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Case: 1:16-cv-01028-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 10/26/16 Page: 1 of 13 PAGEID #: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTERN DISTRICT OHIO
R.V., a minor, by and through his
guardian and next friend, Amy Vance,

: Case No. 16-cv-1028


: Judge

and
:
AMY VANCE
Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT FOR COMPENSATORY


: MONETARY DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE
MONETARY DAMAGES
:
JURY DEMAND
:

v.
:
CLERMONT COUNTY
EDUCATIONAL SERVICE CENTER

:
:

and
MARK DOWDALL

:
:

and
TAMMY RATLEY
Defendants.

:
:
:

1.

The Plaintiffs are a child and his mother. R.V. has been diagnosed with autism

spectrum disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Pervasive Developmental


Disorder, Anxiety, BiPolar Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Intermittent Explosive
Disorder, Mixed Adjustment Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
2.

The conduct complained of herein occurred in Clermont County, Ohio.

3.

R.V. is currently 16 years old, and has, at all times relevant herein, resided in

Clermont County, State of Ohio, and attended Clermont Educational Collaborative North
1

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(CEC-N), a school operated and maintained by the Clermont County Educational Service
Center.
4.

Amy Vance is R.V.s mother. During all relevant time herein, she resided in

Clermont County, State of Ohio.


5.

The Clermont County Educational Service Center is an entity operating under the

laws of the State of Ohio and authorized to sue and be sued as an entity for its acts and those of its
agents and employees. Clermont County Educational Service Center has its primary place of
business in Clermont County, Ohio. At all relevant times herein, the Clermont County Educational
Service Center had authority over how R.V. was treated while he attended CEC-N.
6.

Mark Dowdall, was, at all relevant times, R.V.s teacher at CEC-N, hired, trained,

and supervised by the Clermont County Educational Service Center.


7.

Tammy Ratley (Ratley) was, at all relevant times, the principal of CEC-N, and

in such capacity was responsible for the training and supervision of the staff of CEC-N, including
Dowdall.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. 1331 because of the

federal claims involved including those arising under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C.
1983. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. 1367.
9.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b), as the Defendants

reside within this District, the Defendants transact business within this District and the conduct
complained of occurred within this District.

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FACTS COMMON TO ALL ALLEGATIONS


10.

R.C. 2151.421(A) provides that certain persons, inter alia, school teachers, school

employees, and school authorities have a mandatory duty to immediately report all known or
suspected child abuse to the public children services agency or municipal or county peace officer
in the county in which the child resides.
11.

Each of the individually named Defendants is subject to the mandatory

requirements of R.C. 2151.421(A), et seq.


12.

R.C. 2151.421(M) provides that whoever violates R.C. 2151.421(A) is liable

for compensatory and exemplary damages to the child who would have been the subject of a report
that was not made.
13.

R.V. is a child.

14.

During the 2015-2016 school year R.V. was a student at CEC-N, assigned to

Dowdalls classroom.
15.

In October 2015, R.V. argued with an aide in a hallway at CEC-N during which

time Dowdall physically attacked R.V. Dowdall had to be physically pulled away from R.V. by
the principal (Ms. Ratley) and another teacher, as he attempted to continue his assault on R.V.
despite the intervention of other staff members.
16.

After the October 2015 attack, a meeting was held with the classroom aides, during

which meeting the aides were instructed that if intervention was needed with R.V. in the future,
the aides were to call a teacher other than Dowdall to intervene, and that Dowdall was not to touch
R.V. at all.
17.

In the aftermath of the October 2015 attack, no one from CEC-N reported the attack

to either the police or child protective services, or even to R.V.s mother.

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18.

After the October 2015 attack of which R.V.s mother was not informed R.V.

was forced to remain in Dowdalls classroom.


19.

On or about February 4, 2016, R.V. left Dowdalls classroom without permission

and threw himself onto a gym mat on the hallway floor.


20.

Dowdall charged out of the classroom, jumped on top of R.V., and proceeded to

strike R.V. multiple times with his fists.


21.

Only after several teachers and aides intervened did Dowdall stop his attack.

22.

As with the October 2015 attack, despite being physically restrained from R.V.,

Dowdall attempted to fight over the would-be peacemakers to get back to R.V.
23.

Indeed, as Dowdall approached R.V. to attack him on one of Dowdalls shoes fell

off his foot. As he was being pulled away from R.V., Dowdall threw his shoe at R.V., striking
R.V. on his leg.
24.

