASTRO: If the Commissioner will take note of my speech on U.S. military bases on 12 September 1986,1 spoke on the selfreliance
policy of the armed forces. However, due to very limited resources, the only thing we could do is manufacture small arms ammunition. We
cannotblamethearmedforces.WehavetoblamethewholeRepublicofthePhilippinesforfailuretoprovidethenecessaryfundstomakethe
Philippine Armed Forces selfreliant. Indeed that is a beautiful dream. And I would like it that way. But as of this time, fighting an insurgency
case,arebellioninourcountryinsurgencyandwithverylimitedfundsandverylimitednumberofmen,itwillbequiteimpossibleforthe
Philippines to appropriate the necessary funds therefor. However, if we say that the U.S. government is furnishing us the military
hardware,itisnotcontrolofourarmedforcesorofourgovernment.ItisincompliancewiththeMutualDefenseTreaty.Itisunder
themilitaryassistanceprogramthatitbecomestheresponsibilityoftheUnitedStatestofurnishusthenecessaryhardwareinconnectionwith
themilitarybasesagreement.Pleasebeinformedthattherearethree(3)treatiesconnectedwiththemilitarybasesagreementnamely:theRP
USMilitaryBasesAgreement,theMutualDefenseTreatyandtheMilitaryAssistanceProgram.
MydearCommissioner,whenweenterintoatreatyandwearefurnishedthemilitaryhardwarepursuanttothattreaty,itisnotin
controlofourarmedforcesnorcontrolofourgovernment.Trueindeed,wehavemilitaryofficerstrainedintheU.S.armedforcesschool.
ThisispartofourMilitaryAssistanceProgram,butitdoesnotmeanthatthemindsofourmilitaryofficersarefortheU.S.government,no.Iam
oneofthosewhotookfourcoursesintheUnitedStatesschools,butIassureyou,mymindisfortheFilipinopeople.Also,whilewearesending
military officers to train or to study in U.S. military schools, we are also sending our officers to study in other military schools such as in
Australia,EnglandandinParis.So,itdoesnotmeanthatwhenwesendmilitaryofficerstoUnitedStatesschoolsortoothermilitaryschools,we
will be under the control of that country. We also have foreign officers in our schools, we in the Command and General Staff College in Fort
BonifacioandinourNationalDefenseCollege,alsoinFortBonifacio.377(Emphasessupplied)
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ThislogicwasacceptedinTaadav.Angara,inwhichtheCourtruledthatindependencedoesnotmeantheabsenceofforeignparticipation:
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "selfreliant and independent national economy" does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreigninvestments,goodsandservices.Itcontemplatesneither"economicseclusion"nor"mendicancyintheinternationalcommunity."As
explainedbyConstitutionalCommissionerBernardoVillegas,sponsorofthisconstitutionalpolicy:
Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external
assistanceforevenitsmostbasicneeds.Itdoesnotmeanautarkyoreconomicseclusionrather,itmeansavoidingmendicancyin
the international community.Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy,
especiallyinsuchstrategicindustriesasinthedevelopmentofnaturalresourcesandpublicutilities.378(Emphasessupplied)
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The heart of the constitutional restriction on foreign military facilities and bases is therefore the assertion of independence from the U.S. and other foreign
powers,asindependenceisexhibitedbythedegreeofforeigncontrolexertedovertheseareas.Theessenceofthatindependenceisselfgovernanceandself
control.379Independenceitselfis"[t]hestateorconditionofbeingfreefromdependence,subjection,orcontrol."380
Petitioners assert that EDCA provides the U.S. extensive control and authority over Philippine facilities and locations, such that the agreement effectively
violatesSection25ofthe1987Constitution.381
Under Article VI(3) of EDCA, U.S. forces are authorized to act as necessary for "operational control and defense." The term "operational control" has led
petitioners to regard U.S. control over the Agreed Locations as unqualified and, therefore, total.382Petitioners contend that the word "their" refers to the
subject"AgreedLocations."
Thisargumentmisreadsthetext,whichisquotedbelow:
UnitedStatesforcesareauthorizedtoexerciseallrightsandauthoritieswithinAgreedLocationsthatarenecessaryfortheiroperationalcontrol
or defense, including taking appropriate measure to protect United States forces and United States contractors. The United States should
coordinatesuchmeasureswithappropriateauthoritiesofthePhilippines.
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A basic textual construction would show that the word "their," as understood above, is a possessive pronoun for the subject "they," a thirdperson personal
pronouninpluralform.Thus,"their"cannotbeusedforanonpersonalsubjectsuchas"AgreedLocations."Thesimplegrammaticalconclusionisthat"their"
referstothepreviousthirdpersonpluralnoun,whichis"UnitedStatesforces."Thisconclusionisinlinewiththedefinitionofoperationalcontrol.
a.
U.S.operationalcontrolasthe
exerciseofauthorityoverU.S.
personnel,andnotoverthe
AgreedLocations
Operationalcontrol,ascitedbybothpetitionerandrespondents,isamilitarytermreferringto
[t]he authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigningtasks,designatingobjective,andgivingauthoritativedirectionnecessarytoaccomplishthemission.383
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Attimes,though,operationalcontrolcanmeansomethingslightlydifferent.InJUSMAGPhilippinesv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,theMemorandum
ofAgreementbetweentheAFPandJUSMAGPhilippinesdefinedthetermasfollows:384
The term "Operational Control" includes, but is not limited to, all personnel administrative actions, such as: hiring recommendations firing
recommendationspositionclassificationdisciplinenominationandapprovalofincentiveawardsandpayrollcomputation.
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Clearly,traditionalstandardsdefine"operationalcontrol"aspersonnelcontrol.Philippinelaw,forinstance,deemsoperationalcontrolasoneexercisedbypolice
officers and civilian authorities over their subordinates and is distinct from the administrative control that they also exercise over police
subordinates.385Similarly,amunicipalmayorexercisesoperationalcontroloverthepolicewithinthemunicipalgovernment,386justascitymayorpossesses
thesamepoweroverthepolicewithinthecitygovernment.387
Thus,thelegalconceptofoperationalcontrolinvolvesauthorityoverpersonnelinacommandersubordinaterelationshipanddoesnotincludecontroloverthe
AgreedLocationsinthisparticularcase.ThoughnotnecessarilystatedinEDCAprovisions,thisinterpretationisreadilyimpliedbythereferencetothetakingof
"appropriatemeasurestoprotectUnitedStatesforcesandUnitedStatescontractors."
Itisbutlogical,evennecessary,fortheU.S.tohaveoperationalcontroloveritsownforces,inmuchthesamewaythatthePhilippinesexercisesoperational
controloveritsownunits.
Foractualoperations,EDCAisclearthatanyactivitymustbeplannedandpreapprovedbytheMDBSEB.388Thisprovisionevincesthepartnershipaspectof
EDCA,suchthatbothstakeholdershaveasayonhowitsprovisionsshouldbeputintoeffect.
b. Operationalcontrolvisavis
effectivecommandandcontrol
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Petitioners assert that beyond the concept of operational control over personnel, qualifying access to the Agreed Locations by the Philippine Designated
Authoritywiththephrase"consistentwithoperationalsafetyandsecurityrequirementsinaccordancewithagreedproceduresdevelopedbytheParties"leads
totheconclusionthattheU.S.exerciseseffectivecontrolovertheAgreedLocations.389TheyclaimthatifthePhilippinesexercisespossessionofandcontrol
overagivenarea,itsrepresentativeshouldnothavetobeauthorizedbyaspecialprovision.390
Forthesereasons,petitionersarguethatthe"operationalcontrol"inEDCAisthe"effectivecommandandcontrol"inthe1947MBA.391IntheirMemorandum,
theydistinguisheffectivecommandandcontrolfromoperationalcontrolinU.S.parlance.392CitingtheDoctrinefortheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates,Joint
Publication 1, "command and control (C2)" is defined as "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attachedforcesintheaccomplishmentofthemissionxxx."393Operationalcontrol,ontheotherhand,refersto"[tjhosefunctionsofcommandoverassigned
forcesinvolvingthecompositionofsubordinateforces,theassignmentoftasks,thedesignationofobjectives,theoverallcontrolofassignedresources,andthe
fullauthoritativedirectionnecessarytoaccomplishthemission."394
Twothingsdemonstratetheerrorsinpetitioners'lineofargument.
Firstly,thephrase"consistentwithoperationalsafetyandsecurityrequirementsinaccordancewithagreedproceduresdevelopedbytheParties"doesnotadd
any qualification beyond that which is already imposed by existing treaties. To recall, EDCA is based upon prior treaties, namely the VFA and the
MDT.395Treatiesareinthemselvescontractsfromwhichrightsandobligationsmaybeclaimedorwaived.396Inthisparticularcase,thePhilippineshasalready
agreed to abide by the security mechanisms that have long been in place between the U.S. and the Philippines based on the implementation of their treaty
relations.
Secondly, the full document cited by petitioners contradicts the equation of "operational control" with "effective command and control," since it defines the
termsquitedifferently,viz:398
Commandandcontrolencompassestheexerciseofauthority,responsibility,anddirectionbyacommanderoverassignedandattachedforcesto
accomplishthemission.Commandatalllevelsistheartofmotivatinganddirectingpeopleandorganizationsintoactiontoaccomplishmissions.
Control is inherent in command. To control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander's command authority.
Controlofforcesandfunctionshelpscommandersandstaffscomputerequirements,allocatemeans,andintegrateefforts.Missioncommandis
the preferred method of exercising C2. A complete discussion of tenets, organization, and processes for effective C2 is provided in Section B,
"CommandandControlofJointForces,"ofChapterV"JointCommandandControl."
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Operationalcontrolisdefinedthus:399
OPCONisabletobedelegatedfromalesserauthoritythanCOCOM.Itistheauthoritytoperformthosefunctionsofcommandoversubordinate
forcesinvolvingorganizingandemployingcommandsandforces,assigningtasks,designatingobjectives,andgivingauthoritativedirectionover
all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish the mission. It should be delegated to and exercised by the
commandersofsubordinateorganizationsnormally,thisauthorityisexercisedthroughsubordinateJFCs,Service,and/orfunctionalcomponent
commanders. OPCON provides authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish
assigned missions. It does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the CCDR. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional
responsibilitiesandoperationalareasofsubordinateJFCs.
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Operationalcontrolisthereforethedelegableaspectofcombatantcommand,whilecommandandcontrolistheoverallpowerandresponsibilityexercisedby
thecommanderwithreferencetoamission.Operationalcontrolisanarrowerpowerandmustbegiven,whilecommandandcontrolisplenaryandvestedina
commander. Operational control does not include the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input the assignment of subordinate
commandersthebuildingofrelationshipswithDepartmentofDefenseagenciesorthedirectiveauthorityforlogistics,whereasthesefactorsareincludedin
theconceptofcommandandcontrol.400
Thisdistinction,foundinthesamedocumentcitedbypetitioners,destroystheveryfoundationoftheargumentstheyhavebuilt:thatEDCAisthesameasthe
MBA.
c. Limitedoperationalcontrol
overtheAgreedLocations
onlyforconstruction
activitites
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As petitioners assert, EDCA indeed contains a specific provision that gives to the U.S. operational control within the Agreed Locations during construction
activities.401ThisexerciseofoperationalcontrolispremisedupontheapprovalbytheMDBandtheSEBoftheconstructionactivitythroughconsultationand
mutualagreementontherequirementsandstandardsoftheconstruction,alteration,orimprovement.402
DespitethisgrantofoperationalcontroltotheU.S.,itmustbeemphasizedthatthegrantisonlyforconstructionactivities.Thenarrowandlimitedinstance
wherein the U.S. is given operational control within an Agreed Location cannot be equated with foreign military control, which is so abhorred by the
Constitution.
The clear import of the provision is that in the absence of construction activities, operational control over the Agreed Location is vested in the Philippine
authorities. This meaning is implicit in the specific grant of operational control only during construction activities. The principle of constitutional
construction, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," means the failure to mention the thing becomes the ground for inferring that it was deliberately
excluded.403Following this construction, since EDCA mentions the existence of U.S. operational control over the Agreed Locations for construction activities,
thenitisquitelogicaltoconcludethatitisnotexercisedoverotheractivities.
LimitedcontroldoesnotviolatetheConstitution.Thefearofthecommissionerswastotalcontrol,tothepointthattheforeignmilitaryforcesmightdictatethe
terms of their acts within the Philippines.404More important, limited control does not mean an abdication or derogation of Philippine sovereignty and legal
jurisdictionovertheAgreedLocations.Itismoreakintotheextensionofdiplomaticcourtesiesandrightstodiplomaticagents,405whichisawaiverofcontrol
onalimitedscaleandsubjecttothetermsofthetreaty.
ThispointleadsustothesecondstandardenvisionedbytheframersoftheConstitution:thatthePhilippinesmustretainsovereigntyandjurisdictionoverits
territory.
ii.Secondstandard:Philippine
sovereigntyandapplicablelaw
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EDCAstatesinitsPreamblethe"understandingfortheUnitedStatesnottoestablishapermanentmilitarypresenceorbaseintheterritoryofthePhilippines."
Furtheron,itlikewisestatestherecognitionthat"allUnitedStatesaccesstoanduseoffacilitiesandareaswillbeattheinvitationofthePhilippinesandwith
fullrespectforthePhilippineConstitutionandPhilippinelaws."
ThesensitivityofEDCAprovisionstothelawsofthePhilippinesmustbeseeninlightofPhilippinesovereigntyandjurisdictionovertheAgreedLocations.
Sovereignty is the possession of sovereign power,406while jurisdiction is the conferment by law of power and authority to apply the law.407Article I of the
1987Constitutionstates:
ThenationalterritorycomprisesthePhilippinearchipelago,withalltheislandsandwatersembracedtherein,andallotherterritoriesoverwhich
thePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction,consistingofitsterrestrial,fluvial,andaerialdomains,includingitsterritorialsea,theseabed,
the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions,formpartoftheinternalwatersofthePhilippines.(Emphasissupplied)
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FromthetextofEDCAitself,AgreedLocationsareterritoriesofthePhilippinesthattheU.S.forcesareallowedtoaccessanduse.408Bywithholdingownership
oftheseareasandretainingunrestrictedaccesstothem,thegovernmentassertssovereigntyoveritsterritory.ThatsovereigntyexistssolongastheFilipino
peopleexist.409
Significantly,thePhilippinesretainsprimaryresponsibilityforsecuritywithrespecttotheAgreedLocations.410Hence,Philippinelawremainsinforcetherein,
anditcannotbesaidthatjurisdictionhasbeentransferredtotheU.S.Eventhepreviouslydiscussednecessarymeasuresforoperationalcontrolanddefense
overU.S.forcesmustbecoordinatedwithPhilippineauthorities.411
JurisprudencebearsoutthefactthatevenundertheformerlegalregimeoftheMBA,Philippinelawscontinuetobeinforcewithinthebases.412Thedifference
between then and now is that EDCA retains the primary jurisdiction of the Philippines over the security of the Agreed Locations, an important provision that
givesitactualcontroloverthoselocations.Previously,itwastheprovostmarshaloftheU.S.whokeptthepeaceandenforcedPhilippinelawinthebases.In
thisinstance,Philippineforcesactaspeaceofficers,instarkcontrasttothe1947MBAprovisionsonjurisdiction.413
iii.Thirdstandard:mustrespect
nationalsecurityandterritorial
integrity
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The last standard this Court must set is that the EDCA provisions on the Agreed Locations must not impair or threaten the national security and territorial
integrityofthePhilippines.
ThisCourtacknowledgedinBayanv.Zamorathattheevolutionoftechnologyhasessentiallyrenderedthepriornotionofpermanentmilitarybasesobsolete.
Moreover,militarybasesestablishedwithintheterritoryofanotherstateisnolongerviablebecauseofthealternativesofferedbynewmeans
andweaponsofwarfaresuchasnuclearweapons,guidedmissilesaswellashugeseavesselsthatcanstayafloatintheseaevenformonthsand
yearswithoutreturningtotheirhomecountry.Thesemilitarywarshipsareactuallyusedassubstitutesforalandhomebasenotonlyofmilitary
aircraftbutalsoofmilitarypersonnelandfacilities.Besides,vesselsaremobileascomparedtoalandbasedmilitaryheadquarters.414
cralawlawlibrary
TheVFAservesasthebasisfortheentryofU.S.troopsinalimitedscope.Itdoesnotallow,forinstance,thereestablishmentoftheSubicmilitarybaseorthe
ClarkAirFieldasU.S.militaryreservations.Inthiscontext,therefore,thisCourthasinterpretedtherestrictionsonforeignbases,troops,orfacilitiesasthree
independentrestrictions.Inaccordwiththisinterpretation,eachrestrictionmusthaveitsownqualification.
Petitionersquotefromthewebsitehttp://en.wikipedia.orgtodefinewhatamilitarybaseis.415Whilethesourceisnotauthoritative,petitionersmakethepoint
thattheAgreedLocations,bygrantingaccessandusetoU.S.forcesandcontractors,areU.S.basesunderadifferentname.416More important, they claim
thattheAgreedLocationsinviteinstancesofattackonthePhilippinesfromenemiesoftheU.S.417
WebelievethattheraisedfearofanattackonthePhilippinesisnotintherealmoflaw,butofpoliticsandpolicy.Attheveryleast,wecansaythatunder
internationallaw,EDCAdoesnotprovidealegalbasisforajustifiedattackonthePhilippines.
Inthefirstplace,internationallawdisallowsanyattackontheAgreedLocationssimplybecauseofthepresenceofU.S.personnel.Article2(4)oftheUnited
NationsCharterstatesthat"AllMembersshallrefrainintheirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpolitical
independenceofanystate,orinanyothermannerinconsistentwiththePurposesoftheUnitedNations."418AnyunlawfulattackonthePhilippinesbreaches
thetreaty,andtriggersArticle51ofthesamecharter,whichguaranteestheinherentrightofindividualorcollectiveselfdefence.
Moreover, even if the lawfulness of the attack were not in question, international humanitarian law standards prevent participants in an armed conflict from
targeting nonparticipants. International humanitarian law, which is the branch of international law applicable to armed conflict, expressly limits allowable
military conduct exhibited by forces of a participant in an armed conflict.419Under this legal regime, participants to an armed conflict are held to specific
standards of conduct that require them to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants,420 as embodied by the Geneva Conventions and their
AdditionalProtocols.421
Corollarytothispoint,ProfessorJohnWoodcliffe,professorofinternationallawattheUniversityofLeicester,notedthatthereisnolegalconsensusforwhat
constitutesabase,asopposedtoothertermssuchas"facilities"or"installation."422Instrategicliterature,"base"isdefinedasaninstallation"overwhichthe
user State has a right to exclusive control in an extraterritorial sense."423 Since this definition would exclude most foreign military installations, a more
importantdistinctionmustbemade.
For Woodcliffe, a type of installation excluded from the definition of "base" is one that does not fulfill a combat role. He cites an example of the use of the
territoryofastatefortrainingpurposes,suchastoobtainexperienceinlocalgeographyandclimacticconditionsortocarryoutjointexercises.424Another
examplegivenisanadvancedcommunicationstechnologyinstallationforpurposesofinformationgatheringandcommunication.425Unsurprisingly,hedeems
thesenoncombatusesasborderlinesituationsthatwouldbeexcludedfromthefunctionalunderstandingofmilitarybasesandinstallations.426
Byvirtueofthisambiguity,thelawsofwardictatethatthestatusofabuildingorpersonispresumedtobeprotected,unlessprovenotherwise.427Moreover,
the principle of distinction requires combatants in an aimed conflict to distinguish between lawful targets428and protected targets.429 In an actual armed
conflict between the U.S. and a third state, the Agreed Locations cannot be considered U.S. territory, since ownership of territory even in times of armed
conflictdoesnotchange.430
Hence,anyarmedattackbyforcesofathirdstateagainstanAgreedLocationcanonlybelegitimateunderinternationalhumanitarianlawifitisagainstabona
fideU.S.militarybase,facility,orinstallationthatdirectlycontributestothemilitaryeffortoftheU.S.Moreover,thethirdstate'sforcesmusttakeallmeasures
toensurethattheyhavecompliedwiththeprincipleofdistinction(betweencombatantsandnoncombatants).
Thereis,then,amplelegalprotectionforthePhilippinesunderinternationallawthatwouldensureitsterritorialintegrityandnationalsecurityintheeventan
Agreed Location is subjected to attack. As EDCA stands, it does not create the situation so feared by petitioners one in which the Philippines, while not
participatinginanarmedconflict,wouldbelegitimatelytargetedbyanenemyoftheU.S.431
Inthesecondplace,thisisapolicyquestionaboutthewisdomofallowingthepresenceofU.S.personnelwithinourterritoryandisthereforeoutsidethescope
ofjudicialreview.
Evidently,theconceptofgivingforeigntroopsaccessto"agreed"locations,areas,orfacilitieswithinthemilitarybaseofanothersovereignstateisnothingnew
ontheinternationalplane.Infact,thisarrangementhasbeenusedastheframeworkforseveraldefensecooperationagreements,suchasinthefollowing:
1. 2006U.S.BulgariaDefenseCooperationAgreement432
2. 2009U.S.ColombiaDefenseCooperationAgreement433
3. 2009U.S.PolandStatusofForcesAgreement434
4. 2014U.S.AustraliaForcePostureAgreement435
5. 2014U.S.AfghanistanSecurityandDefenseCooperationAgreement436
cralawlawlibrary
In all of these arrangements, the host state grants U.S. forces access to their military bases.437 That access is without rental or similar costs to the
U.S.438Further,U.S.forcesareallowedtoundertakeconstructionactivitiesin,andmakealterationsandimprovementsto,theagreedlocations,facilities,or
areas.439AsinEDCA,thehoststatesretainownershipandjurisdictionoverthesaidbases.440
In fact, some of the host states in these agreements give specific militaryrelated rights to the U.S. For example, under Article IV(1) of the U.S.Bulgaria
Defense Cooperation Agreement, "the United States forces x x x are authorized access to and may use agreed facilities and areas x x x for staging and
deployingoffereesandmateriel,withthepurposeofconductingxxxcontingencyoperationsandothermissions,includingthoseundertakenintheframeworkof
theNorthAtlanticTreaty."Insomeoftheseagreements,hostcountriesallowU.S.forcestoconstructfacilitiesforthelatter'sexclusiveuse.441
Troopbilleting,includingconstructionoftemporarystructures,isnothingnew.InLimv.ExecutiveSecretary,theCourtalreadyupheldtheTermsofReference
ofBalikatan021, which authorized U.S. forces to set up "[t]emporary structures such as those for troop billeting, classroom instruction and messing xxx
duringtheExercise."SimilarprovisionsarealsointheMutualLogisticsSupportAgreementof2002and2007,whichareessentiallyexecutiveagreementsthat
implement the VFA, the MDT, and the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement. These executive agreements similarly tackle the "reciprocal provision of logistic
support,supplies,andservices,"442whichinclude"[b]illeting,xxxoperationssupport(andconstructionanduseoftemporarystructuresincidenttooperations
support),trainingservices,xxxstorageservices,xxxduringanapprovedactivity."443Theselogisticsupplies,support,andservicesincludetemporaryuseof
"nonlethal items of military equipment which are not designated as significant military equipment on the U.S. Munitions List, during an approved
activity."444ThefirstMutualLogisticsSupportAgreementhaslapsed,whilethesecondonehasbeenextendeduntil2017withoutanyformalobjectionbefore
thisCourtfromtheSenateoranyofitsmembers.
TheprovisionsinEDCAdealingwithAgreedLocationsareanalogoustothoseintheaforementionedexecutiveagreements.Insteadofauthorizingthebuilding
oftemporarystructuresaspreviousagreementshavedone,EDCAauthorizestheU.S.tobuildpermanentstructuresoralterorimproveexistingonesfor,and
tobeownedby,thePhilippines.445EDCAisclearthatthePhilippinesretainsownershipofalteredorimprovedfacilitiesandnewlyconstructedpermanentor
nonrelocatablestructures.446UnderEDCA,U.S.forceswillalsobeallowedtousefacilitiesandareasfor"trainingxxxsupportandrelatedactivitiesxxx
temporaryaccommodationofpersonnelcommunications"andagreedactivities.447
Concerns on national security problems that arise from foreign military equipment being present in the Philippines must likewise be contextualized. Most
significantly,theVFAalreadyauthorizesthepresenceofU.S.militaryequipmentinthecountry.ArticleVIIoftheVFAalreadyauthorizestheU.S.to
import into or acquire in the Philippines "equipment, materials, supplies, and other property" that will be used "in connection with activities" contemplated
therein.Thesamesectionalsorecognizesthat"[t]itletosuchpropertyshallremain"withtheUSandthattheyhavethediscretionto"removesuchproperty
fromthePhilippinesatanytime."
There is nothing novel, either, in the EDCA provision on the prepositioning and storing of "defense equipment, supplies, and materiel,"448since these are
sanctionedintheVFA.Infact,thetwocountrieshavealreadyenteredintovariousimplementingagreementsinthepastthatarecomparabletothepresent
one.TheBalikatan021TermsofReferencementionedinLimv.ExecutiveSecretaryspecificallyrecognizesthatPhilippineandU.S.forces"maysharexxxin
theuseoftheirresources,equipmentandotherassets."Boththe2002and2007MutualLogisticsSupportAgreementsspeakoftheprovisionofsupportand
services,includingthe"constructionanduseoftemporarystructuresincidenttooperationssupport"and"storageservices"duringapprovedactivities.449These
logisticsupplies,support,andservicesincludethe"temporaryuseofxxxnonlethalitemsofmilitaryequipmentwhicharenotdesignatedassignificantmilitary
equipment on the U.S. Munitions List, during an approved activity."450 Those activities include "combined exercises and training, operations and other
equipment on the U.S. Munitions List, during an approved activity."

Those activities include "combined exercises and training, operations and other
deployments"and"cooperativeefforts,suchashumanitarianassistance,disasterreliefandrescueoperations,andmaritimeantipollutionoperations"withinor
outside Philippine territory.451 Under EDCA, the equipment, supplies, and materiel that will be prepositioned at Agreed Locations include "humanitarian
assistanceanddisasterreliefequipment,supplies,andmateriel."452Nuclearweaponsarespecificallyexcludedfromthematerielthatwillbeprepositioned.
Therefore,thereisnobasistoinvalidateEDCAonfearsthatitincreasesthethreattoournationalsecurity.Ifanything,EDCAincreasesthelikelihoodthat,in
aneventrequiringadefensiveresponse,thePhilippineswillbepreparedalongsidetheU.S.todefenditsislandsandinsureitsterritorialintegritypursuanttoa
relationshipbuiltontheMDTandVFA.
8. Othersissuesand
concernsraised
ApointwasraisedduringtheoralargumentsthatthelanguageoftheMDTonlyreferstomutualhelpanddefenseinthePacificarea.453Webelievethatany
discussionoftheactivitiestobeundertakenunderEDCAvisavisthedefenseofareasbeyondthePacificispremature.Wenotethataproperpetitiononthat
issuemustbefiledbeforewerulethereon.Wealsonotethatnoneofthepetitionsormemorandahasattemptedtodiscussthisissue,exceptonlytotheorize
thattheU.S.willnotcometoouraidintheeventofanattackoutsideofthePacific.Thisisamatterofpolicyandisbeyondthescopeofthisjudicialreview.
In reference to the issue on telecommunications, suffice it to say that the initial impression of the facility adverted to does appear to be one of those that
requireapublicfranchisebywayofcongressionalactionunderSection11,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution.Asrespondentssubmit,however,thesystemreferred
to in the agreement does not provide telecommunications services to the public for compensation.454 It is clear from Article VII(2) of EDCA that the
telecommunicationsystemissolelyfortheuseoftheU.S.andnotthepublicingeneral,andthatthissystemwillnotinterferewiththatwhichlocaloperators
use.Consequently,apublicfranchiseisnolongernecessary.
Additionally,thechargethatEDCAallowsnuclearweaponswithinPhilippineterritoryisentirelyspeculative.Itisnoteworthythattheagreementinfactspecifies
thattheprepositionedmaterielshallnotincludenuclearweapons.455PetitionersarguethatonlyprepositionednuclearweaponsareprohibitedbyEDCAand
that,therefore,theU.S.wouldinsidiouslybringnuclearweaponstoPhilippineterritory.456Thegeneralprohibitiononnuclearweapons,whetherprepositioned
ornot,isalreadyexpressedinthe1987Constitution.457ItwouldbeunnecessaryorsuperfluoustoincludeallprohibitionsalreadyintheConstitutionorinthe
lawthroughadocumentlikeEDCA.
Finally,petitionersallegethatEDCAcreatesataxexemption,whichunderthelawmustoriginatefromCongress.Thisallegationignoresjurisprudenceonthe
government's assumption of tax liability. EDCA simply states that the taxes on the use of water, electricity, and public utilities are for the account of the
PhilippineGovernment.458Thisprovisioncreatesasituationinwhichacontractingpartyassumesthetaxliabilityoftheother.459InNationalPowerCorporation
v.ProvinceofQuezon,wedistinguishedbetweenenforceableandunenforceablestipulationsontheassumptionoftaxliability.Afterwards,weconcludedthat
anenforceableassumptionoftaxliabilityrequiresthepartyassumingtheliabilitytohaveactualinterestinthepropertytaxed.460ThisruleappliestoEDCA,
sincethePhilippineGovernmentstandstobenefitnotonlyfromthestructurestobebuiltthereonorimproved,butalsofromthejointtrainingwithU.S.forces,
disaster preparation, and the preferential use of Philippine suppliers.461 Hence, the provision on the assumption of tax liability does not constitute a tax
exemptionaspetitionershaveposited.
Additional issues were raised by petitioners, all relating principally to provisions already sufficiently addressed above. This Court takes this occasion to
emphasize that the agreement has been construed herein as to absolutely disauthorize the violation of the Constitution or any applicable statute. On the
contrary,theapplicabilityofPhilippinelawisexplicitinEDCA.
EPILOGUE
ThefearthatEDCAisareincarnationoftheU.S.basessozealouslyprotestedbynotedpersonalitiesinPhilippinehistoryarisesnotsomuchfromxenophobia,
but from a genuine desire for selfdetermination, nationalism, and above all a commitment to ensure the independence of the Philippine Republic from any
foreigndomination.
Merefears,however,cannotcurtailtheexercisebythePresidentofthePhilippinesofhisConstitutionalprerogativesinrespectofforeignaffairs.Theycannot
cripplehimwhenhedeemsthatadditionalsecuritymeasuresaremadenecessarybythetimes.Asitstands,thePhilippinesthroughtheDepartmentofForeign
AffairshasfiledseveraldiplomaticprotestsagainsttheactionsofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaintheWestPhilippineSea462initiatedarbitrationagainstthat
countryundertheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea463is in the process of negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for peace in
SouthernPhilippines,464 which is the subject of a current case before this Court and faces increasing incidents of kidnappings of Filipinos and foreigners
allegedlybytheAbuSayyafortheNewPeople'sArmy.465ThePhilippinemilitaryisconductingreformsthatseektoensurethesecurityandsafetyofthenation
intheyearstocome.466In the future, the Philippines must navigate a world in which armed forces fight with increasing sophistication in both strategy and
technology,whileemployingasymmetricwarfareandremoteweapons.
Additionally,ourcountryisfightingamostterrifyingenemy:thebacklashofMotherNature.ThePhilippinesisoneofthecountriesmostdirectlyaffectedand
damagedbyclimatechange.ItisnocoincidencethattherecordsettingtropicalcycloneYolanda(internationallynamedHaiyan),oneofthemostdevastating
forcesofnaturetheworldhaseverseenhitthePhilippineson8November2013andkilledatleast6,000people.467Thisnecessitatedamassiverehabilitation
project.468Intheaftermath,theU.S.militarywasamongthefirsttoextendhelpandsupporttothePhilippines.
ThatcalamitybroughtoutthebestintheFilipinosasthousandsuponthousandsvolunteeredtheirhelp,theirwealth,andtheirprayerstothoseaffected.Italso
broughttotheforethevalueofhavingfriendsintheinternationalcommunity.
In order to keep the peace in its archipelago in this region of the world, and to sustain itself at the same time against the destructive forces of nature, the
Philippineswillneedfriends.Whotheyare,andwhatformthefriendshipswilltake,areforthePresidenttodecide.TheonlyrestrictioniswhattheConstitution
itselfexpresslyprohibits.Itappearsthatthisoverarchingconcernforbalancingconstitutionalrequirementsagainstthedictatesofnecessitywaswhatledto
EDCA.
Asitis,EDCAisnotconstitutionallyinfirm.Asanexecutiveagreement,itremainsconsistentwithexistinglawsandtreatiesthatitpurportstoimplement.
WHEREFORE,weherebyDISMISSthepetitions.
SOORDERED.
Velasco,Jr.,DelCastillo,Villarama,Jr.,Perez,Mendoza,andReyes,JJ.,concur.
Carpio,J.,seeseparateconcurringopinion.
LeonardoDeCastro,J.,Idissent.seemydissentingopinion.
Brion,J.,Idissent.seemydissentingopinion.
Peralta,J.,IjoinJ.Carpio'sopinion.
Bersamin,J.,IjointheseparateconcurringopinionofJ.Carpio.
PerlasBernabe,J.,Ijointhedissentingopinions
Leonen,J.,Idissent.seeseparateopinion.
Jardeleza,J.,nopart.
Endnotes:
*Nopart.
1PetitionofSaguisagetal.,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),pp.366PetitionofBayanetat.,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),pp.3101.
2PetitionofSaguisagetal.,p.5,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),p.7PetitionofBayanetal,p.5,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),p.7.
3PrincipallythefollowingprovisionsundertheConstitution:Art.VII,Sec.21Art.XVIII,Sec.25Art.IArt.II,Sees.2,7,&8Art.VI,Sec.
28(4)andArt.VIII,Sec.1.SeePetitionofSaguisagetal,pp.2359,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),pp.2561PetitionofBayanetal.,rollo,
pp.2393,(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),pp.2595.
4MemorandumoftheOSG,pp.838,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),pp.438468.
5The Protocol, Ceremony, History, and Symbolism of the Presidential Inauguration,THE PRESIDENTIAL Museum and Library, available at (last
visited5Nov.2015).
6CONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.1.
7CONSTITUTION,Art.II,Sec.4.
8CONSTITUTION,Art.I.
10Id.
12SeeCONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.18inrelationtoArt.II,Sees.3,4&7ExecutiveOrderNo.292(AdministrativeCodeof1987),BookIV
(ExecutiveBranch),TitleVIII(NationalDefense),Sees.1,15,26&33[hereinafterAdministrativeCodeof1987].
13AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIV(ExecutiveBranch),TitleXII(LocalGovernment),Sec.3(5).
15SeeCONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.1inrelationtoAdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIV(ExecutiveBranch),TitleI(ForeignAffairs),Sees.3(1)
and 20Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, 580 Phil. 422 (2008) Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303
(2005)People'sMovementforPressFreedomv.Manglapus,G.R.No.84642,13September1988(unreported)(citingUnitedStatesv.Curtiss
WrightExportCorp.,299U.S.304[1936])JOAQUINBERNAS,FOREIGNRELATIONSINCONSTITUTIONALLAW,101(1995)IRENER.CORTES,
THEPHILIPPINEPRESIDENCY:ASTUDYOFEXECUTIVEPOWER187(1966)VICENTEG.SINCO,PHILIPPINEPOLITICALLAW:PRINCIPLESAND
CONCEPTS297(10thed.,1954).
16See1933MontevideoConventionontheRightsandDutiesofStates,Art.1,165LNTS19JAMESCRAWFORD,THECREATIONOFSTATESIN
INTERNATIONALLAW61(2nded.2007).
17Vinuyav.ExecutiveSecretary,633Phil.538,570(2010)(quotingtheDissentingOpinionofthenAssoc.JusticeReynatoS.PunoinSecretary
ofJusticev.Lantion,379Phil.165,233234[2004]).
19CONSTITUTION(1973,asamended),Art.VIII,Sec.14(1).
20CONSTITUTION(1973,asamended),Art.VIII,Sec.16.
21CONSTITUTION(1935),Art.VII,Sec.10(7).
23QuoththeCourt:"FortheroleoftheSenateinrelationtotreatiesisessentiallylegislativeincharactertheSenate,asanindependentbody
possessedofitsowneruditemind,hastheprerogativetoeitheracceptorrejecttheproposedagreement,andwhateveractionittakesinthe
exerciseofitswidelatitudeofdiscretion,pertainstothewisdomratherthanthelegalityoftheact.Inthissense,theSenatepartakesaprincipal,
yetdelicate,roleinkeepingtheprinciplesofseparationofpowersandofchecksandbalancesaliveandvigilantlyensuresthatthesecherished
rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treatyconcurring
poweroftheSenate,ahealthysystemofchecksandbalancesindispensabletowardournation'spursuitofpoliticalmaturityandgrowth."Bayan
v.Zamora,396Phil.623(2000).
24
FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, AGREEMENTS ON UNITED STATES MILITARY FACILITIES IN PHILIPPINE MILITARY BASES 19471985 ix
(PacificoA.Castroreviseded.1985).
25Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, 10 Dec. 1898, 30 US Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343 (1898)
(enteredintoforce11Apr.1899).
26ForeignServiceInstitute,supranote24atix.
27Id.
28Id.
29Id.
31Id.ROLANDG.SlMBULAN,THEBASESOFOURINSECURITY:ASTUDYOFTHEUSMILITARYBASESINTHEPHILIPPINES13(2nded.1985).
32 HareHawesCutting Act, ch. 11, Sec. 2(1), 47 US Stat. 761 (1933) According to the law: "Sec. 2. The constitution formulated and
draftedshallberepublicaninform,shallcontainabillofrights,andshall,eitherasapartthereoforinanordinanceappendedthereto,contain
provisions to the effectthat,pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine
Islands (1) The Philippine Islandsrecognizes the right of the United States x x x to maintain military and other reservations and
armedforcesinthePhilippinesxxx."
33HareHawesCuttingAct,Sees.5&10.Accordingtothelaw:"Sec.5.Allthepropertyandrightswhichmayhavebeenacquiredinthe
PhilippineIslandsbytheUnitedStatesunderthetreatiesmentionedinthefirstsectionofthisAct,exceptsuchlandorotherpropertyas
hasheretoforebeendesignatedbythePresidentoftheUnitedStatesformilitaryandotherreservationsoftheGovernmentofthe
UnitedStatesxxxareherebygrantedtothegovernmentoftheCommonwealthofthePhilippineIslandswhenconstituted,xxxx.""Sec.10.
On the 4th day of July,immediately following the expiration of a period often years from the date of the inauguration of the new
governmentunder the constitution provided for in this Act, the President of the United States shall by proclamation withdraw and
surrenderallrightofpossession,supervision,jurisdiction,control,orsovereigntythenexistingandexercisedbytheUnitedStatesinandover
theterritoryandpeopleofthePhilippineIslands,includingallmilitaryandotherreservationsoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesin
the Philippines (except such land or property reserved under section 5 as may be redesignated by the President of the United
Statesnotlaterthantwoyearsafterthedateofsuchproclamation)."SeeFOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24,atixSimbulan,supra
note31.
34 Philippine Independence Act, US Pub. L. No. 73127, Sees. 5 & 10, 48 US Stat. 456 (1934) [hereinafter Philippine Independence Act].
Accordingtothelaw:"SEC.10.(a)Onthe4thdayofJulyimmediatelyfollowingtheexpirationofaperiodoftenyearsfromthedateof
the inauguration of the new government under the constitution provided for in this Act the President of the United States shall by
proclamationwithdrawandsurrenderallrightofpossession,supervision,jurisdiction,control,orsovereigntythenexistingandexercised
bytheUnitedStatesinandovertheterritoryandpeopleofthePhilippineIslands,includingallmilitaryandotherreservationsofthe
GovernmentoftheUnitedStatesinthePhilippines(exceptsuchnavalreservationsandfuelingstationsasarereservedundersection5)
xxx."SeeFOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24.
35PhilippineIndependenceAct,Sees.5&10FOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24.
36PhilippineIndependenceAct,Sec.10.
37FOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24,atxSimbulan,supranote31at1314.
38SeeAgreementBetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaConcerningMilitaryBases,preamble,14Mar.1947,
43UNTS271(enteredintoforce26Mar.1947)[hereinafter1947MilitaryBasesAgreement]FOREIGNServiceINSTITUTE,supranote24,atx.
39TreatyofGeneralRelationsbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,Art.I,4Jul.1946,7UNTS3(1946)
(entered into force 22 Oct. 1946) [hereinafter 1946 Treaty of General Relations]. According to the treaty: "The United States of
Americaagrees to withdraw and surrender, and doeshereby withdraw and surrender, all rightsof possession, supervision, jurisdiction,
control or sovereignty existing and exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory and the people of the Philippine
Islands,excepttheuseofsuchbases,necessaryappurtenancestosuchbases,andtherightsincidentthereto,astheUnitedStatesof
America,byagreementwiththeRepublicofthePhilippinesmaydeemnecessarytoretainforthemutualprotectionoftheRepublic
ofthePhilippinesandoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,xxx."ThePhilippineSenateconcurredinthistreaty(S.Res.11,1stCong.[1946]).See
also:Nicolasv.Romulo,598Phil.262(2009).
40FOREIGNSERVICEInstitute,supranote24,atxxiBayanv.Zamora,supranote23.
411947MilitaryBasesAgreement.
42S.Res.29,1stCong. (1946) Philippine instrument of ratification was signed by the President on 21 Jan. 1948 and the treaty entered into
forceon26Mar.1947Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39.
43FOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24,atxiSIMBULAN,supranote31,at7679.
441947MilitaryBasesAgreement,Art.1(3)FOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24,atxiiSimbulan,supranote31,at7879.
45FOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24,atxiixv.
46Id.,atxiii.
47Id.,atxii.
48Id.,atxiii.
49Id.
50Id.
51Id.,atxiiixiv.
52Id.
53Id.
54 Republic Act No. 9 Authority of President to Enter into Agreement with US under Republic of the Phil. Military Assistance Act (1946).
According to Section 1 thereof: "ThePresidentofthePhilippinesishereby authorized to enter into agreement or agreementswith the
President of the United States, or with any of the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the United States, regarding military
assistance to the armed forces of the Republic of the Philippines, in the form of transfer of property and information, giving of
technicaladviceandlendingofpersonneltoinstructandtrainthem,pursuanttotheprovisionsofUnitedStatesPublicActNumberedFour
hundredandfiftyfour,commonlycalledthe'RepublicofthePhilippinesMilitaryAssistanceAct,'underthetermsandconditionsprovidedin
thisAct."
55 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Military
AssistancetothePhilippines,45UNTS47(enteredintoforce21Mar.1947)[hereinafter1947MilitaryAssistanceAgreement].
56FOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24,atxiSimbulan,supranote31,at7989.
571947MilitaryAssistanceAgreement,Sec.6.
58ExchangeofNotesConstitutinganAgreementExtendingtheAgreementBetweentheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesandthe
GovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaonMilitaryAssistancetothePhilippines,26Jun.1953,213UNTS77(enteredintoforce5Jul.1953)
reproduced in FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 197203. See Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (21 Nov. 2007). See
generally:Peoplev.Nazareno,612Phil.753(2009)(onthecontinuedeffectivityoftheagreement).
59SeeMutualDefenseTreatybetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,30Aug.1951,177UNTS133(entered
intoforce27Aug.1952)[hereinafter1951MDT].Accordingtoitspreamble:"ThePartiestothisTreatyxxxDesiringfurthertostrengthentheir
present efforts to collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of
regionalsecurityinthePacificAreaxxxherebyagreedasfollows[.]"See:Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23.
60S.Res.84,2ndCong.(1952)FOREIGNSERVICEINSTITUTE,supranote24,at193194ThePhilippineinstrumentofratificationwassigned
bythePresidenton27August1952anditenteredintoforceonthesamedateupontheexchangeofratificationbetweentheParties(Philippines
andU.S.),andwasproclaimedbythePresidentbyvirtueofProc.No.341,S.1952.
61Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39(citingU.S.CongressionalRecord,82ndCongress,SecondSession,Vol.98Part2,pp.25942595).
621951MDT,Art.II.
631951MDT,Arts.IVV.
64COLONELPATERNOC.PADUA,REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINESUNITEDSTATESDEFENSECOOPERATION:OPPORTUNITIESANDCHALLENGES,
AFILIPINOPERSPECTIVE6(2010).
65Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23People'sMovementforPressFreedomv.Manglapus,supranote15.
66SeeTreaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
UnitedStatesofAmerica,27Aug.1991(rejectedbytheSenateon16Sept.1991).
67Id.,Art.VIISupplementaryAgreementTwototheTreatyofFriendship,CooperationandSecurity,Arts.I&11(9).
68Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23.
69Bayan
v. Zamora, supra note 23 Joint Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee oh National Defense and
SecurityreproducedinSENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,THEVISITINGFORCESAGREEMENT:THESENATEDECISION206(1999)Limv.Executive
Secretary,430Phil.555(2002).
70AgreementregardingthestatusofU.S.militaryandcivilianpersonnel,ExchangeofnotesbetweentheDFAandtheU.S.EmbassyinManilaon
Apr.2,andJune11and21,1993,Hein'sNo.KAV3594(enteredintoforce21June1993)[hereinafterStatusofForcesAgreementof1993],The
agreement was extended on 19 September 1994 on 28 April 1995 (See Hein's No. KAV 4245) and 8 December 1995 (SeeHein's No. KAV
4493).SeealsoR.CHUCKMASON,STATUSOFFORCESAGREEMENT(SOFA)WHATIsIT,ANDHOWHasItBeenUtilized?14(2012).
71 Joint Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on National Defense and Security reproduced in Senate OF THE
PHILIPPINES,supranote69Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23.
72Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the
Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines, Phil.U.S., 10 Feb. 1998, TIAS No. 12931 (entered into force 1 Jun. 1999)
[hereinafterVFAI],reproducedinSENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,supra,at257266(1999)Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69.
73VFAI,preamble.See:Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69.InLim,weexplainedthat"ItistheVFAwhichgivescontinuedrelevanceto
the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine
militaryforcesintheeventofanattackbyacommonfoe."
74Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23,at637.
75VFAILimv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69.
76Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the
TreatmentofRepublicofthePhilippinesPersonnelVisitingtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,Phil.U.S.,9Oct.1998,TIASNo.12931[hereinafterVFA
II].
77SenateResolutionNo.18,27May1999reproducedinSENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,supranote63,at185190Bayanv.Zamora,supranote
23.
78Limv.ExecutiveSecretarv,supranote69.
79Id.
80Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Department of National
Defense of the Republic of the Philippines, Preamble, 21 Nov. 2002 [hereinafter 2002 MLSA]. According to the preamble thereof, the parties
"have resolved to conclude" the agreement in light of their "desir[e] to further the interoperability, readiness, and effectiveness of their
respective military forces through increased logistic cooperation in accordance with the RPUS Mutual Defense Treaty, RPUS Visiting Forces
Agreement or the RPUS Military Assistance Agreement." Consequently, Article II of the agreement provides that: "[it] shall be implemented,
applied and interpreted by the Parties in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement or the
MilitaryAssistanceAgreementandtheirrespectiveconstitutions,nationallawsandregulations."
812002MLSA,Preamble.
822002MLSA,Art.I.
832002MLSA,Art.lV(l)(a)PADUA,supranote64,at12.
84SeeMutualLogisticsSupportAgreementBetweentheDepartmentofDefenseoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheDepartmentofNational
Defense of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX, 8 Nov. 2007 (applied provisionally on 8 Nov. 2007 entered into force 14 Jan. 2009)
[hereinafter 2007 MLSA] Extension of the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (RPUS01) Between the Department of Defense of the United
StatesofAmericaandtheDepartmentofNationalDefenseoftheRepublicofthePhilippines(enteredintoforce6Nov.2012).
85MemorandumoftheOSG,pp.8,24rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.1),pp.438,454.
86SeeNoteNo.1082oftheU.S.EmbassytotheDFAdated25June2014,AnnexBoftheMemorandumoftheOSG,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.
I),p.477MemorandumoftheOSG,p.8,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),p.438.
87StatementofSecretaryAlbertF.delRosarioOnthesigningofthePHU.S.EDCA,DEPARTMENTOFFOREIGNAffairs(28Apr.2014)available
at(lastvisited5
DEPARTMENTOFFOREIGNAFFAIRS(28Apr.2014)availableat(lastvisited5Nov.2015).
88EDCAMemorandumofOSG,p.3,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.1),p.433
89InstrumentofRatification,AnnexofAoftheMemorandumofOSG,rollo,p.476,
90OralArgumentsTSN,25November2014,pp.119120.
91Rollopp.865867,G.R.No.212444
92AccordingtotheResolution:"BeitfurtherresolvedthatthisresolutionexpressingthestrongsenseoftheSenatebeformallysubmittedtothe
SupremeCourtthroughtheChiefJustice."Rollo(G.R.No.212444)p867.
93Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,460Phil.830,914(2003).
94See: Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012, 676 SCRA 579 Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013, 693 SCRA 574 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322
(2011)Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supraDemetriav.Alba,232Phil.222(1987).
95 The Constitution provides: "SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
establishedbylaw.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment."
96Angarav.ElectoralCommission,(APhil.139,156158(1936).
97Gutierrezv.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonJustice,supranote94Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote94Taadav.
Angara,338Phil.546(1997)Oposav.Factoran,G.R.No.101083,30July1993,224SCRA792,809810(citingLlamasv.Orbos,279Phil.920
[1991]Bengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee,G.R.No.89914,20November1991,203SCRA767Gonzalesv.Macaraig,G.R.No.87636,
19November1990,191SCRA452Cosetengv.Mitra,G.R.No.86649,12July1990,187SCRA377Dazav.Singson,259Phil.980[1989]and
IRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCommission434436[1986]).
98Oposav.Factoran,supra,at97.
99Morfev.Mutuc,130Phil.415,442(1968)Angarav.ElectoralCommission,supranote96,at178.
100See:Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93UnitedStatesv.Raines,362U.S.17(1960)andAngarav.ElectoralCommission,
supranote96.
101Demetriav.Alba,supranote94,at226.
102Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93,at922923.
103Ashwanderv.TennesseeValleyAuthority,297U.S.288,346348(1936).
104Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93,at923.
105Id.,at922.
106SouthernHemisphereEngagementNetwork,Inc.v.AntiTerrorismCouncil,646Phil.452,471(2010)Davidv.MacapagalArroyo,522Phil.
705,753(2006)Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93at892Angarav.ElectoralCommission,supranote96,at158.
107MemorandumofOSG,p.6,rollo,p.436.
108Rollo(G.R.No.212444),pp.865867.
109SouthernHemisphereEngagementNetwork,Inc.v.AntiTerrorismCouncil,supranote106,at479.
110InformationTechnologyFoundationofthePhilippinesv.CommissiononElections,499Phil.281,304305(2005)(citingAetnaLifeInsurance
Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227 [1937]) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council, supra note 106, at
480David v. MacapagalArroyo, supra note 106, at 753 (2006)Francisco v. House of Representatives,supra note 93, 879880 Angara v.
ElectoralCommission,supranote96,at158.
111Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, supra (citingAetna Life Insurance Co. v. Hayworth,300
U.S.227[1937])SouthernHemisphereEngagementNetwork,Inc.v.AntiTerrorismCouncil,supranote106,at480Lozanov.Nograles,607
Phil.334,340[2009]).
112Angarav.ElectoralCommission,supranote96,at158159.
113MemorandumofOSG,supranote80.SeealsoNoteNo.1082,supranote86.
114Almariov.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.189028,16July2013,701SCRA269,302BayanMunav.Romulo,656Phil.246(2011).
115Funa v. CSC Chairman, G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014 Almario v. Executive Secretary, supra note 114, at 302 Bayan
Romulo,supranote114,at265Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93,895896.
Muna v.
116BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114at265Pimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,supranote15Joyav.PresidentialCommission
onGoodGovernment,G.R.No.96541,24August1993,225SCRA568.
117Funav.CSCChairman,supranote115Almariov.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote114at302SouthernHemisphereEngagementNetwork,
Inc.v.AntiTerrorismCouncil,supranote106,at472Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93at895896.
118SouthernHemisphereEngagementNetwork,Inc.v.AntiTerrorismCouncil,supranote106.
119BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114,at265Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93,at893.
120Bayan Muna v. Romulo,
supra note 114, at 266267 Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, supra note 15 Francisco v. House of
Representatives,supranote93Tanadav.Tuvera,220Phil.422(1985).
121PetitionofSaguisagetal,p.20,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),p.22MemorandumofSaguisagetal,p.15,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.II),
p.985PetitionofBayanetal,p.9,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),p.11MemorandumofBayanetal,pp.19,23,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.
I),pp.583,587.
122PetitionofSaguisagetal,p.10,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),p.12PetitionofBayanetal,pp.910,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),pp.
1112MemorandumofBayanetal,pp.19,23,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),pp.583,587.
123OralArgumentsTSN,18November2014,pp.1920.
124ConsolidatedCommentoftheOSG,p.4,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),p.241MemorandumofOSG,p.7,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.I),
p.437.
126Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23(citingPascualv.SecretaryofPublicWorks,110Phil.331[I960]Macedav.Macaraig,G.R.No.88291,31
May 1991, 197 SCRA 771 Lozada v. Commission on Elections, 205 Phil. 283 [1983] Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 369
[1980]Gonzalesv.Marcos,160Phil.637[1975]).
127See:Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23(citingBugnayConst.&DevelopmentCorp.v.Laron,257Phil.245[1989]).
128Lozanov.Nograles,supranote111,at342343.
129PetitionofBayanetal.,p.10,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),p.12MemorandumofBayanetal.,pp.1920,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.1),
pp.583584.
130ConsolidatedCommentoftheOSG,pp.34,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),pp.240241MemorandumoftheOSG,pp.47,rollo(G.R.No.
212444,Vol.I),pp.434437.
131Pimentel
v. Office of the Executive Secretary, supra note 15 Bayan v. Zamora, supra note 23 Philippine Constitution Association, v.
Enriquez,G.R.No.113105,113174,113766,113888,19August1994,235SCRA506Gonzalesv.Macaraig,supranote97Mabanagv.Lopez
Vito,78Phil.1(1947).
132PhilippineConstitutionAssociation,v.Enriquez,supra.
133Pimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,supranote15PhilippineConstitutionAssociation,v.Enriquez,supra.
134Mabanagv.LopezVito[Dis.Op.,J.Perfecto],supranote131,at35.
135 Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, supra note 15 Bayan v. Zamora,
Enriquez,supranote131.
supra note 23 Philippine Constitution Association, v.
136Pimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,supranote15.
138PetitionofSaguisagetal.,pp.2122,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.1),pp.2324MemorandumofSaguisagetal.,pp.1517,rollo(G.R.No.
212426, Vol. II), pp. 985987 Petition of Bayanetal.,pp.6,rollo (G.R. No. 212444, Vol. I), pp. 8 Memorandum of Bayan et al., pp. 19,
23,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.I),pp.583,587.
139ConsolidatedCommentoftheOSG,pp.45,rollo(G.R.No.212444,Vol.1),pp.241242MemorandumoftheOSG,pp.78,rollo(G.R.No.
212444,Vol.I),pp.437438.
140Bayan Muna v. Romulo, supra note 114, at 265 (citing Constantino v. Cuisia, 509 Phil. 486 [2005] Agan v. Philippine International Air
TerminalsCo.,Inc.,450Phil.744[2003]DelMarv.PhilippineAmusementandGamingCorporation,400Phil.307[2000]Tatadv.Garcia,313
Phil.296[1995]Kilosbayanv.Guingona,G.R.No.113375,5May1994,232SCRA110)IntegratedBarofthePhil.v.Zamora,392Phil.618
(2000).
141Kilosbayan,Inc.v.Guingona[Con.Op.,J.Feliciano],supra,at155156(1995)(citedinMagallonav.Ermita,671Phil.243(2011)Paguiav.
OfficeofthePresident,635Phil.568[2010]Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93,at899).
142MemorandumofOSG,supranote80.SeealsoNoteNo.1082,supranote86.
143GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsv.Springer,50Phil.259(1927).
144Id.
145Id.
146CONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.5Constitution(1973,asamended),Art.VII,Sec.7CONSTITUTION(1935,asamended),Art.VII,Sec.7.
148Almariov.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote114.
149CONSTITUTION(1973,asamended),Art.VII,Sec.10:"ThePresidentshallhavecontroloftheministries."
150CONSTITUTION(1935,asamended),Art.VII,Sec.10(1):"ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofallexecutivedepartments,bureausoroffices,
exercisegeneralsupervisionoveralllocalgovernmentsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,andtakecarethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted."
151AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIII,TitleI,Sec.1.
152CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Sec. 16: "The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are
faithfullyexecuted."
153Ilusoriov.Ilusorio,564Phil.746(2007)Gonzalezv.Hongkong&ShanghaiBankingCorp.,562Phil.841(2007).
154MetropolitanManilaDevelopmentAuthorityv.VironTransportationCo.,Inc.,557Phil.121(2007).
155LaPerlaCigar&CigaretteFactoryv.Capapas,139Phil.451(1969).
156Inre:R.McCullochDick,38Phil.211(1918).
157Almariov.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote114.
158AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIV,Sec.38.
159ConcurringOpinionofJ.Carpio,AbakadaGuroPartyListv.Purisima.584Phil,246(2008)
160Id.
161Id.at297.
162PhilippineConstitutionAssociationv.Enhquez,supranote131.
163GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsv.Springer,supranote143.
164SeeCONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sees.17&18.
165DissentingOpinionofJusticeArturoD.Brion,p.17.
166Id.,at18.
167Id.,at1719.
168DissentingOpinionofJusticeArturoD.Brion,pp.1920.
169Vinuyav.Romulo,supranote17.
170MemorandumofBayanetal.,pp.2932,rollo(G.R.No.212444),pp.593596MemorandumofSaguisagetal,pp.1729,3537,rollo(G.R.
No.212426,Vol.II),pp.987999,10051007.
171ThepertinenttextofSR105isreproducedbelow:
WHEREAS,thetreatyknownasRPUSEDCA(EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement)isatpresentsubjectofSupremeCourt
proceedingsonthequestionofwhetherthistreatyisvalidandeffective,consideringthattheSenatehasnotconcurredwiththe
treaty
WHEREAS, the Office of the President argues that the document is not a treaty but is instead an executive agreement that
allegedlydoesnotrequireSenateconcurrence
WHEREAS, the only constitutional ground for the position taken by the Executive is the mere inclusion of the term "executive
agreement"intheConstitutionwhichprovides:"Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofan...executiveagreement..."(Article
VIII,Section4,paragraph2)asoneofitemsincludedinthelistofcaseswhichtheSupremeCourthaspowertodecide.
WHEREAS,thereisnootherprovisionintheConstitutionconcerningasocalledexecutiveagreement,andthereisnomentionat
all of its definition, its requirements, the role of the Senate, or any other characteristic of, or protocol for, any such socalled
"executiveagreement"
WHEREAS, "executive agreement" is a term wandering alone in the Constitution, bereft of provenance and an unidentified
constitutionalmystery
WHEREAS,instarkcontrasttothelonementionoftheterm"executiveagreement,"theConstitutionprovidescategorically:
(a)"NotreatyorinternationalagreementshallbevalidandeffectiveunlessconcurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofalltheMembers
oftheSenate",(ArticleVII,Section21)
(b) "After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreaty
duly concurred in the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
nationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState",(ArticleXVIII,Section25)
WHEREAS, on the one hand, the Constitution is clear and categorical that Senate concurrence is absolutely necessary for the
validityandeffectivityofanytreaty,particularlyanytreatythatpromotesforforeignmilitarybases,troopsandfacilities,suchas
theEDCA
WHEREAS,undertherulesofconstitutionalandstatutoryconstruction,thetwoconstitutionalprovisionsonSenateconcurrenceare
specificprovisions,whiletheloneconstitutionalprovisionmerelymentioningan"executiveagreement"isageneralprovision,and
therefore,thespecificprovisionsonSenateconcurrenceprevailoverthegeneralprovisionon"executiveagreement"
WHEREAS,theSenateisawareofandobeystherulingoftheSupremeCourtinPimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,462
SCRA622(2005)
WHEREAS,therulingcitedabovedoesnotapplytotheEDCAcase,becausetheSenatemakesnoattempttoforcethePresidentof
thePhilippinestosubmittheEDCAtreatyforconcurrencebytheSenate,bythisResolution,theSenatemerelytakesadefinitive
standonthenonnegotiablepoweroftheSenatetodecidewhetheratreatywillbevalidandeffective,dependingontheSenate
concurrence[]
WHEREFORE,beitherebyresolvedbytheSenatethattheRPUSEDCAtreatyrequiresSenateconcurrence,inordertobevalid
andeffective
Beitfurtherresolved,ThatthisResolutionexpressingthestrongsenseoftheSenatebeformallysubmittedtotheSupremeCourt
throughtheChiefJustice.
172Arigov.Swift,G.R.No.206510,16September2014,735SCRA102LandBankv.AtlantaIndustries,Inc.,G.R.No.193796,2July2014,
729 SCRA 12Roxas v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180030, June 10, 2014 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, supra note 114 Vinuya v. Romulo, supra note
17Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino,supranote15Suplicov.NEDA, 580 Phil. 301 (2008)Neri v.
SenateCommitteeonAccountabilityofPublicOfficersandInvestigations,572Phil.554(2008)Abayav.Ebdane,544Phil.645(2007)Senate
ofthePhilippinesv.Ermita,522Phil.1(2006)Pimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,supranote15Bayanv.Zamora,supranotenote
23Chavezv.PCGG,360Phil.133(1998).
173Republicv.Quasha,150BPhil.140(1972)Adolfov.CourtofFirstInstanceofZambales, 145 Phil. 264 (1970)CommissionerofInternal
Revenue v. Guerrero, 128 Phil. 197 (1967) Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963) Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading,113 Phil. 333 (1961)USAFFE Veterans Ass'n., Inc. v. Treasurer of the Phil,105 Phil. 1030 (1959)Uy Matiao & Co., Inc. v. City of
Cebu,93Phil.300(1953)AbbotLaboratoriesv.Agrava,91Phil.328(1952).
174Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39.
175Chavezv.JudicialandBarCouncil,supranote94Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93(quotingJ.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.v.
LandTenureAdministration,142Phil.719[1970]citingBarandav.Gustilo,248Phil.205[1988]LuzFarmsv.SecretaryoftheDepartmentof
AgrarianReform,270Phil.151[1990]Ordillov.CommissiononElections,270Phil.183[1990]).
176Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,supranote94Ang Bagong BayaniOFW v. Commission on Elections,412 Phil. 308 (2001) (citing J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,supraGold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez,66 Phil 259, 264 [1938] Ruben C. Agpalo,
STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION311[1990]).
177Chavezv.JudicialandBarCouncil,supranote94Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93(quotingJ.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.v.
Land Tenure Administration, supra citing Baranda v. Gustilo, supra, at 770 Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform,supraOrdillo v. Commission on Elections,supra)Sarmiento v. Mison, 240 Phil. 505 (1987)Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez,
supra.
178Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93(quotingJ.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.v.LandTenureAdministration,supra).
179AngBagongBayaniOFWv.CommissiononElections,supranote176.
180AngBagongBayaniOFWv.CommissiononElections,supranote176(quotingtheSeparateOpinionofJusticeMendozainCivilLibertiesUnion
v.ExecutiveSecretary,272Phil.147[1991]).
181OEDOnline,availableat,accessedon28October2015SeealsoMerriamWebsterOnlineDictionary,"allow"availableat,accessedon28
October2015.
182BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY(2nded).
183OEDOnline,availableat,accessedon28October2015SeealsoMerriamWebsterOnlineDictionary,availableat,accessedon28October
2015.
184G.R.No.151445,11April2002.
185InthewordsoftheCourt:"ThepresentConstitutioncontainskeyprovisionsusefulindeterminingtheextenttowhichforeignmilitarytroops
areallowedinPhilippineterritory."Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69.
186MemorandumofOSG,pp.1427,rollo,pp.444457.
187DissentingOpinionofJusticeArturoD.Brion,p.29.
188Id.,at31.
189Id.
190Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives,supranote93(quotingJ.M.Tuason&Co,,Inc.v.LandTenureAdministration,supranote175).
191See IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 759, (18 Sep. 1986): "By inequalities, is the Commissioner referring to the onesided
provisions,theonerousconditionsoftheRPUSBasesAgreement?,"Nicolasv.Romido,supranote39,at280(2009).
192SeeTreatyofGeneralRelationsbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,October22,1946,Art.1(1946)
Philippine Independence Act (TydingsMcDuffie Act), Pub.L. 73127, 48 Stat. 456, (24 March 1934), Sees. 5 and 10 FOREIGN SERVICE
INSTITUTE,supranote24,atixx.
193Land Bank v. Atlanta Industries, Inc.,supranote172Bayan Muna v. Romulo,supra note 114Nicolas v. Romulo, supra note 39 Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, supra note 172 DBMPS v. Kolonwel Trading, 551 Phil. 1030
(2007) Abaya v. Ebdane, supra note 172Republic v. Quasha, supra note 173 Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of Zambales, supra note
173Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero,supra note 173Gonzales v. Hechanova, supra note 173 Commissioner of Customs v.
EasternSeaTrading,supranote173USAFFE Veterans Ass'n., Inc. v. Treasurer of the Phil, supra note 173Uy Matiao & Co., Inc. v. City of
Cebu,supra note 173Abbot Laboratories v. Agrava,supra note 173 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 544546 (31 July 1986)
CORTES,supranote15,at190SlNCO,supranote15,at303305.
194Constitution, Art. VIII (Judicial Department), Sees. 4(2) & 5(2)(a) Constitution (1973, as amended), Art. X (The Judiciary), Sees. 2(2) &
5(2)(a),Art.XVII(TransitoryProvisions),Sec.12CONSTITUTION(1935),OrdinanceAppendedtotheConstitutionor"ParityAmendment."
195
Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) (2003), Sec. 4 Administrative Code of 1987, Book II, Sec. 18(2)(a)
Presidential Decree No. 1464, as amended (Tariff and Customs Code of 1978), Sec. 402(f) Republic Act No. 1789 (Reparations Law) (1957),
Sec. 18. Commonwealth Act No. 733 (Acceptance of Executive Agreement Under Title IV of [United States] Public Law 37179th Congress)
(1946).
196Neri
v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, supra note 172 Republic v. Quasha, supra note
173Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero,supra note 173 Gonzales v. Hechanova, supra note 173Commissioner of Customs v.
EasternSeaTrading,supranote173USAFFEVeteransAss'n.,Inc.v.TreasurerofthePhil.,supranote173AbbotLaboratoriesv.Agrava,supra
note173.
197IIRecord,ConstitutionalCommission,supranote184.
198BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114.SeealsoSlNCOsupranote15.
199Seegenerally:Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69.
200See:
Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, supra note 15 Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, supra note 15. See
CONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.1inrelationtoAdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIV(ExecutiveBranch),TitleI(ForeignAffairs),Sees.3(1)and
20SlNCO,supranote15,at297.
201Pimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,supranote15.SeeCONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.1inrelationtoAdministrativeCodeof1987,
BookIV(ExecutiveBranch),TitleI(ForeignAffairs),Sees.3(1)and20SlNCO,supranote15,at298.
202See: CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 1 in relation to Administrative Code of 1987, Book III (Office of the President), Title I (Powers of the
President),Sec.1andBookIV(ExecutiveBranch),TitleI(ForeignAffairs),Sees.3(1)and20andTitleIII(Justice),Sec.35(10)Pimentelv.
OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,supranote15(onratificationoftreaties)Vinuyav.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote17(onespousingclaims
against foreign governments) Abaya v. Ebdane, supra note 172 (on contracting foreign loans) People's Movement for Press Freedom v.
Manglapus,supranote15(ontreatynegotiationswithforeignstates)Sinco,supranote15,at298.
203SeeSlNCO,supranote15,at297298.
204CommissionerofCustomsv.EasternSeaTrading,supranote173.
205BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114.SeealsoSlNCO,supranote15.
207 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 544546 (31 July 1986). See also Miriam Defensor Santiago, International
ConstitutionalLaw:TheSuspendedRPChina(ZTE)LoanAgreement,53AteneoL.J.537,539(2008).
Agreements in
208Bayan
Muna v. Romulo, supra note 114, at 261 Gomales v. Hechanova, supra note 173 Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading,supranote173IIRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION544546(31July1986)CORTES,supranote15SiNCO,supranote15.
209See,e.g.:BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114(onthetransferorsurrenderofUSnationalsinthePhilippineswhomaybesuedbefore
internationaltribunals)Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39(onagreementconcerningthedetentionofamemberoftheU.S.ArmedForces,who
was accused of committing a crime in the Philippines)Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of Zambales,supra note 173 (on exchange of notes
pursuanttothe1947MBA)TreatyofGeneralRelationsBetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica(1946).
See, e.g.: Republic v. Quasha, supra note 173 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, supra note 173 Abbot Laboratories v.
Agrava,supranote173(ontheinterpretationoftheprovisioninthePhilippinePatentLawof1947concerningthereciprocitymeasureonpriority
rightstobegrantedtoU.S.nationals)UyMatiao&Co.,Inc.v.CityofCebu,supranote173RepublicActNo.9AuthorityofPresidenttoEnter
intoAgreementwithUSunderRepublicofthePhil.MilitaryAssistanceAct(1946).
211See,e.g.:LandBankv.AtlantaIndustries,Inc.,supranote172(onforeignloanagreement)BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114DBM
PS v. Kolonwel Trading, supra note 193 (on foreign loan agreement) Abaya v. Ebdane, supra note 172 (on foreign loan
agreement)Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading,supra note 173 (on foreign trade and financial agreements)USAFFE Veterans
Ass'n., Inc. v. Treasurer of the Phil.,supra note 173 (on conversion of unspent fund as a foreign loan). But see on limitations: Gonzales v.
Hechanova,supranote173.
212See
generally: Bayan v. Zamora, supra note 23 Philippe Gautier, 1969 Vienna Convention, Article 2 Use of Terms, in THE VIENNA
CONVENTIONSONTHELAWOFTREATIES:ACOMMENTARY,Vol.I3536(OlivierCorten&PierreKleineds.2011).
213See
generally: Bayan v. Zamora, supra note 23 Philippe Gautier, 1969 Vienna Convention, Article 2 Use of Terms, in THE VIENNA
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, VOL. 1 37 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds. 2011) (quoting Customs regime
betweenGermanyandAustria,AdvisoryOpinion,1931PC1J,Ser.A/Bno.41,p.47).
214Gonzalesv.Hechanova,supranote173.
215BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114(affirmingAdolfov.CourtofFirstInstanceofZambales,supranote173).
216See:BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114.
217PharmaceuticalandHealthCareAssociationv.Duque,561Phil.386(2007)Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69SecretaryofJustice
v.Lantion,supranote17PhilipMorris,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.91332,16July1993,224SCRA576.
218See:BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114(affirmingAdolfov.CourtofFirstInstanceofZambales,supranote173)CivilCode,Art.7.
219See:BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote114Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39Gonzalesv.Hechanova,supranote173CIVILCODE,Art.7.
220SeeCONSTITUTION,Art.VIII,Sec.5(2)CivilCode,Art.7.
221CONSTITUTION,Art.11,Sec.8.
222CONSTITUTION,Art.VI,Sec.28(2).
223CONSTITUTION,Art,VI,Sec.28(4).
225CONSTITUTION,Art.XVIII,Sec.25.
226IIRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION544(31July1986).
229SlNCO,supranote15,at297.See:Vinuyav.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote17(onespousaloftheclaimsofPhilippinenationalsagainsta
foreigngovernment)Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary,supra note 15 (on ratification of international agreements) Secretary of
Justicev.Lantion,supra note 17 (on temporarily withholding of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process)People's Movement for Press Freedom v. Manglapus,supra note 15 (on the imposition of secrecy in treaty negotiations with foreign
countries).
230Vinuyav.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote17.
231Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69.
232Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39.
233Nicolasv.Romulo,supranote39,at291.
234Bayan
Muna v. Romulo, supra note 114, at 273. See also: Nicolas v. Romulo, supra note 39 Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of
Zambales,supranote173Abbot Laboratories v. Agrava,supra note 173. Senate Resolution No. 18, dated 27 May 1999, which embodies the
concurrenceoftheSenateintheVFA,stressesinitspreamblethat"nothinginthisResolutionorintheVFAshallbeconstruedasauthorizing
thePresidentofthePhilippinesalonetobindthePhilippinestoanyamendmentofanyprovisionoftheVFA."(EmphasesSupplied)
235Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69,at571.
236
The provision states: "As used in this Agreement, 'United States personnel' means United States military and civilian
personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government, x x x." (Emphases
supplied)
237Theprovisionstates:"ItisthedutyofUnitedStatespersonneltorespectthelawsoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtoabstainfromany
activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the Philippines. The
GovernmentoftheUnitedStatesshalltakeallmeasureswithinitsauthoritytoensurethatthisisdone."(Emphasessupplied)
238Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69,at572.Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote69,at575.
240 According to the agreement: "[H]e will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of
approximately10x12squarefeet.HewillbeguardedroundtheclockbyU.S.militarypersonnel.ThePhilippinepoliceandjailauthorities,under
thedirectsupervisionofthePhilippineDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernment(DILG)willhaveaccesstotheplaceofdetentiontoensure
theUnitedStatesisincompliancewiththetermsoftheVFA."
242DissentingOpinionofJusticeMarvicM.V.F.Leonen,p.1.
243EDCA,Art.V(l)and(4).
244DissentingOpinionofJusticeLeonen,supranote242,p.2.
245Id.
246ConcurringandDissentingOpinionofJusticeTeresitaJ.LeonardoDeCastro,p.25.
248DissentingOpinionofJusticeLeonen,supranote242.
249Id.
250MemorandumofOSG,pp.1427,rollo(G.R.No.212426),pp.444457.
251Memorandum of Saguisagetal., pp. 2223, 3849,rollo(G.R. No. 212426, Vol. II), pp. 992993, 10081019 Memorandum of Bayan et
al.,pp.3541,rollo(G.R.No.212444),pp.599605.
252EDCA,Art.11(1).
253EDCA,Art.11(2).
254EDCA,Art.11(3).
255EDCA,Art.V1II(1).
256Accordingtothisprovision:"1.ThisAgreementdeepensdefensecooperationbetweenthePartiesandmaintainsanddevelopstheirindividual
andcollectivecapacities,infurtheranceofArticleIIoftheMDT,whichstatesthat'thePartiesseparatelyandjointlybyselfhelpandmutualaid
willmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack,'andwithinthecontextoftheVFA.Thisincludes:xxxx
(b) Authorizing access to Agreed Locations in the territory of the Philippines by United States forces on a rotational basis, as mutually
determinedbytheParties.
237 According to this provision: "Agreed Locations" means facilities and areas that
are provided by the Government of the Philippines

