Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) - Fairness and Retaliation - The Economics of Reciprocity.

Journal of Economic PerspectivesVolume 14, Number 3Summer 2000 Pages 159 181
Fairness and Retaliation:

The Economics of Reciprocity
Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter
long-standing tradition in economics views human beings as exclusively

self-interested. In most economic accounts of individual behavior and
aggregate social phenomena, the vast forces of greed (Arrow, 1980) are
put at the center of the explanation. In economic models human actors are
typically portrayed as self-interest seeking with guile (which) includes . . . more
blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating . . . (but) more often involves
subtle forms of deceit (Williamson, 1985).
However, as we will document below, many people deviate from purely selfinterested behavior in a reciprocal manner. Reciprocity means that in response to
friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative
than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions
they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal. The Edda, a 13th century
collection of Norse epic verses, gives a succinct description of reciprocity: A man
ought to be a friend to his friend and repay gift with gift. People should meet smiles
with smiles and lies with treachery. There is considerable evidence that a substantial fraction of people behave according to this dictum: People repay gifts and take
revenge even in interactions with complete strangers and even if it is costly for them
and yields neither present nor future material rewards. Our notion of reciprocity is thus
very different from kind or hostile responses in repeated interactions that are solely
motivated by future material gains.
y Ernst Fehr is Professor of Economics and a Core Member of the MacArthur Foundation Network on Economic Environments and the Evolution of Individual Preferences
and Social Norms, while Simon Gachter is Assistant Professor of Economics, both at
the University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Economic Research, Zurich, Switzerland.
Their web page is http://www.unizh.ch/iew/grp/fehr/index.html. Their e-mail addresses are
efehr@iew.unizh.ch and gaechter@iew.unizh.ch, respectively.
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Journal of Economic Perspectives
We term the cooperative reciprocal tendencies positive reciprocity while the

retaliatory aspects are called negative reciprocity. In this paper, we first offer a
brief overview of the evidence for reciprocal actions in relatively abstract one-shot
games. Then, we show that reciprocity has powerful implications for many important economic domains. George Stigler (1981) wrote that when self-interest and
ethical values with wide verbal allegiance are in conflict, much of the time, most of
the time in fact, self-interest-theory . . . will win. Our evidence indicates that Stiglers position is often not valid. When the world is made up of self-interested types
and reciprocal types, interacting with each other, the reciprocal types dominate the
aggregate outcome in certain circumstances, while the self-interested types will
dominate the aggregate outcome in other circumstances. We will provide evidence
that there are important conditions in which the self-interest theory is unambiguously refuted. For example, in competitive markets with incomplete contracts, the
reciprocal types dominate the aggregate results. Similarly, when people face strong
material incentives to free ride, the self-interest model predicts no cooperation at
all. However, if there are individual opportunities to punish others, then the
reciprocal types vigorously punish free riders even when the punishment is costly
for the punisher. As a consequence of the punishing behavior of the reciprocal
types, a very high level of cooperation can in fact be achieved. Indeed, the power
to enhance collective actions and to enforce social norms is probably one of the
most important consequences of reciprocity.
This line of thought brings out another important implication of the presence
of reciprocal types: Details of the institutional environment, like the presence of
incomplete contracts or of costly individual punishment opportunities, determine
whether the reciprocal or the selfish types are pivotal. Institutional features like this
may thus have a tremendous impact on patterns of aggregate behavior that are
neglected by the self-interest model. As a consequence, economic predictions
regarding the impact of different institutions will be questionable if they do not
take into account the presence of reciprocal types. Moreover, it turns out that the
existence of reciprocal types may actually give rise to a world of incomplete
contracts, so that reciprocity helps to generate those conditions under which it can
flourish.
Positive and Negative Reciprocity: Some Evidence