Again, no one from CEC-N reported Dowdalls attack to either the police,

Childrens services, or R.V.s mother.


25.

The next morning, R.V. was again forced to report to Dowdalls classroom and

Dowdall was permitted to teach.


26.

On or about February 5, 2016, seeing that no action to protect R.V. was being taken,

Jane Pirman, a classroom aide, contacted Childrens services and reported the abuse that occurred
both in October 2015 and February 2016.
27.

On information and belief, prior to the October 2015 attack on R.V., Dowdall was

involved in a separate physical altercation with a different student during which altercation that
student suffered injuries including a separated shoulder (the Prior Abuse).

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28.

On information and belief, faculty and staff and administrative officials of CEC-N,

including Ms. Ratley, witnessed, knew of, or became aware of the Prior Abuse at or shortly after
the time of the Prior Abuse.
29.

On information and belief, no one from CEC-N reported the Prior Abuse to the

police or childrens services.


30.

CEC-N did not properly train and supervise Dowdall to teach R.V.

31.

Dowdall punished R.V. because of his disability and, in effect, did nothing but

inflict unnecessary and unjustifiable pain and injury on him.


32.

Defendants actions and omissions were a gross deviation from accepted practices

for caring for multi-handicapped students.


33.

Defendants did not base their aversive punishment of R.V. upon any

professionally acceptable practices. Instead, they intentionally exacerbated R.V.s anxiety and
fear.
34.

Defendants did not document their aversive punishment of R.V.

35.

Despite all the prior warnings about Dowdall, CEC-N failed to adequately address

and stop Dowdalls injurious conduct against R.V.


36.

Amy Vance did not learn of the abuse of her son, R.V., until a classroom aide

contacted her after the second assault committed by Dowdall in February 2016.
37.

Due to the physical and emotional abuse imposed upon R.V. by Defendants, R.V.

has regressed emotionally, socially, and behaviorally.


38.

In addition, R.V. began having nightmares and extreme anxiety due to the abusive

actions of Defendants.

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39.

R.V. suffered emotional distress proximately caused by Defendants unlawful

conduct and abusing RV. R.V. further suffered physical injury caused by Defendants conduct.
R.V. suffers post-traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of Defendants conduct.
40.

As a result of the abuse by Defendants, R.V. has suffered physical pain, acute and

chronic emotional distress, and psychological damage proximately caused by the Defendants
conduct.
41.

As a result of the abuse by Defendants towards her child, Amy Vance has suffered

acute and chronic emotional distress and psychological damage proximately caused by
Defendants conduct.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
42.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

43.

R.V. and his parents, like all United States citizens, have a right to equal protection

of the laws.
44.

Without any lawful basis, each Defendant treated Plaintiffs differently than they

treated typically developing children and the parents of typically developing children.
45.

Both with regard to how they abusively and with deliberate indifference treated

R.V. as described in this Complaint, and how they failed to promptly report the abuse as required
under Ohio law, the Defendants had no lawful basis whatsoever.
46.

Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants had a pattern

and practice of treating multi-handicapped students and their families differently than typically
developing children and their families.
47.

Defendants intentional disparate treatment of the Plaintiffs violated the Plaintiffs

right to equal protection of the laws.


6

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION


DENIAL OF R.V.S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS - EXCESSIVE FORCE
48.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

49.

R.V., like all United States citizens, has a constitutional right to be free from the

use of excessive force.


50.

Dowdall, Ratley, and Clermont County Educational Service Center deprived R.V.

of his constitutional rights to be free from the use of excessive force by punching and hitting him
and throwing a shoe at him. Dowdall acted unlawfully and Ratley acquiesced as supervisor and
final policymaker for Clermont County Educational Service Center.
51.

As a direct and proximate result of the violation of R.V.s constitutional rights, R.V.

has suffered damages.


THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
DENIAL OF R.V.S 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS - SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
52.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

53.

R.V., like all United States citizens, has the substantive due process constitutional

right to personal security and bodily integrity.


54.

R.V. also has the substantive due process constitutional right to be free from

arbitrary government conduct that lacks all socially redeeming value.


55.

The relationship between R.V. and the Defendants was not voluntary. R.V. was

required by law to attend Clermont County Educational Service Center, in general, and Dowdalls
class, in particular.
56.