throughtheAFPandthatUnitedStatesforces,UnitedStatescontractors,andothersasmutuallyagreed,shallhavetherighttoaccess
andusepursuanttothisagreement.SuchAgreedLocationsmaybelistedinanannextobeappendedtothisAgreement,andmaybefurther
describedinimplementingarrangements.
258VFAI,Art.I.
259See:Djumantanv.Domingo,310Phil.848(1995).
260Djumantanv.Domingo,310Phil.848,854(1995).
261CommonwealthActNo.613(ThePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,asamended).
262CommonwealthActNo.613(ThePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,asamended),Sees.10&11.
263CommonwealthActNo.613(ThePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,asamended),Sec.29&30.UnderSection29,thefollowingclassesof
aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines: (1) Idiots or insane persons and persons who have been insane (2) Persons afflicted
withaloathsomeordangerouscontagiousdisease,orepilepsy(3)Personswhohavebeenconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude(4)
Prostitutes,orprocurers,orpersonscomingforanyimmoralpurposes(5)Personslikelytobecome,publiccharge(6)Paupers,vagrants,and
beggars (7) Persons who practice polygamy or who believe in or advocate the practice of polygamy (8) Persons who believe in or
advocatetheoverthrowbyforceandviolenceoftheGovernmentofthePhilippines,orofconstitutedlawfulauthority,orwhodisbelievein
orareopposedtoorganizedgovernment,orwhoadvocatetheassaultorassassinationofpublicofficialsbecauseoftheiroffice,orwho
advocate or teach principles, theories, or ideas contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines or advocate or teach the unlawful
destruction of property, or who are members of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching such doctrines (9) Persons over
fifteenyearsofage,physicallycapableofreading,whocannotreadprintedmatterinordinaryuseinanylanguageselectedbythealien,butthis
provision shall not apply to the grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, wife, husband or child of a Philippine citizen or of an alien lawfully
resident in the Philippines (10) Persons who are members of a family accompanying an excluded alien, unless in the opinion of the
Commissioner of Immigration no hardship would result from their admission (11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who is helpless
from mental or physical disability or infancy, when the protection or guardianship of such accompanying person or persons is required by the
excludedperson,asshallbedeterminedbytheCommissionerofImmigration(12)Childrenunderfifteenyearsofage,unaccompaniedbyornot
comingtoaparent,exceptthatanysuchchildrenmaybeadmittedinthediscretionoftheCommissionerofImmigration,ifotherwiseadmissible
(13)Stowaways,exceptthatanystowawaymaybeadmittedinthediscretionoftheCommissionerofImmigration,ifotherwiseadmissible(14)
Personscomingtoperformunskilledmanuallaborinpursuanceofapromiseorofferofemployment,expressorimplied,butthisprovisionshall
notapplytopersonsbearingpassportvisasauthorizedbySectionTwentyofthisAct(15)Persons who have been excluded or deported
from the Philippines, but this provision may be waived in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration: Provided, however, That the
CommissionerofImmigrationshallnotexercisehisdiscretioninfavorofaliensexcludedordeportedonthegroundofconvictionforanycrime
involvingmoralturpitudeorforanycrimepenalizedunderSections[45]and[46]ofthisActoronthegroundofhavingengagedinhoarding,
blackmarketingorprofiteeringunlesssuchalienshavepreviouslyresidedinthePhilippinesimmediatelybeforehisexclusionordeportationfora
periodoftenyearsormoreoraremarriedtonativeFilipinowomen(16)PersonswhohavebeenremovedfromthePhilippinesattheexpenseof
theGovernmentofthePhilippines,asindigentaliens,undertheprovisionsofsection[43]ofthisAct,andwhohavenotobtainedtheconsentof
theBoardofCommissionerstoapplyforreadmissionand(17)Personsnotproperlydocumentedforadmissionasmayberequiredunderthe
provisionsofthisAct.(Emphasissupplied)
264Djumantanv.Domingo,supranote259.
265AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIII(OfficeofthePresident),Title1(PowersofthePresident),Sees.8&11inrelationtoCommonwealth
Act No. 613 (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940), Sec. 52 and Act. No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code of 1917), Sec. 69. See:
Djumantanv.Domingo,supranote259TeoTungv.Machlan,60Phil.916(1934).
266See:CommonwealthActNo.613(ThePhilippineImmigrationActof1940,asamended),Sees.6,12,28&29Djumantanv.Domingo,supra
note259Salazarv.Achacoso,262Phil.160(1990)RONALDOP.Ledesma,DeportationProceedings:Practice,Precedents,andProcedures96
(2013).
267 Commonwealth Act No. 613 (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended), Sec. 37. The provision enumerates as follows: (1)
AnyalienwhoentersthePhilippinesxxxbymeansoffalseandmisleadingstatementsorwithoutinspectionandadmissionbythe
immigrationauthoritiesxxx(2)AnyalienwhoentersthePhilippinesxxx,whowasnotlawfullyadmissibleatthetimeofentry(3)Any
alien who, x x x, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral
turpitudecommittedwithinfiveyearsafterhisentrytothePhilippines,orwho,atanytimeaftersuchentry,issoconvictedandsentencedmore
than once (4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs (5) Any alien who practices
prostitutionorisaninmateofahouseofprostitutionorisconnectedwiththemanagementofahouseofprostitution,orisaprocurer(6)Any
alienwhobecomesapublicchargewithinfiveyearsafterentryfromcausesnotaffirmativelyshowntohavearisensubsequenttoentry(7)Any
alienwhoremainsinthePhilippinesinviolationofanylimitationorconditionunderwhichhewasadmittedasanonimmigrant(8)
Anyalienwhobelievesin,advises,advocatesorteachestheoverthrowbyforceandviolenceoftheGovernmentofthePhilippines,
or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government or who advises, advocates, or teaches the
assaultorassassinationofpublicofficialsbecauseoftheiroffice,orwhoadvises,advocates,orteachestheunlawfuldestructionofproperty,or
who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever
lendsassistance,financialorotherwise,tothedisseminationofsuchdoctrines(9)Anyalienwhocommitsanyoftheactsdescribedinsections
[45]and[46]ofthisAct,independentofcriminalactionwhichmaybebroughtagainsthim:xxx(10)Anyalienwho,atanytimewithinfive
years after entry, shall have been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act [653], otherwise known as
thePhilippine Alien Registration Act of 1941, or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of violating the
provisions of the same Act (11) Any alien who engages inprofiteering, hoarding, or blackmarketing, independent of any criminal action
which may be brought against him (12) Any alien who isconvicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act [473], otherwise
knownastheRevisedNaturalizationLawsofthePhilippines,oranylawrelatingtoacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship(13)Anyalienwho
defraudshiscreditorbyabscondingoralienatingpropertiestopreventthemfrom,beingattachedorexecuted.(Emphasissupplied)268Republic
ActNo.10173,Sec.34.Accordingtotheprovision,"[i]ftheoffenderisanalien,heorsheshall,inadditiontothepenaltieshereinprescribed,
bedeportedwithoutfurtherproceedingsafterservingthepenaltiesprescribed."
269See:
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra note 17. According to the Court: "An equally compelling factor to consider is the
understandingofthepartiesthemselvestotheRPUSExtraditionTreatyxxx.Theruleisrecognizedthatwhilecourtshavethepowerto
interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is accorded great weight, x x x This interpretation by the two governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be
presumptuousfortheCourttoassumethatbothgovernmentsdidnotunderstandthetermsofthetreatytheyconcluded."(Emphasissupplied)
270SeeStatusofForcesAgreementof1993,supranote70.TheInternationalLawCommissionexplainsthatthesubsequentpracticeofstatesin
theapplicationofthetreatymaybetakenintoaccountinascertainingtheparties'agreementintheinterpretationofthattreaty.Thisis"well
established in the jurisprudence of international tribunals" even before the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was
concluded.SeeInternational Law Commission,Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 1966(11) Y.B.I.L.C. 187, at 221222
(citingRussian Claim for Indemnities[Russia/Turkey], XI R.I.A.A. 421, 433 [1912] [Nov. 11]Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural
Labour,1922P.C.l.J.[ser.B]No.2,39[Aug.12]InterpretationofArticle3,paragraph2,oftheTreatyofLausanne,1925P.C.l.J.[ser.B]No.
12,24[Nov.21]BrazilianLoans,1929P.C.l.J.(ser.A)No.21,119[Jul.12]andCorfuChannel[U.K.v.Albania],1949l.C.J.4,25[Apr.9]).
273Id.
274Lim v. Executive Secretary, supra note 69, at 575 Joint Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on National
DefenseandSecurityreproducedinSENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,supranote69,at206.
275StatusofForcesAgreementof1993,supranote70.AccordingtoNoteNo.932301dated11June1993oftheDFAtotheU.S.Embassy,
"The [DFA] x x x has the honor to reaffirm its position that all U.S. military and civilian personnel present in the Philippines participating in
activities undertaken in relation to the Mutual Defense Treaty will be accorded the same status as the U.S. Embassy's technical and
administrative personnel who are qualified to enter the Philippines under existing Philippine laws. The Department further proposes that the
proceduresaswellasthearrangementsfortheseMDTrelatedactivitiesaretobemutuallyagreeduponbytheMDB,subjecttotheguidelinesof
theCouncilofMinisters."
276Lim v. Executive Secretary, supra note 69. See also Joint Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on National
DefenseandSecurityreproducedinSENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,supranote69,at230231.
277Joint Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on National Defense and Security reproduced in Senate OF THE
PHILIPPINES,supranote69,at205206,231.
278EDCA,Art.11(1).
279EDCA,Art.1(3).
280EDCA,Art.II1(1).
281EDCA,Art.111(4)&(6).
282EDCA,Art.VI(3).
283EDCA,Art.VII(l).
284EDCA,Art.VII(2).
285 According to the Agreed Minutes of the Discussion between the former Philippine VicePresident/Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, both countries approved the Terms of
AgreementoftheBalikatanexercises.See:rollo(G.R.No.151445),pp.99100.
287MemorandumofSaguisagetal.,pp.4346,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.II),pp.10131016.
288ConcurringandDissentingOpinionofJusticeTeresitaJ.LeonardoDeCastro,p.24.
289DissentingOpinionofJusticeBrion,pp.4851.
290AileenS.P.Baviera,Implications of the USPhilippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,ASIA PACIFIC BULLETIN No. 292,9 May
2014.
291SeeCONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.18inrelationtoArt.II,Sec.3.
292SeeAdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIV(ExecutiveBranch),TitleI(ForeignAffairs),Sec.3(1)inrelationtoCONSTITUTION,Art.VII,Sec.1
andArt.II,Sec.3AkbayanCitizensActionPartyv.Aquino,supranote15Pimentelv.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,supranote15Bayan
v.Zamora,supranote23.
293Vinuyav.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote17.
294Id.
295SeegenerallyJointReportoftheCommitteeonForeignRelationsandtheCommitteeonNationalDefenseandSecurityreproducedinSENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, supra note 69, at 206. According to the report: "The Mutual Defense Board programs an average of 10 to 12 exercises
annually. Participating U.S. personnel, numbering from 10 to more than 1,000, stay in Philippine territory from four days to four weeks,
dependingonthenatureoftheexercise."
296MemorandumofBayan,pp.4751,rollo(G.R.No.212444),pp.611615
297EDCA,Art.111(1).
298EDCA,Art.IV(4).
299EDCA,Art.IV(5).
300CommonwealthActNo.541.
301RepublicActNo.10951.
302ExecutiveOrderNo.184(2015).
303RepublicActNo.5487ThePrivateSecurityAgencyLaw,asamendedbyP.D.No.11.
304GlennDefense:SBMAsuspensiondoesn'tcoverallourfunctions,RAPPLER,availableat(lastvisited3December2015).
305GlennDefense:SBMAsuspensiondoesn'tcoverallourfunctions,RAPPLER,availableat(lastvisited3December2015)NormanBordadora,
US Navy contractor liable for Subic waste dumping, Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at (last visited 3 December 2015) Matikas Santos, US
navycontractordumpedmillionsoflitersofwastesinSubic,PhilippineDailyInquirer,availableat(lastvisited3December2015).
306VincentCabreza,USEmbassysaysdumpingofuntreatedwasteinSubicnotcondoned,PHILIPPINEDailyInquirer,availableat(lastvisited3
December2015).
307 Robert Gonzaga, Contractor could face sanctions from US navy for violations, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, available at (last visited 3
December2015).
309SeeR.A.No.10591ortheComprehensiveFirearmsandAmmunitionRegulationAct.AccordingtoSection4,ArticleIIthereof:Inorderto
qualifyandacquirealicensetoownandpossessafirearmorfirearmsandammunition,theapplicantmustbeaFilipinocitizen,at
leasttwentyone(21)yearsoldandhasgainfulwork,occupationorbusinessorhasfiledanIncomeTaxReturn(ITR)fortheprecedingyearas
proof of income, profession, business or occupation. In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by appropriate
authoritiesattestingthefollowing:xxxx."Ontheotherhand,Section5states:"Ajuridicalpersonmaintainingitsownsecurityforcemay
beissuedaregularlicensetoownandpossessfirearmsandammunitionunderthefollowingconditions:(a)ItmustbeFilipinoowned
anddulyregisteredwith the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (b) It is current, operational and a continuing concern (c) It has
completedandsubmittedallitsreportorialrequirementstotheSECand(d)Ithaspaidallitsincometaxesfortheyear,asdulycertifiedbythe
Bureau of Internal Revenue, x x x x. Security agencies and LGUs shall be included in this category of licensed holders but shall be subject to
additionalrequirementsasmayberequiredbytheChiefofthePNP."Finally,Section22expresses:"ApersonarrivinginthePhilippineswho
is legally in possession of any firearm or ammunition in his/her country of originand who has declared the existence of the firearm
uponembarkationanddisembarkationbutwhosefirearmisnotregisteredinthePhilippinesinaccordancewiththisActshalldeposit
thesameuponwrittenreceiptwiththeCollectorofCustomsfordeliverytotheFEOofthePNPforsafekeeping,orfortheissuanceofa
permittotransportifthepersonisacompetitorinasportsshootingcompetition.Iftheimportationofthesameisallowedandthepartyin
question desires to obtain a domestic firearm license, the same should be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.Ifnolicenseisdesiredorleavetoimportisnotgranted,thefirearmorammunitioninquestionshallremaininthecustodyoftheFEOofthe
PNPuntilotherwisedisposedofinaccordancewithlaw."(Emphasissupplied)
310Article 40 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: "Employment permit of nonresident aliens. Any alien seeking admission to the
Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the
PhilippinesshallobtainanemploymentpermitfromtheDepartmentofLabor.Theemploymentpermitmaybeissuedtoanonresident
alienortotheapplicantemployerafteradeterminationofthenonavailabilityofapersoninthePhilippineswhoiscompetent,able
and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired. For an enterprise registered in
preferredareasofinvestments,saidemploymentpermitmaybeissueduponrecommendationofthegovernmentagencychargedwith
thesupervisionofsaidregisteredenterprise,"(Emphasissupplied)
311Supranotes263and267.
312MemorandumofSaguisagetal,pp.2529,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.II),pp.995999.
313PHUSMDBandSEBConvenes,DEPARTMENTOFNATIONALDEFENSE,availableat(lastvisited3December2015)
314EDCA,Art.IV(3).
315EDCA,Art.IV(3).
316EDCA,Art.IV(3).
317EDCA,Art.IV(1).
318SuchrightsgleanedfromTitleII,Chapter1oftheCivilCodeare(Cojuangcov.Sandiganbayan,604Phil.670[2009]):therighttopossess,
touseandenjoy,toabuseorconsume,toaccessories,todisposeoralienate,torecoverorvindicate,andtothefruits.
319 Memorandum of Saguisag et al, pp. 2933, rollo
,rollo(G.R.No.212444),pp.605635.
(G.R. No. 212426, Vol. II), pp. 9991003 Memorandum of Bayan et al., pp. 4171
320MemorandumofSaguisagetal,pp.3335,rollo(G.R.No.212426,Vol.II),pp.10031005.
321Id.,pp.10001001.
322Id.,p.1000.EDCA,Arts.1(1)(b),1(2),1(3),&111(4).
323Id.,p.1002.
324SeegenerallyCIVILCODE,Arts.427429.
327CONSTITUTION,Art.XII,Sec.7.
328P.D.No.1227PunishingUnlawfulEntryintoAnyMilitaryBaseinthePhilippines,Sec.2.
329IVRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION648(15September1986).
330R.A.No.7227.
331PADUA,supranote64.
332EDCA,Art.11(4).
333MemorandumofOSG,p.23,rollo(G.R.No.212426),p.453.
335Id.at628.
336Id.at629.
338Id.at630.
339Id.at631.
341Id.at632.
342IVRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION634635(15September1986)
343Id.at634.
344IVRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSIOn635636(15September1986).
345Id.at636.
347Id.at638.
348Id.at639.
350Id.at640.
352Id.at643.
353Id.at644.
355Id.at645.
357Id.at650.
358Id.at651.
359Id.at652.
360IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission652653(15September1986).
361Id.
362IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission653654(15September1986).
363Id.at653.
364Id.at654.
365CIVILCODE,Art.419.
366CIVILCODE,Art.420.
367CUArt.433.
368EDCA,Art.V.
369EDCA,Art.11(4).
370RomanCatholicApostolicAdministratorofDavao,Inc.v.LandRegistrationCommission,102Phil.596(1957).
371EDCA,Art.111(2).
372EDCA,Art.III(l).
373EDCA,Art.111(4).
374EDCA,Art.111(5).
3751947MBA,III(2)(a).
376VRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION240(30September1986).
377VRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION240241(30September1986).
378Tahadav.Angara,supranote97.
379TydingsMcDuffieAct,Section10(a)Pub.L.73127,48Stat.456(enacted24March1934).
380BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY770(6thed.1990).SeealsoJ.Carpio'sDissentingOpinioninLibanv.Gordon,654Phil.680(2011).
381MemorandumofSaguisag,p.56,rollo(G.R.No.212426)p594.
382Id.at596.
383Id.at460.
384G.R.No.108813,15December1994,239SCRA224,229.
385R.A.No.6975DepartmentoftheInteriorandLocalGovernmentActof1990,Sec.86P.D.No.531,Sees.4,5,and6.
386LocalGovernmentCodeof1991,Sec.444.
387LocalGovernmentCodeof1991,Sec.455.
388Rollo,(G.R.No.212426),pp.515525.
389Id.at597.
390Id.
391Id.at598.
392Id.at599.
393Id.at599,FN76
394Id.atfootnote77.
395EDCA,preamble.
396See:BayanMimav.Romulo,supranote114Bayanv.Zamora,supranote23USAFFEVeteransAss'n.,Inc.v.TreasurerofthePhil,supra
note173ViennaConventionontheLawoftheTreaties,Art.27(oninternallawandobservanceoftreaties)inrelationtoArt.46(onprovisions
ofinternallawregardingcompetencetoconcludetreaties).
397"UnderEDCA,beforeconstructionsandotheractivitiescanbeundertaken,priorconsentofthePhilippineswillhavetobesecuredthroughthe
Mutual Defense Board (MDB) and Security Engagement Board (SEB) which were established under the MDT and the VFA." . SeeQ&A on the
EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement,OFFICIALGAZETTE,availableat(lastaccessed3December2015).
398UNITEDSTATESDEPARTMENTOFDEFENSE,DOCTRINEFORTHEARMEDFORCESOFTHEUNITEDSTATES:JointPublication1,Chap.118
(2013).
399Id.,atChap.V6.
400Seeid.,atChap.V2.
401EDCA,Art.111(4).
402EDCA,Art.111(4).
403Sarmientov.Mison,supranote177.Thecasealsoformulatedthisprincipleasfollows:"anexpressenumerationofsubjectsexcludesothers
notenumerated."
404RebuttalofCommissionerNolledo,supranote362.
405ViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations,Arts.3140,500U/N.T.S.95(1961).
405SeeBLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY1523(9thed.2009).
407SeeBLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY927(9thed.2009).
408EDCA,Article1(1)(b).
409Laurelv.Misa,77Phil.856(1947).
410EDCA.Art.VI(2).
411EDCA,Art.VI(3).
412Liwanagv.Hamill,98Phil.437(1956).
4131947MBA,Art.XIII.
415MemorandumofSaguisag,p.72,rollo(G.R.No.212426),p.610.
416Id.
417Id.
418CharteroftheUnitedNations,24October1945,1UNTSXVI.
419ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofInternationalArmedConflicts
(ProtocolI),1125U.N.T.S.3(1977)[hereinafterGenevaConventionAdditionalProtocolI]ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12
August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNonInternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII),1125UNTS609(1977).
420Articles48,51(2)and52(2),ProtocolI,supranote419.
4211949GenevaConvention(I)fortheAmeliorationoftheConditionoftheWoundedandSickinArmedForcesintheField,12August1949,75
UNTS311949GenevaConvention(II)fortheAmeliorationoftheConditionofWounded,SickandShipwreckedMembersofArmedForcesat
Sea,12August1949,75UNTS851949GenevaConvention(III)RelativetotheTreatmentofPrisonersofWar,12August1949,75UNTS135
1949GenevaConvention(IV)RelativetotheProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWar,12August1949,75UNTS287Id.
422JOHNWOODCLIFFE,THEPEACETIMEUSEOFFOREIGNMILITARYINSTALLATIONSUNDERMODERNINTERNATIONALLAW30(1992).
423Id.
424Id.at32.
425Id.
426Id.
427JeanMarieHenckaertsandLouiseDoswaldBeck,CustomaryinternationalHumanitarianlawVolumeI:Rules3436(2005)
428Art.52,ProtocolI,supranote419.
429Art.48,Id..
430Art.4.,Id.
431MemorandumofSaguisag,pp.6670,rollo(G.R.No.212426),pp.604608.
432Article11(6)thereofprovides:"Agreedfacilitiesandareas"meansthestateownedfacilitiesandareasintheterritoryoftheRepublic
ofBulgarialistedinAnnexA,andsuchotherstateownedfacilitiesandareas,asmaybemutuallyagreedbytheParties.
433ArticleI(g)thereofprovides:"Agreedfacilitiesandlocations"meansthosesites,installations,andinfrastructureto which the United
StatesisauthorizedaccessandusebyColombiainconnectionwithactivitiescarriedoutwithintheframeworkofthisAgreement.
434Article 2(i) thereof provides: "agreed facilities and areas"shallmeanareas,facilities, buildings or structuresin the territory of the
RepublicofPoland,ownedbytheRepublicofPoland,andusedbyUnitedStatesforceswiththeconsentoftheRepublicofPoland.
435 Article I thereof provides: "Agreed Facilities and Areas" means the facilities and areas in the territory of Australia provided
by
AustraliawhichmaybelistedinAnnexAappendedtothisAgreement,andsuchotherfacilitiesandareasintheterritoryofAustraliaasmay
be provided by Australia in the future,to which United States Forces, United States Contractors, dependants, and other United States
Governmentpersonnelasmutuallyagreed,shallhavetherighttoaccessandusepursuanttothisAgreement.
436Article1(7)thereofprovides:"Agreedfacilitiesandareas"meansthefacilitiesandareasintheterritoryofAfghanistanprovidedby
AfghanistanatthelocationslistedinAnnexA,andsuchotherfacilitiesandareasintheterritoryofAfghanistanasmaybeprovidedby
Afghanistaninthefuture,towhichUnitedStatesforces,UnitedStatescontractors,UnitedStatescontractoremployees,andothersasmutually
agreed,shallhavetherighttoaccessandusepursuanttothisAgreement.
437USBulgariaDefenseCooperationAgreement,Arts.11(6)&IV(1)USColombiaDefenseCooperationAgreement,Art.IVUSPolandStatus
ofForcesAgreement,Art.3(2)USAustraliaForcePostureAgreement,Arts.1,IV
438USBulgariaDefenseCooperationAgreement,Art.IV(5)USColombiaDefenseCooperationAgreement,Art.IVUSPolandStatusofForces
Agreement,Art.3(1)USAustraliaForcePostureAgreement,Art.IV(7).
439USBulgariaDefenseCooperationAgreement,Art.IV(7)USColombiaDefenseCooperationAgreement,Arts.IV(7),XIUSPolandStatusof
ForcesAgreement,Art.3(6)USAustraliaForcePostureAgreement,Art.IV(8).
440 USBulgaria Defense Cooperation Agreement, Arts. 11(6), IV(1) & VI(1) USColombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, Art. IV(6) US
PolandStatusofForcesAgreement,Art.4(1)USAustraliaForcePostureAgreement,Art.XIV(l).
441 USBulgaria Defense Cooperation Agreement, Art. IV(8) USColombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, Art. 1V(4) USPoland Status of
ForcesAgreement,Art.3(10)USAustraliaForcePostureAgreement,Art.X(2).
4422002MLSA,Art.111(2)2007MLSA.Art.111(2).
4432002MLSA,Art.IV(l)(a)(2)2007MLSA,Art.lV(l)(a)(2).
4442002MLSA,Art.IV(l)(a)(3)2007MLSA,Art.IV(l)(a)(3).
445EDCA,Art.V(l).
446EDCA,Art.V(2).
447EDCA,Art.111(1).
448EDCA,Art.IV(l).
4512002MLSA,Art.III(l)2007MLSA,Art.III(l).
452EDCA,Art.IV(1).
453MDT,Arts.III,IV.andV.
454Rollo,p.464.
455EDCA,Art.IV(6).
456Rollo,pp.3435.
457ArticleII,Sec.8.
458EDCA.Art.VI1(1).
459NationalPowerCorporationv.ProvinceofQuezon,610Phil.456(2009).
460NationalPowerCorporationv.ProvinceofQuezon,supra.
461EDCA,Art.111(6)Art.IV(2)Art.V(l,4)Art.VIII(2).
462Statement of Secretary Albert del Rosario before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Peace Palace, The Hague, Netherlands,7 July 2015,
OFFICIALGAZETTE,availableat(lastvisited3December2015)StatementonRecentIncidentsinthePhilippines'BajodeMasinloc,4February
2015,DEPARTMENTOFFOREIGNAFFAIRS,availableat(lastvisited21October2015).
463TheRepublicofthePhilippinesv.ThePeople'sRepublicofChina,CaseNo.201319(PermCt.Arb.)(lastvisited13October2015).
464ComprehensiveAgreementontheBangsamoro,OFFICIALGAZETTE,availableat(lastvisited21October2015).
465FrinstonLim,Authorities believe Abu Sayyaf behind abduction of Filipina, 3 foreigners,22 September 2015, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
availableat
466RepublicActNo.10349(2012)ThePhilippineNavy,PictureoftheFuture:ThePhilippineNavyBriefer,availableat(lastvisited3December
2015).
467JoelLocsin,NDRRMC:Yolandadeathtollhits6,300marknearly6monthsaftertyphoon,17April2014,GMANewsOnline(lastaccessed3
December2015).
468TyphoonYolanda,OFFICIALGAZETTE,availableat(lastvisited3December2015).
SEPARATECONCURRINGOPINION
CARPIO,J.:
The threshold issue in this case is whether the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) merely implements the existing and ratified
1951MutualDefenseTreaty1(MDT),orwhethertheEDCAisanewtreatyrequiringSenateratificationtotakeeffect.
Theanswertothisquestionturnsonwhether,underpresentcircumstances,theattainmentofthepurposeoftheMDTrequirestheEDCA.The
fundamentalruleintreatyinterpretationisthatatreatymustbeinterpreted"inthelightofitsobjectandpurpose."2
As stated in the MDT, the purpose of the United States (U.S.) and the Philippines in forging the MDT is to "declare publicly and formally their
sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack." If the MDT cannot attain this purpose
withouttheEDCA,thentheEDCAmerelyimplementstheMDTandExecutiveactionissufficienttomaketheEDCAvalid.
A ratified treaty like the MDT must be interpreted to allow the Executive to take all necessary measures to insure that the treaty's purpose is
attained.Aratifiedtreatycannotbeinterpretedtorequireasecondratifiedtreatytoimplementthefirstratifiedtreaty,asafundamentalruleis
thatatreatymustbeinterpretedtoavoida"resultwhichismanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable."3This is particularly true to a mutual defense
treatythepurposeofwhichismutualselfdefenseagainstsuddenarmedattackbyathirdstate.
However,iftheMDTcanattainitspurposewithouttheEDCA,thentheEDCAisaseparatetreatythatrequiresSenateratification.Ishalldiscuss
why,underpresentcircumstances,theEDCAisabsolutelynecessaryandessentialtoattainthepurposeoftheMDT.
With the departure in 1992 of U.S. military forces from Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base in Luzon, a power vacuum resulted in the South
ChinaSea.Asinanypowervacuum,thenextpowerwouldrushintofillthevacuum.Thus,China,thenextpoweraftertheU.S.,filledthepower
vacuumintheSouthChinaSea,whichincludestheWestPhilippineSea.4
Inearly1995,barelythreeyearsafterthedepartureofU.S.militaryforcesfromthePhilippines,ChinaseizedMischiefReeffromthePhilippines.
There was no power to deter China as the U.S. forces had left. The Philippines did not anticipate that China would rush in to fill the power
vacuum,orifthePhilippinesanticipatedthis,itdidnotupgradeitsmilitarytodeteranyChineseaggression.AfterChinaseizedMischiefReefin
1995,thePhilippinesstilldidnotupgradeitsmilitary,particularlyitsnavy.
In2012,ChinaseizedScarboroughShoalfromthePhilippines,whichcouldoffernoarmedresistancetoChinesenavalforces.TheScarborough
Shoal seizure finally made the Philippine Government realize that there was an absolute need to deter China's creeping invasion of Philippine
islands,rocksandreefsintheWestPhilippineSea.Thus,thePhilippinesrushedthemodernizationofitsnavyandairforce.ThePhilippinesalso
agreed with the U.S. to use the MDT to preposition U.S. war materials in strategic locations in the Philippines, particularly in the islands of
PalawanandLuzonfacingtheWestPhilippineSea.
Inmodernwarfare,thesuccessfulimplementationofamutualdefensetreatyrequiresthestrategicprepositioningofwarmaterials.Beforethe
advent of guided missiles and drones, wars could take months or even years to prosecute. There was plenty of time to conscript and train
soldiers,manufacturegunsandartillery,andshipwarmaterialstostrategiclocationsevenafterthewarhadstarted.Today,warscouldbewon
orlostinthefirstfewweeksorevenfirstfewdaysaftertheinitialoutbreakofwar.
Inmodernwarfare,theprepositioningofwarmaterials,likemobileantishipandantiaircraftmissiles,isabsolutelynecessaryandessentialtoa
successful defense against armed aggression, particularly for a coastal state like the Philippines. This is what the EDCA is all about the
prepositioninginstrategiclocationsofwarmaterialstosuccessfullyresistanyarmedaggression.Suchprepositioningwillalsopubliclytelegraph
totheenemythatanyarmedaggressionwouldberepelled.Theenemymustknowthatwepossessthecapability,thatis,thewarmaterials,to
defend the country against armed aggression. Otherwise, without such capability, we telegraph to the enemy that further seizure of Philippine
islands,rocksandreefsintheSouthChinaSeawouldbeawalkinthepark,justlikeChina'sseizureofMischiefReefandScarboroughShoal.
Withoutsuchcapability,wewouldpracticallybeinvitingtheenemytoseizewhateverPhilippineisland,rockorreefitdesirestoseizeintheWest
PhilippineSea.
Since2014,ChinahasstartedbuildingartificialislandsintheSpratlysoutofsubmergedareaslikeMischiefReefandSubiReef,oroutofrocks
thatbarelyprotrudeabovewaterathightidelikeFieryCrossReef.Chinahassofarcreateda590hectareartificialislandinMischiefReefwhich
isonly125nauticalmiles(NM)fromPalawan,wellwithinthePhilippines'ExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ).Incomparison,SanJuanCityis595
hectaresinarea.Chinahasbuilta390hectareartificialislandinSubiReef,outsidethePhilippines'EEZbutwithinitsExtendedContinentalShelf
(ECS).Chinahascreateda265hectareartificialislandinFieryCrossReef,outsidethePhilippines'EEZbutwithinitsECS.
China claims that its islandbuilding activities are for civilian purposes but the configuration of these artificial islands shows otherwise. The
configurationofChina'sMischiefReefisland,whichisChina'slargestartificialislandintheSpratlys,isthatofacombinedairandnavalbase,with
a3,000meterairstrip.5The configuration of China's Subi Reef island is that of a naval base with a 3,000meter airstrip. The configuration of
China'sFieryCrossReefislandisthatofanairbasewitha3,000meterairstripandaharborforwarships.
ThesethreeairandnavalbasesformatriangleintheSpratlys,surroundingtheislandsoccupiedbythePhilippines.
Mischief Reef, located midway between Palawan and Pagasa, is ideally situated to block Philippine ships resupplying Pagasa, the largest
PhilippineoccupiedislandintheSpratlys.MischiefReefisalsoclosetothegasrichReedBank,thegasfieldthatshouldreplaceMalampayaonce
Malampayarunsoutofgasin10to12years.Malampayasupplies40%oftheenergyrequirementofLuzon.TheReedBankandMalampayaare
wellwithinthePhilippines'EEZ.However,China's9dashedlinesencloseentirelytheReedBankandencroachpartlyonMalampaya.
It is obvious that China will use the three air and naval bases in its artificial islands to prevent Philippine ships and planes from resupplying
Philippineoccupied islands in the Spratlys, forcing the Philippines to abandon its occupied islands. Already, Chinese coast guard vessels are
preventing mediumsized Philippine ships from resupplying the BRP Sierra Madre, the dilapidated Philippine landing ship beached in Ayungin
Shoal, just 20 NM from Mischief Reef. Only the Philippines' use of small watercrafts enables the resupply to the BRP Sierra Madre, which is
mannedbyaboutadozenPhilippinemarinesoldiers.ThePhilippines'smallwatercraftscannavigatetheshallowwatersofAyunginShoalwhile
China'slargecoastguardvesselscannot.
WiththeanticipatedinstallationbyChinaofmilitaryfacilitiesandwarmaterialsinitsthreeairandnavalbasesintheSpratlys,expectedtobe
completedbeforetheendof2016,Chinawillbegintoaggressivelyenforceits9dashedlinesclaimovertheSouthChinaSea.Underthisclaim,
Chinaassertssovereigntynotonlytoalltheislands,rocksandreefsintheSpratlys,butalsoto85.7%oftheSouthChinaSea,comprisingallthe
waters, fisheries, mineral resources, seabed and submarine areas enclosed by the 9dashed lines. Under this claim, the Philippines will lose
381,000squarekilometers6ofitsEEZintheWestPhilippineSea,amaritimespacelargerthanthetotalPhilippinelandareaof300,000square
kilometers. China's 9dashed lines claim encroaches on all the traditional fishing grounds of Filipino fishermen in the South China Sea:
ScarboroughShoal,MacclesfieldBankandtheSpratlys.
The Philippines, acting by itself, cannot hope to deter militarily China from enforcing its 9dashed lines claim in the West Philippine Sea. The
Philippines cannot acquire war materials like antiship and antiaircraft missiles off the shelf. The operation of antiship missiles requires
communicationswithairborneradarorsatelliteguidancesystems.WiththecompletionofChina'sairandnavalbasesbeforetheendof2016,the
Philippineshasnotimetoacquire,installandoperateanantishipmissilesystemonitsown.Militaryandsecurityanalystsareunanimousthat
thereisonlyonepoweronearththatcandetermilitarilyChinafromenforcingits9dashedlinesclaim,andthatpoweristheUnitedStates.This
iswhytheMDTisutterlycrucialtothePhilippines'defenseofitsEEZintheWestPhilippineSea.
Ofcourse,theUnitedStateshasrepeatedlystatedthattheMDTdoesnotcoverthedisputedislands,rocksandreefsintheSouthChinaSea.We
understand this because at the time the MDT was signed the Philippine territory recognized by the United States did not include the Kalayaan
Island Group in the Spratlys. However, the MDT provides that an armed attack on "public vessels or aircraft" (military or coast guard ship or
aircraft) of either the United States or the Philippines in the Pacific area is one of the grounds for a party to invoke mutual defense under the
MDT.7TheUnitedStateshasofficiallyclarifiedthatthePacificareaincludestheSouthChinaSea.8
IfChina'snavyshipsattackaPhilippinemilitaryshipresupplyingPhilippineoccupiedislandsintheSpratlys,thatwillbecoveredbytheMDT.
However,unlesstheU.S.andthePhilippineshaveprepositionedantishipmissilesinPalawan,therewillbenodeterrencetoChina,andnoswift
response from U.S. and Philippine forces. The absence of any deterrence will likely invite Chinese harassment, or even armed attack, on
Philippineresupplyships.ThatwillleadtothelossofallPhilippineoccupiedislandsintheSpratlys,aswellasthelossofthegasrichReedBank.
The prepositioning of war materials is a necessary and essential element to achieve the purpose of the MDT. Article II of the MDT expressly
provides:
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by selfhelp and mutual aid
willmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack.
(Emphasissupplied)
cralawlawlibrary
The prepositioning of war materials is the very essence of the phrase to"maintain and develop (the Parties') individual and collective
capacitytoresistarmedattack."Withouttheprepositioningofwarmaterials,aPartytotheMDTcannotmaintainanddevelopthecapacityto
resistarmedattack.Withouttheprepositioningofwarmaterials,aPartyissimplyandtotallyunpreparedforarmedattack.
The1987Constitutiondefinesthe"nationalterritory"toincludenotonlyislandsorrocksabovewaterathightidebutalsotheseabed,subsoil
andothersubmarineareas"overwhichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction."Article1ofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines hassovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,
includingitsterritorialsea,theseabed,thesubsoil,theinsularshelves,andothersubmarineareas.Thewatersaround,between,
andconnectingtheislandsofthearchipelago,regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions,formpartoftheinternalwatersofthe
Philippines.(Emphasissupplied)
cralawlawlibrary
Thus,thePhilippine"nationalterritory"referstoareasoverwhichthePhilippineshas"sovereigntyorjurisdiction."TheConstitutionmandates:
"TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,andexclusiveeconomiczone,andreserveitsuse
andenjoymentexclusivelytoFilipinocitizens."9
Underbothcustomaryinternationallawandthe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS),thePhilippineshas"sovereign
rights"and"jurisdiction"10toexploitexclusivelyallthelivingandnonlivingresourceswithinitsEEZ.UndertheUNCLOS,thePhilippineshas
the sovereign rights to exploit exclusively the mineral resources within its ECS.11 Under the UNCLOS, the Philippines also has
sole"jurisdiction"tocreateartificialislandsorinstallstructureswithinitsEEZ12andECS.13
In short, under international law and in particular under the UNCLOS, the Philippines has jurisdiction over its EEZ and ECS. Thus, under
domesticlaw,thePhilippines'EEZandECSformpartofPhilippine"nationalterritory"sincetheConstitutiondefines"nationalterritory"toinclude
areasoverwhichthePhilippineshas"jurisdiction,"atermwhichmeanslessthansovereignty.However,underinternationallaw,thePhilippine
"nationalterritory"referstotheareasoverwhichthePhilippineshassovereignty,referringtothePhilippines'landterritory,archipelagicwaters
andterritorialsea,excludingareasoverwhichthePhilippinesexercisesonlyjurisdictionlikeitsEEZandECS.
ChinahasalreadyinvadedrepeatedlyPhilippine"nationalterritory"intwoseparateareas,oneintheKalayaanIslandGroupintheSpratlysand
theotherinScarboroughShoal.WhenChinaseizedin1988SubiReef,asubmergedareawithinthePhilippines'ECSandbeyondtheterritorial
seaofanyhightidefeature,14ChinainvadedPhilippinenationalterritoryasdefinedintheConstitution.WhenChinaseizedin1995MischiefReef,
asubmergedareawithinthePhilippines'EEZandbeyondtheterritorialseaofanyhightidefeature,15ChinainvadedPhilippinenationalterritory
as defined in the Constitution. When China seized in 2012 Scarborough Shoal, a rock above water at high tide and constituting land territory
underinternationallaw,ChinainvadedPhilippinenationalterritoryasdefinedintheConstitutionandasunderstoodininternationallaw.Republic
Act No. 9522, amending the Philippine Baselines Law, expressly declares that Scarborough Shoal is part of Philippine territory over which the
Philippinesexercises"sovereigntyandjurisdiction."16
After China's seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the Philippines finally woke up and summoned the political will to address the serial and
creeping Chinese invasion of Philippine national territory. Thus, the EDCA was born, to give much needed teeth to the MDT as a deterrent to
further Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea. Without the EDCA, the MDT remains a toothless paper tiger. With the EDCA, the MDT
acquiresarealandreadyfirepowertodeteranyarmedaggressionagainstPhilippinepublicvesselsoraircraftsoperatingintheWestPhilippine
Sea.
WiththeEDCA,ChinawillthinktwicebeforeattackingPhilippinemilitaryresupplyshipstoPhilippineoccupiedislandsintheSpratlys.Withthe
EDCA,thePhilippineswillhaveafightingchancetoholdontoPhilippineoccupiedislandsintheSpratlys.WiththeEDCA,Chinawillthinktwice
before attacking Philippine navy and coast guard vessels patrolling the West Philippine Sea. This will give the Philippines a fighting chance to
wardoffChina'simpendingenforcementofits9dashedlinesasChina's"nationalboundaries"asshowninits2013officialverticalmap.17
Thenumberandsitesofthe"agreedlocations"toplacetheprepositionedwarmaterialsmustnecessarilyremainnumerousandanonymous.The
"agreed locations" must be numerous enough to survive repeated or surprise armed attacks. There must not only be redundant "agreed
locations" but also dummy "agreed locations" to mislead the enemy. The sites of many of the "agreed locations" cannot be disclosed publicly
becausethatwillgivetheenemythefixedcoordinatesofthe"agreedlocations,"makingthemeasytargetsoflongrangeenemycruisemissiles.
Thenumberandsitesofthe"agreedlocations"aremattersbestlefttothesounddiscretionoftheExecutive,whoistheimplementingauthority
oftheMDTforthePhilippines.
TheimplementationoftheMDTisapurelyExecutivefunctionsincetheSenatehasalreadyratifiedtheMDT.TheimplementationoftheMDTis
alsopartofthepurelyExecutivefunctionofthePresidentasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForces.Asexecutorand"chiefarchitect"18ofthe
country'srelationswithforeigncountries,includingourtreatyallytheUnitedStates,thePresidentisconstitutionallyvestedwithamplediscretion
in the implementation of the MDT. EDCA, being essentially and entirely an implementation of the MDT, is within the sole authority of the
PresidenttoenterintoasanexecutiveagreementwiththeU.S.
ArticleVIIIoftheMDTprovides:"ThisTreatyshallremaininforceindefinitely.Eitherpartymayterminateitoneyearafternoticeisgiventothe
otherParty."NeitherthePhilippinesnortheUnitedStateshasterminatedtheMDT.Onthecontrary,the1998VisitingForcesAgreementbetween
thePhilippinesandtheUnitedStates,whichthePhilippineSenatehasratified,expresslystatesthatthepartiesare"[reaffirmingtheirobligations
undertheMutualDefenseTreatyofAugust30,1951."Thus,thecontinuedvalidityandrelevanceoftheMDTcannotbedenied.
Moreover, the Senate ratification of the MDT complies with the requirement of Section 25, Article XVIII19of the 1987 Constitution that any
agreementallowingforeignmilitaryfacilitiesinthePhilippines,liketheprepositioningofU.S.warmaterials,mustbeembodiedinatreatyand
ratifiedbytwothirdsvote20oftheSenate.ThattreatyistheMDTwhichthePhilippineSenateratifiedbytwothirdsvoteon12May195221and
whichtheU.S.Senateratifiedon20March1952.22
Insummary,theEDCAisabsolutelynecessaryandessentialtoimplementthepurposeoftheMDT,whichonthepartofthePhilippines,giventhe
existing situation in the West Philippine Sea, is to deter or repel any armed attack on Philippine territory or on any Philippine public vessel or
aircraftoperatingintheWestPhilippineSea.ToholdthattheEDCAcannottakeeffectwithoutSenateratificationistorendertheMDT,oursole
mutualselfdefensetreaty,totallyinutiletomeetthegrave,evenexistentialist,23nationalsecuritythreatthatthePhilippinesisnowfacinginthe
WestPhilippineSea.
China has already invaded several geologic features comprising part of Philippine "national territory" as defined in the
Constitution.TheterritorialintegrityofthePhilippineshasbeenviolatedopenlyandrepeatedly.ThePresident,asCommanderinChiefofthe
Armed Forces, "chief architect" of foreign policy and implementer of the MDT, has decided on the urgent need to fortify Philippine military
defenses by prepositioning war materials of our treaty ally on Philippine soil. This Court should not erect roadblocks to the President's
implementationoftheMDT,particularlysincetimeisoftheessenceandthePresident'sactofenteringintotheEDCAonhisowndoesnotviolate
anyprovisionoftheConstitution.
A final word. The EDCA does not detract from the legal arbitration case that the Philippines has filed against China under UNCLOS. The EDCA
brings into the Philippine strategy the element of credible selfdefense. Having refused to participate in the legal arbitration despite being
obligatedtodosounderUNCLOS,ChinaisnowusingbruteforcetoassertitsclaimtoalmosttheentireSouthChinaSea.Giventhissituation,
the proper equation in defending the Philippines' maritime zones in the West Philippine Sea is "legal right plus credible selfdefense equals
might."
Accordingly,IvotetoDISMISSthepetitionsonthegroundthattheEDCAmerelyimplements,andinfactisabsolutelynecessaryandessential
totheimplementationof,theMDT,anexistingtreatythathasbeenratifiedbytheSenate.
Endnotes:
1ThePhilippineSenateratifiedtheMDTon12May1952underSenateResolutionNo.84.
2Article31ofthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(ViennaConvention)provides:
Article31
Generalruleofinterpretation
1.Atreatyshallbeinterpretedingoodfaithinaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningtobegiventothetermsofthetreatyintheir
contextandinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose.
2.Thecontextforthepurposeoftheinterpretationofatreatyshallcomprise,inadditiontothetext,includingitspreambleand
annexes:
xxx(Emphasissupplied)
ThePhilippinesaccededtotheViennaConventionon15November1972.
3Article32ofthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesprovides:
Article32
Supplementarymeansofinterpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances ofitsconclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from theapplicationofarticle31,ortodeterminethe
meaningwhentheinterpretationaccordingtoarticle31:(a)leavesthemeaningambiguousorobscureor(b)leadstoaresult
whichismanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable.(Emphasissupplied)
4SeeAdministrativeOrderNo.29,5September2012.
5A 3,000meter airstrip is long enough for any military aircraft of China to land and take off. A Boeing 747 airliner, or a B52
bomber,caneasilylandandtakeoffona3,000meterairstrip.
6
Final
Transcript
Day
Merits
Hearing,
page
58,
line
11,
PhilippinesChina
Arbitration,
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/15487.
7ArticleIVoftheMDTprovides:"EachPartyrecognizesthatanarmedattackinthePacificareaoneitherofthePartieswouldbe
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its
constitutionalprocesses,xxx."
8LetterofU.S.SecretaryofStateCyrusVancetoPhilippineSecretaryofForeignAffairsCarlosP.Romulodated6January1979
LetterofU.S.AmbassadortothePhilippinesThomasC.HubbardtoForeignSecretaryDomingoL.Siazondated24May1999.
9Section2,ArticleXIIofthel987Constitution.Emphasissupplied.
10Article56ofUNCLOSprovides:
Article56
Rights,jurisdictionanddutiesofthecoastalStateintheexclusiveeconomiczone
1.Intheexclusiveeconomiczone,thecoastalStatehas:
(a)sovereignrightsforthepurposeofexploringandexploiting,conservingandmanagingthenaturalresources,whetherliving
ornonliving,ofthewaterssuperjacenttotheseabedandoftheseabedanditssubsoil,andwithregardtootheractivitiesforthe
economicexploitationandexplorationofthezone,suchastheproductionofenergyfromthewater,currentsandwinds
(b)jurisdictionasprovidedforintherelevantprovisionsofthisConventionwithregardto:
(i)theestablishmentanduseofartificialislands,installationsandstructures
(ii)marinescientificresearch
(iii)theprotectionandpreservationofthemarineenvironment
(c)otherrightsanddutiesprovidedforinthisConvention.
2.InexercisingitsrightsandperformingitsdutiesunderthisConventionintheexclusiveeconomiczone,thecoastalStateshall
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this
Convention.
xxxx(Emphasissupplied)
11Article77oftheUNCLOSprovides:
Article77
RightsofthecoastalStateoverthecontinentalshelf
1.ThecoastalStateexercisesoverthecontinentalshelfsovereignrightsforthepurposeofexploringitandexploitingits
naturalresources.
2.Therightsreferredtoinparagraph1areexclusiveinthesensethatifthecoastalStatedoesnotexplorethecontinentalshelf
orexploititsnaturalresources,noonemayundertaketheseactivitieswithouttheexpressconsentofthecoastalState.
3.TherightsofthecoastalStateoverthecontinentalshelfdonotdependonoccupation,effectiveornotional,oronanyexpress
proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil
togetherwithlivingorganismsbelongingtosedentaryspecies,thatistosay,organismswhich,attheharvestablestage,eitherare
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
(Emphasissupplied)
Article60
Artificialislands,installationsandstructuresintheexclusiveeconomiczone
1. In the exclusive economic zone,the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and
regulatetheconstruction,operationanduseof:
(a)artificialislands
(b)installationsandstructuresforthepurposesprovidedforinarticle56andothereconomicpurposes
(c)installationsandstructureswhichmayinterferewiththeexerciseoftherightsofthecoastalStateinthezone.
2.The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and structures, including
jurisdictionwithregardtocustoms,fiscal,health,safetyandimmigrationlawsandregulations.
xxxx(Emphasissupplied)
Article80
Artificialislands,installationsandstructuresonthecontinentalshelf
Article60appliesmutatismutandistoartificialislands,installationsandstructuresonthecontinentalshelf.
14
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http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1548.
page
23,
lines
7,
and
9,
PhilippinesChina
Arbitration,
15Id.
16Section2ofRANo.9522provides:"ThebaselineinthefollowingareasoverwhichthePhilippineslikewiseexercisessovereignty
andjurisdictionshallbedeterminedas"RegimeofIslands"undertheRepublicofthePhilippinesconsistentwithArticle121ofthe
UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS):
a)TheKalayaanIslandGroupasconstitutedunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1596and
b)BajodeMasinloc,alsoknownasScarboroughShoal."(Emphasissupplied)
InitsNoteVerbaleof7June2013toChina,thePhilippinesstatedit"strongly objects to the indication that the ninedash
linesareChina'snationalboundariesintheWestPhilippineSea/SouthChinaSea."
(Emphasissupplied)
18Pimentel,Jr.v.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,501Phil.303(2005).
19Section25,ArticleXVIIIofthe1987Constitutionprovides:"Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRepublic
ofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnot
be allowed in the Philippines exceptunder a treaty duly concurred in by the Senateand, when the Congress so requires,
ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatyby
theothercontractingState."(Emphasissupplied)
20Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unlessconcurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate."
(Emphasissupplied)
21The1935Constitution,underwhichtheMDTwasratified,alsorequiredratificationoftreatiesbytwothirdsvoteoftheSenate.
Section10(7),ArticleVIIofthe1935Constitutionprovides:"ThePresidentshallhavethepower,withtheconcurrenceoftwo
thirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate,tomaketreaties,andwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,heshall
appointambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls.Heshallreceiveambassadorsandotherpublicministersdulyaccredited
totheGovernmentofthePhilippines."(Emphasissupplied)
22Seefootnote7,Nicolasv.Romulo,598Phil.262(2009).
23China's successful control of the South China Sea will force the Philippines to share a 1,300kilometer sea border with China,
fromBalabacIslandinPalawantoYaminIslandinBatanes,veryclosetothePhilippinecoastlinefacingtheSouthChinaSea.This
willbringthePhilippinesintoChina'sorbit,withthePhilippinesadheringtoChina'spositionsonmattersinvolvingforeignpolicy.
CONCURRINGANDDISSENTINGOPINION
LEONARDODECASTRO,J..:
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same
extentinthatpowerwhichcouldimposesuchrestriction."xxx.1
cralawlawlibrary
I concur with the disposition of the procedural issues but not with the arguments and conclusions reached as to the substantive
issues.
Thefocusofthepresentcontroversy,asmentionedbytheHonorableChiefJusticeistheapplicationofSection25,ArticleXVIIIof
theConstitutionwhichreads:
ARTICLEXVIII
TRANSITORYPROVISIONS
SEC.25.Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
nationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.
cralawlawlibrary
Section25,ArticleXVIIIbansforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinPhilippineterritory,unlessthefollowingrequisitesarecompliedwith:
(1)thepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshouldbeallowedbyatreaty(2)thetreatymustbedulyconcurredinbythe
PhilippineSenateand, when Congress so requires, such treaty should be ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the Filipino people in a
nationalreferendumheldforthatpurposeand(3)suchtreatyshouldberecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparty.2
Couchedinnegativeterms,Section25,ArticleXVIIIembodiesaprohibition:"foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedin
thePhilippines,"unlesstherequisitesinthesaidsectionaremet.
InBAYANv.Zamora,3the Court held that Section 25, Article XVIII covers three different situations: a treaty allowing the presence within the
Philippines of (a) foreign military bases, or (b) foreign military troops, or (c) foreign military facilities, such that a treaty that involves any of
thesethreestandingalonefallswithinthecoverageofthesaidprovision.
BAYANv.ZamoralikewiseexpoundedonthecoverageofthetwoprovisionsoftheConstitutionSection21,ArticleVIIandSection25,Article
XVIIIwhichbothrequireSenateconcurrenceintreatiesandinternationalagreements.TheCourtstated:
Section21,ArticleVIIdealswithtreatiesorinternationalagreementsingeneral,inwhichcase,theconcurrenceofatleasttwo
thirds(2/3)ofalltheMembersoftheSenateisrequiredtomakethesubjecttreaty,orinternationalagreement,validandbinding
onthepartofthePhilippines.Thisprovisionlaysdownthegeneralruleontreatiesorinternationalagreementsandappliestoany
formoftreatywithawidevarietyofsubjectmatter,suchas,butnotlimitedto,extraditionortaxtreatiesorthoseeconomicin
nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
particulardesignationorappellation,requirestheconcurrenceoftheSenatetobevalidandeffective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to
render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25,
ArticleXVIIIfurtherrequiresthat"foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities"maybeallowedinthePhilippinesonlybyvirtueofa
treatydulyconcurredinbytheSenate,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinanationalreferendumheldforthatpurposeifso
requiredbyCongress,andrecognizedassuchbytheothercontractingstate.
xxxx
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that
there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no
distinctionbetween"transient"and"permanent."Certainly,wefindnothinginSection25,ArticleXVIIIthatrequiresforeigntroops
orfacilitiestobestationedorplacedpermanentlyinthePhilippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is made by law the Court should not distinguish Ubi lex non
distinguitneenosdistinguiredebemos.
Inlikemanner,wedonotsubscribetotheargumentthatSection25,ArticleXVIIIisnotcontrollingsincenoforeignmilitarybases,
butmerelyforeigntroopsandfacilities,areinvolvedintheVFA.Notably,aperusalofsaidconstitutionalprovisionrevealsthatthe
proscriptioncovers"foreign military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of
troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to"foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities"collectivelybuttreatsthemasseparateandindependentsubjects.Theuseofcommaandthedisjunctiveword"or"
clearlysignifiesdisassociationandindependenceofonethingfromtheothersincludedintheenumeration,suchthat,theprovision
contemplates three different situations a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign
troops,or(c)foreignfacilitiesanyofthethreestandingaloneplacesitunderthecoverageofSection25,ArticleXVIII.
To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission,isconsistentwiththisinterpretation:
MR.MAAMBONG.IjustwanttoaddressaquestionortwotoCommissionerBernas.Thisformulationspeaksofthree
things:foreignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilities.Myfirstquestionis:Ifthecountrydoesenterintosuchkindofa
treaty,mustitcoverthethreebases,troopsorfacilitiesorcouldthetreatyenteredintocoveronlyoneortwo?
FR.BERNAS.Definitely,itcancoveronlyone.Whetheritcoversonlyoneoritcoversthree,therequirementwillbe
thesame.
MR.MAAMBONG.Inotherwords,thePhilippinegovernmentcanenterintoatreatycoveringnotbasesbutmerely
troops?
FR.BERNAS.Yes.
MR.MAAMBONG.Icannotfindanyreasonwhythe,governmentcanenterintoatreatycoveringonlytroops.
FR.BERNAS.Whynot?Probablyifwestretchourimaginationalittlebitmore,wewillfindsome.Wejustwantto
covereverything.4(Citationsomitted.)
cralawlawlibrary
Furthermore,thewordingofSection25,ArticleXVIIIalsoprovidesanindubitableimplication:foreignmilitarybases,troopsandfacilities
haveceasedtobeallowedinthePhilippinesaftertheexpirationin1991oftheMilitaryBasesAgreementthereafter,thesamecan
onlyberealloweduponthesatisfactionofallthethreerequirementssetforthintheSection25,ArticleXVIII.
ThelegalconsequenceoftheaboveprovisionwithrespecttotheMilitaryBasesAgreement(March14,1947),theMutualDefenseTreaty(August
30,1951),theVisitingForcesAgreement(February10,1998),andtheEnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement([EDCA]April28,2014)can
beappreciatedbyanexaminationoftherespectiverightsandobligationsofthepartiesintheseagreements.
EffectofSection25,ArticleXVIIIof
theConstitutionontheMilitaryBases
Agreement,theMutualDefenseTreaty,
theVisitinsForcesAgreement,andthe
EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement
OnJuly4,1946,theUnitedStatesrecognizedtheindependenceoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,therebyapparentlyrelinquishinganyclaimof
sovereigntythereto.However,onMarch14,1947,thePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesenteredintoaMilitaryBasesAgreement(MBA)which
grantedtotheUnitedStatesgovernmenttherighttoretain5theuseofthebaseslistedintheAnnexesofsaidagreement.6Withinsaidbases,
theUnitedStateswasgranted"therights,powerandauthoritywithinthebaseswhicharenecessaryfortheestablishment,use,operationand
defensethereoforappropriateforthecontrolthereofandalltherights,powerandauthoritywithinthelimitsofterritorialwatersandairspace
adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them, or appropriate for their control."7The term of the
original agreement was "for a period of ninetynine years subject to extension thereafter as agreed by the two Governments."8In 1966, the
partiesenteredintotheRamosRuskAgreement,whichreducedthetermoftheMilitaryBasesAgreementto25yearsfrom1966,oruntil1991.
OnAugust30,1951,thePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesenteredintotheMutualDefenseTreaty(MDT),wherebythepartiesrecognizedthat
"anarmedattackinthePacificareaoneitherofthePartieswouldbedangeroustoitsownpeaceandsafetyanddeclaresthatitwouldactto
meetthecommondangersinaccordancewithitsconstitutionalprocess."9Thetreatyprovidedthatit"shallremaininforceindefinitely,"although
eitherparty"mayterminateitoneyearafternoticehasbeengiventotheotherParty."10Itbearspointingoutthatthereisnoexplicitprovision
intheMDTwhichauthorizedthepresenceinthePhilippinesofmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesoftheUnitedStates.
In 1986, during the early stages of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, and in view of the impending expiration of the MBA in
1991, the members of the Commission expressed their concern that the continued presence of foreign military bases in the country would
amount to a derogation of national sovereignty. The pertinent portion of the deliberations leading to the adoption of the present Section 25,
ArticleXVIIIisquotedasfollows:
FR.BERNAS.Myquestionis:Isitthepositionofthecommitteethatthepresenceofforeignmilitarybasesinthecountryunder
anycircumstancesisaderogationofnationalsovereignty?
MR.AZCUNA.Itisdifficulttoimagineasituationbasedonexistingfactswhereitwouldnot.However,intheabstract,itispossible
thatitwouldnotbethatmuchofaderogation.Ihaveinmind,MadamPresident,theargumentthathasbeenpresented.Isthat
thereasonwhythereareU.S.basesinEngland,inSpainandinTurkey?Anditisnotbeingclaimedthattheirsovereigntyisbeing
derogated.OursituationisdifferentfromtheirsbecausewedidnotleaseorrentthesebasestotheU.S.TheU.S.retainedthem
fromusasacolonialpower.
FR.BERNAS.So,thesecondsentence,MadamPresident,hasspecificreferencetowhatobtainsnow.
MR.AZCUNA.Yes.Itisreallydeterminedbythepresent
situation.
FR. BERNAS. Does the first sentence tolerate a situation radically different from what obtains now? In other words, if we
understandsovereigntyasautolimitation,asapeople'spowertogiveupcertaingoodsinordertoobtainsomethingwhichmaybe
more valuable, would it be possible under this first sentence for the nation to negotiate some kind of a treaty agreement that
wouldnotderogateagainstsovereignty?
MR.AZCUNA.Yes.Forexample,MadamPresident,ifitisnegotiatedonabasisoftruesovereignequality,suchasamutualASEAN
defenseagreementwhereinanASEANforceiscreatedandthisASEANforceisaforeignmilitaryforceandmayhaveabasisinthe
memberASEANcountries,thiskindofasituation,Ithink,wouldnotderogatefromsovereignty.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, may I be permitted to make a comment on that beautiful question. I think there will be no
derogationofsovereigntyiftheexistenceofthemilitarybasesasstatedbyCommissionerAzcunaisonthebasisofatreatywhich
wasnotonlyratifiedbytheappropriatebody,liketheCongress,butalsobythepeople.
IwouldlikealsotorefertothesituationinTurkeywheretheTurkishgovernmenthascontroloverthebasesinTurkey,wherethe
jurisdiction of Turkey is not impaired in anyway, and Turkey retains the right to terminate the treaty under circumstances
determinedbythehostgovernment.Ithinkundersuchcircumstances,theexistenceofthemilitarybasesmaynotbeconsidereda
derogationofsovereignty,MadamPresident.
FR.BERNAS.Letmebeconcrete,MadamPresident,inourcircumstances.Supposetheyweretohavethissituationwhere
our government were to negotiate a treaty with the United States, and then the two executive departments in the
ordinarycourseofnegotiationcometoanagreement.AsourConstitutionistakingshapenow,ifthisistobeatreaty
atall,itwillhavetobesubmittedtoourSenateforitsratification.Suppose,therefore,thatwhatwasagreedupon
betweentheUnitedStatesandtheexecutivedepartmentofthePhilippinesissubmittedandratifiedbytheSenate,
thenitisfurthersubmittedtothepeopleforitsratificationandsubsequently,weasktheUnitedStates:"Complete
theprocessbyacceptingitasatreatythroughratificationbyyourSenateastheUnitedStatesConstitutionrequires,"
wouldsuchanarrangementbeinderogationofsovereignty?
MR. NOLLEDO. Under the circumstances the Commissioner just mentioned, Madam President, on the basis of the
provisionofSection1that"sovereigntyresidesintheFilipinopeople,"thenwewouldnotconsiderthataderogation
ofoursovereigntyonthebasisandexpectationthattherewasaplebiscite.11(Emphasissupplied.)
cralawlawlibrary
Asasafeguardagainstthederogationofnationalsovereignty,thepresentformofSection25,ArticleXVIIIwasfinalizedbytheCommissionand
ratifiedbytheFilipinopeoplein1987.
On September 16, 1991, the Senate rejected the proposed Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, which would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United
StatescontinuedinaccordancewiththeMDT.12
UpontheexpirationoftheMBAin1991,Section25,ArticleXVIIIcameintoeffect.Thepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilitiesin
thecountrycanonlybealloweduponthesatisfactionofallthreerequirementssetforthinSection25,ArticleXVIII.
OnFebruary10,1998,thePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesenteredintotheVisitngForcesAgreement(VFA),whichrequiredthePhilippinesto
facilitate the admission of United States personnel,13 a term defined in the same treaty as "United States military and civilian
personneltemporarilyinthePhilippinesinconnectionwithactivitiesapprovedbythePhilippineGovernment."14
UnitedStatesGovernmentequipment,materials,supplies,andotherpropertyimportedintothePhilippinesinconnectionwithactivitiestowhich
theVFAapplies,whilenotexpresslystatedtobeallowedintothePhilippinesbytheprovisionsoftheVFA,wereneverthelessdeclaredtobe
freefromPhilippineduties,taxesandsimilarcharges.TitletheretowasalsodeclaredtoremainwiththeUnitedStates.15
TheVFAexpresslyallowedtheimportationintothePhilippinesofreasonablequantitiesofpersonalbaggage,personaleffects,andotherproperty
forthepersonaluseofUnitedStatespersonnel.16TheVFAlikewiseexpresslyallowedtheentryintothePhilippinesof(1)aircraftoperatedbyor
fortheUnitedStatesarmedforcesuponapprovaloftheGovernmentofthePhilippinesinaccordancewithproceduresstipulatedinimplementing
arrangements and (2) vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces upon approval of the Government of the Philippines, in
accordancewithinternationalcustomandpracticeandsuchagreedimplementingarrangementsasnecessary.17
TheVFAalsoprovidedforthejurisdictionovercriminalanddisciplinarycasesoverUnitedStatespersonnelwithrespecttooffencescommitted
withinthePhilippines.18
TheVFAfurtherstatedthatthesameshallremaininforceuntiltheexpirationof180daysfromthedateonwhicheitherpartygivestheother
partynoticeinwritingthatitdesirestoterminatetheagreement.19
Subsequently, the constitutionality of the VFA was questioned before the Court in the aforementioned October 10, 2000 case of BAYAN v.
Zamora,20andagainintheFebruary11,2009caseofNicolasv.Romulo.21Inbothcases,theCourtheldthatSection25,ArticleXVIIIofthe
Constitution is applicable, but the requirements thereof were nevertheless complied with. In Nicolas, however, the implementing Romulo
KenneyAgreementsofDecember19and22,2006concerningthecustodyofLanceCorporalDanielJ.Smith,whowaschargedwiththecrimeof
rape,weredeclarednotinaccordancewiththeVFA.
Thereafter,onApril28,2014,thegovernmentsofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesenteredintotheassailedEDCA.
TheEDCA
Under the EDCA, the Philippines by mutual agreement with the United States, shall provide the United States forces the access and use of
portionsofPhilippineterritory.UnitedStatesforcesare"theentitycomprisingUnitedStatespersonnelandallproperty,equipment,andmateriel
oftheUnitedStatesArmedForcespresentintheterritoryofthePhilippines."TheseportionsofPhilippineterritorythatwillbemadeavailableto
theUSarecalled"AgreedLocations,"whichisanewconceptdefinedunderArticle11(4)oftheEDCAas:
4."AgreedLocations"meansfacilitiesandareasthatareprovidedbytheGovernmentofthePhilippinesthroughtheAFPandthat
the United States forces,22 United States contractors, and others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access and
usepursuant tothisAgreement. Such Agreed Locations may be listed in an annextobe appendedtothisAgreement,andmay
furtherbedescribedinimplementingarrangements.(Emphasissupplied.)
cralawlawlibrary
Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the United States may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises joint and combined training activities humanitarian and disaster relief activities and such
otheractivitiesthatas may be agreed upon by the Parties."23Article 111(1) of the EDCA further states in detail the activities that the United
otheractivitiesthatas may be agreed upon by the Parties."