Reciprocity is fundamentally different from cooperative or retaliatory behavior in repeated interactions. These behaviors arise because actors expect future
material benefits from their actions; in the case of reciprocity, the actor is responding
to friendly or hostile actions even if no material gains can be expected. Reciprocity
is also fundamentally different from altruism. Altruism is a form of unconditional
kindness; that is, altruism given does not emerge as a response to altruism received.
Again, reciprocity is an in-kind response to beneficial or harmful acts.
Examples of retaliatory behavior abound. Many wars and gang crimes fit well
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into this category. A vivid example is provided by the recent events in Kosovo when
many Albanian refugees took bloody revenge after the victory of NATO over
Serbian forces. Other examples are given by the rise in employees theft rates after
firms have cut employees wages (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997) or by the social
ostracism exercised by coworkers against strikebreakers during and after industrial
disputes.
Likewise, positive reciprocity is deeply embedded in many social interactions.
Psychological studies show, for example, that smiling waitresses get tipped much
more than less friendly ones (Tidd and Lochard, 1978). Calls for contributions to
charities are often accompanied by small gifts. Apparently, charities believe that this
raises the propensity to donate. Uninvited favors, in general, are likely to create
feelings of indebtedness obliging many people to repay the psychological debt. A
particularly powerful example of this is the use of free samples as a sales technique
(Cialdini, 1993). In supermarkets, customers are frequently given small amounts of
a certain product for free. For many people it seems to be very difficult to accept
samples from a smiling attendant without actually buying anything. Some people
even buy the product although they do not like it very much. The normative power
of reciprocity is also likely to have an important impact on social policy issues
(Bowles and Gintis, 1998b). Social policies are much less likely to be endorsed by
public opinion when they reward people independent of whether and how much
they contribute to society.
Since in real world interactions, it is very difficult to rule out with certainty
that an actor derives a future material benefit from a reciprocal response, we
provide in the following discussion evidence on reciprocity from controlled
laboratory experiments. In these experiments, real subjects interact anonymously and face real, and sometimes rather high, material costs of reciprocal
actions, in a context where it can be precluded that reciprocal responses will
lead to future material rewards.
Perhaps the most vivid game to demonstrate negatively reciprocal behavior is
the ultimatum bargaining experiment. In this game, two subjects have to agree on
the division of a fixed sum of money. Person A, the Proposer, can make exactly one
proposal of how to divide the amount. Person B, the Responder, can accept or
reject the proposed division. In the case of rejection, both receive nothing; in the
case of acceptance, the proposal is implemented. A robust result in this experiment, across hundreds of trials, is that Proposers who offer the Responder less than
30 percent of the available sum are rejected with a very high probability (for
example, see Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995;
Roth, 1995, and the references therein). Apparently, Responders do not behave in
a self-interest maximizing manner. In general, the motive indicated for the rejection of positive, yet low, offers is that subjects view them as unfair.
Negative reciprocity in an ultimatum game has been observed in many countries, including Indonesia, Israel, Japan, many European countries, Russia and the
United States (for example, see Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir,
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1991).1 Moreover, rather high monetary stakes do not change or have only a minor
impact on these experimental results. In the study of Cameron (1999), the amount
to be divided represented the income of three months for the subjects. Other
studies with relatively high stakes have involved college students dividing amounts
of $100 or more (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1995; Henrich, forthcoming;
Slonim and Roth, 1998).
Positive reciprocity has been documented in many trust or gift exchange
games (for example, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Berg, Dickhaut and
McCabe, 1995; McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1996). In a trust game, for example,
a Proposer receives an amount of money x from the experimenter, and then can
send between zero and x to the Responder. The experimenter then triples the
amount sent, which we term y, so that the Responder has 3y. The Responder is then
free to return anything between zero and 3y to the Proposer. It turns out that many
Proposers send money and that many Responders give back some money. Moreover, there is frequently a positive correlation between y and the amount sent back
at the individual as well as at the aggregate level. Again, positive reciprocity does not
appear to diminish even if the monetary stake size is rather high; for example, Fehr
and Tougareva (1995) found strong positive reciprocity in experiments conducted
in Moscow, where their subjects earned on average the monetary income of ten
weeks in an experiment that lasted for two hours.
The fraction of subjects who show a concern for fairness and behave reciprocally in one-shot situations is relatively high. Many studies have carried out detailed
analyses of individual decisions and found that the fraction of subjects exhibiting
reciprocal choices is between 40 and 66 percent (Gachter and Falk, 1999; Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner,
forthcoming). However, these same studies also find that between 20 and 30
percent of the subjects do not reciprocate and behave completely selfishly. Thus, a
nontrivial minority of subjects exhibits selfish behavior. Burnham (1998) found
that male behavior in the ultimatum game is systematically linked to testosterone
levels. Males who reject unfair offers have higher testosterone levels than males who
accept unfair offers. This is interesting because testosterone levels are thought to be
important mediators of male willingness to engage in aggressive behavior.
There is now little disagreement among experimental researchers about the
facts indicating reciprocal behavior. There also seems to be an emerging consensus
that the propensity to punish harmful behavior is stronger than the propensity to
reward friendly behavior (Offerman, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2000). There