Dowdall and the other Defendants had a significant period of time for deliberation

to choose their conduct that is challenged in this case.

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57.

None of the Defendants were pursuing any legitimate governmental purpose by

physically abusing R.V.


58.

Dowdall, Ratley, and Clermont County Educational Service Center deprived R.V.

of his constitutional right to substantive due process by engaging in arbitrary actions and omissions
towards each of them that was of such an extreme nature as to shock the conscience. Dowdall acted
unlawfully and Ratley acquiesced as supervisor and final policymaker for Clermont County
Educational Service Center.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO TRAINING AND RATIFICATION
59.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

60.

Clermont County Educational Service Center was deliberately indifferent to R.V.s

constitutional and other rights by failing to promulgate a policy to properly train Dowdall and other
employees to prevent his unconstitutional, unlawful, and tortious treatment of R.V. Among other
deficiencies, Clermont County Educational Service Center failed to train its employees to report
child abuse to the appropriate authorities.
61.

Clermont County Educational Service Center knew or should have known that the

child abuse training provided to its employees was deficient.


62.

Clermont County Educational Service Center also caused the deprivation of R.V.'s

rights to equal protection and to freedom from discrimination based on her disability by ignoring
the obvious need to train the school district's employees how to properly report abuse to the
designated authorities.
63.

As a direct and proximate result of the deliberate indifference to training, R.V.s

rights were violated and R.V. suffered damages.

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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION


VIOLATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 AND
TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. 12181, et seq.
64.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

65.

The Defendant Clermont County Educational Service Center receives federal

financial assistance and other government benefits.


66.

Defendant Clermont County Educational Service Center discriminated against R.V.

based solely on his disability. The Defendants did not treat similarly situated typically developing
students without disabilities in the same unlawful and injurious manner they treated R.V.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
ASSAULT
(OCTOBER 2015 ATTACK ON R.V. Dowdall)
67.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

68.

In attacking R.V. in October 2015, Dowdall willfully attempted to harm or touch

R.V. in an offensive manner.


69.

As a result of Dowdalls October 2015 attack, R.V. reasonably feared harmful or

offensive conduct.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
BATTERY
(OCTOBER 2015 ATTACK Dowdall)
70.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

71.

In attacking R.V. in October 2015, Dowdall willfully engaged in an intentional

touching of or application of force to R.V.s body and did so in a harmful or offensive manner,
and without consent.
72.

As a direct and proximate cause of the foregoing actions of Dowdall, R.V. has

suffered damages.
9

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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION


ASSAULT
(FEBRUARY 2016 ATTACK ON R.V. Dowdall)
73.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

74.

In attacking R.V. in February 2016, Dowdall willfully attempted to harm or touch

R.V. in an offensive manner.


75.

As a result of Dowdalls February 2016 attack, R.V. reasonably feared harmful or

offensive conduct.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
BATTERY
(FEBRUARY 2016 ATTACK Dowdall)
76.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

77.

In attacking R.V. in February 2016, Dowdall willfully engaged in an intentional

touching of or application of force to R.V.s body and did so in a harmful or offensive manner,
and without consent.
78.

As a direct and proximate cause of the foregoing actions of Dowdall, R.V. has

suffered damages.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FAILURE TO REPORT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ABUSE (Ratley Prior Abuse)
79.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

80.

Ratley is a school employee.

81.

As a result of the Prior Abuse, Ratley knew or had reasonable cause to suspect that

the victim of the Prior Abuse, R.V., and other children had been abused or were at risk of abuse
by Dowdall.

10

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82.

Ratley violated R.C. 2151.421(A) by failing to immediately report the known or

suspected abuse or risk of abuse of the victim of the Prior Abuse, R.V., and other children to the
county child services agency or a municipal or county police officer.
83.

R.V. has suffered damages as a result of Defendant Ratleys violation of R.C.

2151.421(A) with respect to the Prior Abuse.


84.

R.V. is entitled to compensatory an exemplary damages from Ratley.


ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FAILURE TO REPORT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ABUSE
(Ratley October 2015 Attack)

85.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

86.

Ratley is a school employee.

87.

As a result of the October 2015 attack, Ratley knew or had reasonable cause to

suspect that R.V., and other children had been abused or were at risk of abuse by Dowdall.
88.

Ratley violated R.C. 2151.421(A) by failing to immediately report the known or

suspected abuse or risk of abuse of R.V., and other children to the county child services agency or
a municipal or county police officer.
89.