StatesmayconductinsidetheAgreedLocations:
Article 111(1) of the EDCA further states in detail the activities that the United
1. With consideration of the views of the Parties, the Philippines hereby authorizes and agrees that United States forces, United
Statescontractors,andvehicles,vessels,andaircraftsoperatedbyorforUnitedStatesforcesmayconductthefollowingactivities
with respect to Agreed Locations:training transit support and related activities refueling of aircraft bunkering of
vessels temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft temporary accommodation of personnel
communicationsprepositioningofequipment,supplies,andmaterieldeployingforcesandmaterielandsuchother
activitiesasthePartiesmayagree.(Emphasissupplied.)
cralawlawlibrary
TheUnitedStatesmayaccessandusetheAgreedLocationswithoutanyobligationonitsparttopayanyrentorsimilarcosts.24
InadditiontotherighttoaccessandtousetheAgreedLocationsandtoconductvariousactivitiestherein,theUnitedStates,uponrequesttothe
Philippines' Designated Authorities,25can further temporarily access public land and facilities (including roads, ports, and airfields), including
thoseownedorcontrolledbylocalgovernments,andtootherlandandfacilities(includingroads,ports,andairfields).26
TheUnitedStatesisalsograntedoperationalcontrolofAgreedLocationstodoconstructionactivities,makealterationsorimprovementsofthe
AgreedLocations.27Allbuildings,nonrelocatablestructures,andassembliesaffixedtothelandintheAgreedLocations,including[those]altered
orimprovedbyUnitedStatesforces,remainthepropertyofthePhilippines.PermanentbuildingsconstructedbytheUnitedStatesforcesbecome
thepropertyofthePhilippines,onceconstructed,butshallbeusedbytheUnitedStatesforcesuntilnolongerrequired.28
IncidentaltotheaccessanduseoftheAgreedLocations,theUSisgrantedtheuseofwater,electricityandotherpublicutilities,29aswellasthe
useoftheradiospectruminrelationtotheoperationofitsowntelecommunicationssystem.30
AstothemanagementoftheAgreedLocations,theUnitedStatesforcesareauthorizedtoexerciseallrightsandauthoritieswithintheAgreed
Locationsthatarenecessaryfortheiroperationalcontrolordefense,includingtakingappropriatemeasurestoprotectUnitedStatesforcesand
UnitedStatescontractors.TheUnitedStatesshouldcoordinatesuchmeasureswithappropriateauthoritiesofthePhilippines.31
TheUnitedStatesisauthorizedtoprepositionandstoredefenseequipment,supplies,andmateriel("prepositionedmateriel"),includingbutnot
limitedto,humanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefequipment,suppliesandmaterial,atAgreedLocations.32Theprepositionedmaterielofthe
UnitedStatesforcesshallbefortheexclusiveuseofUnitedStatesforces,andfulltitletoallsuch.equipment,suppliesandmaterielremainswith
the United States.33 United States forces and United States contractors34 shall have unimpeded access to Agreed Locations for all matters
relating to the prepositioning and storage of defense equipment, supplies, and materiel, including delivery, management, inspection, use,
maintenance,andremovalofsuchequipment,suppliesandmateriel.35TheUnitedStatesforcesandUnitedStatescontractorsshallretaintitleto
all equipment, materiel, supplies, relocatable structures, and other movable property that have been imported into or acquired within the
territoryofthePhilippinesbyoronbehalfofUnitedStatesforces.36
ConsideringthepresenceofUSarmedforces:militarypersonnel,vehicles,vessels,andaircraftsandotherdefensiveequipment,supplies,and
materiel in the Philippines, for obvious military purposes and with the obvious intention of assigning or stationing them within the Agreed
Locations,saidAgreedLocations,forallintentsandpurposes,areconsideredmilitarybasesandfallsquarelyunderthedefinitionofamilitary
base under Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1227, otherwise known as "Punishing Unlawful Entry into Any Military Base in the
Philippines,"whichstates:
SECTION2.Theterm"militarybase"asusedinthisdecreemeansanymilitary,air,naval,orcoastguardreservation,base,
fort,camp,arsenal,yard,station,orinstallationinthePhilippines.(Emphasissupplied.)
cralawlawlibrary
Inthesamevein,ArticleXXVIofthe1947RPUSMilitaryBasesAgreement(MBA)definedamilitarybaseas"areasnamedinAnnexAandAnnex
BandsuchadditionalareasasmaybeacquiredformilitarypurposespursuanttothetermsofthisAgreement."37
Considering further that the United States armed forces stationed in the Philippines, as well as their relocatable structures, equipment and
materiel are owned, maintained, controlled, and operated by the United States within Philippine territory, these Agreed Locations are clearly
overseasmilitarybasesoftheUSwithRPasitshostcountry.
TheEDCAprovidedforaninitialtermoftenyears,whichthereaftershallcontinueinforceautomatically,unlessterminatedbyeitherpartyby
givingoneyear'swrittennoticethroughdiplomaticchannelsofitsintentiontoterminatetheagreement.38
Interestingly,theEDCAhassimilarprovisionsfoundinthe1947MBA:
MilitaryBasesAgreement
(March14,1947)
EnhancedDefenseCooperation
Agreement(April28,2014)
ArticleIII:DESCRIPTIONOFRIGHTS
ArticleIII:AGREEDLOCATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States

shallhavetherights,powerandauthoritywithin
the bases which are necessary for the
establishment, use,operation and defense
thereoforappropriateforthecontrolthereof
andalltherights,powerandauthoritywithinthe
limitsofterritorialwatersandairspaceadjacent
to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are
necessary to provide access to them, or
appropriatefortheircontrol.
4. The Philippines hereby grants the United

States, through bilateral security mechanisms,
such as the MDB and SEB, operational
control of Agreed Locations for construction
activities and authority to undertake such
activities on, and make alterations and
improvementsto,AgreedLocations,xxx.
ArticleVI:SECURITY
3. United States forces are authorized to
exercise all rights and authoritieswithin
Agreed Locations that are necessary for their
operationalcontrolordefensexxx.
4. The Philippines hereby grants the United

2. Such rights, power and authority shall States, through bilateral security mechanisms,
include, inter alia, the right, power and such as the MDB and SEB, operational
authority:
control
of
Agreed
Locations
for
construction activities and authority to
(a)toconstruct(includingdredgingandfilling), undertake such activities on, and make
operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison and alterations and improvements to, Agreed
controlthebases
Locations,xxx.
(b) to improve and deepen the harbors,
channels, entrances and anchorages, and to
construct or maintain necessary roads and
bridgesaffordingaccesstothebases
2.Suchrights,powerandauthorityshallinclude, 5. The Philippine Designated Authority and its

interalia,theright,powerandauthority:
authorized representative shall have access to
the entire area of the Agreed Locations. Such
xxxx
access shall be provided promptly consistent
with operational safety and security
(c) to control (including the right to requirements in accordance with agreed
prohibit) in so far as may be required for the proceduresdevelopedbytheParties.
efficient operation and safety of the bases, and
within the limits of military necessity, Article IV: EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES, AND
anchorages, moorings, landings, takeoffs, MATERIEL
movements and operation of ships and
waterborne craft, aircraft and other vehicles on 4. United States forces and United States
water,intheairoronlandcomprisingorinthe contractors shall have unimpeded access to
vicinityofthebases
Agreed Locations for all matters relating to
the prepositioning and storage of defense
equipment,
supplies,
and
materiel,
includingdelivery,management,inspection,
use, maintenance, and removal of such
equipment,suppliesandmateriel.
2. Such rights, power and authority shall 1.WithconsiderationoftheviewsoftheParties,

include, inter alia, the right, power and the Philippines hereby authorizes and agrees
authority:
that United States forces, United States
contractors, and vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
xxxx
operated by and for United States forces may
conduct the following activities with
(e) to construct, install, maintain, and respect to Agreed Locations:training transit
employ on any base any type, offacilities, support and related activities refueling of
weapons, substance, device, vessel or aircraft bunkering of vessels temporary
vehicleonorundertheground,intheairoron maintenance of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
or under the water that may be requisite or temporary accommodation of personnel
appropriate, including meteorological systems, communications prepositioning of equipment,
aerial and water navigation lights, radio and supplies, and materiel deplovine forces and
radar apparatus and electronic devices, of any materielandsuchotheractivitiesastheParties
desiredpower,typeofemissionandfrequency. mayagree.
Article IV:
MATERIEL
EQUIPMENT,
SUPPLIES,
AND
1. The Philippines hereby authorizes the United

States forces, x x x topreposition and store
defense equipment, supplies, and materiel
("prepositionedmateriel")xxx.
xxxx
3. The prepositioned materiel of the United
States forces shall be for the exclusive use
oftheUnitedStatesforces,andfulltitletoall
such equipment, supplies, and materiel remains
withtheUnitedStates.UnitedStatesforcesshall
have control over the access to and disposition
ofsuchprepositionedmaterielandshallhavethe
unencumbered
right
to
remove
such
prepositioned materiel at any time from the
territoryofthePhilippines.(Emphasessupplied.)
TheEDCAisnotamere
implementingagreementof
theMPTortheVFA
Ascanbeseenintheabovetableofcomparison,theseEDCAprovisionsestablishesmilitaryareassimilartothatintheMilitaryBases
Agreement,andforthatreasonalone,theEDCAisfargreaterinscopethanboththeMutualDefenseTreatyandtheVisitingForcesAgreement.
TheEDCAisnotamereimplementingagreementofeithertheMDTortheVFA.
TheEDCAisaninternationalagreementthatallowsthepresenceinthePhilippinesofforeignmilitarybases,troopsandfacilities,
and thus requires that the three requisites under Section 25, Article XVIII be complied with. The EDCA must be submitted to the Senate for
concurrence.
Themajorityopinionposits,interalia,thatthePresidentmayenterintoanexecutiveagreementonforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities
if:(a)it"isnottheprincipalagreementthatfirstallowedtheirentryorpresenceinthePhilippines,"or(b)itmerelyaimstoimplement
anexistinglawortreaty.Likewise,thePresidentalonehadthechoicetoenterintotheEDCAbywayofanexecutiveagreementoratreaty.Also,
themajoritysuggeststhat executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign militaryforcesifitinvolvesdetailadjustmentsofpreviously
existinginternationalagreements.
TheaboveargumentsfailtoconsiderthatSection25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitutioncoversthreedistinctandmutuallyindependentsituations:
the presence of foreign military bases or troops or facilities. The grant of entry to foreign military troops does not necessarily allow the
establishmentofmilitarybasesorfacilities.39
Generally,thepartiestoaninternationalagreementaregiventhefreedomtochoosetheformoftheiragreement.
Internationalagreementsmaybeintheformof:(1)treaties,whichrequirelegislativeconcurrenceafterexecutiveratificationor(2)executive
agreements, which are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a
narrower range of subject matters than treaties. Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is defined as an
internationalagreementconcludedbetweenstatesinwrittenformandgovernedbyinternationallaw,whetherembodiedinasingleinstrumentor
intwoormorerelatedinstrumentsandwhateveritsparticulardesignation.40
In the 1961 case of Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading,41 the Court had occasion to state that "[international agreements
involvingpoliticalissuesorchangesofnationalpolicyandthoseinvolvinginternationalarrangementsofapermanentcharacterusuallytakethe
formoftreaties.Butinternationalagreementsembodyingadjustmentsofdetailcarryingoutwellestablishednationalpoliciesandtraditionsand
thoseinvolvingarrangementsofamoreorlesstemporarynatureusuallytaketheformofexecutiveagreements."
InthemorerecentcaseofBayanMunav.Romulo,42theCourtexpoundedontheabovepronouncementinthiswise:
ThecategorizationofsubjectmattersthatmaybecoveredbyinternationalagreementsmentionedinEasternSeaTradingisnot
cast in stone.There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an
executiveagreementasaninstrumentofinternationalrelations.Theprimaryconsiderationinthechoiceoftheform
ofagreementistheparties'intentanddesiretocraftaninternationalagreementintheformtheysowishtofurther
theirrespectiveinterests.Verily,thematterofformtakesabackseatwhenitcomestoeffectivenessandbindingeffectofthe
enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under thepacta
suntservandaprinciple.
Asmaybenoted,almosthalfacenturyhaselapsedsincetheCourtrendereditsdecisioninEasternSeaTrading.Sincethen,the
conduct of foreign affairs has become more complex and the domain of international law wider, as to include such subjects as
humanrights,theenvironment,andthesea.xxxSurely,theenumerationinEasternSeaTradingcannotcircumscribetheoption
ofeachstateonthematterofwhichtheinternationalagreementformatwouldbeconvenienttoserveitsbestinterest.AsFrancis
Sayresaidinhisworkreferredtoearlier:
xxxItwouldbeuselesstoundertaketodiscussherethelargevarietyofexecutiveagreementsassuchconcluded
fromtimetotime.Hundredsofexecutiveagreements,otherthanthoseenteredintounderthetradeagreementact,
have been negotiated with foreign governments, x x x. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil air craft, custom matters and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etc. x x x.
(Citationsomitted.)
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However,itmustbeemphasizedthatwhileintheabovecase,theCourtcalledattentionto"onetypeofexecutiveagreementwhichisatreaty
authorizedoratreatyimplementingexecutiveagreement,whichnecessarilywouldcoverthesamemattersubjectoftheunderlyingtreaty,"
still, the Court cited the special situation covered by Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which explicitly prescribes the form of the
internationalagreement.TheCourtstated:
ButoverandabovetheforegoingconsiderationsisthefactthatsaveforthesituationandmatterscontemplatedinSee.
25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution when a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that
involving political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties
needtheconcurrenceoftheSenatebyavotedefinedthereintocompletetheratificationprocess.43(Emphasissupplied,citation
omitted.)
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Clearly, the Court had since ruled that when the situation and matters contemplated in Sec. 25, Article XVIII obtains,i.e., when the subject
matterofaninternationalagreementinvolvesthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilities,atreatyisrequiredandthatthesame
mustbesubmittedtotheSenateforthelatter'sconcurrence.InBAYANv.Zamora,44theCourtheldthatSection25,ArticleXVIII,likeSection
21,ArticleVII,embodiesaphraseinthenegative,i.e.,"shallnotbeallowed"andtherefore,theconcurrenceoftheSenateisindispensableto
renderthetreatyorinternationalagreementvalidandeffective.
WhatthemajoritydidistocarveoutexceptionstoSection25,ArticleXVIIIwhennoneiscalledfor.
As previously discussed, the language of Section 25, Article XVIII is clear and unambiguous. The cardinal rule is that the plain, clear and
unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning. The
CourtalsoenunciatedinChavezv.JudicialandBarCouncilthat:
TheConstitutionevincesthedirectactionoftheFilipinopeoplebywhichthefundamentalpowersofgovernmentareestablished,
limitedanddefinedandbywhichthosepowersaredistributedamongtheseveraldepartmentsfortheirsafeandusefulexercisefor
thebenefitofthebodypolitic.TheFramersreposedtheirwisdomandvisionononesupremalextobetheultimateexpressionof
the principles and the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutionalprovisions,theCourtfirmlyreliesonthebasicpostulatethattheFramersmeanwhattheysay.Thelanguageused
in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in
the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modificationevenbythebranchtaskedtointerpretit.(Emphasissuppliedcitationomitted.)
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ThemajorityopinionpositsthattheEDCAisconsistentwiththecontent,purposeandframeworkoftheMDTandtheVFA.Assuch,themajority
arguesthattheEDCAmaybeintheformofanexecutiveagreementasitmerelyimplementstheprovisionsoftheMDTandtheVFA.
I disagree. Compared closely with the provisions of the MDT and the VFA, the EDCA transcends in scope and substance the subject matters
coveredbytheaforementionedtreaties.Otherwisestated,theEDCAisanentirelynewagreementuntoitself.
TheMDTinrelationtotheEDCA
WenotedinLimv.ExecutiveSecretary47thattheMDThasbeendescribedasthe"core"ofthedefenserelationshipbetweenthePhilippinesand
itstraditionalally,theUnitedStates.Theaimofthetreatyistoenhancethestrategicandtechnologicalcapabilitiesofourarmedforcesthrough
jointtrainingwithitsAmericancounterparts.
As explicitly pronounced in its declaration of policies, the MDT was entered into between the Philippines and the United States in order to
actualize their desire "to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination todefend themselves against
externalarmedattack"48and "further to strengthen their present efforts tocollectivedefensefor the preservation of peace and security
pendingthedevelopmentofamorecomprehensivesystemofregionalsecurityinthePacificarea."49
UnderArticleIIoftheMDT,thepartiesundertook"separatelyandjointlybyselfhelpandmutualaid"to"maintainanddeveloptheirindividual
andcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack."50ArticleIIIthereofstatesthatthepartiestothetreatyshall"consulttogetherfromtimetotime
regarding the implementation of [the] Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or
securityofeitherofthePartiesisthreatenedbyexternalarmedattackinthePacific."51
Moreover,ArticleIVstatesthattheindividualpartiestothetreaty"recognizesthatanarmedattackinthePacificareaoneitheroftheParties
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares thatit would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its
constitutionalprocess."52Thisprovisionhighlightstheneedforeachpartytofollowtheirrespectiveconstitutionalprocessesand,therefore,the
MDT is not a selfexecuting agreement. It follows that if the Philippines aims to implement the MDT in the manner that the majority opinion
suggests,suchimplementationmustadheretothemandateofSection25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution.
Also, under the above article, the parties are thereafter obligated to immediately report to the Security Council of the United Nations the
occurrenceofanysucharmedattackandallthemeasurestakenasresultthereof.SaidmeasuresshallbeterminatedwhentheSecurityCouncil
hastakenthemeasuresnecessarytorestoreandmaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.53ArticleVofthetreatyexplainedthat"anarmed
attackoneitherofthePartiesisdeemedtoincludeanarmedattackonthemetropolitanterritoryof either of the Parties, or on theisland
territoriesunderitsjurisdictioninthePacificoronitsarmedforces,publicvesselsoraircraftinthePacific."54
UnderArticleVIIIofthetreaty,thepartiesagreedthatthetreatyshallremaininforceindefinitelyandthateitherpartymayterminateitone
yearafternoticehasbeengiventotheotherparty.55
Clear from the foregoing provisions is that the thrust of the MDT pertains to the furtherance of the avowed purpose of the parties thereto of
maintaining and developing their individual and collective capacity to resist external armed attackonlyin the metropolitan territory of either
party or in their island territories in the Pacific Ocean.Accordingly, the territories of the parties other than those mentioned are not
coveredbytheMDT.
ConspicuouslyabsentfromtheMDTarespecificprovisionsregardingthepresenceinPhilippineterritorywhetherpermanentortemporaryof
foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities.TheMDTdidnotcontemplatethepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilitiesinourcountry
in view of the fact that it was already expressly covered by the MBA that was earlier entered into by the Philippines and the United States in
1947.Moreover,theMDTcontainsnodelegationofpowertothePresidenttoenterintoanagreementrelativetotheestablishmentofforeign
militarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinourcountry.TheMDTcannotalsobetreatedasallowinganexceptiontotherequirementsofSection25,
ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution,whichtookeffectin1987.Asexplainedabove,thereferencetoconstitutionalprocessesofeitherpartyinthe
MDTrendersitobligatorythatthePhilippinesfollowSection25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution.
Indeed, the MDT covers defensive measures to counter an armed attack against either of the parties' territories or armed forces but there is
nothingintheMDTthatspecificallyauthorizesthepresence,whethertemporaryorpermanent,ofaparty'sbases,troops,orfacilitiesintheother
party'sterritoryevenduringpeacetimeorinmereanticipationofanarmedattack.
On the other hand, the very clearcut focal point of the EDCA is the authority granted to the United States forces and contractors to have
unimpeded access to socalled Agreed Locations which can be anywhere in the Philippines and to build there military facilities and use the
sametoundertakevariousmilitaryactivities.TheverywordingoftheEDCAshowsthatitundoubtedlydealswiththepresenceofforeignmilitary
bases,troops,andfacilitiesinPhilippineterritory.
Thus,contrarytotheposturingofthemajority,thepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesprovidedundertheEDCAcannotbe
tracedtotheMDT.Moreover,thegeneralprovisionsoftheMDTcannotprevailoverthecategoricalandspecificprovisionofSection25,Article
XVIIIoftheConstitution.
Aswillbefurtherhighlightedinthesucceedingdiscussion,theEDCAcreatesnewrights,privilegesandobligationsbetweenthepartiesthereto.
TheVFAinrelationtotheEDCA
WithrespecttotheVFA,theEDCAlikewisesurpassestheprovisionsofthesaidformertreaty.
TheVFAprimarilydealswiththesubjectofallowingelementsoftheUnitedStatesarmedforcestovisitthePhilippinesfromtimetotimefor
thepurposeofconductingactivities,approvedbythePhilippinegovernment,inlinewiththepromotionandprotectionofthecommonsecurity
interestsofbothcountries.
In the case of BAYAN v. Zamora,56 the Court ruled that the VFA "defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines," "provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel," and "defines the rights of the United States and the
Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,
materialsandsupplies."
WelikewisereiteratedinLimv.ExecutiveSecretary,57that:
TheVFAprovidesthe"regulatorymechanism"bywhich"UnitedStatesmilitaryandcivilianpersonnel[mayvisit]temporarilyin
the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government." It contains provisions relative to entry and
departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation,
movementofvesselsandaircraft,aswellasthedurationoftheagreementanditstermination.ItistheVFAwhichgivescontinued
relevancetotheMDTdespitethepassageofyears.Itsprimarygoalistofacilitatethepromotionofoptimalcooperationbetween
AmericanandPhilippinemilitaryforcesintheeventofanattackbyacommonfoe.
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To a certain degree, the VFA is already an amplification of the MDT in that it allows the presence ofvisiting foreign troops for cooperative
activitiesinpeacetime.Thus,inlinewiththemandateofSection25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution,theVFAisembodiedinatreatyconcurred
inbytheSenate.
Inparticular,thecoverageoftheVFAisasfollows:
1)
The admission of United States personnel and their departure from Philippines in
connectionwithactivitiescoveredbytheagreement,andthegrantofexemption
toUnitedStatespersonnelfrompassportandvisaregulationsuponenteringand
departingfromthePhilippines58
2)
The validity of the driver's license or permit issued by the United States, thus
givingUnitedStatespersonneltheauthoritytooperatemilitaryorofficialvehicles
withinthePhilippines59
3)
The rights of the Philippines and the United States in matters of criminal
jurisdiction over United States personnel who commit offenses within the
PhilippineterritoryandpunishableunderPhilippinelaws60
4)
The importation and exportation of equipment, materials, supplies and other

property,byUnitedStatespersonnelfreefromPhilippineduties,taxesandsimilar
charges61
5)
The movement of United States aircrafts, vessels and vehicles within Philippine
territory62and
6)
Thedurationandterminationoftheagreement.63
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Incontrast,theEDCAspecificallydealswiththefollowingmatters:
1)
TheauthorityoftheUnitedStatesforcestoaccessfacilitiesandareas,termedas
"AgreedLocations,"andtheactivitiesthatmaybeallowedtherein64
2)
The grant to the United States of operational control of Agreed Locations to do

constructionactivitiesandmakealterationsorimprovementsthereon65
3)
The conditional access to the Agreed Locations of the Philippine Designated

Authorityanditsauthorizedrepresentative66
4)
The storage and prepositioning of defense equipment, supplies and materiel, as

well as the unimpeded access granted to the United States contractors to the
Agreed Locations in matters regarding the prepositioning, storage, delivery,
management, inspection, use, maintenance and removal of the defense
equipment, supplies, and materiel and the prohibition that the preposition
materielshallnotincludenuclearweapons67
5)
a)TheownershipoftheAgreedLocationsbythePhilippines,b)theownershipof
the equipment, materiel, supplies, relocatable structures and other moveable
propertyimportedoracquiredbytheUnitedStates,c)theownershipanduseof
thebuildings,nonrelocatablestructures,andassembliesaffixedtothelandinside
theAgreedLocations68
6)
The cooperation between the parties in taking measures to ensure protection,

safety and security of United States forces, contractors and information in
Philippine territory the primary responsibility of the Philippines to secure the
Agreed Locations, and the right of the United States to exercise all rights and
authorities within the Agreed Locations that are necessary for their operational
controlordefense69
7)
Theuseofwater,electricityandotherpublicutilities70
8)
The use of the radio spectrum in connection with the operation of a