is, however, disagreement regarding the main sources of reciprocal behavior.
Some believe that the desire to maintain equity is most important (Bolton and
Ockenfels, forthcoming). Others emphasize that the desire to punish hostile
intentions and to reward kind intentions is also important (Rabin, 1993; Blount, 1995;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1999; Falk and Fischbacher, 1999). A third possibility
1
The only exception is the study of Henrich (forthcoming) among the Machiguenga in the Peruvian
Amazon. Machiguengas exhibit very low rejection rates.
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
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is that people do not respond to the intention but to the type of person they face
(Levine, 1998). A fourth group of researchers, in contrast, views the reciprocal
actions in laboratory experiments as a form of boundedly rational behavior (Gale,
Binmore and Samuelson, 1995; Roth and Erev, 1995). However, differences in
interpretation notwithstanding, many researchers now agree that reciprocity is a
rather stable behavioral response by a nonnegligible fraction of the people that can
be reliably elicited under appropriate circumstances.2
In our view, this stability and reliability renders reciprocity important for
economics and raises exciting questions: How do reciprocal types change the
nature of collective action problems that permeate peoples interactions in firms,
public bureaucracies, markets and the political sphere? To what extent can reciprocal people constrain the opportunistic tendencies of selfish people? Which
institutions render the reciprocal types decisive in shaping aggregate social phenomena and when are the selfish types pivotal? How does the presence of reciprocal types change organizational outcomes, contractual and institutional choices,
and the interactions in competitive markets? How do explicit economic incentives
affect the propensity for voluntary cooperation among the reciprocal people? Do
explicit incentives crowd out or enhance voluntary cooperation? In the rest of this
paper, we offer answers to these questions.
Public Goods
Many societies face the problem of how to provide public goods. For a group
of self-interested agents, of course, public goods present the difficulty that since all
agents will want to be free riders on the efforts of others, no agent will contribute
willingly to the public good.
To take a specific example of this situation, consider the basic structure of a
public good experiment run by Fehr and Gachter (forthcoming). In this experiment, there are four group members who are each given 20 tokens. All four
subjects decide simultaneously how many tokens to keep for themselves and how
many tokens to invest in a common public good project. For each token that is
privately kept by a subject, that subject earns exactly one token. For each token a
subject invests into the project each of the four subjects, whether they have invested
in the public good or not, earns .4 tokens. Thus, the private return for investing one
additional token into the public good is .4 tokens while the social return is 1.6
tokens. Since the cost of investing one token is exactly one token while the private
return is only .4 tokens, it is always in the material self-interest of a subject to keep
all tokens. Yet, if all group members keep all tokens privately, each subject earns
only 20 tokens, while if all invest their total endowment in the public good, each
2
The stability of reciprocal behavior suggests that it has deep evolutionary roots. For evolutionary
explanations see Guth and Yaari (1992); Bowles and Gintis (1999); Sethi and Somananthan (2000); and
Gintis (forthcoming).
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subject earns 32 tokens. Thus, in this simple example, the highest level of social
welfare would be achieved if everyone contributed all of their assets to the public
good, but it is in the self-interest of each individual to free ride, regardless of what
others contribute, and to contribute nothing.3
To what extent can reciprocity provide the basis for agents deciding to make
at least some contribution to the public good? Positive reciprocity implies that
subjects are willing to contribute something to the public good if others are also
willing to contribute, because a contribution to the public good represents a kind
action, which induces reciprocally motivated people to contribute, too (Sugden,
1984; Keser and van Winden, forthcoming). However, to sustain contributing to the
public good as a stable behavioral regularity, a sufficiently high proportion of the
agents in the game have to be reciprocally motivated. Since we know that a
nonnegligible minority of subjects is motivated by pure self-interest, not reciprocity,
it is unlikely that a positive level of contributions to the public good can be
sustained as an equilibrium.
Up to this point, negative reciprocity has not played a role, because in the
game as described there are no opportunities for direct retaliation in response to
observed free riding. However, negative reciprocity can play the role that if subjects
expect that others free ride, and if they interpret that as a hostile act, then they can
punish others by free riding, too. The result is likely to be that self-interested types
choose to free ride because they are self-interested, and reciprocal types free ride
because they observe others free riding. Although the motivation to free ride is
different for the reciprocal type, in the end the behavior of the selfish and the
reciprocal type is indistinguishable. This public good game provides, therefore, an
example where selfish types can induce reciprocal types to make selfish choices.4
However, the impact of negative reciprocity changes radically if subjects are
given the opportunity to observe the contributions of others, and to punish those
who do not contribute. Suppose, for example, that each subject in a group has the
opportunity to reduce the income of each other subject in the group. Suppose
further, that a reduction of the income of one other group member by x tokens
costs the punisher (1/3)x tokens. It is important that punishment be costly to the
agent who imposes it. After all, if punishing is costly for the punisher, selfish
subjects will never punish. Hence, if all subjects were purely self-interested, contribution decisions would be unaffected by the punishment opportunity. However,
negatively reciprocal subjects, who are willing to pay a price to act reciprocally, will
use the costly punishment opportunity to punish free riders. This, in turn, will
induce self-interested subjects to contribute to avoid the punishment. The public
good game with direct punishment opportunities provides, therefore, an example
where the reciprocal types can induce the selfish types to make cooperative
For a survey on public goods experiments, see Ledyard (1995).