R.V. has suffered damages as a result of Defendant Ratleys violation of R.C.

2151.421(A) with respect to the October 2015 Attack.


90.

R.V. is entitled to compensatory an exemplary damages from Ratley.


TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FAILURE TO REPORT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ABUSE
(Ratley February 2016 Attack)

91.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

92.

Ratley is a school employee.

93.

As a result of the February 2016 attack, Ratley knew or had reasonable cause to

suspect that R.V., and other children had been abused or were at risk of abuse by Dowdall.
11

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94.

Ratley violated R.C. 2151.421(A) by failing to immediately report the known or

suspected abuse or risk of abuse of R.V., and other children to the county child services agency or
a municipal or county police officer.
95.

R.V. has suffered damages as a result of Defendant Ratleys violation of R.C.

2151.421(A) with respect to the February 2016 Attack.


96.

R.V. is entitled to compensatory an exemplary damages from Ratley.


THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

97.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

98.

The foregoing actions and omissions of the Defendants towards the Plaintiffs were

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and are regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
99.

The foregoing actions and omissions of the Defendants towards the Plaintiffs were

intentional or reckless.
100.

Defendants intended to cause Plaintiffs severe emotional distress and/or acted with

reckless disregard as to the risk their actions or omissions would cause Plaintiffs severe emotional
distress.
101.

The foregoing actions and omissions of the Defendants towards Plaintiffs were

extreme and outrageous.


102.

The foregoing actions and omissions of the Defendants towards the Plaintiffs

caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress beyond that which a reasonable person should
be expected to endure.
103.

As a direct and proximate cause of the foregoing actions and omissions of the

Defendants towards the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have suffered damages.


12

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FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION


LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

104.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

105.

As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Amy Vance, as

the parent and guardian of R.V. has been damaged due to the deprivation of services, society,
companionship, comfort, love, solace, and affection of her son and is entitled to recover for her
loss of consortium in an amount to be determined at trial.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that judgment be entered in their favor against the
Defendants and that the Court Award:
Amy Vance, individually and on behalf of her minor child R.V., compensatory monetary
damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including compensatory monetary damages for
physical injuries and emotional distress, together with punitive monetary damages caused by
Defendants violent abusive, deliberately indifferent, reckless, and intentional unlawful conduct,
and an award of attorney fees, and such other relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled in law or
in equity.
Respectfully submitted,

Richard Ganulin, Esq. (0025642)


3662 Kendall Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio 45208
(513) 405-6696
rganulin@gmail.com

/s/ Christopher P. Finney


Christopher P. Finney, Esq. (0038998)
Bradley M. Gibson, Esq. (0087109)
Brian C. Shrive, Esq. (0088980)
FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC
4270 Ivy Pointe Blvd., Suite 225
Cincinnati, Ohio 45245
(513) 943-6650
(513) 943-6669 (fax)

13

JS 44 (Rev. 0/16)

Case: 1:16-cv-01028-MRB Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 10/26/16 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 14

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS

R.V., a minor, by and through his guardian and next friend, Amy Vance
Amy Vance

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff

Clermont County Educational Services Center


Mark Dowdall
Tammy Rately

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant

(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)


NOTE:

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)


IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

Christopher P. Finney, Esq.


513-943-6655
Finney Law Firm, LLC
4270 Ivy Pointe Boulevard, Ste. 225, Cincinnati, OH 45245

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in One Box Only)


u 1

U.S. Government
Plaintiff

u 2

U.S. Government
Defendant

u 3
X

u 4

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an X in One Box for Plaintiff


(For Diversity Cases Only)
PTF
Citizen of This State
u 1

Federal Question
(U.S. Government Not a Party)