telecommunicationssystembytheUnitedStates71
9)
The authority granted to the of the United States to contract for any materiel,
supplies, equipment, and services (including construction) to be furnished or
undertakeninsidePhilippineterritory72
10) The protection of the environment and human health and safety, and the
observance of Philippine laws on environment and health, and the prohibition
against the intentional release of hazardous waste by the United States and the
containmentofthereofineaseaspilloccurs73
11) The need to execute implementing arrangements to address details concerning
the presence of United States forces at the Agreed Locations and the functional
relationsbetweentheUnitedStatesforcesandtheAFPwithrespecttotheAgreed
Locations74and
12) The resolution of disputes arising from the EDCA through consultation between
theparties.75
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Initially,whatisabundantlyclearwiththeforegoingenumerationisthattheEDCAisanentirelynewcreation.TheprovisionsoftheEDCAarenot
foundinorhavenocorrespondingprovisionsintheVFA.Theycoverentirelydifferentsubjectmattersandtheycreatenewanddistinctrightsand
obligationsonthepartofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStates.
Furthermore, as to the nature of the presence of foreign military troops in this country, the VFA is explicit in its characterization that it is an
agreement between the governments of the Philippines and the United States regarding the treatment of United States Armed
ForcesvisitingthePhilippines.ThePreambleoftheVFAlikewiseexpresslyprovidesthat,"notingthatfromtimetotimeelementsoftheUnited
States armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines"76 and "recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States
personnelvisitingtheRepublicofthePhilippines"77thepartiestotheVFAagreedtoenterintothesaidtreaty.Theuseofthewordvisitisvery
telling.Initsordinaryusage,tovisitisto"staytemporarilywith(someone)orat(aplace)asaguestortourist"orto"gotosee(someoneor
something)foraspecificpurpose."78Thus,thewordvisitimpliesthetemporarinessorimpermanenceofthepresenceataspecificlocation.
On the other hand, under the EDCA, United States forces and United States contractors are permitted to stay in the Agreed Locations to
undertake military activities thereinwithout any clear limitation as to the duration of their stay. Moreover, they are given unimpeded
accesstoAgreedLocationstoconductdifferentactivitiesthatdefinitelywerenotcontemplatedundertheVFA.
The Court's ruling inLim v. Executive Secretary79provides some insights as to the scope of activities germane to the intention of the VFA.
Thus:
The first question that should be addressed is whether "Balikatan 021" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement. To resolve
this,itisnecessarytorefertotheVFAitself.Notmuchhelpcanbehadtherefrom,unfortunately,sincetheterminologyemployed
isitselfthesourceoftheproblem.TheVFApermitsUnitedStatespersonneltoengage,onanimpermanentbasis,in"activities,"
theexactmeaningofwhichwasleftundefined.Theexpressionisambiguous,permittingawidescopeofundertakingssubjectonly
to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that
UnitedStatespersonnelmust"abstainfromanyactivityinconsistentwiththespiritofthisagreement,andinparticular,fromany
politicalactivity."Allotheractivities,inotherwords,arefairgame.
xxxx
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word"activities"arose from
accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner,
visitingUSforcesmaysojourninPhilippineterritoryforpurposesotherthanmilitary.Asconceived,thejointexercisesmayinclude
trainingonnewtechniquesofpatrolandsurveillancetoprotectthenation'smarineresources,seasearchandrescueoperationsto
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and
humanitarianmissions,andthelike.
Undertheseauspices,theVFAgiveslegitimacytothecurrentBalikatanexercises.Itisonlylogicaltoassumethat"Balikatan02
1,"a"mutualantiterrorismadvising,assistingandtrainingexercise,"fallsundertheumbrellaofsanctionedorallowableactivities
in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combatrelatedactivities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant
petition,areindeedauthorized.(Emphasessupplied,citationsomitted.)
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TheabovediscussionclearlyshowsthattheVFAwasintendedfornoncombatactivitiesonly.
In the instant case, the OSG averred that the entry of the United States forces into the Agreed Location is borne out of "military
necessity."80Military necessity means the necessity attending belligerent military operations that is held to justify all measures necessary to
bringanenemytocompletesubmissionexcludingthose(ascruelty,torture,poison,perfidy,wantondestruction)thatareforbiddenbymodern
lawsandcustomsofwar.81
In the instant case, some of the activities that the United States forces will undertake within the Agreed Locations such as prepositioning of
defense equipment, supplies and materiel, and deploying of forces and materiel are actual military measures supposedly put into place in
anticipationofbattle.Toprepositionmeans"toplacemilitaryunits,equipment,orsuppliesatornearthepointofplanneduseoratadesignated
location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of a specific force during initial phases of an operation."82On the other hand,
materielisdefinedas"allitemsnecessarytoequip,operate,maintain,andsupportmilitaryactivitieswithoutdistinctionastoitsapplicationfor
administrativeorcombatpurposes."83Also,todeploymeans"toplaceorarrange(armedforces)inbattledispositionorformationorinlocations
appropriatefortheirfutureemployment."84Deploymentalsomeans"therotationofforcesintoandoutofanoperationalarea."85
TheEDCAlikewiseallowstheconstructionofpermanentbuildings,whichtheUnitedStatesforcescanutilizeuntilsuchtimethattheynolonger
needtheusethereof.Theconstructionofpermanentbuildings,includingthealterationorimprovementbytheUnitedStatesofexistingbuildings,
structures and assemblies affixed to the land, are certainly necessary not only for the accommodation of its troops, bunkering of vessels,
maintenanceofitsvehicles,butalsothecreationoftheproperfacilitiesforthestorageandprepositioningofitsdefensemateriel.Thisgrantof
authority to construct new buildings and the improvement of existing buildings inside the Agreed Locations which buildings are to be used
indefinitelyfurtherevincesthepermanentnatureofthestayofUnitedStatesforcesandcontractorsinthiscountryundertheEDCA.Thisisa
farcryfromthetemporaryvisitsofUnitedStatesarmedforcescontemplatedintheVFA.
Moreover,asidefromagreementsthatthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesmaysubsequentlyenterintowithrespecttotheaccessoftheUnited
StatesforcesintheAgreedLocationsona"rotationalbasis,"86andotheractivitiesthattheUnitedStatesmayconducttherein,87theEDCAalso
contains provisions requiring the execution of further "implementing arrangements" with regard to description of the Agreed Locations,88 "
[funding] for construction, development, operation and maintenance costs at the Agreed Locations,"89 and "additional details concerning the
presence of the United States forces at the Agreed Locations and the functional relations between the United States forces and the AFP with
respecttoAgreedLocations."90
Article 11(4) of the EDCA states that the Agreed Locations shall be provided by the Philippine GovernmentthroughtheAFP. What is readily
apparentfromsaidarticleisthattheAFPisgivenabroaddiscretiontoenterintoagreementswiththeUnitedStateswithrespecttotheAgreed
Locations.ThegrantofsuchdiscretiontotheAFPiswithoutanyguideline,limitation,orstandardastothesize,area,location,boundariesand
even the number of Agreed Locations to be provided to the United States forces. As there is no sufficient standard in the EDCA itself, and no
meanstodeterminethelimitsofauthoritygranted,theAFPcanexerciseunfetteredpowerthatmayhavegraveimplicationsonnationalsecurity.
TheinterventionoftheSenatethroughtheconstitutionallyordainedtreatymakingprocessindefiningthenewnationalpolicyconcerningUnited
States access to Agreed Locations enunciated in the EDCA, which has never been before expressly or impliedly authorized,
isimperativeandindispensibleforthevalidityandeffectivityoftheEDCA.
The above distinctions between the EDCA and the VFA, therefore, negate the OSG's argument that the EDCA merely involves "adjustments in
detail"oftheVFA.Tomymind,theEDCAisthegeneralframeworkfortheaccessanduseoftheAgreedLocationsbytheUnitedStatesforces
andcontractorsratherthananimplementinginstrumentofboththeMDTandtheVFA.
Asstatedabove,Section25,ArticleXVIIIcontemplatesthreedifferentsituations:atreatyconcerningtheallowancewithinthePhilippinesof(a)
foreign military bases, (b) foreign military troops, or (c) foreign military facilities, such that a treaty that involves any of these three standing
alonewouldfallwithinthecoverageofthesaidprovision.TheVFAclearlycontemplatesonlyvisitsofforeignmilitarytroops.
The VFA, which allows the presence of the units of the United States military troops, cannot by any stretch of the imagination include any
arrangement that practically allows the establishment of United States militarybasesorfacilitiesin the socalled Agreed Locations under the
EDCA.Thus,theEDCAgoesfarbeyondthearrangementcontemplatedbytheVFAandthereforeitnecessarilyrequiresSenateconcurrenceas
mandatedbySection25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution.Inthesamevein,theinitialentryofUnitedStatestroopsundertheVFAcannot,as
postulatedbytheponencia,justifya"treatyauthorized"presenceundertheEDCA,sincethepresencecontemplatedintheEDCAalsopertainsto
theestablishmentofforeignmilitarybasesorfacilities,andnotmerelyvisitingtroops.
TheargumentthattheentryoftheUnitedStatesbases,troopsandfacilitiesundertheEDCAisalreadyallowedinviewofthe"initialentry"of
UnitedStatestroopsundertheVFAglaringlyignoresthattheentryofvisitingforeignmilitarytroopsisdistinctandseparatefromthepresenceor
establishmentofforeignmilitarybasesorfacilitiesinthecountryunderSection25,ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitution.
Toreiterate,theEDCAisentirelyanewtreaty,separateanddistinctfromtheVFAandtheMDT.Hence,itmustsatisfytherequirementsunder
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution. The Senate itself issued Resolution No. 105 on November 10, 2015, whereby it expressed its
"definite stand on the nonnegotiable power of the Senate to decide whether a treaty will be valid and effective depending on the Senate
concurrence"andresolved"thattheRPUSEDCA[isa]treaty[that]requiresSenateconcurrenceinordertobevalidandeffective."
Incidentally,withrespecttotheVFA,thereisadifferenceofopinionwhetherornotthesameisanimplementingagreementoftheMDT,asthe
latterdoesnotconferauthorityupontheUnitedStatesPresident(orthePhilippinePresident)toenterintoanexecutiveagreementtoimplement
saidtreaties.Still,inNicolasv.Romulo,91theCourtnotedthateveniftheVFAwastreatedasanimplementingagreementoftheMDT,theVFA
wassubmittedtotheSenateforconcurrence.
By no means should this opinion be construed as one questioning the President's intention and effort to protect our national territory and
security.However,inthecaseofTawangMultipurposeCooperativev.LaTrinidadWaterDistrict92theCourtsaid:
Thereisno"reasonableandlegitimate"groundtoviolatetheConstitution.TheConstitutionshouldneverbeviolatedbyanyone.
Rightorwrong,thePresident,Congress,theCourt,xxxhavenochoicebuttofollowtheConstitution.Anyact,howevernoble
itsintentions,isvoidifitviolatestheConstitution.Thisruleisbasic.
InSocialJusticeSociety, the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."
InSabio,theCourtheldthat,"theConstitutionisthehighestlawoftheland.Itis'thebasicandparamountlawtowhichxxxall
persons,includingthehighestofficialsoftheland,mustdefer.Noactshallbevalid,howevernobleitsintentions,ifitconflictswith
theConstitution.'"inBengzonv.Drilon,the Court held that, "the three branches of government must discharge their respective
functionswithinthelimitsof.authorityconferredbytheConstitution."InMutucv.CommissiononElections,theCourtheldthat,
"The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no
choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution's] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed."(Emphasessupplied,citationsomitted.)
cralawlawlibrary
A final word. While it is true that the Philippines cannot stand alone and will need friends within and beyond this region of the world, still we
cannotoffendourConstitutionandbargainawayoursovereignty.
Accordingly,Ivotetogranttheconsolidatedpetitions.
Endnotes:
1The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon and Others, 3 Law. ed., 287, 293 cited inDizon v. Commanding General of the Phil.
RyukusCommand,U.S.Army,81Phil.286,292(1948).
2BAYAN(BagongAlyansangMakabayan)v.Zamora,396Phil.623,654655(2000).
3Id.at653.
4Id.at650654.
5TheCourtexplainedinNicolasv.Romulo(598Phil.262,279280[2009])that:"[U]nderthePhilippineBillof1902,whichlaid
thebasisforthePhilippineCommonwealthand,eventually,fortherecognitionofindependence,theUnitedStatesagreedtocede
to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm,
exceptcertainnavalportsand/ormilitarybasesandfacilities,whichtheUnitedStatesretainedforitself.
Thisisnoteworthy,becausewhatthismeansisthatClarkandSubicandtheotherplacesinthePhilippinescoveredbytheRPUS
MilitaryBasesAgreementof1947werenotPhilippineterritory,astheywereexcludedfromthecessionandretainedbytheUS.
xxxx
Subsequently,theUnitedStatesagreedtoturnoverthesebasestothePhilippinesandwiththeexpirationoftheRPUSMilitary
BasesAgreementin1991,theterritorycoveredbythesebaseswerefinallycededtothePhilippines."
6MilitaryBasesAgreement(March14,1947),ArticleI,whichprovides:ArticleIGRANTOFBASES
1.TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines(hereinafterreferredtoasthePhilippines)grantstotheGovernmentofthe
UnitedStatesofAmerica(hereinafterreferredtoastheUnitedStates)therighttoretaintheuseofthebasesinthePhilippines
listedinAnnexAattachedhereto.
2.ThePhilippinesagreestopermittheUnitedStates,uponnoticetothePhilippines,tousesuchofthosebaseslistedinAnnexB
astheUnitedStatesdeterminestoberequiredbymilitarynecessity.
3.ThePhilippinesagreestoenterintonegotiationswiththeUnitedStatesatthelatter'srequest,topermittheUnitedStatesto
expandsuchbases,toexchangesuchbasesforotherbases,toacquireadditionalbases,orrelinquishrightstobases,asanyof
suchexigenciesmayberequiredbymilitarynecessity.
4. A narrative description of the boundaries of the bases to which this Agreement relates is given in Annex A and Annex B. An
exact description of the bases listed in Annex A, with metes and bounds, in conformity with the narrative descriptions, will be
agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments as soon as possible. With respect to any of the bases
listedinAnnexB,anexactdescriptionwithmetesandbounds,inconformitywiththenarrativedescriptionofsuchbases,willbe
agreeduponifandwhensuchbasesareacquiredbytheUnitedStates.
7Id,ArticleIII(l).
8Id,ArticleXXIX.
9ArticlesIVandVoftheMutualDefenseTreaty(August30,1951)provides:
ARTICLEIV
EachPartyrecognizesthatanarmedattackinthePacificAreaoneitherofthePartieswouldbedangeroustoitsownpeaceand
safetyanddeclaresthatitwouldacttomeetthecommondangersinaccordancewithitsconstitutionalprocess.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the
United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and
maintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.ARTICLEV
ForthepurposeofArticleIV,anarmedattackoneitherofthePartiesisdeemedtoincludeanarmedattackonthemetropolitan
territoryofeitheroftheParties,orontheislandterritoriesunderitsjurisdictioninthePacificoronitsarmedforces,publicvessels
oraircraftinthePacific.
10MutualDefenseTreaty(August30,1951),ArticleVIII.
11IVRECORDOFTHECONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION,pp.661662.
12BAYANv.Zamora,supranote2.
13VisitingForcesAgreement(February10,1998),ArticleIII.
14Id.,ArticleI.
15Id.,ArticleVII.
16Id.,ArticleVII.
17Id.,ArticleVIII.
18Id.,ArticleV.
19Id.,ArticleIX.Supranote2.Supranote5.
22"United States forces" means the entity comprising United States personnel and all property, equipment and materiel of the
UnitedStatesArmedForcespresentintheterritoryofthePhilippines.[EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement,Article11(2).]
23EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement,Article1(3).
24Id.,Article111(3).
25Id.,Article11(5)states:
5. "Designated Authorities" means, respectively, the Philippine Department of National Defense, unless the Philippines otherwise
provides written notice to the United States, and the United States Department of Defense, unless the United States otherwise
provideswrittennoticetothePhilippines.
27Id,Article111(4).
28Id.,ArticleV(4).
29Id,ArticleVII(l).
30Id.ArticleVII(2).
31Id,ArticleVl(3).
32Id.,ArticleIV(l).
33Id.,ArticleIV(3).
34Id.,ArticleIIdefinesUnitedStatescontractorsas:
3."UnitedStatescontractors"meanscompaniesandfirms,andtheiremployees,undercontractorsubcontracttooronbehalfof
the United States Department of Defense. United States contractors are not included as part of the definition of United States
personnelinthisAgreement,includingwithinthecontextoftheVFA.
35Id.,ArticleIV(4).
36Id.,ArticleV(3).
37AnnexesAandBreferredtoundertheMBAincludedthefollowingmilitarybasesinthePhilippines,namely:ClarkFieldAirBase,
PampangaMarivelesMilitaryReservation,POLTerminalandTrainingArea,BataanCampJohnHayLeaveandRecreationCenter,
Baguio Subic Bay, Northwest Shore Naval Base, Zambales Province, and the existing Naval reservation at Olongapo and the
existing Baguio Naval Reservation CanacaoSangley Point Navy Base, Cavite Province Mactan Island Army and Navy Air Base
Florida Blanca Air Base, Pampanga Camp Wallace, San Fernando, La Union and Aparri Naval Air Base, among others. (Military
BasesAgreement[March14,1947].)
38EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement,ArticleXII(4).
39BAYANv.Zamora,supranote2at653.
40Id.at657.
41113Phil.333,338(1961).
42656Phil.246,271272(2011).
43Id.at273.
44Supranote2.
45SorianoIIIv.Lista,447Phil.566,570(2003).
46G.R.No.202242,April16,2013,696SCRA496,507508.
47430Phil.555,571572(2002).
48MutualDefenseTreaty,Preamble,paragraph3.
49Id.,Preamble,paragraph4.
50Id.,ArticleII.
51Id.,ArticleIII.
52Id.,ArticleIV,firstparagraph.Id.,ArticleIV,secondparagraph.
54Id.,ArticleV.
55Id.,ArticleVII.
56Supranote2at652.
57Supranote47at572.
58VisitingForcesAgreement,ArticleIII.
59Id.,ArticleIV.
60Id.,ArticleV.
61Id.,ArticleVII.
62Id.,ArticleVIII.
63Id.,ArticleIX.
64EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement,ArticleII.
67Id.,ArticleIV.
68Id.,ArticleV.
69Id.,ArticleVI.
70Id.,ArticleVII(l).
71Id.,ArticleVII(2).
72Id.,ArticleVIII.
73Id.,ArticleIX.
74Id.,ArticleX.
75Id.,ArticleXI.
76VisitingForcesAgreement,Preamble,thirdparagraph.
77Id.,fifthparagraph.
78http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/visit.AccessedonDecember14,2015,5:30P.M.
79Supranote47at572575.
80Rollo(G.R.No.212444),p.481.
81Webster'sThirdNewInternationalDictionary[1993].
82http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf.AccessedonDecember11,2015,11:48A.M.
83http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf.AccessedonDecember11,2015,11:48A.M.
84Webster'sThirdNewInternationalDictionary[1993].
85http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf.AccessedonDecember11,2015,12:36P.M.
86EnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement,Article1(1)(b).
87Id.,ArticleIII(l).
88Id.,Article11(4).
90Id.,ArticleX(3).
91ChiefJusticeReynatoS.PunoandJusticeCarpiosubmittedstirringdissentingopinionswhichassailtheconstitutionalityofthe
VFAonitsbeingunenforceableduetotheabsenceofratificationbytheUSSenate.
92661Phil.390,406(2011).
DISSENTINGOPINION
BRION,J.:
Before this Court is the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement(EDCA), an executive agreement with
theUnitedStatesofAmerica(U.S.)thattheExecutiveDepartmententeredintoandratifiedonJune6,2014.1
Thiscaseisnotaneasyonetoresolveformanyreasonsthestakesinvolvedinlightofcontemporaryhistory,thelimitedreachof
judicialinquiry,thelimitsoftheCourt'sownlegalcompetenceinfullyactingonpetitionsbeforeit,andtheplainandcleartermsof
our Constitution. While the petitions, the comments, and the ponencia all extensively dwell on constitutional, statutory, and
internationallaw,theconstitutionalchallengecannotberesolvedbasedsolelyonourconsiderationoftheConstitutionnorthrough
theprismofPhilippinenationalinterestconsiderations,bothexpressedandthoseleftunspokeninthesecases.Inourglobalized
world where Philippine interests have long been intersecting with those of others in the world, the country's externalities the
international and regional situations and conditions must as well be considered as operating background from where the
Philippinesmustdeterminewhereitsnationalinterestslie.
From the practical point of view of these externalities and the violation of Philippine territorial sovereignty that some of us have
expressed,aquickdecisionmayimmediatelysuggestitselfletusdoawaywithallstopsanddowhatwemusttoprotect
oursovereigntyandnationalintegrity.
WhatrendersthiskindofresolutiondifficulttoundertakeistheviolationofourownConstitutiontheexpressmanifestationofthe
collectivewilloftheFilipinopeoplethatmaytranspireifwesimplyembracetheprofferedeasysolutions.Ourhistorytellsusthat
wecannotsimplyturnablindeyetoourConstitutionwithoutcompromisingtheverysameintereststhatweasanationwantto
protectthroughadecisionthatlooksonlyattheimmediatepracticalview.TolightlyregardourConstitutionnowaswedidinthe
past,istoopenthewaytofutureweightiertransgressionsthatmayultimatelybeattheexpenseoftheFilipinopeople.
It is with these thoughts that this Opinion has been written: I hope to consider all the interests involved and thereby achieve a
resultthatbalancestheimmediatewiththelongviewoftheconcernsbesettingthenation.
Iammindful,ofcourse,thattherequiredactionsthatwouldactivelyserveournationalinterestsdepend,toalargeextent,onthe
political departments of government the Executive and, to some extent, the Legislature.2The Judiciary has only one assigned
role to ensure that the Constitution is followed and, in this manner, ensure that the Filipino people's larger interests, as
expressedintheConstitution,areprotected.3Smallthoughthiscontributionmaybe,letthoseofusfromtheJudiciarydoourpart
andbecounted.
I.THECASE
I.A.ThePetitions
ThechallengestotheEDCAcomefromseveralpetitionsthatuniformlyquestionbasedonArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe1987
ConstitutiontheuseofanexecutiveagreementasthemediumfortheagreementwiththeU.S.Thepetitionerspositthat
the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops, and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty
They question substantive EDCA provisions as well, particularly the grant of telecommunication and tax privileges to the U.S.
armed forces and its personnel4 the constitutional ban against the presence and storage of nuclear weapons within the
Philippines5theviolationoftheconstitutionalmandatetoprotecttheenvironment6thedeprivationbytheEDCAoftheexercise
bytheSupremeCourtofitspowerofjudicialreview7theviolationoftheconstitutionalpolicyonthepreferentialuseofFilipino
laborandmaterials8the violation of the constitutional command to pursue an independent foreign policy9the violation of the
constitutionalprovisionontheautonomyoflocalgovernmentunits10andofNationalBuildingCode11and,lastbutnottheleast,
theyquestiontheEDCAforbeingaonesidedagreementinfavoroftheAmericans.12
I.B.TheRespondents'Positions
Therespondents,throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG),respondbyquestioningthepetitionersonthethresholdissues
ofjusticiability,prematurityandstanding,andbyinvokingtheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.13
TheOSGclaimsaswellthattheEDCAisproperlyembodiedinanexecutiveagreementasitisanexerciseofthePresident'spower
anddutytoserveandprotectthepeople,andofhiscommanderinchiefpowers14thatthepracticalconsiderationsofthecase
requires a deferential review of executive decisions over national security15that the EDCA is merely in implementation of two
previoustreatiestheMutualDefenseTreatyof1951(1951MDT)andtheVisitingForcesAgreementof1998(1998VFA)16that
thePresidentmaychoosetheformoftheagreement,providedthattheagreementdealingwithforeignmilitarybases,troops,or
facilitiesisnottheprincipalagreementthatfirstallowedtheirentryorpresenceinthePhilippines.
I.C.ThePonencia
TheponenciaexhaustivelydiscussesmanyaspectsofthechallengesinitssupportoftheOSGpositions.ItholdsthatthePresident
isthechiefimplementorofthelawandhasthedutytodefendtheState,andforthesepurposes,hemayusethesepowersinthe
conductofforeignrelations17evenifthesepowersarenotexpresslygrantedbythelawinthisregard,heisjustifiedbynecessity
andislimitedonlybythelawsincehemusttakethenecessaryandproperstepstocarrythelawintoexecution.
The ponencia further asserts that the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities,if
(a)itisnottheinstrumentthatallowsthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesor
(b)itmerelyaimstoimplementanexistinglawortreaty.18
Itaddsthatthe1951MDTisnotanobsoletetreaty19thatthe1998VFAhasalreadyallowedtheentryofU.S.troopsandcivilian
personnelandisthetreatybeingimplementedbytheEDCA20thatthePresidentmaygenerallyenterintoexecutiveagreements
subject to the limitations defined by the Constitution, in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate21that the
PresidentcanchoosetoagreetotheEDCAeitherbywayofanexecutiveagreementorbytreaty.22WhileitcomparestheEDCA
withthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA,itclaimsatthesametimeitmerelyimplementsthesetreaties.23
On the exercise of its power of judicial review, the ponencia posits that the Court does not look into whether an international
agreementshouldbeintheformofatreatyoranexecutiveagreement,saveinthecasesinwhichtheConstitutionorastatute
requiresotherwise24thatthetaskoftheCourtistodeterminewhethertheinternationalagreementisconsistentwithapplicable
limitations25andthatexecutiveagreementsmaycoverthematterofforeignmilitaryforcesifthesemerelyinvolveadjustmentsof
details.26
I.D.TheDissent
Idissent,asIdisagreethatanexecutiveagreementisthepropermediumforthematterscoveredbytheEDCA.The
EDCAisanagreementthat,ondeeperexamination,violatestheletterandspiritofArticleXVIII,Section25andArticleVII,Section
21,bothoftheConstitution.
TheEDCAshouldbeintheformofatreatyasitbringsbacktothePhilippines
themodernequivalentoftheforeignmilitarybaseswhosetermexpiredin1991andwhichArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe
Constitutiondirectlyaddresses
foreigntroopsunderarrangementsoutsideofthecontemplationofthevisitingforcesthatthe1998VFAallowsand
militaryfacilitiesthat,undermodernmilitarystrategy,likewisecanbebroughtinonlythroughatreaty.
Astheponenciadoes, I shall discuss the background facts and the threshold issues that will enablethe Court and the reading public to fully
appreciate the constitutional issues before us, as well as my reasons for the conclusion that the EDCA, as an executive agreement, is
constitutionallydeficient.
Ipurposelyconfinemyselftotheterm"constitutionallydeficient"(insteadofsaying"unconstitutional")inlightofmyviewthat
the procedural deficiency that plagues the EDCA as an executive agreement is remediable and can still be addressed. Also on
purpose,IrefrainfromcommentingonthesubstantiveobjectionsonthecontentsoftheEDCAforthereasonsexplainedbelow.
II.THETHRESHOLDISSUES
The petitioners bring their challenges before this Court on the basis of their standing as citizens, taxpayers, and former legislators. The
respondents, on the other hand, question the justiciability of the issues raised and invoke as well thepolitical question doctrineto secure the
prompt dismissal of the petitions. I shall deal with these preliminary issues below, singly and in relation with one another, in light of the
commonalitythatthesethresholdissuescarry.
ThepetitionerspositthattheuseofanexecutiveagreementasthemediumtocarryEDCAintoeffect,violatesArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe
1987Constitutionandisanissueoftranscendentalimportancethatthey,ascitizens,canraisebeforetheSupremeCourt.27(Significantly,the
incumbentSenatorsarenotdirectparticipantsinthiscaseandonlybelatedlyreflectedtheirinstitutionalsentimentsthroughaResolution.)28The
petitionersinG.R.No.212444alsoclaimthattheconstitutionalityoftheEDCAinvolvestheassertionandprotectionofapublicright,inwhich
theyhaveapersonalinterestasaffectedmembersofthegeneralpublic.29
ThepetitionerslikewiseclaimthattheEDCArequiresthedisbursementofpublicfundsandthewaiverofthepaymentoftaxes,feesandrentals
thus,thepetitionershavethestandingtosueastaxpayers.30
They lastly claim that the exchange of notes between the Philippines' Department of National Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and U.S.
AmbassadorPhilipGoldberg31thefinalsteptowardstheimplementationoftheEDCArenderedthepresentedissuesripeforadjudication.
The respondents, in response, assert that the petitioners lack standing,32and that the petitions raise political questions that are outside the
Court'sjurisdictiontoresolve.33
Theyalsoarguethattheissuesthepetitionsraisearepremature.34TheEDCArequiresthecreationofseparateagreementstocarryoutseparate
activities such as joint exercises, the prepositioning of materiel, or construction activities. At present, these separate agreements do not exist.
Thus,therespondentsstatethatthepetitionersareonlyspeculatingthattheagreementstobeforgedundertheEDCAwouldviolateourlaws.
Thesespeculationscannotbethebasisforaconstitutionalchallenge.
II.A.LocusStandi
TheponenciaholdsthatthepetitionersdonothavetherequisitestandingtoquestiontheconstitutionalityoftheEDCA,butchoosestogivedue
course to the petitions because of the transcendental importance of the issues these petitions raise.35In effect, theponencia takes a liberal
approachinappreciatingthethresholdissueoflocusstandi.
Iagreewiththeponencia'sultimateconclusionsonthethresholdissuesraised.IagreeaswellthatajusticiableissueexiststhattheCourtcan
passupon,althoughonbothcountsIdifferfromtheponencia'slineofreasoning.Letmepointoutattheoutset,too,thatjudicialreviewisonly
anexerciseofthewiderjudicialpowerthatArticleVIII,Section1oftheConstitutiongrantsanddefines.Oneshouldnotbeconfusedwiththe
other.
JudicialreviewispartoftheexerciseofjudicialpowerunderArticleVIII,Section1oftheConstitution,particularlywhenitisexercisedunderthe
judiciary's expanded power (i.e.,when courts pass upon the actions of other agencies of government for the grave abuse of discretion they
committed), or when the Supreme Court reviews, on appeal or certiorari, the constitutionality or validity of any law or other governmental
instrumentsunderSection5(2)(a)and(b)ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution.
A basic requirement is the existence of anactualcaseorcontroversythat, viewed correctly, is a limit on the exercise of judicial power or the
morespecificpowerofjudicialreview.36
Whethersuchcaseorcontroversyexistsdependsontheexistenceofalegalrightandtheviolationofthisright,givingrisetoadisputebetween
oramongadverseparties.37Under the expanded power of judicial review, the actual case or controversy arises when an official or agency of
governmentisallegedtohavecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionintheexerciseofitsfunctions.38
Locus standi is a requirement for the exercise of judicial review39 and is in fact an aspect of the actual case or controversy requirement
viewedfromtheprismofthecomplainingpartywhoserighthasbeenviolated.40
Whenaviolationofaprivaterightisasserted,thelocusstandirequirementissharpandnarrowbecausetheclaimofviolationaccruesonlyto
thecomplainantorthepetitionerwhoserightisallegedtohavebeenviolated.41
Ontheotherhand,whenaviolationofapublicrightisassertedi.e.,arightthatbelongstothepublicingeneralandwhoseviolationultimately
affectseverymemberofthepublicthelocusstandirequirementcannotbesharpornarrowitmustcorrespondinwidthtotherightviolated.
Thus,thestandingofevenaplaincitizensufficientlyabletobringandsupportasuit,shouldberecognizedasheorshecanthenbedeemedto
beactinginrepresentationofthegeneralpublic.42
Transcendentalimportanceisaconcept(amuchabusedone)thathasbeenappliedinconsideringtherequirementsfortheexerciseofjudicial
power.43To be sure, it may find application when a public right is involved because a right that belongs to the general public cannot but be
important.44Whethertheimportancerisestothelevelofbeingtranscendentalisasubjectiveelementthatdependsontheuser'sappreciationof
thedescriptiveword"transcendental"oronhisorhercalibrationofthedisputedissues'levelofimportance.
Ineithercase,theuseoftranscendentalimportanceasajustificationisrepletewithrisksofabuseassubjectiveevaluationisinvolved.45Tobe
sure,thislevelofimportancecanbeusedasjustificationinconsideringlocusstandiwithliberality,46butit can never be an excuse to find an
actual controversy when there is none.To hold otherwise is to give the courts an unlimited opportunity for the exercise of judicial power a
situationthatisoutsidetheConstitution'sintentinthegrantofjudicialpower.
Inthepresentcases,aviolationoftheConstitution,noless,isallegedbythepetitionersthroughthecommissionofgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Theviolationpotentiallyaffectsournationalsovereignty,security,anddefense,andtheintegrityoftheConstitutionconcernsthattouchonthe
livesofthecitizensaswellasontheintegrityandsurvivalofthenation.Inparticular,theyinvolvethenation'scapabilityforselfdefensethe
potential hazards the nation may face because of our officials' decisions on defense and national security matters and our sovereignty as a
nationaswellastheintegrityoftheConstitutionthatallcitizens,includingthehighestofficials,mustprotect.
In these lights, I believe that the issues involved in the present case are so important that a plain citizen sufficiently knowledgeable of the
outstandingissues,shouldbeallowedtosue.Thepetitionerssomeofwhomarerecognizedlegalluminariesorarenotedfortheiractivismon
constitutionalmattersshouldthusberecognizedaspartieswithproperstandingtofileandpursuetheirpetitionsbeforethisCourt.
II.B.RipenessoftheIssuesRaisedforAdjudication
Iagreewiththeponencia'sconclusionthatthecasesbeforethisCourt,totheextenttheyareanchoredontheneedforSenateconcurrence,are
ripeforadjudication.Myownreasonsforthisconclusionareoutlinedbelow.
Likelocusstandi,ripenessforadjudicationisanaspectoftheactualcaseorcontroversyrequirementintheexerciseofjudicialpower.47Thetwo
conceptsdifferbecauseripenessisconsideredfromtheprism,notofthepartywhoserighthasbeenviolated,butfromtheprismoftheactual
violationitself.
Ofthetwobasiccomponentsofactualcaseorcontroversy,namely,theexistenceofarightandtheviolationofthatright,ripenessessentially
addressesthelattercomponent.48Thatarightexistsisnotsufficienttosupporttheexistenceofanactualcaseorcontroversytherightmustbe
allegedtohavebeenviolatedtogiverisetoajusticiabledispute.Inotherwords,itisthefactofviolationthatrendersacaseripe,49assumingof
coursetheundisputedexistenceoftherightviolated.
In the present cases, Article VIII, Section 25 of the Constitution lays down in no uncertain terms the conditions under which foreign military
bases,troops,andfacilitiesmaybeallowedintothecountry:thereshouldatleastbetheconcurrenceoftheSenate.
Under these terms, the refusal to allow entry of foreign military bases, troops, and facilities into the country without the required Senate
concurrence is a prerogative that the people of this country adopted for themselves under their Constitution: they want participation in this
decision, however indirect this participation might be. This prerogative is exercised through the Senate thus, a violation of this constitutional
prerogativeisnotonlyatransgressionagainsttheSenatebutoneagainstthepeoplewhotheSenaterepresents.
TheviolationinthiscaseoccurredwhenthePresidentratifiedtheEDCAasanexecutiveagreementandcertifiedtotheothercontractingparty
(the U.S.) that all the internal processes have been complied with, leading the latter to believe that the agreement is already valid and
enforceable.Uponsuchviolation,thedisputebetweenthePresidentandtheFilipinopeopleripened.
Thesameconclusionobtainsevenundertherespondents'argumentthattheconstitutionalityoftheEDCAisnotyetripeforadjudication,sinceit
requires the creation of separate agreements to carry out separate activities such as joint exercises, the prepositioning of materiel, or
construction activities. To the respondents, the petitioners are merely speculating on their claim of unconstitutionality since these separate
agreementsdonotyetexist.
Indeed,issuesrelatingtoagreementsyettobemadearenot,andcannotbe,ripeforadjudicationfortheobviousreasonthattheydonotyet
exist.ThequestionoftheEDCA'sconstitutionality,however,doesnotdependsolelyontheseparateagreementsthatwillimplementit.Thefact
that an executive agreement had been entered into, not a treaty as required by Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution, rendered the
agreement'sconstitutionalstatusquestionable.Thus,whentheexchangeofnotesthatsignaledtheimplementationoftheEDCAtookplace,the
issueofitscompliancewiththeconstitutionalrequirementsbecameripeforjudicialinterventionunderourexpandedjurisdiction.
II.C.ThePoliticalQuestionDoctrine
AnotherthresholdissuethatthisCourtmustsettleattheoutset,relatestothepoliticalquestiondoctrinethat,asarule,barsanyjudicialinquiry
onanymatterthattheConstitutionandthelawshavelefttothediscretionofacoordinatebranchofgovernmentforactionordetermination.50
Therespondentsraisethepoliticalquestionissueaspartoftheirdefense,arguingthattheissuesthepetitionersraisearepolicymattersthatlie
outsidetheCourt'scompetenceorarematterswheretheCourtshoulddefertotheExecutive.51
ThepoliticalquestionbaressentiallyrestsontheseparationofpowersdoctrinethatunderliestheConstitution.52Thecourtscannotinterferewith
questionsthatinvolvepolicydeterminationexclusivelyassignedtothepoliticaldepartmentsofthegovernment.53TheAmericancaseofBakerv.
Carr54bestdescribesthestandardsthatmustbeobservedindeterminingwhetheranissueinvolvesapoliticalquestion,asfollows:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolvingitortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationofakindclearlyfornonjudicialdiscretionorthe
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made or the potentiality of
embarrassmentfrommultifariouspronouncementsbyvariousdepartmentsononequestion.55
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From among these tests, the presence or absence of constitutional standards is the most relevant under the circumstances of the present
consolidatedcases.
After analyzing the issues raised, I find the respondents' position partly erroneous andpartly premature for a political question doctrine
ruling.
Thisconclusionproceedsfrommyrecognitionthatadistinctionshouldbedrawninrecognizingtheconstitutionalissuesbeforeus,someofwhich
areproceduralincharacterwhileothersaresubstantiveonesthatrequiretheapplicationofdifferentconstitutionalprovisions.
ThepetitionersprimarilyquestiontheconstitutionalvalidityoftheEDCAforviolationofArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe1987Constitution.They
challenge, as well, substantive provisions of the EDCA, among them, those relating to the grant of telecommunication privileges and tax
exemptionstoAmericanvisitingforces,andtheEDCAprovisionsthatwouldallegedlyallowtheentryofnuclearweaponsintothecountry.
That the EDCA is an agreement that requires concurrence by the Senate before it can be considered valid and enforceable, is an issue that is
essentially procedural as it requires thatsteps be takenbefore an international agreement can be considered fully valid and enforceable. It
isanissueextrinsictothetermsoftheEDCAandisproperlyathresholdissuethatmustberesolvedbeforethesubstantivechallengesto
theEDCA'svaliditycanbeaddressed.
Asidefrombeingprocedural,theissuerelatesaswelltothestandardsetbytheConstitutionthatdelineateswhenaninternationalagreement
shouldbeatreatysubjecttoSenateconcurrence.Thepresenceofthisstandardrendersthedeterminationofthemediumtobeusedinforging
aninternationalagreementwhetherasatreatyorasanexecutiveagreementanissuewithinthecompetenceandauthorityofthecourtsto
resolveintheirroleasguardiansoftheConstitution.56
Thus, the main issue the petitioners pose the constitutional status of the EDCA as an executive agreement in light of the mandate of Article
XVIII,Section25oftheConstitutionisnotapoliticalquestionoutsidethejudiciary'scompetenceandauthoritytoresolve.Therespondents'
argumentonthispointisthereforeerroneous.
If indeed a referral to the Senate is required and no referral has been made, then the EDCA isconstitutionallydeficient so that its terms
cannotbeenforced.Thisfindingrendersfurtherproceedingsonthemeritsofthesubstantiveissuesraised,pointlessandunwarranted.Thereis
likewisenopointindeterminingwhetherthesubstantiveissuesraisedcallfortheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.57
likewisenopointindeterminingwhetherthesubstantiveissuesraisedcallfortheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.
Ontheotherhand,theexaminationoftheEDCA'ssubstantivecontentsmayberipeandproperforresolutionifindeedtheEDCAcanproperlybe
the subject of an executive agreement. It is at that point when the respondents may claim that the substantive contents of the EDCA involve
policy matters that are solely for the President to determine and that the courts may not inquire into under the separation of powers
principle.58Itisonlyatthatpointwhentheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrineiscalledfor.
Intheselights(particularly,mypositiononthemeritsoftheproceduralissueraised),Ifindarulingontheapplicationofthepoliticalquestion
doctrinetothesubstantiveissuesraisedprematureandunripeforadjudicationanyrulingordiscussionImaymakemayonlyconfusetheissues
whenaproperpetitionontheconstitutionalityofthesubstantivecontentsofEDCAisfiled.
III.THEFACTS
III.A.Historical,InternationalandRegionalContexts
III.A(1)TheEarlyYearsofPhilippinesU.S.Relationship
Active PhilippineAmerican relations started in 1898, more than a century ago, when Commodore George Dewey and his armada of warships
defeatedtheSpanishnavyinthePhilippinesintheBattleofManilaBay.59TheseabattlewascomplementedbylandassaultsbyPhilippineforces
whoweretheninopenrebellionagainstSpainundertheleadershipofGeneralEmilioAguinaldo.60
Thecomplementaryeffortstartedarelationshipthat,fromthePhilippineend,wascharacterizedbyhopeofcollaborationandassistanceinthe
thencolony'squestforindependencefromSpain.61ButthefulfillmentofthishopedidnotcometopassandwasinfactshatteredwhenAmerica,
withitsowngeopoliticalinterestsinmind,decidedtofightthePhilippineforcesandtokeepthePhilippinesforitselfasacolony.TheAmerican
objectivewasfullyrealizedundertheTreatyofParisbetweenSpainandtheU.S.,whenthePhilippineswashandedbySpaintotheU.S.asa
colony.62
Theresult,ofcourse,wasinevitableasthePhilippineforceswerenotthenfightingforachangeofmastersbutforindependence.ThePhilippine
forcesfoughttheAmericansinthePhilippineAmericanwar,andlost.63
Thus,anewcolonizertookSpain'splace.UnliketheSpanishcolonialrule,however,oneredeemingfeatureoftheAmericancolonialrulewasthe
introductionoftheconceptsofdemocracyandgovernance.
Asacolony,thePhilippines,playedadistinctroleastheAmericanoutpostintheFarEastastheAmericangeopoliticalinterestsslowlygrewfrom
theFirstWorldWaryears.BytheendoftheSecondWorldWar,theU.S.'internationalprimacywasconfirmedastheleaderofthevictornations.
ThisinternationalleadershiprolebecamesoleleadershipwhentheSovietUnioncollapsedinthelate1980s.Thus,theU.S.nowstandsasthe
onlyglobalsuperpowerwhosemilitary,economic,cultural,andtechnologicalreachandinfluenceextendoverallcontinents.64
III.A(2)ThePostW.W.IIYears
ItwassoonafterPhilippineindependence,astheU.S.superpowerstatuswasrising,thattheU.S.andthePhilippinesforgedtheMilitaryBases
Agreementof1947(1947MBA)andthe1951MDT.The1947MBAwastheagreementspecifictotheU.S.bases,troops,andfacilitiesinthe
Philippines,65 while the 1951 MDT was the overarching document, entered into and ratified by the two countries as a treaty, to define the
PhilippineAmericandefenserelationshipincaseofanarmedattackbyathirdcountryoneitherofthem.66Asitstitledirectlysuggests,itisa
defenseagreement.
ThesolidityoftheR.P.U.S.relationshipthatstartedinthecolonizercolonymode,shiftedtodefense/militaryalliance(throughtheMBA,MDT,
and their supplementary agreements) after Philippine independence, and began to progressively loosen as the Philippines tracked its own
independent path as a nation. Through various agreements,67 the American hold and the length of stay of American military bases in the
Philippinesprogressivelyshrunk.
The death knell for the U.S. military bases started sounding when a new Philippine Constitution was ratified in 1987. The new Constitution
providesthataftertheexpirationoftheagreementonmilitarybases,noforeignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilitiesshallbeallowed
exceptthroughatreatyconcurredinbytheSenateorwiththedirectconsentoftheFilipinopeopleifCongresswouldrequirethis
modeofapproval.68
Theactualendofthemilitarybasescamein1991whenthe1947MBAexpiredwithnoreplacementformalarrangementinplaceexceptthe1951
MDT.69 For some years, R.P.U.S. relationship on defense/military matters practically froze. The thaw only came when the 1998 VFA was
negotiatedandagreeduponasatreatythatthePhilippineSenateconcurredin.
III.A(3)TheU.S.'s"PivottoAsia"Strategy
DuringthelatterpartofthefirsttermoftheObamaAdministration,theU.S.announcedashiftinitsglobalstrategyinfavorofamilitaryand
diplomatic"pivot"or"rebalance"towardAsia.70ThestrategyinvolvedashiftoftheU.S.'sdiplomatic,economic,anddefenseresourcestoAsia,
madeurgentby"theriseofChineseregionalpowerandinfluence,andChina'sapparentinclinationtoexerciseitsburgeoningmilitarypowerin
territorialdisputeswithitsneighbors."71ThesedisputesaffectedsealanesthatarevitaltotheU.S.anditsallieshence,theU.S.wasparticularly
concernedwiththeirpeacefulresolution.72CriticaltothestrategyistheprojectionofAmericanpowerandinfluenceworldwide.
The key to the new strategy in the militarypolitical area is "presence: forward deployment of U.S. military forces a significant tempo of
regionaldiplomaticactivity(includinghelpingAsiancountriesresolvedisputesthattheycannotresolvethemselves)andpromotinganagendaof
political reform where it is appropriate"73 This meant, among others, the strengthening of American military alliance with Asian countries,
includingthePhilippines.
The"pivot"hasadirectrelevancetoPhilippineconcernssinceitwasprompted,amongothers,by"China'sgrowingmilitarycapabilitiesandits
increasing assertiveness of claims to disputed maritime territory, with implications for freedom of navigation and the United States' ability to
project power in the region."74The opening of new areas for military cooperation with the Philippines is among the announced features of the
"pivot."75
III.A(4)TheEDCA
It was soon after the launch of the "pivot" strategy that the initiatives for the EDCA came. The EDCA, of course, did not introduce
troopsintothecountryforthefirsttime,asthe1998VFAalreadyusheredinthepresenceofU.S.militarytroopsonarotationalbuttemporary
basis.
WhattheEDCAbroughtwithitwastheconceptof"agreedlocations"towhichtheU.S.has"unimpededaccess"fortherefueling
of aircraft bunkering of ships prepositioning and storage of equipment, supplies and materials the introduction of military
contractorsintotheagreedlocationsandthestationinganddeploymentpointfortroops.76
In these lights, the confirmed and valid adoption of the EDCA would make the Philippines an active ally participating either as a forward
operating site (FOS,) or Cooperative Security Location (CSL)in the American "pivot" strategy or, in blunter terms, in the projection and
protectionofAmericanworldwidepower.FOSandCSLshallbeexplainedunderthepropertopicbelow.
AllthesefactsarerecitedtoplaceourreadingoftheEDCAinpropercontexthistorically,geopolitically,andwithaproperappreciationofthe
interestsinvolved,bothforthePhilippinesandtheU.S.
TheU.S.isinAsiabecauseofthegeopoliticalinterestsandtheworlddominancethatitseekstomaintainandpreserve.77Asiaisoneregionthat
hasbeeninafluxbecauseofthesenseofnationalismthathadlaindormantamongitspeoples,theeconomicprogressthatmanyofitscountries
are experiencing as the economic winds shift to the East, and the emergence of China that at the very least is now gradually being
recognizedasaregionalpowerwiththepotentialforsuperpowerstatus.78ThePhilippinesitselfisencounteringterritorialproblemswithChina
because of the latter's claims in the West Philippine Sea the Philippines has chosen the path of peace in the dispute through international
arbitration.79
EDCA and Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution, in their larger regional signification, mean that the Philippines would
thereafter, not only be bound as an American ally under the 1951 MDT, but as an active participant as "pivot" and projection
pointsinthegrandAmericanstrategyinAsia.
How the Philippines will react to all these developments is largely for the Executive and the people (through the Legislature) to determine. In
makingitsdecisions,theymustattheveryleastshowoneandallthatourcountryisentitledtorespectasanindependentandsovereign
nation.ThisrespectmustcomeprimarilyfromwithinthePhilipinesandtheFilipinosthemselves,fromthenation'sownsenseof
selfrespect:innegativeterms,theFilipinonationcannotattainselfrespectunlessitshowsitsrespectforitsownConstitution
theonlyinstrumentthatbindsthewholenation.
IV.THEPRESIDENT'SROLEIN
GOVERNANCEANDITSLIMITS
This discussion is made necessary by the ponencia's patent misconceptions regarding the role the President plays in governance as chief
executiveandimplementorofpoliciesandthelaws.
IV.A.ThePonenciaandMyObjections
InupholdingtheconstitutionalityoftheEDCA,theponenciaholdsthatthePresident'spoweranddutytoensurethefaithfulexecutionofourlaws
includethedefenseofourcountryasthecommanderinchiefofthecountry'sarmedforces.80Itcontendsthatthesepowers,combinedwiththe
President's capacity as the country's sole organ in foreign affairs, empower the President to enter into international agreements with other
countriesandgivehimthediscretiontodeterminewhetheraninternationalagreementshouldbeintheformofatreatyorexecutiveagreement.
The patent misconception begins when the ponencia asserts that the President cannot function with crippled hands: "the manner of the
President'sexecutionofthelaw,evenifnotexpresslygrantedbythelaw,isjustifiedbynecessityandlimitedonlybylawsincehemust'take
necessaryandproperstepstocarryintoexecutionthelaw."'81ItfurtheraddsthatitisthePresident'sprerogativetodowhateverislegaland
necessaryforthePhilippines'defenseinterests.82
WhileacknowledgingtheConstitution'scommandthattheentryofforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesmustbeinatreaty,theponencia
assertsthattheEDCAshouldbeexaminedinrelationwiththisrequirementalone,asthePresident'swideauthorityinexternalaffairsshouldbe
subjectonlytothelimitedamountofchecksandrestrictionsundertheConstitution.83
It is within this framework that the ponencia concludes thatthe requirement under Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution is limited to
theinitialentryofforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilities.Thus,onceatreatyhasallowedtheentryofforeignmilitarybases,troops,and
facilities into the Philippines, the ponencia posits that the President may enter into subsequent executive agreements that involve "detail
adjustments"ofexistingtreaties.84
Icannotfullyagreewiththeponencia'sapproachandwithitsconclusions.
Firstandforemost,theponenciaoverlooksthatasChiefExecutive,thePresident'sroleisnotsimplytoexecutethelaws.Thisimportantfunction
isprecededbythePresident'sforemostdutytopreserveanddefendtheConstitution,thehighestlawoftheland.ThePresident'soath,
quotedbytheponenciaitself,infact,states:
Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmydutiesasPresident(orVicePresidentor
Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecratemyselftotheserviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod.85[Emphasissupplied]
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ThesupremacyoftheConstitutionmeansthatintheperformanceofhisduties,thePresidentshouldalwaysbeguidedandkeptincheckbythe
safeguards that were crafted by the framers of the Constitution and ratified by the people. The Constitution prescribes the limitations to the
otherwiseawesomepowersoftheExecutivewhowieldsthepoweroftheswordandsharesinthepowerofthepurse.
Ialsodonotagreethatconstitutionallimitations,suchastheneedforSenateconcurrenceintreaties,canbedisregardediftheyunduly"tiethe
hands"ofthePresident.86Theselimitationsaredemocraticsafeguardsthatplacetheresponsibilityovernationalpolicybeyondthehandsofa
singleofficial.Theirexistenceisthehallmarkofastrongandhealthydemocracy.Intreatymaking,thisishowthepeopleparticipatethrough
their dulyelected Senate or directly when the Congress so requires.When the Constitution so dictates, the President must act through the
mediumofatreatyandisleftwithnodiscretiononthematter.ThisisthesituationunderArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitution,whose
applicationiscurrentlyindispute.
LetitbenotedthatnobleobjectivesdonotauthorizethePresidenttobypassconstitutionalsafeguardsandlimitstohispowers.Toemphasize
thispoint,weonlyneedtorefertoArticleVI,Section23(2)oftheConstitution:
(2)Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongressmaybylawauthorizethePresident,foralimitedperiod
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such power shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.[Emphasissupplied]
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Thus,thePresidentcannot,byhimself,usurptheprerogativesofacoequalbranchtocarryoutwhathebelievesisnecessaryforthecountry's
defenseinterests.HispositionastheCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP)doesnotgivehimthesolediscretionto
increaseourmilitary'sdefensivecapabilitieshisroleascommanderinchiefonlygiveshimcontrolofthemilitary'schainofcommand.Itgrants
himthepowertocalloutthearmedforcestoprevent/suppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.87
Themodernizationofthemilitary,inparticular,isajointresponsibilityofthepoliticalbranchesoftheStatebecausetheCongressisresponsible
forcraftingrelevantlaws88andforallocatingfundsfortheAFPthroughtheGeneralAppropriationsAct.89Theincreaseordecreaseoffundsand
theextentofdefenseinitiativestobeundertakenarenationalpolicymattersthatthePresidentcannotundertakealone.
IV.B.ThePresident'sForeignRelationsPowershouldbeInterpretedintheContextoftheSeparationofPowersDoctrine
We cannot also interpret a provision in the Constitution in isolation and separately from the rest of the Constitution. Similarly, we cannot
determinewhethertheExecutive'sactshadbeencommittedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionwithoutconsideringhisauthorityinthecontextofthe
powersoftheotherbranchesofgovernment.
WhilethePresident'sroleasthecountry'sleadofficialintheconductofforeignaffairsisbeyondquestion,hisauthorityisnotwithoutlimit.When
examinedwithinthelargercontextofhowourtripartitesystemofgovernmentworks(whereeachbranchofgovernmentissupremewithinits
spherebutcoordinatewiththeothers),wecanseethattheconductofforeignaffairs,particularlywhenitcomestointernationalagreements,is
asharedfunctionamongallthreebranchesofgovernment.
ThePresidentisundeniablythechiefarchitectofforeignpolicyandisthecountry'srepresentativeininternationalaffairs.90Heisvestedwiththe
authoritytopresideoverthenation'sforeignrelationswhichinvolve,amongothers,dealingwithforeignstatesandgovernments,extendingor
withholdingrecognition,maintainingdiplomaticrelations,andenteringintotreaties.91Intherealmoftreatymaking,thePresidenthasthesole
authoritytonegotiatewithotherStates.92
IV.B(l)SeparationofPowersandtheTreatyMakingProcess
This wide grant of authority, however, does not give him the license to conduct foreign affairs to the point of disregarding or bypassing the
separationofpowersthatunderliesourestablishedconstitutionalsystem.
Thus,whilethePresidenthasthesoleauthoritytonegotiateandenterintotreaties,ArticleVII,Section21ofthe1987Constitutionatthesame
timeprovidesthelimitationthattwothirdsofthemembersoftheSenateshouldgivetheirconcurrenceforthetreatytobevalidandeffective.
Notably,thislimitationisanotanewrulethelegislativebranchofgovernmenthasbeenparticipatinginthetreatymakingprocessbygiving(or
withholding)itsconsenttotreatiessincethe1935Constitution.Section10(7),ArticleVIIofthe1935Constitutionprovides:
Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make
treatiesxxx.
Thistraditionoflegislativeparticipationcontinueddespiteourpresidentialparliamentaryformofgovernmentunderthe1973Constitution,thatis
markedly different from the tripartite form of government that traditionally prevailed in the country. Section 14(1) Article VIII of the 1973
Constitutionstated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by a
majorityofalltheMembersoftheBatasangPambansa.
Thatwehaveconsistentlyincludedtheparticipationofthelegislativebranchinthetreatymakingprocessisnotwithoutanimportantreason:it
providesacheckontheExecutiveinthefieldofforeignrelations.ByrequiringtheconcurrenceoftheLegislatureinthetreatiesenteredintoby
the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balances necessary in the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.
Underthissystem,thefunctionsofgovernmentaredividedamongthreebranchesofgovernment,eachonesupremewithinitsownsphere:the
executive administers and enforces laws the legislature formulates and enacts laws and the judiciary settles cases arising out of the
enforcementoftheselaws93TherequirementofSenateconcurrencetotheexecutive'streatymakingpowersisacheckontheprerogatiyeofthe
Executive,inthesamemannerthattheExecutive'svetoonlawspassedbyCongress94isacheckonthelatter'slegislativepowers.
Even the executive agreements that the President enters into without Senate concurrence has legislative participation they are
implementations of existing laws Congress has passed or of treaties that the Senate had assented to.95The President's authority to negotiate
andratifytheseexecutiveagreementsspringsfromhispowertoensurethattheselawsandtreatiesareexecuted.96
The judicial branch of government's participation in international agreements is largely passive, and is only triggered when cases reach the
courts.Thecourts,intheexerciseoftheirjudicialpower,havethedutytoensurethattheExecutiveandLegislaturestaywithintheirspheresof
competence97they ensure as well that constitutional standards and limitations set by the Constitution for the Executive and the Congress to
followarenotviolated.
ArticleVIII,Section5oftheConstitutionisevenmoreexplicit,asitgivestheSupremeCourtthejurisdiction"toreviewbyappealorcertiorariall
casesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,lawxxxisinquestion."
Thus,entryintointernationalagreementsisasharedfunctionamongthethreebranchesofgovernment.Inthislightandinthecontextthatthe
President'sactionsshouldbeviewedunderourtripartitesystemofgovernment,Icannotagreewiththeponencia'sassertionthatthecase
shouldbeexaminedsolelyandstrictlythroughtheconstitutionallimitationfoundinArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitution.
IV.B(2)StandardsinExaminingthePresident'sTreatyMakingPowers
Because the Executive's foreign relations power operates within the larger constitutional framework of separation of powers, I find the
examinationofthePresident'sactionsthroughthislargerframeworktobethebetterapproachinthepresentcases.Thisanalyticalframework,
incidentally,isnottheresultofmyoriginalandindependentthoughtitwasdevisedbyU.S.SupremeCourtAssociateJusticeRobertJacksonin
hisConcurringOpinioninYoungstownSheet&TubeCo.v.Sawyer.98
Justice Jackson's framework for evaluating executive action categorizes the President's actions into three:first, when the President acts with
authorityfromtheCongress,hisauthorityisatitsmaximum,asitincludesallthepowershepossessesinhisownrightandeverythingthat
Congresscandelegate.99
Second, "when the President actsin the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely on his own
independent powers, but there is a [twilight zone where] he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or where its distribution is
uncertain."100Inthissituation,presidentialauthoritycanderivesupportfrom"congressionalinertia,indifferenceorquiescence."101
Third,"whenthePresidenttakesmeasuresincompatiblewiththeexpressedorimpliedwillofCongress,hispowerisatitslowestebb,"102and
theCourtcansustainhisactions"onlybydisablingtheCongressfromactinguponthesubject."103
This framework has been recently adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court inMedellinv.Texas,104a case involving the President's foreign affairs
powersandonethatcanbedirectlyinstructiveindecidingthepresentcase.
Inexaminingthevalidityofanexecutiveact,theCourttakesintoconsiderationthevaryingdegreesofauthoritythatthePresidentpossesses.
ActsofthePresidentwiththeauthorizationofCongressshouldhavethe"widestlatitudeofjudicialinterpretation"105andshouldbe"supported
by the strongest of presumptions."106For the judiciary to overrule the executive action, it must decide that the government resell lacks me
power.Incontrast,executiveactsthatarewithoutcongressionalimprimaturwouldhavetobeverycarefullyexamined.
IV.B(3)TheSenateObjectiontoEDCAasanExecutiveAgreement
Inthepresentcases,thePresident'sactoftreatingtheEDCAasanexecutiveagreementhasbeendisputedbytheSenate,although
theSenateisnotanactivepartyinthepresentcases.
On November 10, 2015, the Senate sent the Supreme Court a copy of Senate Resolution No. 1414107expressingitssentimentthattheEDCA
should have been entered into in the form of a treaty. Furthermore, and as will be explained in the succeeding portions of this Dissenting
Opinion, the EDCA's provisions are not all within the terms of the two treaties properly ratified by the Senate the 1951 MDT and 1998 VFA
hence,thePresidentcouldnothavedrawnhisauthorityfromtheseagreements.
Thus,contrarytotheponencia'sassertionthatthePresident'sactoftreatingtheEDCAasanexecutiveagreementshouldbesubjecttothe"least
amountofchecksandrestrictionsundertheConstitution,"108thispresidentialactionshouldactuallybeverycarefullyexamined,inlightofthe
Senate'sownexpressedsentimentsonthematter.
The mandatory character of the executivelegislative power sharing should be particularly true with respect to the EDCA, as its adoption
signifiesPhilippine participation in America's pivot strategy by making our country one of the (ipivot" or projection points that
would enforce America's military strategy. In taking this kind of step, the Senate must simply be there to give its consent, as the
Constitutionenvisionsinsituationsinvolvingtheentryofforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesintothecountry.
Intheselights,IproposethatweexaminethePresident'sactoftreatingtheEDCAnotsimplybythestandardofwhetheritcomplieswiththe
limitationunderArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitution,butinthecontextofhowourgovernmentfunctions,andofotherrelevantprovisions
intheConstitution.
IV.C.ConstitutionalStandardsinAllowingtheEntryofForeignMilitaryBases,Troops,andFacilitiesinthePhilippines
IV.C(l)ArticleVII,Section21oftheConstitutionandTreatyMaking
Ingeneral,thePresident'sforeignaffairspowermustbeexercisedincompliancewithArticleVII,Section21oftheConstitution,whichrequires
thesubmissionoftreatiesthePresidentratified,totheSenateforitsconcurrence.TheSenatemayeitherconcurin,orwithholdconsentto,the
submittedtreaties.
Significantly, not all the international agreements that the President enters into are required to be sent to the Senate for concurrence.
Jurisprudence recognizes that the President may enter into executive agreements with other countries,109and these agreements under the
properconditionsdonotrequireSenateconcurrencetobevalidandenforceableinthePhilippines.110
IV.C(2)TreatiesandExecutiveAgreementsunderArticleVIISection21
Where lies the difference, it may well be asked, since both a treaty and an executive agreement fall under the general title of
internationalagreement?
AnexecutiveagreementemanatesfromthePresident'sdutytoexecutethelawsfaithfully.111Theytracetheirvalidityfromexistinglawsor
fromtreatiesthathavebeenauthorizedbythelegislativebranchofgovernment.112Inshort,theyimplement,lawsandtreaties.
Incontrast,treatiesareinternationalagreementsthatdonotoriginatesolelyfromthePresident'sdutyastheexecutorofthecountry'slaws,
butfromthesharedfunctionthattheConstitutionmandatesbetweenthePresidentandtheSenate.113They therefore need concurrence from
theSenateafterpresidentialratification,inordertofulfilltheconstitutionalsharedfunctionrequirement.114
Jurisprudential definitions of treaties and executive agreements are conceptually drawn from these distinctions although in Bayan Muna v.
Romulo,115wesimplydifferentiatedtreatiesfromexecutiveagreementsinthiswise:
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: An international agreement concluded between states in written form
andgovernedbyinternationallaw,whetherembodiedinasingleinstrumentorintwoormorerelatedinstrumentsandwhatever
its particular designation. International agreements may be in the form of(1) treaties that require legislative concurrence
afterexecutiveratificationor(2)executiveagreementsthataresimilartotreaties,exceptthattheydonotrequire
legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than
treaties.116][Emphasessupplied]
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BayanMunalikewise did not distinguish between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting States
concerned.117ButneitheronecancontravenetheConstitution.
ThisambiguityperhapsmighthavebeentherootofthegeneralstatementthattheExecutivegenerallyhasthediscretiontodeterminewhether
aninternationalobligationshouldbeintheformofatreatyoranexecutiveagreement.Thisgeneralstatement,however,isfarfromcomplete
andshouldbequalifiedbecausetheExecutive'sexerciseofdiscretionisaffectedandshouldbedictatedbythedemandsoftheenforceabiHtyof
theobligationstheinternationalagreementcreatesinthedomesticsphere.
Between a treaty and an executive agreement, a treaty exists on a higher plane as it carries the authority of the President and the
Senate.118 Treaties have the status, effect, and impact of statutory law in the Philippines they can amend or prevail over prior statutory
enactments.119
Executiveagreementswhichexistatthelevelofimplementingrulesandregulationsoradministrativeordersinthedomesticspherecarryno
sucheffect.120Theycannotcontravenestatutoryenactmentsandtreatiesandwouldbeinvalidiftheydoso.121
Again,thisdifferenceinimpactistraceabletothesourceoftheirauthoritysinceatreatyhastheapprovalofboththePresidentandtheSenate,
it has the same impact as a statute. In contrast, since an executive agreement springs from the President's power to execute laws, it cannot
amendorviolateexistingtreaties,andmustbeinaccordwithandbemadepursuanttoexistinglawsandtreaties.122
Accordingly,thetermsandobjectivesofthepresidentialentryintoaninternationalagreementdictatestheformtheagreementmusttake.When
an international agreement is mademerely to implement an existing law or treaty, then it can properly take the form of an executive
agreement.123
Incontrast,whenaninternationalagreementinvolvestheintroductionofanewsubjectmatterortheamendmentofexistinsagreements
orlawsandhasnotpassedtherequiredexecutiveandlegislativeprocesses,thenitshouldproperlybeintheformofatreaty.124
Toreiterate,theconsequenceoftheviolationofthisnormimpactsontheenforceabilityoftheinternationalagreementinthedomesticsphere
shouldanexecutiveagreementamendorcontravenestatutoryenactmentsandtreaties,thenitisvoidandcannotbeenforcedinthePhilippines
forlackoftheproperauthorityonthepartoftheissuer.
In judicial terms, the distinctions and their consequences mean thatan executive agreement that creates new obligations or amends
existing ones, has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and can be
judiciallynullifiedunderthecourts'powerofjudicialreview.
IV.C(3)JointReadingofArticleVII,Section21andArticleXVIII,Section25
ThedynamicsthatArticleVII,Section21embody,shouldbereadintoArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe1987Constitution,whichspecificallycovers
andappliestotheentryofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesintothecountry.
Itisonthebasisofthisjointreadingthattheponencia'sconclusionthatArticleXVIII,Section25appliesonlytotheinitialentryofforeign
militarybases,troops,andfacilitiesinthecountryisessentiallyincorrect.
ArticleXVIII,Section25doesnotprovideforanysuchlimitationinitsapplicability.Neitheristhere,anythinginthelanguageoftheprovision
thatremotelyimpliesthisconsequence.Whatitsimplystatesisthatforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesmayonlybepresentinPhilippine
soilinaccordancewithatreatyconcurredinbytheSenate.
When the terms of Article XVIII, Section 25 treaty does not provide for situations or arrangements subsequent to the initial entry of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the country and the subsequent arrangements are still attributed to the same treaty made pursuant to
Section25,thecombinedreadingofArticleVII,Section21andArticleXVIII,Section25mustnowcomeintoplay.
This combined reading simply means that after the initial entry of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines under a duly
ratifiedtreaty,subsequentarrangementsrelatingtoforeignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilitiesthatareclaimedtobebasedonthesametreaty,
should be examined based on the treatyexecutive agreement distinctions recognized by jurisprudence under Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution.
Inotherwords,anysubsequentinternationalagreementreferringtomilitarybases,troopsorfacilitiesshouldbeexaminedbasedonwhether
it creates a new obligation or implements an existins one.The determination of this question rests with the Executive but the treaty
executiveagreementdistinctionsshouldlimittheExecutive'sdiscretionwhenthenewinternationalagreementrelatestoanewobligation(ora
changeinanexistingobligation)asthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinthePhilippinesshouldthenbeeffectedthrough
anothertreaty.
Toputitmorebluntly,ArticleXVIII,Section25effectivelyremovestheExecutive'sdiscretionindecidingtheformofaninternationalagreement
becauseofthisprovision'sexplicitdirectivetouseatreatyasthemediumfornewobligationscreated.
InBayanv.Zamora,125ourconclusionsupportedthisposition.WeexplainedthatArticleXVIII,Section25makesnodistinctionastowhether
the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be transient or permanent.126By concluding that the permanence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities is immaterial to the application of Article XVIII, Section 25, we effectively acknowledged that subsequent
agreements that amend or introduce new obligations to existing treaties that previously allowed the entry of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities,shouldbethesubjectofanothertreatyastheymayenterthecountryonvaryinggrounds,lengthsorperiodsoftimeallofwhichcan
changethenatureoftheobligationsunderexistingtreaties.
IV.C(4)TheDissent'sAnalyticalApproach
Giventheseparameters,IproposethatweexaminetheconstitutionalityoftheExecutive'sactofenteringintotheobligationsfoundintheEDCA
intheformofanexecutiveagreementwiththesetwoquestions:
(1)DoestheEDCAinvolvetheintroductionintothePhilippinesofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesthatcall
foritsexaminationunderArticleXVIII,Section25?
(2)DoestheEDCAimposenewobligations,oramendorgobeyondexistingones,regardingthepresenceofforeign
militarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinthePhilippines?
IftheEDCAintroducesforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinthePhilippineswithinthecontemplationofArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe
1987Constitution,andiftheseobligationsaredifferentfromthosefoundinourexistingtreatyobligationswiththeU.S.,thentheEDCAcannot
beenforcedinthePhilippineswithouttheSenate'sconcurrence.TheponenciaisthenincorrectandtheDissentmustprevail.
Conversely, if the EDCA merely implements present treaty obligations particularly those under the 1951 MDT and the 1998 VFA then the
Presidentwaswellwithinhispowersintheexecutionofourpresenttreatyobligations.TheponenciaiscorrectandtheDissenttherefore
fails.
V.THEAPPLICATIONOFARTICLEXVIII,
SECTION25TOTHEEDCA
V.A.TheArticleXVIII,Section25Dispute
When the subject of an international agreement falls under Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution, the President by constitutional
commandmustenterintoatreatysubjecttotheconcurrenceoftheSenateand,whenCongresssodesires,ofthepeoplethroughanational
referendum.
This rule opens the door for Court intervention pursuant to its duty to uphold the Constitution and its further duty (under its power of judicial
review)topassuponanygraveabuseofdiscretioncommittedbyanyofficialoragencyofgovernment.Itisunderthisconstitutionallymandated
termsthatthisCourtinvokesitspowertoreviewtheconstitutionalityofthePresident'sactionsinhandlingtheEDCA.
Within this framework, the issue these cases present is clear. The bottom line question is whether the President gravely abused his
discretioninexecutingtheEDCAasanexecutiveagreementtheallegedexistenceofgraveabuseofdiscretionconstitutestheactualcase
orcontroversythatallowstheexerciseofjudicialpower.Whethergraveabuseexists,inturn,dependsonthedeterminationofwhether
thetermsoftheEDCAimposedneworamendedexistingobligationsinvolvingforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesinthe
Philippines.
IftheEDCAdoes,thenitshouldhavebeenintheformofatreatysubmittedtotheSenateforitsconcurrence.Inresolvingthisquestion,Iam
guided first, by the text of the Constitution itself and the meaning of its operative words in both their original and contemporaneous
sensessecond,bythespiritthatmotivatedtheframingofArticleXVIII,Section25andthird,byjurisprudenceinterpretingthisprovision.
TheponencialaysthepremisethatthePresidentmayenterintoanexecutiveagreementonforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesif:
(a)itisnottheinstrumentthatallowsthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesor
(b)itmerelyaimstoimplementanexistinglawortreaty127
TheponenciafollowsthispremisewiththepositionthatArticleXVIII,Section25refersonlytotheinitialentryofbases,troops,orfacilities,and
nottotheactivitiesdoneafterentry.128
InconstruingArticleXVIII,Section25,theponenciainvokestheruleofverbalegis,acardinalruleofconstructionstatingthatwhenthelawis
clearandfreefromanydoubtorambiguity,thenthereisnoroomforconstructionorinterpretation,onlyapplication.129Thelawmustbegiven
itsliteralmeaningandappliedwithoutattemptedinterpretation.130Theponenciaassertsthattheplainmeaningof"allowedin"referssolelyto
theinitialentry.131Thus,afterentry,anysubsequentactsinvolvingforeignmilitarytroops,bases,orfacilitiesnolongerfallunderthecoverage
ofArticleXVIII,Section25.132
Ibelievethattheponencia'sapproachandinterpretationareincorrectbecausetheyareoverlysimplistic.Theproperunderstanding
of Article XVIII, Section 25 must take into account the many considerations that bear upon its plain terms, among them, the treatyexecutive
agreementdistinctionsunderArticleVII,Section21thatIdiscussedabovethehistoryofArticleXVIII,Section25themotivationsthatdrove
theframerstoadopttheprovisionandthecurrentandcontemporaneousdevelopmentsandusagesthatgivefullandeffectivemeaningtothe
provision.
SeparatelyfromtextualinterpretationconsiderationsandaspartofthehistoryofArticleXVIII,Section25,thebasicconceptofsovereigntythat
underlies it should not be forgotten.133Sovereignty means the full right and power of the nation to govern itself, its people, and its territory
withoutanyinterferencefromoutsidesourcesorentities.134Withinitsterritory,anationreignssupreme.Ifitwillallowinterferenceatall,such
interferenceshouldbeunderthetermsthenationallowsandhasaccepted135beyondthoseterms,theprimacyofsovereigntyistherule.136
Thus,ifinterferenceweretobeallowedatall,orifexceptionstofullsovereigntywithinaterritorywouldbeallowed,oriftherewouldbeany
ambiguity in the extent of an exception granted, the interference, exception or ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the fullest exercise of
sovereignty under the obtaining circumstances. Conversely, if any ambiguity exists at all in the terms of the exception or in the terms of the
resulting treaty, then such terms should be interpreted restrictively in favor of the widest application of the restrictions embodied in the
Constitutionandthelaws.
Theponenciacannotbeincorrectinstatingtherulethatwhentermsareclearandcategorical,noneedforanyforcedconstitutionalconstruction
exists137weneednotdivineanyfurthermeaningbutmustonlyapplytermsinthesensethattheyareordinarilyunderstood.
Aflaw,however,existsintheponencia'sapplicationofverbalegisasArticleXVIII,Section25isneitherplainnorthatsimple.
Aspointedoutabove,itmustbereadtogetherwithArticleVII,Section21forthegeneralrulesonthetreatymakingprocess.Italsoexpressly
referstoahistoricalincidentthethencomingexpirationofthe1947MBA.Fromthesetakeoffpoints,theArticleXVIII,Section25proceedsto
alistofthemattersitspecificallyaddressesforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities.
Allthesebringupthequestionthathassofarbeenleftundiscussedwhatarethecircumstancesthatledtotheexpirationofthe1947
MBAandwhataretheforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesthatArticleXVIII,Section25refersto?
V.B.TheHistoryandIntentofArticleXVIII,Section25
The history of Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution is practically summed up in the introductory phrase of the provision "After the
expirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBasesxxx.
Purelyandsimply,theframersoftheConstitutionin1986thenlookedforwardtotheexpirationoftheU.S.basescomingin1991andwanted
the terms of any future foreign military presence governed by the Constitution itself. Behind this intent is the deeper policy expressed under
ArticleII,Section7oftheConstitution
The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall
benationalsovereignty,territorialintegrity,nationalinterest,andtherighttoselfdetermination.
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DuringtheconstitutionaldeliberationonArticleXVIII,Section25,twoviewswereespousedonthepresenceofmilitarybasesinthePhilippines.
Oneviewwasthatespousedbytheantibasesgrouptheothergroupsupportedtheviewthatthisshouldbelefttothepolicymakers.
CommissionerAdolfoAzcunaexpressedthesentimentofthefirstgroupwhenhestatedinhisprivilegespeechon16September1986that:
Aftertheagreementexpiresin1991,thequestiontherefore,is:Shouldweextendanewtreatyforthesebasestostayputin1991
in our territory? The position of the committee is that it should not, because the presence of such bases is a derogation of
Philippinesovereignty.
Itissaidthatweshouldleavethesematterstobedecidedbytheexecutive,sincethePresidentconductsforeignrelationsandthis
is a question of foreign policy. I disagree, Madam President.This is not simple a question of foreign policythis is a question of
national sovereignty. And the Constitution is anything at all, it is a definition of the parameters of the sovereignty of the
people.138
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On the other hand, the second group posited that the decision to allow foreign bases into the country should be left to the policy makers.
CommissionerJoseBengzonexpressedthepositionofthisgroupthat:
xxxthisisneitherthetimenortheforumtoinsistonourviewsforweknownotwhatliesinthefuture.Itwouldbefoolhardyto
secondguesstheeventsthatwillshapetheworld,ourregionandourcountryby1991.Itwouldbesheerirresponsibilityanda
disservice to the highest calibre to our own country if we were to tie down the hands of our future governments and future
generations.139
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Despite his view that the presence of foreign military bases in the Philippines would lead to a derogation of national security, Commissioner
Azcunaconcededthatthiswouldnotbethecaseiftheagreementwouldallowtheforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiestobeembodiedin
atreaty.140
After a series of debates, Commissioner Ricardo Romulo proposed an alternative formulation that is now the current Article XVIII, Section
25.141HeexplainedthatthisisanexplicitbanonallforeignmilitarybasesotherthanthoseoftheU.S.142Basedonthediscussions,thespiritof
the basing provisions of the Constitution is primarily abalance of the preservation of the national sovereignty and openness to the
establishmentofforeignbases,troops,orfacilitiesinthecountry.
Article XVIII, Section 25 imposed three requirements that must be complied with for an agreement to be considered valid insofar as the
Philippinesisconcerned.Thesethreerequirementsare:(1)theagreementmustbeembodiedinatreaty(2)thetreatymustbedulyconcurred
inby2/3votesofallthemembersoftheSenate143and(3)theagreementmustberecognizedasatreatybytheotherState.
Onthesecondrequirement,thetwothirdsconcurrenceofallthemembersoftheSenate,thepeople'srepresentative,144maybeviewedasthe
people's"voluntarysubmission"oftheirsovereigntysotheycanreapthegreaterbenefitsoftheagreementthatthePresident,aspolicymaker,
enteredinto.
WhentheCongresssorequires,theagreementshouldberatifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumheldfor
thatpurpose.145Thisadditionalrequirementevincestheframers'intenttoemphasizethepeople'sdirectparticipationintreatymaking.
InBayanv.Zamora,146the Court relaxed the third requirement when it ruled that it is sufficient that "the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledgestheagreementasatreaty."Inthatcase,sincetheU.S.hadalreadydeclareditsfullcommitmenttothe1998VFA,147wedeclared
thatitwasunnecessaryfortheU.S.tofurthersubmittheagreementtotheU.S.Senate.148
This history highlights the importance of the issue now before us, and stresses as well how seriously the Constitution regards the Senate
concurrence requirement. Thus, the issue can neither be simply glossed over nor disregarded on the basis ofstretched legal technicalities. In
caseofdoubt,asabovediscussed,suchdoubtshouldberesolvedstrictlyinfavorofwhattheConstitutionrequiresinitswidestsense.
V.C.HistoricalRootsoftheU.S.BasesinthePhilippines
AsaU.S.colonyaftertheTreatyofParisof1898,thewholePhilippinescouldbeequatedtoonebigAmericanbase:theU.S.hadsovereigntyand
hadafreehandonhowtodealwithdefensemattersanditsmilitaryforcesinthePhilippines.
TheTydingsMcDuffie Act of 1934provided for the Philippines' selfgovernment and specified a procedural framework for the drafting of a
constitution for the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines149 within two years from the Act's enactment.150 The Act, more
importantly,mandatedtherecognitionbytheU.S.oftheindependenceofthePhilippineIslandsasaseparateandselfgoverningnationaftera
tenyeartransitionperiod.151
Prior to independence, the Act allowed the U.S to maintain military forces in the Philippines and to call all military forces of the Philippine
government into U.S. military service.152The Act empowered the U.S. President, within two years following independence, to
negotiatefortheestablishmentofU.S.navalreservationsandfuelingstationsinthePhilippineIslands.153
ThenegotiationsforAmericanbasesthattookplaceafterindependenceresultedinthe1947MBA.
V.C(l)The1947MilitaryBasesAgreement
The 1947 MBA between the Philippines and the U.S. was signed on March 16, 1947. The agreement officially allowed the U.S. to establish,
maintain,andoperateairandnavalbasesinthecountry.154Itprovidedforabout23listedbasesandfacilitiesforusebyAmericansforaperiod
of99years.155Themostimportantofthesebaseswerethe180,000acreClarkAirBaseinPampanga,thenthebiggestAmericanairbaseoutside
ofthecontinentalU.S.A.,andtheSubicNavalBaseinZambales.
The bases covered by the 1947 MBA werefixedbaseswhereAmericanstructures and facilitieshad been built andarms, weapons, and
equipmentweredeployedandstored,andwheretroopsandcivilianpersonnelwerestationed,togetherwiththeirfamilies.
Otherprovisionsofthe29article1947MBAwerethefollowing:
The bases were properties over which the U.S. originally exercised sovereignty but this was subsequently transferred to the Philippines
pursuanttotheRomuloMurphyAgreementof1979.Afterthetransfer,theU.S.anditsarmedforcesandpersonnelweregrantedrentfree
accessuptotheexpirationoftheAgreement.156
The bases were for the mutual protection and cooperation of the two countries and for this purpose were for their use as U.S. and
Philippinemilitaryinstallations.157
The U.S. had the right, power and authority necessary for the establishment, operation, and defense of the bases and their
control,158specifically:
Tooperate,maintain,utilize,occupy,garrison,andcontrolthebases
Toimproveanddeepentheharbors,channelsandentrancesandanchorage,andtoconstructandmaintainnecessaryroadsand
bridgesaccessingthebases
Tocontroltheoperationandsafetyofthebasesandallthestructuresandfacilitiesinthem
Toacquirerightofwaybyagreementandtoconstructtelecommunicationandotherfacilities
To construct, install, maintain and employ on any base any type of facilities, weapons, substance, device, or vessel as may be
necessary
TobringintothePhilippinesmembersoftheU.S.militaryforcesandU.S.nationalsemployedundercontractbytheU.S.withthe
families,aswellastechnicalpersonnelofothernationalitiesnototherwiseexcludedfromthePhilippines.
ThePhilippinegovernmentwasprohibitedfromgrantinganybasestoothernationswithoutU.S.consent.159
TheU.S.waspermittedtorecruitFilipinocitizens,onvoluntarybasis,forserviceintheAmericanmilitary.160
The U.S. base commanders had the right to tax, distribute utilities, hand out licenses, search without warrants, and deport
undesirables.161
Complementingthesigningofthe1947MBAwasthesigningoftheMilitaryAssistanceAgreementof1947andthe1951MDT.
Overtheyears,variousprovisionsofthe1947MBAwereamended,graduallydelimitingU.S.controloverthebases.162OnSeptember16,1966,
theRamosRuskAgreementreduceditstermto25yearsstartingfromthatyear.
A review of the 1947 MBA in 1979 led to the formal transfer of control of Clark and Subic bases to the Philippines.163 Thus, these bases
became Philippine military installations containing U.S. military facilities.The review also provided that each base would beunder a
Filipinobasecommander,thePhilippineflagwastoflysinglyinthebasesthePhilippinegovernmentwastoprovidesecurityalong
thebases'perimetersandthereviewoftheagreementswouldtakeplaceeveryfiveyearsstartingin1979.164
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RPUS Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security that would have
extendedthelifeofthebasesfor10moreyears.165The1947MBAwasterminatedonDecember21,1992whenthe25yeartenurelapsed.This
prompted the U.S. to vacate its bases effective at the end of December 1992.166The departure of the U.S. warshipBellauWood marked the
closureofAmericanmilitarybasesinthecountry.167
With the expiration of the 1947 MBA, the detailed arrangements for the presence of U.S. military forces and facilities in the Philippines,
particularlythoselistedabove,similarlyended,leavingonlythegeneralarrangementsunderthe1951MutualMDT.
V.C(2)The1951MutualDefenseTreaty
The1951MDTwassignedonAugust30,1951,whiletheU.S.wasestablishinganumberofbilateraldefenseallianceswithkeyAsianStatesasit
positioned itself to contain communist expansion in Asia in the period following World War II and the Korean War. Despite periods of drift, its
relationshipwithitsAsianalliesprovidedtheU.S.supportandassistancethroughouttheColdWarandduringtheVietnamwar.168
The1951MDTprovidedthegeneraltermsofthedefensealliancebetweentheU.S.andthePhilippinesthemoredetailedtermswerereflectedin
theearlier1947MBAthatexpiredandwasnotrenewedin1991.
The1947MBAandthe1951MDTwerethecounterpartsofU.S.agreementswiththeNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)countries.Oneof
those agreements was the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATOSOFA), a multilateral agreement that applies to all the NATOmember
countries.169
AftertheWorldWarII,theU.S.maintainedvariousEuropeanbases.170Despitethepresenceofthesebases,theU.S.enteredintotheNATO
SOFAonJune19,1951,todefinethetermsforthedeploymentandstatusofitsmilitaryforcesinthesecountries.171MostoftheotherNATO
states,however,requiredratificationandimplementinglegislation,withadditionalagreementstoimplementtheNATOSOFA.172
The1951MDTprovidesforanalliancethatbothnationswouldsupportoneanotherifeitherthePhilippinesortheU.S.wouldbeattackedbyan
externalparty.173Itstatesthateachpartyshalleither,separatelyorjointly,throughmutualaid,acquire,developandmaintaintheircapacityto
resist armed attack.174It provides for a mode of consultations to determine the 1951 MDT's appropriate implementation measures and when
either of the parties determines that their territorial integrity, political independence, or national security is threatened byarmed attack in the
Pacific.175Anattackoneitherpartywillbeacteduponinaccordancewiththeirconstitutionalprocessesandanyarmedattackoneitherpartywill
bebroughttotheattentionoftheUnitedNationsforimmediateaction.176
Theaccorddefinesthemeaningofanarmedattackasincludingarmedattacksbyahostilepoweronametropolitanareaofeitherparty,onthe
islandterritoriesundertheirjurisdictioninthePacific,orontheirarmedforces,publicvessels,oraircraftsinthePacific.177TheU.S.government
guaranteed to defend the security of the Philippines against external aggression but not necessarily against internal subversion. The treaty
expressly stipulates that its terms are indefinite and would last until one or both parties terminate the agreement by a oneyear advance
notice.178Thetreatysubsequentlybecamethebasisforanannualjointexercise,knownasBalikatan,betweenthePhilippinesandtheU.S.179
Onthewhole,the1951MDTembodiedanallianceanddefenseagreement,focusedasitisonjointactionanddefensesagainstarmedexternal
attacks.Itmadenoprovisionforbases,troops,orfacilitieswhichthe1947MBAcontainedandwhichlapsedwhentheMBA'stermexpired.
V.C(3)The1998VisitingForcesAgreement
The1998VFAcameaftertheexpirationofthe1947MBAin1991andopenedalimitedwindowforthepresenceofAmericantroopsinthe
Philippines. It was entered into during the era when the U.S. was envisioning "access" as a new approach in maintaining its presence in
Southeast Asia. Instead of permanent bases, the approach sought bilateral arrangements like those with Singapore for training,
exercises, and interoperabilityto allow for uninterrupted forward deployment in the Asian region their continued presence in the region
assuresfasterresponsetodevelopmentsinflashpointsintheeasternhemisphere.180
In line with the American approach, the 1998 VFA allows the rotational presence of U.S. military forces and their operations anywhere in the
PhilippinesforatemporarybutundefinedlengthoftimetotrainandinteroperatewiththePhilippinearmedforcesandtousetheirfacilities.The
Philippinesretainsjurisdictionovercriminalcases,includingcapitaloffenses,involvingU.S.troops.181
InBayanv.Zamora,182theCourtheldthatalthoughtheagreementdidnotentailthepermanentbasingofaforeignmilitaryforce,itrequireda
treaty because Article XVI11, Section 25 of the Constitution covers not only the presence of bases but also the presence of "troops."183As a
treaty,the1998VFArequiredtheconcurrenceoftheSenatepursuanttoArticleVII,Section21oftheConstitution.
TheCourtalsoheldthatthePhilippinesisboundtoacceptanofficialdeclarationbytheU.S.tosatisfytherequirementthattheothercontracting
partymustrecognizetheagreementasatreaty.184ItnotedthattheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesleaveseachstatefreetochoose
itsformofgivingconsenttoatreaty.185
V.D.TheEDCA
Asheretoforeoutlined,theU.S.adoptedthe"PivottoAsia"strategybeginning2009undertheadministrationofPresidentBarackObama.Inthe
articleExplaining the U.S. Pivot to Asia, Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews enumerated six key efforts under the U.S.'s "Pivot to Asia" policy,
namely: alliances improving relationships with emerging powers economic statecraft engaging with multilateral institutions support for
universalvaluesandincreasingmilitarypresence.186
Onmilitarypresence,theoperativewordis"presence":theforwarddeploymentofU.S.militaryforcesinAsia.187TheEDCAperfectlyfitsthe
American strategy as it allows the prepositioning of equipment and supplies in agreed locations to enhance the U.S.'s
"developmentofageographicallydispersed,politicallysustainableforcepostureintheregion."188
The EDCA was signed on April 28, 2014, in Manila, by Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines
PhilipGoldberg,intimefortheofficialstatevisitbyU.S.PresidentBarackObama.The10yearaccordisthesecondmilitaryagreementbetween
theU.S.andthePhilippines(thefirstbeingthe1998VFA)sinceAmericantroopswithdrewfromitsPhilippinesnavalbasein1992.
The agreement allows the U.S. to station troops and operations on Philippine territory without establishing a permanent base189and with the
stipulationthattheU.S.isnotallowedtostoreorpositionanynuclearweaponsonPhilippineterritory.190
TheEDCAwasenteredintoforthefollowingpurposes:
1. This Agreement deepens defense cooperation between the Parties and maintains and develops their individual and collective
capacities,infurtheranceofArticleIIoftheMDT,whichstatesthat"thePartiesseparatelyandjointlybyselfhelpandmutualaid
willmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack,"andwithinthecontextoftheVFA.This
includes:
(a) Supporting the Parties' shared goal of improving interoperability of the Parties' forces and for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines ("AFP"), addressing shortterm capabilities gaps promoting longterm modernization, and helping maintain and
developadditionalmaritimesecurity,maritimedomainawareness,andhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefcapabilitiesand
(b) Authorizing access to Agreed Location in the territory of the Philippines by United States forces on a rotational basis as
mutuallydeterminedbytheParties.
2. In furtherance of the MDT, the Parties mutually agree that this Agreement provides the principal provisions and necessary
authorizationswithrespecttoAgreedLocations.
3. The Parties agree that the United States may undertake the following types of activities in the territory of the Philippines in
relation to its access to and use of Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises joint and combined training activities
humanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefactivitiesandsuchotheractivitiesasmaybeagreeduponbytheParties.191
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Tosummarize,theEDCAhastwomainpurposes:
First,itisintendedasaframeworkforactivitiesfordefensecooperationinaccordancewiththe1951MDTandthe1998VFA.
Second,it grants to the U.S. military the right to use certain identified portions of the Philippine territory referred to in the EDCA as Agreed
Locations. This right is fleshed out in the EDCA when the agreement identifies the privileges granted to the U.S. in bringing in troops and
facilities,inconstructingstructures,andinconductingactivities.192
TheEDCAiseffectivefor10years,unlessboththeU.S.andthePhilippinesformallyagreetoalterit.193TheU.S.isboundtohandoveranyand
allfacilitiesinthe"AgreedLocations"tothePhilippinegovernmentupontheterminationoftheAgreement.
Intermsofcontents,EDCAmaybedividedintotwo:
First,itreiteratesthepurposesofthe1951MDTandthe1998VFAinthatitaffirmsthecontinuedconductofjointactivitiesbetweenttheU.S.
andthePhilippinesinpursuitofdefensecooperation.
Second, it contains an entirety new agreement pertaining to Agreed Locations, the right of the LIS. military to stay in these areas and
conductactivitieswhichmaynotbeimbuedwithmutualityofinterestssincetheydonotinvolvedefensecooperation.
ThelatterprovidessupportfortwointerrelatedargumentsthatIwillforwardinthisOpinion.First,theEDCAreferstothepresenceofforeign
militarybases,troops,andfacilitiesinthisjurisdiction.Second,theEDCAisnotamereimplementationof,butgoesbeyond,the1951MDTand
the1998VFA.Itisanagreementthat,introducesnewtermsandobligationsnotfoundinthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA,andthusrequiresthe
concurrenceoftheSenate.
V.D(l)DoestheEDCAinvolvetheentryofmilitarybasestothePhilippinesasenvisionedunderArticleXVIII,Section25?
V.D(l)(i)TheConceptofaForeignMilitaryBase
AreadingoftheEDCAwillrevealthatitpertainstothepresenceinthiscountryofaforeignmilitarybaseorthemodemequivalentofone.While
Article XVIII, Section 25 mentions no definition of what a foreign military base, troops, or facility is, these terms, at the time the 1987
Constitutionwasdrafted,carriedaspecialmeaning.Infact,thismeaningwasthecompellingforcethatconvincedtheframerstoincludeArticle
XVIII,Section25inthe1987Constitution.
More specifically, when the framers of the 1987 Constitution referred to foreign military bases, they had in mind the then existing 1947
MBA.194Thisisapparentfromthetextoftheprovisionitselfwhichmakesdirectreferencetothetreaty,aswellasfromtheexchangesofthe
framersofthe1987Constitutionpriortotheirvoteontheproposedprovision.195
In construing the meaning of statutes and of the Constitution, one aim is to discover the meaning that the framers attached to the particular
wordorphraseemployed.196ThepertinentstatuteorprovisionoftheConstitutionmustthenbe"construedasitwasintendedtobeunderstood
whenitwaspassed."197
Thus,aproperinterpretationofthemeaningofforeignmilitarybasesmusttakeintoaccounthowitwasunderstoodbytheframersinaccordance
withhowthe1947MBAestablishedU.S.militarybasesinthePhilippines.Itisinthistechnicalandprecisemeaningthatthetermmilitarybase
wasused.ItisthiskindofmilitarybasesthatArticleXVIII,Section25intendstocover,subjecttospecificqualifications.
Hence,theconceptofmilitarybasesasillustratedinthe1947MBAshouldbetakenintoaccountinascertainingwhethertheEDCAcontemplates
theestablishmentofforeignmilitarybases.Thisrealityrendersacomparisonofthe1947MBAandtheEDCAappropriate.
Toclarifythisposition,itisnotthattheframersofthe1987Constitutionhadinmindthespecificexistingforeignmilitarybasesunderthe1947
MBA when they drafted Article XVIII, Section 25.Such a position unjustifiably assumes that the framers lacked foresight and merely allowed
themselvestobesolelylimitedbytheexistingfacts.
Rather,mypositionisthatitistheconceptofaforeignmilitarybaseunderthe1947MBA,andnotthespecificmilitarybaseslistedinits
Annexes,thatshouldbedeterminativeofwhattheConstitutionintendstocover.Theforeignmilitarybaseconceptshouldnecessarilybe
adjusted,too,totakeintoaccountthedevelopmentsunderthenewU.S."PivottoAsia"strategy.
V.D(l)(ii)EDCAandthe1947MBACompared
AfirstmaterialpointtonoteisthattheobligationsundertheEDCAaresimilartotheobligationsfoundinthe1947MBA.Tosupportthis
view,IpresentbelowasidebysidecomparisonoftherelevantprovisionsoftheEDCAandthe1947MBA.
EDCA
1947MBA
ArticleIII,Section1
ArticleIII,par.1
With the consideration of the views of the