Fehr and Schmidt (1999, Proposition 4) provide a formal proof of these arguments. They show that
even a small minority of purely selfish subjects can induce the reciprocal subjects to behave selfishly
in this game.
4
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choices. Fehr and Schmidt (1999, Proposition 5) show theoretically that even a
minority of reciprocal subjects is capable of inducing a majority of selfish subjects to
cooperate in these circumstances.
Fehr and Gachter (forthcoming) have conducted a variety of public good
experiments with and without punishment opportunities, using the basic structure
of the four-person, 20-token public good game just described.5 The experiment was
conducted in two versions: a Perfect Stranger version and a Partner version. In an
experimental session of the Perfect Stranger version, 24 subjects formed six groups
with four members in each group. The public good games were repeated for six
periods and in each period completely new groups were formed so that nobody met
another group member more than once. The Perfect Stranger version ensures that
the actions in a particular period have no rewards in future periods. In contrast, in
the Partner version the same four members played ten times.6 In this version there
are possible strategic spillovers across periods so that present actions can have
future returns. However, as in the Perfect Stranger version, all subjects knew the
total number of periods in advance.
Figure 1 shows how much a subject is punished for a given negative
deviation from the average contribution of other members in the group. The
punishment is measured by the average percentage reduction in the incomes of
the punished subject. It turns out that the negative deviation from others
average contributions to the public good is a strong determinant of punishment. The more a subject free rides relative to the others the more it gets
punished. Moreover, this pattern is almost the same in the two versions of the
game: Free riders are punished irrespective of whether there are future rewards
for the punisher. Questionnaire evidence that elicits subjects motives and
emotions indicates that the deviation from the norm of cooperation causes
resentment and the impulse to punish.7
The heavy punishment of free riders, in turn, has a large disciplining effect on
subjects cooperation behavior, as indicated in Figure 2. This figure compares the
time paths of the average contributions in the two versions of the public good
game. The first observation is that in the absence of a punishment opportunity,
average cooperation converges to very low levels in the later periods. For instance,
in period six of the Perfect Stranger version, 79 percent of the subjects free ride
completely and the rest contributes little. This high defection rate stands in sharp
contrast to the contribution behavior in the games with a punishment opportunity:
When subjects are perfect strangers they can at least stabilize contributions at
For an exciting experiment with punishment opportunities in a common pool resource context, see
Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992).
6
In the Partner and the Perfect Stranger version, experiments with and without the punishment
opportunity were conducted and all interactions were completely anonymous. In the presence of the
punishment opportunity, subjects could punish in each period after they observed others contributions
in this period.
7
On the role of emotions in similar contexts, see also the experimental study by Bosman and van
Winden (1999).
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Figure 1
Mean Income Reduction for a Given Negative Deviation from the Mean Contribution of Other Group Members
Source: Fehr and Gachter (forthcoming).
relatively high levels. In the Partner version they almost converge to the maximum
level of contributions. It is particularly remarkable that in the final period of the
Partner version subjects still contribute 90 percent of the endowment (of 20
tokens), indicating the disciplining force of the punishment opportunity.
From Public Goods to Social Norms