Diversity
(Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

u
u
u
u
u

TORTS

u
u
u
u

110 Insurance
120 Marine
130 Miller Act
140 Negotiable Instrument
150 Recovery of Overpayment
& Enforcement of Judgment
151 Medicare Act
152 Recovery of Defaulted
Student Loans
(Excludes Veterans)
153 Recovery of Overpayment
of Veterans Benefits
160 Stockholders Suits
190 Other Contract
195 Contract Product Liability
196 Franchise

u
u
u
u
u
u

REAL PROPERTY
210 Land Condemnation
220 Foreclosure
230 Rent Lease & Ejectment
240 Torts to Land
245 Tort Product Liability
290 All Other Real Property

u
u

PERSONAL INJURY
u 310 Airplane
u 315 Airplane Product
Liability
u 320 Assault, Libel &
Slander
u 330 Federal Employers
Liability
u 340 Marine
u 345 Marine Product
Liability
u 350 Motor Vehicle
u 355 Motor Vehicle
Product Liability
u 360 Other Personal
Injury
u 362 Personal Injury Medical Malpractice
CIVIL RIGHTS
u 440 Other Civil Rights
u 441 Voting
u 442 Employment
u 443 Housing/
Accommodations
u 445 Amer. w/Disabilities Employment
u 446 Amer. w/Disabilities X
Other
u 448 Education

and One Box for Defendant)


PTF
DEF
Incorporated or Principal Place
u 4
u 4
of Business In This State

Citizen of Another State

u 2

Incorporated and Principal Place


of Business In Another State

u 5

u 5

Citizen or Subject of a
Foreign Country

u 3

Foreign Nation

u 6

u 6

&OLFNKHUHIRU1DWXUHRI6XLW&RGH'HVFULSWLRQV
FORFEITURE/PENALTY
BANKRUPTCY
OTHER STATUTES

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in One Box Only)


CONTRACT

DEF
u 1

PERSONAL INJURY
u 365 Personal Injury Product Liability
u 367 Health Care/
Pharmaceutical
Personal Injury
Product Liability
u 368 Asbestos Personal
Injury Product
Liability
PERSONAL PROPERTY
u 370 Other Fraud
u 371 Truth in Lending
u 380 Other Personal
Property Damage
u 385 Property Damage
Product Liability
PRISONER PETITIONS
Habeas Corpus:
u 463 Alien Detainee
u 510 Motions to Vacate
Sentence
u 530 General
u 535 Death Penalty
Other:
u 540 Mandamus & Other
u 550 Civil Rights
u 555 Prison Condition
u 560 Civil Detainee Conditions of
Confinement

u 625 Drug Related Seizure


of Property 21 USC 881
u 690 Other

u 422 Appeal 28 USC 158


u 423 Withdrawal
28 USC 157
PROPERTY RIGHTS
u 820 Copyrights
u 830 Patent
u 840 Trademark

LABOR
u 710 Fair Labor Standards
Act
u 720 Labor/Management
Relations
u 740 Railway Labor Act
u 751 Family and Medical
Leave Act
u 790 Other Labor Litigation
u 791 Employee Retirement
Income Security Act

u
u
u
u
u

SOCIAL SECURITY
861 HIA (1395ff)
862 Black Lung (923)
863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
864 SSID Title XVI
865 RSI (405(g))

FEDERAL TAX SUITS


u 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff
or Defendant)
u 871 IRSThird Party
26 USC 7609

IMMIGRATION
u 462 Naturalization Application
u 465 Other Immigration
Actions

u 375 False Claims Act


u 376 Qui Tam (31 USC
3729(a))
u 400 State Reapportionment
u 410 Antitrust
u 430 Banks and Banking
u 450 Commerce
u 460 Deportation
u 470 Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations
u 480 Consumer Credit
u 490 Cable/Sat TV
u 850 Securities/Commodities/
Exchange
u 890 Other Statutory Actions
u 891 Agricultural Acts
u 893 Environmental Matters
u 895 Freedom of Information
Act
u 896 Arbitration
u 899 Administrative Procedure
Act/Review or Appeal of
Agency Decision
u 950 Constitutionality of
State Statutes

V. ORIGIN (Place an X in One Box Only)

u1
X

Original
Proceeding

u 2 Removed from
State Court

u 3

u 6 Multidistrict
Litigation Transfer
(specify)
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
Remanded from
Appellate Court

u 4 Reinstated or
Reopened

u 5 Transferred from
Another District

u 8 Multidistrict
Litigation Direct File

42 USC 1983, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Unlawful discrimination, excessive force, and unreasonable seizure of a student with disabilities
CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
DEMAND $
u CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION
VII. REQUESTED IN
UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.
u Yes
u No
JURY DEMAND:
X
COMPLAINT:
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
(See instructions):
IF ANY
JUDGE
DOCKET NUMBER
DATE

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

10/26/2016

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY


RECEIPT #

AMOUNT

APPLYING IFP

JUDGE

MAG. JUDGE

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