Parties, the Philippines hereby authorizes and
agrees that United States forces, United States
contractors, and vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
operated by or for United States forces may
conduct the following activities with respect to
Agreed Locations: training, transit, support and
relatedactivities,refuelingofaircraftbunkering
of vessels temporary maintenance of vehicles,
vessels, and aircraft temporary accommodation
of personnel communications prepositioning of
equipment, supplies, and materiel deploying
forces and materiel and such other activities as
thePartiesmayagree.
ItismutuallyagreedthattheUnitedStatesshall
havetherights,power,andauthoritywithinthe
baseswhicharenecessaryfortheestablishment,
use, operation and defense thereof or
appropriate for the control thereof and all the
rights, power and authority within the limits of
territorialwatersandairspaceadjacentto,orin
thevicinityof,thebaseswhicharenecessaryto
provide access to them, or appropriate for their
control.
ArticleVI,Section3
United States forces are authorized to exercise
all rights and authorities within the Agreed
Locationsthatarenecessaryfortheiroperational
control or defense, including undertaking
appropriate measures to protect United Stains
forcesandUnitedStatescontractors.TheUnited
States should coordinate such measures with
appropriateauthoritiesofthePhilippines.
ArticleIII,Section4
ArticleIII,par.2(a)and(b)
The Philippines hereby grants to the United

States, through bilateral securit ymechanisms,
suchastheMDBandSEB,operationalcontrolof
Agreed Locations for construction activities and
authority to undertake activities on, and make
alterations and improvements to, Agreed
Locations,xxx
xxxx
2. Such rights, power, and authority shall
include,interlia,theright,powerandauthority:
(a) to construct (including dredging and filling),
operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison and
controlthebases
(b) to improve and deepen the harbors,
channels, entrances and anchorages, and to
construct or maintain necessary roads and
xxxx
ArticleVII,Section1.
ArticleIII,par2(d)
The Philippines hereby grants to United States

forces and United States contractors the use of
water, electricity, and other public utilities on
termsandconditions,includingratesofcharges,
nolessfavorablethanthoseavailabletotheAFP
ortheGovernmentofthePhilippines,xxx
xxxx
ArticleIV,Section1
ArticleIII,par(2)(e)
The Philippines hereby authorizes United States

forces, through bilateral mechanisms, such as
the MDB and SEB, to preposition and store
defense equipment, supplies and materiel
("prepositioned materiel"), including, but not
limited to, humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief equipment, supplies, and materiel, at
AgreedLocations.UnitedStatesforcesxxx
xxxx
the right to acquire, as may be agreed between

thetwoGovernments,suchrightsofway,andto
construct thereon, as may be required for
military
purposes,
wire
and
radio
communications facilities, including submarine
ArticleVII,Section2
and subterranean cables, pipe lines and spur
tracks from railroads to bases, and the right, as
The Parties recognize that it may be necessary may be agreed upon between the two
for United States forces to use the radio Governments to construct the necessary
spectrum. The Philippines authorizes the United facilities
States to operate its own telecommunications
systems(astelecommunicationisdefinedinthe xxxx
1992 Constitution and Convention of the
International Telecommunication Union "ITU").
Thisshallincludetherighttoutilizesuchmeans
andservicesrequiredtoensurethefullabilityto
operate telecommunications systems and the
right to use all necessary radio spectrum
allocatedforthispurpose,xxx
ArticleIV,Section3
to construct, install, maintain, and employ on

any base any type of facilities, weapons,
substance,device,vesselorvehicleonorunder
the ground, in the air or on or under the water
that may be requisite or appropriate, including
meteorological systems, aerial and water
navigationlights,radioandradarapparatusand
electronicdevices,ofanydesiredpower,typeof
emissionandfrequency.
The prepositioned materiel of the United States

shall be for the exclusive use of United States
forces, and full title to all such equipment,
supplies, and materiel remains with the United
States. United States forces shall have control
over the access and disposition of such
prepositioned materiel and shall have the
unencumbered
right
to
remove
such
prepositioned materiel at any time from the
territoryofthePhilippines.
ArticleIV,Section4
United States forces and United States
contractors shall have unimpeded access j to
Agreed Locations for all matters relating to the
prepositioning and storage of defense
equipment, supplies, and materiel including
delivery,
management,
inspection,
use,
maintenance, and removal of such equipment,
suppliesandmateriel.
ArticleIII,Section2
ArticleVII
Whenrequested,theDesignatedAuthorityofthe
Philippines shall assist in facilitating transit or
temporary access by United States forces to
public land and facilities (including roads, ports,
an airfield) including those owned or controlled
by local governments, and to other land and
facilities(includingroads,portsandairfields).
ItismutuallyagreedthattheUnitedStatesmay
employanduseforUnitedStatesmilitaryforces
any and all public utilities, other services and
facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads,
highways, railroads, bridges, viaducts, canals,
lakes,riversandstreamsinthePhilippinesunder
conditionsnolessfavorablethanthosethatmay
be applicable from time to time to the military
forcesofthePhilippines.
Whilethe1947MBAgrantsbroaderpowerstotheU.S.,dueperhapstothegeopoliticalcontextunderwhichtheagreementwasforged(the1947
MBA had an international, in contrast with EDCA's Asian, focus), the EDCA and the 1947 MBA essentially pursue the same purpose the
identificationofportionsofPhilippineterritoryoverwhichtheU.S.isgrantedcertainrightsforitsmilitaryactivities.
Theserightsmaybecategorizedintofour:
(1)therighttoconstructstructuresandotherfacilitiesfortheproperfunctioningofthebases
(2)therighttoperformactivitiesforthedefenseorsecurityofthebasesorAgreedLocations
(3)therighttoprepositiondefenseequipment,suppliesandmaterieland,
(4)otherrelatedrightssuchastheuseofpublicutilitiesandpublicservices.
Onlythosewhorefusetoseecannotdiscerntheseundeniableparallelisms.
Further, even independently of the concept of military bases under the 1947 MBA, the provisions of the EDCA itself provide a compelling
argumentthatitseekstoallowinthiscountrywhatArticleXVIII,Section25intendstoregulate.
Thereexistsnorigiddefinitionofamilitarybase.However,itisatermusedinthefieldofmilitaryoperationsandthushasagenerallyaccepted
connotation.TheU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DoD)DictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTermsdefinesabaseas"anareaorlocalitycontaining
installationswhichprovidelogisticorothersupport"homeairfieldorhomecarrier.198
Underourlaws,wefindthedefinitionofamilitarybaseinPresidentialDecreeNo.1227whichstatesthatamilitarybaseis"anymilitary,air,
naval, coast guard reservation, base, fort, camp, arsenal, yard, station, or installation in the Philippines."199 A military base connotes the
presence,inarelativelypermanentdegree,oftroopsandfacilitiesinaparticulararea.200
In 2004, the U.S. DoD released Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture, a report to U.S. Congress about the renewed U.S. global
position.201TheU.S.DoDredefinedandreclassifiedtheirmilitarybasesinthreecategories:
MainOperatingBase(MOB)
Mainoperatingbases,withpermanentlystationedcombatforcesandrobustinfrastructure,willbecharacterizedbycommandand
control structures, family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures. Examples include Ramstein Air Base
(Germany),KadenaAirBase(Okinawa,Japan),andCampHumphreys(Korea).
ForwardOperatingSite(FOS)
Forward operating site will be an expandable "warm facilities" maintained with a limited U.S. military support presence and
possiblyprepositionedequipment.FOSswillsupportrotationalratherthanpermanentlystationedforcesandbeafocusforbilateral
andregionaltraining.ExamplesincludetheSembawangportfacilityinSingaporeandSotoCanoAirBaseinHonduras.
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ThefollowingarethekeycharacteristicsofanFOS:
First,anFOSisanexpandable/scalablefacility.AndrewKrepinevichandRobertWorknotedthatanFOScansupportbothsmallandlargeforces,
andcanbereadilyexpandedtoserveasexpeditionaryorcampaignbasesshouldacrisiseruptnearby.202
Second,thefacilityismaintainedor"keptwarm"bylimitedU.S.militarysupportpersonnelorU.S.militarycontractors.Ithostsrotationalrather
thanpermanentlystationedforces.AnFOSmayalsohouseprepositionedequipment.
Finally,anFOSfacilitydoesnotneedtobeownedbytheU.S.{i.e.,theSembawangPortFacilityandthePayaLebarAirfieldinSingapore).FOSs
aregenerallybasesthatsupportforwarddeployedratherthanforwardbasedforces.203
ThethirdclassificationofmilitarybasesisaCooperativeSecurityLocation,describedasfollows:
CooperativeSecurityLocation(CSL)
Cooperative security locations will be facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence. Instead they will be maintained with
periodic service, contractor, or hostnation support. CSLs will provide contingency access and be a focal point for
security cooperation activities. A current example of a CSL is in Dakar, Senegal, where the U.S. Air Force has negotiated
contingencylanding,logistics,andfuelcontractingarrangements,andwhichservedasastagingareaforthe2003peacesupport
operationinLiberia.204
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The GDPR emphasized that the U.S.'s plan is to establish a network ofFOSs and CSLs in AsiaPacific to support the global war on
terrorismandtoprovidemultipleavenuesofaccessforcontingencyoperations.Thesefacilitiesservetoexpandtrainingopportunities
for the U.S. and the hostcountry. FOSs and CSLs allow U.S. forces to use these areas in times of crisis while avoiding the impression of
establishingapermanentpresence.205Notably,theseaccessagreementsarelessexpensivetooperateandmaintainthanMOBs.206Moreover,
FOSsandCSLsallowoverseasmilitarypresencewithalighterfootprint.207
TogobacktotheEDCA,itnotablyallowstheU.S.tousetheAgreedLocationsforthefollowingactivities:"training,transit,supportandrelated
activities, refueling of aircraft bunkering of vessels temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft temporary accommodation of
personnelcommunicationsprepositioningofequipment,supplies,andmaterieldeployingforcesandmaterielandsuchotheractivitiesasthe
Partiesmayagree.208
Inordertocarryouttheseactivities,theEDCAallowsU.S.militarypersonneltoenterandremaininPhilippineterritory.ItgrantstheU.S.the
right to construct structures and assemblies.209It also allows the U.S. to preposition defense equipment, supplies and materiel.210The U.S.
personnelmayalsousetheAgreedLocationstorefuelaircraftandbunkervessels.211
StockpilingofmilitarymaterielinthePhilippinesisexplicitlypermittedunderthefollowingEDCAprovisions:
1. Article III, par. 1: The activities allowed on the agreed locations include: (i) theprepositioningof equipment, supplies,
andmateriel(ii)deployingforcesandmaterieland(iii)suchotheractivitiesasthePartiesmayagree.
2. Article IV, par. 1: U.S. forces are allowed to preposition and store defense equipment, supplies, material
("prepositionedmateriel"),including,butnotlimitedto,humanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefequipment,supplies,
andmateriel,atagreedlocations.
3. ArticleIV,par.3:TheprepositionedmaterielisfortheexclusiveuseofU.S.forcesandfulltitleshallbelongtothe
U.S.
4. Article IV, par. 4: The U.S. forces and U.S. contractors shall have unimpeded access to the agreed locations for all
matters relating to the prepositioning and storage of defense equipment, supplies, and materiel, including
delivery,management,inspection,use,maintenance,andremovalofsuchequipment,suppliesandmateriel.
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Notably,neither the 1951 MDT nor the 1998 VFA authorized stockpiling. The 1951 MDT focused on developing the Philippines and the
U.S.'scapacitytoresistanarmedattackwhile1998VFAfocusedontheentryandexitofUStroopsinthecountry.Noprovisionineithertreaty
specificallyallowsstockpilingofmilitarymateriel.
Insum,theAgreedLocationsmentionedintheEDCAareareaswheretheU.S.canperformmilitaryactivitiesinstructuresbuiltbyitspersonnel.
TheextentoftheU.S.'righttouseoftheAgreedLocationsisbroadenoughtoincludeeventhestockpilingofweaponsandtheshelterandrepair
ofvesselsoverwhichtheU.S.personnelhasexclusivecontrol.Clearly,thisisamilitarybaseasthistermisordinarilyunderstood.
Further,asweheldinBayanMuna,ArticleXVIII,Section25referstothreedifferentsituations:thepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,or
facilities.212EvenassumingthattheEDCAisnotabasingagreement,itneverthelessinvolvesthedeploymentoftroopsandfacilities
inPhilippinesoil.AsIhavealreadystated,theEDCAallowsU.S.forcestoenterandremaininthePhilippines.ItdefinesU.S.forcestoinclude
U.S. military and civilian personnel and U.S. Armed Forces property, equipment, and materiel.213The EDCA itself provides that the U.S. can
deployforcesandmaterielintheAgreedLocations.214
ThattheEDCAallowsthisarrangementforaninitialperiodof10years,tocontinueautomaticallyunlessterminated,215isfurtherproofthatit
pertainstothepresenceinPhilippinesoilofforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesonamoreorlesspermanentbasis.
Note,atthispoint,thattheSenators,duringtheratificationofthe1998VFA,observedthatitonlycoverstemporaryvisits of U.S. troops and
personnel in the country.These Senators gave their consent to the 1998 VFA on the knowledge that the U.S. forces' stav in the
countrymaylastonlyuptothreeweekstosixmonthsperbatch.216
ThistemporarystayofU.S.forcesinthePhilippinesunderthe1998VFAmeansthatitdoesnotcover,orapproveofamorepermanentstayof
U.S. forces and their equipment in the Philippines. Significantly, this is the key characteristic of the Agreed Locations in the EDCA.For, if the
EDCAhadnotenvisionedthestayofU.S.forcesandequipmentintheAgreedLocationsinthePhilippinesforaperiodlongertlianenvisionedin
the1998VFA,itwouldnothaveaddedobligationsregardingthestorageoftheirequipmentandmateriel.Themorepermanentnatureofthe
EDCA,incontrasttothe1998VFA,indicatesachangeinthetenoroftheagreementintheEDCA,onethatdoesnotmerelyimplementthe1998
VFA.
V.D(2)DoestheEDCAMerelyImplementthe1951MPT?
This question responds to the ponencia's argument that the EDCA can be embodied in an executive agreement because it merely provides
implementingdetailsforthe1951MDT.217
V.D(2)(i)TheEffectsoftheExpirationofthe1947
MBAandoftheAdoptionofthe1987Constitution
The sequence of events relating to American bases, troops, and facilities in the Philippines that took place since Philippine independence, is
critical in responding to the question in caption. It should be remembered that as a condition under the TydingsMcDuffie Act for the grant of
Philippineindependence,thePhilippineswasboundtonegotiatewiththeU.S.forbasesinthePhilippines,resultinginthe1947MBA.
ThisagreementcontainedthedetailedtermsrelatingtotheexistenceandoperationofAmericanbasesandthepresenceofAmericanforcesand
facilities in the Philippines. As its title denotes, the 1951 MDT is the treaty providing for alliance and mutual defense against armed attack on
eithercountryitonlygenerallycontainedthedefenseandalliancerelationshipbetweenthePhilippinesandtheU.S.
In1987,thePhilippinesadoptedanewConstitution.ThisCharterdirectlylookedforwardtotheexpirationofthe1947MBAandprovidedforthe
termsunderwhichforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitieswouldthereafterbeallowedintothePhilippines.The1947MBAexpiredin1991
and no replacement treaty took its place thus,all the detailed arrangements provided under the 1947 MBA for the presence of U.S.
bases,troopsandfacilitiesalsoended,leavingonlythe1951MDTanditsgeneraltermsinplace.
Under this situation, the detailed arrangements that expired with the 1947 MBA were not carried over to the 1951 MDT as this treaty only
generallyprovidedforthedefenseandalliancerelationshipbetweentheU.S.andthePhilippines.Thus,therewerenospecificpoliciesonmilitary
bases,troops,andfacilitiesthatcouldbeimplementedandoperationalizedbysubsequentexecutiveagreementsonthebasisoftheMDT.
Inparticular,thetermsofthe1947MBAthathadexpiredandhadnotbeenrenewedcannotbedeemedcarriedovertothe1951
MDT.Ifanysuchfutureagreementswouldbemadeaftertheeffectivityofthe1987Constitution,thensuchagreementswouldbe
governedbyArticleXVIII,Section25ofthenewConstitution.
Significantly,whenthe1987ConstitutionanditsArticleXVIII,Section25tookeffect,noabsoluteprohibitionagainsttheintroductionofnewU.S.
bases,troops,andfacilitieswasputinplace.Infactthe1951MDTthenstillexistedasageneraldefenseallianceofthePhilippinesandtheU.S.
against armed attack by third parties. But the introduction of military bases or their equivalent, of troops, and of military facilities into the
PhilippinescannowonlytakeplacebywayofatreatyconcurredinbytheSenate.
V.D(2)(ii)The1951MDTexaminedinlishtoftheEDCA
ThattheEDCAispurelyanimplementationofthe1951MDTanddoesnotneedtobeintheformofatreaty,isnottenablefortworeasons.
First,TheEDCAgrantsrightsandprivilegestotheU.S.thatgowellbeyondwhatiscontemplatedinthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA.
Second,eventheassumptionsthattheEDCAisindeedamereimplementationofboththeearlier1951MDTandthe1998VFA,thisassumption
by no means provides an argument in favor of treating the EDCA as an executive agreement. Notably,the 1998 VFA is also recognized as an
implementationofthe1951MDTyettheGovernmentdeemeditnecessarytohaveitembodiedinaseparatetreatyconcurredinbytheSenate.
Onthefirstargumentananalysisofthe1951MDT,the1998VFA,andtheEDCArevealsthattheEDCAisastandaloneagreement.
The1951MDTisatreatyintendedforthecollectivedefenseofitssignatorycountries(i.e.,theU.S.andthePhilippines)againstexternalarmed
attack.Thisisapparentfromitsdeclarationofpolicieswhichstates,amongothers,thattheU.S.andthePhilippineshaveagreedtotheMDTin
pursuitoftheirdesireto
xxxdeclarepubliclyandformallytheirsenseofunityandtheircommondeterminationtodefendthemselvesagainstexternal
armedattack,sothatnopotentialaggressorcouldbeundertheillusionthateitherofthemstandsaloneinthePacificarea.218
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Therestofthetextofthe1951MDTconsistentlyhighlightsthisgoal.ItsArticleIIstatesthatthepartiesshall"separatelyandjointlybyself
helpandmutualaidmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack."ArticleIIIprovides that the parties
shall "consult together" regarding the implementation of the MDT whenever in their opinion the "territorial integrity, political independence or
securityofeitherofthepartiesisthreatenedbyexternalarmedattackinthePacific."ArticleIVdeclaresthatanarmedattackinthePacificarea
on either of the parties would be dangerous to each other's peace and safety and thus they would act to meet the common danger. Article
V then proceeds to define an armed attack as to include an armed attack on "the metropolitan territory of either parties or on the island
territoriesunderitsjurisdictioninthePacificOcean,itsarmedforces,publicvesselsandaircraftsinthePacific."
ThisCourthashadoccasiontoexplainthenatureofthe1951MDT.InLimv.ExecutiveSecretary,219wesaid
xxxTheMDThasbeendescribedasthecoreofthedefenserelationshipbetweenthePhilippinesanditstraditionalally,theUnited
States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its
Americancounterpartsxxx.[Emphasissupplied]
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Thus,theessenceofthe1951MDTistheconductofjointactivitiesbytheU.S.andthePhilippinesinaccordancewiththedictatesofcollective
defenseagainstanattackinthePacific.ThisisafocusthattheEDCAlacks.
V.D(2)(iii)The1951MDTComparedwithOtherDefenseAllianceAgreements
OurmilitaryobligationstotheU.S.underthe1951MDTare(1)tomaintainanddevelopourmilitarycapacitytoresistarmedattack,and(2)to
recognizethatanarmedattackagainsttheU.S.inthePacificisanattackonthePhilippinesandtomeetthecommondangerinaccordancewith
ourconstitutionalprocess.Therelevantprovisionsread:
ArticleII.In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by selfhelp and
mutualaidwillmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack.
ArticleIV.EachPartyrecognizesthatanarmedattackinthePacificareaoneitherofthePartieswouldbedangeroustoitsown
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional
processes.
United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and
maintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.
ArticleV.For purposes of ARTICLE IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the
metropolitanterritoryofeitheroftheParties,orontheislandterritoriesunderitsjurisdictioninthePacificOcean,itsarmedforces,
publicvesselsoraircraftinthePacific.
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(Fortunately,thelimitsofthe1951MDThavenotbeentestedinactualoperationsinceneitherthePhilippinesnortheU.S.hasasyetbeenthe
subjectofanarmedattackinthePacificregion.)
Inrelatingthe1951MDTtotheEDCA,Igleanfromtheponenciatheintenttoseizetheterm"mutualaid"indevelopingthecontractingparties'
collectivecapacitytoresistanarmedattack,asbasisfortheUStoestablishamilitarybaseoramilitaryfacilityorstationmilitarytroopsinthe
Philippines.220This reading, however, would be a novel one in the context of American agreements with other Asian countries with their own
allianceandMDTswiththeU.S.
NotethatArticleIIoftheRPU.S.1951MDTissimilartothefollowingprovisionsinotherMDTs:
(1)The1953USSouthKoreanMDT
ArticleII
ThePartieswillconsulttogetherwhenever,intheopinionofeitherofthem,thepoliticalindependenceorsecurityofeitherofthe
Partiesisthreatenedbyexternalarmedattack.Separatelyandjointly,byselfhelpandmutualaid,thePartieswillmaintainand
develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to
implementthisTreatyandtofurtheritspurposes.221
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(2)The1954USTaiwan(RepublicofChina)MDT
ArticleII
InordermoreeffectivelytoachievetheobjectiveofthisTreaty,thePartiesseparatelyandjointlybyselfhelpandmutualaidwill
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities
directedfromwithoutagainsttheirterritorialintegrityandpoliticalstability.222
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(3)the1960USJapanTreatyofMutualCooperationandSecurity
ArticleIII
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective selfhelp and mutual
aidwillmaintainanddevelop,subjecttotheirconstitutionalprovisions,theircapacitiestoresistarmedattack.223
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Withlittlevariance,224thesearticlesareessentiallyidenticaltoArticleIIoftheRPU.S.1951MDT.
But notably, despite the existence of the abovementioned provisions, all three treaties also saw the need to include a separate provision
explicitlygrantingtheU.S.therighttoaccessanduseofareasandfacilitiesoftheothercontractingparty.Thus:
ArticleIV
(USKorea)
TheRepublicofKoreagrants,andtheUnitedStatesofAmericaaccepts,therighttodisposeUnitedStatesland,airandsea
forcesinandabouttheterritoryoftheRepublicofKoreaasdeterminedbymutualagreement.225
ArticleVII
(USTaiwan)
TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofChina(Taiwan)grants,andtheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaaccepts,theright
todisposesuchUnitedStatesland,airandseaforcesinandaboutTaiwanandthePescadoresasmayberequiredfor
theirdefense,asdeterminedbymutualagreement.226
ArticleVI
(USJapan)
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far
East,theUnitedStatesofAmericaisgrantedtheusebyitsland,airandnavalforcesoffacilitiesandareasinJapan.
TheuseofthesefacilitiesandareasaswellasthestatusofUnitedStatesarmedforcesinJapanshallbegovernedbyaseparate
agreement,replacingtheAdministrativeAgreementunderArticleIIIoftheSecurityTreatybetweenJapanandtheUnitedStatesof
America,signedatTokyoonFebruary28,1952,asamended,andbysuchotherarrangementsasmaybeagreedupon.227
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ThesethreearticlesdonothaveanycounterpartintheRPUS1951MDT.Understandablyperhaps,counterpartprovisionsarenotinthe1951
MDTasourcommitmenttogranttheU.S.useandaccesstoareasandfacilitiesinthePhilippineterritorywasembodiedinanearlieragreement,
the1947MBA(which,however,expired,thusendingtheuseandaccessgrantstotheU.S.anditsarmedforces).
In my view, the implication of the abovequoted provisions in the USSouth Korea, USTaiwan, and USJapan treaties (on "mutual aid") is
clear: the obligation to provide mutual aid under Article II of the RPUS 1951 MDT (and its counterpart
provisions)doesnotincludethe obligation to allow the entry and the stationing of U.S. troops or the establishment of military
basesorfacilities.
Inlightparticularlyoftheconstitutionaldevelopmentsin1987,the1951MDTcannotbeinvokedasanumbrellaagreementthatwouldlegally
justifythegranttotheU.S.ofentry,access,anduseofPhilippineownedareasorfacilitieswithoutSenateconcurrence.Theseactivities,which
theEDCAseekstodoallegedlypursuanttothe1951MDT,donotfallwithinthepurviewofourcommitmentsundertheearliertreaty.
V.D(3)DoestheEDCAMerelyImplementthe1998VFA?
IstheEDCAmerelyanagreementimplementingthe1998VFAwhichalreadyallowsthelimitedentryofU.S.militarytroopsandtheconstruction
offacilities?
ThequickandshortanswertotheabovequestionisNo,theEDCAdoesnotimplementthe1998VFAastheEDCAinfactprovidesawider
arrangementthanthe1998VFAwithrespecttotheentryofmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesintothePhilippines.Anaughtyviewisthatthe
1998 VFA should form part of the EDCA and not the other way around. Another reality, based on the treatyexecutive agreement distinctions
discussed above, is thatthe EDCA introduces new arrangements and obligations to those existing under the 1998 VFA hence, the
EDCAshouldbeintheformofatreaty.
V.D(3)(i)The1998VisitingForcesAgreement
The Philippines' primary obligation under the 1998 VFA, is to facilitate the entry and departure of U.S. personnel in relation with "covered
activities"228it merely defines the treatment of U.S. personnel visiting the Philippines hence, its name.229It is in fact a counterpart of the
NATOSOFAthattheU.S.forgedinEurope.
ThePreambleoftheVFAdefinesitsobjectivestogovernthetermsofvisitsof"elementsoftheUnitedStatesArmedForces"tothePhilippines,
whilethebodyoftheagreementcontainstheagreedconditions.Toquotefromtherelevantprovisionsofthe1998VFA:
VISITINGFORCESAGREEMENT
Preamble
TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen
internationalandregionalsecurityinthePacificarea
ReaffirmingtheirobligationsundertheMutualDefenseTreatyofAugust30,1951:
Considering that cooperation between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States promotes their common security
interests
RecognizingthedesirabilityofdefiningthetreatmentofUnitedStatespersonnelvisitingtheRepublicofthePhilippines
Haveagreedasfollows:
ArticleI:Definitions
As used in this Agreement, "United States personnel" means United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the
PhilippinesinconnectionwithactivitiesapprovedbythePhilippineGovernment,xxx
xxxx
ArticleIII:EntryandDeparture
1. The Government of the Philippinesshall facilitate the admissionof United States personnel and their departure from the
PhilippinesinconnectionwithactivitiescoveredbythisAgreement,xxx
cralawlawlibrary
Astheponenciacorrectlyobserved,the1998VFAitselfdoesnotspecifywhat"activities"wouldallowtheentryofU.S.troopsintothePhilippines.
ThepartiesleftthisopenandrecognizedthattheactivitiesthatshallrequiretheentryofU.S.troopsaresubjecttofutureagreementsandthe
approvalbythePhilippineGovernment.
Howthisapproval,however,willbesecuredisfarfromcertain.Whatiscertainisthatbeyondtherestrictive"visits"thatthe1998VFAmentions,
nothingelseissaidundertheexpresstermsoftheAgreement.
Harkingbacktothe1947MBAanditsclearandcertainterms,whatcomesoutboldlyisthatthe1998VFAisnotanagreementthatcovers
"activities"inthewaythatthe1947MBAdiditissimplyanagreementregulatingthestatusofandthetreatmenttobeaccorded
to US. armed forces personnel and their aircraft and vehicles while visiting the Philippines. The agreement itself does not authorize
U.S.troopstopermanentlystayinthePhilippines,norauthorizeanyactivityrelatedtotheestablishmentandtheoperationofbases,asthese
activitieshadbeendefinedunderthe1947MBA.
Asdiscussedunderthetreatyexecutiveagreementdistinctionsabove,ifindeedtheactivitieswouldbeinlinewiththeoriginalintentofthe1998
VFA,thenanexecutiveagreementwouldsufficeasanimplementingagreement.Ontheotherhand,iftheactivitywouldbeamodificationofthe
1998VFAorwouldbebeyonditstermsandwouldentailtheestablishmentofamilitarybaseorfacilityortheirequivalent,andtheintroduction
oftroops,then,atreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenatewouldbetheappropriatemediumoftheU.S.Philippinesagreement.
ThisCourthashadtheopportunitytoexaminethe1998VFAinBayanMuna230anddescribedtheagreementinthiswise
Onthewhole,theVFAisanagreementwhichdefinesthetreatmentofUnitedStatestroopsandpersonnelvisitingthePhilippines.
Itprovidesfortheguidelinestogovernsuchvisitsofmilitarypersonnel,andfurtherdefinestherightsoftheUnitedStatesandthe
Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment,materialsandsupplies.
cralawlawlibrary
InLimv.ExecutiveSecretary,231thisCourtfurtherexplained:
The VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "United States military and civilian personnel |may visitl
temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government." It contains
provisions relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims,
importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its termination.
[Emphasissupplied]
cralawlawlibrary
The1998VFAallowstheentryofU.S.militarypersonneltoPhilippineterritoryandgrantstheU.S.specificrightsitisessentiallyanagreement
governing the rules for the visit of "US armed forces in the Philippinesfrom time to time"232in pursuit of cooperation to promote "common
securityinterests"itisessentiallyatreatygoverningthesojournofUSforcesinthiscountryforjointexercises.233
Significantly,the1951MDTandthe1998VFAcontainasimilarfeaturejointactivitiesinpursuitofcommonsecurityinterests.TheEDCA,onthe
otherhand,goesbeyondthetermsofthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA.
Asexplainedabove,theEDCAhastwopurposes.First,itisanagreementfortheconductofjointactivitiesinaccordancewiththe1951MDTand
the 1998 VFA. This, however, is not the centerpiece of the EDCA. Its centerpiece is the introduction of Agreed Locations which are
portionsofthePhilippineterritorywhoseuseisgrantedtotheU.S.234TheEDCAthenproceedstolisttherightsthattheU.S.has
overtheAgreedLocations.235
AreadingoftheEDCA'sprovisionsshowsthattherightsandprivilegesgrantedtotheU.S.donotalwayscarryaconcomitantrightonthepartof
the Philippines nor do they involve joint exercises.While the EDCA mentions that the Agreed Locations may be used for "security cooperation
exercises"236and"jointandcombinedtrainingactivities,"237theprovisionsoftheEDCAalsoprovidefortheconductofotheractivitiesbeyond
the1951MDTandthe1998VFA.
Within the Agreed Locations, the U.S. may conduct trainings for its troops, transit, support and related activities.238The EDCA also allows the
U.S. to use the Agreed Locations to refuel aircraft, bunker vessels, temporarily maintain vehicles, vessels and aircraft.239Significantly,itdoes
notprovideforanyqualificationonthepurposefortheentryofthesevessels,vehicles,andaircraftintoPhilippinejurisdiction.
TheEDCAalsopermitsthetemporaryaccommodationofpersonnel,240againwithoutanyqualificationastothepurposeoftheirvisit.TheU.S.
forces may also engage in communications activities including the use of its own radio spectrum,241similarly without any limitation as to the
purposebywhichsuchcommunicationsshallbecarriedout.
Further, within the Agreed Locations, the U.S. can also preposition defense equipment, supplies, and materiel over which the U.S. forces shall
have exclusive use and control.242Clearly, the right to deploy weapons can be undertaken even if it is not in the pursuit of joint activities for
commonsecurityinterests.
Theserights,grantedtotheU.S.undertheEDCA,donotcontainanelementofmutualityinthesensethatmutualityisreflectedinthe1951
MDTandthe1998VFA.Astheserightsgobeyondtheearliertreatiesandare,infact,independentsourcesofrightsandobligationsbetweenthe
U.S.andthePhilippines,theycannotbemeredetailsofimplementationofboththe1951MDTandthe1998VFA.
And,aspointedoutearlier,theAgreedLocationsundertheEDCAareakintothemilitarybasescontemplatedunderthe1947MBA.Thus,byits
own terms, the EDCA is not only a military base agreement outside the provisions of the 1951 MDT and the 1998 VFA, but a piecemeal
introductionofmilitarybasesinthePhilippines.
Note that, at this point, there exists no agreement on the establishment of U.S. military bases in the Philippinesthe EDCA reintroduces a
modernizedversionofthefixedmilitarybaseconceptcontemplatedandoperationalizedunderthe1947MBA.
V.D(4)The1951MPTand1998VFAinconjunctionwiththeEDCA
An additional dimension that the EDCA introduces the treatment of U.S. forces and U.S. contractors reveals that it does not merely
implementthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA,butaddstotheobligationsintheseagreements.
TosupportitsconclusionthattheEDCAimplementstheprovisionsinthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA,theponenciapointsoutthattheEDCA
references 1951 MDT and the 1998 VFA in allowing the entry of U.S. personnel and U.S. forces in the Philippines, and that the entry of U.S.
contractors(whohadnotbeenmentionedinthe1998VFA)donotcontradicttheobligationsfoundinthe1998VFA.
TheponenciafurthernotesthattheU.S.contractorshadbeenexpresslyexcludedfromthedefinitionofU.S.personnelandU.S.forces,inline
withtheirdefinitionsinthe1998VFA.243TheyarenotentitledtothesameprivilegesthatU.S.PersonnelandU.S.forcesenjoyunderthe1998
VFA,butwouldhavetocomplywithPhilippinelawtoenterthePhilippines.
Theponencia proceeds to argue that the lack of dissimilarities between the 1998 VFA and the EDCA point to the conclusion that the EDCA
implementsthe1998VFA.BylimitingtheentryofpersonsundertheEDCAtothecategoriesunderthe1998VFA,theEDCAmerelyimplements
whathadalreadybeenagreeduponunderthe1998VFA.TheU.S.forces'sauthorizationtoperformactivitiesundertheEDCAdoesnotchange
thenatureoftheEDCAasthe1998VFA'simplementingagreement,astheterm"jointexercises"underthe1998VFAdenotesawiderangeof
activitiesthatincludetheadditionalactivitiesundertheEDCA.
Thatthe1998VFAandtheEDCAarenotdissimilarintermsoftheirtreatmentofU.S.forcesandU.S.personnel,doesnotautomaticallymean
thattheEDCAsimplyimplementsthe1998VFA,giventheadditionalobligationsthattheEDCAintroducesforthePhilippinegovernment.
Asearlierdiscussed,theEDCAintroducesmilitarybasesinthePhilippineswithintheconceptofthe1987Constitution,anditisinlightofthese
additional obligations that the EDCA's affirmation of the 1998 VFA should be viewed: the EDCA adds new dimensions to the
treatment of U.S. Personnel and U.S. forces provided in the 1998 VFA, and these dimensions cannot be ignored in determining
whethertheEDCAmerelyimplementsthe1998VFA.
Thus,whiletheEDCAaffirmsthetreatmentofU.S.personnelandU.S.forcesinthePhilippines,itatthesametimeintroducesthePhilippines'
obligationtorecognizetheauthorityofU.S.Forcesinthe"AgreedLocations." Under the EDCA, U.S. forces can nowprepositionand
store defense equipment, supplies, and materiel at Agreed Locations. They shall haveunimpededaccess to Agreed Locations for all matters
relating to the prepositioning and storage of defense equipment, supplies, and materiel. Lastly, the EDCA authorizes the U.S. forces to
exerciseallrightsandauthoritieswithintheAgreedLocationsthatarenecessaryfortheiroperationalcontrolordefense.Incontrast,the
1998VFAonlyreferstothetaxanddutyfreeentryofU.S.Governmentequipmentinconnectionwiththeactivitiesduringtheirvisit.
Inthesamemanner,anddespitebeinginadifferentclassasU.S.personnelandU.S.forces,U.S.contractorsarealsoallowed"unimpeded
access"totheAgreedLocationswhenitcomestoallmattersrelatingtotheprepositioningandstorageofdefenseequipment,supplies
andmateriel.
Thus,thesegroupsofpeople(U.S.personnel,U.S.forcesandU.S.contractors)havebeenreferredtointheEDCAnotmerelytoimplementthe
1998VFA,buttofurthertheirrolesintheAgreedLocationsthattheEDCAauthorizes.
Fromtheseperspectives,theEDCAcannotbeconsideredtobeasimpleimplementationofthe1998VFA.Rather,itisacontinuationofthe1998
VFA under new dimensions. These dimensions should not and cannot be hidden behind reaffirmations of existing 1998 VFA obligations. These
addeddimensionsreinforcetheideaofmilitarybases,asitallowsthemaccesstotheAgreedLocationsthat,asIhadearliermentioned,isthe
cornerstoneoftheEDCA.Fromthelegalend,theobligationsundertheEDCA,notitspolicydeclarationsandcharacterization,shouldbe
decisiveindeterminingwhetherSection25,ArticleXVIIIapplies.
Lastly,evenassumingthattheEDCAisanimplementationofthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA,thepracticeoftheGovernmentrevealsthateven
whenanagreementisconsideredasanimplementationofapriortreaty,theconcurrenceoftheSenatemuststillbesought.
Early in the Senate deliberations on the 1998 VFA, the senatorsponsors characterized it merely as a subsidiary or implementing
agreementtothe1951MDT.244Nevertheless,SenatorTatad,oneofthe1998VFA'scosponsors,recognizedthatArticleXVIII,Section25of
theConstitutionprohibitsthe1998VFAfrombeingexecutedasamereexecutiveagreement,245forwhichreasonitwassenttotheSenatefor
concurrence.
Thesenatorsagreedduringthedeliberationsthatanagreementimplementingthe1951MDTrequiresSenateconcurrence.246Thisisbecausethe
agreement,despiteimplementingoraffirmingthe1951MDT,allowstheentryofU.S.troopsinthePhilippines,amattercoveredbyArticleXVIII,
Section25oftheConstitution.
Indeed, the 1998 VFA has been consistently treated as an implementation of the 1951 MDT. Nevertheless, the Government correctly chose to
enterintotheinternationalagreementintheformofatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenate,becauseitinvolvestheentryofforeignmilitary
troopsindependentof,andinadditionto,thegeneralagreementsinthe1951MDT.
In the same manner, the EDCA, which purportedly implements and complements both the 1951 MDT and the 1998 VFA, should have likewise
beensubmittedtotheSenateforitsconcurrencebecauseofthenewobligationsitintroduces.
To reiterate, the EDCA allows for a more permanent presence of U.S. troops and military equipment in the Philippines (akin to establishing a
base),whichwasnotcontemplatedunderthe1998VFA.Thus,despitehavingbeentreatedasanimplementationofthe1951MDTandthe1998
VFA,thenewobligationsundertheEDCAcallsfortheapplicationofArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitutionanditssubmissiontotheSenate
forconcurrence.
V.E.TheEDCA:theActualandOperationalView
Asmylastpoint,letmejustsaythattheponenciacanengageinalotofrationalizationsandtechnicaldistinctionsonwhytheEDCA
provisions do not amount to or equate with the operation of military bases and the introduction of troops and facilities into the Philippines.
Theponenciacannotescapetheconclusionthattranslatedtoactualoperationalreality:
1. The activities described in the EDCA are no different from theoperationof a military base in the 1947 sense, except that under the
current U.S. strategy, a fixed base in the 1947 sense is hardly ever established because the expenses and administrative problems
accompanyingafixedbasecannowbeavoided.Amilitary"facility"canverywellservethesamepurposesasafixedmilitarybaseunder
current technological advances in weaponry, transportation, and communications.247 The U.S. can achieve the same results at less
expenseandwithlesserproblemsifitwouldhaveguaranteedaccesstoandcontrolofspecifiedareassuchastheAgreedLocationsthat
theEDCAconvenientlyprovides.
FOSs or CSLs, as defined above, are expandable "warm facilities" maintained with limited U.S. military support presence and
possiblyprepositionedequipment.248FOSswillsupportrotationalratherthanpermanentlystationedforces,andwillbeafocusforbilateral
andregionaltrainingandforthedeploymentoftroopsandstoredandprepositionedequipment,supplies,andmateriel.249
As has already been mentioned, examples include the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. The
PhilippineswillsoonfollowwithouttheconsentoftheFilipinopeopleandagainsttheconstitutionalstandardstheyset,ifEDCAwouldbe
enforcedwithoutthebenefitofSenateconcurrence.
2. Underthe"pivottoAsiastrategy,"theoperativewordis"presence"whichmeansreadyaccesstoequipment,supplies,andmaterielby
troopswhocanbeferriedfromsaferlocationsandimmediatelybebroughttothesceneofactionfromtheAgreedLocations.TheEDCA
providessuchpresencethroughtheAgreedLocationstheaccesstothesesecuredlocationstheprepositioningandstorageofdefense
(readas"military")equipment,supplies,andmaterielandtheforwardjumpoffpointforthedeploymentoftroopstowhateversceneof
actiontheremaybethatPhilippinelocationsmayservebest.
3. Fromthepointofviewof"troops"thatArticleXVIII,Section25likewiseregulatesthroughSenateconcurrence,notethatintheEDCA,
contractual employees are mentioned together or sideby side with the military. This is a relatively recent development
wherecontractualemployeesareusedtoprovidethesameservicesandservehandinhandorasreplacementortoaugmentregular
militaryforces.TheU.S.hasputthesecontractualemployeestogooduseinvariouslocaltheatersofconflict,notablyinIraq,Afghanistan
andSyria.250The U.S. has reportedly resorted to the use, not only of regular military forces, but of contractual employees who may
providethesameservicesasmilitaryforcesandwhocanincreasetheirnumberswithoutalertingtheU.S.publictotheactualnumberof
troopsmaintained.
VI.CONCLUSIONANDTHEQUESTIONOF
REMEDY
Based on all the above considerations, I conclude that the EDCA, instead of being in implementation of the 1951 MDT and the 1998 VFA, is
significantlybroaderinscopethanthesetwotreaties,andeffectivelyaddedtowhatthe1951MDTandthe1998VFAprovide.
TheEDCAisthusanewagreementthattouchesonmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesbeyondthescopeofthe1951MDTandthe1998VFA,
andshouldbecoveredbyatreatypursuanttoArticleXVIII,Section25andArticleVII,Section21,bothofthe1987Constitution.Withoutthe
referralandconcurrencebytheSenate,theEDCAisconstitutionallydeficientand,hence,cannotbeenforcedinourcountry.
To remedy the deficiency, the best recourse RECOMMENDED TO THE COURT under the circumstances is for the Court to suspend the
operations of its ruleson the finality of its rulings and for the Court to give the President ninety (90) days from the service of its
Decision,whetherornotamotionforreconsiderationisfiled,theOPTIONtorefertheEDCAtotheSenateforitsconsiderationand
concurrence.
ThereferraltotheSenateshallserveasamainorsupplementalmotionforreconsideration'thataddressesthedeficiency,renderingtheeffects
oftheCourt'sDecisionmootandacademic.Otherwise,theconclusionthatthePresidentcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionbyenteringintoan
executiveagreementinsteadofatreaty,andbycertifyingtothecompletenessofPhilippineinternalprocess,shallbefullyeffective.
Asmylastpoint,wemustnotforgetthatthedisputedexecutiveagreementthatthePresidententeredintoiswiththeAmericans
from whom we trace the roots of our present Constitution. The Americans are a people who place the highest value in their
respectfortheirConstitution.ThisshouldbenolessthanthespiritthatshouldmoveusinadheringtoourownConstitution.To
accordalesserrespectforourownConstitutionistoinviteAmerica'sdisrespectforthePhilippinesasacoequalsovereignand
independentnation.
Endnotes:
1InstrumentofRatification,AnnexAoftheMemorandumofOSG,rollo,p.476.[perp.14ofponencia,toverifyfromrollo]
2Constitution,ArticleVII,Section21ArticleXVIII,Section25.
3DerivedfromtheSupremeCourt'spowersunderArticleVIII,Section5(2)(a)oftheConstitution.
4BayanMuna,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212444),pp.4647,7981.
5Id.at5257Saguisag,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212444),pp.3234.
6BayanMuna,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212444),pp.8487.
11Id.at9091.
12Id.at4445,5859Saguisag,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212426),pp.3949.
13OSGConsolidatedComment,pp.38.
14Id.at1013.
15Id.at1314.
16Id.at1421.
17Ponencia,pp.37,2527.
18Id.at2943.
19Id.at31.
20Id.at4852.
21Id.at3443.
22Id.at4346.
23Id.at4872.
24Id.at46.
25Id.
26Id.at4648.
27Saguisag,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212426),pp.1922BayanMuna,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212444),p.6.
28SenateResolutionNo.105datedNovember10,2015.
29BayanMuna,elal.Petition(G.R.No.212444),pp.910.
30Saguisag,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212426),pp.1922.
31Idat19.
32OSGConsolidatedComment,pp.35.
33Idat57.
34Id.at78.
35Ponencia,pp.1925.
36Imbongv.Ochoa,Jr.,G.R.No.204819,April8,2014,721SCRA146,278279.
37Id.at279280.
38SeeSeparateOpinionofJ.BrioninImbongv.Ochoa,Jr.,supranote36,at489491.
39Galictov.Aquino,683Phil.141,170(2012).
40Ibid.
41SeeDavidv.MacapagalArroyo,552Phil.705(2006),wheretheCourtheldthatinprivatesuits,standingisgovernedbythe
"realpartiesininterest"ruleascontainedinSection2,Rule3ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,asamended.Itprovidesthat
"everyactionmustbeprosecutedordefendedinthenameoftherealpartyininterest."Accordingly,the"realpartyininterest"is
"the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
Succinctlyput,theplaintiffsstandingisbasedonhisownrighttothereliefsought.
42DeCastrov.JudicialandBarCouncil,629Phil.629,680(2010).
43See Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,392 Phil. 618, 634 (2000), citingTatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy,G.R.No.124360,December'3,1997,281SCRA330,349,citingGarciav.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.101273,July3,
1992,211SCRA219Osmehav.COMELEC,G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750Bascov.Pagcor,G.R. No. 91649,
May14,1991,197SCRA52andAranetav.Dinglasan,84Phil.368(1949).
44InitiativesforDialogueandEmpowermentthroughAlternativeLegalServices,Inc.(IDEALS,INC.)v.PowerSectorAssetsand
LiabilitiesManagementCorporation(PSALM),G.R.No.192088,October9,2012,682SCRA602,633634.
45 See Separate Opinion of J. Brion in Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015, citing Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
189698,December1,2009,606SCRA258,276andGMANetworkv.COMELEC,G.R.No.205357,September2,2014,734SCRA
88,125126.
46
See CREBA v. ERC, 638 Phil. 542, 556557 (2010), where the Court provided "instructive guides" as determinants in
determiningwhetheramatterisoftranscendentalimportance,namely:(1)thecharacterofthefundsorotherassetsinvolvedin
thecase(2)thepresenceofaclearcaseofdisregardofaconstitutionalorstatutoryprohibitionbythepublicrespondentagency
orinstrumentalityofthegovernmentand(3)thelackofanyotherpartywithamoredirectandspecificinterestinthequestions
beingraised.
47Imbongv.Ochoa,Jr.,supranote36,at280.
48Id.
49ProvinceofNorthCotabatov.GovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesPeacePanelonAncestralDomain,589Phil.387,481
(2008).
50Bondocv,Pineda,278Phil.784(1991).
51Javellanav.ExecutiveSecretary,151APhil.36,131(1973),citingInReMcConaughy119N.W.408,417,
52SeeGarciav.ExecutiveSecretary,602Phil.64,7377(2009).
53Ibid.
54369U.S.186(1962).
55Id.at217.
56Dueasv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,610Phil.730,742(2009)Lambinov.CommissiononElections,536Phil.
1,111(2006).
57SeeConstitution,ArticleVII,Section21.
58Bondocv.Pineda,supranote50,at784.
59 On
order of then U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, Commodore Dewey attacked the Spanish fleet in the
Philippines. At noon of May 1, 1898, Commodore Dewey's ships had destroyed the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay.
SeeBayanMuna,etal.Petition(G.R.No.212444),pp.11,citinghttp://www.history.com/thisdayinhistory/battleofmanilabay.
SeeZbigniewBrzesinski,TheGrandChessboardAmericanPrimacyanditsGeostrategicImperatives(1997).
See also Fraser Weir.A Centennial History of Philippine Independence, 18981998: Spanish American War War of Philippine
Independence18981901.University of Alberta, available at https://www.ualberta.ca/vmitchel/fw4.html The SpanishAmerican
War, 1898. United States Department of State, available at https://hislory.state.gov/milestones/18661898/spanishamerican
war and, The SpanishAmerican War in the Philippines (1989). American Experience, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/pandeAMEX87.html.
60In the early part of 1898, the relations between the U.S. and Spain deteriorated. As the war became imminent, Commodore
George Dewey, the commander of the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, had discussion with Emilio Aguinaldo's government in exile in
SingaporeandHongKong.SeeWeir,supranote59.
61In the early part of 1898, the relations between the U.S. and Spain deteriorated. As the war became imminent, Commodore
George Dewey, the commander of the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, had discussion with Emilio Aguinaldo's government in exile in
SingaporeandHongKong.SeeWeir,supranote59.
62TreatyofPeaceBetweentheUnitedStatesandSpain(December10,1898),ArticleIII:"SpaincedestotheUnitedStatesthe
archipelagoknownasthePhilippineIslandsxxx"
See Yale Law School. The Avalon Project. Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain. Available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19thcentury/sp1898.asp.
63RenatoConstantino.ThePhilippines:APastRevisited(1975),pp.228229.
64SeeBrzesinski,supranote59,at329.
AccordingtoBrzesinski,Americastandssupremeinthefourdecisivedomainsofglobalpower:(1)militarily,ithasanunmatched
globalreach(2)economically,itremainsthemainlocomotiveofglobalgrowth(3)technologically,itretainstheoveralllead
in the cuttingedge areas of innovation and (4)culturally, despite some crassness, it enjoys an appeal that is unrivaled. The
combinationofallfourmakesAmericatheonlycomprehensivesuperpower.
BrzesinskitracedthetrajectoryoftheUS'srisetoglobalsupremacybeginningfromWorldWarI(WWI)totheendoftheColdWar,
noting that the U.S.'s participation in WWI introduced it as a new major player in the international arena. While WWI was
predominantlyaEuropeanwar,notaglobalone,itsselfdestructivepowermarkedthebeginningoftheendofEurope'spolitical,
economicandculturalpreponderanceovertherestoftheworld.TheEuropeanerainworldpoliticsendedinthecourseofWorld
WarII(WWII),thefirsttrulyglobalwar.SincetheEuropean(i.e.,Germany)andtheAsian(i.e.,Japan)weredefeated,theUSand
theSovietUnion,twoextraEuropeanvictors,becamethesuccessorstoEurope'sunfulfilledquestforglobalsupremacy.
The contest between the Soviet Union and the US for global supremacy dominated the next fifty years following WWII. The
outcomeofthiscontest,theauthorbelieves,waseventuallydecidedbynonmilitarymeans:politicalvitality,ideologicalflexibility,
economic dynamism, and cultural appeal. The protracted competition, in the end, eventually tip the scales in America's favor
simply because it was much richer, technologically much more advanced, militarily more resilient and innovative, socially more
creativeandappealing.
65SeeBayanMuna,etal.Petition,GRNo.212444,pp.1314andKilusangMayoUno,etal.petitioninintervention,p.7.
SeealsoStephenShalom.SecuringtheU.S.PhilippineMilitaryBasesAgreementof1947,WilliamPatersonUniversity,availableat
http://www.wpuni.edu/dotAsset/209673.pdf Robert Paterno. American Military Bases in the Philippines: The Brownell Opinion,
available at http://philippinestudies,net/ojs,/index.php/ps/article/viewFile/2602/5224 James Gregor. The Key Role of U.S. Bases
in the Philippines. The Heritage Foundation, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1984/01/thekeyroleofus
basesinthephilippinesMariaTeresaLim."RemovalProvisionsofthePhilippineUnitedStatesMilitaryBasesAgreement:Canthe
UnitedStatesTakeitAll"20LoyolaofLosAngelesLawReview421,421422.SeeFredGreene.ThePhilippineBases:Negotiating
FortheFuture(1988),p.4.
The1947MilitaryBasesAgreementwassignedbythePhilippinesandtheU.S.onMarch14,1947itenteredintoforceonMarch
26,1947andwasratifiedbythePhilippinePresidentonJanuary21,1948.SeeCharlesBevans.TreatiesandOtherInternational
Agreements of the United States of America (17761949), Available at United States Department of State,
https://books.google.com.ph/book?
id=MUU6AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA55&lpg=PA55&dq=17+UST+1212+TIAS+6084&source=bl&ots=VBtIV34ntR&sig=X2yYCbWVfjqF_o69
CcyiP88zw0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiKg
jXq8LJAhXRBY4KHSicDeAQ6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=17%20UST%201212%3B%20TIAS%206084&f=false.
ThePhilippinegovernmentalsoagreedtoenterintonegotiationswiththeU.S.,onthelatter'srequest,to:expandorreducesuch
bases,exchangethosebasesforothers,oracquireadditionalbaseareas.TheagreementallowedtheU.S.fulldiscretionaryuseof
thebases'facilitiesgavecriminaljurisdictionoverU.S.basepersonnelandtheirdependentstotheU.S.authoritiesirrespectiveof
whethertheallegedoffenseswerecommittedonoroffthebaseareas.SeeGregor,supra.
66The Philippines and the U.S. signed the MDT on August 30, 1951. It came into force on August 27, 1952 by the exchange of
instrumentsofratificationbetweentheparties.SeeMutualDefenseTreaty,U.S.Philippines,August30,1951,177U.N.T.S.134.
Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20177/volume17712315English.pdf See also Bayan v.
Gazminpetition,GRNo.212444,at14Saguisagv.ExecutiveSecretaryOchoapetition,GRNo.212426,p.8andKilusangMayo
Uno,et.al.petitioninintervention,p.7.
ItwasconcurredinbythePhilippineSenateonMay12,1952andwasadvisedandconsentedtobytheU.S.SenateonMarch20,
1952,asreflectedintheU.S.CongressionalRecord,82ndCongress,SecondSession,Vol.98Part2,pp.25942595.SeeNicolas
v.Romulo,598Phil.262(2009).
671956: The GarciaBendetsen conference resolved the issue of jurisdiction in the American bases. The US began to recognize
sovereignty of the Philippine government over the base lands. See Exchange of Notes, U.S.Philippines, December 6, 1956,
availableathttp://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/docmonth/Dec/1956/35.
1959:Olongapo,whichwasthenanAmericanterritory,wasofficiallyturnedoverbytheUStothePhilippines.Overtheyears,17
ofthe23militaryinstallationswerealsoturnedovertothePhilippines.SeeMemorandumofAgreement,U.S.Philippines,October
12,1959,availableathttp://elibrary.iudiciarv.itov.ph/thebooksheliyshowdocs/35/11192.
1965:AnagreementwassignedrevisingArticleXIIIofthetreatywhereintheUSwillrenounceexclusivejurisdictionovertheon
base offenses and the creation of a joint criminal jurisdiction committee. See Exchange of Notes, U.S.Philippines, August 10,
1965,availableathttp://elibrarv.iudiciarv.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/35/10934.
1966:TheRamosRuskAgreementreducedthetermoftheMBAto25yearsstartingfromthatyear.SeeExchangeofNotes,U.S.
Philippines,September16,1966,availableathttp://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelgsliowdocs/35/10859.
1979: The US reaffirmed Philippine sovereignty over the, basis and placed each base under command of a Philippine base
commander.SeeOfficeofthePresidentofthePhilippines.(1979).OfficialWeekinReview.OfficialGazelleoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines,75(1),iiiiv,availableathttp://www.gov.ph/1979/01/08/officialweekinreviewjanuary1january71979/.
68Constitution,ArticleXVIII,Section25.
69On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate voted to reject a new treaty that would have extended the presence of U.S.
militarybasesinthePhilippines.SeeBayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623,632(2002),citingtheJointReportoftheSenateCommittee
onForeignRelationandtheCommitteeonNationalDefenseandSecurityontheVisitingForcesAgreement.
70UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense.SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense(January2012),p.
2,availableathttp://archive.defense.gov/news/DefenseStrategicGuidance.pdf.
71
John Hemmings. Understanding the U.S. Pivot: Past, Present, and Future. 34(6) Royal United Services Institute
Newsbrief(November26,2014),availableatlittps://hemmingsiohn.wordpress.com/2014/ll/27/understandine,theuspivotpast
presentandfuture/
72Ibid.
73RichardBush,No rebalance necessary: The essential continuity of U.S. policy in the AsiaPacific.Brookings Institution (March
18, 2015), available at http://www.brookings.edu/bIogs/orderfromchaos/posts/2015/18valueofcontinuityuspolicyinasia