The problem of public goods may seem a rather limited economic application,
and it may seem farfetched to link the experiment here to government spending on
basic research and development or national defense. While we believe that such
links can be made, we readily concede that the most important applications of this
line of thought are not found in government budget decisions. Instead, we believe
that the analytical structure of the public good problem is a good approximation to
the question of how social norms are established and maintained.
At this point, it is useful to define a social norm more precisely. It is: 1) a
behavioral regularity; that is 2) based on a socially shared belief of how one ought to
behave; which triggers 3) the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by informal
social sanctions. Thus, a social norm can be thought of as a sort of behavioral public
good, in which everybody should make a positive contributionthat is, follow the
social normand also where individuals must be willing to enforce the social norm
with informal social sanctions, even at some immediate cost to themselves.
Casual evidence and daily experience suggests that social norms are pervasive
in social and economic life. The large majority of interactions in peoples lives take
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Figure 2
Evolution of Average Contributions with and without the Punishment Option in the
Partner and the Perfect Stranger Condition
place in the family, in residential neighborhoods, in formal or informal clubs and

at peoples workplaces. Typically, these interactions are not regulated by explicit
contracts but by informal social norms.
For example, it has been observed in many studies that social norms influence
work morale and behavior against rate busters (Roethlisberger and Dickson,
1947). Social sanctions by peer members are probably a very important determinant of effort behavior in work relations. It has often been observed that consumption and savings decisions are to a large degree affected by social norms that
determine what others regard as appropriate consumption. Norm-governed attitudes, social interactions and conformism among peers, relatives, and in neighborhoods may have important consequences for human capital decisions, for the
decision to take part in elections, and for criminal activities. Social norms also often
regulate the use of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1998) and the ways landowners settle disputes (Ellickson, 1994). There is a huge literature that argues that in
collective action problems and in the provision of public goods, social norms play
a decisive role (Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 1998). There is also reason to believe that
social norms are relevant for the amount of tax evasion and the abuse of welfare
payments, and for attitudes towards the welfare state in general. Social norms also
constitute perhaps one of the most important elements of what recently has been
termed social capitalthe informal cooperative infrastructure of our societies.
Finally, there are powerful arguments that social norms also have a decisive impact
on the functioning of markets. Solow (1990), for instance, has argued that they can
lead to involuntary unemployment. The above examples also indicate that social
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norms are not necessarily beneficial for society. Depending on the specific context
of the norm, norms may deter or encourage socially beneficial behavior.
In our view, there can be little doubt that human behavior is shaped by social
norms. They constitute constraints on individual behavior beyond the legal, information and budget constraints usually considered by economists. In view of the fact
that most social relations in neighborhoods, families and work places are not
governed by explicit agreements but by social norms, the role of reciprocity as a
norm enforcement device is perhaps its most important function.
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device