pacific.
74US Congressional Research Service,Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia, March 28,
2012,p.2.Availableathttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf.
75UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense.TheAsiaPacificMaritimeSecurityStrategy:AchievingU.S.NationalSecurityObjectives
in a Changing Environment, (2015), p. 23. Available at http://www.defense.gov/Ponals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A

P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy081420151300FlNALFORMAT.PDF.
76EDCA,ArticleIII.
77DavidVine,BaseNation:HowU.S.MilitaryBasesAbroadHarmAmericaandtheWorld(2015),pp.300301.
78Brzesinski,supranote59,at151193.
79ThearbitrationcasewasfiledbeforethePermanentCourtofArbitrationonJanuary22,2013.SeeRepublicofthePhilippinesv.
the People's Republic of China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, available at http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage65f2.html?

pag_id=1529.
80Ponencia,pp.2528.
81Id.at27.
82Id.at28.
83Id.at2846.
84Id.at2834,4695.
85Constitution,ArticleVII,Section5.
86
Although the ponencia recognized constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the President's prerogative in concluding
internationalagreements(seeponencia,pp.3443),itcontradictorilyassertsthat"[n]ocourtcantellthePresidenttodesistfrom
choosinganexecutiveagreementoveratreatytoembodyaninternationalagreement,unlessthecasefallssquarelywithinArticle
VIII, Sec. 25" and that "[t]he President had the choice to enter into the EDCA by way of an executive agreement or a treaty."
Seeponencia,p.43.
87Constitution,ArticleVII,Section18.
88TheConstitutionvestslegislativepowerupontheCongressofthePhilippines.Thus,theCongresshasthepowertodetermine
thesubjectmattersitcanlegislateupon.SeeConstitution,ArticleVI,Section1.
89Constitution,ArticleVI,Section25.
90Pimentelv.ExecutiveSecretary,501Phil.303,317318(2005).
91Ibid.
92Ibid.
93Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil139(1936).
94Constitution,ArticleVI,Section27(2).
95CommissionerofCustomsv.EasternSeaTrading,113Phil.333,338340(1961).
96Constitution,ArticleVII,Sections5and17.
97Angarav.ElectoralCommission,supranote93,at157159.
98343U.S.579(1952).
99Id.at635.
100Id.at637.
101Ibid.
102Ibid.
103YoungstownSheetv.Sawyer,supranote98,at637638.
104552U.S.491(2008).
105Id.supranote98,at637.
106Ibid.
107SenateResolutionNo.1414wasentitledasthe"ResolutionexpressingthestrongsenseoftheSenatethatanytreatyratified
bythePresidentofthePhilippinesshouldbeconcurredinbytheSenate,otherwisethetreatybecomesinvalidandineffective."It
was signed by thirteen Senators: Senators DefensorSantiago, Angara, Cayetano, P., Ejercito, Estrada, Guingona III, Lapid,
Marcos,
Jr.,
Osmea
III,
Pimentel
III,
Recto,
Revilla,
Jr..
and
'
Villar.
Available
at
https://www.senate.gov.ph/listdata/2175018478!.pdf.
108Ponencia,pp.4546.
109SeeLandBankofthePhilippinesv.AtlantaIndustries,Inc.,G.R.No.193796,July2,2014,729SCRA12,303),citingBayan
Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 269274 (2011) Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,586 Phil 135, 168 (2008), citingUsaffe Veterans Association, Inc. v. Treasurer of the Philippines, 105 Phil. 1030,
1038(1959)CommissionerofCustomsv.EasternSeaTrading,supranote95
110Ibid.
111Constitution,ArticleVII,Sections5and17.
113Constitution,ArticleVII,Section21.SeealsoBayanMunav.Romulo,supranote109,at269270.
114Ibid.
115Supranote109.
116Id.at269.
117Ibid.
118BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote109,at270,citingHerein,ForeignAffairsandtheUnitedStatesConstitution224(2nded.,
1996),andEdwinBorchard,TreatiesandExecutiveAgreementsReply,YaleLawJournal,June1945.
119Ibid.
120Gonzalesv.Hechanova,118Phil.1065,1079(1963).
121Adolfov.CFIofZamhales,145Phil.264,266268(1970).
122BayanMunav.Romulo,supranote109.at10791080.
123Ibid.
124Ibid.
125Supranote69.
126Id.at653.
127Ponencia,p.29.
128Id.at33.
129Bolosv.Bolos,G.R.No.186400,20October2010,634SCRA429437
130Ponencia,p.32.
131Id.at33.
132Ibid.
133IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission84,659and661(September16,1986),whichreads:
MR.AZCUNA:Aftertheagreementexpiresin1991,thequestion,therefore,is:Shouldweextendanewtreatyfor
these bases to stay put in 1991 in our territory? The position of the committee is that it should not, because the
presenceofsuchbasesisaderogationofPhilippinesovereignty.
It is said that we should leave these matters to be decided by the executive, since the President conducts foreign
relationsandthisisaquestionofforeignpolicy.Idisagree,MadamPresident.Thisisnotsimplyaquestionofforeign
policythisisaquestionofnationalsovereignty,xxx
FR. BERNAS: My question is: Is it the position of the committee that the presence of foreign military bases in the
countryunderanycircumstancesisaderogationofnationalsovereignty?
MR.AZCUNA:Itisdifficulttoimagineasituationbasedonexistingfactswhereitwouldnot.xxx
134IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission84,659and661(September16,1986),whichreads:
MR.AZCUNA:Aftertheagreementexpiresin1991.thequestion,therefore,is:Shouldweextendanewtreatyfor
these bases to stay put in 3 991 in our territory? The position of the committee is that it should not, because the
presenceofsuchbasesisaderogationofPhilippinesovereignty.
It is said that we should leave these matters to be decided by the executive, since the President conducts foreign
relationsandthisisaquestionofforeignpolicy.Idisagree,MadamPresident.Thisisnotsimplyaquestionofforeign
policythisisaquestionofnationalsovereignty,xxx
FR. BERNAS: My question is: Is it the position of the committee that the presence of foreign military bases in the
MR.AZCUNA:Itisdifficulttoimagineasituationbasedonexistingfactswhereitwouldnot.xxx
135See Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil." 546, 593 (1997), citing Reagan v. Commission on Internal Revenue, 141 Phil. 621. 625
(1969), where the Court discussed the concept of autolimitation,viz.: "It is to be admitted that any State may by its consent,
expressorimplied,submittoarestrictionofitssovereigntyrights.Thatistheconceptofsovereigntyasautolimitationwhich,in
the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a stateforce due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legalself
determination and selfrestriction.' A State then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence."
136Ibid.
137Ponencia,p.32.
138111Record,ConstitutionalCommission86(16September1986),p.659.
139IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission82(13September1986),pp.617618.
140IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission84(16September1986),pp.661662,whichreads:
FR. BERNAS. My question is: is it the position of the committee that the presence of foreign military bases in the
MR. AZCUNA: It is difficult to imagine a situation based on existing facts where it would not. However, in the
abstract, it is possible that it would not be that much of a derogation. 1 have in mind. Madam President, the
argumentthathasbeenpresented.IsthatthereasonwhythereareUS.basesinEngland,inSpainandinTurkey?
Anditisnotbeingclaimedthattheirsovereigntyisbeingderogated.Oursituationisdifferentfromtheirsbecause
wedidnotleaseorrentthesebasestotheU.S.TheUS.retainedthemfromusasacolonialpower.
xxxx
FR.BERNAS:Doesthefirstsentencetolerateasituationradicallydifferentfromwhatobtainsnow?Inotherwords,if
we understand sovereignty as autolimitation, as a people's power to give up certain goods in order to obi.tin
something which may be more valuable, would it be possible under this first sentence for the nation to negotiate
somekindofatreatyagreementthatwouldnotderogateagainstsovereignty?
MR.AZCUNA:Yes.Forexample,MadamPresident,ifitisnegotiatedonabasisoftruesovereignequality,suchasa
mutualASEANdefenseagreementwhereinanASEANforceiscreatedandthisASEANforceisaforeignmilitaryforce
and may have a basis in the member ASEAN countries, this kind of a situation, I think would not derogate from
sovereignty.
141IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission86(18September1986),p.787,whichreads:
MR. ROMULO: Madam President, may I propose my amendment to the Bernas amendment: "AFTER THE
EXPIRATIONOFTHERPUSAGREEMENTIN1991,FOREIGNMILITARYBASES,TROOPSORFACILITIESSHALLNOT
BE ALLOWED IN THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY EXCEPT UNDER THE TERMS OF A TREATY DULY CONCURRED IN BY
THESENATE,ANDWHENCONGRESSSOREQUIRESRATIFIEDBYAMAJORITYOFTHEVOTESCASTBYTHEPEOPLE
IN A REFERENDUM HELD FOR THAT PURPOSE AND RECOGNIZED AS A TREATY BY THE OTHER CONTRACTING
STATE."
142IVRecord,ConstitutionalCommission86(18September1986),p.780whichreads:
FR.BERNAS:Ontheotherhand,MadamPresident,ifweplaceitintheTransitoryProvisionsandmentiononlythe
AmericanState,theconclusionmightbedrawnthatthisappliesonlytoforeignmilitarybasesoftheUnitedStates.
Theconclusionmightbedrawnthattheprincipledoesnotapplytootherstates.
MR.ROMLJLO:Thatiscertainlynotourmeaning.WedonotwishanyotherforeignmilitarybasehereandIthink
thephrasewhichsays:"NOFOREIGNMILITARYBASES,TROOPSORFACILITIES..."makesthatveryclearevenifit
isintheTransitoryProvisions.
143Bayanv.Zamora,supranote69,at652,statingthat:
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities,
shouldapplyintheinstantcase.Toacertainextentandinalimitedsense,however,theprovisionsofSection21,ArticleVIIwill
findapplicabilitywithregardtotheissueandforthesolepurposeofdeterminingthenumberofvotesrequiredtoobtainthevalid
concurrenceoftheSenate,aswillbefurtherdiscussedhereunder.
xxxx
Asnoted,the"concurrencerequirement"underSection25,ArticleXVIIImustbeconstruedinrelationtotheprovisionsofSection
21,ArticleVII.Inamoreparticularlanguage,theconcurrenceoftheSenatecontemplatedunderSection25,ArticleXVIUmeans
thatatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenatefavorablyvotetoconcurwiththetreaty,theVFAintheinstantcase.
144 Constitution, Article VII, Section 21. See also Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary(1995),pp.487488.
145Constitution,ArticleXVIII,Section25.
146Supranote69.
147Id.at659.
148Id.at656659.
149The TydingsMcDuffie Act, also known as the Philippine Independence Act, was entitled "An Act to Provide for the Complete
IndependenceofthePhilippineIslands,toprovidefortheAdoptionofaConstitutionandaFormofGovernmentfor(hePhilippine
Islands,andforotherpurposes."ItwassignedintolawbyPresidentFranklinD.RooseveltonMarch24,1934andwasapproved
by the Philippine Senate on May 1, 1934. See Encyclopedia Britannica, TydingsMcDuffie Act, available at
http:/www.britanica.com/topic/TydingsMcDuffieActandhttp://www.philippinehistoiry.org/tydingsmcduffielaw.htm.
150TydingsMcDuffieAct,SectionJ.
151Id.,Section10.
152Id.,Section2(12).SeealsoOrdinanceappendedto1935Constitution,Section1(12).
153Id.,Section10(b).
154The1947MBAWhereasClause,par.7,states:
THEREFORE,theGovernmentsoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesandoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaagreeuponthe
followingtermsforthedelimitation,establishment,maintenance,andoperationofmilitarybasesinthePhilippines.
1551947MBA,ArticleXXIXseeAnnexesAandBofthe1947MBA.
156The1947MBAWhereasclausestates:
Whereas, the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and of the United States of America are desirous of
cooperatinginthecommondefenseoftheirtwocountriesthrougharrangementsconsonantwiththeproceduresand
objectivesoftheUnitedNations,andparticularlythroughagranttotheUnitedStatesofAmericabytheRepublicof
the Philippines in the exercise of its title and sovereignty, of the use, free of rent, in furtherance of the mutual
interestofbothcountries,ofcertainlandsofthepublicdomainxxx(Emphasessupplied)
1571947MBA,WhereasClause,ArticlesIIand111.
158Id.,ArticlesII,III,IV,VI,andVII.
159Id,ArticleXXV(1).
160Id,ArticleXXVII.
161Id.,ArticlesXI,XII.XIII,XIV.andXV.
162TheRamosRvskAgreementof1966reducedthetermofthe1947BasesTreatytoatotalof44yearsoruntil1991.
TheBohlenSerranoMemorandumofAgreementprovidedforthereturntothePhilippinesof17U.S.militarybases.
The RomuloMurphy exchange of Notes of 1979recognized Philippine sovereignty over the Clark and Subic Bases, reduced the
areathatcouldbeusedbytheU.S.military,andprovidedforthemandatoryreviewofthe1947BasesTreatyeverynv2years.
The RomualdezArmacast Agreement of 1983 revised the 1947 Bases Treaty, particularly pertaining to the operational use of
military/basesbytheU.S.governmentwithinthecontextofPhilippinesovereignty,includingtheneedforprior"consultationwith
the Philippine government on the former's use of the bases for military combat operations'or the establishment of longrange
missiles.
The1947MilitaryAssistanceAgreement(1947MAA)enteredintobythePresidentwiththeU.S.pursuanttotheauthoritygranted
underRepublicActNo.9.TheAgreementestablishedtheconditionsunderwhichtheU.S.militaryassistancewouldbegrantedto
the Philippines, particularly the provision of military arms, ammunitions, supplies, equipment, vessels, services, and training for
thelatter'sdefenseforces.
The1953ExchangeofNotesConstitutinganAgreementExtendingtheAgreementBetweentheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthe
PhilippinesandtheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaonMilitaryAssistancetothePhilippines(1953Agreement)clarified
thaithe1947Agreementwouldremaininforceuntilterminatedbyanyoftheparties.
163SeeRomuloMnrphyExchangeofNotesof1979.
164SeeOfficialGazette,ReportofPresidentMarcostotheBatasangPambansa,January15,1979.
165Bayanv.Zamora,supranote69,at632,whichstates:
InviewoftheimpendingexpirationoftheRPU.S.MilitaryBasesAgreementin1991,thePhilippinesandtheU.S.
negotiatedforapossibleextensionofthemilitarybasesagreement.OnSeptember16,1991,thePhilippineSenate
rejectedtheproposedRPU.S.TreatyofFriendship,CooperationandSecuritywhich,ineffect,wouldhaveextended
thepresenceofU.S.militarybasesinthePhilippines.
166PhilippineCommunicationsSatelliteCorporationv.GlobeTelecom,Inc.,473Phil.116,122(2004),whichstates:
On 31 December 1991, the Philippine Government sent a Note Verbale to the U.S. Government through the U.S.
Embassy,notifyingitofthePhilippines'terminationoftheRPUSMilitaryBasesAgreement.TheNoteVerbalestated
thatsincetheRPUSMilitaryBasesAgreement,asamended,shallterminateon31December1992,thewithdrawal
ofallU.S.militaryforcesfromSubicNavalBaseshouldbecompletedbysaiddate.
167 Gerald Anderson. Subic Bay From Magellan to Pinatubo: The History of the US Naval Station, Subic Bay (2006), p. 181.
Available
at
https://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=OfPs0NH5EuAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=subic+bay+from+magellan+to+pinatubo&hl
en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjvitrLrNjJAhUBJ5QKHcBICAUQ6AEIJDAA#v=onepage&q=subic%20bay%20from%20magellan%20to%20pinatubo&f=false.
168 Bruce Vaughn. "U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the AsiaPacific Region" U.S. Congressional Research Service
ReportforCongress(January22,2007).Availableathttps://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33821.pdf.
169R. Chuck Mason. "Status of Force, Agreement (SOFA): What is it, how is it utilized?"U.S. Congressional Research Service
ReportforCongress(March15,2012).Availableathttps://wvvw.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf.
170ForanillustrateddepictionoftheincreaseofU.S.militarybasesaroundtheworldbefore(1939)andafter(1945)WorldWar
III,seeDavidVine,supranote77,at3236.
171SeeMason,supranote169,statingthattheU.S.andGermanyenteredintoasupplementalagreementtotheNATOSOFA(as
provided in 14 U.S.T. 531 T.l.A.S. 5351. Signed at Bonn, August 3, 1959. Entered into force July 1, 1963) and additional
exchange ofnol.es related to specific issues (14 U.S.T. 689 T.l.A.S. 5352 490 U.N.T.S. 30. Signed at Bonn, August 3, 1959.
EnteredintoforceJuly1,1963).
Also, the Manila Pact entered into on September 8, 1954 by the U.S., the Philippines, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan,
andThailand,wherebythepartiesagreed,amongothers,to:settleanyinternationaldisputesinwhichtheymaybeinvolvedby
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and
separatelyandjointly,bymeansofcontinuousandeffectiveselfhelpandmutualaidwillmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualand
collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their
territorialintegrityandpoliticalstability.SeeSoutheastAsiaCollectiveDefenseTreaty(September8,1954).209U.N.T.S2830.
Availableathttps://treaties.in.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20209/v209.pdf.
172For example, the U.S. entered into supplementary agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (which acceded to the
NATOSOFAin1963)withrespecttoalliedforcesstationedpermanentlyinGermany,seeDieterFleck,TheHandbookoftheLaw
onVisitingForces(2001),p.353.
173The1951MDTstatestheParties'objective"[d]esiringtodeclarepubliclyandformallytheirsenseofunityandtheircommon
determinationtodefendthemselvesagainstexternalarmedattack,sothatnopotentialaggressorcouldbeundertheillusionthat
eitherofthemstandsaloneinthePacificArea."
1741951MDT,ArticleII.
175Id.,ArticleIII.
176Id.,ArticleIV.
177Id.,ArticleV.
178Id.,ArticleVIII.
179Lim v. Executive Secretary, 430 Phil 555, 562 (2002), which states: These socalled "Balikatan" exercises are the largest
combinedtrainingoperationsinvolvingFilipinoandAmericantroops.Intheory,theyareasimulationofjointmilitarymaneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in
1951.
180SeeH.MarcosModerno,"ADecadeofUSTroopsinMindanao:RevisitingtheVisitingForcesAgreement(2)"MindaNews,April
24,2012,availableathttp://www.mindanews.com/specialreports/2012/04/24/adecadeofustroopsinmindanaorevisitingthe
visitingforcesagreement2/.
1811998VFA,ArticleV.
182Supranote69.
183Id.at652,whichstates:
Onthewhole,theVFAisanagreementwhichdefinesthetreatmentofUnitedStatestroopsandpersonnelvisiting
the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rightsoftheUnitedStatesandthePhilippinegovernmentinthematterofcriminaljurisdiction,movementofvessel
andaircraft,importationandexportationofequipment,materialsandsupplies.
Undoubtedly,Section25.ArticleXVI11.whichspecificallydealswithtreatiesinvolvingforeignmilitarybases,troops,
orfacilities,shouldapplyintheinstantcase.Toacertainextentandinalimitedsense,however,theprovisionsof
Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
numberofvotesrequiredtoobtainthevalidconcurrenceoftheSenate,aswillbefurtherdiscussedhereunder.
184Id.at657.whichstates:
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledgesthe agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submittheVFAtotheUnitedStatesSenateforconcurrencepursuanttoitsConstitution,istoaccordstrictmeaningtothephrase.
185JoaquinBernas,supranote144,atS4001401.
186See Kurt Campbell & Brian Andrews,Explaining the US 'Pivot' to Asia,August 2013, Chatham House, pp. 38 Available at
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf
187Id.at8.
188Ibid.
189EDCA,Preamble,par.5.
190Id.,ArticleIV,par.6.
191Id.,Article1.
192Id.,ArticleIII.
193Id.,ArticleXII(4).
194VRecords,ConstitutionalCommission105.(October11.1986),whichreads:
Mr.Benrtagen:Pointofinformation.!havewithmeabookofPatriciaM.Paez,TheBasesFactor,theauthorityonUSrelations.
And reference to the agreement reads this way: Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
Americaconcerningmilitarybases.
Mr.Azcuna:ThatistheofficialtitleWhydowenotusethat?Afterthe
expirationoftheagreementxxx.
195Ibid.
196SamsonAlcantara.Statutes(1997ed.)at58SecalsoRubenAgpalo,StatutoryConstruction(6thed)at282.
197Ernestov.CourtofAppeals,216Phil.319,327328(1984).
198USDepartmentofDefense,JointPublication102,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,at21
(2015),availableat.
199PresidentialDecreeNo.1227,Section2.
200IVRecords,ConstitutionalCommission86(September18,1986):
Fr.Bernas:Bytheterm'bases,'werewethinkingofpermanentbases?
Mr.Maambona,:Yes.
201USDoD,Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture: Report to Congress, U.S. Department of Defense, (2004), pp. 1011.
Availableathttp://www.dnizhawaii.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/12/global_posture.pdf.
202AndrewKrepinevichandRobertWork.ANewGlobalDefensePosturefortheSecondTransoceanicEra(2007),p.19.
203KrepinevichandWork,supranote201,at18.
204USDoD,supranote201,at1011.
205BrunoCharbonneauandWayneCox.LocatingGlobalOrder:AmericanPowerandCanadianSecurityafter9/11(2010),p.65.
206StaciePettyjohn."Minimalist International Interventions: For the Future US Overseas Presence, Access Agreement Are Key"
Summer 2013, RAND Corporation, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/randreview/issues/2013/summer/forthe

futureusoverseaspresence.html.
207Id.,at2.
208EDCA,ArticleIIISec.1.
209Id.,ArticleV,Section2.
210Id.,ArticleIV.Sec.1
211Id.
212Supranote109,at653.
Inlikemannerxxxsuchthat,theprovisioncontemplatesthreedifferentsituationsamilitarytreatythesubjectofwhichcould
beeither(a)foreignbases,(b)foreigntroops,or(c)foreignfacilitiesanyofthethreestandingaloneplacesitunderthecoverage
ofSection25,ArticleXVIII.
213EDCA,ArticleII,Section2.
214Id.,ArticleIII,SectionI.
215Id.,ArticleXII,Section4.
216Thesenatorsarguedthepreciselengthoftimebutagreedthatitwouldnotexceedsixmonths.SeeSenatedeliberationson
P.S.Res.No.443VisitingForcesAgreement,May17,1999,RecordsandArchivesService,Vol.133,pp.2325.
2181951MDT,Preamble,par.3.
221
Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.South Korea, October 1,