Real-world contracts are often highly incomplete, which gives rise to strong
incentives to shirk (Williamson, 1985). Economic historians like North (1990) have
argued that differences in societies contract enforcement capabilities are probably
a major reason for differences in economic growth and human welfare.
The employment relationship, in particular, is characterized by incomplete
contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage contract without
explicit performance incentives and in which workers have a considerable degree
of discretion over effort levels. In such a situation, a workers general job attitude,
loyalty (Simon, 1991), or what Williamson (1985) called consummate cooperation, which is an affirmative job attitude whereby gaps are filled, initiative is taken,
and judgment is exercised in an instrumental way, becomes important. Under a
complete labor contract, of course, a generally cooperative job attitude would be
superfluous, because all relevant actions would be unambiguously described and
enforceable. But how can any explicit contract unambiguously describe, assess, and
enforce terms like initiative, good judgment and potentially arising gaps?
The requirement of a generally cooperative job attitude renders reciprocal
motivations potentially very important in the labor process. If a substantial fraction
of the work force is motivated by reciprocity considerations, employers can affect
the degree of cooperativeness of workers by varying the generosity of the compensation package even without offering explicit performance incentives.
The conjecture that reciprocity plays a role in the choice of effort has been
investigated in several tightly controlled laboratory experiments. For example, in Fehr,
Gachter and Kirchsteiger (1997), experimental employers could offer a wage contract
that stipulated a binding wage w and a desired effort level e. If an experimental worker
accepted this offer, the worker was free to choose the actual effort level e between a
minimum and a maximum level. The employer always had to pay the offered wage
irrespective of the actual effort level. In this experiment effort is represented by a
number e between 1 and 10. Higher numbers represent higher effort levels and,
hence, a higher profit for the employer and higher effort costs c(e) for the worker.
The effort cost for e 1 was zero. The profit from the employment of a worker
was given by 10e w and the monetary payoff for the experimental worker was
u w c(e). In each experimental session there were eight workers and six
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employers, who could employ at most one worker. All participants knew the excess
supply of workers. It ensured that a workers reservation wage, if the worker is purely
selfish, was zero so that employers could, in principle, enforce very low wages. The
crucial point in this experiment is that selfish workers have no incentives to provide
effort above the minimum level e 1. The question, therefore, is to what extent
experimental employers do appeal to workers reciprocity by offering generous compensation packages and to what extent workers honor generous offers.
It turns out that many employers indeed make quite generous offers. On
average, the offered contracts stipulate a desired effort of e 7 and the offered
wage implied that the worker receives 44 percent of the total surplus u .
Interestingly, many workers honor this generosity somewhat but not fully. The
actual average effort is given by e 4.4, which was substantially above the selfish
choice of e 1. However, only in 14 percent of all cases workers abide by the
terms of the contract, while in 83 percent of all cases they shirk. Still, in 74 percent
of all instances of shirking they do not shirk fully. Thus, although shirking is still
quite prevalent in this situation the evidence suggests that in response to generous
job offers, people are on average willing to put forward extra effort above what is
implied by purely pecuniary considerations.
A large interview study conducted by Bewley (1995, 1999) provides field
evidence supporting this view. The managers who were interviewed stress that
workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not
wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators. . . . Employers believe that other motivators are necessary, which are best thought of as
having to do with generosity (Bewley, 1995, p. 252).
In the situation described above, only workers can react reciprocally while
employers cannot. Employers can only try to elicit reciprocal effort choices from
the workers. Yet, what happens if employers can also respond reciprocally by
rewarding or punishing workers after they observe actual effort choices? This
question is examined as well in Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger (1997). In this
experiment everything is kept identical to the previous experiment, except that
employers could now reward or punish the workers after the effort decision is
revealed. For every token spent on rewards they could raise the workers monetary
income by 2.5 tokens (reflecting the possible higher marginal utility of income for
workers in reality). Likewise, for every token spent on punishment, they could
reduce the workers income by 2.5 tokens. Since rewarding and punishing is costly,
a selfish employer will never reward or punish. Hence, the reward and punishment
opportunity is irrelevant according to the self-interest model.
If workers shirked in the experiments, however, employers punished in 68
percent of these cases. If there was overprovision, employers rewarded in 70
percent of these cases. If workers exactly met the desired effort, employers still
rewarded in 41 percent of the cases. As a consequence, workers chose much
higher effort levels when employers have a reward/punishment opportunity. Indeed,
although in these experiments the average desired effort level is slightly higher than in
the previous experiment, the shirking rate declined from 83 percent to 26 percent. In
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38 percent of the cases, workers even provided a higher effort than requested. An
important consequence of this increase in average effort was that the aggregate
monetary payoff increased by 40 percent even if one takes the payoff reductions that
result from actual punishments into account.
This evidence strongly suggests that reciprocity substantially contributes to the
enforcement of contracts. The power of reciprocity derives from the fact that it
provides incentives for the potential cheaters to behave cooperatively or at least to
limit their degree of noncooperation. In the above experiments, for example, even
purely selfish employers have an incentive to make a generous job offer, if they
expect sufficiently many workers to behave in a reciprocal manner. Similarly, even
purely selfish workers have an incentive to provide a high effort in case of a
reward/punishment opportunity, if they expect that sufficiently many employers
respond reciprocally to their effort choices.
Work Motivation and Performance Incentives

The previous experiments focus on fairness and reciprocity as a means to enforce
contracts. In reality, material incentives are, of course, also used to mitigate the
enforcement problem. The question, therefore, arises, how explicit material incentives
to abide by the terms of the contract interact with motivations of fairness and reciprocity. One possibility is that reciprocity gives rise to extra effort on top of what is enforced
by material incentives alone. However, it is also possible that explicit incentives may
cause a hostile atmosphere of threat and distrust, which reduces any reciprocity-based
extra effort. Bewley (1995, p. 252), for example, reports that many managers stress that
explicit punishment should be rarely used as a way to obtain co-operation because of
the negative effects on work atmosphere.
In a new series of experiments, Fehr and Gachter (2000) examine this possibility. They implement a control treatment that is identical to the previous contract
enforcement experiment without reward and punishment opportunities. Remember that in this treatment there are no material incentives. In addition, they also
implement a treatment with explicit performance incentives. This treatment keeps
everything constant relative to the control treatment, except that employers now
have the possibility to stipulate a fine, to be paid by the worker to the employer in
case of verified shirking. The probability of verification is .33 and the fine is
restricted to an interval between zero and a maximal fine. The maximal fine is fixed
at a level such that a selfish risk-neutral worker will choose an effort level of 4 when
faced with this fine.8
The line with the black dots in Figure 3 shows workers effort behavior in the
control treatment. It depicts the average effort on the vertical axis as a function of
8
To prevent hostility from being introduced merely by the use of value-laden terms we avoided terms
like fine, performance, and so on. Instead we used a rather neutral language like, for example, price
deduction.
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Figure 3
Actual Effort-Rent Relation in the Absence and Presence of Explicit Performance
Incentives
the rent offered to the workers. The offered rent is implied by the original contract
offer; it is defined as the wage minus the cost of providing the desired effort level.
Due to the presence of many reciprocal workers, the average effort level is strongly
increasing in the offered rent and rises far above the selfish level of e 1. The line
with the white dots in Figure 3 shows the relationship of rent to effort in the
presence of the explicit performance incentive. Except at the low rent levels, the
average effort is lower in the presence of the explicit incentives!
This result suggests that reciprocity-based effort elicitation and explicit performance incentives may indeed be in conflict with each other. In particular, explicit
incentives may crowd out reciprocal effort choices. In the experiments of Fehr
and Gachter (2000), the average effort taken over all trades and, hence, the
aggregate monetary surplus, is lower in the incentive treatment than in the control
treatment. However, employers profits are higher because in the incentive treatment they rely much less on the carrot of generous wage offers. Instead, they
threaten the maximal fine in most cases. For the employers, the savings in wage
costs more than offset the reductions in revenues that are caused by the lower effort
in the incentive treatment. However, while the wage savings merely represent a
transfer from the workers to the firms, the reduction in effort levels reduces the
aggregate surplus. This shows that, in the presence of reciprocal types, efficiency
questions and questions of distribution are inseparable. Since the perceived fairness of the distribution of the gains from trade affects the effort behavior of the
reciprocal types, different distributions are associated with different levels of the
aggregate gains. Thus, lump-sum transfers between trading parties have allocative
consequences.
Our crowding out result may seem counterintuitive, since it is almost axiom-
172
atic to some economists that material incentives should produce a better outcome.
However, this position neglects the existence of reciprocity-based voluntary cooperation. Similar problems with explicit incentives are obtained in the experiments
of Gneezy and Rustichini (forthcoming) and Bohnet, Frey and Huck (1999)
explicit material incentives may have counterproductive effects. These results, of
course, do not provide a general case against the use of explicit incentives.9 In some
cases, there is evidence that explicit incentives can leave voluntary cooperation
intact (for example, Guth, Klose, Konigstein and Schwalbach, 1998). In particular,
notice that the incentive devices discussed here involved punishments and it may
well be that reward-based explicit incentives do not destroy reciprocal inclinations,
or may even strengthen them. However, the results do indicate that in the presence
of reciprocity-based voluntary cooperation, the task of providing explicit incentives
is considerably more complicated than envisaged by standard principal-agent theory.
Wage Rigidity, Rent-Sharing and Competition

In a seminal paper, Akerlof (1982) argued that labor markets are characterized
by considerations of gift exchange, by which he meant that employers offer a gift
of pay which is more than labors opportunity cost and employees offer a gift of
more than minimal effort. This exchange may explain why employers are reluctant
to cut wages in a recession, as found by many researchers (see Bewley, 1999, and the
references therein). The reason is that wage cuts may decrease productivity. In
addition, the gift exchange notion implies that, ceteris paribus, more profitable
firms pay on average higher wages. Higher profitability is likely to be associated with
a higher marginal product of effort. Therefore, the return of a given effort increase
is higher and employers have an incentive to pay higher wages.
The fact that the presence of reciprocal types in the labor market gives rise to
downward wage rigidity has been demonstrated in a number of experiments. In the
following we draw on Fehr and Falk (1999), because they confirmed the existence
of downward wage rigidity in a version of the most competitive environmentthe
competitive double auction. In this environment, both experimental firms and
workers can make wage bids. A large body of research has shown the striking
competitive properties of experimental double auctions. In hundreds of such
experiments, prices and quantities quickly converged to the competitive equilibrium predicted by standard self-interest theory (Holt, 1995, presents a survey of
important results). Therefore, showing that reciprocity causes wage rigidity in a
double auction provides a strong piece of evidence in favor of the importance of
reciprocity in markets.
There exists a large psychological literature on the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by explicit
rewards (Deci and Ryan, 1985). For applications of intrinsic motivation theory to economics, see Frey
(1997). There are, however, considerable differences between the literature discussed above and the
psychological studies on crowding out (Fehr and Gachter, 2000).
173
Fehr and Falk (1999) carried out a series of double auction experiments set in
the context of a labor market. Both experimental firms and experimental workers
could make wage bids. If a bid was accepted, a labor contract was concluded. There
were eight firms and twelve workers and each firm could employ at most one
worker. A worker who concluded a contract had costs of 20. Therefore, due to the
excess supply of labor, the competitive wage level was 20. Within this broader
context, Fehr and Falk (1999) considered two treatment conditions: one condition
in which the labor contract was complete because the experimenter enforced a
given effort level; and one where the labor contract was incomplete because
employees could choose an effort level between a minimum and maximum after
the wage contract was concluded, and the employers could neither stipulate nor
enforce an effort level above the minimum level.10
The time path of the average wage in a typical double auction with incomplete
contracts is shown in Figure 4a. Figure 4b shows average wages in a typical double
auction with complete contracts. In addition, both figures show workers wage bids.
Clearly, wage levels are radically different in the two conditions. In the market with
complete contracts, employers take full advantage of the low wage offers made by
the workers and, as a consequence, wages are close to the competitive level in this
market. In contrast, in the market with incomplete contracts employers are very
reluctant to accept workers underbidding of prevailing wages. From period 4
onwards, wages move even further away from the competitive level despite fierce
competition among workers for scarce jobs. The data analysis in Fehr and Falk
(1999) shows that employers high wage policy in the market with incomplete
contracts was quite rational, because in this way they could sustain higher effort
levels and increase profits relative to a low wage policy.
The big difference in the impact of reciprocity on wage formation in markets
with complete and incomplete contracts illustrates again the importance of institutional details. In the incomplete contracts condition, a reciprocal worker can
punish the firm by choosing a low effort level after the labor contract has been
concluded. Since firms anticipate this possibility, they have a reason to pay generous wages. In contrast, in the complete contracts condition, the only method for a
worker to punish a firm who offers a low wage is to reject such an offer. However,
due to the presence of a certain proportion of purely self-interested workers, the
reciprocal worker knows that others will accept low wage offers. Thus, reciprocal
workers have, in fact, no possibility to punish firmswhich induces them to accept
low wage offers, too. Since firms anticipate or notice this willingness to accept low
offers, they have no reason to offer generous wages. Thus, the ability to punish is
10
One double auction lasted for ten periods and a period lasted for three minutes. In each period the
same stationary situation was implemented; that is, there were twelve workers, eight firms, and each
workers reservation wage was 20. In a given period, employers and workers could make as many wage
bids as they liked, as long as they had not yet concluded a contract. In the condition with incomplete
contracts, workers had to choose an effort between a minimum and a maximum level after they had
concluded a contract.
174
Figure 4a
Workers Offers and Mean Contract Wages in the Double Auction Market with
Incomplete Contracts
Figure 4b
Workers Offers and Mean Contract Wages in the Double Auction Market with
Complete Contracts
Source: Fehr and Falk (1999).
175
an institutional detail that means that reciprocity will have a very different impact
on wage formation in the two conditions. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) provide a
rigorous derivation of this argument.
A variety of studies have found that one major reason why managers are
reluctant to cut wages in a recession is the fear that wage cuts may inhibit work
performance. Among others, Bewley (1999) reports that managers are afraid that
pay cuts express hostility to the work force and will be interpreted as an insult.
A comparison of wage levels in Figure 4a and 4b shows that workers earn rents
in the market with incomplete contracts. The existence of rents is also indicated by
the many wage bids below the prevailing wage level in Figure 4a. This raises two
questions: 1) Does reciprocity also cause a reduction in employment if employers
can hire more than one worker? 2) Do the rents vary systematically with firms
profitability? In a recent paper, Falk and Fehr (2000) addressed the first question.
They show that firms indeed reduce employment in response to workers reciprocity. The second question is examined in Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger (1996) who
conducted competitive market experiments in which experimental firms differed
according to their profit opportunities. They found a clear positive correlation
between firms profit opportunities and the rents paid to workers.
This result is compatible with empirical evidence on rent-sharing in real
companies. For example, Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) show that there
is a positive relation between long-run wages and the profitability of nonunionized
companies or nonunionized industries, respectively. Also, Krueger and Summers
(1987), for instance, have shown that estimated industry wage differentials are
positively correlated in a cross section with industry profitability. Such findings are
not consistent with competitive theories of the labor market, because in those
theories, firms should pay no more than the opportunity cost of wages, and there
is no reason that the profit opportunities of a certain firm should affect those
market-determined opportunity costs. However, this finding is predicted by rentsharing theories of the labor market based on the presence of reciprocal agents in
the market.
The combination of the findings of laboratory studies on rent-sharing and the
field evidence on rent-sharing suggests that rent-sharing theories have explanatory
power. The laboratory results have the advantage that they unambiguously show the
existence of profit-related job rents, due to their ability to control fully for other
factors like unobservable heterogeneity in working conditions or skill levels. Such
factors can create havoc in interpreting the results of real world studies of wage
differentials (for example, Gibbons and Katz, 1992). In addition, the laboratory
approach allows for the isolation of the gift-exchange mechanism as a cause for
noncompensating wage differentials. The disadvantage of the laboratory data is
that further assumptions are necessary to render the results relevant for real labor
markets. This comparison illustrates that field and laboratory studies should be
viewed as complementary methods of economic exploration.
176
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Standard principal-agent models predict that contracts should be made contingent on all verifiable measures that are informative with regard to the agents
effort. But in reality, we often observe highly incomplete contracts. For example, as
noted earlier, wages are often paid without explicit performance incentives. To this
point, the discussion has focused on demonstrating that reciprocity has powerful
economic effects in situations where contracts are incomplete.
This section seeks to explore the underlying causes for the prevalence of
incomplete contracts in the first place. One common explanation for the absence
of explicit incentives is that when employees are expected to carry out multiple
tasks or when the measures of effort and performance are distorted in some way,
providing powerful incentives will induce agents to focus too much on what is being
measured and not enough on the other dimensions and tasks of the job (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). This line of explanation certainly has some truth in it.
However, our aim here is to show that the presence of reciprocal types is an
independent source of the absence of explicit incentives.
To study the impact of reciprocity on contractual choices, Fehr, Klein and
Schmidt (2000) conducted an experiment in which principals had the choice