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20238/v238.pdf.
222
Mutual
Defense
Treaty,
U.S.Taiwan,
December
10,
1953,
1954,
238
248
U.N.T.S.
U.N.T.S.
202,204.
214.
Available
Available
at
at
223
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.Japan, January 19, 1960, 373 U.N.T.S. 188. Available at
224TheUSTaiwanMDTstatesthatselfhelpandmutualaidwillbeutilizedbythePartiestoresistnotonlyanarmedattackbut
also"communistsubversiveactivitiesdirectedagainstTaiwan'sterritorialintegrityandpoliticalstability."Moreover,theUSKorean
Treatyaddsthephrase"whenever,intheopinionofeitherofthem,thepoliticalindependenceorsecurityofeitherofthePartiesis
threatenedbyexternalarmedattack"andusesthephrase"meanstodeter[an]armedattack")insteadof"maintainanddevelop
xxxtheircapacitiestoresistarmedattack."
225MutualDefenseTreaty,U.S.SouthKorea,supranote221.
226MutualDefenseTreaty,U.S.Taiwan,supranote222.
227TreatyofMutualCooperationandSecurity.U.S.Japan,supranote223.
2281998VFA,Article111(1).
229Bayanv.Zamora,supranote69.Onthewhole,theVFAisanagreementwhichdefinesthetreatmentofUnitedStatestroops
andpersonnelvisitingthePhilippines.Itprovidesfortheguidelinestogovernsuchvisitsofmilitarypersonnel,andfurtherdefines
the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft,importationandexportationofequipment,materialsandsupplies.
230ibid.
2321998VFA,Preamble,par.4.
233Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,supra note 179, at 575. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for
purposesotherthanmilitary.Asconceived,thejointexercisesmayincludetrainingonnewtechniquesofpatrolandsurveillanceto
protectthenationsmarineresources,seasearchandrescueoperationstoassistvesselsindistress,disasterreliefoperations,civic
actionproject'ssuchasthebuildingofschoolhouses,medicalandhumanitarianmissions,andthelike.
234EDCA,Article11(4).
236Id.,Article1(3).
237Ibid.
238Id.,ArticleIII(1).
239Ibid
240Ibid
241Id.,ArticleVI1(2).
242Id.,ArticleIV(l),(3).
244Ibid.
245Senatedeliberations,May25,1999,A.M.,p.17,whichreads:
SenatorTatad.xxxMr.President,distinguishedcolleagues,theVisitingForcesAgreementdoesnotcreateanewpolicyoranew
relationship.Itsimplyseekstoimplementandreinforcewhatalreadyexists.
For that purpose, an executive agreement might have sufficed, were there no constitutional constraints. But the
ConstitutionrequirestheSenatetoconcurinallinternationalagreements.SotheSenatemustconcurintheVisiting
ForcesAgreement,eveniftheU.S.ConstitutiondoesnotrequiretheU.S.Senatetogiveitsadviceandconsent.
246SenateResolutionNo.1414,supranote107.
247During the latter part of the Coki War, the term "facilities" was frequently substituted for the word "bases" tosoftenthe negative political
overtones normally associated with the basing of foreign troops in a sovereign country. In line with this thinking, the Stockholm International
PeaceResearchInstituteusesthetermforeignmilitarypresence(FMP)todescribebases/facilitiesthathouseforeigntroopsinasovereignstate.
SeeKrepinevichandWork,supranote202.
248StrengtheningU.S.GlobalDefensePosture:ReporttoCongress,supranote201.
249Ibid.
250SeeJoseGomezdelPrado.PrivitizationofWar:Mercenaries,PrivateMilitaryandSecurityCompanies,GlobalResearch,November8,2010.
Availableathttp://www.globalresearch.ca/theprivitazationofwarmercenariesprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniespmsc/21826.
DISSENTINGOPINION
"Parakayongmgabirhennananiniwalasapagibigngisangputa!"1
HeneralLunakinaPedroPaterno,FelixBuencamino,at
EmilioAguinaldonoongsinabinilananangakoangmgaAmerikano
nakikilalaninnilaangkasarinlanngmgaPilipino
LEONEN,J.:
1987Constitution,ArticleXVIII,Section25:
Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaconcerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurredinbytheSenateand,whentheCongresssorequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanational
referendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.
cralawlawlibrary
In a disturbing turn of events, the majority of this court just succeeded in amending this constitutional provision. At the very least, it
emasculateditstextandweakeneditsspirit.
AnagreementsignedbyourSecretaryofDefenseandtheAmbassadoroftheUnitedStatesthatgrantsUnitedStatesmilitarypersonnelandtheir
contractorsoperationalcontroloverunspecifiedlocationswithinPhilippineterritoryinordertoprepositionmilitaryequipmentaswellastouse
as launching pads for operations in various parts of the globe is not binding until it is concurred in by the Senate. This is in accordance with
ArticleXVIII,Section25andArticleVII,Section21oftheConstitution.
Furthermore,theEnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement(EDCA)doesnotsimplyimplementtheAgreementBetweentheGovernmentofthe
UnitedStatesofAmericaandtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesRegardingtheTreatmentofUnitedStatesArmedForcesVisiting
thePhilippines(VisitingForcesAgreementorVFA).TheEDCAsubstantiallymodifiesoramendstheVFA.Anexecutiveagreementcannotamenda
treaty.Norcananyexecutiveagreementamendanystatute,mostespeciallyaconstitutionalprovision.
TheEDCAsubstantiallymodifiesoramendstheVFAinthefollowingaspects:
First,theEDCAdoesnotonlyregulatethe"visits"offoreigntroops.ItalsoallowsthetemporarystationingonarotationalbasisofUSmilitary
personnelandtheircontractorsinphysicallocationswithpermanentfacilitiesandprepositionedmilitarymateriel.
Second, unlike the VFA, the EDCA allows prepositioning of military materiel, which can include various types of warships, fighter planes,
bombers,andvessels,aswellaslandandamphibiousvehiclesandtheircorrespondingammunition.
Third,theVFAcontemplatestheentryoftroopsforvarioustrainingexercises.TheEDCAallowsourterritorytobeusedbytheUnitedStatesto
launchmilitaryandparamilitaryoperationstobeconductedwithinourterritoryoragainsttargetsinotherstates.
Fourth, the EDCA introduces the following concepts not contemplated in the VFA or in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, namely: (a) agreed
locations(b)contractors(c)prepositioningofmilitarymaterieland(d)operationalcontrol.
Lastly, the VFA does not have provisions that may be construed as a restriction or modification of obligations found in existing statutes. The
EDCAcontainsprovisionsthatmayaffectvariousstatutes,including(a)thejurisdictionofcourts,(b)localautonomy,and(c)taxation.
ThereisnoshowingthatthenewmatterscoveredintheEDCAwerecontemplatedbytheSenatewhenitapprovedtheVFA.SenateResolution
No.105,Seriesof2015,whichexpressesthesentimentofthatlegislativechamber,isadefiniteandunequivocalarticulationoftheSenate:the
VFAwasnotintendedtocoverthemattersnowincludedintheEDCA.IntheviewoftheSenatereadingthesameprovisionsoftheConstitution
aswedo,theEDCAshouldbeintreatyform.
TheEDCA,initscurrentform,isonlyanofficialandformalmemorialofagreedprovisionsresultingfromthenegotiationswiththeUnitedStates.
ThePresidenthasthediscretiontosubmittheagreementtotheSenateforconcurrence.TheEDCAisatreatyandrequiresSenateconcurrence.
I
TheEDCAshouldcomplywithArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitution.
Bayanv.Zamora2interpretedthescopeofthisprovisionwhenitdiscussedtheconstitutionalityoftheVFA.SimilartotheEDCA,theVFAwasa
productofnegotiationsbetweenthetwogovernmentsrelatingtomutualsecurityinterests.UnliketheEDCA,however,theVFAwassubmittedto
theSenateforconcurrence,thus:
OnJuly18,1997,theUnitedStatespanel,headedbyUSDefenseDeputyAssistantSecretaryforAsiaPacificKurtCampbell,met
with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino, Jr., to exchange notes on "the
complementingstrategicinterestsoftheUnitedStatesandthePhilippinesintheAsiaPacificregion."Bothsidesdiscussed,among
otherthings,thepossibleelementsoftheVisitingForcesAgreement(VFAforbrevity).NegotiationsbybothpanelsontheVFAled
toaconsolidateddrafttext,whichinturnresulted[in]afinalseriesofconferencesandnegotiationsthatculminatedinManilaon
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondentSecretarySiazonandUnitesStatesAmbassadorThomasHubbardonFebruary10,1998.
OnOctober5,1998,PresidentJosephE.Estrada,throughrespondentSecretaryofForeignAffairs,ratifiedtheVFA.
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the
Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations,
chairedbySenatorBiasF.Ople,anditsCommitteeonNationalDefenseandSecurity,chairedbySenatorRodolfoG.Biazon,for
theirjointconsiderationandrecommendation.Thereafter,jointpublichearingswereheldbythetwoCommittees.
OnMay3,1999,theCommitteessubmittedProposedSenateResolutionNo.443recommendingtheconcurrenceoftheSenateto
theVFAandthecreationofaLegislativeOversightCommitteetooverseeitsimplementation.Debatesthenensued.
OnMay27,1999,ProposedSenateResolutionNo.443wasapprovedbytheSenate,byatwothirds(2/3)voteofitsmembers.
SenateResolutionNo.443wasthenrenumberedasSenateResolutionNo.18.
OnJune1,1999,theVFAofficiallyenteredintoforceafteranExchangeofNotesbetweenrespondentSecretarySiazonandUnited
StatesAmbassadorHubbard.3(Citationsomitted)
cralawlawlibrary
BayanheldthatArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitutionappliestotheVFA:
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficientlymet,viz:(a)itmustbeunderatreaty(b)thetreatymustbedulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,whensorequired
byCongress,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumand(c)recognizedasatreatybythe
othercontractingstate.
ThereisnodisputeastothepresenceofthefirsttworequisitesinthecaseoftheVFA.TheconcurrencehandedbytheSenate
through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general requirement in
Section21,ArticleVII,orthespecificmandatementionedinSection25,ArticleXVIII,theprovisioninthelatterarticlerequiring
ratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinanationalreferendumbeingunnecessarysinceCongresshasnotrequiredit.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and
effective, must be concurred in by at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article
XVIIIsimplyprovidesthatthetreatybe"dulyconcurredinbytheSenate."
Applyingtheforegoingconstitutionalprovisions,atwothirdsvoteofallthemembersoftheSenateisclearlyrequiredsothatthe
concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII
requires,amongotherthings,thatthetreatytheVFA,intheinstantcasebe"dulyconcurredinbytheSenate,"itisverytrue
howeverthatsaidprovisionmustberelatedandviewedinlightoftheclearmandateembodiedinSection21,ArticleVII,whichin
morespecificterms,requiresthattheconcurrenceofatreaty,orinternationalagreement,bemadebyatwothirdsvoteofallthe
membersoftheSenate.Indeed,Section25,ArticleXVIIImustnotbetreatedinisolationtoSection21,ArticleVII.
Asnoted,the"concurrencerequirement"underSection25,ArticleXVIIImustbeconstruedinrelationtotheprovisionsofSection
21,ArticleVII.Inamoreparticularlanguage,theconcurrenceoftheSenatecontemplatedunderSection25,ArticleXVIIImeans
thatatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenatefavorablyvotetoconcurwiththetreatytheVFAintheinstantcase.
....
HavingresolvedthatthefirsttworequisitesprescribedinSection25,ArticleXVIIIarepresent,weshallnowpassuponanddelve
ontherequirementthattheVFAshouldberecognizedasatreatybytheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
....
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.4
cralawlawlibrary
Limv.ExecutiveSecretary5furtherexploredthescopeoftheVFAasitdealtwiththeconstitutionalityoftheTermsofReferenceofthe"Balikatan
021"jointmilitaryexercisesbetweenthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStates:
TheTermsofReferencerightlyfallwithinthecontextoftheVFA.
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word "activities" arose from
accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner,
visitingUSforcesmaysojourninPhilippineterritoryforpurposesotherthanmilitary.Asconceived,thejointexercisesmayinclude
trainingonnewtechniquesofpatrolandsurveillancetoprotectthenation'smarineresources,seasearchandrescueoperationsto
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and
humanitarianmissions,andthelike.
Undertheseauspices,theVFAgiveslegitimacytothecurrentBalikatanexercises.Itisonlylogicaltoassumethat"Balikatan02
1,"a"mutualantiterrorismadvising,assistingandtrainingexercise,"fallsundertheumbrellaofsanctionedorallowableactivities
inthecontextoftheagreement.BoththehistoryandintentoftheMutualDefenseTreatyandtheVFAsupporttheconclusionthat
combatrelatedactivitiesasopposedtocombatitselfsuchastheonesubjectoftheinstantpetition,areindeedauthorized.
Thatisnottheendofthematter,though.Grantedthat"Balikatan021"ispermittedunderthetermsoftheVFA,whatmayUS
forceslegitimatelydoinfurtheranceoftheiraimtoprovideadvice,assistanceandtrainingintheglobaleffortagainstterrorism?
Differently phrased, may American troops actually engage in combat in Philippine territory? The Terms of Reference are explicit
enough.Paragraph8ofsectionIstipulatesthatUSexerciseparticipantsmaynotengageincombat"exceptinselfdefense."We
wrylynotethatthissentimentisadmirableintheabstractbutdifficultinimplementation.Thetargetof"Balikatan021,"theAbu
Sayyaf,cannotreasonablybeexpectedtositidlywhilethebattleisbroughttotheirverydoorstep.Theycannotbeexpectedto
pickandchoosetheirtargetsfortheywillnothavetheluxuryofdoingso.Westatethispointifonlytosignifyourawarenessthat
the parties straddle a fine line, observing the honored legal maxim "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per
directum." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 021" is actually a war principally
conductedbytheUnitedStatesgovernment,andthattheprovisiononselfdefenseservesonlyascamouflagetoconcealthetrue
natureoftheexercise.Aclearpronouncementonthismattertherebybecomescrucial.
In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine
territory.6(Emphasissupplied)
cralawlawlibrary
Nicolasv.Romulo7involved the grant of custody of Lance Corporal Daniel Smith to the United States pursuant to the VFA and reiterated the
rulinginBayan:
[A]sanimplementingagreementoftheRPUSMutualDefenseTreaty,itwasnotnecessarytosubmittheVFAtotheUSSenatefor
advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the CaseZablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this
reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this
substantiallycomplieswiththerequirementsofArt.XVIII,Sec.25ofourConstitution.8
cralawlawlibrary
ThecontroversynowbeforeusinvolvesmorethantheVFA.ReadingtheentiretyoftheConstitutionisnecessarytofullyappreciatethecontext
oftheinterpretationofArticleXVIII,Section25.
II
Foreignpolicyindeedincludessecurityalliancesanddefensecooperationamongstates.Intheconductofnegotiationsandintheimplementation
ofanyvalidandbindinginternationalagreement,ArticleIIoftheConstitutionrequires:
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amitywithallnations.
....
Section7.TheStateshallpursueanindependentforeignpolicy.Initsrelationswithotherstatestheparamountconsiderationshall
benationalsovereignty,territorialintegrity,nationalinterest,andtherighttoselfdetermination.
cralawlawlibrary
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations similarly provides that "[a] 11 Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate,orinanyothermannerinconsistentwiththePurposes
oftheUnitedNations."9
OuruseofforceisnotcompletelyproscribedastheCharteroftheUnitedNationsprovidesfortheinherentrightofindividualorcollectiveself
defense:
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF
AGGRESSION
....
Article51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefen[s]e if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefen[s]e shall be immediately
reportedtotheSecurityCouncilandshallnotinanywayaffecttheauthorityandresponsibilityoftheSecurityCouncilunderthe
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.10
cralawlawlibrary
Furthermore,fallingwithinthepenumbraontheuseofforcearepreemptiveselfdefense,11selfhelp,andhumanitarianinterventions.12
Another exception would be the collective security system set up under the Charter of the United Nations, with the Security Council acting in
accordancewithChapterVIIoftheCharter.UnderArticle42:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate,itmaytakesuchactionbyair,sea,orlandforcesasmaybenecessarytomaintainorrestoreinternationalpeaceand
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
UnitedNations.13
cralawlawlibrary
WefallwithinthisexceptionwhenweparticipateintheenforcementoftheresolutionsoftheSecurityCouncil.14
Generally, the President's discretion is plenary in matters falling within executive functions. He is the chief executive,15having the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.16 Further, "by constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the
President,asheadofState,isthesoleorganandauthorityintheexternalaffairsofthecountry[and][i]nmanyways,thePresidentisthechief
architectofthenation'sforeignpolicy."17
ThePresidentisalsotheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippines.18Hehasthepowerto"calloutsucharmedforcestoprevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion . . . suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereofundermartiallaw"19subjecttotheconditionsandrequisitesundertheprovision.
However,thePresident'sdiscretiontoallowourparticipationintheuseofforcewhetherbycommittingourownmilitaryassetsandpersonnelor
byallowingourterritorytobeusedaswaypoints,refuelingorstagingareasisalsoconstrainedbytheConstitution.Inthissense,thepowerof
thePresidentasCommanderinChiefandheadofstateislimitedbythesovereignthroughjudiciallydeterminableconstitutionalparameters.
III
Withrespecttotheuseoforthreattouseforce,wecandiscernagradationofinterrelationsofthelegislativeandexecutivepowerstoensure
thatwepursue"anindependentforeignpolicy"inthecontextofourhistory.
ArticleVI,Section23oftheConstitutioncoversdeclarationsofastateofwar.ItisvestedsolelyinCongress,thus:
Section23.(1)TheCongress,byavoteoftwothirdsofbothHousesinjointsessionassembled,votingseparately,shallhavethe
solepowertodeclaretheexistenceofastateofwar.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.
UnlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.
cralawlawlibrary
Informedbyourhistoryandtoensurethattheindependenceofourforeignpolicyisnotcompromisedbythepresenceofforeignbases,troops,
orfacilities,theConstitutionnowprovidesfortreatyrecognition,Senateconcurrence,andpublicratificationwhenrequiredbyCongressthrough
ArticleXVIII,Section25,thus:
Section25.Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
nationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.
cralawlawlibrary
TheprohibitioninArticleXVIII,Section25relatesonlytointernationalagreementsinvolvingforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities.Itdoes
notprohibitthePresidentfromenteringintoothertypesofagreementsthatrelatetootheraspectsofhispowersasCommanderinChief.
InBayan:
Section 25, Article XVIII is aspecial provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military
bases,troopsorfacilitiesinthePhilippines.Underthisprovision,theconcurrenceoftheSenateisonlyoneoftherequisites
to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25,
ArticleXVIIIfurtherrequiresthat"foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities"maybeallowedinthePhilippinesonly
byvirtueofatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenate,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinanationalreferendum
heldforthatpurposeifsorequiredbyCongress,andrecognizedassuchbytheothercontractingstate.
....
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditionsaresufficientlymet,viz:(a)itmustbeunderatreaty(b)thetreatymustbedulyconcurredinbytheSenate
and,whensorequiredbyCongress,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendum
and(c)recognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingstate.20(Emphasissupplied)
cralawlawlibrary
"Foreignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilities"shouldnotbereadtogetherbutseparately.Again,inBayan:
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that
there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no
distinctionbetween"transient"and"permanent."Certainly,wefindnothinginSection25,ArticleXVIIIthatrequiresforeigntroops
orfacilitiestobestationedorplacedpermanentlyinthePhilippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguishUbi lex non
distinguitneenosdistinguiredebemos.
Inlikemanner,wedonotsubscribetotheargumentthatSection25,ArticleXVIIIisnotcontrollingsincenoforeignmilitarybases,
butmerelyforeigntroopsandfacilities,areinvolvedintheVFA.Notably,aperusalofsaidconstitutionalprovisionrevealsthatthe
proscription covers "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of
troops or facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word "or"
clearlysignifiesdisassociationandindependenceofonethingfromtheothersincludedintheenumeration,suchthat,theprovision
contemplates three different situations a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign
troops,or(c)foreignfacilitiesanyofthethreestandingaloneplacesitunderthecoverageofSection25,ArticleXVIII.
To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission,isconsistentwiththisinterpretation:
"MR.MAAMBONG.IjustwanttoaddressaquestionortwotoCommissionerBernas.
Thisformulationspeaksofthreethings:foreignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilities.Myfirstquestionis:Ifthecountry
doesenterintosuchkindofatreaty,mustitcoverthethreebases,troopsorfacilitiesorcouldthetreatyentered
intocoveronlyoneortwo?
FR.BERNAS.Definitely,itcancoveronlyone.Whetheritcoversonlyoneoritcoversthree,therequirementswillbe
thesame.
MR.MAAMBONG.Inotherwords,thePhilippinegovernmentcanenterintoatreatycoveringnotbasesbutmerely
troops?
FR.BERNAS.Yes.
MR.MAAMBONG.Icannotfindanyreasonwhythegovernmentcanenterintoatreatycoveringonlytroops.
FR.BERNAS.Whynot?Probablyifwestretchourimaginationalittlebitmore,wewillfindsome.Wejustwantto
covereverything."
cralawlawlibrary
Moreover,militarybasesestablishedwithintheterritoryofanotherstateisnolongerviablebecauseofthealternativesofferedby
newmeansandweaponsofwarfaresuchasnuclearweapons,guidedmissilesaswellashugeseavesselsthatcanstayafloatin
the sea even for months and years without returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as
substitutes for a landhome base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are
mobileascomparedtoalandbasedmilitaryheadquarters.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the
SenategaveitsconcurrencetotheVFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficientlymet,viz:(a)itmustbeunderatreaty(b)thetreatymustbedulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,whensorequired
bycongress,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumand(c)recognizedasatreatybythe
othercontractingstate.21(Citationsomitted)
cralawlawlibrary
Theponencia,amongothers,interprets"shallnotbeallowed"asbeinglimitedtothe"initialentry"ofbases,troops,orfacilities.22Subsequent
acts are treated as no longer being subject to Article XVIII, Section 25 and are, therefore, only limited by other constitutional provisions and
relevantlaws.23
Thisinterpretationisspeciousandahistorical.
There is nothing in Article XVIII, Section 25 that defines the extent and scope of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities,
therebyjustifyingadistinctionbetweentheirinitialentryandsubsequentactivities.ItsverystructureshowsthatArticleXVIII,Section25isnota
meregatewayfortheentryofforeigntroopsorfacilitiesintothePhilippinesforthemtocarryoutanyactivitylateron.
Theprovisioncontainsmeasuresdesignedtoprotectourcountryinthebroaderschemeofinternationalrelations.Militarypresenceshapesboth
foreignpolicyandpoliticalrelations.Warorthethreatthereofthroughthepositionoftroops,basing,andprovisionofmilitaryfacilitiesisan
extensionofpolitic,thus:
Theuseofmilitaryforceisameanstoahigherendthepoliticalobject.Warisatoolthatpolicyusestoachieveitsobjectives
and,assuch,hasameasureofrationalutility.So,thepurposeforwhichtheuseofforceisintendedwillbethemajordeterminant
ofthecourseandcharacterofawar.AsClausewitzexplains,war"iscontrolledbyitspoliticalobject,"which"willsetitscourse,
prescribethescaleofmeansandeffortwhichisrequired,andmakesitsinfluencefeltthroughoutdowntothesmallestoperational
detail.24
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Withrespecttotheentryandpresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilities,ArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe1987Constitutionenables
governmenttopoliticallynegotiatewithotherstatesfromapositionofequality.TheauthorityisnotexclusivelygrantedtothePresident.Itis
sharedwiththeCongress.TheSenateparticipatesbecausenoforeignbase,troop,orfacilitymayenterunlessitisauthorizedbyatreaty.
Thereismoreevidenceinthetextoftheprovisionofasovereignintenttorequireconscious,deliberate,andpublicdiscussionregardingthese
issues.
TheprovisiongivesCongress,consistingoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives,theoptiontorequirethatthetreatybecomeeffective
only when approved by a majority of the people in a referendum. Furthermore, there is the additional requirement that the authority will be
absentiftheotherstatedoesnottreatthesameinstrumentthatallowstheirbases,troops,andfacilitiestoenterourterritoryasatreaty.
Theprovisionensuresequalitybyrequiringahigherlevelofpublicscrutiny.UnlikeinthepastwhenwebargainedwiththeUnitedStatesfroma
position of weakness, the Constitution opens the legislative forum so that we use the freedoms that we have won since 1946 to ensure a fair
agreement.Legislativehearingsmaketheagreementsmorepubliclylegible.Theyallowmorecriticismtobeaddressed.Publicforumsclarifyto
the United States and other foreign military powers interested in the Philippines the full extent of interest and the various standpoints of our
different constituents. As a mechanism of public participation, it also assures our treaty partners of the durability of the various obligations in
thesetypesofsecurityarrangements.
TheEDCAwasnegotiatedinprivatebetweenrepresentativesofthePresidentandtheUnitedStates.Thecompletetextofthenegotiationswas
presentedtothepublicintimeforthevisitofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates.Duringitspresentation,thePresident'srepresentativestookthe
position that no further public discussion would be held that might affect the terms of the EDCA. The President presented the EDCA as a final
product withdrawn from Senate or Congressional input. The President curtailed even the possibility of full public participation through a
CongressionalResolutioncallingforareferendumonthismatter.
The Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Puno inBayanprovides a picture of how the Constitutional Commission recognized the lopsided
relationshipoftheUnitedStatesandthePhilippinesdespitethe1951MutualDefenseTreatyandthe1947AgreementBetweentheUnitedStates
ofAmericaandtheRepublicofthePhilippinesConcerningMilitaryBases(1947MilitaryBasesAgreement):
TodeterminecomplianceoftheVFAwiththerequirementsofSec.25,Art.XVIIIoftheConstitution,itisnecessarytoascertain
the intent of the framers of the Constitution as well as the will of the Filipino people who ratified the fundamental
law. This exercise would inevitably take us back to the period in our history when U.S. military presence was
entrenchedinPhilippineterritorywiththeestablishmentandoperationofU.S.MilitaryBasesinseveralpartsofthe
archipelagounderthe1947R.P.U.S.MilitaryBasesAgreement.AsarticulatedbyConstitutionalCommissionerBiasF.Ople
inthe1986ConstitutionalCommissiondeliberationsonthisprovision,the1947RPUSMilitaryBasesAgreementwasratified
by the Philippine Senate, but not by the United States Senate. In the eyes of Philippine law, therefore, the Military
Bases Agreement was a treaty, but by the laws of the United States, it was a mere executive agreement. This
asymmetryinthelegaltreatmentoftheMilitaryBasesAgreementbythetwocountrieswasbelievedtobeaslurto
oursovereignty. Thus, in the debate among the Constitutional Commissioners, the unmistakable intention of the commission
emergedthatthisanomalousasymmetrymustneverberepeated.Tocorrectthishistoricalaberration,Sec.25,Art.XVIIIof
theConstitutionrequiresthatthetreatyallowingthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesshould
also be "recognized as a treaty by the other contacting party." In plain language, recognition of the United States as the
othercontractingpartyoftheVFAshouldbebytheU.S.PresidentwiththeadviceandconsentoftheU.S.Senate.
Thefollowingexchangesmanifestthisintention:
"MR. OPLE. Will either of the two gentlemen yield to just one question for clarification? Is there anything in this
formulation, whether that of Commissioner Bernas or of Commissioner Romulo, that will prevent the Philippine
governmentfromabrogatingtheexistingbasesagreement?
FR.BERNAS.Tomyunderstanding,none.
MR.ROMULO.IconcurwithCommissionerBernas.
MR.OPLE.IwasverykeentoputthisquestionbecauseIhadtakenthepositionfromthebeginningandthisis
embodiedinaresolutionfiledbyCommissionersNatividad,MaambongandRegaladothatitisveryimportantthat
thegovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesbeinapositiontoterminateorabrogatethebasesagreementas
one of the options . . . . we have acknowledged starting at the committee level that the bases agreement was
ratified by our Senate it is a treaty under Philippine law. But as far as the Americans are concerned, the Senate
never took cognizance of this and therefore, it is an executive agreement. That creates a wholly unacceptable
asymmetry between the two countries. Therefore, in my opinion, the right step to take, if the government of our
countrywilldeemitinthenationalinteresttoterminatethisagreementoreventorenegotiateit,isthatwemust
beginwithacleanslateweshouldnotbeburdenedbytheflawsofthe1947MilitaryBasesAgreement...
MR.ROMULO.MadamPresident,IthinkthetwophrasesintheBernasformulationtakecareofCommissionerOple's
concerns.
The first says "EXCEPT UNDER THE TERMS OF A TREATY." That means that if it is to be renegotiated, it must be
underthetermsofanewtreaty.Thesecondistheconcludingphrasewhichsays:"ANDRECOGNIZEDASATREATY
BYTHEOTHERCONTRACTINGSTATE."
....
MR.SUAREZ.Istheproposalprospectiveandnotretroactiveincharacter?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, it is prospective because it does not touch the validity of the present agreement. However, if a
decisionshouldbearrivedatthatthepresentagreementisinvalid,thenevenpriorto1991,thisbecomesoperative
rightaway.
MR.SUAREZ.Inotherwords,wedonotimpressthepreviousagreementswithavalidcharacter,neitherdowesay
thattheyarenullandvoidabinitioasclaimedbymanyofushere.
FR.BERNAS.ThepositionIholdisthatitisnotthefunctionofthisCommissiontopassjudgmentonthevalidityor
invalidityofthesubsistingagreement.
MR. SUAREZ ... the proposal requires recognition of this treaty by the other contracting nation. How would that
recognition be expressed by that other contracting nation? That is in accordance with their constitutional or
legislativeprocess,Iassume.
FR.BERNAS.AsCommissionerRomuloindicated,sincethiscertainlywouldreferonlytotheUnitedStates,because
it is only the United States that would have the possibility of being allowed to have treaties here, thenwe would
havetorequirethattheSenateoftheUnitedStatesconcurinthetreatybecauseunderAmericanconstitutionallaw,
theremustbeconcurrenceonthepartoftheSenateoftheUnitedStatestoconcludetreaties.
FR. BERNAS. When I say that the other contracting state must recognize it as a treaty, by that I meanit must
performalltheactsrequiredfortheagreementtoreachthestatusofatreatyundertheirjurisdiction"25(Emphasis
supplied)
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By allowing the entry of United States military personnel, their deployment into undefined missions here and abroad, and their use of military
assetsstagedfromourterritoryagainsttheirpresentandfutureenemiesbasedonageneralprovisionintheVFA,themajoritynowundermines
themeasuresbuiltintoourpresentConstitutiontoallowtheSenate,CongressandourPeopletoparticipateintheshapingofforeignpolicy.The
EDCAmaybeanagreementthat"deepensdefensecooperation"26betweenthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStates.However,likethe1947Military
BasesAgreement,itistheagreementmorethananyotherthatwillextensivelyshapeourforeignpolicy.
IV
ArticleVII,Section21oftheConstitutioncomplementsArticleXVIII,Section25asitprovidesfortherequisiteSenateconcurrence,thus:
Section21.Notreatyorinternationalagreementshallbevalidandeffectiveunlessconcurredinbyatleasttwothirdsofallthe
MembersoftheSenate.
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The provision covers both "treatyandinternationalagreement." Treaties are traditionally understood as international agreements entered into
between states or by states with international organizations with international legal personalities.27 The deliberate inclusion of the term
"international agreement" is the subject of a number of academic discussions pertaining to foreign relations and international law. Its addition
cannotbemeresurplus.Certainly,Senateconcurrenceshouldcovermorethantreaties.
That the President may enter into international agreements as chief architect of the Philippines' foreign policy has long been
acknowledged.28However, whether an international agreement is to be regarded as a treaty or as an executive agreement depends on the
subject matter covered by and the temporal nature of the agreement.29Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading30 differentiated
internationalagreementsthatrequireSenateconcurrencefromthosethatdonot:
Internationalagreementsinvolvingpoliticalissuesorchangesofnationalpolicyandthoseinvolvinginternationalarrangementsofa
permanentcharacterusuallytaketheformoftreaties.Butinternationalagreementsembodyingadjustmentsofdetailcarryingout
wellestablishednationalpoliciesandtraditionsandthoseinvolvingarrangementsofamoreorlesstemporarynatureusuallytake
theformofexecutiveagreements.31(Emphasisintheoriginal)
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Indeed, the distinction made inCommissioner of Customsin terms of international agreements must be clarified depending on whether it is
viewed from an international law or domestic law perspective. Dean Merlin M. Magallona summarizes the differences between the two
perspectives:
FromthestandpointofPhilippineconstitutionallaw,atreatyistobedistinguishedfromanexecutiveagreement,astheSupreme
Court has done inCommissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Tradingwhere it declares that "the concurrence of [the Senate] is
required by our fundamental law in the making of 'treaties' . . . which are, however, distinct and different from 'executive
agreements,'whichmaybevalidlyenteredintowithoutsuchconcurrence."
Thus,thedistinctionrestsontheapplicationofSenateconcurrenceasaconstitutionalrequirement.
However,fromthestandpointofinternationallaw,nosuchdistinctionisdrawn.NotethatforpurposesoftheViennaConvention
ontheLawofTreaties,inArticle2(1)(a)theterm"treaty"isunderstoodas"aninternationalagreementconcludedbetweenStates
inwrittenformandgovernedbyinternationallaw,whetherembodiedinasingleinstrumentorintwoormorerelatedinstruments
andwhateveritsparticulardesignation."...ThePhilippinesisapartytotheConventionwhichisalreadyinforce.Intheuseof
theterm"treaty,"Article2(1)(a)oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesbetweenStatesandInternationalOrganizations,
which is not yet in force, the designation or appellation of the agreement also carries no legal significance. Provided the
instrumentspossesstheelementsofanagreementunderinternationallaw,theyaretobetakenequallyas"treaty"withoutregard
to the descriptive names by which they are designated, such as "protocol," "charter," "covenant," "exchange of notes," "modus
vivendi,""convention,"or"executiveagreement."32(Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
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UnderArticle2(2)33oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,inrelationtoArticle2(1)(a),34thedesignationandtreatmentgiventoan
internationalagreementissubjecttothetreatmentgivenbytheinternallawofthestateparty.35Paragraph2ofArticle2specificallysafeguards
thestates'usageoftheterms"treaty"and"internationalagreement"undertheirinternallaws.36
WithinthecontextofourConstitution,therequirementforSenateconcurrenceinArticleVII,Section21oftheConstitutionconnotesaspecial
fieldofstatepolicies,interests,andissuesrelatingtoforeignrelationsthattheExecutivecannotvalidlycoverinanexecutiveagreement:
As stated above, an executive agreement is outside the coverage of Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution and hence not
subject to Senate concurrence. However, the demarcation line between a treaty and an executive agreement as to the subject
matter or content of their coverage is illdefined. The courts have not provided reliable guidelines as to the scope of executive
agreementauthorityinrelationtotreatymakingpower.
Ifexecutiveagreementauthorityisuncontained,andifwhatmaybethepropersubjectmatterofatreatymayalsobeincluded
within the scope of executiveagreement power, the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence could be rendered
meaningless.Therequirementcouldbecircumventedbyanexpedientresorttoexecutiveagreement.
The definite provision for Senate concurrence in the Constitution indomitably signifies that there must be a regime of national
interests,policiesandproblemswhichtheExecutivebranchofthegovernmentcannotdealwithintermsofforeignrelationsexcept
through treaties concurred in by the Senate under Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. The problem is how to define that
regime, i.e., that which is outside the scope of executiveagreement power of the President and which exclusively belongs to
treatymakingassubjecttoSenateconcurrence.37(Emphasissupplied)
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Thus,ArticleVII,Section21maycoversomebutnotalltypesofexecutiveagreements.Definitely,thedeterminationofitscoveragedoesnot
dependonthenomenclatureassignedbythePresident.
Executiveagreementsareinternationalagreementsthatpertaintomereadjustmentsofdetailthatcarryoutwellentrenchednationalpolicies
andtraditionsinlinewiththefunctionsoftheExecutive.Itincludesenforcementofexistingandvalidtreatieswheretheprovisionsareclear.It
involvesarrangementsthatareofatemporarynature.Moreimportantly,itdoesnotamendexistingtreaties,statutes,ortheConstitution.
In contrast, international agreements that are considered treaties under our Constitution involve key political issues or changes of national
policy.Theseagreementsareofapermanentcharacter.ItrequiresconcurrencebyatleasttwothirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate.
EvenifweassumethattheEDCA'snomenclatureasan"executiveagreement"iscorrect,itisstillthetypeofinternationalagreementthatneeds
to be submitted to the Senate for concurrence. It involves a key political issue that substantially alters or reshapes our national and foreign
policy.
Fundamentallyhowever,thePresident'sclassificationoftheEDCAasamere"executiveagreement"isinvalid.ArticleXVIIISection25requires
that the presence of foreign troops, bases, and facilities must be covered by an internationally binding agreement in the form of a treaty
V
TheSolicitorGeneral,onbehalfofgovernment,proposesthatweshouldviewtheEDCAmerelyasanimplementationofboththeMutualDefense
TreatyandtheVFA.Inhisview,sinceboththeMutualDefenseTreatyandtheVFAhavebeensubmittedtotheSenateandconcurredinvalidly
underthegoverningconstitutionalprovisionsatthattime,thereisnolongeranyneedtohaveanimplementingagreementsimilarlysubmitted
forSenateconcurrence.
TheChiefJustice,writingforthemajorityofthiscourt,agreeswiththepositionoftheSolicitorGeneral.
Idisagree.
The proposal of the Solicitor General cannot be accepted for the following reasons: (1) the Mutual Defense Treaty, entered into in 1951 and
ratified in 1952, cannot trump the constitutional provision Article XVIII, Section 25 (2) even the VFA, which could have been also argued as
implementingtheMutualDefenseTreaty,waspresentedtotheSenateforratification(3)theEDCAcontainssignificantandmaterialobligations
notcontemplatedbytheVFAand(4)assumingarguendothattheEDCAonlyprovidesthedetailsforthefullimplementationoftheVFA,Article
XVIII, Section 25 still requires that it at least be submitted to the Senate for concurrence, given the history and context of the constitutional
provision.
VI
The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty cannot be the treaty contemplated in Article XVIII, Section 25. Its implementation through an executive
agreement,whichallowsforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilities,isnotenough.IftheMutualDefenseTreatyisthebasisfortheEDCAasa
mere executive agreement, Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution will make no sense. An absurd interpretation of the Constitution is no
validinterpretation.
TheMutualDefenseTreatywasenteredintobyrepresentativesofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesonAugust30,1951andconcurredinby
the Philippine Senate on May 12, 1952. The treaty acknowledges that this is in the context of our obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations.Thus,ArticleIoftheMutualDefenseTreatyprovides:
ThePartiesundertake,assetforthintheCharteroftheUnitedNations,tosettleanyinternationaldisputesinwhichtheymaybe
involvedbypeacefulmeansinsuchamannerthatinternationalpeaceandsecurityandjusticearenotendangeredandtorefrainin
theirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceinanymannerinconsistentwiththepurposesoftheUnitedNations.
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Further,thetreatyexpressesthedesireofthepartiesto"maintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack."
Thus,inArticleIIIoftheTreaty:
maintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack.
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Whiletheseprovisionsinthe1951MutualDefenseTreatycouldreasonablybeinterpretedtoincludeactivitiesdonejointlybythePhilippinesand
theUnitedStates,nothinginInternationalLawnorintheConstitutioncanbereasonablyreadasreferringtothistreatyfortheauthorizationfor
"foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities"aftertheratificationofthe1987Constitution.
Again,theconstitutionalprovisionreads:
Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
StatesofAmericaconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troopsorfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippines
exceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,whentheCongresssorequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescast
bythepeopleinanationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.(Emphasis
supplied)
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Thereisatimestamptotheobligationunderthisprovision.Theprohibitionagainst"foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities,"unlesscovered
bytreatyorallowedthroughareferendum,becomeseffective"aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreement...concerningMilitaryBases."The
treatyabouttoexpirereferstothe1947MilitaryBasesAgreementasamended.Thiswasstillineffectatthetimeofthedrafting,submission,
andratificationofthe1987Constitution.
Theconstitutionaltimelineisunequivocal.
The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty was in effect at the time of the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. It was also in effect even after the
expirationoftheMilitaryBasesAgreementin1991.Wecouldreasonablyassumethatthosewhodraftedandratifiedthe1987Constitutionwere
awareofthislegalsituationandofthebroadtermsofthe1951treatyyetdidnotexpresslymentionthe1951MutualDefenseTreatyinArticle
XVIII, Section 25. We can conclude, with sturdy and unassailable logic, that the 1951 treaty is not the treaty contemplated in Article XVIII,
Section25.
Besides,theExecutivealsoviewedtheVFAasanimplementationofthe1951MutualDefenseTreaty.Yet,itwasstillsubmittedtotheSenatefor
concurrence.
Parenthetically, Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties38 provides for the principle of "rebus sic stantibus," in that a
fundamentalchangeofcircumstancesmaybeagroundtoterminateorwithdrawfromatreaty.39DeanMerlinM.Magallonaisoftheviewthat
therehasbeenafundamentalchangeincircumstancesthatallowsthePhilippinestoterminatethe1951MutualDefenseTreaty.40Althoughwe
shouldacknowledgethissuggestionduringtheoralargumentsbypetitioners,wedonotneedtogointosuchanissueandatthistimetobeable
toresolvethecontroversiesinthiscase.Weawaitacasethatwillprovideaclearerfactualbackdropproperlypleadedbytheparties.
Inaddition,theMutualDefenseTreatyisnotthetreatycontemplatedbyArticleXVIII,Section25onaccountofitssubjectmatter.InParagraph
5 of its Preamble, the Mutual Defense Treaty articulates the parties' desire "to strengthen their present efforts to collective defense for the
preservationofpeaceandsecuritypendingthedevelopmentofamorecomprehensivesystemofregionalsecurityinthePacificArea."ArticleII
furtherclarifiesthetreaty'spurpose:
ArticleII
maintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack.(Emphasissupplied)
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Clearly,noneofitsprovisionsprovidespecificallyforthepresenceofabase,troops,orfacilitiesthatwillputitwithintheambitofArticleXVIII,
Section 25. Its main aim is to provide support against state enemies effectively and efficiently. Thus, for instance, foreign military bases were
coveredinthe1947MilitaryBasesAgreement.
The VFA cannot also be said to be the treaty required in Article XVIII, Section 25. This is because the United States, as the other contracting
party,hasnevertreateditassuchunderitsowndomesticlaws.TheVFAhasthesamestatusasthatofthe1947MilitaryBasesAgreementin
thatitismerelyanexecutiveagreementonthepartofUnitedStates:
As articulated by Constitutional Commissioner Bias F. Ople in the 1986 Constitutional Commission deliberations on this
provision,the1947RPUSMilitaryBasesAgreementwasratifiedbythePhilippineSenate,butnotbytheUnitedStates
Senate. In the eyes of Philippine law, therefore, the Military Bases Agreement was a treaty, but by the laws of the
United States, it was a mere executive agreement. This asymmetry in the legal treatment of the Military Bases
Agreementbythetwocountrieswasbelievedtobeaslurtooursovereignty.41(Emphasissupplied)
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InNicolas,AssociateJusticeAntonioT.CarpiohimselfunderscoredthenontreatystatusoftheVisitingForcesAgreementinlightofMedellinv.
Texas42inhisSeparateOpinion,thus:
UnderMedellin,theVFAisindisputablynotenforceableasdomesticfederallawintheUnitedStates.Ontheotherhand,sincethe
PhilippineSenateratifiedtheVFA,theVFAconstitutesdomesticlawinthePhilippines.ThisunequallegalstatusoftheVFAviolates
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution, which specifically requires that a treaty involving the presence of foreign
troopsinthePhilippinesmustbeequallybindingonthePhilippinesandontheothercontractingState.
Inshort,thePhilippineConstitutionbarstheefficacyofsuchatreatythatisenforceableasdomesticlawonlyinthePhilippinesbut
unenforceableasdomesticlawintheothercontractingState.ThePhilippinesisasovereignandindependentState.Itisnolonger
a colony of the United States. This Court should not countenance an unequal treaty that is not only contrary to the express
mandateofthePhilippineConstitution,butalsoanaffronttothesovereignty,dignityandindependenceofthePhilippineState.
ThereisnodisputethatSection25,ArticleXVIIIofthePhilippineConstitutiongovernstheconstitutionalityoftheVFA.Section25
states:
Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
PhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,whentheCongresssorequires,ratifiedbya
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treatybytheothercontractingState.
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The clear intent of the phrase "recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State" is to insure that the treaty has the
same legal effect on the Philippines as on the other contracting State. This requirement is unique to agreements involving the
presenceofforeigntroopsinthePhilippines,alongwiththerequirement,ifCongressissominded,toholdanationalreferendum
fortheratificationofsuchatreaty.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal the sensitivity of the framers to the "unacceptable asymmetry" of the
then existing military bases agreement between the Philippines and the United States. The Philippine Senate had ratified the
military bases agreement but the United States Government refused to submit the same to the U.S. Senate for ratification.
CommissionerBiasOpleexplainedthis"unacceptableasymmetry"inthismanner:
...ButIthinkwehaveacknowledgedstartingatthecommitteelevelthatthebasesagreementwasratifiedbyour
SenateitisatreatyunderPhilippinelaw.ButasfarastheAmericansareconcerned,theSenatenever
tookcognizanceofthisand,therefore,itisanexecutiveagreement.Thatcreatesawhollyunacceptable
asymmetry between the two countries. Therefore, in my opinion, the right step to take, if the government of
our country will deem it in the national interest to terminate this agreement or even to renegotiate it, is that we
mustbeginwithacleanslateweshouldnotbeburdenedbytheflawsofthe1947MilitaryBasesAgreement.Ithink
that is a very important point. I am glad to be reassured by the two Gentlemen that there is nothing in these
proposals that will bar the Philippine government at the proper time from exercising the option of abrogation or
termination.
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Eventually,theConstitutionalCommissionrequiredthatanyagreementinvolvingthepresenceofforeigntroopsinthePhilippines
mustbe"recognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState."ThismeansthattheothercontractingStatemustrecognize
the agreement as a treaty, as distinguished from any other agreement, and if its constitutional processes require, submit the
agreement to its proper legislative body for ratification as a treaty. As explained by Commissioner Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
duringthedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission:
Third,onthelastphrase"ANDRECOGNIZEDASATREATYBYTHEOTHERCONTRACTINGNATION,"weenterinto
a treaty and we want the other contracting party to respect that document as a document possessing
forceinthesamewaythatwerespectit.Thepresentsituationwehaveisthatthebasesagreementisatreaty
asfarasweareconcerned,butitisonlyanexecutiveagreementasfarastheUnitedStatesisconcerned,because
thetreatyprocesswasnevercompletedintheUnitedStatesbecausetheagreementwasnotratifiedbytheSenate.
So, for these reasons, I oppose the deletion of this section because, first of all, as I said, it does not prevent
renegotiation.Second,itrespectsthesovereigntyofourpeopleandthepeoplewillbeinabetterpositiontojudge
whethertoacceptthetreatyornot,becausethentheywillflbevotingnotjustonanabstractionbuttheywillbe
votingafterexaminationofthetermsofthetreatynegotiatedbyourgovernment.Andthird,therequirementthat
it be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting nation places us on the same level as any other
contractingparty.
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ThefollowingexchangesintheConstitutionalCommissionexplainfurtherthemeaningofthephrase"recognizedasatreatyby
theothercontractingState":
FR.BERNAS:Letmebeconcrete,MadamPresident,inourcircumstances.Supposetheyweretohavethissituation
whereourgovernmentweretonegotiateatreatywiththeUnitedStates,andthenthetwoexecutivedepartmentsin
theordinarycourseofnegotiationcometoanagreement.AsourConstitutionistakingshapenow,ifthisistobea
treatyatall,itwillhavetobesubmittedtoourSenateforitsratification.Suppose,therefore,thatwhatwasagreed
upon between the United States and the executive department of the Philippines is submitted and ratified by the
Senate, then it is further submitted to the people for its ratification and subsequently, we ask the United States:
"Complete the process by accepting it as a treaty through ratification by your Senate as the United
StatesConstitutionrequires,"wouldsuchanarrangementbeinderogationofsovereignty?
MR. NOLLEDO: Under the circumstances the Commissioner just mentioned, Madam President, on the basis of the
provisionofSection1that"sovereigntyresidesintheFilipinopeople,"thenwewouldnotconsiderthataderogation
ofoursovereigntyonthebasisandexpectationthattherewasaplebiscite.
xxxxxxxxx
FR.BERNAS:AsCommissionerRomuloindicated,sincethiscertainlywouldreferonlytotheUnitedStates,because
it is only the United States that would have the possibility of being allowed to have treaties here, then we would
havetorequirethattheSenateoftheUnitedStatesconcurinthetreatybecauseunderAmericanconstitutionallaw,
theremustbeconcurrenceonthepartoftheSenateoftheUnitedStatestoconcludetreaties.
MR.SUAREZ:Thankyoufortheclarification.
Under the 1935 Constitution, if I recall it correctly, treaties and agreements entered into require an exchange of
ratification.Irememberthatishowitwasworded.Wedonothaveinmindhereanexchangeofratificationbythe
SenateoftheUnitedStatesandbytheSenateofthePhilippines,forinstance,butonlyanapprovalorarecognition
bytheSenateoftheUnitedStatesofthattreaty.
FR.BERNAS:WhenIsaythattheothercontractingstatemustrecognizeitasatreaty,bythatImeanit
must perform all the acts required for that agreement to reach the status of a treaty under their
jurisdiction.
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Thus,Section25,ArticleXVIIIofthePhilippineConstitutionrequiresthatanyagreementinvolvingthepresenceofforeigntroops
inthePhilippinesmustbeequallylegallybindingbothonthePhilippinesandontheothercontractingState.Thismeans
the treaty must be enforceable under Philippine domestic law as well as under the domestic law of the other contracting State.
Even Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, the ponente of the majority opinion, and who was himself a member of the Constitutional
Commission,expresslyadmitsthiswhenhestatesinhisponencia:
Theprovisionisthusdesignedtoensurethatanyagreementallowingthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops
orfacilitiesinPhilippineterritoryshallbeequallybindingonthePhilippinesandtheforeignsovereignState
involved.Theideaistopreventarecurrenceofthesituationwherethetermsandconditionsgoverning
the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding on us but not upon the foreign
State.
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An"equallybinding"treatymeansexactlywhatitsaysthetreatyisenforceableasdomesticlawinthePhilippinesandlikewise
enforceableasdomesticlawintheothercontractingState.43(Emphasisintheoriginal,citationsomitted)
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Surprisingly,throughhisConcurringOpinioninthiscase,AssociateJusticeCarpiohasnowabandonedhisearlierviews.
This court's interpretation of a treaty under Article XVIII, Section 25 inBayan, which did away with the requirement that the agreement be
recognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingparty,hasresultedinanabsurdsituationofpoliticalasymmetrybetweentheUnitedStatesand
the Philippines. A relationship where both parties are on equal footing must be demanded, and from one state to another. The Philippine
government must be firm in requiring that the United States establish stability in its international commitment, both by legislation and
jurisprudence.
ThedoctrinelaiddowninBayan,insofarastheVFAisconcerned,shouldnowberevisitedinlightofnewcircumstancesandchallengesinforeign
policyandinternationalrelations.
VII
EvenifweassumethattheMutualDefenseTreatyandtheVFAarethetreatiescontemplatedbyArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitution,this
courtmustdeterminewhethertheEDCAisavalidexecutiveagreementasarguedbyrespondents.
Itisnot.TheEDCAmodifiesthesetwoagreements.
RespondentsclaimthattheEDCAisanexecutiveagreementandmerelyimplementstheMutualDefenseTreatyandVFA.44Inarguingthatthe
EDCA implements the Mutual Defense Treaty, respondents state that the latter has two operative principles: (1) the Principle of Defensive
ReactionunderArticleIV45and(2)thePrincipleofDefensivePreparationunderArticleII.46Accordingtorespondents,"[t]heprimaryconcernof
the EDCA is the Principle of Defensive Preparation in order to enhance both parties' abilities, if required, to operationalize the Principle of
DefensiveReaction."47ThespecificgoalsenumeratedintheEDCAdemonstratethis:
56.ThespecificpurposesoftheEDCAto"[s]upporttheParties'sharedgoalofimprovinginteroperabilityoftheParties'forces,and
fortheArmedForcesofthePhilippines("AFP"),[toaddressits]shorttermcapabilitiesgaps,promotinglongtermmodernization,
and helping maintain and develop additional maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and
disasterreliefcapabilities"properlyfallwithintheMDT'sobjectiveofdevelopingthedefensecapabilitiesofthePhilippinesandthe
US. The EDCA implements the MDT by providing for a mechanism that promotes optimal cooperation between the US and the
Philippines.48
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Similarly,respondentsallegethattheEDCAimplementstheVFAinrelationtotheentryofUnitedStatestroopsandpersonnel,importationand
exportationofequipment,materials,supplies,andotherproperty,andmovementofvesselsandaircraftinthePhilippines.49Respondentsrelyon
thiscourt'spronouncementinLimthatcombatrelatedactivitiesareallowedundertheVFA:
61. Article I of the EDCA provides that its purposes are to support "the Parties' shared goal of improving interoperability of the
Parties'forces,andfortheArmedForcesofthePhilippines("AFP"),[toaddressits]shorttermcapabilitiesgaps,promotinglong
term modernization, and helping maintain and develop additional maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and
humanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefcapabilities."
62.TheHonorableCourtinLimruledthattheseactivitiesarealreadycoveredbytheVFA.UnderLim,"maritimesecurity,maritime
domainawareness,andhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefcapabilities"areactivitiesthatareauthorizedtobeundertaken
inthePhilippinesundertheVFA.
63.ArticleIIoftheEDCAreiteratesthedefinitionof"UnitedStatespersonnel"intheVFAwhichmeans"UnitedStatesmilitaryand
civilianpersonneltemporarilyinthePhilippinesinconnectionwithactivitiesapprovedbythePhilippines."
64. Article III of the EDCA provides for the "Agreed Locations" where the Philippines authorizes US to "conduct the following
activities":"trainingtransitsupportandrelatedactivitiesrefuelingofaircraftbunkeringofvesselstemporarymaintenanceof
vehicles,vesselsandaircrafttemporaryaccommodationofpersonnelcommunicationsprepositioningofequipment,suppliesand
materieldeployingforcesandmaterielandsuchotheractivitiesasthePartiesmayagree."
65.ArticleIVoftheEDCAauthorizestheprepositioningandstoringofdefenseequipment,suppliesandmateriel.UnderArticleIV
inrelationtoArticleIIIoftheEDCA,the"prepositioningofequipment,suppliesandmateriel"isan"activity"tobeapprovedbythe
PhilippineGovernment"throughbilateralsecuritymechanisms,suchastheMDBandSEB."
66.Insum,whattheEDCAdoesistoenhancetheexistingcontractualsecurityapparatusbetweenthePhilippinesandtheUS,set
upthroughtheMDTandtheVFA.ItisthedutyoftheHonorableCourttoallowthissecurityapparatusenoughbreathingspaceto
respondtoperceived,anticipated,andactualexigencies.
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As discussed earlier, an executive agreement merely provides for the detailed adjustments of national policies or principles already existing in
othertreaties,statutes,ortheConstitution.ItinvolvesonlytheenforcementofclearandspecificprovisionsoftheConstitution,law,ortreaty.It
cannotamendnorinvalidateanexistingstatute,treaty,orprovisionintheConstitution.Itincludesagreementsthatareofatemporarynature.
ThisisnotthecasewiththeEDCA.
The EDCA contains significant and material obligations not contemplated by the VFA. As an executive agreement, it cannot be given any legal
effect.TheEDCAsubstantiallymodifiesandamendstheVFAinatleastthefollowingaspects:
First, the EDCA does not only regulate the "visits" of foreign troops. It allows the temporary stationing on a rotational basis of United States
militarypersonnelandtheircontractorsonphysicallocationswithpermanentfacilitiesandprepositionedmilitarymateriel.
Second, unlike the VFA, the EDCA allows the prepositioning of military materiel, which can include various types of warships, fighter planes,
bombers,landandamphibiousvehicles,andtheircorrespondingammunition.
Third,theVFAcontemplatestheentryoftroopsforvarioustrainingexercises.TheEDCAallowsourterritorytobeusedbytheUnitedStatesto
launchmilitaryandparamilitaryoperationsconductedinotherstates.
Fourth, the EDCA introduces new concepts not contemplated in the VFA, namely: (a) agreed locations (b) contractors (c) prepositioning of
militarymaterieland(d)operationalcontrol.
Lastly,theVFAdidnothaveprovisionsthatmayhavebeenconstruedasarestrictionormodificationofobligationsfoundinexistingstatutes.
TheEDCAcontainsprovisionsthatmayaffectvariousstatutesincluding,amongothers,(a)thejurisdictionofcourts,(b)localautonomy,and(c)
taxation.
VIII
Article1(1)(b)oftheEDCAauthorizesUnitedStatesforcesaccessto"AgreedLocations"inthePhilippinesonarotationalbasis.50Evenwhilethe
concept of "rotation" may refer to incidental and transient presence of foreign troops and contractors, the nature of the "Agreed Locations" is
eerilysimilartoand,therefore,amountstobasingagreements.
"AgreedLocations"hasbeendefinedbytheEDCAinArticle11(4)as:
FacilitiesandareasthatareprovidedbytheGovernmentofthePhilippinesthroughtheAFPandthatUnitedstatesforces,
United States contractors, and others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access and use pursuant to this
Agreement.SuchagreedLocationsmaybelistedinanannextobeappendedtothisAgreement,andmaybefurtherdescribedin
implementingagreements.(Emphasissupplied)
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Astreaties,the1947MilitaryBasesAgreementanditsvariousamendmentsspecifiedtheactuallocationofthephysicallocationsofUnitedStates
troopsandfacilities.TheEDCA,however,nowdelegatestheidentificationofthelocationnottoaselectSenateCommitteeorapublicbodybut
simplytoourmilitaryrepresentativesintheMutualDefenseBoardandtheSecurityEnhancementBoard.
Moreimportantly,theextentofaccessanduseallowedtoUnitedStatesforcesandcontractorsundertheEDCAisbroad.ItissetoutinArticle
III:
ArticleIII
AgreedLocations
1. With consideration of the views of the Parties, the Philippines hereby authorizes and agrees that United States
forces,United States contractors, and vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for United States forces may conduct
the following activities with respect to Agreed Locations: training transit support and related activities refueling of
aircraft bunkering Of vessels temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels, arid aircraft temporary accommodation of
personnelcommunicationsprepositioningofequipment,supplies,andmaterieldeployingforcesandmaterielandsuch
otheractivitiesasthePartiesmayagree.
2. Whenrequested,theDesignatedAuthorityofthePhilippinesshallassistinfacilitatingtransitortemporaryaccessbyUnited
Statesforcestopubliclandandfacilities(includingroads,ports,andairfields),includingthoseownedorcontrolledbylocal
governments,andtootherlandandfacilities(includingroads,ports,andairfields).
3. Given the mutuality of benefits, the Parties agree that the Philippines shall make Agreed Locations available to United
States forces without rental or similar costs. United States forces shall cover their necessary operation expenses with
respecttotheiractivitiesattheAgreedLocations.
4. The Philippines hereby grants to the United States, through bilateral security mechanisms, such as the MDB and SEB,
operationalcontrolofAgreedLocationsforconstructionactivitiesandauthoritytoundertakesuchactivitieson,andmake
alterations and improvements to, Agreed Locations. United States forces shall consult on issues regarding such
constructionalterations,andimprovementsontheParties'sharedintentthatthetechnicalrequirementsandconstruction
standards of any such projects undertaken by or on behalf of United States forces should be consistent with the
requirementsandstandardsofbothParties.
....
6. United States forces shall be responsible on the basis of proportionate use for construction, development, operation, and maintenance
costsatAgreedLocations.SpecificfundingarrangementsmaybefinedinImplementingarrangements.(Emphasissupplied)
Parsingtheprovisionscarefully,wefindthattheAgreedLocationsmaybeusedfor:
(1)training
(2)transit
(3)supportandrelatedactivities
(4)refuelingofaircraft
(5)bunkeringofvessels
(6)temporarymaintenanceofvehicles,vessels,andaircraft
(7)temporaryaccommodationofpersonnel
(8)communications
(9)prepositioningofequipment,supplies,andmateriel
(10)deployingforcesandmaterieland
(11)otheractivitiesasthepartiesmayagree.
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Thereisnohierarchyamongtheseactivities.Inotherwords,functions(2)to(11)neednotbesupportiveonlyoftrainingortransit.Function
(10),whichpertainstodeploymentofUnitedStatesforcesandmateriel,canbedoneindependentlyofwhethertherearetrainingexercisesor
whetherthetroopsareonlyintransit.
ThepermissiontodoalltheseactivitiesisexplicitintheEDCA.Governmenthasalreadyauthorizedandagreedthat"UnitedStatesforces,United
Statescontractors,andvehicles,vessels,andaircraftoperatedbyorforUnitedStatesforces"mayconductalltheseactivities.Carefullybreaking
downthisclauseinArticle111(1)oftheEDCA,theauthorizationisalreadygrantedto:
(a)"UnitedStatesforces"
(b)"UnitedStatescontractors"and
(c)"vehicles,vessels,andaircraftoperatedbyorforUnitedStatesforces."
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UnitedStatesmilitaryforceswillnotonlybeallowedto"visitPhilippineterritorytodoatransientmilitarytrainingexercisewiththeirPhilippine
counterparts.Theyarealsoallowedtoexecute,amongothers,thefollowingscenarios:
One:PartsofPhilippineterritorymaybeusedasstagingareasforspecialorregularUnitedStatesmilitarypersonnelforinterventioninconflict
areasintheSoutheastAsianregion.Thiscanbeintheformoflandingrightsgiventotheirfighterjetsandstealthbombersorwaystationsfor
SEALSorotherspecialunitsenteringforeignterritoryinstatesnotofficiallyatwarwiththePhilippines.
Two: Parts of Philippine territory may be used to supplement overt communication systems of the United States forces. For instance,
cyberwarfaretargetingastatehostiletotheUnitedStatescanbelaunchedfromanyoftheAgreedLocationstopursuetheirinterestsevenifthis
willnotaugurwelltoPhilippineforeignpolicy.
Three: Parts of Philippine territory may be used to plan, deploy, and supply covert operations done by United States contractors such as
BlackwaterandothermercenarygroupsthathavebeenusedbytheUnitedStatesinotherpartsoftheworld.TheEDCAcoversthesetypesof
operations within and outside Philippine territory. Again, the consequences to Philippine foreign policy in cases where targets are found in
neighboringcountrieswouldbeimmeasurable.
TheVisitingForcesAgreementdoesnotcoverthesesampleactivities.NordoesitcoverUnitedStatescontractors.
IX
BlanketauthorityoverAgreedLocationsisgrantedunderArticleVI,Section3oftheEDCA.TheUnitedStatesforcesaregivenabroadrangeof
powers with regard to the Agreed Locations that are "necessary for their operational control or defense."51 This authority extends to the
protectionofUnitedStatesforcesandcontractors.Inaddition,theUnitedStatesismerelyobligatedtocoordinatewithPhilippineauthoritiesthe
measurestheywilltakeincasetheydeemitnecessarytotakeaction.
Incontrast,theMutualDefenseTreatyisdifferent.ItisspecifictothemaintenanceanddevelopmentofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStates'
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The parties' goal under the Mutual Defense Treaty is to enhance collective defense
mechanismsforthepreservationofpeaceandsecurityinthePacificarea.52
While certain activities such as "joint RPUS military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall . . .
under the provisions of the RPUS Mutual Defense Treaty,"53 the alleged principles of Defensive Reaction and Defensive Preparation do not
license the ceding of authority and control over specific portions of the Philippines to foreign military forces without compliance with the
Constitutionalrequirements.54SuchgrantofauthorityandcontroloverAgreedLocationstoforeignmilitaryforcesinvolvesadrasticchangein
nationalpolicyandcannotbedoneinamereexecutiveagreement.
Moreover,nothingintheVFAprovidesfortheuseofAgreedLocationstoUnitedStatesforcesorpersonnel,consideringthattheVFAfocuseson
thevisitationofUnitedStatesarmedforcestothePhilippinesinrelationtojointmilitaryexercises:
Preamble
TheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen
internationalandregionalsecurityinthePacificarea
ReaffirmingtheirobligationsundertheMutualDefenseTreatyofAugust30,1951
Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security
interests
RecognizingthedesirabilityofdefiningthetreatmentofUnitedStatespersonnelvisitingtheRepublicofthePhilippines!.]
(Emphasissupplied)
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InLim,theTermsofReference55ofthe"Balikatan021"jointmilitaryexercisesiscoveredbytheVFA.Hence,undertheVFA,activitiessuchas
joint exercises, which "include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea searchand
rescueoperationstoassistvesselsindistress,disasterreliefoperations,civicactionprojectssuchasthebuildingofschoolhouses,medicaland
humanitarianmissions,andthelike,"56areauthorized.However,Limspecificallyprovidedforthecontextoftheconductofthecombatrelated
activitiesundertheVFA:PresidentGeorgeW.Bush'sinternationalantiterrorismcampaignasaresultoftheeventsonSeptember11,2001.57
Meanwhile,theEDCAundulyexpandsthescopeofauthorizedactivitiestoAgreedLocationswithonlyavaguereferencetotheVFA:
ArticleI
PurposeandScope
1. This Agreement deepens defense cooperation between the Parties and maintains and develops their individual and collective
capacities,infurtheranceofArticleIIoftheMDT,whichstatesthat"thePartiesseparatelyandjointlybyselfhelpandmutualaid
willmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualcapacitytoresistarmedattack,andwithinthecontextofVFA.Thisincludes:
(a) Supporting the Parties' shared goal of improving interoperability of the Parties' forces, and for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines("AFP"),addressingshorttermcapabilitiesgaps,promotinglongtermmodernization,andhelpingmaintainanddevelop
additionalmaritimesecurity,maritimedomainawareness,andhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefcapabilitiesand
(b) Authorizing access to Agreed Locations in the territory of the Philippines by United States forces on a rotational basis, as
2. In furtherance of the MDT, the Parties mutually agree that this Agreement provides the principal provisions and necessary
authorizationswithrespecttoAgreedLocations.
3. The Parties agree that the United States may undertake the following types of activities in the territory of the Philippines in
relation to its access to and use of Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises joint and combined training activities
humanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefactivitiesandsuchotheractivitiesasmaybeagreeduponbytheParties.(Emphasis
supplied)
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The VFA was ratified in 1998. However, in 2011, the Obama Administration announced its plan of intensifying its presence in the AsiaPacific
region.58 The United States hinges this pivot on maritime peace and security in the region in relation to a stable international economic
order.59Hence, their Department of Defense enumerates three maritime objectives: "to safeguard the freedom of the seas deter conflict and
coercionandpromoteadherencetointernationallawandstandards."60
To achieve these objectives, the United States conducts operations, exercises, and training with several countries it considers allies in the
region.61Nevertheless,keytotheUnitedStates'militarystrategyistheenhancementofitsforwardpresenceintheAsiaPacific:
ForcePosture
OneofthemostimportanteffortstheDepartmentofDefensehasunderwayistoenhanceourforwardpresencebybringingour
finestcapabilities,assets,andpeopletotheAsiaPacificregion.TheU.S.militarypresencehasunderwrittensecurityandstability
intheAsiaPacificregionformorethan60years.Ourforwardpresencenotonlyservestodeterregionalconflictandcoercion,it
also allows us to respond rapidly to maritime crises. Working in concert with regional allies and partners enables us to respond
moreeffectivelytothesecrises.
TheUnitedStatesmaintains368,000militarypersonnelintheAsiaPacificregion,ofwhichapproximately97,000arewestofthe
InternationalDateLine.Overthenextfiveyears,theU.S.NavywillincreasethenumberofshipsassignedtoPacificFleetoutside
of U.S. territory by approximately 30 percent, greatly improving our ability to maintain a more regular and persistent maritime
presence in the Pacific. And by 2020, 60 percent of naval and overseas air assets will be homeported in the Pacific region. The
DepartmentwillalsoenhanceMarineCorpspresencebydevelopingamoredistributedandsustainablelaydownmodel.
Enhancing our forward presence also involves using existing assets in new ways, across the entire region, with an emphasis on
operational flexibility and maximizing the value of U.S. assets despite the tyranny of distance. This is why the Department is
workingtodevelopamoredistributed,resilient,andsustainableposture.Aspartofthiseffort,theUnitedStateswillmaintainits
presenceinNortheastAsia,whileenhancingdefensepostureacrosstheWesternPacific,SoutheastAsia,andtheIndianOcean.
....
InSoutheastAsia,theDepartmentishoninganalreadyrobustbilateralexerciseprogramwithourtreatyally,theRepublicofthe
Philippines,toassistitwithestablishingaminimumcredibledefensemoreeffectively.Weareconductingmorethan400planned
events with the Philippines in 2015, including our premier joint exercise, Balikatan, which this year was the largest and most
sophisticated ever. During this year's Balikatan, more than 15,000 U.S., Philippine, and Australian military personnel exercised
operationsinvolvingaterritorialdefensescenariointheSuluSea,withpersonnelfromJapanobserving.62(Emphasissupplied)
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ThesechangesinUnitedStatespolicyarereflectedintheEDCAandnotintheVFA.Thus,thereisasubstantialchangeofobjectives.
If,indeed,thegoalisonlytoenhancemutualdefensecapabilitiesundertheMutualDefenseTreatythroughconductofjointmilitaryexercises
authorized by the VFA, then it behooves this court to ask the purpose of providing control and authority over Agreed Locations here in the
PhilippineswhenitisoutsidethecoverageofboththeMutualDefenseTreatyandtheVFA.ThroughavaguereferencetotheVFA,respondents
failtoestablishhowtheEDCAmerelyimplementstheVFA.TheycannotclaimthattheprovisionsoftheEDCAmerelymakeuseoftheauthority
previouslygrantedundertheVFA.WhatisclearisthattheAgreedLocationsbecomeaplatformfortheUnitedStatestoexecuteitsnewmilitary
strategyandstrengthenitspresenceintheAsiaPacific,whichisclearlyoutsidethecoverageoftheVFA.
In addition, the EDCA does not merely implement the Mutual Defense Treaty and VFA when it provides for the entry of United States private
contractorsintothePhilippines.
IntheEDCA,UnitedStatescontractorsaredefinedasfollows:
3."UnitedStatescontractors"meanscompaniesandfirms,andtheiremployees,undercontractorsubcontracttooronbehalfof
the United States Department of Defense. United States contractors are not included as part of the definition ofUnited States
personnelinthisAgreement,includingwithinthecontextoftheVFA.63(Emphasissupplied)
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This definition admits that the VFA does not provide for the entry of contractors into Philippine territory. The activities that United States
contractorsareallowedtoundertakearespecifictoUnitedStatesforcesorpersonnelonlyascanbegleanedfromthiscourt'sdecisionsinBayan,
Lim,andNicolas.Hence,theextensiveauthoritygrantedtoUnitedStatescontractorscannotbesourcedfromtheVFA:
ArticleII
DEFINITIONS
....
4. "Agreed Locations" means facilities and areas that are provided by the Government of the Philippines through the AFP and
that United States forces, United States contractors, and others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access and use
pursuant to this Agreement. Such Agreed Locations may be listed in an annex to be appended to this Agreement, and may be
furtherdescribedinimplementingarrangements.
ArticleIII
AGREEDLOCATIONS
1. With consideration of the views of the Parties, the Philippines hereby authorizes and agrees thatUnited States forces, United
Statescontractors,andvehicles,vessels,andaircraftoperatedbyorforUnitedStatesforcesmayconductthefollowingactivities
with respect to Agreed Locations: training transit support and related activities refuel big of aircraft bunkering Of vessels
temporarymaintenanceofvehicles,vessels,andaircrafttemporaryaccommodationofpersonnelcommunicationsprepositioning
ofequipment,supplies,andmaterieldeployingforcesandmaterielandsuchotheractivitiesasthePartiesmayagree.
....
ArticleIV
EQUIPMENT,SUPPLIES,ANDMATERIEL
....
4.UnitedStatesforcesandUnitedStatescontractorsshallhaveunimpededaccesstoAgreedLocationsforallmattersrelatingto
the prepositioning and storage of defense equipment, supplies, and materiel, including delivery, management, inspection, use,
maintenance,andremovalofsuchequipment,suppliesandmateriel.
5. The Parties share an intent thatUnited States contractors may carry out such matters in accordance with, and to the extent
permissibleunder,UnitedStateslaws,regulations,andpolicies.(Emphasissupplied)
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Respondents,throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,insistthattheEDCAisanimplementingagreementoftheMutualDefenseTreatyand
the VFA. They do so based on the conclusion that all treaties or agreements entered into by the Philippines pursuant to certain principles
containedintheMutualDefenseTreatymaybeconsideredsubservienttothesetreaties.ThiswillsubstantiallyweakenthespiritofArticleXVIII,
Section25andthesovereigndesiretoachieveanindependentforeignpolicy.
X
The EDCA authorizes the use of Philippine territory as bases of operations. Although not as permanent as those set up pursuant to the 1947
MilitaryBasesAgreement,theyarestillforeignmilitarybaseswithinthecontemplationofArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitution.
The development and use of these Agreed Locations are clearly within the discretion of the United States. The retention of ownership by the
PhilippinesunderArticleV(l)64oftheEDCAdoesnottemperthewidelatitudeaccordedtotheothercontractingparty.Atbest,theUnitedStates'
onlyobligationistoconsultandcoordinatewithourgovernment.UndertheEDCA,theconsentofthePhilippinegovernmentdoesnotextendto
the operations and activities to be conducted by the United States forces and contractors. Operational control remains solely with the United
States government. The agreement did not create a distinction between domestic and international operations. Ownership of the Agreed
LocationsundertheEDCAisadilutedconcept,withthePhilippinegovernmentdevoidofanyauthoritytosettheparametersforwhatmayand
maynotbeconductedwithintheconfinesoftheseareas.
What constitutes a "base" in the context of United StatesPhilippine relations may be explored by revisiting the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement.65Inoneoftheagreement'spreambularclauses,theUnitedStatesandPhilippinegovernmentsagreedthatinlinewithcooperation
andcommondefense,theUnitedStatesshallbegrantedtheuseofcertainlandsofthepublicdomaininthePhilippines,freeofrent.66Inline
with the promotion of mutual security and territorial defense, the extent of rights of the contracting parties in the use of these lands was
describedinArticleIIIoftheagreement:
ArticleIII
Descriptionofrights
1.ItismutuallyagreedthattheUnitedStatesshallhavetherights,powerandauthoritywithinthebaseswhicharenecessaryfor
theestablishment,use,operationanddefensethereoforappropriateforthecontrolthereofandalltherights,powerandauthority
within the limits of territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide
accesstothem,orappropriatefortheircontrol.
2.Suchrights,powerandauthorityshallinclude,interalia,theright,powerandauthority:
a)toconstruct(includingdredgingandfilling),operate,maintain,utilize,occupy,garrisonandcontrolthebases
b) to improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances and anchorages, and to construct or maintain necessary roads and
c)tocontrol(includingtherighttoprohibit)insofarasmayberequiredfortheefficientoperationandsafetyofthebases,and
withinthelimitsofmilitarynecessity,anchorages,moorings,landings,takeoffs,movementsandoperationofshipsandwaterborne
craft,aircraftandothervehiclesonwater,intheairoronlandcomprisingorinthevicinityofthebases
d)therighttoacquire,asmaybeagreedbetweenthetwoGovernments,suchrightsofway,andtoconstructthereon,asmaybe
requiredformilitarypurposes,wireandradiocommunicationsfacilities,includingsubmarineandsubterraneancables,pipelines
and spur tracks from railroads to bases, and the right, as may be agreed upon between the two Governments to construct the
necessaryfacilities
e)toconstruct,install,maintain,andemployonanybaseanytypeoffacilities,weapons,substance,device,vesselorvehicleonor
undertheground,intheairoronorunderthewaterthatmayberequisiteorappropriate,includingmeteorologicalsystems,aerial
and water navigation lights, radio and radar apparatus and electronic devices, of any desired power, type of emission and
frequency.
3.Intheexerciseoftheabovementionedrights,powerandauthority,theUnitedStatesagreesthatthepowersgrantedtoitwill
notbeusedunreasonablyor,unlessrequiredbymilitarynecessitydeterminedbythetwoGovernments,soastointerferewiththe
necessary rights of navigation, aviation, communication, or land travel within the territories of the Philippines. In the practical
application outside the bases of the rights, power and authority granted in this Article there shall be, as the occasion requires,
consultationbetweenthetwoGovernments.(Emphasissupplied)
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The bases contemplated by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement contain the elements of (a) absolute control of space (b) the presence of a
foreigncommandand(c)havingapurposeofamilitarynature.TheagreementalsorelegatestheroleofthePhilippinegovernmenttoamere
"consultant"incasesofapplicationsfallingoutsidethetermsprovidedinArticleIII.
TheEDCAcontainssimilarelements.
However,theEDCAhasanopenendedduration.Despitehavinganinitialtermof10years,ArticleXII(4)specificallyprovidesfortheautomatic
continuationoftheagreement'seffectivityuntilapartycommunicatesitsintenttoterminate.67
ThepurposeoftheAgreedLocationsisalsoopenended.Atbest,itsdefinitionanddescriptionofrightsprovidethattheareasshallbefortheuse
ofUnitedStatesforcesandcontractors.However,shortofreferringtoAgreedLocationsasbases,theEDCAenumeratesactivitiesthattendtobe
militaryinnature,suchasbunkeringofvessels,prepositioningofequipment,supplies,andmateriel,anddeployingforcesandmateriel.68The
UnitedStatesisalsoallowedtoundertaketheconstructionofpermanentfacilities,69aswellastouseutilitiesanditsowntelecommunications
systems.70
MostsignificantisthePhilippinegovernment'sgranttotheUnitedStatesgovernmentofoperationalcontrolovertheAgreedLocations:71
ArticleVI
Security
....
3. United States forces are authorized to exercise all rights and authorities within Agreed Locations that are necessary for their
operational control or defense, including taking appropriate measures to protect United States forces and United States
contractors.TheUnitedStatesshouldcoordinatesuchmeasureswithappropriateauthoritiesofthePhilippines.
4. The Parties shall take all reasonable measures to ensure the protection, safety, and security of United States property from
seizure by or conversion to the use of any party other than the United States, without the prior written consent of the United
States.(Citationomitted)
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TheUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms72defines"operationalcontrol"as:
[Operational control The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplishthemission.AlsocalledOPCON.
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Similartothe1947MilitaryBasesAgreement,theroleofthePhilippinegovernmenthasbeenreducedtothatofaconsultant,exceptthatthe
EDCAavoidedtheuseofthislabel.
Insomerespects,too,theEDCAissimilartotheTreatyofFriendship,CooperationandSecuritybetweentheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, which was rejected by the Philippine Senate in 1991. This rejected
treaty73definesinstallationsas:
"Installations" on the base authorized for use by the United States forces are buildings and structures to include nonremovable
buildings,structures,andequipmentthereinownedbytheGovernmentofthePhilippines,grounds,landorseaareasspecifically
delineated for the purpose. "Nonremovable buildings and structures" refer to buildings, structures, and other improvements
permanentlyaffixedtotheground,andsuchequipment,includingessentialutilitysystemssuchasenergyandwaterproduction
anddistributionsystemsandheatingandairconditioningsystemsthatareanintegralpartofsuchbuildingsandstructures,which
are essential to the habitability and general use of such improvements and are permanently attached to or integrated into the
property.
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The treaty, which was not concurred in by the Senate, sets the parameters for defense cooperation and the use of installations in several
provisions:
ArticleIV
UseofInstallationsbytheUSForces
1.SubjecttotheprovisionsofthisAgreement,theGovernmentofthePhilippinesauthorizestheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates
tocontinuetouseformilitarypurposescertaininstallationsinSubicNavalBase.
2. The installations shall be used solely for the purposes authorized under this Agreement, and such other purposes as may be
mutuallyagreedupon
3.OwnershipofallexistingnonremovablebuildingsandstructuresinSubicNavalBaseiswiththeGovernmentofthePhilippines
which has title over them. The Government of the Philippines shall also become owner of all nonremovable buildings and
structures that shall henceforth be constructed in Subic Naval Base immediately after their completion, with title thereto being
vestedwiththeGovernmentofthePhilippines.
4.TheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesshallnotremove,relocate,demolish,reconstructorundertakemajorexternalalterations
of nonremovable buildings and structures in Subic Naval Base without the approval of the Philippine commander. The United
States shall also not construct any removable or nonremovable buildings or structures without the approval of the Philippine
Commander.ThePhilippineCommanderwillgrantsuchapprovalforreasonsofsafetyasdeterminedjointlybythePhilippineand
UnitedStatesCommanders
....
8.TheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesshallbearcostsofoperationsandmaintenanceoftheinstallationsauthorizedforusein
accordancewithAnnexBtothisAgreement.
9. The Government of the Philippines will, upon request, assist the United States authorities in obtaining water, electricity,
telephoneandotherutilities.SuchutilitiesshallbeprovidedtotheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,UnitedStatescontractorsand
United States personnel for activities under this Agreement at the rates, terms and conditions not less favorable than those
availabletothemilitaryforcesofthePhilippinegovernment,andfreeofduties,taxes,andothercharges.
ArticleVIIDefenseCooperationandUseofPhilippineInstallations
1. Recognizing that cooperation in the areas of defense and security serves their mutual interest and contributes to the
maintenance of peace, and reaffirming their existing defense relationship, the two Governments shall pursue their common
concernsindefenseandsecurity.
2.ThetwoGovernmentsrecognizetheneedtoreadjusttheirdefenseandsecurityrelationshiptorespondtoexistingrealitiesin
the national, regional, and global environment. To this end, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines allows the
GovernmentoftheUnitedStatestouseinstallationsinSubicNavalBaseforaspecifiedperiod,underspecificconditionssetforth
in Supplementary Agreement Number Two: Agreement on Installations and Military Operating Procedures and Supplementary
AgreementNumberThree:AgreementontheStatusofForces.
3.Bothgovernmentsshallalsocooperateinthemaintenance,upgradingandmodernizationofthedefenseandsecuritycapabilities
of the armed forces of both countries, particularly of those of the Republic of the Philippines. In accordance with the common
desire of the Parties to improve their defense relationship through balanced, mutual contributions to their common defense, the
GovernmentoftheUnitedStatesshall,subjecttotheconstitutionalproceduresandtoUnitedStatesCongressionalaction,provide
securityassistancetotheGovernmentofthePhilippinestoassistinthemodernizationandenhancementofthecapabilitiesofthe
ArmedForcesofthePhilippinesandtosupportappropriateeconomicprograms.
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The 1987 Constitution does not proscribe the establishment of permanent or temporary foreign military bases. However, the Constitution now
requiresthatdecisionsonthepresenceofforeignmilitarybases,troops,andfacilitiesbenotthesoleprerogativeofthePresidentandcertainly
nottheprerogativeatalloftheSecretaryofDefenseorPhilippineRepresentativestotheMutualDefenseBoardandtheSecurityEnhancement
Board.
AbsentanytransmissionbythePresidenttotheSenate,theEDCAremainsaformalofficialmemorialoftheresultsofintensivenegotiationsonly.
Ithasnolegaleffectwhatsoever,andanyimplementationatthisstagewillbegraveabuseofdiscretion.
XI
Thus,theEDCAamendstheVFA.SincetheVFAisatreaty,theEDCAcannotbeimplemented.
Treaties,beingofthesamestatusasthatofmunicipallaw,maybemodifiedeitherbyanotherstatuteorbytheConstitutionitself.74Treaties
suchastheVFAcannotbeamendedbyanexecutiveagreement.
XII
Petitionersinvokethiscourt'spowerofjudicialreviewtodeterminewhetherrespondentsfromtheExecutiveBranchexceededtheirpowersand
prerogativesinenteringintothisagreementonbehalfofthePhilippines"inutterdisregardofthenationalsovereignty,territorialintegrityand
nationalinterestprovisionoftheConstitution,Section25oftheTransitoryprovisionsoftheConstitution,Section21andotherprovisionsofthe
PhilippineConstitutionandvariousPhilippinelawsandprinciplesofinternationallaw."75
Petitionerssubmitthatallrequisitesforthiscourttoexerciseitspowerofjudicialreviewarepresent.76PetitionersinG.R.No.212444discussed
that they had legal standing and they raised justiciable issues. Petitioners in G.R. No. 212426 similarly discussed their legal standing, the
existenceofanactualcaseorcontroversyinvolvingaconflictoflegalrights,andtheripenessofthecaseforadjudication.77
Respondents counter that only the Senate may sue on matters involving constitutional prerogatives, and none of the petitioners are
Senators.78 They submit that "[t]he silence and active nonparticipation of the Senate in the current proceedings is an affirmation of the
President's characterization of the EDCA as an executive agreement,"79and "there is no such actual conflict between the Executive and the
Senate."80Theyaddthattheoveruseofthetranscendentalimportanceexception"hascheapenedthevalueoftheConstitution'ssafeguardsto
adjudication."81
ArticleVIII,Section1oftheConstitutionnowclarifiestheextentofthiscourt'spowerofjudicialreview"todeterminewhetherornottherehas
beenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment."82
The1936landmarkcaseofAngarav.ElectoralCommission83explained the fundamental principle of separation of powers among government
branchesandthiscourt'sdutytomediateintheallocationoftheirconstitutionalboundaries:
Intimesofsocialdisquietudeorpoliticalexcitement,thegreatlandmarksoftheConstitutionareapttobeforgottenormarred,if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determinetheproperallocationofpowersbetweentheseveraldepartmentsandamongtheintegralorconstituentunitsthereof.
...TheConstitutionsetsforthinnouncertainlanguagetherestrictionsandlimitationsupongovernmentalpowersandagencies.
IftheserestrictionsandlimitationsaretranscendeditwouldbeinconceivableiftheConstitutionhadnotprovidedforamechanism
by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly,thelimitationandrestrictionsembodiedinourConstitutionarerealastheyshouldbeinanylivingconstitution....
TheConstitutionisadefinitionofthepowersofgovernment...TheConstitutionitselfhasprovidedfortheinstrumentalityofthe
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemnandsacredobligationassignedtoitbytheConstitutiontodetermineconflictingclaimsofauthorityundertheConstitution
andtoestablishforthepartiesinanactualcontroversytherightswhichthatinstrumentsecuresandguaranteestothem.Thisisin
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very Us mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.Narrowedasitsfunctionisinthismanner,thejudiciarydoesnotpassuponquestionsofwisdom,justiceorexpediency
of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislativedepartmentsofthegovernmentsofthegovernment.84
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Jurisprudenceaboundsonthesefourrequisitesfortheexerciseofjudicialreview.Itmustbeshownthatanactualcaseorcontroversyexists
that petitioners have legal standing that they raised the constitutionality question at the earliest possible opportunity and that the
constitutionalityquestionistheverylismotaofthecase.85
Thiscourtcanonlyexerciseitspowerofjudicialreviewafterdeterminingthepresenceofallrequisites,suchasanactualcaseorcontroversy,in
considerationofthedoctrineofseparationofpowers.Itcannotissueadvisoryopinionsnoroverstepintothereviewofthepolicybehindactions
bythetwoothercoequalbranchesofgovernment.Itcannotassumejurisdictionoverpoliticalquestions.
XIII
Therequirementforanactualcaseorcontroversyacknowledgesthatcourtsshouldrefrainfromrenderingadvisoryopinionsconcerningactions
bytheotherbranchesofgovernment.86
Courtsresolveissuesresultingfromadversarialpositionsbasedonexistingfactsestablishedbythepartieswhoseekthecourt'sapplicationor
interpretation of a legal provision that affects them.87It is not for this court to trigger or reenact the political debates that resulted in the
enactmentoflawsafterconsideringbroadlyconstruedfactualcircumstancestoallowageneralapplicationbytheExecutive.88
The requisite actual case or controversy means the existence of "a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicialresolutionthecasemustnotbemootoracademicorbasedonextralegalorothersimilarconsiderationsnotcognizablebyacourtof
justice."89Itmeansthepleadingsshow"anactiveantagonisticassertionofalegalright,ontheonehand,andadenialthereofontheotherthat
is,itmustconcernarealandnotamerelytheoreticalquestionorissue."90
Thus,itisnotthiscourt'sdutyto"ruleonabstractandspeculativeissuesbarrenofactualfacts."91Rulingonabstractcasespresentsthedanger
offoreclosinglitigationbetweenrealparties,andrenderingadvisoryopinionspresentsthedangerofacourtthatsubstitutesitsownimagination
andpredictsfacts,acts,oreventsthatmayormaynothappen.92Factsbasedonjudicialproofmustframethecourt'sdiscretion,93as"[r]igorin
determiningwhethercontroversiesbroughtbeforeusarejusticiableavoidsthecountermajoritariandifficultiesattributedtothejudiciary."94
Abstract cases include those where another political department has yet to act. In other words, a case not ripe for adjudication is not yet a
concretecase.
RepublicofthePhilippinesv.Roque95clarifiedtheconceptofhavinganactualcaseorcontroversyandtheaspectofripeness:
Pertinently,ajusticiablecontroversyreferstoanexistingcaseorcontroversythatisappropriateorripeforjudicialdetermination,
not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued
factsmaybedispensedwith,butthatadisputemaybetriedatitsinceptionbeforeithasaccumulatedtheasperity,distemper,
animosity,passion,andviolenceofafullblownbattlethatloomsahead.Theconceptdescribesastateoffactsindicatingimminent
andinevitablelitigationprovidedthattheissueisnotsettledandstabilizedbytranquilizingdeclaration.
Aperusalofprivaterespondents'petitionfordeclaratoryreliefwouldshowthattheyhavefailedtodemonstratehowtheyareleft
tosustainorareinimmediatedangertosustainsomedirectinjuryasaresultoftheenforcementoftheassailedprovisionsofRA
9372.NotfarremovedfromthefactualmilieuintheSouthernHemispherecases,privaterespondentsonlyassertgeneralinterests
as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law
wouldremainuntrammelled.Astheirpetitionwoulddisclose,privaterespondents'fearofprosecutionwassolelybasedonremarks
of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however failed to show how these remarks
tendedtowardsanyprosecutorialorgovernmentalactiongearedtowardstheimplementationofRA9372againstthem.Inother
words,therewasnoparticular,realorimminentthreattoanyofthemAsheldinSouthernHemisphere:
Withoutanyjusticiablecontroversy,thepetitionshavebecomepleasfordeclaratoryrelief,overwhichtheCourthas
no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency" where both the
activitythepetitionersintendtoundertakeandtheanticipatedreactiontoitofapublicofficialaremerelytheorized,
liebeyondjudicialreviewforlackofripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the
realmofthesurrealandmerelyimagined.SuchpossibilityisnotpeculiartoRA9372sincetheexerciseofanypower
grantedbylawmaybeabused.Allegationsofabusemustbeanchoredonrealeventsbeforecourtsmaystepinto
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.96 (Emphasis supplied,
citationsomitted)
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Ourcourtsgenerallytreattheissueofripenessforadjudicationintermsofactualinjurytotheplaintiff.97Thequestioniswhether"theactbeing
challengedhashadadirectadverseeffectontheindividualchallengingit."98ThePetitionsarepremature.SincetheSenatehasyettoactand
thePresidenthasyettotransmittotheSenate,thereisnorightthathasbeenviolatedasyet.
XIV
Thereisstillapoliticalactthatmusthappenbeforetheagreementcanbecomevalidandbinding.TheSenatecanstilladdresstheconstitutional
challengeswithrespecttothecontentsoftheEDCA.Thus,thechallengestothesubstantivecontentoftheEDCAare,atpresent,inthenatureof
politicalquestions.
However,thenatureoftheEDCA,whetheritisatreatyormerelyanexecutiveagreement,isripeforadjudication.
In1957,Taadav.Cuenco99explainedtheconceptofpoliticalquestionsasreferringtoissuesthatdependnotonthelegalityofameasurebut
onthewisdombehindit:
Asalreadyadvertedto,theobjectiontoourjurisdictionhingesonthequestionwhethertheissuebeforeusispoliticalornot.In
thisconnection,Willoughbylucidlystates:
"Elsewhere in this treatise the wellknown and wellestablished principle is considered that it is not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where,
therefore,discretionarypowersaregrantedbytheConstitutionorbystatute,themannerinwhichthosepowersare
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to
theexistenceandextentofthesediscretionarypowers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of
public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the
legislaturetoviolateconstitutionalprovisions,ortheexecutivetoexerciseauthoritynotgrantedhimby
the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or
together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations,
togetherwiththeconsequencesthatflowtherefrom,maynotbetraversedinthecourts."
TothesameeffectisthelanguageusedinCorpusJurisSecundum,fromwhichwequote:
"Itiswellsettleddoctrinethatpoliticalquestionsarenotwithintheprovinceofthejudiciary,excepttotheextent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions.
"Itisnoteasy,however,todefinethephrase'politicalquestion',nortodeterminewhatmattersfallwithinitsscope.
Itisfrequentlyusedtodesignateallquestionsthattheoutsidethescopeofthejudicialquestions,whichunderthe
constitution, are to bedecided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authorityhasbeendelegatedtothelegislativeorexecutivebranchofthegovernment."
Thus,ithasbeenrepeatedlyheldthatthequestionwhethercertainamendmentstotheConstitutionareinvalidfornoncompliance
withtheprocedurethereinprescribed,isnotapoliticaloneandmaybesettledbytheCourts.
InthecaseofInreMcConaughy,thenatureofpoliticalquestionwasconsideredcarefully.TheCourtsaid:
"Atthethresholdofthecasewearemetwiththeassertionthatthequestionsinvolvedarepolitical,andnotjudicial.
If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final,
regardlessoftheactualvoteupontheamendment.Thequestionthusraisedisafundamentalonebutithasbeen
sooftendecidedcontrarytotheviewcontendedforbytheAttorneyGeneralthatitwouldseem,tobefinallysettled.
...Whatisgenerallymeant,whenitissaidthataquestionispolitical,andnotjudicial,isthatitisamatterwhich
is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegatedtosomeotherdepartmentorparticularofficerofthegovernment,withdiscretionarypowerto
act. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely
becausethey involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution
delegatedtotheLegislature.TheGovernormayexercisethepowersdelegatedtohim,freefromjudicialcontrol,so
long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be
controllable,notprimarilybecausetheyareofapoliticalnature,butbecausetheConstitutionandlawshaveplaced
the particular matter under his control.But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to
law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as
throughtheexecutiveortheLegislature.Onedepartmentisjustasrepresentativeastheother,andthejudiciaryis
thedepartmentwhichischargedwiththespecialdutyofdeterminingthelimitationswhichthelawplacesuponall
officialaction.Therecognitionofthisprinciple,unknownexceptinGreatBritainandAmerica,isnecessary,to'the
endthatthegovernmentmaybeoneoflawsandnotmen'wordswhichWebstersaidwerethegreatestcontained
inanywrittenconstitutionaldocument."
Inshort,theterm"politicalquestion"connotes,inlegalparlance,whatitmeansinordinaryparlance,namely,aquestionofpolicy.
Inotherwords,inthelanguageofCorpusJurisSecundum(supra),itrefersto"thosequestionswhich,undertheConstitution,are
tobedecidedbythepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity,orinregardtowhichfulldiscretionaryauthorityhasbeendelegatedtothe
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particularmeasure.100(Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
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Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives101involvedthesecondimpeachmentComplaintfiledagainstformerChiefJusticeHilarioDavidebeforethe
HouseofRepresentativesandraisedtheissueofwhetherthisraisedapoliticalquestion.Ittracedtheevolutionofjurisprudenceonthepolitical
questiondoctrineandtheeffectofthiscourt'sexpandedpowerofjudicialreviewunderthepresentConstitutiononthisdoctrine:
AspointedoutbyamicuscuriaeformerdeanPacificoAgabinoftheUPCollegeofLaw,thisCourthasinfactinanumberofcases
takenjurisdictionoverquestionswhicharenottrulypoliticalfollowingtheeffectivityofthepresentConstitution.
InMarcosv.Manglapus,thisCourt,speakingthroughMadameJusticeIreneCortes,held:
ThepresentConstitutionlimitsresorttothepoliticalquestiondoctrineandbroadensthescopeofjudicialinquiryinto
areaswhichtheCourt,underpreviousconstitutions,wouldhavenormallylefttothepoliticaldepartmentstodecide.
...
InBengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee,throughJusticeTeodoroPadilla,thisCourtdeclared:
The"allocationofconstitutionalboundaries"isataskthatthisCourtmustperformundertheConstitution.Moreover,
asheldinarecentcase,(t)hepoliticalquestiondoctrineneitherinterposesanobstacletojudicialdeterminationof
therivalclaims.ThejurisdictiontodelimitconstitutionalboundarieshasbeengiventothisCourt.Itcannotabdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicabilityoftheprincipleinappropriatecases.
AndinDazav.Singson,speakingthroughJusticeIsaganiCruz,thisCourtruled:
Inthecasenowbeforeus,thejurisdictionalobjectionbecomesevenlesstenableanddecisive.Thereasonisthat,
evenifweweretoassumethattheissuepresentedbeforeuswaspoliticalinnature,wewouldstillnotbeprecluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
politicalquestion....
....
Inourjurisdiction,thedeterminationofatrulypoliticalquestionfromanonjusticiablepoliticalquestionliesintheanswertothe
questionofwhetherthereareconstitutionallyimposedlimitsonpowersorfunctionsconferreduponpoliticalbodies.If
there are, then our courts are dutybound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properlyactedwithinsuchlimits[.]102(Emphasissupplied)
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InDiocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC,103this court held that the political question doctrine never precludes this court's exercise of its power of
judicialreviewwhentheactofaconstitutionalbodyinfringesuponafundamentalindividualorcollectiveright.104However,thiswillonlybetrue
ifthereisnootherconstitutionalbodytowhomthediscretiontomakeinquiryispreliminarilygrantedbythesovereign.
RulingonthechallengetothecontentoftheEDCAwillprecludeandinterferewithanyfutureactiononthepartoftheSenateasitinquiresinto
anddeliberatesastowhetheritshouldgiveitsconcurrencetotheagreementorwhetheritshouldadvisethePresidenttoreopennegotiationsto
amend some of its provisions. It is the Senate, through Article VII, Section 21 in relation to Article XVIII, Section 25, that was given the
discretion to make this initial inquiry exclusive of all other constitutional bodies, including this court. A policy of deference and respect for the
allocation of such power by the sovereign to a legislative chamber requires that we refrain from making clear and categorical rulings on the
constitutionalchallengestothecontentoftheEDCA.
XV
Itistruethatwehave,oncertainoccasions,substantiallyoverriddentherequirementsofjusticiabilitywhenthereisanimminentthreattothe
violationofconstitutionalrights.InGarciav.Drilon,105Istatedthat:
IamawareofourprecedentswherethisCourthaswaivedquestionsrelatingtothejusticiabilityoftheconstitutionalissuesraised
when they have "transcendental importance" to the public. In my view, this accommodates our power to promulgate guidance
"concerningtheprotectionandenforcementofconstitutionalrights."Wechoosetorulesquarelyontheconstitutionalissuesina
petition wanting all or some of the technical requisites to meet out general doctrines on justiciability but raising clear conditions
showing imminent threat to fundamental rights. The imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional
rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. In a sense, our exceptional doctrine relating to constitutional issues of
"transcendental importance" prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for
substantialprotection.106(Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
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There is, however, no need to invoke these exceptions. The imminence of the implementation of the EDCA and, therefore, the clarity of the
impending threat to constitutional rights do not appear cogent if we declare that the EDCA, without Senate concurrence, is not yet valid and
bindingasatreatyorfullycomplyingwiththerequirementsofArticleXVIII,Section25.
XVI
TheproposeddispositionofthiscasedoesnotinanywaydiscountthedeploymentoftheexpertiseoftheExecutiveasitconductsforeignpolicy.
NorshouldwearrogateexecutivediscretionbycompellingthePresidenttotransmittheagreementtotheSenateforconcurrence.107
Nevertheless, the judiciary has the duty to ensure that the acts of all branches of government comply with the fundamental nature of the
Constitution.108WhiletheEDCAisaformalandofficialmemorialoftheresultsofnegotiationsbetweenthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStates,itis
notyeteffectiveuntiltheSenateconcursorthereiscompliancewithCongressionalactiontosubmittheagreementtoanationalreferendumin
accordancewithArticleXVIII,Section25oftheConstitution.
It is, thus, now up to the President. Should he desire to continue the policy embedded in the EDCA, with deliberate dispatch he can certainly
transmit the agreement to the Senate for the latter to initiate the process to concur with the agreement. After all, on these matters, the
sovereign,speakingthroughtheConstitution,hasassumedthattheexerciseofwisdomisnotwithinthesoledomainofthePresident.Wisdom,
inallowingforeignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilities,islikewisewithintheprovinceofnationallyelectedSenatorsoftheRepublic.
Onthesematters,theConstitutionrightlyassumesthatnoonepersonbecauseoftheexigenciesandtheirconsequenceshasamonopolyof
wisdom.
Inmyview,thesamesecurityconcernsthatmovedthePresidentwithhastetoratifytheEDCAsignedbyhisSecretaryofDefensewillbethe
same security concernsand morethat will move the Senate to consider the agreement with dispatch. There are matters of national
consequencewheretheviewsofanelectedPresidentcanbeenrichedbytheviewsofanelectedSenate.Certainly,theparticipationofthepublic
throughthesemechanismsisascriticalastheforeignpolicydirectionsthattheEDCAframes.
By abbreviating the constitutional process, this court makes itself vulnerable to a reasonable impression that we do not have the courage to
enforce every word, phrase, and punctuation in the Constitution promulgated by our People. We will stand weak, as an institution and by
implication as a state, in the community of nations. In clear unequivocal words, the basic instrument through which we exist requires that we
interpret its words to make real an independent foreign policy. It requires measures be fully publicly discussed before any foreign resource
capable of making war with our neighbors and at the command of a foreign sovereignforeign military bases, troops and facilitiesbecomes
effective.
Instead,themajoritysuccumbedtoanarrativeofdependencetoasuperpower.
Ourcollectivememoriesareperilouslyshort.Oursenseofhistoryiswanting.
TheAmericansdidnotrecognizetheDeclarationofIndependenceof1898,whichwasmadepossiblebythebloodofourancestors.Theyignored
their agreements with the Filipino revolutionaries when they entered Intramuros and staged the surrender of the Spanish colonizers to them.
TheyignoredourpoliticianswhentheynegotiatedtheTreatyofParis.NotasingleFilipinowastherenotevenasanobserver.Theytriggered
armedconflictwiththeFilipinorevolutionaries.Theschoolstheyputupattemptedtoblockouttheinhumanityandbarbarismintheconflictthat
followed.OnlyafewrememberthemassacresofSamar,ofBudDajo,andofotherplacesinourcountry.InthememoryofmanyFilipinostoday,
thesebrutalitieshavebeenpracticallyerased.
FilipinoveteransofWorldWarIIwhofoughtgallantlywiththeAmericans,nowgrayandailing,stillawaitequaltreatmentwithUnitedStateswar
veterans. Filipina comfort women of that war still seek just treatment and receive no succor from the ally with and for whom they bled and
suffered.
The1951MutualDefenseTreatyandtheVisitingForcesAgreementwasineffectwhentheChineseinvadedcertainfeatureswithinourExclusive
EconomicZoneintheWestPhilippineSea.TheAmericansdidnotcometoouraid.ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesvisitedand,ontheoccasion
ofthatvisit,ourownPresidentannouncedthecompletionoftheEDCA.Noclear,unequivocal,andbindingcommitmentwasgivenwithrespectto
theapplicabilityoftheMutualDefenseTreatytotheentiretyofourvalidlegalclaimsintheWestPhilippineSea.ThecommitmentoftheUnited
States remains ambiguous. The United States' statement is that it will not interfere in those types of differences we have with China, among
others.
TheinequalityoftheMutualDefenseTreatyisbestpresentedbytheimageofacommissionedbutrustinganddilapidatedwarshipbeachedina
shoalintheWestPhilippineSea.Thisshipismannedbyahandfulofgallantheroicmarines,andbytheprovisionsoftheMutualDefenseTreaty,
anattackonthisshipasapublicvesseliswhatwearerelyingupontotriggermutualdefensewiththeUnitedStates.
We remain a permanent ally of the United States. For decades, we relied on them for the training of our troops and the provision of military
materiel.Fordecades,wehostedtheirbases.Yet,ourarmedforcesremainwoefullyequipped.Unlikeinmanyoftheirotherallies,nomodern
USmadefighterjetexistsinourAirForce.Wehavenocrediblemissiledefense.OurNavy'smostpowerfulassetsnowincludeadestroyerthat
wasdecommissionedbytheUnitedStatesCoastGuard.
ItisnowsuggestedthatthesewillchangewiththeEDCA.Itisnowsuggestedthatthiscourtshouldacttomakethatchangepossible.Impliedly,
itisthusalsosuggestedthattheSenate,orCongress,orthePeopleinareferendumasprovidedinourConstitution,willbelesspatrioticthan
thiscourtorthePresident.
There has never been a time in our historyand will never be a time in the futurewhen the national interest of the United States was
subservienttoours.WecannotstakeourfutureonhowweimaginetheUnitedStateswillbehaveinthefuture.Weshouldlearnfromourhistory.
IfwewishtheUnitedStatestobehaveinawaythatweexpect,thenourgovernmentshoulddemandclearcommitmentsforassistancetoour
primary interests. The likelihood that this will happen increases when agreements with them run through the gauntlet of public opinion before
theybecomeeffective.
Certainly,thisiswhattheConstitutionprovides.Certainly,thisistheleastthatweshouldguaranteeasacourtoflaw.
FINALNOTE
In1991,therewasthe"SenatethatSaidNo"totheextensionofthestayofmilitarybasesoftheUnitedStateswithinPhilippineterritory.That
historicaldecisiondefinedthepatriotismimplicitinoursovereignty.Thatsinglecollectiveactofcouragewassupposedtousheropportunitiesto
achieve the vision of our Constitution for a more meaningful but equal relationship with the American empire. That act was the pinnacle of
decadesofpeople'sstruggles.
Historywillnowrecordthatin2016,itisthisSupremeCourtthatsaidyestotheEDCA.Thisdecisionnowdarkensthecolorsofwhatisleftofour
sovereigntyasdefinedinourConstitution.Themajority'stakeistheaftermathofsquanderedopportunity.Wesurrendertothedualnarrativeof
expediencyandahegemonicviewoftheworldfromtheeyesofasinglesuperpower.TheopinionofthemajorityofthisSupremeCourtaffirms
executive privileges and definitively precludes Senate and/or Congressional oversight in the crafting of the most important policies in our
relationswiththeUnitedStatesand,implicitly,itsenemiesanditsallies.Initshurrytoabbreviatetheconstitutionalprocess,themajorityalso
excludesthepossibilitythatourpeopledirectlyparticipateinareferendumcalledtoaffirmtheEDCA.
Article XVIII, Section 25 does not sanction the surreptitious executive approval of the entry of United States military bases or any of its
euphemisms(i.e.,"AgreedLocations")throughstrainedandacrobaticimplicationfromanambiguousandcompletelydifferenttreatyprovision.
ThemajoritysucceedsinemasculatingourConstitution.Effectively,thiscourterasestheblood,sweat,andtearsshedbyourmartyrs.
I register more than my disagreement. I mourn that this court has allowed this government to acquiesce into collective subservience to the
Executivepowercontrarytothespiritofourbasiclaw.
Idissent.
ACCORDINGLY,IvotetoPARTIALLYGRANTthePetitionsandtoDECLAREtheEnhancedDefenseCooperationAgreement(EDCA)between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America as a formal and official memorial of the results of the
negotiationsconcerningtheallowanceofUnitedStatesmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesinthePhilippines,whichisNOTEFFECTIVEuntilit
complieswiththerequisitesofArticleXVIII,Section25ofthe1987PhilippineConstitution,namely:(1)thattheagreementmustbeintheform
ofatreaty(2)thatthetreatymustbedulyconcurredinbythePhilippineSenateand,whensorequiredbyCongress,ratifiedbyamajorityof
votes cast by the people in a national referendum and (3) that the agreement is either (a) recognized as a treaty or (b) accepted or
acknowledgedasatreatybytheUnitedStatesbeforeitbecomesvalid,binding,andeffective.
Endnotes:
1HeneralLuna,Dir.JerroldTarogArtikuloUnoProductions(2015).Theinclusionofthisquoteistoemphasizeitsmetaphorandnot
meantinanywaytodenigratethehumandignityofcommercialsexworkers.
2Bayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623(2000)[PerJ.Buena,EnBanc].
3Id.at632637.
4Id.at654657.
5430Phil.555(2002)[PerJ.DeLeon,Jr.,EnBanc].
6Id. at 575576. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potesl facere per directum" translates to "No one is allowed to do
indirectlywhatheisprohibitedtododirectly."
7598Phil,262(2009)[PerJ.Azcuna,EnBanc].
8Id.at284285.
9CharterofUnitedNations,ChapterI,art.2(4)(visitedJanuary11,2016).
10CharterofUnitedNations,ChapterVII,art.51(visitedJanuary11,2016).SeeMilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandAgainst
Nicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStatesofAmerica),I.C.J.1984I.C.J.39
11SeeAnthonyClarkArend,InternationalLawandthePreemptiveUseofMilitaryForce,THEWashingtonQuarterly26:2,89103
(2003).SeeROSALYNHIGGINS,PROBLEMSANDPROCESS:INTERNATIONALLAWANDHOWWEUSEIT242243(1994),citingUS
Secretary of State Webster in his diplomatic note in the 1842 Caroline Case. According to Professor Higgins, under customary
international law, preemptive selfdefense may be resorted to when the necessity is "instant, overwhelming, and leav[es] no
choiceofmeans,andnomomentfordeliberation."
12SeeROSALYNHIGGINS,PROBLEMSANDPROCESS:INTERNATIONALLAWANDHOWWEUSEIT245248(1994).SeeKeynote
address by Jacques Forster, Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, presented at the Ninth Annual
Seminar on International Humanitarian Law for Diplomats accredited to the United Nations, Geneva, 89 March 2000 (visited
January11,2016):"TheuseofforcebytheinternationalcommunityshouldcomewithinthescopeoftheUnitedNationsCharter.
International humanitarian law cannot be invoked to justify armed intervention because it has nothing to do with the right of
States to use force. Its role is strictly limited to setting limits to armed force irrespective of the legitimacy of its use." See
alsoUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1674(2006)ontheconceptofResponsibilitytoProtect(visitedJanuary11,2016).
13CharterofUnitedNations,ChapterVII,art.42(visitedJanuary11,2016).
14See Charter of United Nations, Chapter VII, art. 44 (visited January 11, 2016). See also Enforcement action through regional
arrangementsunderArticles52(1)and53(1)oftheUnitedNationsCharter,(visitedJanuary11,2016).
15CONST.,art.VII,seel.
16CONST.,art.VII,sec.17.
17Bayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623,663(2000)[PerJ.Buena,EnBanc].
20Bayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623,651655(2000)[PerJ.Buena,EnBanc].
21Id.at653655.
22Ponencia,pp.2627.
23Id.at28.
24ThomasWaldman,PoliticsandWar:Clausewitz'sParadoxicalEquation,AUTUMN2(2010)(visitedJanuary11,2016).
25J.Puno,DissentingOpinioninBayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623,672675(2000)[PerJ.Buena,EnBanc].
26 Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced
DefenseCooperation(2014),Art.1,sec.1.
27SeeVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art. 2(1 )(a) and Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between
StatesandInternationalOrganizationsorbetweenInternationalOrganizations,art.2(1)(a)(1986).28
28SeeBayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623(2000)[PerJ.Buena,EnBanc]andPimentel,Jr.v.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,501
Phil.303(2005)[PerJ.Puno,EnBanc].SeealsoExec.OrderNo.292(1987),BookIV,TitleI,sec.3(1)and20.
29CommissionerofCustomsv.EasternSeaTrading,113Phil.333(1961)[PerJ.Concepcion,EnBanc].
30Id.
31Id.at338.
32MERLINM.MAGALLONA,APRIMERININTERNATIONALLAW6264(1997).
33ARTICLE2.USEOFTERMS
....
2.Theprovisionsofparagraph1regardingtheuseoftermsinthepresentConventionarewithoutprejudicetotheuseofthose
termsortothemeaningswhichmaybegiventothemintheinternallawofanyState.
341.ForthepurposesofthepresentConvention:
(a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whetherembodiedinasingleinstrumentorintwoormorerelatedinstrumentsandwhateveritsparticulardesignation
35See
Merlin M. Magallona, The Supreme Court and International Law: Problems and Approaches in Philippine Practice, in
INTERNATIONALRELATIONSPAMPHLETSERIESNO.12,1617(2010).
36See1OLIVIERCORTIENANDPIERREKLEIN,THEVIENNACONVENTIONSONTHELAWOFTREATIES:ACOMMENTARY34and
55(2011).
37MERLINM.MAGALLONA,APRIMERININTERNATIONALLAW6667(1997).
38Article62.FundamentalChangeofCircumstances
1. Afundamentalchangeofcircumstanceswhichhasoccurredwithregardtothoseexistingatthetimeoftheconclusionofa
treaty,andwhichwasnotforeseenbytheparties,maynotbeinvokedasagroundforterminatingorwithdrawingfromthe
trearyunless:
a.Theexistenceofthosecircumstancesconstitutedanessentialbasisoftheconsentofthepartiestobeboundbythe
treatyand
b. Theeffectofthechangeisradicallytotransformtheextentofobligationsstilltobeperformedunderthetreaty.
2. Afundamentalchangeofcircumstancesmaynotbeinvokedasagroundforterminatingorwithdrawingfromatreaty
a.Ifthetreatyestablishesaboundaryor
b. Ifthefundamentalchangeistheresultofabreachbythepartyinvokingiteitherofanobligationunderthetreatyor
ofanyotherinternationalobligationowedtoanyotherpartytothetreaty.
3. If,undertheforegoingparagraphs,apartymayinvokeafundamentalchangeofcircumstancesasagroundforterminating
orwithdrawingfromatreatyitmayalsoinvokethechangeasagroundforsuspendingtheoperationofthetreaty.
ViennaConventionoftheLawofTreaties(1969)
(visitedJanuary11,2016).
39ViennaConventionoftheLawofTreaties,art.62(1969)(visitedJanuary11,2016).
40MerlinM.Magallona,ACriticalReviewoftheEDCA29(2014)(Unpublished),annexedtopetitioners'Memorandum.
41J.Puno,DissentingOpinioninBayanv.Zamora,396Phil.623,672673(2000)[PerJ.Buena,EnBanc].
42128S.Ct.1346170L.Ed.2d190.
43J.Carpio,DissentingOpinioninNicolasv.Romulo,598Phil.262,308312(2009)[PerJ.Azcuna,EnBanc].
44Respondents'Memorandum,pp.1516.
45ARTICLEIV.EachPartyrecognizesthatanarmedattackinthePacificareaoneitherofthePartieswouldbedangeroustoits
ownpeaceandsafetyanddeclaresthatitwouldacttomeetthecommondangersinaccordancewithitsconstitutionalprocesses.
United Nations, Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and
maintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.
46ARTICLEII.InordermoreeffectivelytoachievetheobjectiveofthisTreaty,thePartiesseparatelyandjointlybyselfhelpand
mutualaidwillmaintainanddeveloptheirindividualandcollectivecapacitytoresistarmedattack.
47Respondents'Memorandum,p.15.
48Id.at16.
49Id.,citingAgreementbetweentheGovernmentRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica
RegardingtheTreatmentofUnitedStatesArmedForcesVisitingthePhilippines(1998),art.I,VII,andVIII.
50(b) Authorizing access to Agreed Locations in the territory of the Philippines by United States forces on a rotational basis, as
Defense Cooperation (2014), art. VI(3). United States forces are authorized to exercise all rights and authorities within Agreed
Locations that are necessary for their operational control or defense, including taking appropriate measures to protect United
StatesforcesandUnitedStatescontractors.TheUnitedStatesshouldcoordinatesuchmeasureswithappropriateauthoritiesofthe
Philippines.
52MutualDefenseTreatybetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica(1951),Preamble,par.4.
53Nicolasv.Romulo,598Phil.262,284(2009)(PerJ.Azcuna,EnBane].
54SeeCONST.,art.XVIII,sec.25.
55TheTermsofReferenceprovides:
I.POLICYLEVEL
1. TheExerciseshallbeConsistentwiththePhilippineConstitutionandallitsactivitiesshallbeinconsonancewiththelawsof
thelandandtheprovisionsoftheRPUSVisitingForcesAgreement(VFA).
2. TheconductofthistrainingExerciseisinaccordancewithpertinentUnitedNationsresolutionsagainstglobalterrorismas
understoodbytherespectiveparties.
3. NopermanentUSbasingandsupportfacilitiesshallbeestablished.Temporarystructuressuchasthosefortroopbilleting,
classroominstructionandmessingmaybesetupforusebyRPandUSForcesduringtheExercise.
4. TheExerciseshallbeimplementedjointlybyRPandUSExerciseCoDirectorsundertheauthorityoftheChiefofStaff,AFP.
InnoinstancewillUSForcesoperateindependentlyduringfieldtrainingexercises(FTX).AFPandUSUnitCommanderswill
retaincommandovertheirrespectiveforcesundertheoverallauthorityoftheExerciseCoDirectors.RPandUSparticipants
shallcomplywithoperationalinstructionsoftheAFPduringtheFTX.
5. Theexerciseshallbeconductedandcompletedwithinaperiodofnotmorethansixmonths,withtheprojectedparticipation
of 660 US personnel and 3,800 RP Forces. The Chief of Staff, AFP shall direct the Exercise CoDirectors to wind up and
terminatetheExerciseandotheractivitieswithinthesixmonthExerciseperiod.
6. TheExerciseisamutualcounterterrorismadvising,assistingandtrainingExerciserelativetoPhilippineeffortsagainstthe
ASG,andwillbeconductedontheIslandofBasilan.Furtheradvising,assistingandtrainingexercisesshallbeconductedin
MalagutayandtheZamboangaarea.RelatedactivitiesinCebuwillbeforsupportoftheExercise.
7. Only160USForcesorganizedin12manSpecialForcesTeamsshallbedeployedwithAFPfieldcommanders.TheUSteams
shall remain at the Battalion Headquarters and, when approved, Company Tactical headquarters where they can observe
andassesstheperformanceoftheAFPForces.
8. USexerciseparticipantsshallnotengageincombat,withoutprejudicetotheirrightofselfdefense.
9. ThesetermsofReferencearcforpurposesofthisExerciseonlyanddonotcreateadditionallegalobligationsbetweenthe
USGovernmentandtheRepublicofthePhilippines.
II.EXERCISELEVEL
1.TRAINING
a.The Exercise shall involve the conduct of mutual military assisting, advising and training of RP and US Forces with the
primaryobjectiveofenhancingtheoperationalcapabilitiesofbothforcestocombatterrorism.
b. AtnotimeshallUSForcesoperateindependentlywithinRPterritory.
c. Flightplansofallaircraftinvolvedintheexercisewillcomplywiththelocalairtrafficregulations.
2.ADMINISTRATION&LOGISTICS
a.RPandUSparticipantsshallbegivenacountryandareabriefingatthestartoftheExercise.ThisbriefingshallacquaintUS
ForcesonthecultureandsensitivitiesoftheFilipinosandtheprovisionsoftheVFA.Thebriefingshallalsopromotethefull
cooperationonthepartoftheRPandUSparticipantsforthesuccessfulconductoftheExercise.
b. RP and US participating forces may share, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, in the use of their
resources,equipmentandotherassets.Theywillusetheirrespectivelogisticschannels.
c. MedicalevaluationshallbejointlyplannedandexecutedutilizingRPandUSassetsandresources.
d. LegalliaisonofficersfromeachrespectivepartyshallbeappointedbytheExerciseDirectors.
3.PUBLICAFFAIRS
a.CombinedRPUSInformationBureausshallbeestablishedattheExerciseDirectorateinZamboangaCityandatGHQ,AFP
inCampAguinaldo,QuezonCity.
b. LocalmediarelationswillbetheconcernoftheAFPandallpublicaffairsguidelinesshallbejointlydevelopedbyRPandUS
Forces.
c. SocioEconomic Assistance Projects shall be planned and executed jointly by RP and US Forces in accordance with their
respectivelawsandregulations,andinconsultationwithcommunityandlocalgovernmentofficials.
56Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,430Phil.555(2002)[PerJ.DeLeon,Jr.,EnBane].
57Id.at564.
58 Manyin, Mark E., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia (2012)
(visited January 11,