between an explicit contract and an implicit, less complete, contract. In a typical
session of this experiment, there are 12 principals and 12 agents who play for ten
periods. In each of the ten periods, an employer faces a different principal, which
ensures that all matches are one-shot. A period consists of three stages. At stage one
of a period, the principal has to decide whether to offer the agent an implicit or an
explicit contract. The implicit contract specifies a fixed wage and a desired effort
level (where effort choices can range from one to ten). In addition, the principal
can promise a bonus that may be paid after actual effort has been observed. In the
implicit contract, there is no contractual obligation to pay the announced bonus,
nor is the agent obliged to choose the desired effort level. The principal is,
however, committed to pay the wage. An explicit contract also specifies a binding
fixed wage and a desired effort level between one and ten. Here, however, the
principal can impose a fine on the agent that has to be paid to the principal in case
of verifiable shirking. Except for one detail, the explicit contract is identical to the
performance contract discussed above in the context of crowding out of reciprocity. The difference concerns the fact that the choice of the explicit contract
involves fixed verification cost. This reflects the fact that the verification of effort is,
in general, costly. Note that the implicit contract does not require third-party
verification of effort. It is only necessary that effort is observable by the principal.11
The explicit contract is more complete than the implicit contract, because in the
explicit contract the employer conditions the fine on the actual effort level in a
11
Employers are, in general, not free to cut a workers wage for shirking but they have little legal
problem when they refuse to pay a promised bonus.
177
credible manner, while in the implicit contract, no such credible commitments are
possible.
At stage two, the agent observes which contract has been offered and decides
whether to accept or reject the offer. If the agent rejects the offer, the game ends
and both parties get a payoff of zero. If the agent accepts, the next step is for the
agent to choose an actual level of effort between one and ten.
At stage three, the principal observes the actual effort level. If the principal has
offered an implicit contract, the next decision is whether to award the bonus
payment to the agent. If the principal offered an explicit contract and if the agents
effort falls short of the agreed effort, a random draw decides with probability of
one-third whether shirking is verifiable, in which case the agent has to pay the fine.
If all players have purely selfish preferences, the analysis of this game is
straightforward. A selfish principal would never pay a bonus. Anticipating this,
there is no incentive for the agent to spend more than the minimum effort. If the
principal chooses the explicit contract, the principal should go for the maximum
punishment because this is the best deterrence for potential shirkers. The parameters of the experiment are chosen such that a risk-neutral and selfish agent
maximizes expected utility by choosing an effort level of four if faced with the
maximum fine. Since the enforceable effort level is four under the explicit contract
while it is only one under an implicit contract, the self-interest model predicts that
principals prefer the explicit contract.
The experimental evidence is completely at odds with these predictions. In
total, the implicit contract was chosen in 88 percent of the cases. In view of the
relative profitability of the different contracts, the popularity of the implicit contract is not surprising. Those principals who chose the explicit contract made an
average loss of nine tokens per contract, while those who chose the implicit
contract made an average profit of 26 tokens per contract. Since the fixed verification cost in the explicit contract was ten tokens, the explicit contract would have
been much less profitable even in the absence of these costs. For both contracts, the
average income of the agents was roughly 18 tokens. Implicit contracts were more
profitable because contrary to the standard predictionthey induced much
higher effort levels. The effort level in the implicit contract was 5.2 on average (on
a scale of one to ten), while the effort level in the explicit contract was 2.1 on
average.
How did implicit contracts induce effort levels so much higher than expected?
A major reason is that in the presence of reciprocal principals, the promised bonus
does not merely represent cheap talk, because reciprocal principals canand
actually do condition the bonus payment on the effort level. The average data
clearly reflect this impact of the reciprocal types because the actual average bonus
rises steeply with the actual effort level. The principals capability to commit to
paying a conditional bonus is based on their reciprocal inclinations. Conditional
bonus payments, in turn, provide a strong pecuniary incentive for the agents to
perform as desired by the principals. Why did explicit contracts induce effort levels
lower than expected? A likely reason is that these contracts crowd out positive
178
reciprocity, and perhaps even induce negative reciprocity, as shown in the section
on work motivation above.
One also might conjecture that the preference for implicit contracts in this
particular experiment is caused by the fact that the explicit contract involves a
punishment while the implicit contract involves a reward. However, further experiments in Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2000) cast doubt on this explanation. If the
above-described implicit contract competes with a piece rate contract, the vast
majority of principals still prefer the implicit contract.
The endogenous formation of incomplete contracts through reciprocal
choices shows that reciprocity may not only cause substantial changes in the
functioning of given economic institutions but that it also may have a powerful
impact on the selection and formation of institutions. To provide a further example: The present theory of property rights predicts that joint ownership will in
general severely inhibit relation-specific investments, so that it emerges only under
very restrictive conditions (Hart, 1995). This may no longer be true in the presence
of reciprocal actors who are willing to cooperate if they expect the trading partner
to cooperate as well, and who are willing to punish even at a cost to themselves.
Concluding Remarks
The assumption that economic agents make their decisions based on pure
self-interest has served economists well in many areas. In situations where contracts
are reasonably complete, the underlying assumption of self-interest should continue to be especially important. However, the self-interest model has also failed to
give satisfactory explanations for a wide variety of questions of interest to economists, including questions about labor market interactions, public goods, and social
norms. We believe that for important questions in these areas, progress will not
come from additional tweaking of a pure self-interest model, but rather from
recognizing that a sizeable proportion of economic actors act on considerations of
reciprocity.
In view of the powerful implications of reciprocity, it is also important to know
why a sizeable fraction of the people have reciprocal inclinations. Which factors in
the evolution of the human species have contributed to this? Which social and
economic conditions produce the propensity to reciprocate? There are now several
evolutionary models (see footnote 3) that provide answers to this question. At the
empirical level, however, little is known.
y This paper is part of the MacArthur Foundation Network on Economic Environments and
the Evolution of Individual Preferences and Social Norms. Some research reported in this paper
has also been funded by the EU-TMR research network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). We
are grateful for helpful comments by Alan Krueger, Timothy Taylor and J. Bradford De Long,
as well as by Ken Binmore, Iris Bohnet, Terence Burnham, Colin Camerer, Gary Charness,
Jim Cox, Vince Crawford, Armin Falk, Urs Fischbacher, Diego Gambetta, Robert Gibbons,
179
Herbert Gintis, Felix Oberholzer, Larry Samuelson, Rajiv Sethi, Herbert Simon, Vernon Smith
and Frans van Winden. We regret thatin view of the very large number of comments we
receivedwe could not do justice to all of them.
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Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) - Fairness and Retaliation - The Economics of Reciprocity.

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Journal of Economic PerspectivesVolume 14, Number 3Summer 2000 Pages 159 181

Fairness and Retaliation:

long-standing tradition in economics views human beings as exclusively

Journal of Economic Perspectives

We term the cooperative reciprocal tendencies positive reciprocity while the

Positive and Negative Reciprocity: Some Evidence

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

Journal of Economic Perspectives

For a survey on public goods experiments, see Ledyard (1995).

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Source: Fehr and Gachter (forthcoming).

From Public Goods to Social Norms

Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

Source: Fehr and Gachter (forthcoming).

place in the family, in residential neighborhoods, in formal or informal clubs and

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Work Motivation and Performance Incentives

Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

Source: Fehr and Gachter (forthcoming).

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Wage Rigidity, Rent-Sharing and Competition

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Source: Fehr and Falk (1999).

Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 1998. Is

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gachter. Forthcoming.

Guth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter

ing Bias, mimeo, CREED, University of Amsterdam.

gaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem,

Journal of Economic Perspectives

This article has been cited by:

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