2016). See Jonathan G. Odom, What Does a "Pivot" or "Rebalance" Look Like? Elements of the U.S. Strategic Turn Towards
Security in the AsiaPacific Region and Its Waters, 14 APLPJ 28 (2013) Ronald O'Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive
EconomicZone(EEZ)DisputesInvolvingChina:IssuesforCongress,(2015)(visitedJanuary11,2016).
59UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,TheAsiaPacificMaritimeSecurityStrategy:AchievingU.S.NationalSecurityObjectives
inaChangingEnvironment,(12)
60Id.at1.
61Id.at2324.
62Id.at2223.
DefenseCooperation(2014),art.II(3).
64"ThePhilippinesshallretainownershipofandtitletoAgreedLocations."
65A copy is contained in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 17761949, as compiled
underthedirectionofCharlesI.Bevans,LL.B.,AssistantLegalAdviser,DepartmentofState(visitedNovember5,2015).
66WHEREAS,theGovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesaredesirousofcooperatingin
the common defense of their two countries through arrangements consonant with the procedures and objectives of the United
Nations,andparticularlythroughagranttotheUnitedStatesofAmericabytheRepublicofthePhilippinesintheexerciseofits
titleandsovereignty,oftheuse,freeofrent,infurtheranceofthemutualinterestofbothcountries,ofcertainlandsofthepublic
domain
67 4.
This Agreement shall have an initial term of ten years, and thereafter, it shall continue in force automatically unless
terminated by either Party by giving one year's written notice through diplomatic channels of its intention to terminate this
Agreement.
DefenseCooperation(2014),art.Ill(1).
Defense Cooperation (2014), art. V (4) provides: All buildings, nonrelocatable structures, and assemblies affixed to the land, in
the Agreed Locations, including ones altered or improved by United States forces, remain the property of the Philippines.
Permanent buildings constructed by United States forces become the property of the Philippines, once constructed, but shall be
usedbyUnitedStatesforcesuntilnolongerrequiredbyUnitedStatesforces.
DefenseCooperation(2014),art.VIIprovidesfortheuseofutilitiesandcommunicationsystems:
1.ThePhilippinesherebygrantstoUnitedStatesforcesandUnitedStatescontractorstheuseofwater,electricity,andotherpublic
utilitiesontermsandconditions,includingratesorcharges,nolessfavorablethanthoseavailabletotheAFPortheGovernmentof
the Philippines in like circumstances, less charges for taxes and similar fees, which will be for the account of the Philippine
Government.UnitedStatesforces'costsshallbeequaltotheirproratashareoftheuseofsuchutilities.
2.ThePartiesrecognizethatitmaybenecessaryforUnitedStatesforcestousetheradiospectrum.ThePhilippinesauthorizesthe
United States to operate its own telecommunication systems (as telecommunication is defined in the 1992 Constitution and
ConventionoftheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion("ITU")).Thisshallincludetherighttoutilizesuchmeansandservices
as required to ensure the full ability to operate telecommunication systems, and the right to use all necessary radio spectrum
allocatedforthispurpose.Consistentwiththe1992ConstitutionandConventionoftheITU,UnitedStatesforcesshallnotinterfere
withfrequenciesinusebylocaloperators.UseoftheradiospectrumshallbefreeofcosttotheUnitedStates.
DefenseCooperation(2014),art.Ill(4).
72November8,2010,AsAmendedThroughJune15,2015(visitedNovember5,2015):
1.Scope
The Joint Publication 102, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms sets forth standard
US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States.
These military and associated terms, together with their definitions, constitute approved Department of Defense
(DOD)terminologyforgeneralusebyallDODcomponents.
2.Purpose
This publication supplements standard Englishlanguage dictionaries and standardizes military and associated
terminology to improve communication and mutual understanding within DOD, with other federal agencies, and
amongtheUnitedStatesanditsallies.
73ThistreatycontainsaSupplementaryAgreementonInstallationsandMilitaryoperatingProcedures
(SupplementaryAgreementNumberTwo),whichprovides:
ARTICLE1
PURPOSESOFTHEUNITEDSTATESMILITARYPRESENCEINTHEPHILIPPINES
TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesauthorizestheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericatostationUnitedStatesforcesin
the Philippines, and in connection therewith to use certain installations in Subic Naval Base, which is a Philippine military base, designated
trainingareasandairspaces,andsuchotherareasasmaybemutuallyagreed,forthefollowingpurposesandunderthetermsandconditions
stipulatedinthisAgreement:
a.trainingofUnitedStatesforcesandjointtrainingofUnitedStatesforceswithPhilippineforces
b.servicing,provisioning,maintenance,supportandaccommodationofUnitedStatesforces
c.logisticssupplyandmaintenancepointsforsupportofUnitedStatesforces
d.transitpointforUnitedStatesforcesandUnitedStatesmilitarypersonnel
e.projectingoroperatingUnitedStatesforcesfromtheinstallationsunderconditionsofpeaceorwar,providedthatmilitarycombatoperations
ofUnitedStatesforcesdirectlylaunchedfrominstallationsonthebaseauthorizedforUnitedStatesuseshallbesubjecttopriorapprovalofthe
GovernmentofthePhilippines
f.suchotherpurposes,consistentwiththisAgreement,asmaybemutuallyagreed.
74See Gonzales v, Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc] andIchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957) [Per J.
Labrador,EnBanc].
75MemorandumforPetitionersBayan,etal.,pp.34.
76Memorandum for Petitioners Bayan, et al., pp. 1925 Memorandum for Petitioners Saguisag, pp.11 17 Memorandum for Petitionersin
InterventionKMU,pp.56.
77MemorandumforPetitionersSaguisag,pp.1117.
78MemorandumforRespondents,pp.45.
79Id.at6.
80Id.at7.
81Id.at8.
82Const.,art.VIII,sec.1.
8363Phil.139(1936)[PerJ.Laurel,EnBanc].
84Id.at157159(1936)[PerJ.Laurel,EnBanc].
85SeeFrancisco,Jr.v.HouseofRepresentatives,460Phil.830,892(2003)[PerJ.CarpioMorales,EnBanc].
86Lozanov.Nograles,607Phil.334,340(2009)[PerC.J.Puno,EnBane].SeealsoJ.Leonen,DissentingandConcurringOpinioninDisini,Jr.v.
SecretaryofJustice,G.R.Nos.203335,February18,2014,716SCRA237,535[PerJ.Abad,EnBanc].
87Diocese
of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,

file=/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/205728.pdf>[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
2015
<
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
88Id.
89InformationTechnologyFoundationofthePhilippinesv.COMELEC,499Phil.281,304(2005)[PerJ.Panganiban,EnBane],citingRepublicv.
Tan,G.R. No. 145255, 426 SCRA 485, March 30, 2004 [Per J. CarpioMorales, Third Division].SeealsoJ. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring
OpinioninDisini,Jr.v.SecretaryofJustice,G.R.Nos.203335,February18,2014,716SCRA237,534[PerJ.Abad,EnBanc]andIntheMatter
of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and
ReductionofFiscalAutonomy,UDK15143,January21,2015[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
90Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 499 Phil. 281, 305 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], citing Vide:De
Lumenv.Republic, 50 OG No. 2, February 14, 1952, 578. See also J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion inDisini, Jr. v. Secretary of
Justice,G.R.Nos.203335,February18,2014,716SCRA237,534535[PerJ.Abad,EnBanc]andIntheMatterof:SavetheSupremeCourt
JudicialIndependenceandFiscalAutonomyMovementv.AbolitionofJudiciaryDevelopmentFund(JDF)andReductionofFiscalAutonomy,UDK
15143,January21,2015[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
91 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R.
Nos. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 731 [Per J. Mendoza, En Bane],
citingAngarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139,158(1936)[PerJ.Laurel,EnBane]andGuingona,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,354Phil.415,
429(1998)[PerJ.Panganiban,FirstDivision].
92Id.
93Id.
94Id.at721.
95G.R.No.204603,September24,2013,706SCRA273[PerJ.PerlasBernabe,EnBanc].
96Republic
of the Philippines v. Roque, G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013, 706 SCRA 273, 284285 [Per J. PerlasBernabe, En
Bane].Seealso J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion inDisini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice,G.R. Nos. 203335, February 18, 2014, 716
SCRA237,536537[PerJ.Abad,EnBanc].
97LawyersAgainstMonopolyandPovertyv.SecretaryofBudgetandManagement,686Phil.357[PerJ.Mendoza,EnBanc].
98Id.at369,citingLozanov.Nograles,607Phil.334(2009)[PerC.J.Puno,EnBanc],inturncitingGuingona,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,354Phil.
415,427428[PerJ.Panganiban,FirstDivision].
99103Phil.1051(1957)[PerJ.Concepcion,EnBanc].
100Id.at10651067.
101460Phil.830(2003)[PerJ.CarpioMorales,EnBanc].
102Id.at910912(2003)[PerJ.CarpioMorales,EnBanc],SeealsoDioceseofBacolodv.COMELEC,G.R.No.205728,January21,2015
[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
103G.R.No.205728,January21,2015[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
104DioceseofBacolodv.COMELEC,G.R.No.205728,January21,2015[PerJ.Leonen,EnBanc].
105J.Leonen,ConcurringOpinioninGarciav.Drilon,G.R,No.179267,June25,2013,699SCRA352[PerJ.PerlasBernabe,EnBanc].
106Id.at493.
107Pimentel,Jr.v.OfficeoftheExecutiveSecretary,501Phil.303(2005)[PerJ.Puno,EnBane].
108CONST.,art.VIII,sec.1and5(2).

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G.R.No.212426,January12,2016RENEA.V.SAGUISAG,WIGBERTOE.TAADA,FRANCISCO"DODONG"NEMENZO,JR.,SR.

Recognizing that all United States access to and

Recognizing that all United States access to and

The Philippines hereby grants to the United

With consideration of the views of the Parties,

Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter

Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter

When requested, the Designated Authority of the

It is mutually agreed that the United States may

When requested, the Designated Authority of the

Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter

The Philippines hereby grants to the United States,

substance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under

undertake such activities on, and make

Whenever it is necessary to acquire by

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall

1. "United States personnel" means United

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall

equipment on the U.S. Munitions List, during an approved activity."

supra note 23 Philippine Constitution Association, v.

are provided by the Government of the Philippines

433ArticleI(g)thereofprovides:"Agreedfacilitiesandlocations"meansthosesites,installations,andinfrastructureto which the United

Final Transcript Day 2 Merits Hearing,

otheractivitiesthatas may be agreed upon by the Parties."

1. It is mutually agreed that the United States

4. The Philippines hereby grants the United

4. The Philippines hereby grants the United

2.Suchrights,powerandauthorityshallinclude, 5. The Philippine Designated Authority and its

2. Such rights, power and authority shall 1.WithconsiderationoftheviewsoftheParties,

1. The Philippines hereby authorizes the United

The importation and exportation of equipment, materials, supplies and other

The grant to the United States of operational control of Agreed Locations to do

The conditional access to the Agreed Locations of the Philippine Designated

The storage and prepositioning of defense equipment, supplies and materiel, as

The cooperation between the parties in taking measures to ensure protection,

The use of the radio spectrum in connection with the operation of a

With the consideration of the views of the

The Philippines hereby grants to the United

The Philippines hereby grants to United States

The Philippines hereby authorizes United States

the right to acquire, as may be agreed between

to construct, install, maintain, and employ on

The prepositioned materiel of the United States

18, 2015), available at http://www.brookings.edu/bIogs/orderfromchaos/posts/2015/18valueofcontinuityuspolicyinasia

in a Changing Environment, (2015), p. 23. Available at http://www.defense.gov/Ponals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A

the People's Republic of China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, available at http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage65f2.html?

Summer 2013, RAND Corporation, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/randreview/issues/2013/summer/forthe

Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.South Korea, October 1,

(visited January 11,

of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,

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